French and American Approaches To Contract Formation and Enforcea

Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law
Volume 12 | Issue 2 Article 3
3-1-2005
French and American Approaches to Contract

Formation and Enforceability: A Comparative
Perspective
Julie M. Philippe
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Julie M. Philippe, French and American Approaches to Contract Formation and Enforceability: A Comparative Perspective, 12 Tulsa J.
Comp. & Int'l L. 357 (2005).
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FRENCH AND AMERICAN APPROACHES TO CONTRACT
FORMATION AND ENFORCEABILITY: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE
By Julie M. Philippe*
"Ignoring the always present role of the social matrix in contract is akin to
ignoring the role of DNA in the interaction of parts of a living body."
- Ian Macneil, The Many Futuresof Contracts
1. INTRODUCTION
This study focuses on certain comparisons of American and French contract

law, particularly questions of formation and enforceability. To that end, this
study is divided into two parts: Part I will set out the common features in
formation of contracts in U.S. and French law. Part II will focus on
characteristic differences concerning enforcement of contracts with special
reference to the doctrine of consideration under U.S. law. Differences and
similarities between French and American approaches to the issues covered in
parts I and II will be highlighted as appropriate.
It is important to remember that there are problems inherent in any
comparative study of two legal systems. First, the fundamental differences
within the general structure of each legal system affect the approach to and the
conceptualization of the subject at hand. The legal systems of the western world
are, for purposes of comparison, frequently divided into two groups, as referring
to two traditions: the common law tradition (to which the United States belongs)
* J.D., University of Caen (France), L.L.M., University of Orleans (France), L.L.M., Paris-
Sorbonne University (France), L.L.M., St. Louis University (U.S.A., MO) Ph.D. (Law) Candidate,
Assistant-Professor, University of Orleans (France). The author would like to thank the Tulsa
Journal of Comparative and International Law staff for the great work they undertook in working
on the final editing of this paper.
1. Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts,47 S. CAL. L. REv. 691, 710 (1974).
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. [Vol. 12:2
and the civil law tradition (to which France belongs). The word "tradition"
should not evoke a static past; rather, it denotes a dynamic and ongoing system.
Although there are important differences between these traditions, these
points of difference should not be allowed to obscure the extent to which both
systems, as products of western civilization, share many values. Similarities in
socio-economic conditions may in the end bring the two legal systems closer to
each other in functional term, but through separate routes. This is particularly
true in the realm of contract law. Despite differences in the process of formation
and in the enforceability of a contract, comparable economic needs in the United
States and in France have led to many similarities.
"Civil law did not become a constituent element of English common law
acknowledged and enforced by the courts, but it exercised a potent influence on
the formation of legal doctrines during the critical twelfth and thirteenth
centuries, when the foundations of common law were laid."' 2 The history of law
is a part of the general history of the economic, political, and intellectual
development of Western Europe. From the end of the eleventh to the beginning
of the fourteenth century, two differences appeared in the general legal situation
of the Continent and in England, both of which were to be of crucial importance
for the later history of civil and common law. On the Continent, revived Roman
law based on the study of the Corpus Juris Civilis, had a much greater impact
than in England. 3 During this same period, the English kings, in striking contrast
to their French counterparts, created an effective, centralized system of courts for
the administration of royal law. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the
development of the law of contracts on the Continent and in England began to
diver e as different forces came into play in molding the common and the civil
laws. In England, the common law of contracts was developed pragmatically
and judicially.
At first sight, the most striking difference between civil law and common
law systems is that the law is primarily to be found in codes and statutes in the
civil law system, while it is to be found primarily in the decisions of the Courts
in the common-law system. However, as far as contract law is concerned, this
assertion must be attenuated. While principles of French contract law are
codified in the French Civil Code of 1804, 5 in the United States the First
Restatement of Contracts was published in 1932.6 It constitutes an attempt by
the American Law Institute to compile a comprehensive statement of the
2. PAUL VINOGRADOFF, ROMAN LAW INMEDIEVAL EUROPE 97 (2d ed. Oxford Univ. Press 1929)
(1909).
3. See generallyid. at 71-96.
4. See generallyid. at 97-103.
5. CODE CIVIL arts. 1101-1369 (Fr.) [hereinafter C. ciV.].
6. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (1932).
2005] FRENCH AND AMERICAN APPROACHES
principles of contract law, but it is not a statute. The second edition, begun in
1960, reflects the evolution of contract law and changes due to the adoption of
the Uniform Commercial Code concerning the sale of goods. The Restatement
(Second) of the Law of Contracts is authoritative because judges and lawyers
refer to it for guidance when a point of law is not settled in a particular
jurisdiction.
While some differences can be explained by the fundamental distinction
between common law and civil law, federalism is also an important factor to take
into account. France is a member of the European Union, and the legal nature of
the European Union is subject to much debate. Winston Churchill said, "We
must build a kind of United States of Europe." 7 Maybe this view could be used
in a legal approach, since some people consider the European Union as a kind of
federation. Others
8
prefer to view the European Union as an international
organization.
The future route to European integration remains an open and difficult
question. It must be remembered that many decisions of European Institutions
have legal force, i.e. they are hard law. This law is not only valid at the
European level, but increasingly at the national level as well, creating an
intertwining of the legal orders. The European legal order is one common to all
of the Member States and is to be applied uniformly by the national courts. The
decisions of the European Court are inspired by common traditions of the
Member States, which include the United Kingdom, a nation of common law
tradition. Therefore, even within the European Union, civil law and common
law inspiration may be mixed. In contract law, the Commission on European
Contract Law was founded by the Danish law professor Ole Lando at the end of
the 1970s.
The Commission included legal scholars from all European Union
Members; they undertook the task of drafting a set of general rules of European
contract law. The result of this process was the Principlesof European Contract
Law. 9 In addition to the Principles, a network of scholars under the
chairmanship of Italian law professor Guiseppe Gandolfi, are drafting a proposed
European contract code. 10 Moreover, one should notice that some countries
7. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, A Speech at Zurich University, in THE SINEWS OF PEACE: POST-WAR

SPEECHES 197, 199 (Randolph S. Churchill ed., Houghton Mifflin Company Boston 1949) (1948).
8. Herbert Burkert, About a Different Kind of Water: An Attempt at Describing and
UnderstandingSome Elements of the European Union Approach to ICANN, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
t 185, 1187 (2003).
9. See generally COMM'N OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT
LAW, PARTS I AND I (Ole Lando and Hugh Beale, eds., 2001) [hereinafter PECL].
10. See generally Ana M. L6pez-Rodrfguez, Towards a European Civil Code Without a Common
European Legal Culture? The Link Between Law, Language and Culture, 29 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
1195 (2004).
would approach the same situation with entirely unfamiliar tools, but arrive
nevertheless at almost the same result. The same can be said concerning U.S.
contract law. In the United States there is not a uniform contract law. In most
States the law follows a model code, while in others it deviates from that code
considerably.
In this work, I will limit my discussion to French contract law rather than
European contract law since this is an aspect of the European unification process
that has not been completed. Comparing the French and American legal systems
is also complicated by differences in linguistic representation and conceptual
treatment. The French and American ways of analyzing and framing a legal
concept are significantly different. The approach adopted in this work is to
adhere to the original texts as much as possible but at the same time to explain
the implications of the significance beyond the literal representation.
The overall organization of this work follows the common patterns of both
U.S. and French contract law. Accordingly, the main objective of this work is to
explain the salient features of each legal system concerning the formation and
the enforceability of a contract as well as a theoretical and functional comparison
between them. A recurrent question in the United States as well as in France is
"which promises should the law enforce?" One of the purposes of contract law
in both countries is to draw a line between enforceable and unenforceable
promises.
A contract is a relationship, a link between two people: a promisor and a
promisee. The relational theory of contract law is attributed to Professor Ian
Macneil, who focused on the primal roots of the concept of exchange and
emphasized the relational character of contracts.11 Some relations involving
promisors and promisees are governed by culture and are enforced by social
means: people feel the importance of respecting a promise given. However, one
should admit that little attention has been paid to the relation between contract
law and morality. According to Stanley Fish, "[m]orality is something to which
the law wishes to be related, but not too closely."' 12 In recent years there has
been more concern with the relationship between contract law and economics.
In France, according to the classic doctrine, the "honor-only" deal cannot
produce legal effects. Ripert wrote that these deals concern only the duty of
conscience which the judge cannot enforce so long as he has any soul. 13 In the
past, these "honor-only" agreements seemed to be confined to family or friendly
relations. 14 However, nowadays, a lot of "honor-only" agreements exist
11. Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REv. 947 (1982).
12. STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH 141 (1994).
13. GEORGES RIPERT, LA REGLE MORALE DANS LES OBLIGATIONS CIVILES, 144 (4th ed. 1949).
14. See generally Etienne Ernest Hippolyte Perreau, Courtoisie, Complaisance et Usages, Non
ObligatoiresDevant la Jurisprudence,13 RTD. Clv. 481 (1914).
20051 FRENCH AND AMERICAN APPROACHES
especially in commerce, corporate, and international relations. Thus, there are

some situations in which, without binding themselves legally, the parties still
intend to bind themselves, and each party expects that the other will carry out the
obligation to which they have consented.
Contracts are sanctioned by the means of the law; a contract is a legally
binding agreement. The French Civil Code emphasizes this idea in ascribing to a
contract "the force of law." 15 Article 1101 of the French Civil Code provides
that "[a] contract is an agreement by which one or several persons bind
themselves, towards one or several others, to transfer, to do or not to do
something."' 16 The Restatement Second of Contracts, provides a widely
recognized definition of contract: "[a] contract is a promise or a set cf promises
for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the
law in some way recognizes as a duty." 17 The Uniform Commercial Code,
which applies to the sale of goods, broadens the meaning of contracts beyond the
agreement 18 of the parties to include the "total legal obligation," 19 which
encompasses the bargain of the parties in fact as well as their course of
2 1 and course of performance. 22
dealings, trade usage,
French contract law falls within the wider purview of obligations. The term
obligation derives from the latin ob-ligare which means to unite or to tie
together. In Roman law, obligations arose ex contractu, ex delicto, quasi ex
contractu or quasi ex delicto. French law has adopted, with certain
modifications, this classification. We will refer to contractual obligations. The
range of contract law is extremely wide in the United States as well as in France.
While under the French system there is a great number of contractual types
derived from the heritage of Roman law; U.S. contract law has fewer categories.
In France, contracts are subject to statutory classifications. Articles 1102
and 1103 of the French Civil Code distinguish between bilateral and unilateral
23
contracts.
• 24 In bilateral contracts, the obligations of contracting parties are
reciprocal. In unilateral contracts, the obligation undertaken by one party has
15. C. civ. art. 1134 (<<Les conventions ligalementfonnes tiennent lieu de loi ct ceux qui les ont
faites.>).
16. C. civ. art. 1101 ((<Le contrat est une convention par laquelle une ou plusieurs personnes
s 'obligent,envers une ou plusieurs autres, a donner, eifaire, ou ez ne pas faire quelque chose ).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
18. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (2004).
19. U.C.C. § 1-201(11) (2004).
20. U.C.C. § 1-205(1) (2004).
21. U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (2004).
22. U.C.C. § 2-208(1) (2004).
23. C. civ. art. 1102-03.
24. C.civ. art. 1102.
25
no corresponding obligation undertaken by the other party. It must be noticed
that despite similar terminology, American unilateral and bilateral contracts do
not have the same meaning. In U.S. contract law, a bilateral contract is one
where both parties make a promise and a unilateral contract is one where only
one party makes a promise. A unilateral contract consists of a promise given
27
for some act to be performed.
Article 1105 of the French Civil Code defines the gratuitouscontract as one
through which one of the parties procures a purely gratuitous advantage for the
other. 8 Article 1106 of the French Civil Code defines an onerous contract as
29
one which obligates each of the contracting parties to give or to do something.
It is noteworthy that the American concept of bargain corresponds to only one
category of contract in French law: the onerous one.30 Moreover, this last
classification has a practical consequence concerning the French doctrine of
cause and the American doctrine of consideration.
We now take up the first part of this study focusing on the common features
of contract between the United States and France.
II. COMMON FEATURES BETWEEN U.S. LAW AND FRENCH LAW CONCERNING
THE FORMATION OF CONTRACTS
The complexity of business relations often necessitates long periods of

negotiation before the closing of a contract. This pre-contractual period is not
neutral, and it must be determined whether some binding obligations have been
created, while the freedom to contract should be preserved. (I will not address
the question of liability for fault committed during the negotiations). The line
between a contractual situation and this pre-contractual period is so thin that
some concepts and rules that apply to a contractual situation may also apply to
31
this negotiation period. One of these rules is the duty to negotiate in good faith.
The duty to negotiate in good faith arises in two kinds of cases. The first
are cases involving an explicit agreement concerning the conduct of
negotiations. 32 Parties promise either to negotiate in good faith or promise not to
negotiate with others during a designated period of time, e.g. in a lock out
agreement. The second are cases in which there is an implicit agreement to
25. C. civ. art. 1103.

26. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, ET AL., CONTRACTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 67 (6th ed. 2001).
27. Id. at 32.
28. C. civ. art. 1105.
29. C. civ. art. 1106.
30. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, at 32.
31. See generally Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assoc. of Am. v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
32. See Jamsports v. Paradama, 336 F. Supp. 2d 824, 848 (N.D. I11.2004).
negotiate in good faith. 33 In Teachers Insurance & Annuity Assoc. of America v.

Tribune Co., Judge Pierre Leval developed an extensive analysis of the duty to
negotiate in good faith in the context of such an implicit agreement. 34 To decide
the case, Judge Leval created a tripartite classification of preliminary
agreements. 35 The first category consists of preliminary agreements that create
no binding legal obligation. The second category consists of agreements that
are "preliminary only in form-only in the sense that the parties desire a more
elaborate formalization of the agreement., 37 Judge Leval called these
agreements preliminary contracts. 38 A preliminary contract "occurs when the
parties have reached complete agreement (including the agreement to be bound)
on all the issues perceived to require negotiation. 3 9 Execution of a later
document is not necessary, but merely desirable. 40 The final agreement is
simply a formalization of an agreement that has already been reached. 4 1 The
third category of preliminary agreements are those that express a "mutual
commitment to a contract on agreed major terms, while recognizing the
existence of open terms that remain to be negotiated.' '4 2 The parties, Judge
Leval said, "can bind themselves to a concededly incomplete agreement in the
sense that they accept a mutual commitment to negotiate together in good faith
in an effort to reach final agreement within the scope that has been settled in the
preliminary agreement. '' 4344 Judge Leval called such agreements binding
preliminary commitments.
One of the functions of contract law is to establish procedures for the
formation of contracts. Some rigid, formal procedures exist. However, under
contemporary U.S. and French contract law, most contracts (at least in
quantitative terms) are binding even if they are made without using any special
form, i.e., orally or by way of conduct. One can observe an evolution common
to both countries of civil and common law tradition: the principle of freedom of
form is now widespread.
For the EU, contracts that are governed by the Principles of European
Contract Law are not subject to any form requirement to determine their
33. See Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assoc. of Am., 670 F. Supp. at 498-99.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 498.
38. Id.
39. See Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assoc. of Am., 670 F. Supp. at 498.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
validity. 45 Even if the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) requires written

evidence in order to prove the existence of contracts of more than 500 dollars, it
means only that a writing is needed not for its formation, but rather, for its
enforceability. 46 The same idea applies in France, where Article 1341 of the
French Civil Code requires a written
47
form for contract as a matter of proof for
contracts of more than 800 euros.
Pursuant to Article 1108 of the French Civil Code, four conditions are
essential for the validity of a contract: the consent of the party who binds
himself, his capacity to contract, a certain object which forms the subject-matter
of the contract, and a lawful cause.48 This thesis will compare two of these
conditions from the viewpoint of U.S. and French contract law: consent and
cause. It should be noted that requisites of contract formation under U.S. law
cannot be easily spelled out in the same way.
During the nineteenth century, contract law in both the United States and
France was governed by the subjective "will theory." Under this theory, the
creation of a contract requires a "meeting of the minds" of the contracting
parties. Therefore, whatever the outward appearance of the conduct of the
parties, no contract is made if the parties are not in agreement. At the end of the
nineteenth century and during the twentieth century, a shift occurred from the
subjective theory to the objective theory. Under the objective theory, whenever a
reasonable person in the position of promisee could have understood the conduct
of the promisor to have reflected the intention to create a contract, the promisor
will be held responsible to that effect, even if factually, the promisor did not
actually intend to enter into a contract.
In Hotchkiss v. National City Bank of New York, the Court decided that "[a]
contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual,
intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of
law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and
represent a known intent." 49 The contractual process can be reduced to two
manifestations of wills: the offer and the acceptance. Attention to these events is
particularly useful in order to determine the timing of the conclusion of the
contract. As will be discussed below, offer and acceptance also create the
outward appearance of an agreement, and despite what was noted above, study
45. PECL, supra note 8, at 137, art. 2:101(2) ("A contract need not be concluded or evidenced in
writing nor is it subject to any other requirement as to form. The contract may be proved by any
means, including witnesses.").
46. U.C.C. § 2-201 (2004).
47. C. civ. art. 1341; see also Decree No. 2001- 476 of May 30, 2001, J.O., June 3, 2001, p.
8886.
48. C. civ. art. 1108.
49. 200 F. 287, 293 (D.C.N.Y. 1911).
of case law shows that reference to the intent of parties to be legally bound is
50
necessary.
A. Functionof Offer and Acceptance in the Formationof Contracts

There is no specific article of the French Civil Code that requires the
existence of an offer and an acceptance. What is called the doctrine of "offer
and acceptance" was shaped in the eighteenth century at the hand of Pothier. At
the turn of the nineteenth century, English law of contract was influenced by
Pothier's Traitg des obligations,51 which was translated by Evans into English as
Treatiseon the Law of Obligationsand published in England in 1806.52
Planiol and Ripen address the chronological order of offer and acceptance
as the consecutive expression of the wills of the parties: "[niecessarily it is one
of the parties who... manifests his will first; one person proposes to deal on
determined lines; this is the offer or pollicitation. The other agrees to the 53
proposition which is made to him, he consents to it: this is the acceptance."
While this sequential approach likely oversimplifies a real business transaction,
it does permit one to follow the step-by-step process of contract formation. The
same reasoning is used in U.S. contract law to analyze a situation in which the
question is either the existence of a contract or the moment at which the contract
came into existence.
It is not always easy to discern offer and acceptance. This is especially true
in cases of protracted and complex contract negotiations in which agreements are
reached by degrees. Sometimes expressions of consent are simultaneous, as in a
tacit renewal of a lease.
Under French law, future parties to a contract can be alternatively offeror
and offeree except in two contracts: the mandat (agency) and the donation (gift).
In these two contracts, the agent 54 and the beneficiary of the gift55 are
necessarily the offerees. Moreover, French law protecting consumers gives to
the professional the role of the offeror and to the consumer the role of the
offeree. For example, in a contract of loan between a professional and a
consumer, the offeror is the professional-lender and the offeree is the consumer-
borrower. In this example, the person who is the qualified "offeror"
(professional) is generally not the one who initiates the contract. But he is
50. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assoc. of Am., 670 F. Supp. at 497.
51. See generally ROBERT JOSEPH POTHIER, TRAITS DES OBLIGATIONS (1727).
52. ROBERT JOSEPH POTHIER, TRAITI DES OBLIGATIONS [A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
OBLIGATIONS] (William David Evans trans., Strahan 1806) (1727).
53. MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGE RIPERT, CIVIL LAW TREATISE § 970 (La. State L. Inst. trans., St.
Paul West Pub. Co. 1959).
54. C. civ. art. 1984; see also C. civ. art. 1985.
55. C. CIV. art. 894; see also C. civ. art. 932.
generally the one who has the power to determine

56 the terms of the contract,
which can explain why he is named "offeror."
1. The Notion of Offer

The first requirement for the formation of a contract is an offer, which is
defined as
[a] promise to do or refrain from doing some specified thing in the future; a
display of willingness to enter into a contract on specified terms, made in a
way that would lead a reasonable person to understand 57
that an acceptance,
having been sought, will result in a binding contract.
The offer creates a power for the offeree since the offer permits the offeree
to create the contract if he agrees. But the offeror confers this power because in
return he will obtain the counterpart of the offer. In bilateral contracts, the
promise of the counterpart suffices to conclude the contract, while in unilateral
contracts, the actual counterpart is required.
In general, no formalities are required for an offer.58 Obviously, an offer
should be sufficiently manifested to have legal effect. According to Carbonnier
an express manifestation of will is to be understood by "any action done for the
purpose of bringing the will to the knowledge of another."59 The offer can be
oral, written, or can be inferred from other conduct. In this last situation, the
conduct has legal consequences if it would lead a reasonable person in the
position of the offeree to believe that a power to create a contract is conferred
upon him. Many means of expression may be used for the formation of a
contract. In France, there is no statutory classification of the means of
expression as there is a classification of contracts under U.S. law. Nevertheless,
there is a common doctrinal classification between "express" and "tacit"
expression. Declaration is "express" when the means convey in themselves,
without regard to other circumstances, the existence of willingness to be bound.
When we have to look to the circumstances, and from that context, see that the
behavior of a person necessarily implies the existence of a contractual intention,
then the manifestation is "tacit." For example, a display of items in shop
windows or a taxi waiting at a cab-station are held to be tacit offers. American
law may consider the same situations not as an offer, but rather as an "invitation
56. See generally Georges Rouhette, Droit de la Consommation et Thgorie Ggnjral du Contrat,
in ETUDES OFFERTES A RENE RODIERE No. 14, 247 (Dalloz 1981).
57. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1 11 (7th ed. 1999).
58. There are some exceptions to the formalities imposed by the Statute of Frauds. The same can
be said in France concerning offers to enter into certain types of contracts, e.g., offers relating to
certain kinds of loans.
59. 4 JEAN CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 82 (Presses Universitaires de France, 22d ed. 2000) (<toute
action accomplie afin de porter la volontd e7la connaissanced'autrui.>).
to make an offer." Proposals made to the public through advertisement are not
generally held to be an offer. The justification is that if a seller were sold out of
an item for which people made a request, the customers would have a right of
action against the seller for not performing his contract. There are some
exceptions to the general rule that an advertisement is not an offer. In Lefkowitz
61
v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, the Court said "[w]hether in any
individual instance a newspaper advertisement is an offer rather than an
invitation to make an offer depends on the legal intention of the parties and the
surrounding circumstances."62 In this case, the advertisement contained the
sentence: "First Come First served."'63 This constitutes identification as well as a
limitation of the person who can accept the offer, which ultimately contributes to
the definiteness of the offer. The Court concluded that an offer existed, because
the advertisement
64
"was clear, definite, and explicit, and left nothing open for
negotiation."
In French contract law, the same consequences are attached whenever the
offer is addressed to a definite person or to the public. 65 The contract is formed
with the first person that accepts the offer. Whatever the form of the offer, it
must be sufficiently definite to be accepted without more. The requirement of
definiteness permits us to determine if we are in the presence of an offer and to
distinguish an offer from a mere intent to open negotiations. A case by case
approach prevails to determine the existence of an offer. Williston suggests that
"[t]he only general test which can be submitted as a guide is the inquiry whether
the facts show that some 6 rformance was promised in positive terms in return
for something requested."
In French law, the same reasoning applies: a proposal is an offer if it
contains all the essential elements of the contract. May an offer, once made in
definite terms, at any time be retracted before acceptance is made? At common
law, as a logical consequence of the doctrine of consideration, the general rule is
that an offer has no binding force. This means that the offeror may withdraw his
offer at any time before it is accepted. If the offeror can reasonably notify
everyone who might accept the offer, revocation is not effective as to a particular
offeree unless it has been communicated to that offeree. 67 if the offer is too
60. FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, at 138.

