Archeology

of the future
Interview with V
QUentin'
MeillaSsoux
TEXTIIIIIIIIIIIIIII

Quentin Malllllllll
 Sinziana Ravini: I’ll ask you some questions from which we who needs faith? Here lies the true con■ict, more so than in
then can depart in any direction. My ■rstconcernsthe impres- the challenge the skeptics offered religion. A provable God
sion of you assome sort of metaphysicaldetective, attempting hasnothing to do with the God of reiigion. My idea was based
to solvethe cold casesof western philosophy. It seemsto me as on the fact that, despite the critique of metaphysics,religion
if you're trying to create a metaphysicsfor the future, for the was doing perfectly ■ne.The end of metaphysics occurred
world to come. Tell me something about your philosophical simultaneously with the return of the religious. Which appea-
discoveries. red bizarre, given the ancient dam of metaphysicsasreligion
cloaked in rationality. And in observing the expressionsof
Quentin Meillassoux: My idea was to break with a certain the relationship between religion and metaphysicsin history,
logic, very present during my student years, consisting in a I came to notice that metaphysics,insofar as it aimed to pro-
refusal of all forms of systemsand metaphysics,perceived as ve things regarding God. was considered the great enemy of
something dogmatic, and thus as violence. All truth regimes religion. The birth of skepticism associatedwith Montaigne’s
were fundamentally conceived as being something criminal, name. in the 16'IIcentury, is particularly interesting in this
and all truth as violence. The great crimes of the 20‘“ century respect. where skepticism takes the form of a protest against
were, if I can exaggerate a bit, perceived as resulting from the ambitions of metaphysics to introduce the proof in the
the idea that we’re capableof providing answers to the great religious sphere.Metaphysical rationality was,in other words,-
problems raised by metaphysics,philosophy, history, and the destroyed by the claim that it’s impossible to approach the
human condition. Anti-totalizing, post-modernthought, whe- absoluteby way of reasoning. Rest assured,was the claim, the
re metaphysicaltruth wasconceived as the inspiration behind absolute is accessible,but only by way of faith and tradition; ‘
the transformation of technology and politics into a system not by way of any rational means, but by the tradition you
of death, striving towards the domination of the earth and of receive,and eventually by revelation. 16"Icentury skepticism
the human being. is thusly ■d■ism.It was the mighty weapon wielded by the
catholic eounter—reformation.against Luther, who pretended
SR:That wasan Adorno-inspired conception. wasn‘tit? The Scripture was something accessibleto everyone. No, the cat-
.. holic skeptics answered, it‘s impossible to understand this by
idea that modernity necessarily leads to a system of death?
oneself; the Bible is completely obscure. and only possible to
OM: Well, this wassomething very dominant, professedby nu- understand through the councils and canons of the Church.
merous schools of thought. It was the spirit of the time, which is
somethingallusive.but possibleto grasp through standardized SR:As a weapon against critical thinking.
ph rases.phrasesthat. if uttered. will immediately set you on
good terms with people in public functions. (Laughs) One I 0M: Yes,against critical thinking, but alsoagainstdogmatical
fund particularly dif■cult to stomach was: “Philosophy does thinking, in the metaphysical or Kantian sense,where I, a ra-
not provide the answer,but posesthe problem“. This,still pre- tional being, by myself know what’s what on the topic of God.
vailing, cult of the problem, or of the question, is somethingl No, wasthe ■deistreply, you know nothing by yourself. You‘re
oppose.primarily becauseI ■ndanSWers to be more interesting not supposedto know anything. And in order to showyou your
than problems.for the simple reason that problemsarise from ignorance, we‘ll bring out the whole panoply of instruments
from ancient skepticism, which Montaigne did, in order to
answers.For! it is by responding to a question,approving an af-
■rmation, that you’ll ■ndyourself facing a problem. One could put the arrogant reason back in its place. When Freud depicts
evensaythat. fundamentally. problems are found asa result of conscience as narcissistic, as pretending to be the center of
answers.I'll give a simpleexample:Deseartes’discoveryof the the world and the crown of evolution, and psychoanalysisas
cogito. “I think. thereforeI am". isfor him an absolutelyindubi- cutting consciencedown to size,hedoesthis without knowing
tabletruth. Immediately. other problems posethemselves;how that, by doing so, he returns to a Christian topos. (Laughs)
is the cogito a more indubitable truth than other truths, which The 16‘IIcentury wanted to humiliate reason into accepting
1hold to be equally certain. that two and two makesfour, and that it’s impossible to pretend to know God by ourselves,
that the external world exists“?Descartes then proceeded to even by way of Scripture. Which, by the way, is the reason to
construct a hyperbolical doubt, from which he wascertain that why we seeplenty of catholic texts written around the time of
only the,cogito would resurface. He funds a very solid system the counter-reformation explaining how the Bible is totally
of doubt. which would provide the basisfor the uncovering of inconsistent! (Laughs) Obscure, contradictory. The Enlighe
the singularity of the cogito, the cogito being that which solves tenment, later on, makes a whole different use of these texts.
the problem of an indubitable truth. Thus, the systemof doubt
emergesfrom the fact of knowing what the responseis respon- SR: Yes, it’s a delicious mess.
..
ding to. The cogito is fundamentally an af■rmation, but what
does this af■rmation respond to? In order to understand that 0M: Precisely. The two things I’ve mentioned, which seem
to which the response is responding, one needs to construct a unrelated, havefor me beenof a certain importance. Through
problematic truth-regime from which the responsewill arise. them, I came to realize that irreligiousness was alwayson the
side of metaphysics, not on the side of skepticism. The most
SR:But Descartes, nonetheless,calls upon God. Saysthat, if unrelenting enemy of the priest is the metaphysieian,the one
God made our sensesuntrustworthy. and hence everything who claims to know it all, including about God, whether he
else is an illusion, then he wouldn’t be God. he would be evil, exists or not. This is why Spinoza can talk about God all day
..
but the good is much greater than evil. so God must exist and long, and still remain the archenemyof priests.
if hedoes, we musttrust our senses.Isn‘t this quite a religious
discourse? SR:Becausehe’s a pantheist.

OM: It‘s a metaphysicaldiscourse rather than a religious one, OM: Yes, but I think that, more profoundly, when you claim
becausemetaphysicsconsist in the idea of God's existence as to know what God is, it’s no longer a question of religion.
something to be proven. Which is something fundamentally A knowable God is something else. You can call it God or
irreligious, given that, all along the Middle Ages, the highest whatever you want. On the other hand, the religious promise
blasphemy was pretending that God could be reduced to the is: “Don’t worry, certain things are beyond the reach of your
m...

conceptual sphere.If God could be entirely conceptualized, understanding”.

