Polish Psychological Bulletin

Original Papers 2021, vol. 52(4) 341–348

DOI: 10.24425/ppb.2021.139168

Marta Kuczek*
Malwina Szpitalak**
Romuald Polczyk*

Anxious and distrustful – How do state anxiety and memory distrust

influence the misinformation effect?

Abstract: The misinformation effect is influenced by many mnestic and non-mnestic factors. This article concerns the
role of two of them: 1) state anxiety, defined as a situational experience of anxiety; 2) memory distrust, understood as
a constant tendency to negatively evaluate one's memory. Both factors are relevant in the situation of being a witness and
are believed to have a negative effect on the magnitude of the misinformation effect. In the present research, participants’
state anxiety had an immunizing effect against misinformation. As for memory distrust, no relationship was found
between negative evaluation of memory and susceptibility to misinformation. The results confirm the beneficial effect of
anxiety on resisting misinformation and demonstrate a greater need for further explorations concerning memory distrust.

Keywords: misinformation effect, memory, anxiety, memory distrust, witness testimony

INTRODUCTION containing misleading information (often included in a text,

questions, or woven into conversation). The experiment is
The memory misinformation effect (ME), which is followed by a memory test in which respondents are asked
the topic of this study, may be defined as follows: “in to answer questions about the original material that was
a witness’s account of an event, the inclusion of presented at the beginning. Depending on the hypothesis
information from sources other than the event itself” tested by the experimenters, the form of the third stage of
(Polczyk, 2007, p. 17). The misinformation effect is an the study (final test) differed and a range of experiments
important phenomenon for researchers, mainly due to the was used to confirm the existence of the specific
consequences it entails for forensic examination. Its mechanisms responsible for the misinformation effect
occurrence is associated with more frequent reporting by (see Ayers & Reder, 1998; Pickrell, McDonald, Bernstein,
witnesses of event accounts that contain distorted or & Loftus, 2016; for reviews).
completely untrue information, thus falsifying what is The occurrence and magnitude of the misinformation
sometimes the most important source of evidence in court effect is determined by a number of factors related both to
cases (e.g., Brewer & Wells, 2011, Eisen, Gabbert, Ying, the experimental situation itself and to the subjects’
& Williams, 2017; Goodwin, Kukucka, & Hawks, 2013; characteristics (Zhu et al., 2010a, 2010b). The aim of the
Luna & Martín-Luengo, 2012; Skagerberg & Wright, present article is to explore two factors that are related to
2008; Wade, Green, & Nash, 2010; Wright, Memon, the emotions experienced by respondents: anxiety and
Skagerberg, & Gabbert, 2009). memory distrust, which is a trait that is related to how
The misinformation effect is usually studied using subjects assess their own memory. Below, we summarize
a three-stage paradigm (e.g., Cohen & Harnick, 1980; the existing knowledge about these factors in the context
Dalton & Daneman, 2006; Duncan, Whitney, & Kunen, of memory reports influenced by misinformation.
1982; Frost, Ingraham, & Wilson, 2002; Loftus, Miller, &
Burns, 1978; VanOss Marin, Holmes, Guth, & Kovac, Anxiety and the Misinformation Effect
1979). In a typical experiment using a three-stage Anxiety influences cognitive processes in various
procedure, the subjects in the first stage are presented ways, e.g. in the form of attention bias (tendency to pay
with material depicting the original event, usually in the more attention to potentially threatening stimuli; e.g., Bar-
form of slides or film. Next, they are given materials Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Van

*
Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Poland
**
Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Poland; ORCID iD - 0000-0003-4928-5556
Corresponding author: Romuald Polczyk, [email protected]
342 Marta Kuczek, Malwina Szpitalak, Romuald Polczyk