61. 86 N.W.2d 689 (Minn. 1957).
62. Id. at 691.
63. Id. at 690.
64. Id.
65. Cass. 3e civ., 28 nov.1968, RTD. Civ. 1969, 348, note Cornu (<L'offre faite au public lie le
pollicitant t Vi'gard du premier adoptant dans les memes conditions que l'offre faite 6 personne
diterminde. ).
66. SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 27 (3d ed. 1957).
67. Long v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 228 P. 873 (Cal. 1924).
general (e.g., if it is made to the public by means of an advertisement

68
in a
newspaper) an equal publicity of the revocation should be given.
Under French law, the offer has to be maintained during a period of time
sufficient to permit the offeree to think about the offer. 69 This period of time
may have been expressly agreed or it may result from the circumstances. In
the first case, if the offeror revokes his offer during the time during which the
offer should have been maintained, he commits a fault, and he may be subject to
pursuits under tort law. When no time has been expressly agreed, the judge will
decide whether or not the offeree had enough time to make up his mind. In a
French case, 7 1 the proprietor of a chalet had, by a letter dated August 11, 1954,
let Mr. Chaston know of his intent to sell him the chalet for 2,500,000 francs.
On the 15th of August, Mr. Chaston visited the chalet, and sent a telegram of
acceptance during the evening. The Court decided that there was a contract
because the proprietor could not have revoked his offer on the 14th. Under
American law, if the offer fails to specify a period, it lapses after a reasonable
time. 72 Thus, basically the same rationale applies under American and French
law.
When the parties bargain by correspondence, the "mailbox rule" applies the
same way in France as in the United States. In general, "a revocation of an offer 73
is ineffective if received after an acceptance has been properly dispatched."
"[Djispatch of the acceptance is the crucial point at which the contract is
made... .74 Once the offeree has dispatched 75 an acceptance, it is too late for the
offeree to change his mind and reject the offer.
In contracts concluded between a professional and a consumer, the French
Consumer Code permits a consumer to change his mind up to seven days after
the conclusion of the contract, and to terminate it. 76 Under French law, there is
no special provision that applies to merchants comparable to § 2-205 of the
68. Shuey v. United States, 92 U.S. 73 (1875).

69. PHILIPPE MALAURIE & LAURENT AYNES, DROIT CIVIL, LES OBLIGATIONS 221 (1998).
70. Cass. 3e civ., May 10, 1968, 1968 Bull. Civ. III, No. 209 ( <Si une offre de vente peut en
principe etre rdtractietant qu 'ellen 'a pas dtd acceptie, il en est autrement au cas oit celui de qui
elle 9mane s'est expressdment engagd t nepas la retireravant une certaine epoque.<) (on file with
author).
71. Cass. le civ., Dec. 17, 1958, 1958 Bull. Civ. I, No. 579.
72. See Starkweather v. Gleason, 109 N.E. 635 (1915) (holding that an offer to buy stock could
no longer be accepted five months after it was made, even though it said it could be accepted at
any time).
73. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 cmt. a (1981); see also Cass. Com., Jan. 7,
1981, 1981 Bull. Civ. IV, No. 14.
75. Id. at 192.
76. CODE DE LA CONSOMMATION arts. 121-25, 311-15 (Fr.).
U.C.C. 77 concerning the revocation of firm offers. "The primary purpose of this
section is to give effect to the deliberate intention of a merchant to make a
current firm offer binding."' 78 The lack of such "codification" in French law can
be explained by the absence of requirement of consideration and by its corollary
that parties are bound by their agreement without any more as long as it does not
violate public policy. "The offeror's death terminates the power of the offeree
without notice to him." 7 9 The same solution is sustained by the French courts:
the offer is terminated by the death of the offeror and his heir cannot be bound
by the offer. 80 Once an offer has been made and if it is neither terminated nor
rejected by the acceptor, a further step is necessary to form the contract: the offer
must be accepted.
2. The Condition of Acceptance

The test to know if there has been correspondence between offer and
acceptance is objective 8 1 rather than subjective. Therefore, the most important
question is not the state of mind of the parties because there may still be a
contract if, objectively, the parties can be said to have agreed. In Lucy v.
Zehmer,82 the Court took into account numerous factors that create the
appearance of a contract: the fact that it was under discussion for forty minutes
before it was signed; 83 Lucy's objection to the first draft because it was written
in the singular, and he wanted Mrs. Zehmer to sign it also; the rewriting to meet
that objection and the signing by Mrs. Zehmer; 84 the discussion of what was to
be included in the sale; the provision for the examination of the title; the
completeness of the instrument that was executed; the taking possession of it by
Lucy with no request or suggestion by either of the defendants that he give it
back.8 5 The Court concluded that all of these facts "furnish persuasive evidence
77. U.C.C. § 2-205 (1979);

An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing which by its
terms give assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of
consideration, during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable time,
but in no event may such period of irrevocability exceed three months; but any
such term of assurance on a form supplied by the offeree must be separately
signed by the offeror.
Id.
78. U.C.C. § 2-205 (2004) cmt. 2.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 48 cmt. a (1981).
80. Cass. soc., Apr. 14, 1961, RTD. Civ. 1962, 349, note Cornu.
81. Whittaker v. Campbell, I Q.B. 318, 326 (Eng. D.C. 1984).
82. 84 S.E. 2d516 (Va. 1954).
83. Id. at 518.
84. Id. at 519.
85. Id. at 520.
that the execution of the contract was a serious business

86
transaction rather than a
casual, jesting matter as defendants now contend."
The contractual expression of intention must be unequivocal. Despite the
French proverb 87 to the effect that silence signifies consent, legally the general
principle is the reverse. In the French Civil Code there is no comprehensive
formulation on the efficacy of silence, but in 1870 the French Cour de Cassation
laid down a principle: "the silence of a person to whom an obligation is imputed
is not, in default
' 88
of other circumstances, a proof against him of the alleged
obligation."
Some exceptions to this principle exist. Notably, when the offer is
formulated in the exclusive interest of the person to whom it is addressed. In 89
this case, the judge can decide that his silence constitutes an acceptance.
Another category of exceptions includes cases where some prior relationship
exists between the parties. In this case, failure by the acceptor to protest
constitutes evidence of an agreement. 90 Another exception is related to
categories of contracts such as contracts of insurance 9 1 or tenancy, 92 which can
be renewed at the expiration of the original stipulated period if neither of them
objects. These last exceptions are designed to protect the person insured and the
tenant.
The general principle is the same in American law: a promise will not be
inferred from the offeree's mere inaction. 93 However, there are exceptional
situations in which silence has been held to be acceptance. There is an American
exception very similar to the French exception that applies when prior dealings
make it reasonable 94
for the offeree to notify the offeror that the offeree does not
intend to accept.
In unilateral contracts, acceptance is given by the performance of the act
required. However, an acceptance through performance of the act, but in
86. Id.
87. <<Qui ne dit mot consent.>>
88. Cass. Civ., May 25, 1870, D. 1870. I. 258 ( <<en droit, le silence de celui qu 'on prdtend oblige
ne peut suffire, en l'absence de toute autre circonstance, pour faire preuve contre lui de
I'obligationalldgude.>>).
89. Ch. Req., Mar. 29, 1938, D. 1939. 1. 5, note Voirin (<<Si, en principe, le silence gardeparle
destinataired'une offre ne vaut pas acceptation, ilest cependant permis aux juges du fond, dans
leur appriciationsouveraine des faits et de l'intention des parties, et lorsque l'offre a jtj faite
dans P'intert exclusif de celui 6 qui elle est adressde, de ddcider que son silence emporte
acceptation (remise partiellede dettes de loyers 6chus. ).
90. CA Paris, 25 nov. 1920, D. 1922. t. 41.
91. CODE DES ASSURANCES art. Li 12-2 (Fr.).
92. C. civ. art. 1738.
93. McGlone v. Lacey, 288 F. Supp. 662 (D.S.D. 1968) (holding that a lawyer's silence was not
assent to handle case).
94. Hobbs v. Massasoit Whip Co., 33 N.E. 495 (Mass. 1893).
95
ignorance of the promise made by the offeror, will not generate a contract.
There are two explanations given for this rule. The first one is based on the idea
of consensus. Anson said: "[a] person who does an act for which a reward has
been offered in ignorance of the offer cannot say either that there was a
consensus of wills between him and the offeror, or that his act was done in return
for the promise offered." 96 The second explanation is based on the absence of
consideration.
Because of the difference in meaning of the expression "unilateral contract"
between French and U.S. law, and the absence of consideration under French
Law, the same mechanism cannot apply in French law. Indeed, in French
"unilateral contracts," only the promisor is bound and so no specific performance
is required from the beneficiary.
In a U.S. bilateral contract, the acceptance is constituted by a return
promise. Three general requirements for an acceptance by a promisee can be
identified. 97 First, there must be an expression of commitment. Second, the
commitment must not be conditional on any further act by either party. Third,
the commitment must be made on the terms proposed by the offer without the
slightest variation. The same reasoning applies in France. The acceptance
should be a mere adhesion to the terms of the offer and should not be
conditional, otherwise it would constitute a counter-offer. Nevertheless, it is
possible to subordinate the acceptance to the realization of a condition (e.g., the
obtaining of a loan). This condition can be suspensive or r'solutoire. In the first
case there is no contract up to the realization of the condition; in the second case
there is a contract as soon as the agreement but which is subject to voidability if
the condition comes into reality. In both cases, the condition must be constituted
by an event which is external to the power of the parties. Otherwise it would
constitute an illusory condition.
In order to determine if the offeror must be notified of the acceptance, it is
necessary to determine what kind of acceptance is required. According to the
Restatement Second of Contracts, "[w]here an offer invites an offeree to accept
by rendering a performance, no notification is necessary to make such an
acceptance effective unless the offer requests such a notification. ' 98 In Carlillv.
Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., 99 the defendants were the manufacturers of a
contraption called a Carbolic Smoke Ball, which was claimed to be capable of
preventing influenza. By the means of an advertisement, the defendants offered
to pay £100 to any person who used the smoke ball and nevertheless caught the
95. Fitch v. Snedaker, 38 N.Y. 248 (1868).

96. WILLIAM R. ANSON, LAW OF CONTRACT 30 (Anthony G. Guest ed., 26th ed. 1984).
97. See generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, at ch. 2, §§ 3, 5.
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 54(1) (1981).
99. 1 Q.B. 256 ( Eng. C.A. 1892).
flu. The plaintiff used one smoke ball according to the instructions but caught
influenza. She then claimed payment of the £100. The Court of Appeal upheld
plaintiff's claim. The Court decided that the fact that she had not notified the
Company of her acceptance was not fatal to her claim.100 It decided that the
offeror impliedly intimates in his offer that 10it will be sufficient to act on the
proposal without communicating acceptance. 1
When the offeror seeks an acceptance by means of a promise, it is essential
"either that the offeree exercise reasonable diligence to notify the offeror of
acceptance or that the offeror receive the acceptance seasonably."' 102 Sometimes
a person cannot accept an offer before a certain period of time after receiving it.
For example, a person who borrows money in order to invest in real estate
cannot accept an offer of credit before ten days after receiving it. 103 The purpose
of this rule is to protect the consent of the person before she becomes legally
bound.
B. Consent to Be Legally Bound

Both American and French contract law assign a role to some psychological
elements in the formation of a contract. American law requires the intention to
create a legal relation. 104 It means that even if a valid offer has been accepted,
the parties must have intended to create legally binding relations. French law
considers the will (volonte) of the parties to be the basic element and refers to
their consent (consentement) to determine defects therein (vices du
consentement), which include mistake, duress, and fraud; while in American law,
these questions are not generally treated in close connection with assent.
In France, the consentement is one of the essential conditions of contract
formation. 10 5 The requirement of intention as an element in the formation of
contract has been challenged on the grounds that it is a continental notion alien
to the common-law system where the idea of bargain is the basis of contract, and
consideration provides a sufficient test for deciding the existence of such a
bargain. 10 6 However, the notion of intention is a more intimate one and, like
assent, it has an individual character. In contrast, the notion of bargain
necessarily involves two people. Intention is a state of mind like the one that
provides assent. Bargain is closer to the notion of mutual assent that appears in
the process of offer and acceptance. To pursue the comparison, the French
100. Id. at 270.