SR:Psychoanalysissaysthe same thing. to return to the idea of an eternal absolute, but only after
having drawn the consequencesof the fact that the principle
0M: True. but psychoanalysisis also an anti-philosophy. of suf■cient reason is, not devoid of meaning, but false. In
other words, nothing has a reason to be. If you search for an
8R: Right, Lacan was quite firm on this point. ultimate reason capableof explaining, for example, why this
glassis standing there, you will follow a chain of determined
0M: You know why the philosopher must be despised, and, causes leading you back in an in■nite regress. but without
by the way, the reason I call myself a philosopher? Because ever ■nding a reason capable of explaining this process of
heembodies the threat of nothing getting away from the con- causation, i.e. the laws of physics allowing all these opera-
cepts. (Laughs) People are fond of mysteries, but no, there’s tions, etc.
no mystery. It was in vain they told me, in my youth: “You’re
mistaken if you believe that the problems can be solved,it’s at SR:And the laws of physics are ultimately unable of explai-
the same time naive, dangerous,criminal”, etc. This is since ning existence on this earth.
■ve centuries back the discourse of the skeptic, the mockery
of the grand systems. OM: Exactly. Sooner or later you’ll bump into the fact that
..
you won’t ■ndan ultimate reasonbehind said causesand laws.
3R:“Whereof one cannot speak,thereof one must stay silent”. And then it’s either one or the other: either you say that it’s
impossible to provide a ground for this reason,which givesyou
GM: Yes, that is to say, we were offered the idea, following a the latitude to believe in mysteries; or, that this is the truth. In
long religious tradition, that metaphysicsand religion are in an ultimate sense,things are without reason. It’s not a matter
the samecamp.But no! The frequently discussedreturn of the of a hidden reason, it’s that there’s no reason at all.
religious had its reason in the disappearanceof metaphysics.
And, at this point, I said to myself: What if I was to abandon SR:The only thing there is, is absolute contingency.
this discourse,and install myself in a place no one would dis-
pute me for, in the vague outlands of metaphysics?(Laughs) OM: Right, the absoluteabsenceof reason for everything. On
the basisof this, I tried to capture the force in the critique of
SR:And this was in the eighties? ideology, which, as stated, consists of reveling contingency
whereneceSSitysupposedlyreigns.Foucault givesan example
0M: Right. of this, when, in his book on incarceration, he says he wanted
to show how the idea of prison, originally, was far from being
SR:What direction would you sayyour thinking took at that the seIf-evident solution it, for us,appearsto be. In Discipfine
time? and Punish, Foucault patticularly wanted to show how the
formation of the prison discourse was met with a great deal of
OM: The direction of irreligiousity. In my opinion, the strugg- wildly polemical counter—discourses contesting the idea.And,
le againstreligion today isn‘t a secularist, repubiican struggle. with this, the contingency in what earlier seemeda necessity
What kind of religion are we dealing with today, after the suddenly appears. In this context I ■rst extracted the idea of
death of metaphysics?It struck me that the religiosity of today the speculative, as opposed to the metaphysical. Metaphysics
was absolutely disseminated, meaning that everyone is free is the subordination of the absolute to the principle of rea-
to believe anything, like the cults, the most idiotic things. My son; speculative philosophy, according to my understanding,
impression was that the great theologic-metaphysical religi- is the idea of a possible accessto the absolute,but without the
ons no longer are norm, and that everyone instead is free to principle of reason. The speculative was able to capture the
believewhat hepleases.Because,what reason tells him is that critical element of anti-ideologieal discourse, and to lay bare
,
it hasno saywhenit comesto the absolute.The absoluteis still the contingency of everything. The only thing that would be
in
there, free of access,provided you’re content believing in impossible, in my estimation, is a necessarybeing. Which is
it, and nothing further. what I’ve tried to demonstrate. The only way to conceiveof a
necessarybeing is by believing in the unthinkable. This has
SR:Wasn’t it rather a question of a loss of a global vision? the paradoxical result that it is religion, not metaphysics,nor
the speculative, that requires necessity.In my view. the only
OM: Of a uni■ed vision perhaps. To eachhis owgbelief. As existing necessityis the necessity of contingence. Necessity,
long asno rational justi■cation is needed, and as it’s in the not of a world, a reality, but of a contingent state, the conting-
name of belief, not in the name of reason, you have the right ency of all things.
to believe in anything, however absurdly idiotic. It wasn’t so
much the return of the religious. of the great religions, as it SR:You discovered this studying Hume, didn’t you?
was the “turn" of the religious as such, without any privile—
ged content. And I wanted to try to ■nd the point of view 0M: Yes.it‘s thanks to Hume I came to understand this. Hume
from which it was possible to critique this element. What raises,in Enquiry concerning human nature, and already in
needed to be taken into account? First and foremost, the Treatiseofhuman nature, a challenge to reason, in saying it
fact that the great metaphysical systems were founded on has no ground to presume the laws of nature to be tomorrow
unacceptable dogmatisms. Why? Because they were always what they are today. And this is a tricky challenge. conside-
subjugated to the principle of reason. The principle positing ring that reason normally is identi■ed with natural science,
that it’s possible to provide an explanation to everything, an especially by the time of the Enlightenment. Try, for example,
explication of why the existin g must exist. The natural world ■ndingthe proof for why this glasswon’t take ■ight an instant
is necessary becauseof the principles regulating it, history from now. There are two ways to disprove something: either
in turn is explained by nature, and the powers that be are by logic, in saying that it’s contradictory, and thus won’t take
in turn explained by history. In the end this takes the form place.
..
of ideology. God is the foundation of nature, of society, of
history, which explains and justi■es everything. Ideology, SR:As a matter of probability, then. We can, following Hume,
always,is the af■rmation of the being assomethin g that must say that given the previous movements of the sun, it’s highly
be. My hypothesis thus became the foilowing: it’s possible probable that there will be a sunrise tomorrow.