Ijzendoorn, 2007; Deryberry & Reed, 2002; Mogg, induced after exposing participants to a misleading
Mathews, & Eysenck, 1992), interpretation bias (tendency narrative summarizing an event presented via a slideshow
to interpret ambiguous signals in the environment as reduced subsequent yielding to the misinformation in the
threatening; e.g., Constans, Penn, Ihen, & Hope, 1999; narrative. Interestingly, this effect was still present even
Derakshan & Eysenck, 1997; MacLeod & Cohen, 1993; after several days. Also, Hoscheidt, LaBar, Ryan Jacobs,
Wilson, MacLeod, Mathews, & Rutherford, 2006), as well and Nadel (2014) found that anxiety during encoding
as greater uncertainty intolerance (e.g., Bensi & Giusberti, reduced the endorsement of misinformation from the post-
2007; Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009; McEvoy & Mahoney, event narrative. In addition (and in contrast to the results
2012). obtained by Ridley and Clifford (2004, 2006) and Ridley
However, it turns out that despite its potentially et al. (2002)), in Hoscheidt et al.’s research, anxiety was
negative consequences for cognitive functioning, anxiety beneficial for memory accuracy concerning items that
can be a protective factor against misinformation in the were not misleading.
context of memory reports. The influence of anxiety It should be mentioned that these results were
induction on susceptibility to misinformation was exam- obtained in experiments using the three-stage experimental
ined by Ridley and Clifford (2004), who showed that paradigm. Somewhat different effects were present in
anxiety reduces the magnitude of the misinformation another paradigm related to memory suggestibility, namely
effect, regardless of when anxiety is induced. Similar interrogative suggestibility (IS), which is defined as ‘the
results were obtained in a study on a population of children extent to which, within a closed social interaction, people
aged 9–10 (Ridley, Clifford & Keogh, 2002). Ridley and come to accept messages communicated during formal
Clifford (2006) also analysed the impact of anxiety on the questioning, as a result of which their subsequent
misinformation effect using a source-monitoring paradigm behavioural response is affected’ (Gudjonsson & Clark,
in which subjects in the final memory test identify the 1986, p. 84).
source of the information presented to them (e.g. Lindsay The difference in the results between both paradigms
& Johnson, 1989; Zaragoza & Koshmider, 1989; Zaragoza (negative correlations of anxiety with ME and positive
& Lane, 1994). It turned out that people with a higher level ones with IS) can be explained in terms of important
of state anxiety were less likely to misidentify the source dissimilarities between these paradigms. Namely, in the
of the misleading information compared to people with case of ME, the influence of misinformation is usually
lower state anxiety, but they were also less sure of their rather impersonal, while in the case of IS it is more similar
answers. to social influence. Also, the direct presence of the
The obtained results have been considered, among interrogator may make anxious participants comply with
others, in the context of Eysenck and Calvo’s processing suggestions and pressure from the interrogator. In contrast,
efficiency theory (1992). This theory assumes a distinction the rather impersonal influence of misinformation included
between performance effectiveness and processing effi- in an anonymous description of original material that is
ciency. Performance effectiveness (performance quality) free of any direct social influence may invoke different
displays itself, for example, in the accuracy of responses. mechanisms.
By contrast, processing efficiency is defined as the The aforementioned considerations concerning IS
relationship between performance effectiveness and the are to some extent corroborated by other research that
amount of effort expended on a given task. According to focused on direct social influence (Wright, London,
researchers (Eysenck and Calvo, 1992), anxiety usually & Waechter, 2010), in which a somewhat more compli-
