G.R. No.

216021, March 02, 2016

SOLOMON VERDADERO Y GALERA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPIbNES, Respondent.

FACTS:

On March 12, 2009, at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Maynard Plata (Maynard) and his father
Romeo were at the Baggao Police Station. Together with Ronnie Elaydo (Ronnie), they went there to
report that Verdadero had stolen the fan belt of their irrigation pump.

After a confrontation with Verdadero at the police station, the three men made their way home on a
tricycle but stopped at a drugstore as Maynard intended to buy some baby supplies. Romeo proceeded
towards a store near the drugstore while Ronnie stayed inside the tricycle. From the drug store,
Maynard saw Verdadero stabbing Romeo, after he was alerted by the shouts of Ronnie.

Verdadero insists that he was able to fully support his defense of insanity.

ISSUE

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE PETITIONER'S CONVICTION
DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS INSANITY AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT WAS ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

RULING:

The Court acquits Verdadero.

In the case at bench, it is undisputed that (1) as early as 1999, Verdadero was brought to the Psychiatric
Department of CVMC for treatment; (2) he was diagnosed with depression in 2001; (3) he was
diagnosed with schizophrenia on July 21, 2003; (4) he was confined in the psychiatric ward sometime in
2009 due to a relapse; (5) he was in and out of psychiatric care from the time of his first confinement in
1999 until the stabbing incident; and (6) he was diagnosed to have suffered a relapse on March 20,
2009.

In order for the accused to be exempted from criminal liability under a plea of insanity, he must
categorically demonstrate that: (1) he was completely deprived of intelligence because of his mental
condition or illness; and (2) such complete deprivation of intelligence must be manifest at the time or
immediately before the commission of the offense.

Maynard was familiar with Verdadero as the latter was his neighbor for a long time. He had observed
that there were times that Verdadero appeared to be of unsound mind as he would sometimes become
violent. On the day of the stabbing incident, Maynard perceived that Verdadero was again of unsound
mind noting that he had reddish eyes and appeared to be drunk. Moreover, he was immediately
transferred to the psychiatry department because of his impaired sleep and to control him from
harming himself and others.28

These circumstances are consistent with Dr. Paggadu's testimony that drinking wine, poor sleep and
violent behavior were among the symptoms of a relapse, the same testimony that was used as basis for
his previous diagnosis.29 The evidence on record supports the finding that Verdadero exhibited
symptoms of a relapse of schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing incident. Thus, Dr. Pagaddu
reiterated Dr. Andre-Juliana's conclusion that Verdadero was having a relapse of his illness on that
fateful day.
 G.R. No. 218425, September 27, 2017

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILSON CACHO Y

SONGCO, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS:

On January 2, 2004, at around 8:10 o'clock in the morning, PO2 Emelito Salen (PO2 Salen) and SPO4
Onofre Tavas (SPO4 Tavas) of the Rodriguez Police Station received a report from a certain Willy Cacho
about a fire in Sitio Catmon, Brgy. San Rafael, Rodriguez, Rizal. PO2 Salen and SPO4 Tavas, who were
accompanied by members of the Bureau of Fire Protection, namely: SFO1 Damasa Viscara and FO2
Casiple, went to Sitio Catmon to verify said report.

Upon arriving in Sitio Catmon, the police officers saw a burned house, which was owned by a certain Boy
who was later identified as Mario Balbao. Upon investigation, they discovered a burned body of a
headless man underneath an iron sheet. Willy Cacho informed the police officers that it was his brother,
[accused-appellant], who killed Boy. [Accused-appellant's] wife likewise told the police officers that her
husband was a patient of [the] National Center for Mental Health and has a recurring mental illness.

Thereafter, the police officers went to the house of [accused-appellant] where they saw a shallow pit
measuring one (1) foot in diameter and five (5) inches deep with a steel peg standing at the center,
which they believed was used to bum a head because there were traces of ash and a human skull on top
of the heap of charcoal. The police officers then saw [accused-appellant] in his backyard. Upon
introducing themselves as police officers, [accused-appellant] acted strangely and exhibited signs of
mental illness. According to SPO4 Tavas, [accused-appellant] admitted killing Boy and burning the
latter's house but did not say why he did it.

When they tried to arrest him, [accused-appellant] became wild. The police officers sought help from
other people to subdue [accused-appellant] and to place him inside the mobile car. [Accused-appellant]
was then brought to the prosecutors [sic] office for inquest proceedings. After the inquest, [accused-
appellant] was brought to the National Center for Mental Health for confinement.