xagx
OM: No. this is what Hume has been made to say. what the the laws to be constant, I can apply probability on objects
logical positivists have tried to say. Hume says. ■rstly, that obeying to these laws.But Kant implicitly applies probability
it’s not, logically speaking, contradictory that the lawswould on the lawsthemselves.He saysthat, if the lawscould change,
change.The statement according to which the lawsof nature. it would be extraordinary if they did not change at every mo-
at the moment T. abides to gravity. and at the moment T + 1, ment. What I try to show is that he, in an unwarranted way,
no longer do, is not contradictory. This changeis not a contra- applies probabilities outside of their legitimate ■eld.
diction. The other way to disprove something is by experience.
But experienceof the past will never enlighten me on how the SR:Applies them on the fundamental laws of nature.
future will be. Which is the reason why probabilities are of
little avail here.Probabilities can be applied to the knowledge OM: And the irony of it is that this isa Kantian style of critique.
I have of laws in past tense, but never regarding the future. Kant criticizes speculativemetaphysicsfor applying causality
And accordingly, Hume’s problem can‘t be resolved through outside of the ■eldof experience, but doesthe same in apply-
probabilities. ing probabilities on the laws themselves,in other words outsi-
de of experience.And this operation is illegitimate. Meaning
SR: And it thus becomes a matter of faith... that, if it‘s the laws that are being postulated as contingent,
then probability doesn't come in to play, and even the im-
0M: The physicists are in other words as much believers as probable can come to exist. One can conceive of a world in
the other believers; this is the irony in Hume's conclusion. The which everything is contingent, but where nothing changes
whole Critique ofpure reason is ignited by this. Kant tries to frequently. This is our world. Once the Kantian reasoning
take up Hume on his challenge, but fails. Phenomena can’t, had beendisquali■ed, I gained accessto a world in which the
according to Kant‘s argument. behavein anymanner. Because laws are contingent. Anything can come about. The time of
if they could. they would. in all likeliness, already havedone the worldwe ate in, is time beyond chaotic; it‘s hyper-chaotic.
so. and if this would have been the case,we wouldn’t sit here Chaos implies disorder. whereas Hyper—Chaosis something
discussingthe possibility of them doing so. The phenomenal capableof producing disorder as well as order. And in this I
world would havedisintegrated in absenceof the lawsholding was at liberty to reactivate an absolute.
it together. Kant approachesthe question through a, in my opi-
nion, probabilistic reasoning,although Kant doesn't perceive SR:This I ■ndfascinating. You saysomewherethat philosop-
it to be one, saying that if anything could take place, at any hy should think. not that which is, but that which could be. or
time, in any fashion. an extraordinary coincidence would have something along those lines. The form of speculativethinking
been required for the stability we seearound us to occur. Sol you champion also appears to contain a utopian ethic, a scar-
had to ■nda rebuttal to the Kantian argument, becauseit’s the ch for a better world. A world in which even the dead could
most serious one standing against the idea of the contingency come back to life. and one would think that you’re on your
of everything. including laws. Kant contests the contingency way to rediscover Christianity, 01'.more precisely. creating a
of the laws of nature, and searches an absolute af■rmation, to new philosophy, one to bridge the gap between philosophy
be produced by transcendental reason.that the lawsof nature and religion.
must remain what they are. He claims that, since we can’t have
knowledge of the absolute.there is no way to prove contingen- 0M: There are some wholly accurate things in what you’re
cy to be absolutely false, but that there is a way to prove that saying,and some quite explosiveones! (Laughs) Let me try to
we would be unable to state its tf‘uth, were it to be true. As defuse them. After having entered the aforementioned world,
long as conscienceexist, we will neversee billiard balls act in I realized I came into a wholly different relation to the imagi-
an irregular manner. Why? Becauseifconseience were to see nary. Whatl ■ndstriking in the imaginary isthe fact that we're
a billiard ball act this way. this would mean that everything capable of imagining a great number of things which nature
could do anything, and that everything would disintegrate:the will never produce. The most rational beings are alsothe ones
ball. the cue, the table, the room. One will never experience gifted with the most unrestrained imagination, capableof le-
..
ascenery.presenting itself asan integral whole, in which even ading us far away from nature. But in Hume’s eyesthis is nor-
the smallest part could behavein an erratic manner. Imagine mal. Reasontells us,saysHume in a magni■centpassagefrom
thatevery grain of matter, howeversmall, at any instant could the Treatise,that anything can produce anything. A perfectly
behaveerratically, that every aspectof reality could transform logical world can also be a perfectly chaotic world, because
in any way. From this, Hume extracts a mental scene, and logic is just non-contradiction. Logic, non-contradiction. is
challenges us to prove that this scene is impossible: he ima- evena condition for chaosandcontingency.For, if wesuppose
gines a pool table from which the balls suddenly take of into everything is without reason, this contingency cannot take
the air. Yes, Kant answers, this scene is impossible, because absolutely any form. This is the paradox. Contingency must
if the balls could behaveerratically, then so could everything obey under certain speculative conditions that contingency,
else.Every atom of the phenomenal world could, and would, by itself, dictates. For, suppose that a being could be univer-
behave in any manner. And thus you would no longer even sally contradictory, thus having the capacity to, at the same
be there. time, be everything and its opposite. The result: this being
would be necessary,not contingent. Why? Sucha being would
SR:You havebeen referred to as a post—Kantian.do you see be necessary,becauseit can neither be other than it is (that
yourself as one? which it is not. it is already), not ceaseto be (if it is no longer,
itstill is).And through this very strange reasoning,extensively
GM: 1 am a post—Kantian.but of materialist denomination. developed in After ■nitude, I discovered that the source of
Which is to say I tried to respond to the Kantian argument, logical necessitywascontingency.It's becausebeings are eter~
and. in order to do this. I had to disqualify his probabilist re- nally contingent that, eternally. they can’t be contradictory.
asoning.by trying to showthat his application of probabilities My work consistsin extracting the eternal properties of the
on the laws themselvesis illegitimate. You can. for example, eternal contingency, which is, basically, a metaphysical task,
apply probability on a die, stating that there‘s one chance in in a very classical sense.I obtain the conditions under which
six for you to roll a. say,four, but this is only possible thanks the world can be the world, time can be time, etc., and these
to the consistencyof the laws.The natural lawsassureme that conditions are all depending of the fact that everything can
the die will come to a halt. won’t changeform. etc. If i assume change,in any manner, under any circumstances.