has a more negative effect on the efficiency of information cated picture emerged as regards the relationship between
processing than on its effectiveness. These assumptions misinformation acceptance and anxiety. Wright et al.
were investigated in the attention control theory (Eysenck, (2010) studied social anxiety and found that participants
Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007), according to which who believed that the cost of disagreeing was higher than
worry and other negative phenomena associated with the cost of making a mistake were more likely to accept
anxiety do not necessarily affect the performance effec- misinformation, whereas social avoidance was associated
tiveness of a given task negatively. Anxiety that occurs with greater resistance to it. Wright et al. (2010) used
while completing a task is often a kind of aversive signal a modification of the classic three-stage misinformation
for an individual who is not coping with the task very well. paradigm: they presented their participants with a large
In order to try to eliminate anxiety, this individual may collection of photos and analysed whether correct
take various compensatory measures that will result in, recognition of them was influenced by the answers of
among others, putting more effort into the task, thereby the second participant. Thus, it is difficult to compare
compensating for the deficits in cognitive resources caused these results to those obtained in the classic misinforma-
by the anxiety. According to Ridley and Clifford (2004), tion paradigm, in which no direct social pressure is
misleading information could be perceived as threatening usually present.
by people exposed to anxiety induction because it causes
a sense of ambiguity and vagueness that can lead to its Memory Distrust and the Misinformation Effect
suppression. The way in which respondents evaluate their memory
In a similar vein, Nitschke, Chu, Pruessner, Bartz and is important in terms of the impact on the occurrence of the
Sheldon (2019) found that acute psychosocial stress misinformation effect. Gudjonsson & MacKeith (1982)
 Anxious and distrustful – How do state anxiety and memory distrust influence the misinformation effect? 343
were the first to describe the “memory distrust syndrome” while the SSMQ Scale (Squire, Wetzel, & Slater, 1979)
in the case of witness testimonies. This phenomenon that was used in the study of van Bergen et al. (2009)
manifests itself in the fact that an individual develops captures this phenomenon in terms of a trait.
profound distrust and scepticism considering the function-
ing of their own memory as a result of the accuracy of their Aims of the present study
memories being undermined. This results, among others, The aims of the present study are to confirm the
in a tendency to rely on external cues when recalling facts; impact of anxiety as a factor that protects against the
difficulties in source monitoring of information; and acceptance of misleading information and to establish how
increased susceptibility to suggestions (Gudjonsson, one’s assessment of one’s own memory influences the
2003). The occurrence of the memory distrust syndrome occurrence of the misinformation effect. Based on current
is mainly associated (Gudjonsson, 2003) with long and reports on anxiety and misinformation (among others
intense interrogation, during which subtle manipulation Ridley & Clifford, 2004; Ridley & Clifford, 2006; Ridley
techniques are sometimes used against the person being et al., 2001) and all the above considerations, the following
interrogated, thus causing them to be uncertain about the hypotheses were formulated:
validity of their memories. 1. The misinformation effect will be present: the
Van Bergen, Jelicic and Merckelbach (2008; 2009) number of correct answers will be lower in the misled
distinguished between memory distrust understood as group compared with the non-misled one.
a state and as a trait. In the first case, individuals who 2. Yielding to misinformation will be negatively
evaluated their memory in a possibly positive way begin to related to anxiety: the number of correct answers will be
