A

01 i

President’s Message
“What we can afford least is to define the problem of future war as we would
like it to be, and by doing so, introduce into our defense vulnerabilities based
on self-delusion”

- LtGen H R McMaster (Ret), former US National Security Adviser

We live in an era of unprecedented change and disruption in the regional

and global security order. As the quote above from US LtGen McMaster states
plainly, we cannot afford self-delusion when thinking and preparing for the
future of warfare. With the security environment in flux, defense thinkers
and strategists must constantly be on the lookout for trends that would
shape warfare and affect the outlook of Philippine security and defense. It is
in this context that the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP),
in partnership with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), pursued the
Future of Philippine Warfare Project.

The first volume of the Future of Philippine Warfare sought to incite

discussions on what the future of warfare would look like. The papers
tackled the proliferation and maturation of emerging technologies, the
transformation of the various domains of warfare, the emergence of hybrid
warfare, and the changing regional and global dynamics vis-à-vis the
Philippines’ traditional defense and security focus and postures. It provides
the baseline and scenarios on where warfare in the future is headed, and
what the Philippines and the AFP must be prepared to face.

Building on this previous work, this second volume aims to reexamine the
President’s Papers: fundamental theoretical assumptions that underpin our understanding
The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II of Philippine defense. The papers provide varying perspectives on the
Copyright © 2022 Philippines’ ‘theory of victory’ in face of the likely threats our country
ISSN 2719-0781 may confront in the coming years. It is in NDCP’s view that in devising
National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP)
solutions against the technologically advanced and multidimensional
General Arturo Enrile Avenue, Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City 1100
threats and challenges of the future, we must countercheck our ideas of
what may guarantee our security and deter aggression against our country.
Our exploration on the concept of a ‘theory of victory’ is timely as recent
events call into question longstanding beliefs that have justified a more
The copyright of the articles and images in this compilation reverts to the individual
inward defense and security focus, such as complex interdependence among
authors and artists. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any
states, and a possible strong international response and condemnation to
means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any
aggressive acts.
information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the
National Defense College of the Philippines, or individual authors.

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II

ii iii

I sincerely hope that this second volume will encourage and inspire the Table of Contents
planners, educators, operators and thinkers of our Armed Forces to further
reevaluate our security and deterrence discourse, to prepare the Philippines
for the future. Introduction to the Volume .......................................................................................... 1
Finally, I would also wish to extend our gratitude to my predecessor,
BGen Archimedes H Viaje AFP (Ret), PhD, MNSA, CESE for starting this Philippine Army Theory of Victory ........................................................................... 7
groundbreaking project, and to Dr Francis C Domingo of the de La Salle
University-Manila, and Capt Xylee C Paculba PN (Ret) for their invaluable Philippine Air Force Theory of Victory ................................................................... 31
assistance in the review and refinement of Volume Two’s papers.
Theorizing Naval Warfare: Conditions and Principles
As you read this volume, I invite you to contemplate upon the words of Dr for Philippine Naval Victory ......................................................................................... 61
Jose Rizal on what it takes to achieve victory:
Editorial Board .................................................................................................................. 85
“Filipinos don’t realize that victory is the child of struggle, that joy blossoms
from suffering, and redemption is the product of sacrifice”

-Dr Jose Rizal, “Como se Gobiernan las Filipinas”, La Solidaridad

LTGEN FERDINAND M CARTUJANO PAF (RET)

President, NDCP

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II

1 2

Introduction to the Volume While these documents outline how the AFP would execute a defensive
campaign and employ its air, land and sea forces to defend the country,
several questions still remain: why would the AFP’s force employment as
The Philippines faces a wide array of defense and security challenges to its outlined in the abovementioned documents, lead to a defeat of a prospective
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and internal peace and order. Strategizing aggressor? What are the underlying strategic and operational logics and
on how to confront these and other future challenges, amidst strains to our assumptions that inform these strategies and how they would lead to the
financial resources exacerbated by the disruptions caused by the COVID-19 desired end-goal? What does it mean for the Philippines to be victorious
pandemic, consumes much of the AFP’s intellectual energies and planning. against an external aggressor?
The need to reevaluate and reinvigorate Philippine defense thinking
There has been a certain reticence to use the term “victory” by Philippine
has never been more urgent; the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, and
defense and security practitioners, especially in addressing external security
the proliferation and use of emerging technologies in conflict such in the
challenges. Perhaps it is due to a belief that conflicts are multifaceted, complex,
Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020 have made it clear that the disaster and war
and intractable, and that it may be hubristic to even speak of victory, for fear
scenarios that were once regarded as imaginary or the stuff of fiction are
of alienating defeated yet prideful parties, or aggressor states with whom
becoming realities.
we must continue to engage. Perhaps too, we have collectively been resigned
It is against this backdrop that the National Defense College of the to thinking that “war is unwinnable”, as stated by many prominent political
Philippines launched the Future of Philippine Warfare Project in 2020, in personalities even up to the Presidents of the Philippines themselves.
partnership with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). It is the belief
As conflicts like the Russo-Ukrainian War are showing, continued ignorance
of the AFP and the NDCP that the Philippines can and should be ready for the
and downplaying of external threats, even for ostensibly pragmatic reasons,
coming wars of the next decade. The volume one of this Project, published
can only bring existential peril. The critical assumptions that underpin
in February 2021, sketched out the probable “future of war” scenarios, with
preexisting defense policy, especially with regards to external defense, need
several features of these visions already playing out in the ongoing 2022
to be reexamined. A conceptual construct is required for the AFP to begin
Russo-Ukrainian War. Having envisioned the future of war and the types of
answering these questions, especially as it confronts major challenges to
conflicts the Philippines will likely confront in 10-20 years; it follows that
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Put another way, there is a need for a
attention must be paid to developing the right strategies and appropriate
Philippine theory of victory.
capabilities to face such challenges.
But what is a theory of victory? The late Colin Gray identified it as a set of
Though progress has been made to advance Philippine strategic planning
plausible explanation of the “ability of success or failure in war to enable a
and thought, a significant gap was identified in the theoretical foundations
decision in an issue”. It is a collection of coherent ideas of how to shape a war,
of Philippine strategic and defense planning. While the Philippine defense
utilizing available or soon-to-be-available resources, forces and strategies,
and security academic community has reams of data and has produced
given the likely adversary and strategic context, to achieve the desired aims
papers that discuss theories and methods for addressing the “root causes”
or end-state.
of insurgency and terrorism, there remains a dearth of literature focusing
on territorial and external defense, despite its increasing importance amidst Achieving ‘end-states’ seems almost intuitive; the end-state and means
the heightening risk of confrontation in the West Philippine Sea, and threats to achieve it through the assorted national lines of effort, is articulated in
to Philippine sovereignty elsewhere, such as in the Philippine Rise. the general policies and strategies of the Philippines, namely the National
Security Policy (NSP), National Security Strategy (NSS), as well as other core
An examination of official documents and public pronouncements indicate
security documents. But it should be noted that the end-states articulated in
that the primary concept for external defense is predicated on “minimum
these documents are purposely broad and encompassing, due to the nature
credible defense”, guided by the National Defense Strategy (NDS), National
and intended audience of such documents. The Department of Defense
Military Strategy (NMS) 2019 and the Joint Operating Concept (JOC), and
(DND) and the AFP need to articulate these end-states according to their
major service supporting strategies such as the Active Archipelagic Defense
mandate and specialization.
Strategy (AADS), Integrated Air Defense Strategy (IADS), and the Land
Power Maneuver Concept (LPMC). While we may be familiar with the stakes of defense (our national
patrimony, our sovereignty, our form of government as a democratic state,

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Introduction to the Volume
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our territorial integrity, the freedom and security of our people), as well the strategic environment and likely threats that its formulation of a theory
as the general tools and strategies required (specific weapons systems, of victory must meet. The Philippine Army assesses that the world that
organizations, doctrines, approaches such as “whole of government” and will continue to tread toward varying degrees of ‘hybrid warfare’, wherein
“whole of nation”, defense diplomacy, etc.), we have not sufficiently assessed adversaries will “resort to techniques and procedures both conventional
whether these tools and strategies would actually lead to achievement/ and non-conventional within the same battlespace, tailored to exploit
protection of said stakes. Failure to do so has often led us to doing things for enemy weakness.” In this environment, the Philippine Army draws on a
the sake of doing them – “for compliance”, not because they contribute to variety of strategic traditions from both East and West, acknowledging the
victory or security. It has also made advocacies for defense modernization need for “the most holistic view of strategy available.” It proposes a theory of
difficult to defend despite sincere belief that defense modernization is victory to explain how the skillful employment of land power maneuver, in
overdue. concert with the joint force and capacitated to wage cognitive, asymmetric
and maneuver warfare, can lead to “an end-state where threats are deterred
A theory of victory is supposed to explain why the strategies of the NSS,
from starting or continuing a conflict”. Their paper also outlines three
NDS and NMS will lead us to the desired end-state. Properly articulated
scenarios of concern where the Philippine Army’s theories may be tested -
and developed, such a construct could better ground Philippine defense
ranging from internal armed conflict to regional conflict.
planning, procurement wish-lists, and provide a coherent rational of our
defense posture. The Philippine Navy, through the Office of the Assistant Chief of Naval
Staff for Plans, N5, in its paper on Theorizing Naval Warfare: Conditions
This is important, as a comprehensive discourse on the country’s defense
and Principles for Philippine Naval Victory, focuses on the naval dimensions
needs has been stymied by long-standing and entrenched biases in favor of
of war and its vital role in securing Philippine defense interests. The Navy
internal security within the Philippine defense and security establishment,
foresees a future where potential aggressors could conduct “deliberate,
frequent characterization of the Philippines as a “small country” incapable
debilitating and decisive” war against the Philippines. To avert such scenario
of meaningful deterrence or even winning any war other than internal ones,
and to contribute to our victory, the Philippine Navy must shift from being
and a lack of expertise or interest in the Philippine academic setting on key
an “input” to seapower, that reacts to the strategic environment and thus is
strategic concepts such as deterrence.
at the mercy of aggressive powers, towards being an “output” to seapower,
As the topic of the theory of victory is a new one for the Philippines, our capable of exercising sea control and actively influencing the calculations of
partners in the AFP were provided guide questions to ponder while writing aggressors and allies alike, even if the power balance remains asymmetric
for this project. These questions were as follows: between the Philippines and its adversary. In the context of an overarching
threat to the Philippines from the West Philippine Sea, the Navy underscores
• What is the Philippines’ “theory of victory” or desired end-state? the need to develop asymmetric capabilities in both cyberspace, surface,
What are our theories of victory against specific adversaries? and subsurface areas, and leverage its partnerships and alliances.
• What defense/warfighting strategy concepts would best answer The Philippine Air Force (PAF), through the Office of the Assistant Chief of
the Philippine theories of victory in the short-term (from now to 2022), Air Staff for Plans, A5, underlines the importance of “jointness” in its paper
mid-term (by 2028), and long term (beyond 2028)? on the Philippine Air Force Theory of Victory. With the dynamic and evolving
• What capabilities must be attained to meet Philippine desired end- security environment, the PAF emphasizes adaptability, while remaining
states and support its theories of victory? Which capabilities are the grounded and compatible with the Joint Force and the JOC. The PAF does not
main purview of the AFP and what capabilities can be handed off to see itself as being in a vacuum, instead it needs to seamlessly operate with
other security agencies or stakeholders? the other major services and government agencies, to achieve its objectives.
Victory is therefore best achieved when the PAF is fully capacitated to meet
• What needs to be done to meet or improve current capability these joint needs. To this end, the PAF has developed its Adaptive Combat
roadmaps (e.g. AFP Modernization Program Horizon 2 and Horizon 3)? Employment concept, which supports wider Integrated Air Operations.
The Philippine Army, through the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Several commonalities can be observed between the papers. The major
Plans, G5, in its paper on The Philippine Army Theory of Victory, examines the services and the AFP as a whole anchor their strategies and plans on key
theoretical and philosophical foundations for a theory of victory, as well as national defense documents, such as the NMS and JOC. The major services

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Introduction to the Volume
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see themselves as force providers, i.e., they provide forces that the AFP, There is also a need to bring together the disparate views of the major
through the General Headquarters and the Unified Commands, employ in an services into a more holistic level, given the importance of ‘jointness’. This
event of war. For the Army and Navy, their contributions to Philippine victory is a way forward that the AFP via its planning and strategic studies units,
can be seen in establishing and maintaining deterrence in their respective led by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans J5, can undertake to
domains. Meanwhile, the Air Force places emphasis on adaptability to further improve Philippine military and strategic planning.
effectively address future threats in support to the Joint Force.
As a new administration takes office this 2022, the time is ripe for us to
In their discussions of future scenarios, the papers crucially appraised engage in these discussions. By questioning and refining our assumptions
the likely adversary—taking note of their strategic culture, growing power, and developing more robust theories of victory to inform our strategies and
penchant for hybrid warfare and gray zone operations, as well their likely our capability plans, we may better present the case to the new president,
aims and objectives against the Philippines. Such endeavor is significant elected officials, and the Filipino people, that your Armed Forces is actively
in crafting a theory of victory; a useful theory should be designed for a thinking, and making itself ready to meet the threats of the future.
particular adversary, taking into consideration states’ differing capabilities,
mindsets, and worldviews.
Furthermore, the papers also considered the country’s allies, and the
likelihood for them to come into our aid in an event of an aggression. The
Philippine Navy’s paper goes into detail on the probability of military
assistance and support from the United States and other like-minded
countries. This is an important aspect for Philippine theory of victory due to
the country’s current defense capabilities. International and allied support
is salient to successfully defend against aggression. Again, the Russo-
Ukrainian War provides a stark real-life demonstration of the importance of
international aid, as well as the limits of expecting external powers to come
to one’s defense.
The major services, and indeed the entire AFP, remained cognizant that
they will be called upon to perform tasks other than war. This is a necessary
part of their duties due to the country’s many concerns as well as the reality
that the AFP has certain capabilities not present in other departments
of government. While this remains among their responsibilities during
peacetime, there is a need to ensure that these tasks do not distract from
their main objectives and goals. The ‘theory of victory’ concept is not meant
to answer these other concerns; indeed, for non-traditional security and
non-warfighting missions, alternative constructs for measuring success are
required.
This volume of the Future of Philippine Warfare is not intended to
decisively answer the question of what the Philippines’ theories of victory
must be against the threats we face. After all, as the Philippine Army itself
mentions in its paper, ultimately these theories are just theories, and their
validity can only truly be tested in the fires of war. While we surely hope it
never comes to that, it is precisely in the spirit of the Future of Philippine
Warfare project that we must continue to discuss and refine our theories,
strategies and plans.

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Introduction to the Volume
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Abstract. As the Philippines progresses further into the 21st century, the
unpredictability of security conditions creates multiple possibilities in
terms of future threat scenarios. This ambiguity emphasizes the need for the
country’s defense institutions to adapt and evolve through the development
of defense capabilities, and as necessary, a redefinition of security policies,
doctrines, and strategies. In exploring the future of Philippine ground warfare,
current threats encountered by the Philippine Army are examined vis-à-
vis the trend of hybridization, due to globalization, mass communication,
and rapid technological innovation. To contribute to the discourse on the
Philippines’ theory of victory, this paper argues that the concerted efforts
President’s Papers: of Army units, utilizing Landpower Maneuver, to supplement the actions of
The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II the Joint Force, will lead to enemy forces abandoning the idea of conflict
in its entire spectrum due to loss of capability or will. The objective is to
PHILIPPINE ARMY THEORY OF VICTORY achieve an end-state where threats are deterred to start or continue conflict,
by exploiting opportunities in all domains and dimensions of the security
architecture. To further demonstrate the Philippine Army’s theory of victory,
multiple future scenarios involving hybrid threats to the ground force are
employed in this paper. Towards the end, an overview of how Philippine
Army’s ground defense strategy and capability development direction are
COL ROMMEL R CORDOVA MNSA (INF) PA highlighted to describe the Army’s path to victory.
Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, G5, PA
INTRODUCTION
MAJ WELLARD S MAQUIDA (INF) PA
Chief, Strategic and Special Studies Branch, OG5, PA The Philippine security environment is not immune to internal
and external pressures sustained or exacerbated by advancements in
Micah Jeiel R Perez technology, among other fields; globalization; calamities; and the pursuit
Research Analyst, OG5, PA of differing, often clashing interests by state and non-state actors. Even
more, these pressures put the country’s security mechanisms to test at the
Joshua L Custodio local, regional, and global level. As the nation progresses further into the
Planning Officer, OG5, PA 21st century, the unpredictability of security conditions creates multiple
possibilities in terms of future threat scenarios. This ambiguity emphasizes
Maria Rosario G Banez the need for the country’s defense institutions to continuously adapt and
Defense Research Officer, OG5, PA evolve through the development of defense capabilities, and as necessary,
through the redefinition of security policies, doctrines, and strategies.
Pvt Marvin Banzuela The National Defense College of the Philippines1, for instance, advocates a
collective understanding of what constitutes warfare, one that reflects the
current trends in the security environment as well as lessons learned from
the past, to usher a more strategic future direction for the defense sector,
cognizant of fiscal limitations, as well as realistic expectations.

While it is important to note that the Philippine Army pursues

organizational and capability development goals parallel to the direction of
higher headquarters, and anchored to national level security policies, the

1  Dianne Faye C Despi, et al., “Short, Sharp, and Multidimensional: Future Wars and
Considerations for Philippine Defense and Deterrence,” President’s Papers Volume 1: The Future
of Philippine Warfare (Quezon City: National Defense College of the Philippines, 2021), 77-88.