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SR: But how would you then picture the future. politically to show,is that the only thing not dependentof us, for the cor-
speaking, for example?How can one apply your thinking on relationist. is the contingency of the Correlation itself. In other
contemporary politics? words.correlationism has a mighty adversaryin the subjecta-
list (in After ■nitude called the “subjectivist metaphysician"),
0M: I would try to answer that question by saying that phi- who absolutizes the correlation. We’re alwaysin the subject,
losophy doesn’t speak of that which exists. The existing is for the subject is the absolute. there's nothing outside of the
contingency, and philosophy is unable to speak of conting- subject. But what correlationism ■rst and foremOStwants, is
ent things. What interests me is necessity, not contingence. to avoid saying that the absolute is known. Against the ma-
Other discourses, those seeking facts, not truth, can speak of terialist it‘s simple, because materialism believes to have ac-
these things. If you wanted to talk about the contemporary cessto the absolute, whereasthis is only a representation of
situation, wouldn’t it rather be with a politician, a historian, a the absolute. Against the subjectalist it becomesmuch more
sociologist, people quali■ed to discusssuch matters? That‘s complicated. The subjectalist saysthat, if it’s impossible to
more or less my point of view. I treat things that could exist. leave the correlation, it’s because the correlation is absolute.
From this I take a certain number of consequences, spiritual Which is what all metaphysicsof the subject has done, up to
or intellectual, but at the same time I disavow myself of all Hegel. How to ■nd a way out? The only way is by saying no,
competence belonging to discourses treating that which is. the correlation isn’t absolute. The correlationist thus insist
The artist, for example,is far better suited than the philosop- on the facticity of the correlation. That, for example, the era
her to discussthe logic of the sensible. in which you’re in, the linguistic categories of this era, and so
on, are impossible to transcend, but this, however, does not
SR:Then let’s get back to speculative realism. You are consiv meanyour era is necessary;there can be others. The correla-
tiered to be the founding father of this new schoolof thought. tionists thus undertook a grand anti-subjectalist enterprise,
What do you make of this philosophical nouvelle vague? aiming at establishing the facticity of the correlation itself; be
it in a psychological,linguistic, cultural, epochal, etc.,manner:
OM: Speculative realism was a meeting that took place in the correlation is alwaysmarked by an irredeemable fictiCity,
2007,at Goldsmith College. There were four of us, Ray Bras— which impedes any attempt to transform it into an absolute
sier, Graham Harman, lain Hamilton Grant. and myself. This subject or correlation.
meeting was indeed called “speculative realism“, which was
Ray’sidea,and, [ believe,a compromise. l, for my part, wanted SR:This is highly complex. Could you rephrase it in a more
no mention of metaphysics, and Graham Harman none of simple way?
materialism, and then Ray came up with the solution. What
reunited us at the time was a common adversary, one I‘ve 0M: It is complex. but I‘ll try with a simple example:if! say “1
named “correlationism”. The opinion according to which it’s am mortal“. what doesthat mean?1can haveopinions on this
naiveto believe wecan accessreality in itself, whenthis reality coming event, my death, but without knowing what it entails.
is “always-already” formed by our accessto it, be it historical- For an atheist, this event is nothingness. the negation of all
ly, psychologically, culturally, linguistically. experience. But what would a correlationist answer?Firstly,
..
that my non-being is dependent of my thought or representa-
SR:We're alwaysimprisoned in our proper subjectivity. tion of this non-being. My death is only possible through my
representation of if. But if I'm no longer there. death becomes
OM: Imprisoned in a subjectivity open towards the world, im- impossible. Which means I‘m immortal: death vanishes as
prisoned in the correlation subject-wmld. in the Heideggerian soon I'm no longer representing it. For my death to bepossible
“ekstasis” (Ekstase),the being-in-the-world. The reason I na- it needsto be an event independent of my existence.Thinking
med this correlationism, instead of idealism, was, to borrow a myself as being mortal is to think, in relation to myself, an
■gurefrom Sartre, the “explosion” in direction of the world event which doesn‘t need me in order to exist, which exists
that this kind of thinking, in its contemporary form, tends absolutely outside of me, being my own annihilation. It’s pos-
to hold as constitutive for subjectivity. Towards a world not sible, through some modi■cations that I can’t develop here,
perceived from a metaphysical point of view, but as a world to make the same reasoning regarding my own contingence:
absolutelyexterior to us. and. simultaneously, only existing in ifI can ceaseto be. then this possibility of annihilation can’t,
relation to us,something I havecalled a “cloistral outside”. An in order to produce itself. be dependent of my thought; and
outside in which you’re imprisoned. But there isaenetheless contingency.conceivedof in this way.is thusprecisely an abso-
a proper, a grand outside, which doesn’t need us in order to lute, becauseit is totally independent of the thought thinking
exist.The name correlationism waschosenbecauseit couldn’t it. It follows that the correlationist, who claims to think the
bedenied that there wasa dominating thought of correlation, contingency of the correlation. thinks the veritable absolute:
in phenomenology as well. that we could not be, but are nonetheiessable to think this.
Not that we are able to think what non-being is like, but to
SR:Aren't you as well a correlationist? think that our non-being is possible. If death was dependent
of the thought of death, it would nevercome to pass,becausel
OM: Me? Ah no. I wouldn’t want that, that would be terrible. need to be there for this to be possible.The correlationist pre-
(Laughs) That would have ruined everything! No, my idea tends to escapethe absolute but the implicit absolutehe can‘t
was to try to find the ancestral categories, that is, the way in escapeis the contingency of the correlation, which he needed
which science■ndsa way to talk about a world prior to us. A in order to cleansethe correlation of the absoluteinstalled in
world prior to all representation of the world, a world that the it by subjectalism. This is the third step, the third form of the
correlationist would claim to be a world prior to us for us, and absolute (after the materialist andsubjectalist forms) that I’m
thus anew imprison the world in this relation to us. trying to establish.The contingency of the correlation. In this
I’m repealing the Cartesian gesture vis-h-vis Montaigne, who
SR: It’s always a subject having this thought, not a dog. nor foundedall the great metaphysicsof subjectivity bysayingthat
a ■ower... our ideasare nothing elsethan the subjectivethought ofideas.

OM: Exactly. Which is the reason why the ancestral, in itself, SR: Montaigne says: I can only speak of that which I have
isn’t an argument against the correlationists. What I‘ve tried known, and thus of myself.