101. Id. at 269.
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §56 (1981).
103. CODE DE LA CONSOMMATION art. L312-10.
104. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §2 (1981).
105. C. Civ. art. 1108.
106. P. S. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 161 (Oxford University Press,
4th ed. 1989) (1961).
«<consentement>, which etymologically is derived from the Latin cum sentire

("consenting together"), corresponds to "mutual assent." However, the term
"consentement" often refers to the intent of one party, making it closer to the
American assent.
We think that the requirement of intention should not be presumed from a
binding contract. Indeed, offer and acceptance, as well as the doctrine of
consideration, do not alone always provide a satisfactory solution. Therefore,
the intention test is always helpful - particularly when the question is to prove
that the consent has not been freely given, e.g., due to duress or undue influence,
or not given with full awareness, e.g., in an adhesion contract.
1. Duress, Undue Influence and Violence

The intention cannot have effect if never expressed. Even when it is
exteriorized, this expression must correspond to the person's intent. The goal of
controlling the contractual relations of people in the community requires us to
look to factors surrounding such an expression. It is a common vision shared by
both American and French law that the choice to consent must be free from
external pressures or other adverse influences. In this way, some social and legal
parameters will be taken into account to determine the legal effect that should be
given to the appearance. 107
The question is to determine what weight should be given to appearance in
determining if it reflects the internal reality concerning the state of mind of a
contracting party. As far as French law is concerned, Article 1156 of the French
Civil Code, dealing with the interpretation of conventions, directs the courts to
determine the common intention of the contracting parties rather than stopping at
the literal sense of the terms.
It is unrealistic to have a Manichean vision of "objectivity" and
"subjectivity" because they are often mixed even relative to a specific topic.
There is no realm, which is dominated solely by "objective" or "subjective"
theory. It should be noted that as far as the correspondence between the offer
and acceptance is concerned, an objective standard is taken into account rather
than the actual accord of the minds of the parties. Treitel wrote, "the law is often
more concerned with the objective appearance, than with the actual fact, of
agreement."' 108 The justification for this is that "in most cases, the appearance
corresponds with the fact of agreement."' 1 9 But Jackson suggests "[i]t is
somewhat clumsy to start with propositions involving will and intent, and then
107. C. civ. art. 1156 (<<On doit dans les conventions rechercher quelle a 6t6 la commune
intention des parties contractantes, plut6t que de s'arr~ter au sens littrral des termes.>).
108. G. H. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 1 (Steven & Sons, 7th ed. 1961) (1987).
109. Id.
explain that 'the law imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the

reasonable meaning of his words and actions."' 110
We can note that both systems apply the test of "reasonableness" and give a
prominent role to the interpretation of appearance. The appearance is sometimes
pierced in order to reveal the reality of the process of formation for a given
contract. The law wants to ensure that the entrance into a contract has been free
and that one party has not been coerced by the other. The doctrines of duress
(developed in common-law) and undue influence (which is a creation of equity)
are concerned with pre-contractual relations, which is a crucial period in contract
formation since it determines the willingness to enter into the contract. Even if
these doctrines can appear primafacie equitable, their justification is not without
philosophical and social questions. Indeed, if we take Aristotle's side, people
are always able to make free choices. If we transpose this idea in contract law, it
means that people always have the choice to refuse to contract, even if it would
be difficult to avoid. Even if a person is not totally free, she can always retain at
least a slight degree of freedom. Therefore, the problem with duress is to
understand why a party who claims that he entered into a contract under coercion
did in fact decide to contract. In that sense, duress does not involve an absence
of consent, in which the contracting party did not know what he was doing, but
rather an absence of his freedom of choice.
Most of the time contracts are made under a kind of pressure. The range of
possible pressures extends from threats of violence to insidious social pressure.
Nevertheless, the law has to deal with those difficulties and distinguish between
legitimate and illegitimate pressures. In the United States, duress was first
recognized in the form of physical duress to the person, then in relation to
property, and finally to economic interests. The courts have elaborated a
hierarchy of interests that, in their eyes, deserve protection: physical integrity,
protection of property, and commercial interests. This list should not be static
since the courts should follow the needs of society. This raises the question of
the role of courts and the legitimacy of the justifications of their decisions.
Indeed, as far as duress to persons was concerned, there was little discussion
whether or not such pressure should be tolerated. The solution seemed obvious,
although one can always argue that a person threatened by a gun to sign a
contract still has the choice to refuse. However, the legitimacy of such a
doctrine can appear more ambiguous as far as property and economic interests
are concerned.
The same question of legitimacy can be raised as far as the doctrine of
undue influence is concerned. It involves the exercise of influence by one party
over the other. This influence must be "undue." Thus the question is what kind
110. R. M. Jackson, The Scope of the Term 'Contract',53 LAW Q. REv. 525, 535 (1937) (quoting
S. MARTIN LEAKE, A DIGEST OF PRINICPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 2 (3d ed. 1892)).
of influence should be considered "undue" or unacceptable? Negotiations

preceding the conclusion of a contract involve necessarily some influences from
both parties; exercise of influence is inherent to bargaining positions. This
explains why Courts are sensitive to the relative positions of the parties. Some
people are better equipped than others to exercise free choice. It can be due to a
more favorable bargaining position, professional conditions, developed skills,
better knowledge or easier access to legal advice. However, duress can also
exist when the two parties are apparently in very similar positions such as in
commercial dealings between businesses. In Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral
Corporation,the Court established a test for economic duress:
[a] contract is voidable on the ground of duress when it is established that the
party making the claim was forced to agree to it by means of a wrongful
threat precluding the exercise of his free will. The existence of economic
duress or business compulsion is demonstrated by proof that 'immediate
possession of needful goods is threatened' ....However, a mere threat by
one party to breach the contract by not delivering the required items, though
wrongful, does not in itself constitute economic duress.II
In Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., the Court decided that "[t]he
fundamental issue in a duress case is... whether the statement that induced the
promise is the kind of offer to deal that we want to discourage, and hence that we
call a 'threat.'... If112contractual protections are illusory, people will be reluctant
to make contracts."
The purpose of the doctrines of duress and undue influence is to prevent
one party from interfering with the other party's freedom to form an independent
judgment about the contract. The same can be said concerning the French
violence whose meaning extends to both duress and undue influence. Under
French law, violence 113 is also sanctioned because it vitiates the consent of the
victim party. A particularity is that it is condemned even if the other party did
not participate in it, and whatever the means employed (physical threats, moral
pressure, etc.), it must be the result of a human action. The constraint that results
from events is not violence. However, in certain situations, some statutes allow
the reduction of excess14 agreement concluded in emergency situations (e.g.,
contract of sea rescue).1
Violence is deemed to vitiate consent only if several conditions are met.
First, it must be illegitimate. It is interesting to note that in almost the same
situation, the notion of legitimacy is not the same from both sides of the Atlantic.
111. 272 N.E.2d 533, 535 (N.Y. 1971) (quoting Mercury Machine Importing Corp. v. City of
New York, 144 N.E.2d 400,403 (N.Y. 1957)).
112. 704 F.2d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted).
113. C.civ. arts. 1111-15.
114. Law of Apr. 29, 1916; see also Law No. 67-545 of July 7, 1967, art. 15.
In Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico,1 1 5 workmen agreed with Alaska Packers

to do a job. Under the agreement, Alaska Packers was to pay each of the
workmen fifty dollars for the season, but the workmen stopped work in a body
and demanded 100 dollars for their services, stating that unless they were paid
this additional wage they would stop work entirely. Because it was impossible
to get substitute workers, the superintendent signed an agreement to pay the
larger amount. Nevertheless, Alaska Packers paid them in accordance with the
first agreement. The Court decided that:
when a party merely does what he has already obligated himself to do, he
cannot demand an additional compensation therefor; and although, by taking
advantage of the necessities of his adversary, he obtains a promise for more,
the law will regard it as nudum pactum, and will not lend its process to aid in
116
the wrong.
In France, a Court decided that an agreement concluded between an
employer and the employee was enforceable although concluded under the
pressure of a strike because a strike is legitimate unless the means employed are
illicit. Second, violence must have been a determinative factor of the consent.
Violence has .to be appreciated 1in 18
concreto. Age, gender, and other personal
conditions are taken into account.
An American court detected a "marked shift in emphasis from the
subjective effect of a threat to the nature of the threat itself.""1 9 Some resistance
is required to restrict relief for duress by denying it to persons who yield to
pressure too easily. The standard of duress and resistance suggested by one
court is "restraint or danger, either actually inflicted or threatened and
impending, which is sufficient in severity or apprehension to overcome the mind
120
of a person of ordinary firmness.
As far as undue influence is concerned, the courts look at the relative status
of the parties. In Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School Dist., the court said that "[b]y
statutory definition undue influence includes 'taking an unfair advantage of
another's weakness of mind; or... taking a grossly oppressive and unfair
advantage of another's necessities or distress. In both American and French
115. 116F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902).

116. Id. at 103 (quoting Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewery Co., 15 S.W. 844 (Mo. 1891)).
117. T. Civ. Nantes, Jan 6, 1956, Gaz. Pal. [1956] 1. 61.
118. C. civ. art. 1112.
119. Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Joy, 389 A.2d 874, 882 (Md. 1978).
120. Carrier v. William Penn Broad. Co., 233 A.2d 519, 521 (Pa. 1967).
121. 54 Cal. Rptr. 533, 539 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (quoting from Cal. Civ. Code § 1575 (West
1872)).
law, a threat of lawful action does not constitute duress. 122 The French Cour de
Cassation decided that the threat of an action does constitute violence only if
there is an 12abuse
3 either in twisting it or in using it to obtain a disproportionate
advantage.
In this part we were concerned with unfair means by which a contract has
been procured; now we shall see how the unfairness of terms may also vitiate a
contract. In both cases, the balance of negotiations has been disturbed.
2. Contracts of Adhesion
The term "contract of adhesion" comes from the French expression "contrat
d'adhesion" coined by Raymond Saleilles to describe contracts "'in which one
predominant unilateral will dictate its law to an undetermined multitude rather
than to an individual.., and all those contracts which, as the Romans said,
resemble a law much more than a meeting of the minds."" 24 It was first used in
the United States by Professor Patterson. 125 The expressions "standardized
contract" and "form contract" are also often used to designate the same reality: a
take-it-or-leave-it proposition in which the only alternatives are adherence or
outright rejection. A general definition was given by Justice Tobriner: "[t]he
term signifies a standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party
of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the
opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it."" The question is whether a
party who has signed a standardized contract can reasonably be held to have
seen, understood, and assented to its unfavorable terms and accordingly be
bound by them.
We may wonder if the doctrine of consideration would be helpful to answer
this question. The traditional response has been that the requirement of bargain
under the bargain theory of consideration was plainly met by simple adherence
to a standard form. Indeed, the bargain theory of consideration does not require
that the parties actually bargain over the terms of their agreement. Thus, the
doctrine of consideration offers no grounds for the party who seeks to be
relieved of her agreement in claiming an imposition. The common law rule is
that "in the absence of fraud, one who signs a written agreement is bound by its
terms whether he reads and understands it or not or whether he can read or
7
12
not."
122. See Chouinard v. Chouinard, 568 F.2d 430, 434-35 (5th Cir. 1978) (explaining that a lawful
demand or insistence on a legal right, even as against a necessitous person, is not duress).
123. Cass. 3e civ., Jan. 17, 1984, 1984 Bull. Civ. 1II, No. 13.
124. Boase v. Lee Rubber & Tire Corp., 437 F.2d 527, 530 (1970).
125. Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222
(1919).
126. Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 10 Cal. Rptr. 781, 784 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
127. Cohen v. Santoianni, 112 N.E.2d 267, 271 (Mass. 1953).
In France, adhesion contracts do not have a specific regime and the regular
law of contracts applies to them. Nevertheless, a practical view limits this
principle. Indeed, it has been noticed that the majority of clauses abusives could
be found in adhesion contracts. The clauses abusives are clauses that can only
be found in contracts which are concluded between a professional person and a
non-professional person or consumer. These clauses are excessive because they
create a significant imbalance between the professional and the non-professional
or consumer concerning their rights and duties derived from the contract. 128 If
clauses in such contracts
129
are qualified by the judge as clauses abusives, these
clauses are void.
Under American law, the concept of adhesion contracts is linked to the
notion of unconscionability and to the broader one of public policy. In Jackson
v. FirstNational Bank, the Court pointed out that contracts, by which one seeks
to relieve himself from the consequences of his own negligence (in this case the
Court considered the validity of an exculpatory clause in a lease of property for
business purposes), are generally enforced "unless ...it would be against the
settled public policy of the State to do so, or ...there is something in' ' 3the social
relationship of the parties militating against upholding the agreement. 0
Moreover, a two-step analysis can be followed concerning the judicially
imposed limitations on the enforcement of adhesion contracts or provisions
thereof. "The first is that such a contract or provision which does not fall within
the reasonable expectations of the weaker or 'adhering' party will not be
enforced against him."' 3 1 This idea is close in its result to the French rule
concerning the interpretation of contracts between professionals and consumers,
which says that the judge must interpret the clause in favor of the consumer.132
This demonstrates that public policy of protection of the consumer led to
abandoning classical rules of interpretation of contracts based on the willingness
of the parties. The second step "is that a contract or provision, even if consistent
with the reasonable expectations of the parties, will be denied enforcement
13 3
if,
considered in its context, it is unduly oppressive or 'unconscionable."'
Under French law, the concept of "unconscionability" does not exist in and
of itself, but both French and American law have moved away from permitting
unlimited freedom of contract to protecting weaker contracting parties from
128. CODE DE LA CONSOMMATION art. L132-1 (e<Dans les contrats conclus entre professionnels et
non-professionnels ou consommateurs, sont abusives les clauses qui ont pour objet ou pour effet
de crier,au dtriment du non-professionnel ou du consommateur, un ddsoquilibresignificatifentre
les droits et obligationsdes parties au contrat. ).
129. Id.
130. 114 N.E.2d 721,725 (1953).
131. Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 604, 612 (1981).
132. CODE DE LA CONSOMMATION Li 33-2.
133. Graham, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
exploitation by more economically powerful ones. Presently, there are few

fields not affected by this phenomenon, including, among others, insurance,
leases, credit, building, environment, labor law, and advertising.
Legislation has been the traditional means of curbing abuses of economic
power. For example, the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968 had a
significant effect... Numerous statutes
. .. impose some .134 mandatory information
disclosures to decrease the inequality in the bargaining process and to favor a
better informed adhering party.' 35 Taking into account the modem means to
conclude a contract, the Federal Trade Commission has examined how its own
consumer protection rules and guidelines apply to advertising and sales made via
the internet. Disclosures are required "to ensure that consumers receive material
information about the terms of a transaction, or to further 136
public policy goals.
These disclosures also must be clear and conspicuous."
The ultimate goal of the doctrine of unconscionability and of the
multiplication of regulations concerning adhesion contracts is to protect the
consent of parties in order "to prevent freedom of contract from becoming a one-
sided privilege. ' 137 The statutory efforts tend to favor better information, but in
a system of common law, they do not exclude the role of courts. In France, the
risk is that the proliferation of statutes will take away responsibility from the
consumer in such a way as to almost place them in the category of being legally
incapable. The degree of available information is not always easy to determine
to ensure the quality of assent. The question of the genuineness of consent
through the problem of disclosure is also raised by the doctrine of concealment,
misrepresentation, and dol.
3. Concealment, Misrepresentation, and Dol