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Philippine Army Theory of Victory
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fulfillment of its mandate demands from it a more nuanced understanding scenarios, as opposed to ideas proliferated by Western thinkers, Clausewitz
of trends in ground defense strategies and operations. Relatedly, in exploring and Liddell Hart. National level strategic policies are then examined to draw
the future of Philippine ground warfare, current threats encountered a common understanding of what the country desires in terms of security,
by the ground force are examined vis-à-vis the trend of hybridization. and how the government as whole, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Conflicts across various operational environments are perceived to evolve (AFP) in particular, envisions to achieve this end. Eastern strategic thought
towards hybridity largely due to globalization, mass communication, and and the Philippines’ security policies are analyzed to arrive at the Philippine
rapid technological innovation – all of which impact upon the perceptions Army theory of victory. This theory is further translated across various
and relations of rational state and non-state actors possessing offensive threat scenarios that the Philippine Army will most likely encounter in
military capability, uncertain of each other’s interests, and at the very least, the future. In each of these scenarios of greatest concern which exhibit
seeking survival within the anarchic international system.2 Hybrid warfare, elements or characteristics of hybrid warfare, the Philippine Army will be
which more closely relates to the Eastern concept of warfare advanced by able to achieve its desired end state, if its efforts are aimed at diminishing
China, is the type which involves the employment of various techniques the enemy’s idea of conflict by stripping them off of their capabilities and
and procedures both conventional and non-conventional, within the same their will. Added analysis is provided in the following section through a
battlespace and tailored to exploit enemy weaknesses.3 The Philippine discussion of the Philippine Army’s Operating Concept and how it relates
Army will thus encounter future threats that are first, willing to violate the to the theory of victory. Similarly, the following portion briefs the reader of
sovereignty and promote violence in a time of peace; second, have strategic the Philippine Army’s capability development objectives, and examines how
goals; and finally, realize the primacy and combination of other-than- these can bring the Army closer to victory, as defined. Towards the end, the
conventional military forms of warfare. paper provides a summary of its arguments and highlights areas of possible
study that will broaden and deepen the discussion of the Philippines theory
However, productive discourse on the future Philippine security of victory.
architecture does not end at a picture of what Philippine land, naval, and air
warfare will look like. Rather, must extend towards the realms of strategy, A PHILIPPINE THEORY OF VICTORY
doctrine, organization, material capabilities, and policy if it aims to inspire
progress in the country’s defense sector.4 In light of clearly articulating the The idea of reconceptualizing military strategy as a “theory of
Philippine Army’s desired end-state given that the future ground warfare victory” is rooted in the Western—and specifically, the American—self-
will possess hybrid characteristics, this paper looks into the Philippine assessment of their strategic approach and culture as something that has
Army’s theory of victory against future hybrid threats and argues that the ossified into rigid structures with simplistic applications. Meiser argues
concerted efforts of Army units, utilizing Landpower Maneuver, to that the US defense community has boxed itself within the boundaries of
supplement the actions of the Joint Force, will lead to enemy forces the ends-ways-means formula by interpreting it too literally. He further
abandoning the idea of conflict in its entire spectrum due to loss of argues that solving strategic problems using a comprehensive or whole-of-
capability or will. The objective is to achieve an end-state where threats government approach has fostered within US strategists an overemphasis
are deterred to start or continue conflict, by exploiting opportunities on straightforward and ultimately uncreative uses of the “means”
in all domains and dimensions of the security architecture. element—resources.5 This creates “a situation where strategy is reduced
to a perfunctory exercise in allocating resources,” an approach that is “an
In fleshing out this argument, the paper is structured to begin with excellent way to foster policy stability, but it is not a recipe for critical and
a definition of what a theory of victory is. Largely drawing from American creative thinking”.6 Meiser concluded that strategy had to be reimagined as a
military thought, a theory of victory is a product of inquiry into how a strategy theory of success, “a solution to a problem, an explanation of how obstacles
brings an actor towards its desired end state. Upon laying this foundation, can be overcome”.7 Such an approach “encourages creative thinking while
the paper then presents the perspectives of Western and Eastern strategic keeping the strategist rooted in the process of causal analysis”.8 This helps
thinkers on their concepts of victory. Eastern philosophies from strategists clarify how a specific plan is expected to cause the desired end state in a
particularly Sun Tzu and Kautilya are more relevant to the modern hybrid given scenario.

2  Rommel R Cordova, Wellard Maquida, and John Manangan, “The Future of Philippine 5  Jeffrey W. Meiser, “Are Our Strategic Models Flawed? Ends + Ways + Means = (Bad) Strategy,”
Land Warfare: The Philippine Army’s Perspective,” President’s Papers Volume 1: The Future of Parameters 46, no.4 (Winter 2016-2017): 81-82.
Philippine Warfare (Quezon City: National Defense College of the Philippines, 2021), 2-31. 6 Ibid., 82.
3  Ibid. 7  Meiser, “Are Our Strategic Models Flawed?,” 90.
4  Despi, et al., “Short, Sharp, and Multidimensional”, 77-88. 8  Ibid., 86.
President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Philippine Army Theory of Victory
11 12

Hoffman refines this concept by specifying the need to understand for centuries.12 Similarly, Sir Basil Liddell Hart saw the application of the
strategy as a hypothesis to be tested. Establishing a testable “if/then” military as a means to fulfill the ends of policy, although by emphasis the
statement is thus central to strategic development.9 For him, strategists military's role is ensuring the prosperous continuance of national policy.
should be proposing logical plans for specific scenarios, and they should Military victory for Hart was less about position or attrition and more about
refrain from answering how each scenario should end. Instead, a strategy analysis or paralysis—the best maneuvers produced decisive outcomes with
should explain how and why its proposed ends-ways-means chain of causal no casualties.13 The philosophies of both men lend themselves easily to the
events would work. Crafting such a logical chain of causal factors requires kinetic and maneuver warfare of the actual battlefield, despite involving
degrees of creativity that cannot be reduced to simple formulas, and so political elements and statecraft in their writings. Central ideas under these
strategy, for Hoffman, has always been “more art than science”.10 The if/ contexts revolve around the enemy’s will to resist.
then hypothesis around which a strategy revolves is what today’s Western
thinkers call a “theory of success” or “theory of victory.” The foundational concepts of Eastern strategists can also be
translated into such if/then statements. With the dual but complimentary
Strategy should always provide answers for the fundamental aspects of harmony and chaos, as well as his emphasis on the use of both
question of “what should we do?” Strategists identify a problem—a foe to maneuver and deception at all levels of conflict, Sun Tzu’s Art of War continues
defeat, a threat to intimidate—and provide decision-makers several distinct to be relevant in today’s trend of whole-of-government approaches. Like
experimental responses,11 all with their own pros and cons. Differences Hart, he proposed the bloodless nature of an ideal and decisive victory.14
between strategic options should never be reduced to the amount of Similarly, the Indian scholar Kautilya took a whole-of-government approach
resources applied to solve a problem but rather provide variations in the to conflict, emphasized the use of spies for both diplomacy and warfare, and
kinds of resources used, the ways in which they are applied, or even the saw the preservation of the state and the economic well-being of its people
ends to be achieved. Each strategy is thus a unique theory on how a problem as paramount to victory. He made no distinction between internal and
can be solved, and for the purposes of this article, theories of victory shall external threats, writing as he was for a state that had to address all threats
be expressed as a testable hypothesis in the form of an “if/then” statement. at once during a period of great existential crisis. Kautilya’s Arthashastra
presents open warfare as a last resort due to the damage kinetic operations
Such a perspective is useful for a smaller world power like the can cause the economies and societies of both parties involved, but even
Philippines. The pivot back towards creative thinking—and thus, the art his peacetime use of diplomacy and spy craft can be more ruthless than his
of strategy—is a direct result of the US loss of its geopolitical domination Western counterparts, such as Machiavelli.15
as a lone superpower. Its problems can no longer be solved by simplistic
applications of massive funding or expensive solutions, a state which the 12  See George Dimitriu, Clausewitz and the politics of war: A contemporary theory, Taylor &
rest of the world is intimately familiar with. This sort of creativity benefits Francis, 2018; and Adrien Schu, “What is war? A reinterpretation of Carl von Clauseitz’s “formula””,
states dealing with other actors of equal or greater power, a category the Revue francaise de science politique, Vol. 67, Issue 2 (2017), 1-18, ISBN 9782724635102.
Philippines fits perfectly. 13  See Alex Danchev, "Liddell-Hart’s Big Idea”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, Issue
1 (January 1999): 29-48, https://library.fes.de/libalt/journals/swetsfulltext/14965921.pdf; Scott
Morrison, “Redefining the Indirect Approach, Defining Special Operations Forces (SOF) Power,
Crafting such creative theories is a process that can be made easier and the Global Networking of SOF”, Journal of Strategic Security, Volume 7, Number 2, Special
by reviewing a few basic strategic principles from well-known military Issue: The Global SOF Network (Summer 2014): 48-54; and B.H. Liddell-Hart, Strategy: The
thinkers. In the Western tradition, Clausewitz and Liddell Hart stand as Indirect Approach (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1954).
pillars of strategic thinking and military philosophy. Carl Von Clausewitz 14  See Joshua J Mark, “Sun-Tzu”, World History Encyclopedia, 09 July 2020, https://www.
is famous for his views on the psychological and physical aspect of war. worldhistory.org/Sun-Tzu/; Akshay Joshi, “Strategic Wisdom from the Orient: Evaluating the
His concept of war as a continuation of policy, and of military victory as Contemporary relevance of Kautilya’s Arthashastra and Sun Tzu’s Art of War,” Strategic Analysis,
Vol 43, No. 1 (2019): 54-74, DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2019.1571747; John F Sullivan, “Sun
winning a clash of wills, has been a foundation of Western strategic thinking Tzu’s Fighting Words.” The Strategy Bridge, 15 June 2020, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-
bridge/2020/6/15/sun-tzus-fighting-words; Li-Sheng Arthur Kuo, “Sun Tzu’s War Theory in the
9  Frank G. Hoffman, “The Mission Element in Crafting National Strategy: A Theory of Success,” 21st Century” (Strategy Research Paper, US Army War College, 2007); Manuel Poejo Torres,
Joint Force Quarterly 97 (2nd Qtr 2020): 57. “Sun Tzu: The Art of War”, The Three Swords Magazine, Vol 33, 2018, https://www.jwc.nato.int/
10 Ibid., 61-62. images/stories/threeswords/SUNTZU_2018.pdf; and Edward O’Dowd and Arthur Walrdon, “Sun
11  Iain King, “Beyond Ends, Ways, and Means: We need a Better Strategic Framework to Win Tzu for Strategists,” Comparative Strategy, Vol 10, Issue 1 (1991): 25-36.
in an Era of Great Power Competition”, Modern War Institute at West Point, US Marine Academy, 15  See Roger Boesche, “Moderate Machiavelli? Contrasting The Prince with the Arthashastra
03 September 2020, https://mwi.usma.edu/beyond-ends-ways-and-means-we-need-a-better- of Kautilya,” Critical Horizons Vol 3, No. 2 (2002): 253-276; and Joshi, “Strategic Wisdom from
strategic-framework-to-win-in-an-era-of-great-power-competition/. the Orient,” 54-74.

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Philippine Army Theory of Victory
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While overcoming the enemy’s will to resist is also part of Eastern and internal challenges to them. It provides goals and strategic objectives for
military traditions, there is also more emphasis on sustaining one’s own the government and private sector towards security of the Filipino nation.
strength during conflict. Central ideas of Sun Tzu and Kautilya can thus be Anchored on the NSP, the National Military Strategy (NMS) 2019 guides the
expressed as hypotheticals with broader horizons, encompassing more than AFP in the attainment of national military objectives (NMOs) amid a volatile,
just the kinetic aspects of warfare. For example: if the enemy is properly uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) strategic environment. The
deceived and outmaneuvered, then their ranks can be sown with chaos while document tackles how to address threats, both kinetic and non-kinetic, in
your own side preserves its harmony, resulting in an effortless victory. Or, if the political, economic, socio-cultural, techno-scientific, environmental, and
all resources available to the state are used to keep it whole, its economy military (PESTEM) dimensions through the Influence-Deter-Defend (IDD)
working, and its people safe and happy, then wealth will be created while approach. The IDD concept is easily related to Eastern strategic traditions:
justice and expansion are ensured despite the hostility of rival powers. kinetic warfare is a last resort and the corresponding Joint Operating
Concept of the AFP emphasizes a holistic and collaborative approach to
The concepts found in either tradition are not mutually exclusive. security concerns whether in peacetime or in war.
However, assuming that all future warfare will be waged in varying degrees
of hybridity, the central ideas of the Eastern philosophies do seem to lend At the PA level, it therefore follows that defeating national security
themselves better to modern conflict scenarios. Hybrid warfare is “the threats would require concerted actions of Army units, utilizing Landpower
adversary’s employment of various techniques and procedures, both Maneuver, to supplement the actions of the Joint Force, so that threats will
conventional and unconventional, within the same battlespace, and tailored abandon the idea of conflict in its entire spectrum due to loss of capability
to exploit enemy weaknesses”.16 Such conflicts require the most holistic or will. The objective is to achieve an end state where threats are deterred
view of strategy available. At the level of grand strategy, the terms ‘victory’ to start or continue conflict, by exploiting opportunities in all domains and
and ‘success’ are viewed differently in the Eastern tradition. “Restraint in dimensions of the security architecture.
war, moderate and balanced attitudes towards the use of force, and attaining
legitimacy through moral and just practices” are recurring themes in the This shall be the Army’s theory of victory.
classic works of both Kautilya and Sun Tzu.17 The two also have a unique
understanding of the costs of war—the devastation of a prolonged conflict THE PA’S FUTURE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
of attrition will see a hollow victory to whoever wins the contest.
The future of Philippine land warfare is hybrid, where threat
These fundamental philosophical concepts are the base for the actors will resort to techniques and procedures both conventional and
distinctive strategies of the Sinicized states of Asia.18 The Philippines non-conventional within the same battlespace, tailored to exploit enemy
is surrounded by such states—Vietnam, India, Taiwan, China, Korea, weakness.20 As of current, the Philippine Army faces three kinds of threats, as
and Japan have all used Sun Tzu’s or Kautilya’s philosophies in past and shown in Figure 1: technologically-advanced conventional threats, internal
current conflicts.19 The country thus needs national strategies that can destabilizing threats, and non-state asymmetric threats.21 Their intent to
keep it in step with its neighbors, and its theories of victory should be no pursue their strategic interests regardless of violations of state sovereignty
exception. coupled with their capabilities to employ other-than-conventional military
forms of warfare will most likely increase their hybridity. In the future, the
A theory of victory at the PA level will have to anchor itself to Philippine Army will encounter three (3) scenarios of greatest concern
broader national strategies. The Philippines’ National Security Policy (NSP) involving these threats. Using a modified Cone of Plausibility framework22,
2017–2022 identifies national security interests and describes both external which takes into account the current strategic and operating environment,
its drivers and trends, and threat groups and security challenges, a strategic
16  Accordingly, victory in such conflicts is determined “when there is a proper understanding assessment report points to the invasion of Taiwan, the resurgence of
of the strategic goal as well as the successful imposition of the aggressors will,” which manifests Communist-Terrorist Groups (CTGs), and occasional violent attacks of
itself in “the full and absolute political power on a territory or specific technology, operation,
influence, or Denial Area action.” Cordova, Maquida and Manangan, “The Future of Philippine
Land Warfare”, 9-10. 20  Cordova, Maquida and Manangan, “The Future of Philippine Land Warfare”, 2-31.
17  Ibid. 21  Philippine Army, Landpower Maneuver Concept: Securing the Sovereignty, Defending the
Land Territory (Taguig City: Philippine Army, 2015), 8.
18  O’Dowd and Waldron, “Sun Tzu for Strategists,” 33-34.
22  Philippine Army, Philippine Army Strategic Assessment Report 2023-2028 (Taguig City:
19  Ibid., 28-33. Philippine Army, 2021), 7.

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Philippine Army Theory of Victory
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terrorist groups, as the most urgent and the most concerning scenarios the A Chinese military invasion of Taiwan will change the region’s
Army will face in the future. To demonstrate the relevance of the Philippine balance of power as it will enable China to “project power beyond the First
Army’s theory of victory, each of these scenarios shall be discussed in brief. Island Chain and control the seas up to the Second Island Chain.”25 This
situation will place the Philippines and its Armed Forces, particularly the
Philippine Army at a position to defend against a superpower with expertise
in conducting hybrid warfare especially through gray zone operations.

If the PA sustains military cooperation with strategic partners and

allies, and is able to build capabilities, then it can defend against an external
aggression.

A Resurgence of Communist-Terrorist Groups

One of the main goals of the Duterte administration is to eradicate

Communist-Terrorist Groups (CTG). To this end, the government has
operationalized the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed
Conflict (NTF-ELCAC) under a whole-of-nation approach which synchronizes
all the government's instrumentalities of power with the capabilities of
private sector stakeholders.26 However, one of the strengths of CTGs is their
ability to exploit the country’s political institutions and align their interests
with political leaders. In the future, CTGs may gain new strength in terms of
influence and resources, thereby enabling them to rebuild their dwindling
forces. Moreover, CTGs may capitalize on the country’s economic slump to
Figure 1. The relation and character of threats gain mass support from the frustrated populace, especially the youth sector,
through social media propaganda.27

A Military Invasion of Taiwan Seeing that a resurgence of the CTGs is tied to their ability to
exploit non-military capabilities, to include shaping and influencing public
In regard to the scenario of a Taiwan invasion by China and its perceptions and doing so in non-physical domains like cyberspace, if the
implications to the future security environment, several things are of note. Philippine Army and its partners work in unison towards winning the
Reunification is a crucial component of the Chinese Communist Party’s 'hearts and minds' of the people through information warfare, then internal
(CCP) “China Dream,” and is considered a sacred obligation. Having set long- destabilizing threat elements will be reduced to their smallest force and
term goals for 203523 may also hint on internal pressures faced by China their armed wing crippled. Information warfare may be combined with
and its possible willingness to employ military force to occupy Taiwan. kinetic operations, to win popular support for the government in previously
Taipei had recently embarked on military build-up through an arms trade CTG-controlled areas, and dissuade the populace from resorting to or
with Washington, enabling it to respond to an asymmetric attack from supporting an armed struggle against the state. Without the support of the
Beijing; however, a number of aerial and naval grey zone activities have masses and in the absence of strong political backing, CTGs may be stripped
been constantly carried out by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in its off an element that fuels them to pursue their agenda.
territory. Such activities increase the possibility of accidents which can lead
to escalation, and further uncertainties.24 25  The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Asia," in Strategic Survey 2021: The
Annual Assessment of Geopolitics (Oxon: Routledge, 2021), 149.
23  “(Authorized) Communiqué of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee 26  “The whole-of-nation approach in attaining inclusive and sustainable peace,” National Task
of the Communist Party of China,” Xinhua.net, last modified October 29, 2020, http://www. Force to Endl Local Communist Armed Conflict, accessed December 08, 2021, https://www.
xinhuanet.com/2020-10/29/c_1126674147.htm. ntfelcac.org/
24  The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Asia," in Strategic Survey 2021: The 27  Philippine Army, Philippine Army Strategic Assessment Report 2023-2028 (Taguig City:
Annual Assessment of Geopolitics (Oxon: Routledge, 2021), 141-151. Philippine Army, 2021), 7.