ISSUE:

whether the accused-appellant sufficiently proved his defense of insanity

RULING:

Accused-appellant alleges that he was diagnosed with Major Depression with Psychosis in 1996 for
which he was admitted at the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) for two (2) months. Thereafter,
he was discharged when there were no longer any symptom that was observed. Then on January 7,
2004, he was again admitted to the NCMH and it was discovered that his Major Depression with
Psychosis had already progressed to Chronic Schizophrenia. Thus, his defense of insanity was sufficiently
proved by his medical record with the NCMH as well as the expert testimony of Dr. Sagun.

After the careful review of the records of the case, We found that the accused-appellant failed to prove
that he is insane immediately prior or at the time of the commission of the crime.

Here, while Dr. Sagun testified that accused-appellant was confined at the NCMH in 1996 and that
accused-appellant was diagnosed with Major Depression with Psychosis which progressed to Chronic
Schizophrenia, no other evidence was presented to show that accused-appellant was insane
immediately prior to or at the very moment that the crime was committed. Mere prior confinement into
a mental institution does not automatically exonerate the accused-appellant from criminal liability in the
absence of any evidence showing that accused-appellant was completely deprived of reason
immediately prior or at the time of the commission of the crime. If at all, there is no evidence showing
that the mental illness of the accused-appellant, as narrated by Dr. Sagun, constitutes insanity, in that,
there is complete deprivation of his intelligence in committing the act.

We therefore find no cogent reason to reverse the RTC and the CA in its finding that accused-appellant
was not able to prove his defense of insanity. However, We hold that accused-appellant can only be
convicted of the crime of Homicide for failure of the prosecution to prove the existence of any of the
qualifying circumstance provided for under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as charged in the Information.

Accused-appellant is liable for the crime of Homicide.

 G.R. No. 223114, November 29, 2017

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JONAS PANTOJA Y

ASTORGA, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS:

Accused-appellant escaped from the hospital on 14 July 2010, at around 7:45 in the evening, and arrived
at their house the day after. When Cederina inquired from accused-appellant how he was able to find
his way home, accused-appellant responded that he roamed around until he remembered the correct
jeepney route to their house. Cederina then informed the NCMH that the accused-appellant was in her
custody, and she was advised to bring him back to the hospital. However, they were unable to do so at
that time because they could not afford the transportation expenses.

On 22 July 2010, at around 8:00 o'clock in the morning, Cederina and the accused-appellant were inside
their house. She was washing dishes while he was sitting on the balcony. She kept an eye on him from
time to time but, eventually, she noticed that accused-appellant was gone. She went outside to look for
him and noticed that the front door of the house where six-year-old AAA resided was open. She found
this unusual because it was normally closed. She became nervous when she heard the cry of a child
coming from the house. She entered the house and, sensing that the cry emanated from upstairs, she
went up.

She then saw accused-appellant holding a knife and the victim sprawled on the floor, bloodied. She took
the knife from him and asked him what happened. He did not respond and appeared dazed. She took
him downstairs and out of the house where she called out for help for the victim. Nobody responded,
until she saw Glenda, who immediately ran to their house when Cederina told her that her son AAA had
been hurt.

After a while, barangay officials arrived and brought the accused-appellant with them. Cederina later
learned that the victim had died. She went to Glenda and asked for her forgiveness.

Cederina further testified that from the time accused-appellant came home until that fateful morning of
22 July 2010, he continued to take his medications. She observed, however, that accused-appellant
exhibited odd behavior, such as repeatedly going in and out of the house.

In his defense, Accused-appellant testified that he was first confined for his mental illness at the PGH in
2003 because his mother observed that he was speaking differently and was starting to hurt people;
that he had been in and out of the hospital for the same reason since then; that he would be released
from confinement whenever the doctors deemed him well enough after a series of examinations and
interviews; that the doctors prescribed medicine, which he had been taking from 2003 up to the time his
testimony was taken; that there was never an instance when any of the doctors recommended him to
stop taking his medications; that there were times when he would stop taking his medicine if he felt that
he was well, which was a source of quarrel for him and his mother; that he knew the victim as his
younger brother's playmate; that he could not recall what happened on the fateful morning of 22 July
2010.