A misrepresentation is a false representation of fact. 138 During
negotiations, a party lies about some facts concerning the future contract in order
to induce the other party to contract. In concealment, a party is aware of
information, but she hides it and does not communicate it. These two notions
correspond to the French dol. Article 1116 of the French Civil Code says that
134. See, e.g., Le Contratd'Enseignement 6tDistance, Law No. 71-556 of July 12, 1971, arts. 8-9,
J.O., July 13, 1971; see also CODE DE LA CONSOMMATION art. L313-12; see also CODE DE LA
CONSOMMATION art. L311-9; see also CODE DE LA CONSOMMATION arts. L312-6, 7. 8, 9; U.C.C. §§
2-205, 2-201(2) (2004).
135. See, e.g., The contract of life-insurance, CODE DES ASSURANCES art. L132-5-1 (requiring the
delivery of an information note).
136. Steven P. Tapia, Dot Corn Disclosures-InformationAbout Online Advertising, 712 PLIIPAT
321, 329 (2002) (citations omitted).
137. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,43
COLUM. L. REV. 629, 640 (1943).
dol is a cause of nullity of the agreement when the artifices practiced by one
party are such that it is evident that without those artifices the other party would
not have contracted. It constitutes a fault which was linked, in Roman law, with
the idea that dishonest acts should be repressed. In the conception of the French
Civil Code, the point is not so much to punish the author of the dol, rather it is to
protect the consent of the victim.
We think that the notion of dol includes concealment as well as
misrepresentation because the dol may be constituted by a lie or by silence.
Even without fraudulent schemes, a simple lie may constitute a dol, 139 as well as
the simple effort to peddle one's wares. Inaccurate advertisement was once 140
considered a bonus dolus (a positive dol) but is now punished by law.
Keeping silence may constitute a dol when a party possessed information that he
should have disclosed but instead did not reveal in order to encourage the other
party to contract. This solution supposes that the party who kept silent had a
duty to speak and to inform the other party. This duty may be implied from the
nature of the contract. For example, in an insurance contract, the person who is
insured has the duty not to conceal information about his health. 14 1 American
courts sustain the same solution. "[A] misrepresentation by a policy buyer
relating to health is a commonplace ground for rejecting a claim." The duty
to give some information may also come from the professional skills of one
party when the other party is a lay person. 143 However, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, in Swinton v. Whitinsville Say. Bank,144 said that the rule is non-
liability for bare nondisclosure. 145 In this case, the defendant sold the plaintiff a
house to be used as a dwelling. At the time of the sale the house was infested
with termites, and the defendant knew the house was infested but he did not
disclose that information. The Court said that "[t]he charge is concealment and
nothing more; and it is concealment in the simple 1sense
46
of mere failure to reveal,
with nothing to show any peculiar duty to speak."
The dol causes a victim's mistake, even if it creates a mistake that
otherwise would not have led to the voidability of the contract. Because the
mistake is caused by the other party, it is possible to consider that there is no
contract if this mistake has determined the consent of the victim of the dol.
American law is more demanding because some degree of diligence is required
139. Cass. 3e civ., Nov. 6, 1970, 1970 Bull. Civ. III, No. 587. (<un simple mensonge, non appuye
d'actes extdrieurs, peut constituer un dob>) (on file with author).
140. CODE DE LA CONSOMMATION art. L121-1, 2, 3.
141. CODE DES ASSURANCES art. L 113-8.
143. For example, a contract of sale of used car by a professional.
144. 42 N.E.2d 808 (Mass. 1942).
145. Id. at 809.
146. Id. at 808.
of a party who relies 147

on another's statement. The complainant must show
justifiable reliance.
In this first part, we have been concerned with the technical conditions
necessary to the formation of the contract. Some of them deal with the fairness
of the process of formation, but they are not necessarily sufficient to ensure the
fairness of the outcome. In the next part, we take up the question of differences
between U.S. and French contract law concerning the enforceability of contracts
with specific reference to the doctrine of consideration.
III. THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN U.S. AND FRENCH CONTRACT

LAW CONCERNING THE ENFORCEABILITY OF CONTRACTS: THE ROLE OF
CONSIDERATION
The most obvious difference between American Law and French law
concerning the enforceability of contracts is the absence in French law of the
requirement of consideration for the validity of a contract. It is sometimes
thought that the concept of cause performs a function akin to that of
consideration in determining whether or not an agreement is binding in law.
However, it would be a mistake to translate "consideration" as "cause" first
because these two terms do not cover the same meaning, and second because
consideration presents numerous features in its application that allow it to be
distinguished from the French cause. Some comments on the notion of
consideration follow.
A. The Notions of Considerationand French Cause

How can we define the French concept of cause so that it can be understood
by an American lawyer, and how can the concept of consideration be understood
by a French lawyer? I think that despite their differences, it is possible to affirm
that the underlying policy behind these two notions is the willingness to find a
measure of contractual justice.
Another similarity is that the validity of a contract under French contract
law requires that cause exists just as an American contract requires the existence
of consideration. The statement is sometimes made that cause is the germ of the
English doctrine of consideration. 148 Salmond has attempted to show that the
American doctrine of consideration was a modification of the Roman causa,
which was adopted by equity and was then borrowed by the common law
courts. 14 9 However, it has also been established that the doctrine of

148. GEORGE T. MORICE, ENGLISH AND ROMAN DUTCH LAW 78 (Grahamstown & Co., 2d ed.
1905).
149. John W. Salmond, The History of Contract,3 L.Q. REv. 166, 178 (1887).
consideration is an outgrowth of common law and remained uninfluenced by

principles of Roman or continental law, except when the action of assumpsit was
developed. 150 It designated those agreements which were unenforceable because
they lacked consideration.
Consideration entered the law around 1539 as a central element of the
common law form of action called assumpsit. 15 1 Assumpsit is the past tense
form of the Latin verb meaning "to undertake." To promise was to undertake.
Ibbetson has argued that the core of the consideration doctrine and the assumpsit
action generally was exchange and reciprocity. 152 The doctrine of consideration
came to embody the concept of bargain.
Today, we can still find this notion of exchange in § 71 of the Restatement
of Contracts which provides that "[tlo constitute consideration, a performance or
a return promise must be bargained for.... A performance or return promise is
bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is
given by the promisee in exchange for that promise."153 This definition may
lead us to think of the French cause, more precisely; the cause is often referred
to as the objective cause in order to determine whether or not the cause does
exist. In the seventeenth century, Domat expressed the idea that the cause is
always the same in the same category of contract. For example, in a bilateral
contract, the cause of the obligation of one party is the obligation expected from
the other party.' 54 In a contract of sale, the cause of the obligation of the seller
is the obligation of the purchaser to pay the price. 155 The cause of the obligation
of the purchaser is the conveyance of the merchandise
156
sold. In a gratuitous
promise, the cause is the "willingness to give."'
It should be noted that in the conception described above, the mobiles or
motives of the contractors are not taken into account. What prompted their
action to contract is not significant. The only field in which the motives of a
contractor are taken into account is when the question is to determine whether
his motivation to enter into a contract fits with the conception of public policy or
morality. Article 1131 of the French Civil Code provides that "[a]n obligation
without cause or with a false cause, or with an unlawful cause [cause illicite],
150. JAMES BARR AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY AND MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL ESSAYS 129,
147-48 (1913).
151. David Ibbetson, Assumpsit and Debt in the Early Sixteenth Century. The Origins of the
Indebitatus Count, 41 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 142 (1982).
152. David J. Ibbetson, Considerationand the Theory of Contract in Sixteenth Century Common
Law, in TOWARDS AGENERAL LAW OF CONTRACT 67 (John Barton ed., 1990).
153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981).
154. JEAN DOMAT, THE CIVIL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDER 161, § 147 (William Strahan trans.,
Luther S. Cushing ed., Rothman and Co. 1980) (1689).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 162, 1 149.
may not have any effect. ' 57 So, the concept of "cause illicite" must be
distinguished from "absence of cause." If the contract is motivated by the
expectancy of realization of an immoral end, it is what French law calls "cause
illicite." So the equivalent in American law of "cause illicite" or "cause
immorale" cannot be found in the concept of consideration but rather in the
doctrines of illegality and public policy.
Louisiana is unique in its assimilation of the doctrine of cause and
consideration. In Louisiana, there is an admixture of cause and consideration in
the treatment of conventional obligations. "The concept of cause makes its first
recorded appearance in the law of Louisiana in the earliest codification of her
laws, 'A Digest of the Civil Laws Now in Force in the Territory of Orleans
(1808). " ' 158 That Digest reproduces in French the articles of cause found in the
French Civil Code. The English version of the Digest presents a literal
translation of the fourth essential condition to validity of an agreement, "[u ne
cause licite dans l'obligation.'' 159 It is translated as "[a] lawful purpose in the
obligation." 160 This version of cause is continued in the Codes of 1825 and
1870.161
Capitant made clear the impropriety of speaking of the cause of a contract.
Cause is that element of the will which presupposes the attainment of the end
desired, or the presupposition of performance performed. As such, it is the
cause of the obligation,inseparable from it and indispensable to its validity until
the final moment of execution. 162 What is striking for a French lawyer in the
Civil Code of Louisiana is that the terms cause, consideration and motive are
made practically interchangeable.1 63 As mentioned above, French scholars make
a distinction inside the concept of cause between the cause seen from the
perspective of its existence and the cause seen from the perspective of its
morality, this last one could be seen as the equivalent of the motive.
157. C. civ. art. 1131.