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Philippine Army Theory of Victory
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Occasional Violent Attacks to Spoil the Peace Process in Southern Philippines in broad strokes the ends, ways, and means of the Army in contributing to
the country’s defense. It is anchored to the strategic guidance of the National
The final future scenario of greatest concern for the Philippine Army Military Strategy 2019, and the AFP Joint Operating Concept 2020, and
is the possible launching of occasional violent attacks by terrorist groups to therefore follows the Influence-Deter-Defend notion on defense.
spoil the peace process in the South. The Bangsamoro Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) is currently administered by the Bangsamoro In a sense, the Influence-Deter-Defend (IDD) notion of country
Transition Authority (BTA), which will stay in legislative power until 2025. defense trails more from the teachings of Sun Tzu and Kautilya than that of
The creation of the BARMM and its BTA were established through the signing Clausewitz. It encourages a holistic view of military strategy by focusing not
of the Bangsamoro Organic Law. These developments are continuations of only on the traditional aspects of warfare, which is the full-on confrontation
the long peace process pursued by the Philippine government and the Moro between two opposing forces, but also the non-traditional ones to, preserve
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) under the Comprehensive Agreement on harmony and avert the occurrence of bloodshed. Here, Defense is resorted
the Bangsamoro signed in 2014. Given that uncertainties still hover around to only as a last resort. It requires much effort on shaping the strategic
the establishment of the BARMM’s parliamentary government, and complex and operational environment, as well as the understanding of threats on
structures exist among a number of ethno-linguistic groups, clans and government actions to induce on them the abandonment of the idea of
guerilla units28 in the region, militant groups inclined towards terrorism conflict. Like Sun Tzu’s theory of victory, the IDD focuses on battle prevention
are likely to disrupt the ongoing peace process through occasional violent and secondarily on the actual confrontation of the adversary. When conflict
attacks. Further, they may tap into various social media platforms to spread is not avoided, the AFP is to exercise strategic flexibility and asymmetric
ideologies pertaining to violent extremism. approaches to avoid enemy strengths and strike at its vulnerable points.30
This approach is in line with Sun Tzu’s thought when he said “avoid what is
In this scenario, if the Philippine Army properly leverages its strong and strike what is weak.”
alliances and partnerships, and operationalizes its Brigade Combat Teams,
then the Army can contribute to mitigating the spread of terrorist narratives To support the IDD, the Army follows the concept of Landpower
and mitigate the effects of violent attacks. The Philippine Army must be able Maneuver as the core of its strategy. Landpower Maneuver is the Army’s
to properly blend non-kinetic and kinetic approaches to prevent terrorist strategy concept which highlights the use of ground forces for Multi-Domain
groups not just from launching violent attacks, but more some from Operations to generate direct and indirect lethal and non-lethal effects
spreading their ideologies and gaining ground in the cognitive domain. that would create strategic and operational advantages for the force in
the attainment of National Military Objectives. This is applied to influence
In all these future hybrid threat scenarios, the Philippine Army people, militaries, and governments and to gain and maintain control over
must develop, organize, train, equip, sustain and support units capable land areas by exploiting the opportunities presented by the other domains.31
of engaging in cross domain operations as part of the Joint Force, geared This is especially important in the conflict objectives of Maritime and
towards deterrence by targeting not only the enemy’s capabilities but more Airspace defense, Territorial Defense, and Internal Security Stabilization
so, its will to fight. since it expounds the area where the Army operates on, from purely land
operations to multi-domain operations.
THE PA’S STRATEGY CONCEPT
The strategy concept of Landpower Maneuver links ideal Army
To guide Army planners in developing the future ground force, one actions to achieve desired outcomes. Basically, it calls for Army efforts,
that is capable of addressing various military scenarios,29 the Philippine coupled with contributions to the joint force, to induce to national security
Army Operating Concept (PAOC) 2021 prescribes in broad terms the threats the notion of abandoning the idea of conflict, either before it begins
application of ground force capabilities to achieve military objectives. Simply, or when it is already occurring, depending on the threat or circumstance.
the Army’s strategy is reflected in the Philippine Army Operating Concept The Landpower Maneuver, being the Army’s strategy concept describes the
2021 (PAOC). Although the document is an Operating Concept, it describes ends, ways, and means to achieve this desired end state.

28  Georgi Engelbrecht, “The Philippines: Three More Years for the Bangsamoro Transition”, 30  Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP Joint Operating Concept (2020)
International Crisis Group, last updated October 29, 2021, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/
31  Philippine Army, Philippine Army Operating Concept (2021)
south-east-asia/philippines/philippines-three-more-years-bangsamoro-transition.
29  Philippine Army, Philippine Army Operating Concept (2021)

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Philippine Army Theory of Victory
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Going back to the concept of theory of victory, it is paramount deals with the requirement of “moral influence” over threats and allies for
to explain how and why this strategy concept would work against state victory in war. It is believed that to achieve victory, the Army must diminish
adversaries in particular conflict scenarios. Since a theory of victory is a the moral support structure of its enemies to shake its will and weaken
product of inquiry into how a strategy brings an actor towards its desired its capabilities. Truly, the “Acme of skill is to subdue the enemy without
end state, it would follow that this document should encompass a theory fighting.” Cognitive Warfare is instrumental to accomplish this dictum since
of how to do so. Following history’s strategic thinkers, a theory of victory disruption and disintegration of a threat’s morale through acts directed
should explain how a strategy, in this case, the Landpower Maneuver, would against the mental processes of its members leads to the degradation of the
bring Army adversaries to a culminating point to not run the cost and risk enemy’s will to fight.35 Elements of cognitive warfare are to be pursued as
of conflict, but instead accede to the preferences of the primary actor, in our adjuncts of military operations to allow the successful delivery of kinetic
instance, the Philippine Army. effects in the operational environment.36

The impetus for change on how the Army conducts warfare was
based largely on technological development and how threats are fighting.
To elaborate, when state adversaries introduce a non-traditional capability
to pursue motives and advance intentions, the Army quickly adopts an
appropriate form of maneuver through Landpower Maneuver. Much like how
Internal Destabilizing Threats have familiarized themselves in the conduct
of cognitive warfare to exert influence over the cognitive domain, or when
Technologically Advanced Conventional Threats are weaponizing the outer
space to outmatch their adversaries, the Army likewise grows its arsenal
to be capable of confronting threats and exploiting their vulnerabilities.
Landpower Maneuver enables the Army to execute the same, and more,
since it presents the Army multiple avenues of approach in responding to the
contingencies created by the threats. Further, the country’s threat landscape
employs complex and hybrid forms of warfare. They do not limit themselves Figure 2. Cognitive Warfare
from the physical dimensions of conflict, but extends their capabilities to the
non-physical realms of cognitive, cyber, and outer space. Some also touch The second operational approach is Collaboration and Partnership.
on the political, economic, and socio-cultural dimensions to create military This allows the Army to leverage on alliances and partnerships to set
effects short of war.32 Landpower Maneuver is what the Army needs in this operational conditions that favor the achievement of military objectives,
threat landscape since it permits strategic flexibility and multi-domain even across areas where the military as prescribed by law, cannot operate.
maneuvers. This approach multiplies the Army’s capabilities, legitimacy, and influence
since partners bring tailored capabilities, forces, and access to areas or
Landpower Maneuver has four operational approaches: 1) Cognitive domains that complement military assets. Likewise, the Army benefits from
Warfare; 2) Collaboration and Partnership; 3) Asymmetric Warfare; and 4) the deterrent and defense value that allies provide. 37 For instance, the Army’s
Maneuver Warfare.33 primary mandate is warfighting. Thus, its support structure is relatively
limited only to those associated with defense. Alliances and partnerships
Cognitive Warfare encourages maneuvers in the cognitive domain would allow the Army to exert its influence over other dimensions of
to establish a predetermined perception among target audiences to gain national security, such as the political, economic, and socio-cultural realms
advantage over another party, as depicted in Figure 2.34 The objective is to use
information to directly or indirectly influence a target audience into action 35  Abbjit Singh, “China’s Three Warfares and India”, Journal of Defense Studies, Vol 7, No 4
or inaction, so that it acts within the best interest of the Army. This approach (October-December 2013): 27-46, ISSN 0976-1004.
36  Emily Bienvenue, Zac Rogers and Sian Troath, “Innovation and Adaptation: Cognitive
32  Philippine Army, Philippine Army Operating Concept (2021) Warfare.” The Cove, 20 September 2018, https://cove.army.gov.au/article/cognitive-warfare.
33  Ibid. 37  Rachel Ellehuus, and Colin Wall, “Leveraging Allies and Partners,” CSIS Briefs, Center for
34  Paul Ottewell, “Defining the Cognitive Domain”, Over The Horizon Journal, 07 December Strategic and International Studies, 28 January 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/leveraging-
2020, https://othjournal.com/2020/12/07/defining-the-cognitive-domain/ allies-and-partners

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Philippine Army Theory of Victory
21 22

to support military operations. This is especially vital since hybrid threats

employ have greater influence, wider networks, and more personnel.
Hybrid Threats allocate military resources strategically and resort primarily
to non-military means, though military and aggressive confrontations are
still possible.38

Asymmetric and Maneuver Warfare are complementary. It is

apparent that the Army cannot afford a full-on confrontation against another
State adversary that has more advanced capabilities, more personnel, and
more resources to sustain the fight. But with Asymmetric and Maneuver
Warfare, the Army will be capable of circumventing the strengths of its
adversaries. Shown in Figure 3, the Army shall capitalize on the ingenuity
of its soldiers to produce and develop innovative tactics, weapons and
technologies in all levels of warfare, may it be strategic, operational or
tactical, across the full spectrum of conflict. The benefit of the two stresses
not only avoidance of strengths, but also the exploitation of initiatives. The Figure 3. Asymmetric and Maneuver Warfare
skillful combination of the two puts in mind Chang Mengxiong’s concept
of “Assassin’s Mace”. He used the analogy of acupuncture for fighting would create a unified stand of local and international partners against the
against asymmetrically more powerful adversaries and argued that, even perceived invading force. It will also be instrumental in delivering consistent
superpowers have a great number of vulnerable points. The focus of attacks and unified messages against the same so that the Army can leverage on its
must be in those points, then the military giant can be brought down by the partners and allies. Leveraging alliances will be effective for deterrence and
weak.39 This is especially relevant since the country is a small state. As a small defense. Hopefully, the invading force will think twice before attacking when
state, leveraging on asymmetries and strategic and operational maneuvers the country has a strong military cooperation with other foreign militaries.
are vital to defeat enemies. Learning from Sun Tzu, the Philippine Army’s Asymmetric Warfare and Maneuver Warfare are the most important here
employment of concepts of operations, which are significantly different since the Philippine Army is a relatively small force. Thus, it cannot afford a
from that of their targets would enable it to attack enemy vulnerabilities and head-on engagement against the invading force. The Army shall exploit the
capitalize on ground force strengths. Coupled with surprise, simultaneous advantages given by the terrain, systems, and allies to target weaknesses of
and continuous attacks in multiple avenues, this will disrupt the will or the invading force, their military leadership, logistics, and tactics.
commitment of the enemy, consequently deterring the same to start or
continue the fight. The second scenario is the possible resurgence of CTGs. It has been
five decades of confrontation against these supposed freedom fighters,
In the three scenarios discussed in the previous chapter, the and their secret lay on their popular support. CTGs center of gravity is not
effective execution of Landpower Maneuver is wanting to avert their possible their leadership but the people.40 They are primarily concerned with the
occurrence. The perceived invasion of Taiwan would result to an external struggle of influence. Ideologies are integral elements of this conflict to
defense contingency since it will involve not only China and Taiwan, but also win the “hearts and minds” of the people. It is a contest of support from
all their neighboring countries, and US itself, being a strategic partner of the population and secondarily, of guns and bullets. Information is indeed,
Taiwan. Being in a strategic location for China, the Philippines may be a target a more powerful weapon against internal destabilizing threats (IDTs). Thus,
for China’s Anti-access/Area denial strategy against US. In such instance, the focus of efforts would be on actions that affect human factors, supported
the Philippine Army may find itself confronting a super power to defend by kinetic and conventional systems of war and conflict. The operational
the nation’s soil. In responding to this contingency, all of the operational approaches allow the Army to execute the enemy-centric and community-
approaches of the Landpower Maneuver are vital. Cognitive Warfare centric approach of addressing insurgency.41 These approaches will aid in
38  President's Papers: The Future of Philipppine Warfare Volume 1 (Quezon City: National 40  James A Gavrilis, “A Model for Population-Centered Warfare: A Conceptual Framework for
Defense College of the Philippines 2021) Analyzing and Understanding the Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency”,
39  Ehsan Ahrari, “China's Preoccupation with Asymmetric War: Lessons Learned from the Small Wars Journal, 05 October 2009, https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-
Hezbollah-Israeli War", Small Wars Journal, 15 October 2009, https://smallwarsjournal.com/ temp/241-gavrilis.pdf.
jrnl/art/chinas-preoccupation-with-asymmetric-war 41 Philippine Army, “Army Operations,” Philippine Army Manual

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Philippine Army Theory of Victory
23 24

creating a secure physical and psychological environment in affected areas and strategic objectives. In military terms, a force’s capability is a measure
by clearing IDT elements within, and then establishing firm government of preparedness in personnel, equipment, training readiness, and
control over the same. They also allow the improvement of popular support sustainment.42
to the government and dissuading them into resorting and supporting
the armed struggle since they also consider offense, defense, and stability The advantage of using capability development as a fulcrum for
mechanisms. long-term strategic planning is its flexibility, achieved by emphasizing
the links between strategy, mission-essential tasks, and other high-level
Occasional violent attacks to spoil the peace process in the South requirements without having to specify the resources involved. By focusing
is the third scenario. Breakaway groups of the MILF/MNLF who turn to on what the Army wants its forces to do, development efforts avoid being
terrorism ensure that peace overtures between the government and their reactive to the types of threats encountered—an approach that often results
former group do not succeed. Spoilage succeeds when any of the parties in a myopic preoccupation over specific technologies to counter specific
fail to sign or implement a settlement. Here, the operational approaches threats. Focusing on the ways to achieve desired end-states instead creates
of cognitive warfare, leveraging alliances and partnership, and maneuver a proactive approach to defense.43 It encourages innovation by abstracting
warfare is vital. Cognitive Warfare and Leveraging Alliances and Partnership away from early determination of equipment solutions and thereby
allows the Army to tap the credible voices of civic society groups to stop, removing single-service stovepipe constraints.44
challenge and counter the narratives of these breakaway groups in spoiling
the peace process. For Maneuver Warfare, the Brigade Combat Teams, are Capability Development
essential to dominate the battlefield and gain full control of the contingency.
It shall conduct cross-domain maneuvers, with the joint force, supported by The PA’s current capability development can be traced back to RA
intelligence, following the concept of Mission Command. 7898, signed on 23 February 1995. The “AFP Modernization Act” aimed to
upgrade the armed forces “to a level where it can effectively and fully perform
The Army’s posturing for Landpower Maneuver enables its strategic its constitutional mandate” over a fifteen-year period.45 This was followed in
application of military and non-military forces to address the contingencies 2012 by RA 10349, which amended several sections of the prior Act, most of
made from threat activities. Given their rapidly evolving nature and character, which involving government appropriations.46 Currently, the PA is following
the Army will adapt, notwithstanding the complexities of the strategic and its Medium-Term Capability Development Plan (MTCDP) for 2022-2028 to
operational environment. It is in this notion of Landpower Maneuver is ensure that these efforts continue afoot. The document serves as a blueprint
conceptualized, and the same guides the current capability development of for the next stage of the Army’s evolution into a more capable fighting force,
the force. It is not enough that the Army develops capabilities. It is important describing how the PA’s outlined capability, force, and sustainment goals
that these capabilities are tailored fit to suit the needs of time and be able shall be achieved over time.
to out maneuver adversaries. Remember that the Army exists only for
land defense, and it cannot perform this without capabilities, specifically The PA has identified twenty-five (25) different capability areas
developed to defeat state adversaries. targeted for development in the next seven years. A majority of its plans
aim to make Army forces mission-ready for external defense operations,
since many of the PA’s capability gaps and shortfalls are found in the areas
CAPACITATING THE PA TOWARDS VICTORY of Maritime Defense and Cyber Security. Additionally, the development of
materiel components remains the greatest effort in capability development,
The PAOC requires the PA to develop capabilities which offer
the most operational flexibility against hybrid threats in both internal 42  The DND defines the term “capability” as the ability “to preplan and accomplish a mission
and achieve the effects desired in an anticipated operational environment in a specified time
security and external defense operations. Such capabilities must also and state of preparedness.” Circular 11 s2011, Department of National Defense 2011.
provide cross-domain synergy with other AFP branches in joint operations.
43  Leung Chim, Rick Nunes-Vaz, and Robert Prandolini, “Capability-Based Planning for
The PA’s capability development efforts thus involve more than just the Australia’s National Security.” Security Challenges Vol 6, No3 (2010): 81
modernization of its materiel and the professionalization of its personnel. 44  Ibid., 84.
It also requires the pursuit of the most cost-effective means of upgrading
45  Republic Act No. 7898, c.1995, “An Act Providing for the Modernization of the Armed
Army forces, aligned with its operational concepts and approaches. Forces of the Philippines and for Other Purposes”, Republic of the Philippines
Proper capability development provides forces with the abilities 46  Republic Act No. 10349, c. 2012. “An Act Amending Republic Act No. 7898, Establishing the
to perform mission tasks that are essential in achieving both operational Revised AFP Modernization Program and for Other Purposes.”

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Philippine Army Theory of Victory
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with many of the capability areas lacking facility and material mission- Strengthening these capabilities are the Cyber Security and
readiness. The importance which the AFP has attached to developing Electronic Warfare capabilities, which increase the protection of the
C4ISTAR and Missile Systems also influenced the PA’s list of high priority Army’s C4ISTAR infrastructure. The Cyber Security Capability is the use
projects. Improving such capabilities should thus prepare Army forces for of cyberspace to deliver an effect, which can be defensive in nature (such
its scenarios of greatest concern. as protection and resilience) or offensive (such as influence, coercion,
disruption, and destruction). Electronic Warfare (EW) is the military use of
Seven (7) PA capability areas in the plan address the greatest electronics, involving actions taken to both prevent or reduce an enemy’s
number of hybrid threats, solve the most capability gaps, and fall under the effective use of radiated electromagnetic emissions and ensure its own
AFP’s priorities. These are 1) C4ISTAR, 2) Intelligence, 3) Cyber Security, 4) effective use of radiated electromagnetic energy.48
Electronic Warfare, 5) Air Defense, 6) Fires, and 7) Counter-Swarm, shown in
Figure 4. High investment items from their materiel components constitute Then there are the capability areas that involve different Missile
the PA’s priority projects in the medium-term. Systems. Air Defense is the defensive measure for attacking enemy aircrafts
or missiles in the air.49 The Fires Capability is the ability to deliver precise,
lethal, and accurate deep and mass fires against security threats. PA artillery
can provide deep and mass fires to neutralize or suppress the enemy and
assist in the integration of all fire support in combined arms operations.50
Finally, the PA’s Counter-swarm Capability is its ability to respond to and
disrupt multiple unmanned platforms of enemy forces coming from different
directions by utilizing both lethal and non-lethal systems.51

The C4ISTAR and Missile Systems the PA is developing will

contribute greatly to its ability to perform Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)
operations alongside similar capabilities of the other Major Services. A2/AD
refers to the employment of methods and capabilities to prevent an entity
from accessing an area and denying its use.52 The C4ISTAR systems also allow
PA ground forces to contribute to the country’s Maritime Domain Awareness
(MDA) by providing additional Command and Control infrastructure for
joint operations.53

Besides the mentioned capabilities, the PA will also continue

sustaining its already highly developed Infantry and Special Operations
capabilities. The PA’s Infantry Capability is the ability of its ground
Figure 4. Seven PA capability areas that address hybrid threats operating forces to engage the enemy effectively and efficiently, achieving
more tangible results by closing in thru fire and maneuver.54 Sustaining it
First are the capabilities that involve the development of C4ISTAR requires an upgrade of its organizational, materiel, and facility components
Systems. The Army’s C4ISTAR capability integrates the gathering, for effective Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT)—a hard-earned
consolidation, processing, and communication of intelligence information lesson from the experience of the Battle of Marawi. Meanwhile, the Philippine
vital to tactical units. Information is also provided by the Intelligence Army Special Operations Forces function as combat multipliers to enhance
capability provides, which is the PA’s ability to use an integrated and
systematic process of intelligence collection, processing, production, and 48  Philippine Army, PAM 6-0102-04, “Cyberspace Operations”.
dissemination.47 Together, these two capabilities allow the Army to conduct 49  Philippine Army, PAM 3-08, “Artillery Fires.”
operations with informed decision-making and adapt to all kinds of terrain. 50  Philippine Army, PAM 3-04, “Field Artillery Operations”.
51  Philippine Army, PAM 3-0803-01 “Army Air and Missile Defense Operations”.
47  Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP Frag-O (2019) 52  Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP Joint Operating Concept (2020), 26.
53  Ibid., 35.
54  Philippine Army, PAM 3-0501-03, “PA Infantry Battalion Operations”.