x91x
“With Descartes,
the skeptic
becomes the '
metaphysician's
" bloodhound in
”thesearchfor the
absolute.”
OM: He installs everything in his own subjectivity. And Des— world. an absolute absenceof sensation,subjectivity, percep-
cartes’ answerto this? Transforming the instancedeterminin g tion, etc.. and from this. something came to pass,something
the skeptical doubt, the subject, into an absolute. With Des- that wasn‘tat this world. nor of the beyond. Hyper—Chaos,or,
cartes, the skeptic becomesthe metaphysician’sbloodhound in other words, the capacity of chaos to break its own laws.
in the searchfor the absolute.Becauseif there is anyone who Every miracle is an experimental proof of God’s inexistence,
knows where to ■nd the absolute in any given era, it’s the of this world‘s furious folly escapingthe aforementioned rea-
skeptic. This was the metaphysical gesture in the ■rst peri- sonableness.We are, reasonably speaking, part of the living.
od: you sayyour doubt regarding everything has the subject And if matter is in no way living, there wouldn’t be a reason
as principle? Very well, then: that’s my absolute.The second for our existence;thus, according to the principle of reason,
period wasthe correlationist, the anti—metaphysical reply: you matter must be living. But the world is more interesting if
hold the subject, the correlation, to be the absolute? It is on the- God doesn’t exist, becauseit‘s stranger. Here wecome to face
contrary contingent, factual. And I would thus situate myself time‘s capacity to radically break with the existing. The world,
in a third period. matter, has been shattered, broken, for it shouldn’t have been
capableof producing us. And this is the reason I ■nd matter
SR:How would you situate yourself in relation to the afore- interesting enough as it is, for it is the realm of the dead. The
mentioned contemporary philosophers? mathematical sciencesallow us to plunge into this realm and
come back to talk about it, the possibility to describe things
OM: I think it‘s a matter of distinct positions. Graham Har- beyond all concepts. I ■ndmore relevant to chargemathema-
man, for instance, has in my opinion a very paradoxical, but ties with the task of describing how the wortd is constituted,
at the same time extremely interesting subjectalist position. becauseno philosophical rationalization of it comes slow to
wherecritique of correlationism is combined with an attemp- be in step with the advancesof science;it’s not by accident
ted subjecti■cationof the whoie of reality. Everything is corre- that science became too proli■c for the philosophers to be
lation. but every reality retracts itself in the same time that it able to keep up. But as I said, the miracle isn’t the sign that a
presentsitself partially, the things having betweenthemselves god exists, but that God does not exist, that there aren’t any
a relation of the samesort asman’srelation to things. Harman foundations that can limit the capacities of time.
is, in my opinion. within the great subjectalistic tradition, a
tradition he at the same time transforms in a brilliant man- SR:Is this thought somethingjoyous for you?
ner Prior versions of subjectalism are offered by Hegel or
Nietzsche: Nietzsche is something of a subjeetalist in saying OM: Very much so.It’s fantastic, becausethe coming ruptures
that everything 15will to power. - are probably to be asinteresting asthosein the past.Justthink
of the two previous ones:the rupture in which. from inorganic
SR:Is there an animistic streak in this form of thinking? and dead matter, life came to be. And I think that thought ari—
sesfrom a similar rupture with the living, for there are certain
GM: 1 think there is, but it’s something way more sophisti- kinds of concepts, exposed for example in mathematics, that
cated than animism, becausehere you have a difference in animal life doesn't carry. Now, try to imagine a rupture in this
degree between forms of subjectivity. Personally, I’m more world that would be as radical in relation to it as the previous
inclined to think of matter from a materialist perspective, ones were in relation to their world, thinking vis—a-vislife, and
as something totally devoid of subjectivity, like the atom of life vis-a-vis matter. ln my opinion, all prophesy.all utopian
Epicure. Modernity brought along a vitalistic transformation visions are surreptitiously determined by the fact that we,
of materialist philosophy. Even in Deleuze you have this, the from the incommensurable ruptures that already took place,
inorganic life of things. I prefer them to bedead,the inorganic are capable of projecting. awaiting. the eventual possibility
death of things. Why? Not becauseof some morbid penchant, of a comparable rupture. But the world is chaotic, and may as
but becausethe scienti■cdescription of the material world is well produce no suchthing. An eternally possiblerupture, but
suf■cientfor me, I feel no need to subjectivize it. without the slightest necessity.For example, one can believe
in the re-existence of the dead (1 prefer this term instead of
SR: But you’ve nonetheless written that philosophy should “resurrection", too loaded with religious connotations). This
resuscitatehumanity in its entirety? is something that may never. in all eternity, come to be. But
it’s equally something that could never,in all eternity, become
OM: Yes, but that‘s something else. I wanted Qget to this impossible, and that’s the point that interests me. How does a
point, for it‘s precisely here I‘m exposing myself to the most mathematician go about his business? Not by trying to prove
perfect ridicule. In my opinion every philosopher shouid ven— everything he'sdealing with, but by trying to ■ndthe most in-
ture through the narrow straits of his own ridicule. (Laughs) teresting axiomatical entities. The ■rstmaterialists, Epicurus
I ■nd this more interesting than to, like most philosophers, and Lucretius, went about in a similar manner. They inquired
ridicule the adversary. I prefer exposing myself to ridicule. after the most interesting creatures capable to be produced
When you‘re ridiculous you’re dangerous, you’re outside under the given circumstances,for them the atoms. And they
the rules. But what I ■nd interesting about matter not being concluded that this would be the gods.They weren’t godless,
suhjectivized, is that this traces a radical break. Time was, they simply conceived of the gods as a haphazard result of
with the advent of the living, capable of creating something the movements of atoms. Materialism doesn’t consist in the
that wasn’t,in anyway,contained in matter. What I don’t like denial of gods, but in the matcrializing of them. Materialism
aboutsubjectalismis how everything becomestoo reasonable. is not atheism, which tends to stay haunted by the God it de-
If everythingis subjectivity, then subject wasin a sensealways niest like term itself, a-theism, suggests.The philosopher's
present. Religion alsohasthis reasonableside: God is always role. after having stated that anything can exist, is, like the
already there, and the rest emanates from Him. More interes- mathematician or the materialist, to search which con■gura-
ting, and unreasonable,it that which is capableof producing tion would be the most interesting. One thing differentiating
things that, in an absolute sense, weren’t there before; that me from other contemporary philosophers is the question of
which is capableof emergenceex nihilo, pure rupture. I prefer the re-description of the real. I'm not condemning this, nor
irruption to creation, becausein the latter you’re presupposing am I hostile towards it. it’s just not interesting to me. Firstly,
something that wasalready there, whereas,in the former. you becauseit's occupying oneself with contingencies. I’m more
havethe idea of an absolutebreak. There was, in the material interested in detaching myself from the potentialities of our

.93.
world. That is to say the "possibles" limited by our own laws. press their proper ideas) I’m a ventriloquist. making Mallar-
It‘s only an in■nity of potentialities after all! The trans■nite mé say what I want him to say. But I come to the conclusion
is, according to Cantor, the idea that. for every in■nity, you that Mallarmé must havecounted the words of the poem, and
can construct a greater in■nity. [t‘s boundless. never ending. discover some things that put me at unease. I’m not certain
of following him. Which is to say, I must have been quite tr-
SR:Yes,the future does last a long time. uthful to what he is saying.becausehe sometimesleads me in
..
directions I would rather not take.
OM: According to my idea, it‘s the mathematicians who have
enumerated the possible.which is something in■nitely larger SR: You mean he calculated this chance?
than the potentialities of our world. The in■nite is something
quite poor in comparison to the translinite. With this, the OM: It’s premeditated, or perhaps not. ltry explaining this at
problem of understanding our world undergoes an easingof the end. Word-eounting is something shaky. with compound
tension. It might bethat Graham is right. that the subjeetalists words you can't be sure how to count. He threw, or he didn't
are right about the world assomething subjective.But it would threw, the dice... He encoded this or didn’t encode it. In the
..
be a shame, the world would be less rich than if matter was end it‘s clear that the code I’m trying to establish is destabili-
something dead.Ifmatter isdeadthe world is a stranger place. zedby three words, one of them being,precisely,maybe[pem-
There are things that can he demonstrated in an absolute way, étre]. For this reason, the constellation is struck by a maybe.
andothers that can't. Icouldn’t in an absolute way demonstra- for Mallarmé becomesin■nitized by my interpretation. He‘s
te that matter is dead. it might be ticklish, screamingwithout inspired by Hegel in thinking that in■nity is hesitation. Being
being heard. as in Diderot. Some would like it if the things Hamlet, who hesitates eternally. He considered that. for art to
were alive, because then this could he the reason behind the become a religion, it‘s necessaryto surpassthe representation
manifest life we‘re familiar with. But there is no suchareason. of the greets;tragical scene,where Wagner placedhimself, to
It‘s not necessary to. alongside the scientific discourse. add learn what has surpassedtragedy. [n his opinion: the Mass.
another, humanizing discou rse. No. science is dehumanizing. He wasan atheist, but wondered how it worked, and thus went
That‘s its role. Scienceis enough. science assuresus a world to Mass, observing it as an artist. and came to consider it to
of incredible heterogeneity.What we needis to become more be a very well arranged apparatus. That there is something
sensible towards its cracks and its irruptions. rather than to in Mass that surpassed what the Greeks invented: the real
re-describe it in a metaphysical fashion. presence,the Host.