158. George M. Snellings, Jr., Cause and Considerationin Louisiana,8 TUL. L. REV 178 (1934),
159. Civ. LAWS NOW INFORCE INTHE TERRITORY OF ORLEANS, art.8 (1803) (replaced by the 1825
act).
160. Id. at 260.
161. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1772 (1825); see also LA. Civ. CODE art. 1779 (1870).
162. See generally HENRI CAPITANT, DE LA CAUSE DES OBLIGATIONS 26 (Dalloz, 3d ed. 1927).
163. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1825 (1870) ("The error in the cause of a contract to have the effect of
invalidating it, must be on the principal cause, when there are several: this principal cause is called
the motive, and means that consideration without which the contract would not have been made.");
see also LA. CIv. CODE art. 1896 (1870) ("By the cause of the contract, in this section, is meant the
consideration or motive for making it; and a contract is said to be without a cause, whenever the
party was in error, supposing that which was his inducement for contracting to exist, when in fact
it had never existed, or had ceased to exist before the contract was made.").
Article 1893 of the Civil Code of Louisiana is the twin of Article 1131 of
the French Civil Code. 164 The same can be said if we read together Article 1895
of the Louisiana Civil Code and Article 1133 of the French Civil Code. 165 In
Louisiana, as in France, unlawful purposes are reprobated in any contract just as
one may not sanction the enforcement of any agreement, which in common law
terminology, is tainted with illegality. For example, the Court has refused to
recognize an action to settle a partnership, which operated as a gambling
enterprise. 166 In both countries the solutions will depend on the notions of
morality and illegality, and more broadly, they depend on public policy. In view
of strict morality, it is surprising to observe the matters relating to prostitution.
In Kathman v. Walters,167 recovery for rent of a house, which was allowed to be
used as a brothel, was denied on the ground that the claim was founded upon a
contract reprobated by law. Two years later this case was expressly overruled in
Lyman v. Townsend, 1which marked the emergence of an apparently strong
desire to safeguard the security of transactions. Thus, the lease of a house for
purposes of prostitution became enforceable. 69 In 2002, the French
Government
envisaged the re-establishment of brothels.1
Performance, like a promise, can constitute consideration; if we stop here,
the same can be said concerning cause: a performance as well as a promise can
constitute a valid cause. But American contract law adds another requirement as
far as a promise is concerned. A promise can be consideration only if the
performance of the promise can be consideration. 17 Moreover, when a promise
is deemed to constitute consideration, this promise must not be illusory. For
example, a promise to forbear may constitute consideration; if there is no
agreement to forbear for a fixed period of time, but for a time that the creditor
should elect, there is no consideration. 17 1 Faced with a promise, a good test
would be the following question: "Has the promisor bound himself to do
164. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1893 (1870) ("An obligation without a cause, or with a false or unlawful
cause, can have no effect."); see also C. CIV. art. 1131 («L'obligation sans cause, ou sur unefausse
cause, ou sur une cause illicite, ne peut avoir aucun effet.>>).
165. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1895 (1870) ("The cause is unlawful, when it is forbidden by law, when
it is contra bonos mores (contrary to moral conduct) or to public order."); see also C. civ. art. 1133
( La cause est illicite, quand elle est prohibde par la loi, quand elle est contraire aux bonnes
moeurs ou a1I ordre public. >).
166. Martin v. Seabaugh, 54 So. 935, 938 (La. 1911).
167. 22 La. Ann. 54 (La. 1870).
168. 24 La. Ann. 625 (La. 1872) (Howell, J., dissenting).
169. Lilian Mathieu, Women beyond the pale, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Oct. 2003, availableat
http://mondediplo.com/2003/1O/14prostitution (last visited Mar. 8, 2005).
170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 75 (1981) ("Except as stated in §§ 76 and 77, a
promise which is bargained for is consideration if, but only if, the promised performance would be
consideration.").
171. Strong v. Sheffield, 39 N.E. 330 (N.Y. 1895).
20051 FRENCH AND AMERICAN APPROACHES,
something?" If the answer is no, the promise is illusory and there is no

consideration. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 77 affirms this
principle. 172
One should pay attention to the use of "termination clauses." Contracting
parties often use termination clauses to reduce the risks that they assume by
contracting. If a termination clause is read as giving a party the power to
terminate at any time at will, without more, the party's promise will be held to be
illusory. The same concerns arise concerning the "satisfactory clauses." In
Lawrence Block Co. v. Palston,173 the provisions "'O.P.A. Rent statements to be
approved by Buyer'; '[s]ubject to buyer's inspection and approval of all
apartments,"" 7 4 were said to give the purchaser "unrestricted discretion" in
deciding whether he would be bound to the contract and to provide no
"standard" which could be used in compelling him to perform. 175
This case, although dealing with the problem of consideration, may make
the French lawyer think of the potestative condition. Such a condition is
comparable to the common law's illusory promise. In both cases, the promisor
has, in substance, a free way out, which is contrary to the essence of obligation.
Article 1174 of the Civil Code 176 declares an obligation void when it has been
contracted subject to a potestative condition on the part of the person who
obligates himself. For example, the promise of a person to sell a car if he so
desires is subject to a potestative condition, that is to say, depends on the single
will of he who obligates himself. A close, but permissible situation, is the
French unilateral promise of sale. In a unilateral promise of sale, one party did
not bind himself but can rely on the promise of the other. The promisor,
proprietor, promises to the promisee to sell him a building if the promisee wishes
to buy it. The promisee has the choice to buy or not to buy the building.
Nevertheless this option cannot be endless. There are two steps to reach the
definitive contract. At the time of the promise, only the promisor is bound. At
the time of the exercise of the option, the promisee binds himself.
This situation is distinct from an offer since there is an agreement between
the promisor and the promisee. With his promise, the promisor gives his
definitive consent to be bound, which cannot be withdrawn. Quite often, a
financial counterpart exists (indemnitg d'immobilisation)for the exclusivity that
the promisor gives to the promisee. However, even in this situation, though
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 77 (1981) ("A promise or apparent promise is not
consideration if by its terms the promisor or purported promisor reserves a choice of alternative
performances").
173. 266 P.2d 856 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954).
174. Id. at 858.
175. Id. at 861-62.
176. C. civ. art. 1174.
tinted with bilateralism, the contract remains a unilateral one since the
beneficiary of the option has a real liberty of choice given the small amount of
the financial counterpart. Such a situation should be unlikely to exist or at least
should lead to unenforceability in American contract law due to the requirement
of consideration. Nevertheless, U.C.C. § 2-205 appears to lump both situations
as firm 7offers, granting enforcement even though consideration cannot be
17
shown.
In the last third of the nineteenth century, American legal theorists
revolutionized the doctrine of consideration. 78 The idea was to present
consideration as the answer to the question of which promises the law should
enforce. 179 Today, it is still this question which underlies the doctrine of
consideration. ISO Classical theorists made consideration into the axis around
which all of contract revolved. Before the classical period, consideration was a
minor issue in contract theory. Parsons, for instance, devoted less 181
than five
percent of his treatise to the combination of consideration and assent.
The Comparison between French cause and American consideration can
only sensibly be made with respect to French bilateral and onerous contracts. It
is only for those categories that the promise itself, which constitutes the cause,
can also constitute the American consideration. Indeed, unilateral and gratuitous
promises are incompatible with the concept of bargain, which underlies the
concept of consideration.
Both benefit and detriment work within the fully developed notion of
consideration, because one or the other had to be present for the requirements of
consideration to be satisfied. It is possible to say that the French cause is often
177. U.C.C. § 2-205 (2004);

An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing which by its
terms give assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of
consideration, during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable time,
but in no event may such period of irrevocability exceed three months; but any
such term of assurance on a form supplied by the offeree must be separately
signed by the offeror.
Id.
178. See generally OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 267-97 (Little, Brown &
Co. 1943) (1923); see also CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACT, WITH A SUMMARY OF THE Topics COVERED BY THE CASES 1011-39 (2d ed.
1879); Christopher Columbus Langdell, Mutual Promises as a Considerationfor Each Other, 14
HARv. L. REV. 496, 496-98 (1901).
179. Roy Kreitner, The Gift Beyond the Grave: Revisiting the Question of Consideration, 101
COLUM. L. REv. 1876 (2001).
180. See generally LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 6-163
(6th ed. 1996).
181. See generally THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 353 (1853); see also id. at
408.
constituted by the expectation of a benefit derived from the contract or by a

detriment imposed on the other party, but there is no statute that requires the
presence of one of these two conditions.
In this part we have been concerned with delineating the notions of
American consideration and French cause. Now we will analyze some
characteristics of consideration that give it its specificity.
B. Distinctive Featuresin the Application of the Notions

Some distinctive features of the concept of consideration can be explained
by the concept of bargain, while others come from mechanisms allowed by
American law and do not exist under French law.
1. Distinctive Features Due to the Concept of Bargain for Exchange

Numerous distinctive features can be explained by the concept of bargain
which is central to American contract law.
a. Past ConsiderationDoes Not constitute Consideration Whereas

Cause Can be Constituted by a PastAction
By the latter half of the sixteenth century, courts had accepted the general
principle that "past consideration" could not be consideration. 182 An action
already taken before a promise is made, for example, a promise made by an
employer to a former employee to pay money for good work and faithful
services, would be past consideration and this past consideration cannot be
consideration for the promise. A promise based upon past services would be
without consideration. 83 So, in this case, the promise is not enforceable. This
can be explained by the fact that there is no bargain, no actual obligation on each
side. The only possibility for the parties to make the promise enforceable is to
restructure the transaction. In this example, the requirement of consideration
will be met if the employer bargains for some future performance by the
employee or for a return promise by the employee to do something. The
conclusion that past consideration cannot be consideration is inevitable under the
bargain theory.
French contract law does not sustain the same solution: a past action can
constitute a valid cause for an obligation. Even if the promise is motivated by
something which has its source in the past and therefore could not constitute a
valid consideration, it can still constitute a valid cause. The same difference in
approach applies for a moral obligation.
182. ALFRED WILLIAM BRIAN SIMPSON, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 452-58
(1987).
183. See generally Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
b. Moral ObligationCannot Constitute Consideration,Whereas

Moral Obligation Can Constitute a Valid Cause
In Mills v. Wyman, Mills had cared for Wyman's son185for several weeks
after the son had fallen ill on his return from a voyage. The father, in
gratitude, wrote Mills a letter promising to reimburse him "for the expenses he
had incurred."' 186 Wyman refused to pay and Mills sued. The Supreme Court of
Massachusetts held that the father's promise was unenforceable because it
appears to have been made without any legal consideration. 187 In the same
situation the Cour de Cassation would have decided that regardless of his
reasons, if Wyman had promised to pay he was bound by this obligation.
In some exceptional situations common law does enforce a promise on the
grounds that it was made in recognition of what could be viewed as a "moral
obligation." One example is a promise to pay a debt that is no longer legally
enforceable because the statutory period of limitations has expired. Another
example is a promise by an adult to perform a duty imposed by 88 a promise that
the adult made as a minor and could have avoided on that ground.
In Webb v. McGowin,189 Webb saved McGowin's life by an act of heroism
that left Webb crippled for life. 190 Webb sued McGowin's estate alleging that
McGowin had, in gratitude, promised to pay him a certain amount of money
regularly for the rest of Webb's life. 19 1 Payments had been made for several
years, until after McGowin's death, but his executors refused to continue
them. 192 The Court of Appeals of Alabama, noting that McGowin had
"complied with this agreement up to the time of his death,' 193 held that the
promise was enforceable, since McGowin, "having received a material benefit
from the promisee, is morally bound to compensate him for the services
rendered." 94 Restatement Second of Contracts § 86(1) recognizes that a moral
obligation can be a basis for enforcement "to the extent necessary to prevent
'
injustice." 195
184. 20 Mass. 207 (1825).

185. Id. at 209.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 212.
188. Lon L. Fuller, Considerationand Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 821-22 (1941).
189. 168 So. 196 (Ala. Ct. App 1935).
190. td.
191. Id. at 197.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 198.
195. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86(1) (1981).
c. As Faras UnsolicitedAction is Concerned,the Bargain Theory

Applies in France as Well as in the United States
If the promisee takes some action subsequent to a promise but the action
was unsolicited by the promisor, that action was not bargained for and therefore
cannot constitute consideration. The same bargain reasoning applies in French
law: subsequent action that differs from that sought by the promisor does not
make the promise enforceable. It is a question of fact whether, when making a
promise, a promisor was bargaining for some action that was later taken by the
promisee. To determine whether a promisor is bargaining when making a
promise, it is useful to look at the promisor's purpose and at the promisor's
means.
We can readily observe that when we look to the promisor's purpose we
look, in the French theory, at the mobiles, in the subjective cause. Although it is
said that the cause should not be confused with motive, it is also said that
consideration should not be confused with motive, one should concede that
motive is an element of bargain which is in turn an element of consideration as
well as an element of cause.
Under French law, it is not certain that this problem would be one of cause.
It could also be analyzed as a problem of objet. Objet is another condition of the
formation of contracts. 19 6 The French Civil Code sometimes mentions the objet
of the obligation 197 and sometimes the objet of contract. 19 8 In this last case,
some French scholars say that the objet of a contract
199 is the legal purpose of the
parties, the operation that they seek to achieve.
d. BargainingProcessand GratuitousPromise
Considering whether a promisor is bargaining for a promise or performance
in return for the promisor's own commitment, leads to the question of whether
the promisor conditioned the commitment on that promise or performance. The
use of the word "if" is generally indicative of a bargaining process. For example,
if a seller says "I promise to deliver this furniture if you pay me 1000 dollars,"
the conditional form of the promise seems to make it clear that the seller is
bargaining for the buyer's promise to pay 1000 dollars. In this case the seller
means: "If you do pay me 1000 dollars, you shall have my commitment to
deliver this furniture."
Nevertheless, the language of the condition alone is not determinative,
because the same language may also be used where there is no bargain. A
196. C. civ. art. 1108.