doubt its proper functioning due to external factors, e.g. positively correlated with anxiety.
pressure from third parties. In the case of trait memory 3. Yielding to misinformation will be positively
distrust, a person has a constant tendency to negatively related to memory distrust: the number of correct answers
evaluate their own memory. will be negatively correlated with memory distrust.
Special interest was directed towards the relation-
ship between memory distrust, susceptibility to suggestion METHOD
and the tendency to give false confessions. Gudjonsson
et al. (Gudjonsson, Kopelman, & MacKeith, 1999; Participants
Gudjonsson, Sigurdsson, Sigurdardottir, Steinthorsson One hundred and fifty-five participants were tested
& Sigurdardottir, 2014) gave examples in which the (109 women and 46 men); their mean age was 17.11 (SD =
systematic use of techniques that undermine suspects’ 1.33; range 15–20). One hundred and twenty participants
faith in the truth of their memories led to these people were students at a public upper-secondary school (high
to doubt their innocence, thus resulting in guilty verdicts – school and technical secondary school); thirty-five were
despite significant doubts about the guilt of the students at a private bilingual high school in Kraków.
tried suspects. Therefore, it can be assumed that the Students took part in the experiment during their classes.
memory distrust that occurs in a certain situational context No compensation was given for participating.
can lead to false confessions. In the case of the
misinformation effect, experimental data was obtained Materials
showing that memory distrust increased the susceptibility The original material was a five-minute sound
to respond according to misinformation in the final recording that had been prepared for the study; it contained
memory test. information on anorexia and a case report. To introduce
Van Bergen et al. (2009) also examined the relation- the misinformation, two summaries of the recording were
ship between memory distrust on one hand and inter- created: one contained misinformation (eight false details);
rogative suggestibility, compliance, the tendency to the control summary did not contain misinformation and
generate false memories, and objective memory perfor- did not mention the correct original information. The
mance on the other hand. Subjects who had negative memory test consisted of sixteen closed-ended questions,
opinions about their memory turned out to be more eight of which were critical and referred to the misleading
compliant and reported a greater number of problems details; the remaining eight were buffers.
related to cognitive functioning. Interestingly, memory In order to induce anxiety, half of the participants
self-assessment was not related to interrogative suggest- were given information written in bold which stated, “The
ibility and false memories. The authors explained the task of the worst performers will be to prepare and deliver
differences in suggestibility results between their research an oral presentation on eating disorders”. We decided to
and the results obtained by Gudjonsson (2003) by pointing use anxiety induction related to public speaking because
that in the case of the court cases analysed by Gudjonsson fear of this is particularly common among young people
(e.g., Gudjonsson et al., 1999) the pressure exerted on the (Graeff, Parente, Del-Ben, & Guimarães, 2003). Experi-
subjects during interrogation was much greater, which mental procedures of this kind have been described as
could have increased susceptibility to suggestion in people simulated public speaking (SPS, McNair et al., 1982). To
experiencing memory distrust. The discrepancy between better conceal the real purpose of the study and to confirm
the results could also have occurred because Gudjonsson the cover story, a questionnaire consisting of ten closed
et al. (1999) mainly focused on state memory distrust, yes/no questions was created; these questions concerned
344 Marta Kuczek, Malwina Szpitalak, Romuald Polczyk