ISSUE:

whether accused-appellant has clearly and convincingly proven his defense of insanity to exempt him
from criminal liability

RULING:

The RTC and the CA both found that all the elements constituting murder exist in the case at bar, with
accused-appellant as the perpetrator. The accused-appellant did not present evidence controverting
such findings. However, accused-appellant raises the defense of insanity in claiming that he should not
be found criminally liable.

To prove its assertion, the defense presented the testimonies of accused-appellant and Cederina. It also
offered in evidence a (1) letter from the NCMH addressed to Cederina; (2) accused-appellant's patient
identification cards from the NCMH and the PGH; (3) accused-appellant's clinical record; and (4) doctor's
prescriptions.

A scrutiny of the evidence presented by accused-appellant unfortunately fails to establish that he was
completely bereft of reason or discernment and freedom of will when he fatally stabbed the victim. The
paucity m accused-appellant's proof is shown by the following circumstances:

First, the testimony of Cederina tends to show that accused-appellant exhibited signs of mental illness
only after being injured in an altercation in 2003; that she observed changes in his personality and knew
he had difficulty sleeping since then; that accused-appellant was confined in the hospital a few times
over the years for his mental issues; and that he was confined at the NCMH on 8 July 2010 from where
he subsequently escaped. Nothing in her testimony pointed to any behavior of the accused-appellant at
the time of the incident in question, or in the days and hours before the incident, which could establish
that he was insane when he committed the offense.
The foregoing narration does not attribute to accused-appellant any behavior indicative of insanity at
the time of, or immediately preceding, the incident. His seemingly odd behaviour of repeatedly going in
and out of the house in the days prior to the incident does not, in any way, demonstrate his insanity.

For purposes of exemption from criminal liability, mere behavioral oddities cannot support a finding of
insanity unless the totality of such behavior indubitably shows a total absence of reason, discernment,
or free will at the time the crime was committed.

As admitted by Cederina, prior to the incident, there were moments when she observed that accused-
appellant appeared well. On the day in question and immediately preceding the incident, no improper,
violent or aberrant behavior was observed of accused-appellant, as he was merely sitting on the balcony
before he suddenly disappeared to go to the victim's house. During the commission of the crime itself,
there were no eyewitnesses who could relay the behavior of accused-appellant, as even Cederina
happened upon the accused-appellant and the victim only after the stabbing incident.

Second, accused-appellant testified that he was admitted to the hospital for his mental illness several
times prior to the incident, which is corroborated by the testimony of his mother and in a report26 on
his mental condition issued by the NCMH on 21 February 2011. This fact, however, does not also prove
that he was insane at the time he committed the crime. Prior confinement at a mental institution does
not, by itself, constitute proof of insanity at the time of the commission of the crime.

Third, the documents offered in evidence by the defense do not categorically state that accused-
appellant was insane; nor do they show when he became insane; whether such insanity constituted
absolute deprivation of reason, intelligence, and discernment; and whether such insanity existed at the
time he committed the crime. No expert testimony was also presented to testify on such.

A consideration of all the foregoing pieces of evidence clearly does not point to accused-appellant's
insanity at the time he committed the crime.
 G.R. No. 216671, October 03, 2016

JERWIN DORADO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner Jerwin Dorado, a 16-year-old minor, and his friends, Jeffrey Confessor and Jayson Cabiaso
threw stones at Ronald Bonion, Raniel Parino, Delon Busar, Annan Luna, Jerome Amergo and a certain
Erwin along A. Reyes Street, Lower Bicutan, Taguig on April 15, 2004, which led the Ronald’s group to
hide inside the “talipapa.” When they thought that their attackers were gone, they came out of hiding
but found that Dorado, who was carrying a makeshift shotgun called “sumpak”, and his friends were
waiting for them and resumed throwing stones. During the commotion, Dorado fired his “sumpak” and
hit Ronald between the eyes. Ronald fell unconscious and was rushed to a hospital while Dorado’s group
ran away.

Dorado raised the defenses of alibi and denial by presenting witnesses that he was at home watching
television with his siblings and mother at the time of the incident. In addition, no “sumpak” was taken
from his house. A witness also testified that she saw the incident and told the court that she could not
recognize the assailant but she was certain it was not Dorado.

The Regional Trial Court found petitioner Dorado guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
frustrated murder defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Despite of Dorado’s minority at
the time of the commission of the crime, he was no longer entitled to a suspension of sentence because
he was above twenty-one (21) years old at the time of the pronouncement of guilt. The appellate court
affirmed the trial court’s decision and did not give weight to the petitioner’s defense.