SR:And ifmatter is something dead.where isthe placeof art? SR:Eating God. a form of cannibalism.

0M: One thing] found interesting about the receptionofAfte-r 0M: The theophagy, as he says.And, not being a play, it‘s all
■nimde was the confirmation of an intuition I‘ve had. In the the more effective; they are not playing the Passion.like an
book there isn‘t one mention of art. But I said to myself that ar— actor playing Christ. It’s an anonymous priest.
tists are more interested in philosophers who aren‘t speaking
about art than philosophers who are. Firstly. becausewhen SR:And you‘re participating.
they do. they tend to get things backwards. and also. because
whatI offer artistsis,insteadof a mirror. a resistance.I think OM: It’s not a theater scene. becausetheatre is a represen-
an artist is more interested in something not at all artistic. tation where the audience does not participate. Here, it‘s a
something resistant‘ that is to saya matter. 1havethe impres- communion with very simple gestures preformed by the
sion artists use me as matter, rather than as a justi■catory priest. supposed to bring about the real presence.Mallarmé
discourse. I. for my part, don't speak about them, and do not asks himself why the authors of his era convert to Catholi-
in the slightest recognize myself in the artistic interpretations cism in great numbers. And the reason was. that we will not
that havebeencloneof my work. lf 1were to talk about art in be ■nishedwith Christianity as long aswe haven’t stolen the
general. the problem would rather be to treat things as with treasure invented by it, an apparatus that's not a scenic one,
Mallarme.
.. nor a representative one. but real passionand real sacri■ceof
the Christ. in the eyes of the Christian. meant to be present.
SR: Discovering a hidden meaning? You‘re thinking about As long as this is not done. the art religion is impossible. And
“Un coup de dés"... Mallarmé wants an art religion, and for poetry to replace the
Bible. just like his forefathers Hugo, Lamartine. Lamartine
OM: Alright. what interested me in Mallarmé was trying to said:“I’m the Messiah".Paul Bénichou showsthis in his books
establish how “a throw of the dice will never abolish chance” on the romantic art. It was a crazy period, the ■rst romanti-
isn‘t stating a failure. but a victory. The failure is to neversue- cism. Hugo with his turning tables. They wanted to form a
..
ceedgoing beyondchance.But if you transform it into victory, religion. Hugo tried with theatre. A failure. Mallarmé, very
it‘s becauseit's indestructible. Everything can bedestroyedby seriously,wanted to give a new version of the Mass.advocate
chance, except chance. This is a declaration of the absolute. a new religion.
Chanceis the matter of the poet. And Mallarmé wassomeone
I just chanced upon. SR: But how?

SR:You just stumbled upon him? 0M: It’s a total dead-end,becausethere is no real sacri■ce.My
hypothesis is that heencodedthe poem, in other words,sacri-
0M: He stumbled on me. For somereason I couldn‘t explain. ■cingthe meaning of the poem, and thus the meaning of his
..
I got to counting the words of another poem of his. “A la nue oeuvre. Christ only sacri■cedhis body, Mallarmé sacri■ced
accablantetu. aehanceexperienceduring my investigation his oeuvre, sacri■ced it to chance. He’s also, in his encoding,
.
of chance. And I came to produce something that was more inspired by a poem of Vigny called “La Bouteille a la Met”, in
than exegesisof Mallarmé. But I don’t follow him everywhe- which a captain of a sinking ship placeshis discovery of a new
re. I‘m not in agreement with everything he says.People are shipping route in a bottle, and then throws in the ocean to be
suspicious.and think that [which is. of course, often the case ■shedup by someone.Mallarmé doesthe same,but here it’s a
when philosophers deal with artists, trying to havethem ex- number thrown in the ocean, the unique number that can’t be

.94:
other than what it is, exactly the one he throws in the ocean. I’ll never know if it’ll be discovered or not. And. further-
The encodedis not a representation, sincehe really did threw more. I’ll need to be divinized. But to be a man divinized
it, like his main character
—“the Master” - who, facing the by chance. what to do?" In the poem, the captain seems to
ocean, hesitates to throw a pair of dice to produce a unique be tied to a celestial roll of the dice. In the night, above
number. Well, Mallarmé hesitated to, in the same way, throw the ocean, the stars start to move and produce a result, the
the unique number. septemrion [the north], which is to say a sept [seven]. The
code I found was that there are 707 words in the poem if you
SR: He hesitates? remove the last phrase. which in turn consist of sevenwords.
Seven,nothingness, seven. In the heart of the poem there's
OM: Yes, but does he go through with it or not? I’ve tried to something like a whirlwind forming among the recurrent Si
elucidate this. He thereby resolves two problems. Wagner’s [if] ...51'also being the seventh note in musical notation. And
problem, on avoiding the production of representation, and the problem is that nothing will take place except for the
instead have a real presence,a real sacri■ce.The sacri■ceis place, the pure nothingness. Everything is crumbling down.
real since the poem is performative. He really does throw a except, perhaps, a constellation pointing northwards. And
code. Secondly,he wants to save metric poetry against free if the code would be 707, everything would blow up, because
verse. This is the secondproblem he was dealing with in the there wouldn’t be any more hesitation. The one who threw
eighties. The free verse had no more rules; Mallarmé wants the dice lets go of hesitation, except perhaps a constellation
to keep the metric verse. He invents a unique number, a new that sets itself in movement and produces a septentrian. If
meter. the code is 707, then everything would be ruined, for there
wouldn't be any more hesitation. He who rolled the dice
SR: To tie metric art and free art. quits hesitating, and it is perhaps then that the constella-
tion should take place. It took ‘place,and is thus refuted by
OM: And he’ll produce a unique meter, becauseit's a unique the poem. The poem says that the constellation must per—
poem, one that, in addition to this, is sacri■ced,asit might ne- haps take place. Why? Because it must reproduce the eter-
ver be discovered. It's sacri■ced to chance, not to providence.