teenagers' knowledge of eating disorders and previous summary of the recording, which did or did not contain
school activities on the subject. misinformation, depending on the experimental condition.
The following questionnaires were used: To maintain the faked anonymity, the students signed the
State and Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI – X1 questionnaires with their class journal number. This was
Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970; Polish adaptation: necessary in order to maintain the credibility of the ‘threat’
Wrześniewski & Sosnowski, 1996). This tool consists of contained in the anxiety induction. After the questionnaires
20 items for assessing trait anxiety and 20 for state anxiety, had been collected, the second phase of the study took
all of which are rated on a 4-point Likert scale. Higher place, in which the students were given the final test (with
scores indicate greater anxiety. For the purpose of this or without anxiety induction), as well as the STAI-XI,
study, only the state anxiety subscale was used. Internal VAS (as the post-test), and the fake questionnaire.
reliability as measured by Cronbach alpha in the present
research was 0.82.
Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) is a response scale that
RESULTS
is usually applied in the form of a horizontal line (10 cm)
that is anchored by word descriptors at each end. The Preliminary Analyses
person marks the point on the line that represents their Manipulation check. First, the manipulation check
current state (Cline, Herman, Shaw, & Morton, 1992). In was performed in order to verify the efficacy of the anxiety
the present study, the left end of the scale was described as induction by means of a two-factor ANOVA with one
“no anxiety” and the right end as “extreme anxiety”. between-subjects factor (anxiety induction) and one
The Memory Assessment Scale (SSMQ; Squire et al., repeated-measures factor (pre- vs. post-test on anxiety
1979; Polish adaptation: Kuczek, Szpitalak, & Polczyk, measures). The manipulation proved unsuccessful in the
2018). This tool consists of 18 statements concerning case of both measures of anxiety: for STAI-XI, the change
memory distrust, which is defined as the tendency to in the anxiety level was not significantly higher in the
evaluate one’s own memory negatively (van Bergen et al., group for which anxiety had been induced compared with
2009; van Bergen et al., 2010). Each statement is rated on the control group (ANOVA for interaction: F(1, 152) =
a 9-point Likert scale. Lower scores indicate greater 0.42, p = .519, η2 < .01), and for VAS: (F(1, 153) = 2.48,
memory distrust. This scale’s Cronbach alpha in the p = .117, η2 = .02).
present research was 0.86. Because of the ineffectiveness of the state anxiety
manipulation, verifying the hypotheses concerning the
Procedure induced state of anxiety was impossible. However, it was
The experiment was run during classes in high still possible to analyse the participants’ varying levels of
schools or in the institute laboratory. The participants trait anxiety and its impact on other variables. All four
were randomly assigned to one of four groups according to indices of anxiety (VAS and STAI at pretest and post-test)
the 2 × 2 design: misinformation (present vs. absent) × were used in these analyses, as well as their total index,
anxiety (with vs. without the induction of anxiety). The which was computed as the mean of the standardized
experimenter introduced herself as a Jagiellonian Uni- results on the four indices.
versity psychology student who was testing young Differences between schools. As described above,
people’s knowledge and beliefs concerning eating dis- the sample consisted of two rather heterogeneous samples.
orders. Next, the students listened to the recording and Therefore, all the important variables of the two sub-
were then given the STAI-XI and VAS tools as the pretest samples were compared by means of Student t tests. The
of anxiety, as well as the SSMQ. They then read the results are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Differences between subsamples for the number of correct answers, anxiety, and memory distrust