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF THE
PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME CHARGED.

RULING:

The judgment of conviction of Jerwin Dorado is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE by reason of the
exempting circumstance of minority. He is hereby referred to the local social welfare and development
officer of the locality for the appropriate intervention program.

A perusal of the records will readily show that Dorado was a sixteen (16) year old minor at the time of
the commission of the crime on March 15, 2004. The Informations filed against him consistently stated
his minority.
The Prosecution did not determine the discernment of Dorado at the time of the commission of the
crime.

After a judicious study of the records, the Court finds that the prosecution did not make an effort to
prove that Dorado, then a sixteen (16)-year old minor, acted with discernment at the time of the
commission of the crime.

The RTC decision simply stated that a privileged mitigating circumstance of minority in favor of Dorado
must be appreciated as it was proven that he was a minor at the time of the incident. Glaringly, there
was no discussion at all on whether Dorado acted with discernment when he committed the crime
imputed against him.

Discernment cannot be presumed even if Dorado intended to do away with Ronald. Discernment is
different from intent.

Considering that there was no determination of discernment by the trial court, the Court cannot rule
with certainty that Dorado was criminally responsible.

Accordingly, Dorado is deemed exempted from criminal liability. Nevertheless, he is not excused from
the civil liability that arose from the act.
 G.R. No. 211062

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MANUEL MACAL y BOLASCO, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS:

For allegedly killing his spouse, Auria Ytac Macal (Auria), the accused-appellant was charged with the
crime of parricide in a February 13, 2003

To prove the accusation, Angeles Ytac (Angeles), the mother of Auria, narrated that Auria and Manuel
(accused-appellant) got married in March 2000, and they begot two (2) children. Angeles claimed that,
that the time of the incident, they were all living together in a house located in V & G Subdivision,
Tacloban City.

Angeles testified that at around 1.20 AM of February 12, 2003, she was walking home along with her
children, including Auria, after playing bingo at a local peryahan. Along the way, Angeles and her group
met Manuel, and the latter joined them in walking back to their house. When they arrived at the house,
the group proceeded to the living room except for Auria and the Manuel who went straight to their
bedroom, about four (4) meters away from the living room. Shortly thereafter, Angeles heard her
daughter Auria shouting, “Mother, help me, I am going to be killed.” Upon hearing Auria’s plea for help,
Angeles and the rest of her companions raced towards the bedroom but they found the door of the
room locked. Arvin kicked open the door of the bedroom and there they all saw a bloodied Auria on one
side of the room. Next to Auria was Manuel who was then trying to stab himself with the use of an
improvised bladed weapon (belt buckle). Auria was immediately taken to a hospital, but was
pronounced dead on arrival. Angeles declared that the Manuel jumped over the fence and managed to
escape before the policemen could reach the crime scene.

Moreover, Erwin Silvano (Erwin) corroborated Angeles’ testimony that Auria was killed by Manuel, as he
claimed that he was part of the group that went to Angeles’ residence on that fateful morning.

On the other hand, in the version of the defense, Manuel, the accused-appellant, admitted his
relationship with Auria. He did not, however, deny the factual allegations of the prosecution that he
stabbed his wife, resulting in the latter’s death, but seeks exoneration from criminal liability by
interposing the defense that the stabbing was accidental and not intentional.

In his version of the incident, on February 12, 2003, Manuel arrived home in V & G Subdivision, Tacloban
City from Manila. Before he could reach the bedroom, he was warned by Arvin, his brother-in-law, not
to go inside the bedroom where his wife was with a man for he might be killed. Ignoring Arvin’s
admonition, Manuel kicked the door but it was opened from the inside. After the bedroom door was
opened, Manuel saw Auria and a man seated beside each other conversing. Furious by what he had
seen, the accused-appellant went out of the room, got a knife and delivered a stab blow towards the
man but the latter was shielded by Auria, which caused the stab blow to land on Auria. After Auria was
accidentally stabbed, the man ran outside and fled. Manuel testified that he wounded himself on the
chest out of frustration for not killing the man. He then left the house and went to Eastern Visayas
Regional Medical Center (EVRMC) for medical treatment

ISSUE:

Whether or not Macal can invoke accident under Art 12 as exempting circumstance to release him from
criminal liability.

RULING:

A close scrutiny of the transcripts of stenographic notes would reveal that the accused-appellant was
not performing a lawful act at the time Auria was stabbed.