'i
nal hesitations of the master. This I understood one day in
recounting, without ■nding the result, that there are three
SR:And you discovered it. compound words which make the poem eternally trembling.
There’s an deld [beyond], which. in Mallarmé‘s era, wasn’t
OM: By chance!(Laughs) That‘s what’simportant. In the end, hyphenated. This was equally the casewith the secondword,
you might say that, when it's discovered, it‘s no longer that par dela‘ [beyond]. How to make the count: as one word or
interesting. But Mallarmé, all throughout his oeuvre, tries to two? This is an incertitude, which creates the eternally he-
show that. in order to be identical to chance, in order to be sitant character of the ■nal sum. 707 —or of another result.
divine, one has to be as in■nite as chance.Chance is for Mal- Of the three words, the only one that was hyphenatedin
larmé in■nite in a Hegelian sense.God is for Hegel in■nite, Mallarme’s time was pem-étre. which seems to be the most
for He is, in a dialectical sense, what He is, and what He isn’t. resistant. But the pettt-étre is really, which I try to show,the
Christ is. after all, God as well as man; God and the ■nite ■nalpoint of hesitation of the number: it completes the pro-
being which opposesitself to Him. For Mallarmé, it's chance duction of the may-be. It is auto-creative, auto—performative.
that, at the same, is what it is, and what it isn’t. He developed It is thus foreverrnore that, maybe, Mallarmé didn’t encode
this in the tale Igirur, where ayoung aristocrat hesitatesto roll his poem. becausewith the other ways of counting, you no
the dice to get the double six, a twelve, a perfect alexandrine, longer end up with 707. There are three other ways to count,
becausehe knows that the twelve wouldn’t be the result of not leading to 707. For eternity Mallarmé divided himself
divine inspiration, but of the rolling of the dice, and thus of in two persons. the known one, and the author of “Un coup ‘
chance.What’s the point in rolling the dice? It’s mediocrity de dés”, which he at the same time coded and did not code.
that af■rmschance,in the sensethat the mediocrity of averse
brings forth the contingency of its writing. But eventhat which SR:But this is the form of a contradiction. Isn’t this a living ;
apparently negateschance is still chance,the extraordinary contradiction? The two contradictory truths are coexistent.
event which seemsto be destined, divine: the roll of the dice,
saving your ‘life in a game. You’re under the impression that 0M: And hereby also opposes themselves to what I can say,
it's providence, but no, says Mallarmé, it’s still chance. Chance right. Mallarmé iseverything at the sametime, all the possibi-
is in■nite; it is in that which af■rms it. as well as in that which lities for the eternity. Nobody knows what was done. Let’s sup-
(apparently) negatesit, If you wish to divinize yourself, the poseMallarmé knows what he’sdoing, but he’ll never know if
question is: how become as in■nite as chance?You must be he‘ll be discovered.The reader knows something Mallarmé
hesitant. lgitur hesitates. If I hesitate, I in■nitize myself, like doesn't... And inversely.Mallarmé knows something that the
Hamlet. But in the end. Hamlet stops hesitating... reader doesn‘t know regarding his invention.

SR:And when he takes action, everything comes crumbling SR:There is aspacebetweenthe two. It’s neither of the order
down. Hesitation is perhapsthe only force to rely on in face of conscious of the unconscious.
.. there, in
nor Is this case, a
..
of contingency. spacebetween conscienceand unconscious?

0M: In hesitation, by retaining all the potentialities, you 0M: I also state that there is this possibility. One needn’t ■nd
become the equal of chance. You move into in■nity, into a precise intention from Mallarmé, since the poem works all
chance, which, fundamentally, is this force of nothingness by itself. But you can‘t excludeall the possibilities. This is even
sayingeverything returns to the same.You equalize yourself better than if you would only have had the option between
to it. You are, to the same extent, that which you af■rm, as the two. You have there. at the same time, the option of the
that Which you negate. If you want to become Christ. then between of conscience and unconscious, but also the option
you better divinize yourself. Mallarmé askshimself what the of the conscienceand of the unconscious.There’s everything!
Mass is saying. That which was missing to the art religion, He becomesthe Christ of chance.
was the Christ. “Well, then, says Mallarmé, I’ll be him. I’ll be
the Christ of poetry, in sacri■cingthe meaning of my poem: 3R: He becomes Christ, because there’s a mysterious aspect?
 OM: Because there’s sacri■ce. a non-reaetive sacri■ce. He SR:When will that be published?
gave everything, in a completely disinterested manner, to
poetry. OM: If I can manage, it's going to be in severalvolumes. I’ll
have to get back to that. For the moment I‘m working on a
..
SR:I-le sacri■cedmeaning... small book on science—■ction. based on a talk] gave.which is
to be published this fall. I‘m also planning a secondMallar-
0M: He sacri■cedthe sacri■ce.Christ on the cross is for eve- mé, where I intend to treat the death of God. a subject I left
ryone to seeand to testify about. Mallarmé sacri■ceswithout untouched in The Number and the Siren.
anybody knowing what, or even that, he sacri■ced.It‘s so-
mething magni■cent. Imagine the disinterestedness of this SR: In relation to Nietzsche?
man. all alone, saying to himself, "that’s it. ■nally. the art
religion is here". I end the book by saying something along 0M: I have one on Nietzsche, too, a topic I've lectured exten-
the lines of “Modernity had thus triumphed and we knew sively on. One on Hegel, one on Duchamp.
..
nothing about it”. 1was told this wasexaggerated.But moder-
post-Christian
nity consistsof the ideaof a post—revolutionary. SR:Duchamp as well?
religion. A religion of art. of science...
OM: Ah! Duchamp is explosivestuff. (Laughs) The contem—
SR:Yes. the artist took the place of God. porary art sceneis such a volatile milieu, so I'll have to take
my time with that one, try not to sayanything too revolting...
OM: But it‘s not in the mode of the grand Wagnerian celebra-
tion. With Mallarme, you ful■ll the religion of art every time SR: ls contemporary art a subject you would like to engage
you in silence read his poem, which, being a visual poem, was, as well? «a:
I believe, intended to be read silently. It reminds of that, basi-
cally, the book, the codex, is the only ceremony that modern 0M: I tend to dedicate thyself to a very precise'object when
mencan acceptwithout ■ndingridicule. A solitary ceremony, I leave philosophy. never anything too big. I take an object
- because when you read, you create a sort of place of silen- and try to discover it in itself, as patiently as I can, which
ce around you. and you see that which can‘t simply be said, require that I un-learn philosophy in order to avoid apply-
which escapesthe voice: a mental gaze.You read a book. “Le ing it on the object in question. The same goes for politics.
Coup de dés", reminding you of this experience of the book. You askedabout the consequencesof philosophy on politics;
the roll of the dice which makes you accesssomething other what I propose is an egalitarianism of contingenee. There
than representation. as with the Bible. but instead gives you is a point on which we’re all equals, and it’s this contingen-
access to an act. This act. its gesture, its code. is available in ee which determines our individuality, our language, our
the mode of a real act, all the more present when you read it mental categories... We’re all at the same time contingent
than when Mallarmé wrote it, becausein the way you read'it, and incapable of understanding the ultimate reason behind
it is the accomplishment of the way Mallarmé wrote it. You our existence.
read the gestures.but also the generosity of chance revealing
it. and thus better than Mallarmé could ever haveread it. This SR: 1will posea rather psychoanalytical question: is it. after
is the religion of art. all, possible to understand that which movesus.our desires?