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Philippine Army Theory of Victory
27 28

the effects of conventional military power and achieve military, political, The PA IDSE MTP 2022-2028 specifies how to closely align
economic, or psychological objectives by non-conventional means in hostile, capability goals with international engagements to achieve more purposive,
denied, or politically sensitive areas.55 holistic, and integrated approach to PA IMA to support the attainment of
national defense and security objectives. Instead of simply identifying the
These backbones of Philippine ground forces will be the centerpieces areas and intensity of engagement per country, the PA IDSE MTP 2022-
of landpower maneuver for external defense operations. They wield many 2028 clearly identifies the concrete materiel and non-materiel outcomes
of the components of the C4ISTAR Systems being developed and will remain in each of the 25 priority capabilities which may be developed through
relevant against the remaining or newly emergent internal threats in the international engagements; and countries the PA should engage to achieve
coming years. the said capability goals.

International Defense and Security Engagements To achieve these various objectives and requirements, three
overlapping impact areas of international engagements are identified:
To supplement these capability development efforts, the PA will Global and Regional Posture, Operational Augmentation and Enhancement,
also look to its allies and partners for assistance. The strategic intent of and Capability Development. Engagements with certain countries target a
the Philippine Army International Military Affairs (IMA) and International combination of two or even all impact areas—the nexus where the three
Defense and Security Engagement (IDSE) is to leverage alliances, impact areas intersect thus form the core of PA partnership, with countries
partnerships, and relationships, both bilateral and multilateral, to advance inside the intersection being priorities for engagement. The impact areas
national security, attain the national military objectives, and to help develop are designed to help planners in two ways; first, focusing their engagements
selected Army capabilities. Through Army diplomacy, the PA shall strengthen on the achievement of tangible outcomes or results; and second, prioritize
its relationship among the armies of ASEAN member states, as well as the which countries to engage with given the Army’s limited resources.56
armies of the country’s allies, and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, as
shown in Figure 5. Moreover, it shall also closely collaborate with the United The Future Force
Nations and other multilateral entities in order to support peacekeeping
and HADR operations in the region. With the Army specifying its capability areas, said required
capabilities shall build forces that will defend territorial integrity and
sovereignty in an evolving national security environment. The PA must be
able to field a force that shall conduct combined arms and joint operations.
Combined arms seek to integrate the different capabilities of the Army to
achieve mutually complementary effects capable of overwhelming enemy
forces. 57

The Brigade Combat Team (BCT) plays a vital role in territorial

defense and notably in hybrid warfare. Yet it is also crucial during internal
security operations should the need arise. The mission of the BCT is to
conduct combined arms operations as a contingency force in support to the
AFP mission49. As a highly mobile and modular force, this unit shall counter
the adversary’s strengths and exploit weaknesses. It integrates the various
capabilities of the PA into a single major unit that is lean yet hard-hitting, as
shown in its structure (Figure 6).
Figure 5. Philippine Army IDSE Conceptual Framework
56  While it is recognized that the foremost goal of IDSE should be towards capability
development and operational augmentation, IDSE can also help the Army in other crucial areas
such as Global and Regional Posture and image-building, and the forging or maintenance of
55  Philippine Army, PAM 3-07, “Special Operations”. 48
Philippine Army, PA Force Structure alliances with strategic partnerships through confidence-building activities.
Medium-Term Plan, p. 22
57  Philippine Army, PA Force Structure Medium-Term Plan, p. 112

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Philippine Army Theory of Victory
29 30

integrating these structures to Army operations and capabilities. Thus, the

writers of this research paper would recommend the following:

1. Study and development of operating concepts for joint,

interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational efforts to gain clarity on
how the various organs of the government would contribute towards the
strategy and land defense; and

2. Thereafter, the study and development of supporting policies and

laws that will capacitate the Army to tap on the resources and influence of
various stakeholders to shape the environment for cognitive, asymmetric
and maneuver warfare, deter adversaries from pursuing violent actions, and
consolidate manpower for territorial defense.

The theories of victory found in this paper were derived from the
PA's concept of landpower maneuver, thus heavily focusing on the use of land
forces. The AFP's drive to build a streamlined and collaborative between
force providers and force employer through the JOC would require not
Figure 6. Structure of PA Infantry Brigade Combat Team by 2028 only the production of similar theories from other Major Services but also
a rigorous process of alignment and assimilation of such inputs to produce
workable Joint Force strategies for all scenarios. Furthermore, such theories
of victory will have to be vigorously tested and assessed to ensure both
their relevance and reliability if the projected scenarios do manifest in the
CONCLUSION and RECOMMENDATIONS future. This will involve high-level debates and discussions among military
strategists as well as various war gaming exercises.
Threats that the Philippines currently faces are bound to become
more complex and sophisticated as they adapt to global trends in the At the end of the day, theories of victory are just that: theories. For
security environment. The defense sector must thus have the capacity to the Philippine Army, the objective is to achieve an end state where threats
constantly be in step with (or two steps ahead of) these changes, and be able are deterred to start or continue conflict, by exploiting opportunities in all
to respond to how ever these changes impact upon the nation’s security. In domains and dimensions of the security architecture. The only way to truly
this regard, having a good understanding of the future of warfare for the test the effectiveness of such theory, as others, would be with an assessment
Philippines is a useful tool for planners and decision-makers in their crafting during actual conflict. Yet many ways exist to refine theories further in
of development programs that are strategic, yet practical. anticipation of their use in the field and these are the actions which await
the Philippine defense community moving forward.
This paper attempted to articulate multiple desired end-states
for different scenarios of concern in the Philippines' future strategic
environment. It also proposed different strategies in the shape of causal
hypotheses that address each scenario; and explained how current
capability development efforts aim to capacitate Philippine ground forces
for future operations. The most tangible expression of these efforts in the
PA’s force structure is the BCT. However, such an exercise is only a small
step towards the development of a robust strategic framework. This paper
also recognizes that the strategy concept would require the supporting
structure of the State, particularly those of the other government agencies
and the private sector. It is thus important to consider different concepts for

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Philippine Army Theory of Victory
31 32

Abstract. As with the current situation, the Philippine Air Force (PAF)
views the future security environment as volatile, uncertain, complex, and
ambiguous. This view can be attributed to the political, economic, social,
geographic, technological, and environmental influences and trends that
have impacted our society. Moreover, these influences and trends also
brought along emerging threats and challenges, which could hamper either
the PAF's growth in terms of capability or the performance of its and the
Armed Forces of the Philippines' (AFP) future missions. For instance, the
current great power competition between the United States and China
increased the tension in the West Philippine Sea, which could escalate into
President’s Papers: a limited war with the Philippines being dragged into the fray. Nevertheless,
The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II the PAF as a major service must be prepared to be part of the whole AFP
force that will address these security threats and challenges.
PHILIPPINE AIR FORCE THEORY OF VICTORY
The PAF intends to contend with the above-mentioned future security
environment with the flexible implementation of its Integrated Air
Operations Concept (IAOC). The PAF IAOC fully supports the Joint Operations
Concept (JOC), the AFP capstone concept for conducting joint operations in
a projected future operating environment. To be adaptable and responsive,
Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Plans, A5 the PAF will adopt the Agile Combat Employment (ACE) concept to further
Philippine Airforce enhance jointness and integration with the AFP Joint Force. The PAF
believes that successfully implementing the concepts will contribute to the
attainment of the National Military Objectives (NMOs) and, subsequently,
victory.

However, the PAF's IAOC entails that the critical gaps in its core system
capability requirements be addressed for the concept to be successfully
implemented. The PAF Flight Plan 2028 focuses on further enhancing the
capabilities needed under the IAOC's six core systems, and prescribes the
capability the PAF needs to modernize to attain victory. The Flight Plan
would guide the PAF in elevating its joint and combined forces capabilities by
becoming a ready, efficient, and effective organization. As a ready, efficient,
and effective organization, the PAF could help support the AFP in achieving
the NMOs, which is its theory of achieving victory.

INTRODUCTION

"It is necessary for us to change radically, not only our institutions, but
also our way of living and thinking" – Apolinario Mabini, "Sublime
Paralytic" Revolutionary Leader, Filipino Hero

The Philippine government envisions ending the local threat by
2022 and transitioning the AFP for territorial defense1. The achievement of
this goal willy significantly benefit the PAF as it will be able to focus on its

1  Armed Forces of the Philippines, Basic War Plans (2020)

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Philippine Air Force Theory of Victory
33 34

mandate of defending our country's airspace, be it for external defense or circumstances, influences, and trends that will directly or indirectly affect
operations other than war. Further, the termination of local hostilities would the organization and its mission in the future. The following are identified
mean a renewed focus on acquiring and developing the PAF's critical assets as major security trends:
and systems through the AFP Modernization Program. Taking off from
the first book, the Future of Philippine Warfare Vol. 12, the PAF's Theory Political Factors. Political stability is necessary to have a secured and
of Victory centers on the 'what' and the 'how' the capabilities needed by developed state. Southeast Asia is considered home to the world's fastest-
the PAF address future and emerging threats and challenges. To satisfy its growing economy and, most notably, to 650 million people. As such, it is
objectives, this paper seeks to answer the following questions: regarded as a strategic and essential region by China and the United States;
subsequently, both are determinedly growing their influence in the area3.

1. What is the view of the PAF on the future operating environment? The constant competition between the United States and China
2. How does the PAF intend to address emerging security threats for global hegemony has caused disparity and inequality economically,
and challenges? and; militarily, and politically in the different regions of the world. If this
competition continues, further inequality, corruption, and environmental
3. What are the capability requirements of the PAF to address degradation may persist4.
current and emerging threats effectively?
For the past six years, the Philippines 'hedged' itself between the
This paper establishes that the PAF's victory shall be achieved by two great powers and strengthened relationships with other countries
attaining the National Military Objectives (NMOs). The attainment of NMOs such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia based on shared interests, mutual
shall be possible with the agile employment of the necessary PAF Integrated cooperation, economic integration, and cultural inclusiveness 5.
Air Operations capabilities adaptable to modern warfare and aligned with
the AFP's Joint Operating Concept. To expound on this idea, the paper is Economic Factors. The global economy was severely affected by
divided into three parts. First, the paper will discuss the future operating the COVID – 19 pandemic. Oil prices fluctuated due to the rising demands
environment based on the output of the PAF Strategy Refresh Workshop with limited production, but the global economy forecast initially seemed
2021. The security trends will be presented, particularly the current, optimistic with the rise of vaccination rates. However, the Ukraine-Russia
emerging, and future security threats and challenges of our country. Second, conflict provoked Western-imposed sanctions on Russia, posing a challenge
it will explain how the PAF intends to address emerging security threats and for the global economy as it hampered growth and put the global inflation
challenges. It will present how the PAF contributes to the joint force through level upwards. The effect of sanctioning the 11th largest economy in the
its concept for the employment of Air Power. It will also highlight how the world (according to the International Monetary Fund) spread in sequence
PAF capabilities shall be employed using the Agile Combat Employment from the big countries that are major import partners of Russia, such as the
US, Germany, France, Italy, and China, to these countries' trading partners
concept. Lastly, it will emphasize that for the PAF to address the NMOs,
such as the Philippines.
the critical gaps in the capability requirements for the PAF's Air Power
employment concept need to be addressed. Moreover, the US-China trade war is also a key consideration in the
potential increase of global economic instability. The United States Strategic
PAF'S FUTURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT Competition Act of 2021 identifies China as the strategic competitor of the
United States in economics, technology, and military technology5. Bearing in
Security Trends and Influences. In a constantly evolving world,
influences and trends have significantly impacted our society, and these 3  Yen Nee Lee, “China's influence in Southeast Asia is growing - and the U.S. has some catching
up to do”, CNBC, 12 June 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/12/china-is-more-powerful-
have become a way of life over time. Influences and trends also affected than-the-us-in- southeast-asia-csis-survey-shows.html
the country's security and stability. The PAF views its future operating 4  The National Academies Press, “Chapter 9 Military and Economic Implications of Science
environment as the amalgamation and progression of current conditions, and Technology Developments”. S&T strategies of six countries: Implications for the United
States”, 2020
2  National Defense College of the Philippines, President’s Papers Vol 1: The Future of Philippine 5  Sara Hsu, “Senate’s Strategic Competition Act Will Make China-US Relations Worse, Not
Warfare (Quezon City: National Defense College of the Philippines, 2021) Better”, The Diplomat, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/senates-strategic-competition-
act-will-make-china-us-relations-worse-not-better/

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Philippine Air Force Theory of Victory
35 36

mind, this trade war between China and US could lead to either a beneficial However, the same could not be said in the Philippines, as the country's
trade redirection and relocation for the Philippines, or the risk of further population is expected to increase in 2040. With the increase in population,
conflict escalation in the West Philippines Sea through a proxy war between the younger and working generation is projected to spur economic growth
the two superpowers. within the country9.
In the Southeast Asian region, the Asian Development Bank6 reports
Currently, generation Z is the political generation. Sociologists
that the ASEAN countries have and will continue to increase their global
classify and describe them as work-centered, family-oriented, traditional,
output and trade. The ASEAN inter-dependence and collective leadership
has provided the region with political stability. Currently, China has a seasoned, decisive, and multi-taskers, as compared to the Millennials or the
growing influence over the Southeast Asian region while the United States technological generations who are considered to be tech-savvy, carefree,
is slowly backing away. laid-back, proud, individualistic, self-centered, arrogant, energetic, and
adventurous10. Consequently, both Generation Z and the Millenials are
Locally, the Philippines has maintained its BBB+ credit rating, considered to be the country's future and working force11. Moreover, the
which could give the country more access to capital sources. The outgoing rapid advancement of technology has further affected people's lives and
President recently signed Republic Act 11647, easing restrictions and changed how society perceives the world. It brought with it the potential to
requirements on foreign ownership of businesses in the country. This law further revolutionize our world with the extensive use of the internet and
could encourage more foreign direct investments to boost the economy social media12.
further. The Build, Build, Build Program, alongside the initiative to further
strengthen the cybersecurity and digitalization of the country, is expected to
On the other hand, the Philippine government, through the
alleviate and respond to improve the lives of the Filipino people in the new
normal. Philippine Education For All (EFA) 2015 National Plans, aims to amend to
a more holistic education system in the country, which is further amplified
Another consideration is the potential of cryptocurrency. Bitcoin by the Philippine Development Plan 2011-2016, which aims to provide a
was created in 2009 alongside the blockchain; it provided a convenient platform to fulfill the aims of the United Nations Sustainable Development
channel for the market to raise money without engaging in venture capital Goals to have a sustainable quality of education by 203013. A more quality
and to trade without going through a stock exchange. Furthermore, education system would result in a higher literacy rate, thus creating more
cryptocurrencies provide decentralized currencies, enabling users an easier skilled workers for our country.
transaction as it does not need to be checked by a third-party channel7.
Nevertheless, with the rampant development of cryptocurrency, analysts Lastly, the urbanization of regions III & IV could potentially
suggest that by 2030, bitcoin will have tripled by then. Furthermore, it is said
alleviate Metro Manila congestion14 and provide new job and educational
that regulations, as well as mainstreaming cryptocurrency, are considered
to be inevitable in the coming years. 9  Air Force Strategic Management Office, “Trend: Economic; Social and Demographic;
Geographic; Technology Evolution,” PAF Future Operating Environment 2021, (Pasay City:
Social and Demographic Factors. There has been a shift in global Philippine Air Force, 2021), 2, 19, 23, 49.
population and demographics; for the first time in centuries, the global 10  Helen Salvosa and Maria Regina Hechanova, “Generational differences and implicit
leadership schemas in the Philippine workforce”, Leadership and Organizational Development
population is expected to decline. With increased awareness, education, and Journal, Vol. 42, No.1, 47 https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/LODJ-08-
access to contraception, women's fertility rate is expected to slow down8. 2018-0314/full/html?skipTracking=true
11  Salvosa and Hechanova, “Generational differences and implicit leadership schemas in the
6  Asian Development Bank, “GDP Growth in Asia and the Pacific, Asian Development Outlook Philippine workforce”, 48-60
(ADO)”, ADB Data Library, https://data.adb.org/dataset/gdp-growth-asia-and-pacific-asian- 12  M Hilyer, “Here's how technology has changed the world since 2000”, World Economic
development-outlook Forum, 18 November 2020, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/11/heres-how-
7  Yukun Liu et. al., “Common Risks Factors in Cryptocurrency”, Wiley Online Library, https:// technology-has- changed-and-changed-us-over-the-past-20-years/ 000
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jofi.13119 13  Nicholas Burbules, et al., Five trends of Education and Technology in a sustainable future.”
8  United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs, “World population projected Geography and Sustainability, https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.geosus.2020.05.001
to reach 9.8 billion in 2050, and 11.2 billion in 2100”, 21 June 2017, https://www.un.org/ 14  Josie B Perez, “Urban Population in the Philippines”, Philippine Statistics Authority, 21
development/desa/en/news/population/world-population-prospects-2017.html March 2019, https://psa.gov.ph/content/urban-population-philippines-results-2015-census-
population

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Philippine Air Force Theory of Victory
37 38

opportunities and better living opportunities without going to the country's One thing is for certain is that for as long as there is no clarity, the Sabah
capital15. issue will continue to be a thorn in the relations between Malaysia and the
Philippines19.
Geographic Area Factors. Regarding geographic factors, the East-
China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and the Korean Peninsula are potential flashpoints Lastly, the Philippine Rise, known as Benham Rise, was awarded
that could undermine international security and stability. In addition, the by the United Nations to the Philippines last 2012 as an extension of its
West Philippine Sea and the larger South China Sea are still considered continental shelf. Hence, the Philippines has the exclusive right to explore
to be highly contested areas in the Asia Pacific region, with the different and exploit the resources there20President Rodrigo Duterte has declared
claimants vying for control and resources. The Ukraine- Russia war could the Philippine Rise as a Marine Reserve Resource, thus making it a no-take
also spill over globally if the war continues. zone and must be protected from abuse and misuse21.