197. C. civ. art. 1129.
198. C. civ. arts. 1110, 1128.
199. See generally PHILIPPE MALAURIE, LAURENT AYNES, DROIT CIVIL, LES OBLIGATIONS 277
(1998).
promise may be conditioned by the same words even though it is clearly

gratuitous, and a gratuitous promise is not enforceable. Today, this solution can
again be explained by the doctrine of bargain.
Traditionally, a promise made between family members is not enforceable.
Gifts or services between family members are assumed to be motivated by
altruism. As we moved into the twenty-first century, the differences between
intimate agreements and commercial agreements narrowed, and the concept of
exchange was central in the adopted solutions. The concept of exchange is
relatively broad in the sense that it includes a benefit and/or a detriment for both
parties. The bargain-for exchange is the test to decide whether or not a promise,
which can appear gratuitous at first sight, can be actually enforced. In the case
of Hamer v. Sidway,200 an uncle promised his nephew 5000 dollars if the
nephew "refrain from drinking liquor[,] using tobacco, swearing, and playing
cards or billiards for money until [he] should become twenty-one years of
age." 201 The nephew fully complied with the conditions.20 2 The Court rejected
the argument that there was no consideration for the uncle's promise. 203 The 2 4
uncle had the benefit of seeing his nephew abstain from the enumerated vices. 0
At the same time, the 2nephew
05
suffered a detriment by denying himself the
pleasures of those vices.
If there is no exchange at all, the promise is a purely gratuitous promise and
unenforceable. The French approach to the problem of gratuitous promises
differs in important respects from that of common law. First, in American
contract law, it is linked to the concept of consideration; second, French law is
based on detailed and comprehensive legislative provisions, so the risks inherent
in gratuitous
,, • promises..are anticipated by the law and there is no need for the
,207
"cautionary function of consideration. Moreover, the notarial contract,
which requires the participation of a lawyer who holds a special appointment
from the state and is charged with handling and recording various types of
transactions, has no counterpart in common law.
200. 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).

201. Id. at 257.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. C. civ. art. 955 (stating that a gift can be revoked on several grounds: that the donee
attempted to kill the donor; that the donee abused the donor, wronged him, or committed a delict
against him; or that the donee has refused needed support to the donor).
207. Fuller, supra note 187, at 800.
e. The Problem of Rewards

In order to evaluate the specificity of the concept of consideration, it is
particularly useful to look at the problem of rewards. In Broadnax v.
Ledbetter,208 Sheriff Ledbetter offered a reward for the capture of a murder
suspect. Broadnax sued for the reward, and Ledbetter demurred on the ground
that Broadnax had not alleged that he knew of the offer of the reward when he
captured the prisoner. The Supreme Court of Texas upheld the demurrer
because the service that Broadnax rendered was not given by Broadnax in
exchange for Ledbetter's promise, since Broadnax did not know of that promise.
Again we can see that it is necessary to keep in mind the basic principle of
consideration (an action is not bargained for unless it is given by the promisee in
exchange for the promise) to justify this solution.
A comparable situation would be resolved in a different way by French
contract law. The reward would be considered an offer to members of the public
or a unilateral promise subordinate to a condition, and the capture, an acceptance
or the realization of the condition, thus all requirements for a binding contract
would be met. The notion of "objective cause" would not play any role, and the
notion of "subjective cause," understood as motive, would be taken into account
only if the reward could be considered a threat to public policy.
2. There is a Substitute for Consideration, Whereas There is No Substitute

for the French Cause
In French contract law, either cause exists or does not exist, without cause
the contract is not enforceable. There is no legal means that can compensate for
the absence of cause. In contrast, American contract law contains a substitute
for consideration: reliance. Reliance can operate as a separate basis for the
enforcement of a promise. After playing its role in the development of the
doctrine of consideration, 209 reliance played no important part for four centuries,
until the twentieth century. The coexistence of promissory estoppel and the
bargain theory of consideration is relatively uneasy. But it permits one to
overcome the defects of the doctrine of consideration. Reliance is an alternative
to bargain-for exchange, and can act as a distinct basis for the enforcement of
promises.
As stated in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts:
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does
208. 99 S.W. 111,

l 1111-12 (Tex. 1907).
209. Since the misfeasance cases that had originally given rise to the action in assumpsit were
characterized by a detriment incurred by the promisee in reliance on the promise, it was natural to
formulate an analogous test and to allow enforcement if the promisee had changed position on the
faith of the promise and had been consequently damaged by its non performance.
induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only

by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be
limited as justice requires.
(2) A charitable subscription or a marriage settlement is binding under
Subsection (1) without proof that the promise induced action or
forbearance.210
First, the promisee must actually rely on the promise. So an employer's
promise of a pension did not induce the employee's retirement where "he made
the decision on his own initiative" and "had reached that decision long before"
the promise was made. 211 If the claimed reliance consists of the promisee's
forbearance rather than affirmative action, proof that this forbearance was
induced by the promise requires showing that the promisee could have acted.
Second, the promisor must have had reason to expect that reliance had
occurred although the promisor may not have bargained for it. So, in the
example of the employer's promise of a pension on retirement, the promisor
should reasonably have expected the employee to retire. The standard for testing
expectation is an objective one, under which the promisor is bound if the
promisor had reason to expect reliance, even if the promisor did not in fact
2 12
expect it.
Third, recovery should be limited as justice requires. The fact of reliance
argues in favor of enforcement both because it indicates that an underlying
understanding existed between the parties and because it raises here again a
question of fairness. The absence of cause is thus fatal to the validity of a
contract whereas the absence of consideration does not inevitably have the same
consequence if a substitute for consideration can be found.
Generally speaking, whenever there is a valuable consideration in the
American sense, the contract will be valid also under the doctrine of cause. But
many agreements, which cannot be supported in American Law for want of
consideration, can be enforced under the broader doctrine of cause in French
Law. There is no doubt that the existence of consideration indicates in the great
majority of cases that the parties seriously contemplated a legal relation, but the
lack of consideration does not necessarily indicate the absence of such an
intention. Nevertheless, the will of the parties to create a legal relation, however
clearly expressed, will be ignored by American courts in the absence of a
technical consideration to support the agreement.
210. RESTATEMENTS (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).

211. Hayes v. Plantations Steel Co., 438 A.2d 1091, 1096 (R.I. 1982).
212. Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264, 1270 (6th
Cir. 1980).
C. Comments on the Notion of Consideration

We may question the doctrine of consideration. What is the rationale that
can explain that a promisor is not able to make a binding promise without
receiving something in return from, or without reliance by, the promisee? While
this question has not been directly confronted, some attempts have been made to
mitigate the harshness of the rule requiring the automatic invalidation of a
contract due to a lack of consideration. For example, the Uniform Written
Obligations Act, proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, facilitates the making of a binding gratuitous promise as
long as there•is some form of writing showing an intention
214 to be bound.2 13 But,
it has not had a lot of success among the States. A more recent attempt is
codified by a California
2 15
statute that makes a writing "presumptive evidence of a
consideration."
Why did common law adopt the principle of bargain, while the French
system developed a principle of agreement that enabled it to deal more simply
and directly with promissory situations in which there is no element of bargain?
Some historical arguments can certainly be made. During the early experiments
of assumpsit, the idea of reciprocity was constantly asserted. It is thus
understandable that judges came to insist, through the doctrine of consideration,
on an element of bargain in the transaction that they were asked to enforce. The
development of assumpsit was basically due to pressures from important
commercial interests and was carried on by the practicing legal profession. Such
interests, and such lawyers, did not seek a general sanction for all executory
. 216
agreements, including charitable gifts, but only for business enterprise. The
doctrine of consideration was not supposed to be "as wide as morality and as
warm as conscience," but should rather be "commercialised into the price of a
bargain. ' 217 Bargain has been defined as "the social and legal machinery
appropriate to arranging affairs in any specialized economy which relies on
exchange rather than tradition (the manor) or authority 2(the
18
army, the U.S.S.R.)
for apportionment of productive energy and of product."
213. UNIFORM WRITTEN OBLIGATIONS ACT § 1 (1925) ("A written release or promise hereafter
made and signed by the person releasing or promising shall not be invalid or unenforceable for
lack of consideration, if the writing also contains an additional express statement, in any form of
language, that the signer intends to be legally bound.").
214. Only Pennsylvania and Utah adopted this act, and Utah later repealed it.
215. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1614 (West 2001).
216. C. H. S. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW: TORT AND CONTRACT 399
(Stevens & Sons Ltd. 1965) (1949).
217. Id. at 398.
218. Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?- An Essay in Perspective,40 YALE L.J. 704, 717
(1931).
The doctrine of consideration emphasizes the notion of exchange. Thus we

can question this notion; why is the concept of exchange so important in the
doctrine of consideration? First of all, it can be justified by economic
considerations. The economists tend to think that the making and the
enforcement of contracts are a part of the process of exchange of goods and2 19
values. They constitute a means to move "from less to more valuable uses."
The counterpart in American law is the principle that promises are not
enforceable unless supported by consideration, in the sense that a promise will
not create an enforceable contract unless it is made in exchange for something of
value such as goods, money or another promise. From this standpoint it is easy
to understand the general rule that gratuitous promises are not enforceable. "[I]t
has been said that the enforcement of gratuitous promises is not an object of
sufficient importance to our social and economic order to justify the expenditure
of the time and energy necessary to accomplish it.220
It is remarkable to notice that Fuller quoted21 Bufnoir's 2 2 lectures,
delivered at the Sorbonne in 1884, considering gratuitous promise as "sterile
transmission." But first, this assertion cannot be demonstrated. Secondly, this
economic justification fails to explain why the requirement of consideration
disappears as far as promises of charitable donations are concerned. We can say
that it is just a special judicial partiality for charity, or that more generally, it
reflects a political choice based on the interest (which can be economic) of the
society. One court explained "[t]his promise was made to a charitable
corporation, and for that reason, we are not confined to... orthodox
concepts. ' 2 23 Moreover Restatement Second § 90(2) continues the policy
favoring charitable subscriptions by making such promises enforceable without
proof of reliance. 224 So maybe it would not be useless to reconsider gratuitous
promises, because "[tihe argument that gratuitous promises do not merit
enforcement cannot depend, therefore,
' 225
on the proposition that the gratuitous
transfer is itself unmeritorious."
Why would it not be possible to enlarge the concept of consideration to
affirm that there is a consideration for gratuitous promises? This consideration
would consist of altruism. This idea would make consideration close to the
French cause in gratuitous promise. But it would imply enlarging the doctrine of
consideration beyond the board of the bargained- for exchange.
219. Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411
(1977).
220 Fuller, supra note 187, at 799.
221. Id. at 815.
222. C. BUFNOIR,PROPRItTI ET CONTRAT 487 (2d ed. 1924).
223. Danby v. Osteopathic Hosp. Assn., 104 A.2d 903, 907 (Del. 1954).
224. RESTATEMENTS (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
225. Andrew Kull, Reconsidering Gratuitous Promises, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 50 (1922).
The Roman law doctrine of laesio enormis refused enforcement of certain

contracts in which the disparity of values comprised in a bargained-for exchange
was objectively very great. In Medieval society, the requirement of fair
exchange of values, in its economic aspects, was the just price, a concept
appropriate to a static economic order. Today, French law still recognizes
classes of transactions in which an agreement can be set aside on the ground of
mere objective disproportion in the value of counterparts.2 26 Out of this limited
category of contracts, a disproportion between performances should not be
condemnable.
Fuller proposed that a significant relationship exists between consideration
and form. 2 7 His idea is that the doctrine of consideration contains both
"formal" and "substantive" elements; 228 and that there are three functions
performed by legal formalities. First, is an "evidentiary function" and Fuller
S 229a lack of evidentiary safeguard is obvious in the case of gratuitous
thinks that
promises. The formal requirement of consideration evidences the making of a
promise. We do not think that this suggestion is supported. We do not think that
the problems of proof are necessarily exacerbated if the promise is gratuitous.
The second function is the cautionary safeguard. 23 It is claimed that those who
promise gifts do not really know what they are doing. The formal requirement
of consideration cautions the promisor about its seriousness. 23 1 Here again, we
do not think that spontaneity and a lack of deliberation necessarily apply to
gratuitous promises. Rather, we think that a gratuitous promise can be the result
of a prolonged reflection. Third, according to Fuller, consideration has a
channeling function. 232 As expanded by Eisenberg, "in a context that involves
neither formality nor explicit reciprocity, it may often be difficult to distinguish a
promise from a statement of present intent. ' ' 2B We believe that the same means
can be used by a promisor and by a gratuitous promisor to distinguish a promise
from a statement of intent. To conclude this explanation, we believe that it is
worthwhile to justify a rule, which can appear arbitrary, but we think that it
reposes on assumed hypotheses that we think are not actually demonstrated.
Another explanation could be that a doctrine based upon the notion of
bargained-for exchange is, in its very nature, inclusive and expansive. It is
called on often to handle a variety of problems. Among them, one should notice
226. C. civ. art. 1674 (stating that the seller of immovable property can, if the price received is
less than seven-twelfths of the value, obtain rescission).
227. Fuller, supra note 187, at 799.
228. Id. at 800.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 814.
232. Id. at 801.
233. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 5 (1979).
the weight of policy concerns and its relationship to handling problems of