SR;But nonethelessdiscovered by you, a philosopher. 0M: If it‘s possible to understand our desires?I don’t know,
I’m not the one to ask. Philosophy tells us you’re right in not
OM: But by chance! It’s possible to spend a lifetime reading searching an ultimate reason. The absenceof reason is so-
Mallarmé without ■nding the smallest trace of this project. mething absolutely necessary.
It’s only after having found it that you understand, but for this
you needchance.I wasquite unread when I ■rstencountered SR:Are you interested in psychoanalysis?
Mallarmé, some eighteen years ago.
0M: By all means, but from the perspective of an outsider.
SR: l-Idw did you manage to keep this to yourself for all those I would say that the unconscious is something fundamental,
years? but without being beyond chance.I would remind of the fact
that some acts are perhaps simply produced by chance. Not
OM: Basically, becausefor a long time I sawno interest in it. all of them, but one mustn’t believe that everything is to be
explained by the unconscious.
SR:The book hassomething of a detective-story.
SR:There are things that aren’t determined by the uncons-
OM: Yes. the investigatory aspect was unavoidable. cious.

8R: You stage thinking, like one would a theatre piece. 0M: Yes,things perhapsdetermined by the silliest of conting-
encies.All acts aren’t Freudian slips. But I have no lessonsto
OM: One of Mallarme‘s masters was. after all. Edgar Allen give psychoanalystsoccupying themselveswith that which is,
Poe. I also needed to go through his entire oeuvre. ■rst to be our desire, our psyche... The only way the absolute can exist
sure of the fact, then to understand how he came to an idea today, without being odious, is by retiring itself.
of the sort. Time wasnecessaryto from the inside seehow he
talked about the number. SR:Like the wavesof the ocean. the coming and going.
..
SR: Could you say something about your future projects? 0M: I‘m lessintrusive than most anti-absolutist philosophers,
What will you be writing on next? occupying themselveswith everything.

0M: I haveplenty of things to get done, too many... I‘ve left SR:Is there something in yOurowu work that eludesyou. that
too much hanging. There’s L’Inexistence divine, my thesis. you don’t understand?

.95:
OM: Always! I am for the time being occupied with the ques- OM: Maybe. I did inherit a thing or two from my own father.
..
tion of how to absolutize the mathematical sign. To show in He wasa Marxist. but without being a memberofthe Commu—
what sensemathematics contains something which allows us nist Party: an individualist Marxist. who consideredhimself to
to talk of the world in the absenceof ourselves.Since years be the only one having understood Marx. (Laughs)
back I’m doing demonstrations I’m not sure hold together.
I‘m constantly in the non-understanding, which is a painful, SR:He wasan anthropologist. correct?
for me daily experience. This is for me the constraint of the
system.Contrary to a widespreadbelief, the systematicmakes OM: Yes. He was quite hostile towards the philosophy of the
thought vulnerable. Nothing is more fragile than a system, seventies.and towards Lacan. According to his conviction.
for it’s enough to topple one part of it for everything to come one doesnot havethe right to be obscure.He passedon to me
crashing down. One often pokes fun at speculative philosop- the challenge to be inventive without being obscure.
hers,sayingthey’re constructing speculative housesof cards.
But I am, too, constructing a speculativehouseof cards.From SR:And what did your mother passon to you”.J
the moment when I subjugatedmyself to that which everyone
discardsof, a principie-based, systematicphilosophy] under— QM: It’s complicated you see... Neither my mother nor my
stood that I was much more fragile than I would have been father held a high opinion of philosophers. My mother was
in the skepticism of the possible... 1 still ■nd myself in this an amateur pianist. and considered that. in comparison to
fragility, not being sure it all holds together. music, philosophy was a nothingness. (Laughs). And, accor-
dingly, they gifted me with an inferiority complex, but one not
SR: Which is to say your weak point is at the same time a without interesting aspects.Philosophy isjust philosophy. but
strong point? I couldn't do anything else. You know, the word metaphysics
can be translated in different manners. It can signify: “that
0M: When I wrote Afrer■nimde, l was at times so exhausted which is taught after physics".and also. of course: “the study
by my own objections against the project that I told myself of that which isbeyondthe physical". But, as I learnedsit turns
there must be some interest in what I was doing. and then eve- out that “meta” in no way can signify "beyond".
rything came to me. almost by itself; I wrote it in one breath.
SR:Really?
SR:But there‘sthis distinct lightness in your work. you travel
among the concepts with such ease that, I imagine. people 0M: It wasan error. a sleight of hand imposed by 5th-century
tend to disregard of the immense labor behind at. Platonisls. In reality, "meta" always means "after“, in a tem—
poral, spatial or normative order.
GM: Let‘s put it like this: one mustn't impose upon one'saudii
ence the pain the labor implied. SR: Is this why you named your book After■nirude‘.’

SR:You haveneither the heavinessof Kant. nor the dryness 0M: No, I was unaware of it at that time. (Laughs) Metap-
of Hume... I‘m at a lossin searchingphilosophers with whom hysics is thus either that which is read after physics. or that
to compare you. which comesafter physicsin a normative sense.meaning that
it would be inferior to physics. In this latter sense I would
0M: It's always a bit tricky, or presumptuous, to compare readily admit to not doing anything but metaphysics.(Laughs)
yourself with a philosopher. I try to be clear, but, at the Metaphysics in this sensesuites me line...
same time, you always have the constraint of the demon-
stration. I'm sometimes considered to be a bit carefree, and SR:Beautifully put. I think we‘ll leaveit at that. Your territory
other times incomprehensible... (Laughs) It is sometimes seemsto be the future. .. You’re actually doing an archeology
impossible to escape complication, but it must be a real of the future.
one. Which is the reason why I’m very distrusting towards
this logic of intimidation, of proper names... That was so- QM: I’m fond of this expression. And, at the same time, phi-
mething very dif■cult in relation to my super-ego: to write, losophy is the ■xed point that allows you to go exploring.
as Deleuze‘says, simple things in your own name. What I Without a compassyou‘ll ■nd yourself going in circles. With
loved learning philosophy was these immensgtthoughts I a compasspointing you northwards, you'll keep going north.
submerged myself in, the spaces they offered to roam. But The ■xed point is what moves you forwards. elsewhere.
when you‘re forced to construct them yourself, you have
nothing. You have no space. always wedged between the SR:And your fixed point is contingency.
banal and the incoherent.
OM: Yes, that's about it.”
SR: Your great achievement is to not end up with God. but
with the artist. You put the artist in God’s place.

GM: But I‘m not sure I agree with Mallarmé... I interpret

Mallarmé such as he appears to me, and I ■nd him abso-
lutely magni■cent. But at the same time. I need him to
elude me in a sense. I‘m not a ventriloquist. There aren't
many philosophers, to my knowledge, who have imposed
themselves this.

SR:You mean to let the object get away from them?

0M:Yes.

SR:Perhapsyou’re simply in no need of killing the father.

..

tgyt