As the global threat continues to loom over, the ongoing Ukraine Technology Evolution. The 4th and 5th Industrial Revolutions
- Russian war shows the potential of asymmetric warfare in both the encompassing artificial intelligence, robotics, 3D printing, automation, data
present and the future of warfare. The use of pervasive inexpensive analytics, quantum computing, cloud computing, Biotechnology/Nano-
commercial technology, especially citizen-empowering social networks Tech, alternate reality, and simulation will be widely used commercially
and crowdsourcing, has been helpful for Ukraine. We can learn from the and in the AFP22 Green Technology and Sustainable Development will be
tactics of Ukraine how we can prepare for the future16. more prevalent, and there will be more clean energy and less dependence
on fossil fuels23. 3D Printing and "Digital Twin" Design & Maintenance will
The Sabah dispute between the Philippines and Malaysia is improve leaps and bounds. Genetic Engineering research will become
considered one of the longest disputes in Southeast Asia, lasting over 60 a potent factor in security and warfare. Lastly, using Unmanned Combat
years. On one side, Malaysians claim that Sabah or formally known as Aerial Vehicles (UCAV) during conflicts will be more prevalent.
North Borneo was inherited by Malaysia when the British gave Malaysia
its sovereignty over its territory, which included the Borneo where Sabah Due to the pandemic, there was a drastic and sudden shift in using
lies17. Conversely, the Philippines has maintained its stance that portions the Internet and digital online platforms. Vulnerabilities posed as a way for
of Sabah or North Borneo is part of its territory. They claim that Sabah malicious attackers and hackers to target individuals, organizations, and
belongs to the Sultanate of Sulu and that the British only leased Sabah institutions. Digital crimes have also increased during the pandemic. The
from the Philippine government. This action caused tensions and strained heightened need to shift toward digital and online platforms poses risks
the bilateral relations between Malaysia and the Philippines. Nevertheless, that may endanger users instead of benefiting them24.
the Sabah issue is considered unsolved because of the contending claims
between Malaysia and the Philippines, and only the British North Borneo 19  Ibid
Company or the British government will know the answer to that matter18. 20  Department of Foreign Affairs, “Philippine Rise as Marine Protected Area”, 15 May 2018,
https://newdelhipe.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/newsroom/embassy-news/506-philippine-rise-as-
15  Judy Baker and Makiko Watanabe, “Unlocking the Philippines' urbanization potential”, marine-protected-area
World Bank Blogs, 20 September 2017, https://blogs.worldbank.org/eastasiapacific/unlocking- 21  World Wildlife Fund, “The case for protecting Benham Rise”, 22 June 2018, https://wwf.
the-philippines-urbanization-potential panda.org/wwf_news/?329835/The-case-for-protecting-Benham-Rise
22  Elmer Dadios, et al., “Preparing the Philippines for the Fourth Industrial Revolution: A
Scoping Study”, PIDS Discussion Paper Series No. 2018-11, Philippine Institute for DDevelopment
16  Andy Kessler, “Ukraine's Asymmetric War”, The Wall Street Journal, 27 March 2022 https:// Studies, August 2018 https://pidswebs.pids.gov.ph/CDN/PUBLICATIONS/pidsdps1811.pdf
www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-asymmetric-war-technology-starlink-mariupol-theater-collapse-
russia-explosives-internet-drones-weapons-11648400672 23  N. Rodil, “Harnessing Science and Technology for Poverty Reduction and Sustainable
Development”, National Academy of Science and Technology, 13 April 2016, https://www.nast.
17  Francesca Regalado, “Malaysia's spat with Philippines over Sabah: Five things to know”, ph/index.php/13-news-press-releases/249-harnessing-science-andtechnology-for-poverty-
Nikkei Asia Review, 29 September 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/ reduction-and-sustainable-development
Malaysia-s-spat-with-Philippines-over-Sabah-Five-things-to-know
24  Angel Averia, et.al., Cybersecurity in the Philippines: Global Context and Local Challenges.,
18  Anna Malindog-Uy, “Sabah: Malaysia's or Philippines'?”, The ASEAN Post, 08 October 2020, Asia Foundation, March 2022, ​​https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/
https://theaseanpost.com/article/sabah-malaysias-or-philippines Cybersecurity-in-the-Philippines-Global-Context-and-Local-Challenges-.pdf

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Philippine Air Force Theory of Victory
39 40

Cyberwarfare is no longer considered a future trend in warfare Slow economic recovery owing to the redirection of funds related
but rather a more notable and dangerous trend. Low cyber security could to COVID-19 response and the impact of the current crisis in Ukraine could
mean malicious attackers, or even states can use this vulnerability to attack slow down the AFP's capability upgrades, especially for external defense;
another state25.
Increasing tension in the West Philippine Sea and other regional
Environmental Factors. The environment is not considered a flashpoints could escalate the threat of limited war among major powers
massive factor in conflicts; nevertheless, environmental degradation can dragging other countries into the fray or a possibility of low and medium-
cause rifts and internal or external conflicts. Also, conflicts themselves intensity conflict;
can cause degradation of the environment. Poor ecological and resource
practices can increase vulnerability and the risk of conflict26 . Increasing trend of cyber-attacks and electronic warfare, the
vulnerability of the AFP in the cyber and electromagnetic domain can be
Scholars posited that environmental degradation and disruptions exploited by the enemies of the State. This would result in the exploitation
could magnify and amplify conflicts and breach security, thus creating war. of critical data and infrastructure by our adversaries;
Disruption and scarcity are not the only motives for conflict27. Regardless,
the environment also plays a huge role in shaping society. Conflicts and Rapid evolution and proliferation of modern weapons, while the AFP
wars are only one of the devastating consequences that may happen if remains deficient in technical know-how on modern asymmetric warfare,
environmental degradation and disruption will continuously be pursued. will position us behind the competition;

Climate change does not necessarily cause conflicts but can Climate change will intensify the effects of natural calamities. It
indirectly affect political, economic, and social factors, which can cause can exacerbate the existing political and economic factors, thus resulting in
conflicts or even wars. Climate change has dramatically impacted our the potential increase in dissatisfaction with the government and slowing
environment, and scientists say that we are currently facing the extinction economic recovery. Relatedly, focusing on non-traditional roles may result
of certain species of animals and plants. Furthermore, there has been in another hump in the AFP modernization related to external security and
significant deforestation in Amazon rainforests due to consumerism, defense; and
urbanization, and ​​ a growing population. It is also said that global
temperatures are expected to increase as well as the ocean level28(McClimon, There will be a rise in radicalization and violent extremism, where
2019). local terrorist groups will be more inspired to cause chaos and disruption
through physical violence or, in some cases, cybercrime. This phenomenon
Threats and Challenges. Along with the security trends identified will further disrupt economic development due to insecurity, thereby
are the following current, emerging, and future security threats and threatening the overall well-being of the citizens.
challenges for the Philippines28.
HOW EMERGING THREATS AND CHALLENGES WILL BE ADDRESSED
Political instability can cause internal and external conflicts
resulting in a lack of trust in the government, division of a state, the rise of With the threats and challenges mentioned above, it is essential
insurgency, and potential external disputes with other states, which could to develop the right strategies and appropriate capabilities to address
hamper the AFP in defending the state; them. In addition, the unpredictable security landscape necessitates one to
undertake review and assessment of the current strategic and operational
25  CJ Haughey, “Cyber warfare: What to expect in 2022”, Security Intelligence, 22 December concepts for the Armed Forces of the Philippines to be more adaptive,
2021, https://securityintelligence.com/articles/cyber-warfare- what-to-expect-2022 relevant and responsive to the constantly changing environment within the
26  W. Douglas Smith, The connection between environment, conflict and security, MAHB domestic and international security perspectives. In line with this, the AFP's
Stanford, 01 May 2018, https://mahb.stanford.edu/blog/environment-conflict-security/
Joint Operating Concept (JOC) prescribes how the AFP will address the
27  Ibid
above-mentioned future threats through the joint force's development and
28  Armed Forces of the Philippines, Future Operating Environment (2021)

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employment. On its part, the PAF has the Integrated Air Operations Concept (UCs). As a general rule, given an operational mission, the General
(IAOC), which is aligned with the AFP JOC. The PAF IAOC is composed of Headquarters (GHQ), AFP, as force manager, shall provide the "why" or the
interrelated capability systems designed to provide the necessary Air strategic purpose; the UCs, as force-employer, shall provide the "how" or
Power support to accomplish the AFP mission. These concepts will be the operational concept using the JOC in the formulation of their respective
implemented using the Agile Combat Employment (ACE), a proactive and campaign plans tailored to their peculiar operating environment; and the
reactive operational scheme of maneuver executed within threat timelines Major Services, as force-providers, shall provide the "what" or the units and
to increase resiliency and survivability. capabilities required to support the Unified Commands.

AFP Joint Operating Concept (JOC) PAF Integrated Air Operations Concept

The AFP JOC is a capstone concept that prescribes how the AFP shall As one of the force providers with the Philippine Army and the
operate as a Joint Force in the future operating environment and describes Philippine Navy, the PAF's contribution to the AFP JOC is the Integrated Air
the force structure and capabilities required by the future Joint Force. As Operations Concept, a conceptual framework for the employment of air
a capstone concept, the JOC guides and synchronizes the development power. It broadly portrays how the PAF conducts its core functions as part
of service-centric operating concepts of the Philippine Army, Philippine of a joint, inter-agency, or multinational force or independently in support
Air Force, and Philippine Navy, and the cross-service operating concepts, of national security objectives; and discusses how the Air Force intends to
namely: Air-Sea Concept, Air-Land Concept and Sea-Land Concept across provide the air power capabilities required by the various mission areas of
the six (6) operating domains (Figure 1) of land, sea, air, space, cyber and the AFP. It was developed using the generally accepted principles of warfare
cognitive (JOC, 2020) to include existing doctrines, frameworks, and processes of the PAF and the
AFP, foremost of which are the Air Power Structure Model (Figure 2) (Air
The success of joint operations is critically hinged on the proper Power Manual, 2000), the Air Operations Manual, and the Force Planning
implementation and appreciation of the force-provider/force-employer Process.
concept between and among the Major Services and Unified Commands

Figure 1: Domains of the Future Operating Environment Figure 2: Air Power Structure Model

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Philippine Air Force Theory of Victory
43 44

The PAF IAOC serves two (2) primary purposes. Firstly, regarding human or cognitive domain. The following are the six (6) core systems of
force employment, the PAF IAOC prescribes the Air Power capabilities that the IAOC:
can be applied in various mission areas of the AFP and aids PAF personnel
in planning air operations. Secondly, the PAF IAOC serves as a guide in Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). IADS is composed of weapon
developing the Air Power capabilities of the PAF through the Doctrine, systems, command and control systems, and detection systems. It constitutes
Organization, Training, Materiel, Personnel, Leadership, and Facilities the PAF's capabilities to conduct defensive counter-air missions and utilize
(DOTMPLF) framework. active or passive defensive measures to detect, identify, intercept, destroy
or neutralize the effectiveness of an adversary. This system will also prevent
In addition, the PAF IAOC provides the capabilities of the PAF, the adversary from achieving control of the air. The primary purpose of IADS
which are categorized into six (6) Core Systems, wherein every system is for territorial defense operations.
can be applied exclusively or in combination with the other systems. It is
designed to provide air power requirements for the AFP's various internal Surface Strike System (SSS). SSS provides the capabilities to find,
and external mission areas. Thus, the IAOC is the PAF's Service Concept that fix, and destroy surface targets, whether these targets are on land or over
will be applied along with the Service Concepts of the Philippine Army and bodies of water. These are PAF capabilities that will attack to damage or
neutralize a target. Strike can employ lethal or nonlethal and kinetic or
the Philippine Navy towards realizing the AFP JOC.
non-kinetic means to create the desired physical and/or cognitive effect
on the adversary.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance System (ISRS). ISRS

allows the acquisition of real or near-real time, network-centric situational
awareness of the PAF's operating environment so that an Air Component
Commander or Joint Force Commander as well as operators, can arrive
at a timely and well-informed decision. While ISRS is primarily used for
territorial defense, security, and stability missions, it also plays a critical
role in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) missions,
especially in conducting area surveys and damage assessments. These PAF
capabilities enable the other core roles and are aligned with the PAF war
fighting function of situational understanding.

Mobility Support System (MSS). MSS provides air mobility capabilities

that will rapidly deploy, sustain and redeploy forces and materiel to, from,
or within a theater of operation by air. The primary purpose of MSS is to
transport personnel and equipment. MSS also plays a significant role in
HADR, especially in transporting relief items.

Search and Rescue System (SARS). SARS capabilities will cater to the
Figure 3: Philippine Air Force Integrated Air Operations System aggregate military and civil efforts to rescue, release or recover personnel
from permissive, uncertain, or hostile environments, whether captured,
missing or isolated. This system also provides air capabilities for disaster
The PAF IAOC is composed of the six (6) core systems (Figure 3) response and combat search and rescue.
that are interconnected, forming a mesh network derived from their very
nature and purpose. The system is safeguarded by Cyber Security (CS) Integrated Command, Control, Communications, and Computer
and Electronic Warfare (EW), reinforced by outward conduct of effective System (IC4S). IC4S integrates and links all Core Systems by enabling the
Information Operations (IO), striking down the adversary systems in the

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Philippine Air Force Theory of Victory
45 46

exchange of information, the interface of components, and the display The PAF IAOC also caters to all levels of operation as follows:
of a Common Tactical Picture (CTP) among all participating components.
The components' CTPs and information from the joint planning network 1. Strategic Level – in the event of actual conflict, the concept will
contribute to a Common Operational Picture (COP). The information flow support the NMS by providing a model or method on how the AFP
should be as complete, reliable, secure, and as near real-time as possible to can systematically employ Air Power to complement the other
support the commander's decision-making cycles. IC4S provides network- Elements of National Power as the AFP pursues to attain the
centric command and control capabilities to support a Commander's military objectives.
decision-making cycle and permit the delivery of timely, accurate, and
proportionate responses. 2. Operational Level – the IAOC must address the critical emerging
challenges, opportunities, defense gaps, and the current capability
Furthermore, the IAOC Framework (Figure 4) illustrates the requirements of the AFP JOC. The core system tasks and forces
interrelationship between the PAF IAOC and the AFP JOC as the latter that compose the PAF IAOC must satisfy the necessities for prompt
achieves the NMOs. The PAF IAOC, through the aforementioned PAF core and sustained air operations for each defense layer. Likewise, this
systems, complements or supports the different lines of effort of the AFP concept will elaborate on how "jointness" can be achieved and how
JOC to attain the end states stated in the NMOs across the full spectrum of integration elements make joint operations possible, considering
military operations during peacetime, conflict, or war. the nature of air power and air domain.

3. Tactical Level – the expected character of air operations to be

performed by each PAF tactical unit within the core systems and the
guidelines regarding the required interactions at the tactical level
are broadly outlined in this concept. Moreover, functional concepts
anchored on this broad concept shall serve as references for the
subsequent development of tactical manuals and doctrines. The
tactical level starts from the Capability and ends with the Forces
portion. The tactical level will cover the tactics, techniques, and
procedures of a core system's specific platform or equipment.

Agile Combat Employment (ACE)

Under the AFP JOC, the above-mentioned capabilities of the PAF

Figure 4: The PAF IAOC Framework may be employed together with the other capabilities of the Joint Force
using the Agile Combat Employment (ACE)29. ACE is a concept espoused by
the United States Air Force (USAF) for non-permanent basing of forward
Consequently, the PAF IAOC serves as the service concept that will deployed expedition combat forces that are smaller and dispersed. ACE is
fill the requirements of the AFP JOC for the tasks required to satisfy the a proactive and reactive operational scheme of maneuver executed within
defense gaps as well as the range of operations and Air Power employment threat timelines to increase resiliency and survivability while generating
options available for the Joint Force Commander. Additionally, the coverage combat power throughout the integrated deterrence continuum. It
encompasses the operating concepts of all PAF capabilities such as Air requires the Command to think and conduct operations within the modern
operational environment. Likewise, this system will inform relevant and
Defense (AD); Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); Internal
forward-looking concepts and provide a mechanism that will quickly adapt
Security Operations (ISO); and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster to an ever-changing security environment. ACE consists of five core elements
Response (HADR), among others. which are as follows:

29  US Air Force, “Agile Combat Employment”, Air Force Doctrine Note 1-21 (2021), 2-11

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Philippine Air Force Theory of Victory
47 48

Posture. Posture is intrinsically tied with other core elements. (WRM) and non-WRM equipment as well as innovative logistics and force
Forces must be able to rapidly execute operations from various locations projection scope of capabilities to address the needs of the Command as its
with integrated capabilities and interoperability across the core. If properly operations grow in scope and scale. Weapons system sustainment is and has
executed, posture will provide a deterrent to a conflict by being strategically been incredibly complex. Decision-makers must not only create sustainment
predictable but operationally unpredictable. An effectively tailored posture plans to support aging equipment but also navigate the decades of budget
provides Commanders with expanded force employment options and battles and changing requirements. The approach should incorporate the
mitigates operational risks.
following factors: Strategic vision – crafting a flexible, effective, and enduring
Command and Control (C2). Having a centralized command and sustainment strategy that balances competing demands on a weapon system
distributed control is part of the C2 core value of ACE. This core value throughout its life cycle readiness; Operational construct – Addressing
requires that there should be reliable communication to have smooth and diverse stakeholder incentives by assigning ownership responsibilities
sustainable execution and defense. that support the overall strategy; Tactical execution – Constantly ensuring
the right people, business processes, and enabling technology are properly
Movement and Maneuver. Movement and Maneuver provide the inserted to make it all happen32.
ability and agility to outpace an adversary's action. Maneuver includes
expansion of operational footprints and access throughout the theater to To maintain the momentum brought by the modernization program,
provide flexibility, deter adversaries, and support partners and allies. it needs to generate, intensify, and sustain "knowledge and technology flow"
through systematic collaboration and partnership among the triumvirate of
Protection. Protection posits that active and passive defenses are
necessary to address and counter threats in all domains. There should Government, Academe, and Industry which is seen to be one of the "holistic"
be a robust and layered defense that can protect forces from present and approaches of defense self-reliance of a country. This could be better served
emerging threats. if Local Industries could fill in 33.

