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3. Oscar B. Pimentel, et al. vs. Legal Education Board (G.R. Nos.

230642 and 242954,


September 10, 2019)

FACTS

The Court's Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters (CLEBM), through its Chairperson,
Justice Jose C. Vitug, noted several objectionable provisions of R.A. No. 7662 where Section
7(e) giving the LEB the power to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and Section
7(h) giving the LEB the power to adopt a system of continuing legal education and for this
purpose, the LEB may provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such
courses and for such duration as the LEB may deem necessary] encroach upon the Supreme
Court's powers under Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Aside from its
power over the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Supreme Court is constitutionally
mandated to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law.

Among the orders issued by the LEB was Memorandum Order No. 7, Series of 2016 (LEBMO
No. 7-2016) pursuant to its power to "prescribe the minimum standards for law admission"
under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662.

The policy and rationale of LEBMO No. 7-2016 is to improve the quality of legal education by
requiring all those seeking admission to the basic law course to take and pass a nationwide
uniform law school admission test, known as the PhiLSAT.

The PhiLSAT is essentially an aptitude test measuring the examinee's communications and
language proficiency, critical thinking, verbal and quantitative reasoning. It was designed to
measure the academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of law. Exempted from the
PhiLSAT requirement were honor graduates who were granted professional civil service
eligibility and who are enrolling within two years from their college graduation.

ISSUES
Did the LEB exercise its powers constitutionally?

HELD

The internal conditions for institutional academic freedom, that is, the academic staff should
have de facto control over: (a) the admission and examination of students; (b) the curricula for
courses of study; (c) the appointment and tenure of office of academic staff; and (d) the
allocation of income among the different categories of expenditure.

Reference was also made to the influential language of Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion
in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, describing it as the "business of the university" to provide a
conducive atmosphere for speculation, experimentation, and creation where the four essential
freedoms of the university prevail: the right of the university to determine for itself on academic
grounds (a) who may teach; (b) what may be taught; (c) how it shall be taught; and (d) who may
be admitted to study.

Thus far, it is settled that the PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude test, is reasonably
related to the State's unimpeachable interest in improving the quality of legal education. This
aptitude test, however, should not be exclusionary, restrictive, or qualifying as to encroach upon
institutional academic freedom. Moreover, in the exercise of their academic freedom to choose
who to admit, the law schools should be left with the discretion to determine for themselves how
much weight should the results of the PhiLSAT carry in relation to their individual admission
policies. At all times, it is understood that the school's exercise of such academic discretion
should not be gravely abused, arbitrary, whimsical, or discriminatory.

Instead, the Court takes a calibrated approach and partially nullifies LEBMO No. 7-2016 insofar
as it absolutely prescribes the passing of the PhiLSAT and the taking thereof within two years
as a prerequisite for admission to any law school which, on its face, run directly counter to
institutional academic freedom

Likewise, in imposing that only those with a basic degree in law may be admitted to graduate
programs in law encroaches upon the law school's right to determine who may be admitted. For
instance, this requirement effectively nullifies the option of admitting non-law graduates on the
basis of relevant professional experience that a law school, pursuant to its own admissions
policy, may otherwise have considered.

The required general weighted average in the college course suffers the same infirmity and
would have been struck down had ·it not been expressly repealed by the LEB because of the
PhiLSAT.

It is clear from the plain text of Section 7(g) that another requirement, i.e., completion of a law
internship program, is imposed by law for taking the bar examinations. This requirement unduly
interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court to promulgate rules concerning the practice
of law and admissions thereto.

In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, NMAT was upheld because NMAT score is not provided with a
threshold which would prevent an applicant from entry into medical school.

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