Mean SD
t df p
S1 S2 S1 S2
Correct answers 5.28 4.54 1.85 2.11 1.99 153 .048
VAS1 28.86 46.97 35.03 37.69 -2.65 153 .009
VAS2 27.59 47.20 32.45 39.58 -2.99 153 .003
STAI1 38.26 43.63 8.16 12.72 -2.99 153 .003
STAI2 37.45 43.47 8.80 12.91 -3.15 152 .002
Mean anxiety -0.12 0.42 0.79 1.09 -3.26 153 .001
Memory distrust 129.66 122.73 12.29 21.21 2.41 151 .017

S1 – public upper-secondary school; S2 – private bilingual high school

 Anxious and distrustful – How do state anxiety and memory distrust influence the misinformation effect? 345
As can be seen, there were rather large and consistent entered in the analyses as covariates in order to control for
differences between the subsamples. Sample 1 scored them. The ‘anxiety induction / no induction’ grouping
more correct answers and had higher results on all indices factor was also controlled for as it might have influenced
of anxiety. Given these results, this grouping variable was the results in an unknown way, despite the fact that it
controlled for in all subsequent analyses. apparently did not affect anxiety. The results are presented
in Table 2.
Main Analyses As can be seen in Table 2, the results were quite clear.
First, the analysis concerning the first hypothesis, i.e. In the misled group, all correlations (as well as coefficients
the existence of the misinformation effect, was performed, from the moderation analysis) of anxiety indices with the
as without it all planned analyses would be meaningless. It number of correct answers were significant and positive,
turned out that misled participants had a significantly thus indicating that the higher the anxiety, the lower the
lower number of correct answers than non-misled ones tendency to accept misinformation. In the non-misled
(means and SDs, respectively: 4.37 vs. 6.25 (1.98 and group, none of the correlations were statistically signifi-
1.14), F(1, 153) = 44.82, p < .001, η2 = .23); thus, the cant. The interactions between misinformation and anxiety
misinformation effect was replicated with a large effect were all significant except for one; even in the case of the
size. non-significant one, the relationship was significant in the
The second hypothesis in this study stated that misled group but not in the control group. This confirms
anxiety would be negatively related to the misinformation the hypothesis concerning anxiety. However, no signifi-
effect. The third hypothesis stated that memory distrust cant correlation or interaction was found in the case of
would be positively related to the misinformation effect. memory distrust, thus leaving the related hypothesis
In order to verify Hypotheses 2 and 3, the correlations without confirmation.
of anxiety and memory distrust with the correctness of In sum, the hypotheses concerning the replication of
answers on critical questions were computed. Such an the misinformation effect and the negative impact of
analysis is only meaningful in a group of misled anxiety on it were confirmed, but no support was found for
participants, as one cannot study the misinformation effect the prediction concerning the positive relationship between
without misinformation; however, for comparison, the memory distrust and misinformation.
correlations were also calculated in the control group.
The results are presented in Table 2, which also DISCUSSION
contains the moderation analyses that were performed in
order to ensure that the correlations were indeed different The present study was performed in order to verify
in the misled and non-misled groups. This is important as three hypotheses: (1) the existence of the misinformation
the fact that an effect is significant in one group and not effect; (2) a negative relationship between anxiety and the
significant in another is only a weak argument for a real misinformation effect (that is, the higher the anxiety,
difference (Hayes, 2018). In the moderation analyses, the lower the vulnerability to misinformation); and
which were performed by means of PROCESS software (3) a positive relationship between memory distrust and
(Hayes, 2018), anxiety indices and memory distrust were the misinformation effect (that is, the higher the memory
set as predictors; the number of correct answers were set as distrust, the higher the vulnerability to misinformation).
the dependent variable; and the ‘misinformation’ grouping The first two hypotheses were confirmed, but the third
factor was set as the dichotomous moderator. Given the was not.
above-mentioned differences between the subsamples, this As for the misinformation effect, the present results
factor, as well as the gender of the participant, were are another demonstration of it. The ease with which it can

Table 2. Correlations between anxiety and memory distrust; the number of correct answers, and results of moderation analyses

Pearson rs Moderation
Misled Non-misled pint bM bNM
VAS1 .38** .11 .003 0.02** < 0.01
VAS2 .39** .10 .003 0.02** < -0.01
STAI1 .35** .10 .022 0.07** < -0.01
STAI2 .27** .13 .127 0.05* 0.01
Anxiety .38** .13 .010 0.85** <0.01
Memory distrust -.07 -.24 .777 -0.01 0.02

**: p < .01

pint: p for interaction of a given predictor with the moderating misinformation manipulation
bM: regression coefficient between a given predictor and the number of correct answers in the misled group
bNM: regression coefficient between a given predictor and the number of correct answers in the non-misled group
346 Marta Kuczek, Malwina Szpitalak, Romuald Polczyk