Examples of this are the capabilities of the Cyber and Space Domain AFP JOC vis-à-vis PAF FLIGHT PLAN 2028
and the utilization of Drones. As operational domains, cyber and space
domains will become more critical for deterrence and defense. Thus, PAF/ The need to fully realize the "jointness" of operations within the
AFP must develop cyber defense capabilities to protect vital military and AFP and its Major Services has been clearly emphasized in the AFP JOC.
government facilities and infrastructures against cyber-attacks. Amid these As a capstone concept, the AFP JOC describes how the integrated and
strategic developments, the PAF/AFP should initiate venturing into the interoperable Joint Force will operate in a projected future operating
domain of space30. environment, particularly in addressing current and emerging defense and
security threats and challenges. It also highlights the force characteristics
necessary to execute the joint mission-essential tasks to guide long-term
Furthermore, drones are essential and a mainstay in military and
capability development. With this, the AFP JOC transcends the planning
warfare capabilities. Other nations are utilizing drones extensively, from
period of 2022-2028 and is designed to be a vital document in the next long-
search and rescue to surveillance. This capability may also be used to
term planning period until 2040.
avert attacks on infrastructures and facilities. With the evolving military
technology, drone strike technologies are evolving31.
As prescribed by the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292), the
PAF is mandated to be responsible for the air defense of the Philippines.
Sustainment. Sustainment under ACE states that there is a need for
To effectively and efficiently perform its mandate, the PAF has established
infrastructure innovation and complete visibility of war reserve materiel
its long-term plan known as the PAF Flight Plan 2028. In this strategic
30  Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, J5, Armed Forces of the Philippines, National
32  Dennis Schultz, et. al., “Sustainment in the military: Maintain technological advantage over
Military Strategy (Quezon City: Armed Forces of the Philippines 2019)
the life span of military systems”, Deloitte Insights, 23 July 2019,
31  Mario Samuel Camacho, “War in Ukraine proves that drones are quickly making tanks
33  Deparment of National Defense, “III. SRDP Strategy: Vision” Self- Reliant Defense Program,
obsolete”, The Infographics Show, https://www.theinfographicsshow.com/drones-attack-tanks
(Quezon City: Department of National Defense 2021)
obsolete/

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Philippine Air Force Theory of Victory
49 50

roadmap, the PAF envisions becoming a more capable and credible air force The following are the capability goals and requirements of the PAF
responsive to national security and development (Flight Plan 2028, 2014). that need to be developed or further enhanced:

To accomplish the PAF's vision, the Flight Plan 2028 caters to both a. Robust Air Surveillance and Early Warning capability;
internal and external mission areas mentioned in the NDS of the DND and the b. Adequate capability to intercept and neutralize threats composed
NMS of the AFP. The PAF Flight Plan 2028 also focuses on further enhancing of the right mix of multi-role fighters and ground-based air defense
the capabilities needed under the PAF's six (6) core systems, namely: IC4S, systems;
IADS, ISRS, SRS, MSS, and SSS. c. Secured PAF IC4S that is integrated into the AFP C4ISTAR for
effective command and control;
Furthermore, these core systems are projected to ensure that the d. Electronic warfare capability for defensive and offensive operations;
PAF can elevate its capabilities for joint and combined forces by becoming e. Cyber warfare capability;
a ready, efficient, and effective organization. The PAF has also set objectives f. Maritime domain awareness capability;
to improve its operational readiness through the capability enablers g. Fixed and rotary-wing airlift capabilities for rapid deployment of
(DOPMTLF). These capability enablers are the PAF's material and non- equipment and personnel;
material requirements to ensure that it can provide and employ forces h. Strike capability to support surface forces;
within the levels and standards required by the AFP. i. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high yield Explosives
(CBRNE) capability; and
WHAT THE PAF NEEDS TO ATTAIN VICTORY j. Basing and support systems.

As emphasized in the National Defense Strategy, the AFP In addition, the Philippine Space Agency (PhilSA) commenced the
Modernization Program plays a significant role in the implementation of the PAF space capabilities initiative as part of its mandate to increase partnership
respective mandates of the AFP and its Major Services, as this entails the with different sectors that will be included in the research and development
identification, development, production, and acquisition of platforms that in exploring space technology and its applications. Furthermore, this
can address the identified threats (NDS, 2018). In support of the Revised collaboration hopes to develop a research partnership between the two
AFP Modernization Act (RA 10349), the AFP and Major Services are advised agencies in order to have concept planning and identification of requirements
to ensure interoperability and integration of platforms and weapon systems. to build the Philippines' sovereign communications and surveillance satellite
in order to achieve the strategic goal of securing the nation.
These equipment shall be acquired to fill the identified capability gaps.
CONCLUSION
The discussion regarding the capability gap assessment in this
paper is vital in terms of evaluating the readiness of the PAF in the current The future operating environment is volatile, uncertain, complex, and
and ever-changing security environment. This endeavor aims to develop the ambiguous. Geopolitical rivalry among the major powers, regional flashpoints,
PAF's capabilities further to provide and fulfill the air power contribution of economic factors, climate change, technological advances, and demographic
the Command to the joint operating efforts of the AFP. changes are among the key trends and drivers that create insecurities. Threats
As the PAF enters Horizon III of the Revised AFP Modernization to sovereignty and territorial integrity, cyber security, economic security, and
Program and finalizes the acquisition projects under Horizon I and Horizon human security already exist but are seen to be more pronounced in the coming
II, there is a need to re-evaluate and update the current capability plans. years.
Identifying the gaps among systems when integrated to carry out different
tasks in war fighting is also imperative. As a force provider, the PAF develops With the various threats and challenges the country faces, it is important
its capabilities under the other core systems of the IAOC. to develop the right strategies and appropriate capabilities to address them. The
threats identified cannot be addressed by a single government agency, much
less by a single branch of the military. Thus, the PAF refers to the AFP JOC and
provides the IAOC as its contribution to the concept of confronting and tackling

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Philippine Air Force Theory of Victory
51 52

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61 62

Abstract. The Philippine Navy (PN) remains the military service capable of
operating within and beyond the Philippines’ maritime territorial boundaries.
Its inherent power-projection and territorial defense capabilities, together
with the Philippines’ strategic location between Asia and the Pacific, allow
Manila to maneuver along strategic, political, and diplomatic dimensions
through various naval operations targeting adversaries and friendly navies
alike. From territorial defense operations to combined maritime exercises
in bilateral and multilateral capabilities, navies are often the go-to military
instrument for states for strategic communication. For the Philippines, its
President’s Papers: growing Navy presents significant opportunities to secure Manila’s position
The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II in its regional strategic goals. From traditional security concerns in the
West Philippine Sea to anti-terrorism efforts in Southern Mindanao, the
Navy plays an integral part in ensuring effective military responses given
THEORIZING NAVAL WARFARE: CONDITIONS AND the current security environment. However, to ensure the victory of the
PRINCIPLES FOR PHILIPPINE NAVAL VICTORY Philippine Navy in the event of war, the organization needs to evolve from
being an input to seapower to becoming the primary lead of the Philippines
as an output and shape the existing strategic environment to benefit the
Philippines’ position in protecting its seas and securing its future through
a modern and multi-capable Navy. Through the AADS and the development
Office of the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Plans, N5 of the Navy’s operating concept, this paper aims to trace the contours of a
Office of Naval Strategic Studies possible theory for the Navy’s victory in warfare.
Philippine Navy
INTRODUCTION

The US National Intelligence Council's Global Report 2040, titled A More

Contested World, postulated that the international system would be further
contested, uncertain, and conflict-prone in the next two decades. While the
world has become more interconnected through technology, migration, and
trade, those connections have divided and fragmented people and states1.
The emerging fragmentation thus invites disequilibrium in the existing
systems and structures as there is a growing mismatch at all levels. The gaps
between challenges and the solutions to address them have heightened.
With this more significant imbalance comes contestation in the international
community that could trigger the ever-rising tensions, divisions, and
competitions in the international arena.2

Likewise, competition between state and non-state actors will likely

intensify in the coming years as states increasingly become more reliant
and dependent upon access to the global commons (i.e., the oceans, space,

1  National Intelligence Council (US), ed. Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds: a Publication
of the National Intelligence Council. US Government Printing Office, 2012.
2  US National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World (March
2021), https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/GlobalTrends_2040.pdf

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63 64

cyberspace). Thus, maintaining freedom of action in the global commons unobtainable goal7 as the organization is increasingly sidelined in the U.S-
has been prioritized in states' national objectives. However, this increasing China rivalry.
competition in the global commons undermines international stability and
causes conflicts and confrontations between states.3 In the global maritime Philippines' Hedging Strategy in Post-Duterte regime
commons, for instance, the Southeast Asian region and particularly the
South China Sea (SCS), has become a hotbed for conflicts and confrontations Similarly, the Philippines is no exception in contending the
for many years due to its strategic importance especially access to ocean asymmetric relationship between ASEAN countries and the major powers,
resources and trade channels. Meanwhile, as 2021 unfolds, new strategic mainly US and China. Notwithstanding President Duterte's strong rhetoric
trends emerge, such as the resurgence of great-power competition that against the U.S., the Philippines has continued its hedging behavior between
could lead to new alliances and power configurations. the two countries, taking advantage of available military and economic
gains. Despite President Duterte's pro-Sino orientations and shifting away
Challenging ASEAN Centrality in Southeast Asian Naval Security from Aquino's administration's balancing strategy, President Duterte's
changing alignment behavior towards China is not a case of bandwagoning
For many decades, the credibility of 'ASEAN centrality,' which seeks since economic and defense cooperation with the US has continued and is
to assert the organization's leadership capacity in hosting multilateral maintained.8 For instance, the US remains the leading security guarantor
discussion forums, especially between its major dialogue partners (e.g., for the Philippines (formalized through the Mutual Defense Treaty) even
the US and China), has attracted pessimism4. The lack of a clearly defined as President Duterte sought to improve bilateral relations with China,
strategic stance on matters concerning the region has been one of its notably through economic engagement rather than outright balancing. 9 In
significant criticisms. It was further highlighted in 2012 when said regional the post-Duterte administration, it may be possible that a balancing policy
bloc's foreign ministers disagreed on a joint communique – a first in ASEAN's will eventually be restored. This is based on the security-maximizing logic
history – due to the SCS dispute. In recent years, ASEAN centrality has that a relatively weaker state such as the Philippines will likely align or
been challenged further, with ASEAN countries having different responses ally with actors facing the same threat. The Department of Foreign Affairs
to China's increasing assertiveness in the region. The geopolitical rivalry (DFA) statements declaring that "the creation of new facts in the water will
between US and China has pushed governments in the region to tiptoe never give rise to legal right anywhere or anytime" and that "such incidents
between the major powers to protect their interests. Since Southeast Asian undermine efforts to build mutual trust" necessary to sustain the positive
states are relatively minor players in the grand geopolitical narrative, they momentum for ongoing Code of Conduct (CoC) negotiations10 lend credence
are expected to either balance between the US and China or, at most, edge to this possibility, despite stronger ties with China in the last three years.
closer to either of these superpowers5. Given the asymmetry between
Southeast Asian countries and the major powers (US and China), ASEAN This only shows that state alignment posture is ever evolving, and
countries generally resort to a hedging strategy to cultivate a neutral or changes depend on various factors such as leadership, levels of threat, and
middle position, avoid conflictual issues in the SCS, and not be constrained big power actions.11 So far, while the Marcos Jr. administration mentions not
by one policy option.6 However, ASEAN centrality is becoming a more to "…preside over any process that will abandon even one square inch of

3  UK Ministry of Defence, Global Strategic Trends 6th Edition: The Future Starts Today (2018),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_ 7  Mark Valencia, “ASEAN Security ‘Centrality’ and the South China Sea,” August 23, 2018,
data/file/771309/Global_Strategic_Trends_-_The_Future_Starts_Today.pdf https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/asean-security-centrality-and-the-south-china-sea/.
4  Mueller, Lukas Maximilian. "Challenges to ASEAN centrality and hedging in connectivity 8  Kuik Cheng-Chwee, “Hedging in Post-Pandemic Asia: What, How, and Why?,” The Asan
governance—regional and national pressure points." The Pacific Review 34, no. 5 (2021): 747- Forum (blog), June 6, 2020, https://theasanforum.org/hedging-in-post-pandemic-asia-what-
777. how-and-why/.
5  Marina Kaneti, “ASEAN Must Make the Best of Its New Centrality in China’s Diplomacy – The 9  Alfred Gerstl, “The Gradual Softening of the Philippines’ Hedging Strategy towards China
Diplomat,” December 21, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/asean-must-make-the-best- under President Duterte,” Vestnik NSU. Series: History and Philology 20 (February 1, 2021): 46–
of-its-new-centrality-in-chinas-diplomacy/. 56, https://doi.org/10.25205/1818-7919-2021-20-1-46-56.
6  Evelyn Goh, Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security 10  Lucio Blanco Pitlo III, “Why Philippine Solidarity With Vietnam in South China Sea
Strategies, Policy Studies 16 (Washington: East-West Center, 2005), https://www.eastwestcenter. Fishing Row Matters,” December 21, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/why-philippine-
org/system/tdf/private/PS016.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=32053. solidarity-with-vietnam-in-south-china-sea-fishing-row-matters/.
11  Cheng-Chwee, “Hedging in Post-Pandemic Asia.”

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Theorizing Naval Warfare: Conditions and Principles for Philippine Naval Victory
65 66

territory (sic) of the Republic of the Philippines to any foreign power"12, he assertiveness in the region16. However, the AUKUS might have adverse
maintains the Duterte administration's foreign policy strategy of looking strategic implications, including an arms race in the region and exacerbating
toward China for infrastructure development loans13. Corollary to this, longstanding tensions between and among states17. Nonetheless, it can be
future leadership should take into consideration the assumptions discussed hypothesized that the AUKUS alliance might be a prelude to a more complex
in the Future of Naval Warfare I: first, as the country's threat perception is security environment in the Southeast Asian region, with more non-claimant
low, national policies and strategies often overlook a possible attack on the states joining the bandwagon in the future.
country, and second, the US alliance serves as a deterrent against asymmetric Naval Warfare for the Philippines: Debilitating, Deliberate, and Decisive
forces, the Philippines will likely be left on its own during a possible war, The hybridity of threats figures prominently in current conflicts
which requires proper military capability planning for single-service and and wars and is projected to likely figure in future warfare scenarios18.
joint military operations. Considering elemental conceptualizations of hybrid warfare, the idea is to
employ the amalgamations of varied forms of warfare (conventional, non-
New Power Configurations: The AUKUS Security Partnership conventional, irregular, asymmetric) to overwhelm the opponent through
complexity19. This development pattern is primarily driven by three main
Philippine foreign policy discussed above demonstrates that contextual factors: a shifting balance in global and regional power, complex
maintaining the country's existing defense relationship with traditional interdependence within the international political economy, and more
allies while engaging other powers and diversifying relations through channels for actors to potentially harm – also known as technological
regional mechanisms are complementing strategies and thus can be pursued convergence20. This drive to challenge the status quo is complemented by
simultaneously14. Further, one of the pillars of Philippine Foreign Policy – the dynamics of the global political economy and captures the essence of the
preservation and enhancement of national security – highlights that the current revisionist agenda.
Philippines' defense and security relationships are designed to manage new
realities, thus requiring a continuous expansion of the country's defense and China presents the most pressing threat to the Philippines. It holds
security engagements15. The Philippines, for instance, recently welcomed the considerably advanced military capabilities and has continually resorted
newfound technological-sharing agreement AUKUS (Australia, the United to gray zone campaigns to shape the region's political entities in warfare's
Kingdom, and the United States), announced on September 15, 2021. The maritime, human/cognitive, and even the cyber/electromagnetic spectrum
AUKUS is a three-way commitment between Australia, the UK, and the US domains. However, the country's standing national policies on security echo
centered on the joint development of undersea capabilities such as nuclear- a distinct form of 'sea-blindness,' articulating a low-level threat perception
powered submarines (SSN) and artificial intelligence (AI) technology. This with the current regional security environment while focusing mainly
pact received mixed reactions from ASEAN countries, as Malaysia and on internal and domestic threats. The Philippines' national policies and
Indonesia voiced their concerns. At the same time, the Philippines and strategies – the basis of its military strategy, plans, and operations – assumes
Singapore have backed the AUKUS agreement, stating that this security an independent foreign policy as an effective bulwark against traditional
partnership complements other regional mechanisms and hoped that threats removed from the possibility of war and as well as new strategies
it could balance the power and strengthen deterrence against China's in conducting gray zone operations (Paculba et al., 68-69). However, China's

16  Madeleine Bond, “Southeast Asian Responses to AUKUS: Arms Racing, Non-Proliferation
12  Philippine Daily Inquirer, “FULL TEXT: President Marcos’ 1st Sona | Inquirer News,” FULL and Regional Stability,” Asialink, October 27, 2021, https://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/insights/
TEXT: President Marcos’ 1st Sona, July 25, 2022, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1634445/full- southeast-asian-responses-to-aukus-arms-racing,-non-proliferation-and-regional-stability.
text-president-marcos-1st-sona
17  Choong, William, and Ian Storey. "Southeast Asian Responses to AUKUS: Arms Racing, Non-
13  Reuters, “Marcos Wants Philippines to Renegotiate Loans on China-Backed Rail Projects | Proliferation and Regional Stability." Perspective. Singapore (2021).
Reuters,” July 16, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-marcos-wants-
18  Xylee C Paculba et al., “Future of Philippine Naval Warfare,” in Future of Philippine Warfare,
renegotiate-loans-49-bln-china-backed-rail-projects-2022-07-16/.
1st ed., President’s Papers 1 (Quezon City: National Defense College of the Philippines, 2021),
14  Mary Fides A. Quintos, “The Philippines: Hedging in a Post-Arbitration South China Sea?,” 52–77, http://www.ndcp.edu.ph/wp-content/uploads/presidents%20papers/PP%20Future%20
Asian Politics & Policy 10, no. 2 (2018): 261–82, https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12394. of%20Philippine%20Warfare%20(Web).pdf.he
15  Albert F Del Rosario, “An Independent and Principled Philippine Foreign Policy for 19  Hoffman, Frank G. Conflict in the 21st century: The rise of hybrid wars. Arlington: Potomac
Economic Growth,” December 21, 2021, https://dfa.gov.ph/dfa-news/dfa-releasesupdate/1110- Institute for Policy Studies, 2007.
an-independent-and-principled-philippine-foreign-policy-for-economic-growth.
20  Monaghan, Sean. "Countering hybrid warfare." Prism 8, no. 2 (2019): 82-99.