unfairness. Consideration is important in the policing of individual transactions
with a view to refusing enforcement if the arrangement is too unfair. In this
view the doctrine of consideration is interconnected to the idea of mutuality. If a
contractual relationship seems too unfair, the courts intervene on the ground that
consideration is lacking. On the other hand, if the court does not sznse an
element of overreaching in the situation, it is likely that consideration will be
found and the agreement upheld. Kessler remarked234that courts saw the potential
of the doctrine "as an instrument of social control."
We have drawn the same conclusion in the first part of this work
concerning the protection of the assent through the means of public policy and
fairness concerning both the procedural and the substantive aspects of the
contract. In general, the requirement of consideration is justified as a guarantee
of the reasonableness of a particular transaction. The law sets up certain limits
in the interest of society or of certain categories of parties, beyond which they
cannot contract. But within the limits so outlined the will of the parties to
assume legal relation should control.
The doctrine of consideration can be viewed as a limitation of the free will
of people to bind themselves as they wish. Limitation is correlative to the
addition of external requirements to the parties' mere agreement. It is
noteworthy that in Principles of European Contract Law, Article 2:101, "[a]
contract is concluded if: (a) the parties intend to be legally bound, and (b) they
reach a sufficient agreement without any further requirement. ' ,235 One "implies
that the contract can be
236
concluded without the existence of the ... requirement
of. . . consideration."
Grant Gilmore dismissed the bargain theory of consideration. He posited
that nonconsensual tort law absorbed the bargain theory and permitted recoveries
in the absence of an enforceable contract.2 37 He concluded that the "death of
238
contract" was inevitable.
To conclude, we can raise a paradox: although it encompasses a lot of
different matters, the doctrine of consideration is actually very narrow. In
response to the strictures of consideration, the courts are obliged either to deny
that the promises in question were gratuitous (and to find sometimes artificial
234. Friedrich Kessler, Introduction: Contract as a Principle of Order,in FRIEDRICH KESSLER Et

AL., CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1986), reprinted in PETER LINZER, A CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY 4, 8 (Peter
Linzer ed., 1989).
235. PECL, supra note 8, at 137.
236. Maria del Piler Perales Viscasillas, The Formationof Contracts & Principles of European
ContractLaw, 13 PACE INT'L L. REV. 371, 374 (2001).
237. See generally GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87-94 (1974).
238. Id. at 3.
bargained-for exchange) or that they have induced detrimental reliance to reach

the outcome of enforcement of the promise.
IV. CONCLUSION
Contracts are legally binding promises. But they are binding only if they
have been freely and voluntarily entered upon. The promise should be a genuine
act of free will. This explains why both U.S. and French law have been
concerned with developing means to reach this goal. By and large, they have
adopted numerous similar mechanisms. Nevertheless, French law's concept of
agreement provides a more consensualistic approach, while American law has an
approach which is linked to the bargain theory.
Despite this difference in approach, we can observe a common trend in U.S.
and French contract law. They both reveal a realization that all parties cannot
always bargain at arm's length. And they both try to instill a balance between
the parties to a contract. They both recognize that the theory of freedom of
contract does not always lead to fair situations because the freedom does not
really exist in and of itself, which is a reflection of society. They both assume
that freedom would be reached by means of equality or at least a lesser
inequality.
It remains to be determined who will assume the task of intruding in private
relations such as contracts. In both countries, legislators as well as courts are
solicited. They both try to curb offenses to their sense of justice. In this way the
rules cannot be neutral and are necessarily tainted, and the line between public
policy and fairness is often blurred. The role of judges has increased, although
they have not always had the legitimacy and the tools to solve the problems. In
France this has led judges to stretch some notions such as the notion of good
faith, sometimes misrepresenting the notion in order to make it fit with a
predetermined sense of justice. Sometimes some positive duties were discovered
such as the duty of disclosure. Giving a party sufficient information before
entering into a contract is, at the same time, imposing on the other a duty (of
disclosure) whereas the interests of contracting parties are often antagonistic. It
is difficult to justify this duty and the implicit restrictions to the principle that
consensus is the foundation of contract.
Moreover, in deciding cases, courts should be concerned with the
imperatives of certainty and predictability. Certainty is required for stable
transactions. The proclivity of courts to discover rules with sufficient certainty
and predictability is now supported by a "flurry of neoformalism in contracts
scholarship. ' 239 The proposed solution, therefore, is to restrict judicial
239. William J.Woodward, Jr., Neoformalism in a Real World of Forms, 2001 WiS. L. REV. 971,
1004 (2001).
speculation by emphasizing the language of the static record of agreement. 24 0 In

the facts, they ask "that the court respect the literal and explicit terms of the
contract."' 24 1 In the opposite view, Llewellyn insisted that the "text" of the
bargain should no longer be the sole basis for discerning obligations. Rather,
"dynamic, legally unformulated, fact patterns of common life" provide an
"immanent law" from which the parties' obligations are derived. 242 The U.C.C
emphasizes an anti-technical, anti-formalist and relational identification of the
agreement. Under the U.C.C. § 1-201(11), contract is defined in terms 24 3
of effect:
"the total legal obligation which results from the parties' agreement."
Contract making is future-oriented. Contracting parties enjoy the assurance
that if necessary, the mechanism of enforcement will work for them to be put in
the future condition envisioned under their contract. Like contract-making, trust
is future-oriented. Contract-making is a functional equivalent of trust. 2 4 It
would be reasonable to expect judges to carry over the logic of trust into their
judgment about a default in the process of contract-making in order to avoid a
systematic voidability.
In France, there is a distrust of the judge. It is a heritage from the abuse of
judicial power during the Ancien Regime. The distrust of the equity of the
Parliamentsis summed up in a well-known proverb "May God preserve us from
the equity of Parliaments." 245 This adage refers to the suffering of the people at
the hands of judges who abused the proper functioning of a court. It means that
the power to judge in equity was arbitrary, partial, and unpredictable. The
perception of arbitrariness may have been intensified by the fact that the
rationality of equity was not and could not be explained. The Parliament
operated in total secrecy in their deliberation. The judges were under a sworn
duty not to reveal the grounds of their decisions. There were no reports of cases
published before the seventeenth century. Thus the entire reasoning which
justified transforming the existing law was kept from litigants.
Today, it can be said that the laconic decisions, the anonymous authorship
of decisions without dissents, and the authoritarian tone, confines judges to the
language of assertion and logical inevitability that prevents them from
developing a full reasoning which could be educational and thus better
240. Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94
Nw. U. L. REV. 749 (2000).
241. Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 847,
851 n. 12 (2000).
242. Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative CaseAgainst Flexibility in Commercial Law, 66 U. C1t. L.
REV. 781, 782 (1999).
243. U.C.C. § 1-201(11) (2004).
244. Menachen Mauter, Contract, Culture, Compulsion, or: What is so Problematic in the
Application of Objective Standards in Contract Law?, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 545 (2002).
245. xPuisse Dieu nous prdserverde l'tiquiti de parlements. >
understood and accepted. It prevents judges from having an eye upon the
consequences of their decisions. But the power to decree new laws as solutions
to individual cases would violate the doctrine of separation of powers and
Article 5 of the French Civil Code which states that "[]udges are forbidden 246 to
decide cases submitted to them by way of general and regulatory provisions.
Following the French vision of the separation of powers, the role of the judge is
only to apply the statutes.
But the theory that the legislature can constantly formulate the law in
accordance with social and economic needs is unrealistic. This idea is not a new
one. Even in 1899, Francois Geny in Methode d'Interpretation et Source en
Droit Prive Positif 47 presented a critique of the mechanical, formalistic judicial
practice of his day. Geny's critique inveighed against what he called fetishism 249
of the codified and written statutory law. 24He dismissed "the fatuous notion
that the codes provided complete legal coverage and that all legal solutions could
be found therein. Rather Geny called for free scientific research and for
recognition of the reality that the codes inevitably contain gaps, conflicts and
ambiguities produced by the evolution of modem society. 250
As recognized in common law, judges have in fact a fundamental role in the
establishment and development of legal norms. They are witnesses of economic
changes in society and reformulate the law in accordance with economic needs.
If the legal order does not furnish an adequate legal rule for the case, then the
judge should forge a rule as though he were acting as legislator. 25 1 French
judges could well draw a lesson from common law judges in this regard. This
would go a long way in reviving and reestablishing the sagging reputation of
French judges.
246. C. civ. art. 5 (4l est d~fendu aux juges de prononcerpar voie de disposition gIndrale et
riglementairesur les causes qui leur sont soumises.>).
247. See generally FRANCOIS GENY, METHODE D'INTERPRETATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PPRIVE
POSTIF [METHOD OF INTERPRETATION AND SOURCES IN POSITIVE PRIVATE LAW] (2d ed. 1954).
248. See generally id.
249. See generally id.
250. See generally id. at 17-96.
251. JEAN CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL [CIVIL LAW] 35-36 (Presses Universitaires de France, 5th
ed. 1967).

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Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law

Volume 12 | Issue 2 Article 3

French and American Approaches to Contract

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tjcil

Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tjcil/vol12/iss2/3

This study focuses on certain comparisons of American and French contract

7. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, A Speech at Zurich University, in THE SINEWS OF PEACE: POST-WAR

especially in commerce, corporate, and international relations. Thus, there are

The complexity of business relations often necessitates long periods of

25. C. civ. art. 1103.

negotiate in good faith. 33 In Teachers Insurance & Annuity Assoc. of America v.

validity. 45 Even if the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) requires written

A. Functionof Offer and Acceptance in the Formationof Contracts

generally the one who has the power to determine

1. The Notion of Offer

60. FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, at 138.

general (e.g., if it is made to the public by means of an advertisement

68. Shuey v. United States, 92 U.S. 73 (1875).

2. The Condition of Acceptance

77. U.C.C. § 2-205 (1979);

that the execution of the contract was a serious business

95. Fitch v. Snedaker, 38 N.Y. 248 (1868).

B. Consent to Be Legally Bound

100. Id. at 270.

«<consentement>, which etymologically is derived from the Latin cum sentire

1. Duress, Undue Influence and Violence

explain that 'the law imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the

of influence should be considered "undue" or unacceptable? Negotiations

In Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico,1 1 5 workmen agreed with Alaska Packers

115. 116F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902).

exploitation by more economically powerful ones. Presently, there are few

3. Concealment, Misrepresentation, and Dol

of a party who relies 147

III. THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN U.S. AND FRENCH CONTRACT

A. The Notions of Considerationand French Cause

147. FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, at 361.

consideration is an outgrowth of common law and remained uninfluenced by

157. C. civ. art. 1131.

something?" If the answer is no, the promise is illusory and there is no

177. U.C.C. § 2-205 (2004);

constituted by the expectation of a benefit derived from the contract or by a

B. Distinctive Featuresin the Application of the Notions

1. Distinctive Features Due to the Concept of Bargain for Exchange

a. Past ConsiderationDoes Not constitute Consideration Whereas

b. Moral ObligationCannot Constitute Consideration,Whereas

184. 20 Mass. 207 (1825).

c. As Faras UnsolicitedAction is Concerned,the Bargain Theory

196. C. civ. art. 1108.

promise may be conditioned by the same words even though it is clearly

200. 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).

e. The Problem of Rewards

2. There is a Substitute for Consideration, Whereas There is No Substitute

208. 99 S.W. 111,

induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only

210. RESTATEMENTS (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).

C. Comments on the Notion of Consideration

The doctrine of consideration emphasizes the notion of exchange. Thus we

The Roman law doctrine of laesio enormis refused enforcement of certain

the weight of policy concerns and its relationship to handling problems of