be elicited (comp. Zaragoza & Lane, 1994) should be (2010) also included adults. Commissaris, Ponds and
a warning for all engaged in justice systems. Due to the Jolles (1998) found that younger people were more
sample of participations in the present study, which mostly vulnerable to memory distrust as a state, which can be
consisted of people in late adolescence, the obtained associated, for example, with experiencing a stressful
results may contribute to knowledge concerning popula- situation. In turn, memory distrust as a relatively stable
tions in which the misinformation effect can be obtained. individual trait (as measured by SSMQ) is more common
The second hypothesis, which concerns the impact of among older persons, as well as among people with
anxiety on the misinformation effect, was planned to be a lower level of education. To some extent, this may
analysed by means of a manipulation that induced anxiety. explain the differences in results between the present study
However, this was impossible due to the ineffectiveness of and that of van Bergen et al. (2010).
the anxiety induction. The reason for the ineffectiveness of There were also some procedural differences between
the anxiety induction may be that it differed slightly from both studies. In the experiments by van Bergen et al.
the standard procedures used for simulated public speak- (2010), after encountering the original material (video
ing. In experiments using SPS, respondents are usually footage of a robbery) the participants were asked to give
informed that their statements will be recorded, which is a free recall of what they remembered. The recall was then
an additional factor that induces anxiety (e.g. Graeff et al., shown to them in a written form containing some
2003; Phillips & Giancola, 2008). A situation in which misleading information. Such a procedure on its own has
students were faced with the possibility of recording their great potential to elicit memory distrust as participants are
statements would definitely be more effective in causing seemingly confronted with their own testimonies. In such
anxiety, but it would also be less plausible in the eyes of a situation, detecting discrepancies caused by misinforma-
subjects, given that the study lasted 45 minutes, i.e. the tion inevitably leads one to doubt one’s own memory
duration of a single lesson in Poland. In the study by (or suspect being tricked by the investigator). This is a big
Ridley and Clifford (2004), participants were tested difference in comparison to the procedure used in the
individually, which also increased the credibility of the present study, in which the participants’ belief in the
anxiety induction applied by the researchers. It is also functioning of their own memories was not undermined at
possible that the authority of the experimenter (who was any moment.
a university student) was not high enough for the students, Another reason for the lack of correlation between
which could have affected the induction efficiency and the memory distrust and vulnerability to misinformation may
level of anxiety.Despite the failure of the anxiety-inducing simply be the low variability of doubting one’s memory in
manipulation, the analyses concerning the relationship the present sample, which consisted only of young people,
between anxiety and the misinformation effect were still who are less prone to experiencing memory distrust
possible when they were based on anxiety measured as (Commissaris et al., 1998). It is possible that greater
a situational emotional state that characterizes the variance of memory distrust would cause it to start to show
participants at the time of the study (regardless of the a significant relationship with the misinformation effect.
anxiety induction). It turned out that the higher the level of
anxiety, the lower the vulnerability to misinformation. Limitations and future directions
These results are congruent with the studies of Ridley et al. The main limitation of the present study is the failure
(2002), Ridley and Clifford (2006), and Hoscheidt et al. to confirm the efficacy of the anxiety manipulation. As
(2014), in which anxiety was measured, as well as with elaborated above, it was still possible to confirm the
those in which it was induced (Ridley & Clifford, 2004; relevant hypothesis, but this would certainly be more
Nitschke et al., 2019). In terms of the processing convincing if substantiated with experimental manipula-
efficiency theory (Eysenck et al., 2007; Eysenck & Calvo, tion. In future research of this kind, better methods of
1992), it seems that in the case of anxious participants the inducing anxiety need to be developed, but this is
increased on-task effort outweighed the negative conse- a technical and ethical challenge.
quences of the reduction in storage and processing Second, the lack of a significant relationship between
capacity caused by worrying. It is possible that anxious believing in the quality of one’s own memory and
participants who strive to perform well were better able to vulnerability to misinformation is still intriguing. As
detect discrepancies between the original and post-event mentioned above, it is possible that this relationship could
materials. Although discrepancy detection by no means not be confirmed in the present study because it only
guarantees resistance to misinformation (Blank, 1998; included young participants, who usually do not doubt
Polczyk, 1997; 2017), it nevertheless reduces it (Tousig- their memories very much. This gives scope for further
nant, Hall, & Loftus, 1986). exploration which would include different age groups,
The present study did not confirm the hypothesis including elderly people. It may also be useful to preselect
postulating a positive relationship between memory samples of participants who for whatever reason differ
distrust and the tendency to yield to misinformation. This considerably as regards memory distrust and to compare
result is not consistent with that obtained by van Bergen vulnerability to misinformation between them.
et al. (2010). One explanation for this discrepancy may be Finally, the proportion of male subjects was rather
the fact that only young adolescents took part in the small in the present research. This warrants a replication
present study, while the experiment by van Bergen et al. on a larger male sample.
 Anxious and distrustful – How do state anxiety and memory distrust influence the misinformation effect? 347
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