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Theorizing Naval Warfare: Conditions and Principles for Philippine Naval Victory
67 68

objective to challenge the established hegemon translates to many lines With communication lines from deployed surface assets cut off from the
of effort that reflect its revisionist stance and intent for power projection Headquarters, the maritime environment is thus ripe for the PLA-N to
towards its' island chain' objectives and beyond. conduct deliberate offensive operations against Manila.

Debilitating: Crippling National Communication Systems Deliberate: The Failure of Trading Space for Time

Given the PLA-N and the Philippine Navy's significantly asymmetric Duterte's "realignment" to China was made under the assumption
naval power balance, a war scenario between Manila and Beijing can be of trading space for time – securing significant economic gains by relegating
debilitating, deliberate, and definite. Debilitating means that the PLA's the SCS disputes to a lower priority22. Regarding Philippine-China political-
cyberwarfare capabilities can easily support the PLA-N's naval operations. military relations, defense cooperation was set aside and restructured
On "D-Day," the Philippines should expect multiple Distributed Denial of into non-military, constabulary maritime agency cooperative mechanisms
Service (DDOS) attacks on critical Philippine infrastructures, including such as the emergent Philippine Coast Guard (PCG)-Chinese Coast Guard
electricity, mass transportation and communication, and financial centers, to staff talks, which aims to adopt confidence-building mechanisms (CBMs)
cripple the Philippine economy lines of communication between Philippine and institutionalize dialogue23. This meant shelving discussions around
national defense and security agencies. In December 2021, the Philippine territorial disputes and investing in enhancing trust through confidence-
Navy (PN), the rest of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the building mechanisms to prevent conflict between the claimants.
DFA were victims of Chinese cyberattacks presumed to be intelligence-
gathering operations. Similarly, Myanmar, Laos, Singapore, Thailand, and However, as Beijing cripples the Philippines' maritime defense
Cambodia were also targeted.21 These operations should be considered coordination capabilities, it immediately conducts massive yet measured
penetration tests to assess the PN's readiness to protect its systems and naval operations against the Philippines. At the same time, the AFP GHQ
pre-empt cyberattacks. Given the PN's limited integrated systems between coordinates with major services to respond to PLA-N and People's Armed
and among its naval assets and the Headquarters (and the Naval Operating Forces Maritime Militia (PAF-MM). The PLA-N's forces are massive in number,
Center, NOC), compromised communication lines will force the PN to estimated to be the largest in the world, with a battle force consisting of 350
revert to analog modes of transmission to prevent Chinese interception. platforms, including more than 130 major surface combatants, submarines,
As cyberattacks are being conducted, Philippine airwaves may also be ocean-going amphibious ships, mine warfare ships, aircraft carriers, and
compromised with the conduct of information warfare to weaken the will fleet auxiliaries24. PLA-N forces will utilize all available means to secure
of the national population and feed into defeatist sentiments to prevent loss all possible choke points and vital areas to exercise control over the "First
of life and property. Island Chain." Apart from swarming tactics, China may likewise utilize mine
warfare to help its forces enforce naval blockades. In addition to providing
The lack of secure communications further debilitates national maritime the general data regarding its naval forces, the following figure similarly
coordination efforts to scramble a best-alternative "force mix" of shows that China is bent on projecting its power outwards towards its
military and civilian assets along the Philippines' western seaboard. As island chain objectives (dubbed as a 'transition from the near seas towards
the Philippines declares a state of national emergency, compromised protection missions on the far seas').
communication platforms not only cut off Philippine communication with
the US to immediately relay national security concerns but also discourage Chinese-occupied and disputed features in the SCS will have been
the US from communicating with its embassies and Philippine counterparts highly militarized through HF radar outposts, long-range anti-ship cruise
in real-time to review the possibility of readying the invocation of Article V
of the PH-US Mutual Defense Treaty. There is also the possibility of the US 22  Andrea Chloe Wong, “The Philippines’ Relations with China: A Pragmatic Perspective
using the intermediary chaos to renege from its mutual defense obligations, Under President Duterte,” Torino World Affairs Institute 12, no. 51 (December 2017): 3.
to cushion itself from another crisis, given the effects of the Russia-Ukraine 23  Frances Mangosing, “PH, China Coast Guards Explore Ways to Boost Cooperation in High-
war on the global crude oil market. Level Talks,” INQUIRER.net, January 21, 2020, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1217483/ph-china-
coast-guards-explore-ways-to-boost-cooperation-in-high-level-talks.
21  Dexter Cabalza, “PH, Neighbors on Sino Cyberhit List, Says US Firm,” INQUIRER.net, 24  Cordesman, A. H., and G. Hwang. "Updated Report: Chinese Strategy and Military Forces in
December 11, 2021, https://globalnation.inquirer.net/201025/ph-neighbors-on-sino-cyberhit- 2021." Center for Strategic and International Studies. Recuperado 26 (2021).
list-says-us-firm.

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Theorizing Naval Warfare: Conditions and Principles for Philippine Naval Victory
69 70

missiles25 , and air-defense missile systems.26 Constructed airfields will have and Electronic Counter Countermeasures (ECCMs), which detect possible
the capacity to cater to the PLA's Xian H-6G bombers and Shenyang FC-31 incoming Naval Air Wing (NAW) and Philippine Air Force (PAF) aircraft
fighters in superior numbers and have previously conducted incursions using High Frequency (HF) radars in Kagitingan, Zamora, and Panganiban
within the Philippines' Air Defense Identification Zone to exhaust the reefs. Disabled communication lines and destroyed assets spell major hits to
country's limited number of combined air and naval air assets as part of national defense morale, detailing a failure of the time traded for space for
China's grey zone shaping operations. With China's 59 submarines (4 of national defense development.
which are nuclear-powered), the Liaoning and Shandong aircraft carriers,
27 destroyers, 59 frigates, 41 corvettes, and other amphibious assets
along with the PAF-MM, Chinese maritime forces can easily overpower
any existing resistance from the PN's surface assets stationed in the WPS
under the AFP's Western Command and the Naval Forces West.27 With the
Philippines' minimal surface-to-air missile batteries and lack of second-
strike capabilities, Chinese intermediate ballistic missiles (IRBMs) can reach
Manila anytime from 6.4 minutes to 4.7 minutes, depending on their launch
site.28 Chinese IRBMs can reach Manila in these shown estimates, assuming
these fly at an average speed of Mach 10:

a. Six mins and 22 seconds from Guangzhou

b. Six mins and 18 seconds from Yulin Naval Base, Hainan
c. Five mins and 57 seconds from the Paracel Islands
d. Four mins and 44 seconds from the Spratly Islands

Assuming that the US does not immediately provide reinforcements

to support the Philippines' response against Chinese attacks, the PN will
activate its strategic forces (i.e., the Fleet-Marine Ready Force) along possible
amphibious attack sites along the western seaboard within a conservative
estimate of between 3-5 days following the initial cyberattacks to Philippine
communication systems and critical national infrastructures. BRP Sierra
Madre is effectively neutralized either by eliminating stationed PN personnel Figure 1. West Philippine Sea Map and the Distance
or sinking the grounded vessel. Philippine-occupied features with multi- of Nearest Chinese Military Bases to Manila
purpose infrastructure such as airstrips along the WPS are destroyed by the
PLA-N's Xian H-6G bombers. Existing assets will be most likely neutralized
with Chinese YJ-12B supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles and the HQ-9B Decisive: Deterring alliance-supported Second-Strikes
anti-air missiles. Furthermore, Philippine electronic warfare capabilities
will be severely challenged by Chinese Electronic Countermeasures (ECMs)
Following IRBM strikes on Manila and a graduated maritime
25  These include the YJ-12B, with a 305kg high explosive payload, 545-kilometer range and response, and successfully establishing anti-access and area denial (A2-AD)
combat altitude of 15 kilometers above sea level. assets (with a force mix of PAF-MM and PLA-N) in the WPS and Philippines'
26  An example of this is the HQ-9B, with a 200-kilometer range and combat altitude of 30 territorial seas, Chinese informational operations permeate throughout the
kilometers above sea level domestic population and as well as political, economic, and financial elites
27  Paculba et al., “Future of Philippine Naval Warfare.” to ensure limited-to-no resistance. With the lack of a collective defense
28  “Fast and Furiously Accurate,” U.S. Naval Institute, July 1, 2019, https://www.usni.org/ agreement in ASEAN, SCS claimants, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei
magazines/proceedings/2019/july/fast-and-furiously-accurate. Darussalam, and Vietnam, ramp up naval defense deployments along their
territorial seas. As the PLA-N occupies the Philippines' western seaboard,

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Theorizing Naval Warfare: Conditions and Principles for Philippine Naval Victory
71 72

Figure 2. China’s Military Infrastructure in the Kalayaan

Island Group (Source: Military Balance, 2020)

Figure 4. China’s D-Day Attack Against the Philippines

(Future of Philippine Warfare 2020)

Theorizing Naval Warfare

In his seminal work Theory of International Politics, Waltz warns against the
haphazard use of the word "theory" instead of related concepts such as laws,
principles, hypotheses, etc.30 Theory is only "built" when assumptions are
developed and, most importantly, confirmed through testing.31 Therefore,
maritime threats should be enumerated in developing a particular "theory"
of naval victory in war and the necessary operations involved to address
these. It should also defend its temporal explanatory power on why the
pertinent character of these naval operations is justified.32 Accordingly, this
Figure 3. China’s Military Infrastructure in the Paracel Islands Theory should present two (2) points: First, this Theory must explain why
(Source: Military Balance, 2020) such naval operations ensure the Navy's victory against an asymmetric
naval power balance, and second, defend why the necessary capabilities in
the PN's modernization pipeline maintain the Philippines' naval strategic
PLA-N ships rapidly move to secure the "second-island chain" along the
Philippine Rise bordering US Territory Guam with a mix of surface assets 30  Kenneth N Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Political Science (Massachusetts:
Addison-Wesley, 1979).
and as the PLA-N's submarines thanks to its multiple hydrographic survey
31  As structural realists assume that states are rationally acting towards self-preservation and
incursions since 2017.29 threats come from other states, a theory of the Navy’s victory must identify the nature of threats
it perpetually faces and as well as its assumed character as a naval force.
29  Steven Stashwick, “China May Have Been Surveying Strategic Waters East of Philippines,” 32  For example, it is not sufficient to say that the West Philippine Sea (WPS) is the Philippines’
accessed March 19, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/china-may-have-been-surveying- core security frontier against aggressive hegemonic powers and simply contextualize the Navy’s
strategic-waters-east-of-philippines/. operations in achieving a set of naval security objectives.

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Theorizing Naval Warfare: Conditions and Principles for Philippine Naval Victory
73 74

advantage to protect its interests. These primary assumptions are pivotal off prompting Manila to lodge a case against China before the PCA at The
loci of the PN's "theory of naval victory," which should spur reviewing Hague.36 Several stand-offs between Manila and Beijing have since occurred
existing strategies and plans toward becoming a modern and multi-capable with some of the latest developments, including BRP Cabra "shooing" away
Navy. Chinese and Vietnamese vessels.37 This concern also informs the Secretary of
National Defense (SND), calling for a more comprehensive MDT.38 These can
With the strategic "realities" of national maritime security outlined in the be classified as "nonwar wars," which characterized the responses of weaker
earlier section, several assumptions must be made to trace the contours of navies short of war toward Chinese gray-zone operations.39 Aside from gray-
a theory of naval warfare victory. First, the power balance between China zone tactics, it must also be assumed that cyberspace will be an essential
and the Philippines will remain asymmetric. Therefore, the Philippines must component of 21st-century hybrid warfare. Current war dynamics between
ensure the relevance of the PH-US alliance to counteract this disadvantage. Russia and Ukraine demonstrate the modern use of kinetic capabilities
National and AFP leadership finds itself in a decades-long difficulty of alongside cyber and information warfare. On March 19, 2022, Russia used its
moving past this history and maintains an asymmetric reliance on the Kinzhal hypersonic missiles against Ukraine during its invasion operations
US for external defense.33 This is characterized by the lack of leadership alongside massive information warfare throughout cyberspace40. With these
positions occupied by admirals from the Navy as Chief of Staff, AFP,34 and assumptions41, an outline for a naval theory of victory can be explored.
naval defense proponents as Secretary of National Defense since Philippine The AADS: Foundations of a Naval Theory of Victory
independence in 1898. To leverage its position amidst the regional power dynamics and security
environment, the Philippines needs to simultaneously protect its national
Nevertheless, this dynamic persists in a post-Duterte foreign policy security interests at both the domestic and international levels. Under the
administration and will be a primary characteristic of the national broad scope of military modernization (domestic level of approach), the
defense institution. The second assumption is that the United States will balancing act of capacitating the AFP to deal with internal and external
be "strategically ambiguous" in its mutual defense commitment to the security threats needs to be considered, which has also been underlined as
Philippines, as underscored in its Mutual Defense Treaty. While the 1951 an important precedent to attaining economic security.
Philippine-US Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) will serve as a significant
security guarantee for Philippine national security in the event any aggressor The PN's Active Archipelagic Defense Strategy (AADS) is the fundamental
attacks Philippine armed forces, vessels, and aircraft, including in the SCS35, articulation of how the PN goes about achieving its naval and maritime
potential economic impacts on the US’ (and its allies') supply chains will be a objectives (ends) through three (3) mutually supporting strategic
significant consideration in possibly reneging on alliance obligations. Other approaches (ways), which are, in turn, respectively articulated by their
considerations could include the Philippines' ability to reciprocate, pressure respective strategic concepts (means). In turn, the ends, ways, and means
from US strategic partners and corporations to preserve trade relations with
China, the US' reputation in upholding alliances, etc. The third assumption is 36  “What Went Before: Panatag Shoal Standoff | Inquirer News,” accessed October 5, 2021,
that hot wars will still be an immediate concern for the PN when exercising https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1421704/what-went-before-panatag-shoal-standoff.
its territorial defense operations. In 2012, BRP Gregorio Del Pilar faced two 37  “Coast Guard’s BRP Cabra Shoos Away 7 Chinese, Vietnamese Vessels | Inquirer News,”
accessed October 5, 2021, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1455388/coast-guards-brp-cabra-
(2) Chinese maritime surveillance ships resulting in a two-month stand- shoos-away-7-chinese-vietnamese-vessels.
38  “Philippines Seeks US Help as It Vows to Ignore China Maritime Law,” accessed October
33  Renato De Castro, “Developing a Credible Defense Posture for the Philippines: From the 5, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/10/dutertes-defence-chief-says-manila-got-
Aquino to the Duterte Administrations: Philippines’ Efforts for Credible Defense Posture,” Asian less-from-us-pact.
Politics & Policy 9, no. 4 (October 2017): 541–63, https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12353.
39  Sean McFate, The New Rules of War: Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder, First edition
34  Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines, “Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (New York, NY: William Morrow, 2019).
of the Philippines,” Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines, accessed September 30,
2021, https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/featured/afp-chief/.Official Gazette of the Republic of 40  Al Jazeera, “Russia Says It Used Hypersonic Missiles in Ukraine for First Time,” accessed
the Philippines, “Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,” Official Gazette of the March 24, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/19/russia-uses-advanced-
Republic of the Philippines, accessed September 30, 2021, https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/ hypersonic-missiles-in-ukraine-for-first-tim.
featured/afp-chief/. 41  To maintain a certain degree of explanatory power, these assumptions maintain that the
35  Reuters, “U.S. Repeats Warning to China against Attack on Philippine Forces,” July 12, 2021, primary threats the Navy should address be traditional ones. Non-traditional security threats
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-repeats-warning-china-against-attack-philippine- such as piracy, terrorism, and the persisting insurgency are assumed to be under the purview of
forces-2021-07-12/. national law-enforcement agencies with the Navy playing a supporting role.

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Theorizing Naval Warfare: Conditions and Principles for Philippine Naval Victory
75 76

are supported by sustainment efforts. As the Joint Operating Concept (JOC), as "…the capacity to influence the behavior of other people or things by
National Military Strategy (NMS), and the AFP Future Force Structure provide what one does at or from the sea."46 It is not enough that the Philippines
the groundwork for joint operational effectivity, the AADS mainly serves as builds a strong and credible Navy; it is far more critical to consider how
the framework which prescribes how the naval service should be employed. the PN influences regional maritime trade and its access to domestic and
Guided by the 'Influence-Deter-Defend' joint general approach, the AADS, in international maritime resources, to further strategically develop its naval
turn, provides the actionable tasks necessary to execute the JOC's ten (10) force and establish overall maritime supremacy. Mahan notes that seapower
Enabling Concepts, validated by how each specific joint enabling concept can allows states to establish sea control effectively and influences the strategic
be specifically supported within the scope of the AADS' three (3) mutually calculus of larger states even in asymmetric conditions.47 As an output to
supporting strategic approaches42. In essence, this outlines how the PN side seapower, the "post-modern" PN needs to exercise a degree of sea control,
prospectively corroborates with the concept of jointness for battles that may employ effective expeditionary operations, promote good order at sea,
be waged in the tangible air-sea, air-sea-land, and air-land domains, as well uphold the rule of law and support a maritime consensus and ensure regional
as that of cyberspace43. stability, especially over the West Philippine Sea; the earlier sections identify
the necessary capabilities required by the PN to perform these functions
The AADS and Seapower as an Output and be output to Philippine seapower. Considering the characteristics of the
strategic maritime environment – connected, opaque, and expansive – the
Till describes seapower in two (2) dimensions: as an input and an output. As PN aims to anchor its Theory of victory on the AADS' strategic approaches:
inputs, seapower is characterized by how states react within their situational
maritime strategic environment. These are manifested through the structure Maritime Cooperation and Maritime Operations: Alliance Deterrence
and design of maritime agencies such as "…navies, coast guards, the marine
of civil-maritime industries…and, where relevant, the contribution of With multiple states claiming parts of the West Philippine Sea as part
land and air forces."44 As the PN was historically designed to complement of their EEZ and/or territorial seas in the case of China, a priority should
the strategic intentions of the US in the Asia-Pacific during the Cold War, be modernizing the Navy, which is capable of exercising sea control over
its capability acquisition and overall strategic culture focused on internal Philippine maritime regions. Surface and subsurface systems such as
security operations – de facto relying on the US 7th Fleet for Manila's external corvettes, frigates, littoral combat ships, and subsurface platforms send
defense.45 Despite being an archipelago strategically situated in the region two (2) messages: to its allies and strategic partners, Manila is no longer
with a rich maritime heritage, the Philippines' naval security apparatus was reliant on only diplomatic avenues to enforce international law, especially
historically relegated in favor of land forces in addressing non-traditional the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the PN is ready to
security threats such as communist insurgencies and terrorism. In other develop its naval diplomatic relations further to identify more significant
words, the PN continued to be reactionary in adjusting to strategic realities areas of cooperation, especially on traditional maritime security. While the
informing the Philippine maritime strategy. This paper argues that the 21st US alliance continues to serve as a deterrence against adversaries, capability
century should be a pivotal era for the PN to redefine its position and overall development, especially on "shows of force," cultivates confidence among
instrumentality, not only in protecting national maritime interests but, more its ally and strategic partners. Furthermore, PN sea control efforts could
importantly, playing a more significant role in shaping the strategic maritime be complemented by regional strategic architecture aligned with Manila's
environment to ensure the best position for the Philippines to defend its maritime security interests, such as the AUKUS and the Quadrilateral Security
maritime security interests. In other words, this means transforming the PN Dialogue (Quad). To its adversaries, force modernization signals that the
into an instrument of seapower output. Till defines' seapower as an output' PN recognizes the need for shows of credible force calibrated by Philippine
independent foreign policy to challenge perceived "historical rights" over
42  Willester Robles, “AFP Joint Operating Concept,” 2020. maritime regions recognized by international law. In the West Philippine
43  Bayani Curaming, “Analysis of the Nexus Between the AADS and the AFP JOC,” 2020.
44  Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, 2nd ed., Cass (New York: 46  Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century.
Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2009).
47  Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (Boston: Little,
45  US Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Brown, 1949).
Defense McNamara” (Washington, D.C.: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 13, 1965), https://history.
state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v26/d304.

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Theorizing Naval Warfare: Conditions and Principles for Philippine Naval Victory
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Sea, for example, China's installation of missile systems such as the YJ-1248 doctrines to match the current dynamics of the region. Furthermore, the
and HQ-9,49 and the deployment of H-6J bombers and FC-31 stealth fighters, combined exercise operations experience is integrated into improving naval
which have a combat radius of 1,200kms,50 support its militarization of the operations by using the country's archipelagic maritime configuration,
region. Through acquiring surface, subsurface, and cybersecurity naval including archipelagic maneuvers.
capabilities, Manila's diplomatic recourses to ensure the security of the WPS
are complemented by a naval force capable of exhibiting minimum credible Another consideration for a naval theory of victory is that its modernization
deterrence against a more significant naval force. Furthermore, a naval program should support strategic naval operations. The PN, while working
force capable of exercising sea control translates into a capacity to sustain with its naval partners in its capacity and capability development, should
naval presence and influence through a greater range of naval operations also pursue a robust and responsive modernization program to improve its
to deter adversaries, conduct sea denial operations from shore to sea, and standing as a reliable naval partner. The success of the first aspect hinges
exude strategic force projection across the Philippines' maritime strategic on the PN's capabilities to respond to mutual security interests across
environment51. alliances and strategic partnerships. One US foreign policy "constant" is
that modern allies should be "picking up their weight,"53 and the Philippines
One aspect to consider for a naval theory of victory for the Philippines is should be no exception. Several initiatives to this end should include the
that it should continue its territorial defense operations within the bounds development of the Philippines' naval industries to support a domestic-
of national and international law. To signal this, the PN should integrate level naval modernization and acquiring the necessary capabilities suitable
alliance-building and develop stronger strategic partnerships into its for a VUCAD environment. Till and Koh, for example, discuss the strategic
overall naval security calculus. With the political and military support impact of submarines on Southeast Asian navies. They argue that subsurface
from the US and as well as shared interests with maritime member-states capabilities could significantly shift offense/defense dynamics in the region
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the PN's TDOs will and provide a significant deterrence.54 In the same book, Bateman presents
strengthen the Philippines' position as an advocate of international law the strategic opportunity anti-subsurface warfare capabilities afford navies
as the "great equalizer" among nations, and demonstrate that traditional for unilateral and combined exercises and operations in Southeast Asia55.
multilateral institutions and alliances work. Furthermore, there are also
developments in US-led security architectures that can be used to enhance Maritime Operations and Maritime Situational Awareness: No Longer
PN TDOs further. The Quad and AUKUS should develop confidence for the Shooting in the Dark
PN to engage better the Philippines' only treaty ally and its security partners
in conducting freedom of navigation operations52 within international The PN can strategically maneuver throughout its strategic maritime
waters and in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Combined operations are environment, considering the SCS's dynamic maritime characteristics of
a significant component in the PN's Theory of victory through leveraging extremely robust sea lines of communication and as well as the various
alliances and strategic partnerships against mutual threats. Previous naval ingress and egress routes to and from the Indian Ocean and the greater
diplomatic gains, e.g., information and intelligence exchange platforms and Pacific region, with the acquisition of agile and versatile platforms such as
technology transfer, shall be integral to a broad range of naval operations. corvettes, frigates, littoral combat ships, and strategic sealift vessels. As the
These exchanges will also be helpful in the PN's review of naval operational PLA-N is equipped with several subsurface capabilities, including unmanned
underwater drones and nuclear-powered submarines, the PN is effectively
48  “New Chinese Supersonic Anti-Ship Missile ‘YJ-12’ Fitted on PLAN’s H-6G Bomber,” "blind" in one-third of its operational domain (the other two-thirds being
accessed September 29, 2020, http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-
news/year-2014-news/january-2014-navy-naval-forces-maritime-industry-technology-security- the surface and air battlespaces).
global-news/1504-new-chinese-supersonic-anti-ship-missile-qyj-12q-fitted-on-plans-h-6g-
bomber.html. 53  Michael Green, “Material Advantage: FOIP and U.S. Alliances in Asia,” The Asia Chessboard,
49  “New Chinese Supersonic Anti-Ship Missile ‘YJ-12’ Fitted on PLAN’s H-6G Bomber.” September 14, 2021.
50  Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “China, Russia Boost Pacific Airpower: PACAF Commander 54  Geoffrey Till and Collin Koh Swee Lean, eds., Naval Modernisation in Southeast Asia,
Robinson,” Breaking Defense, September 14, 2014, https://breakingdefense.com/2015/09/ Part Two (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-
china-russia-boost-pacific-airpower-pacaf-commander-robinson/. 58391-4.
51  Philippine Navy, “Active Archipelagic Defense Strategy 2017” (Office of Naval Strategic 55  Sam Bateman, “Submarine Acquisition in Southeast Asia: The Dangers,” in Naval
Studies, 2017). Modernisation in Southeast Asia, Part Two, by Collin Koh Swee Lean and Geoffrey Till (Cham:
52  Note the lack of capitalization, c.f. the US’ “Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS)” Springer International Publishing, 2018), 15–28, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-58391-4.

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While the PN's modernization includes acquiring surface and subsurface welcome step towards addressing this issue. While the decommissioning
assets, surveillance and detection capabilities should also be considered of World War 2-era surface assets should be considered a desired step
to equip the PN with electronic systems, electronic countermeasure towards naval modernization and capability development, the step is not
capabilities, and electronic countermeasure capabilities. Electromagnetic fully complete until the number of decommissioned assets has at least been
capabilities should also be paired with sound cyberwarfare defensive and replenished by newer, more functional surface vessels.
offensive systems to prevent disruption by Chinese operations. These
cyber-capabilities should also be multi-purpose – ready to either support In support of the concepts articulated by the AADS, the development
national cyber defense operations to protect critical telecommunications of minelaying serves to deny the maritime space (i.e., the sea) to the
infrastructure or contribute to the adversary's disruption and crippling of adversary. Aside from offensive purposes, mine warfare can also be
communications. Effective surveillance systems in the physical and cyber employed to protect friendly and self-owned terminal areas, shores, and
domains also provide operational and strategic commanders a fuller breadth their approaches. Moreover, owing to their degree of plausible deniability,
of informational space to make decisions during war. This would allow mine warfare provides the State with maneuver room to balance its national
effective deployment of strategic maritime forces so that PN can support interests. For instance, a group of small-power States gaining access to
a more comprehensive wartime response against attacks against national relatively inexpensive means for mine warfare can utilize its area denial and
morale and COGs. force multiplication effects in addressing existing power asymmetries, and
in 'internationalized' power play will always serve to benefit the smaller
The PN's ability to observe China's incursions in its territorial seas and EEZ powers over the great powers.
under the pretext of "innocent passage" is primarily limited to detecting
surface vessels such as marine scientific research (MSR) ships. The lack Another desired A2/AD capability development direction would be the
of subsurface detection capabilities is a significant operational gap for the application of shore-based anti-ship missile systems (SBASMs). While not
AFP's maritime forces, especially as submarines can first and second-strike as 'inexpensive' as mine warfare capabilities, SBASMs in confluence with
capabilities against Philippine Centers of Gravity (COGs). Assuming the the country's maritime configuration would yield dividends in terms of
worst case of strategic uncertainty on the US' participation in a potential allowing for greater control over the categorically narrow seas in the region,
conflict, there is a degree of expectation that the US may play a relatively including the SCS. Utilized collectively within naval strategy, mine warfare,
limited (if any) role in "containing" flashpoints from spilling over the greater and SBASM capabilities would greatly capacitate the PN in controlling
Pacific region. Thus, the PN should develop into a maritime force that can chokepoints and vital waterways and effectively shape and influence
sustain expeditionary military operations without the support of its ally the maritime operating environment. The AFP's acquisition of three (3)
and strategic partners. It must be noted that even 'great maritime powers' batteries of surface-to-air missiles from MBDA and the purchase of BrahMos
– especially extra-regional state actors – require the necessary flexibility supersonic anti-ship missiles from India are good first steps in this regard.
to adopt more agile and versatile platforms such as corvettes, frigates, and However, their deterrent and operational effectiveness need further scrutiny
littoral combat ships to operate within the region's narrow seas. Without and development. Furthermore, these acquisitions are dwarfed by the PLA-
such escort capacity, deploying large capital ships such as amphibious N's South Sea Fleet alone; therefore, throughout the conflict spectrum, these
assault ships or aircraft carriers in hostile narrow seas such as the SCS capabilities should be anchored on a strategic appreciation of the maritime
will prove to be high-risk and prone to miscalculation.56 The Philippines domain and poised to deter rather than defeat.
must address its longstanding capability requirements regarding primary
surface warfare platforms and its counterpart sustainment requirements. The PN's modernization should consider surveillance and detection
Capability development cannot be achieved through leapfrogging, that is, capabilities for electronic systems, electronic countermeasure capabilities,
through lofty development targets while bypassing existing capability gaps. and ECCM. Electromagnetic capabilities should be multi-purpose –
The acquisition of frigates, corvettes, anti-submarine helicopters, littoral ready to support national cyber defense operations to protect critical
fast boats, and the development of coast watch systems (along with meeting telecommunications infrastructure from the adversary's disruption and
the respective sustainment/base support and logistics requirements) is a crippling of communications. Effective MSA capabilities also allow the
PN to conduct effective minelaying capabilities and subsurface capability
56  Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, “The Defence of Narrow Seas in Southeast Asia,” East Asia maneuverability.
Forum, 2012, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/10/17/the-defence-of-narrow-seas-in-
southeast-asia/.

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Maritime Cooperation and Maritime Situational Awareness: Supporting Good • Connectedness – the globally-interconnected sea space offers a
Order at Sea connectivity that 'can be used to strike at a wide range of different
places, or can tie together widely dispersed friends and allies… It
As an output of Philippine seapower, the Philippines requires a naval force fully can be used to mobilize the world's resources or to deny them to an
capable of supporting national commitments to international institutions enemy… It would be difficult to overstate the strategic importance
and laws, especially ones ensuring free and open maritime access to the of an ability to use or deny the use of a medium that can represent
global commons. The PN can and must provide the necessary naval power either an intercontinental highway or a barrier to all movement'.
to complement the Philippines' calls for a rules-based maritime regime in • Opaqueness – the world's seas are naturally configured as a vast
Southeast Asia, thereby contributing to the Philippines' overall exercise expanse of space, and specific points of depth remain largely
of “smart power.”57 By cooperating with its naval partners, confidence- unexplored. It is for these reasons that Speller identifies the
building efforts contribute to a more robust exchange of information military dimension of the world's maritime domain with opacity:
(and hopefully intelligence) between and among strategic partners and '… despite modern surveillance systems, the sea is still a hiding
alliances. A modern and multi-capable navy strategically communicates place largely opaque to many sensors, as is demonstrated by the
the Philippines' readiness to develop the PH-US MDT to significantly higher continued effectiveness of mines and submarines (i.e., things under
levels of cooperation, such as enhanced interoperability exercises with the the surface)'.
US 7th Fleet; it also better capacitates the Philippines to engage in more
robust confidence-building measures with its strategic partners in the Royal • Distance – due to its natural configuration, time and space in
Australian Navy (RAN), the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), and the maritime battlespace tend to be prolonged and expanded,
ASEAN naval partners such as the Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan Laut respectively: '… the vastness of the sea not only makes it hard to
(TNI-AL) and the Vietnamese People's Navy (VPN). Acquiring the necessary find an enemy but means that distances work differently in naval
systems compatible to work with the PN's broad set of diplomatic partners warfare. Battles and campaigns occur over a larger distance than
also allows the Philippines to participate in multilateral exercises happening they do on land, and ships travel further and, in an operational
within its strategic environment, such as the ANNUALEX between the US, sense, faster than their land-based counterparts… campaigns can
Japan, Germany, Canada, and Malaysia58, the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) cover thousands of miles".
which is situated in the greater Pacific ocean (and acts as a counter-buffer
against Chinese "island-chain" designs), the ASEAN Maritime Naval Exercises The very nature of the maritime operating environment – when conflated
(AMNEX), and in combined operations such as the PN-US7F-JMSDF Exercise with the country's archipelagic configuration featuring large corridors of
SAMA-SAMA, MTA MALPHI-LAUT, MTA Seagull, the Indonesia-Malaysia- maritime space – warrants a capable ISR system in place. The subsurface
Philippines Trilateral Cooperation Agreement (TCA), and MTA LUMBAS. domain of the maritime operating environment, given its heightened
'opacity, connectedness, and distance' as per Speller's definition, will then
Enhancement of maritime domain awareness (MDA) capabilities is a desired become an advantageous playing ground for adversaries to exploit at the
and essential naval capability development target that supports the PN's expense of the country's national interests and security. This warrants the
credibility for diplomacy and promotes an international rules-based order. use and development of underwater surveillance systems, an aspect of the
There are defined the inter-related nuances of the military dimensions PN's capability development that may need due attention, tapping into the
of maritime battlespaces,59 and three of those definitions that may prove possible whole-of-government or even whole-of-nation approaches. By
relevant to the Philippine milieu are identified: enhancing overall MDA capabilities, the PN stands to raise MDT areas of
cooperation significantly, improve confidence between the PN's strategic
partners such as RAN and JMSDF, strengthen information exchange
57  The overall use of hard and soft power to attain a set of national security objectives. See
Nye, Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power. 2009.
contributions with ASEAN navy partners, and increase helpful participation
in multilateral exercises (e.g., AMNEX, RIMPAC, MTAs).
58  Dzirhan Mahadzir, “U.S. Navy Wraps Up Drills With Partners in Philippine Sea, Strait of
Malacca,” USNI News (blog), December 1, 2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/12/01/u-s-navy-
wraps-up-drills-with-partners-in-philippine-sea-strait-of-malacca.
59  Ian Speller, Understanding Naval Warfare (Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2019).

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Theorizing Naval Warfare: Conditions and Principles for Philippine Naval Victory
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CONCLUSION 'Influence-Deter-Defend' approach towards achieving the theorized notion

of naval victory, it will always be relevant to consider training personnel to
To effectively implement the aforementioned 'Influence-Deter- capacitate them to effectively operate such prospective platforms to ensure
Defend' approach, the Philippine Navy requires several strategic capabilities safety during their operational use and quality maintenance. Until such
to maximize favorable conditions in the regional security environment to concerns are appropriately addressed, current and future capabilities will
achieve victory, theoretically. A significant assumption in such a discussion not be utilized to the full potential beyond being a simple 'psychological
is that in a worst-case full-scale war scenario, the Philippines should be deterrent,' or worse, such capabilities are perpetually relegated to being
able to stand its ground without relying on alliances or partnerships. By merely part of a 'wish list,' keeping the Philippines wide open to external
and large, as a 'coastal State' in a narrow sea operating environment, the naval threats despite being a maritime country with an enormous potential
Philippines can utilize asymmetric warfare, hybrid warfare capability build- for seapower.
up, heightened MDA, and A2/AD capabilities to assert control of maritime
chokepoints.

Integrating the AADS' A2/AD concept through the NOC's operational

design and within the sphere of joint operations and multi-domain warfare
is a foundation of the Navy's Theory of victory. The PN A2/AD concept will
function within the jointness sphere and follow the AFP's multi-domain
capabilities. As the provider of forces within the maritime domain, the PN
should capacitate its A2/AD-facing naval operations functions in support
of the development of the Joint Force Operating Concept of the Unified
Commands.

The PN should be capacitated with asymmetric warfare capabilities

to bridge specific capability development gaps, especially against the PLA-N
and the PAF-MM. The use of force multiplier platforms such as unmanned
systems, mine warfare, and heightened cyberspace capabilities are
potentially effective solutions given the Navy's limited resources and human
resources. While investment in tech-heavy capabilities likewise also requires
investing in peopleware, their asymmetric warfare capabilities become even
more relevant due to the quick pacing of military capability build-up in the
region. The PN should adhere to the concept of 'futureproofing' or planning
and procuring capabilities that will still be relevant in the future. Such
asymmetric warfare capabilities should not be used to supplant 'traditional'
capability gap requirements relatively wholly; they should be seen as an
investment to safeguard against future obsolescence. Given the current
military dynamics in the SCS, the Navy should invest in major cyberwarfare
defense capabilities to secure naval operational communication lines
between assets, the Naval Forces, and AFP area commands, with the
Headquarters and the GHQ.

With the strategic implications of the regional security environment,

the operating environment, and the appropriate policy environment,
identification of priority targets and direction need to be developed alongside
the capability development horizon lists. With the end goal of actualizing the

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II Theorizing Naval Warfare: Conditions and Principles for Philippine Naval Victory
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President’s Papers:
The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II

EDITORIAL BOARD
_______________

The President’s Papers is a bi-annual publication of the Office

of the President, National Defense College of the Philippines
on specific topics and themes under the focus areas
of the College Research Agenda.
_______________

LTGEN FERDINAND M CARTUJANO PAF (Ret)

President

CAPT ALDRIN C CUÑA PN (Res) MNSA

Executive Vice President

Mr Clarence Anthony P Dugenia

Acting Chief, Research and Special Studies Division

EDITORIAL STAFF

Mr Manmar C Francisco
Mr Mico A Galang
Ms Christine Lisette G Castillo
Mr Jun Karlo P Laroza
Mr Lyomari B Suelo
Mr John Francis C Saromines

Mr Erick Nielson C Javier

Managing Editor

Ms Arielle Ann Nicole I Lopez

Layout Coordinator

Mr Apolinario L Aquino Jr
Cover Design Artist

REVIEWERS

Capt Xylee C Paculba PN (Ret)

Francis Rico C Domingo PhD

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II

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ISSN 2719-0781

President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare Vol II