The defense of accident presupposes lack of intention to kill. This certainly does not hold true in the
instant case based on the testimony of the accused-appellant. Moreover, the prosecution witnesses,
who were then within hearing distance from the bedroom, testified that they distinctly heard Auria
screaming that she was going to be killed by the accussedappellant.

Given these testimonies, the accused-appellant’s defense of accident is negated as he was carrying out
an unlawful act at the time of the incident. It also bears stressing that in raising the defense of accident,
the accused-appellant had the inescapable burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, of
accidental infliction of injuries on the victim. In so doing, the accused-appellant had to rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence. As aptly pointed
out by the CA, the defense failed to discharge the burden of proving the elements of exempting
circumstance of accident that would otherwise free the accused-appellant from culpability. Aside from
the accused-appellant’s self-serving statement, no other proof was adduced that will substantiate his
defense of accidental stabbing.

Further, contrary to what the accused-appellant wants the Court to believe, his actuations closely after
Auria was stabbed tell a different story. If Auria was really accidentally stabbed by him, the accused-
appellant’s natural reaction would have been to take the lead in bringing his wife to a hospital. Instead,
his priority was to come up with an improvised bladed weapon that he could use to hurt himself.
Additionally, the fact that the accused-appellant ran away from the crime scene leaving
 G.R. No. 188751, November 16, 2016

BONIFACIO NIEVA Y MONTERO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

Prosecution's version

On October 28, 2005, at around six o'clock in the evening, Luna and Raymundo were doing carpentry
works for Judy at Kaunlaran, Hernandez, Catmon, Malabon City. Judy was supervising the construction
of her nipa hut when Nieva arrived and approached her. Judy was then the President of the Catmon
Homeowners Association. Nieva inquired on the electrification project of the Homeowners Association,
to which Judy replied that the matter was already taken care of by the Manila Electric Company
(MERALC0). However, Nieva suddenly shouted at Judy and cursed her saying: "Mga putang ina nyo, lima
kayo mga president kayo, kung gusto nyo magkaroon ng mga problema, bibigyan ko kayo ng mga
problema ngayon." He then drew a .357 caliber revolver (wrapped in a white piece of cloth) from his
waist.10 Overwhelmed with fear, Judy clung to Luna's back and used him as a shield against Nieva.

Nieva, who was about two arms' length away, pointed his gun at Judy and fired several times but the
gun jammed. At this point, Raymundo, who was at the roof of the nipa hut, jumped from the hut to help
her aunt, Judy. However, before Raymundo reached Judy, he heard a gunshot and saw Judy fall to the
ground. As she simultaneous fell, Judy was able to push Luna towards Nieva. Luna and Nieva then
grappled for the gun. With the help of Raymundo, Luna seized the gun from Nieva.

Judy was brought to the Manila Central University (MCU) Hospital. Dr. Serrano, a surgeon at the MCU
Hospital, attended to the wound of Judy. He stated that Judy suffered a gunshot wound at her right leg,
which caused a bone fracture at her right tibia and lacerated wound at the left thigh.15 He confirmed
that Judy's gunshot wound could have led to her death if not for the timely medical attention.

On Nieva’s defense, Nieva narrated that at about six-thirty in the evening, while on his way to buy
cigarettes, he passed by the Kaunlaran ng Samahan Hernandez Catmon Homeowners, where he met
Judy. He inquired on the electrification of the Homeowners Association and Judy informed him that it
was already done.20 Thereafter, a heated argument ensued between him and Judy. The latter accused
him of having a hand on an electric post that fell down. Irritated, Nieva pulled a handkerchief from his
pocket and wrapped it on his right hand, preparatory to boxing Judy. Suddenly, however, Luna got in
front of Judy and pointed a gun towards Nieva.21chanrobleslaw
Nieva then grabbed the gun from Luna. In the process, the gun went off and Nieva was unaware if the
bullet hit anyone. He and Luna went down as they continued to wrestle for the possession of the gun.
However, Raymundo intervened and smashed Nieva at the back with a hammer causing Nieva to let go
of Luna.22chanrobleslaw

As Luna now had the gun, Nieva clung at Raymundo. Luna tailed to shoot Nieva because the latter's wife,
who happens to be Luna's first cousin, shielded Nieva with her body.

ISSUE:

Whether or not his claim of the exempting circumstance of accident is applicable in this case.

RULING:

Nieva cannot also invoke the exempting circumstance of accident to free him from criminal liability.
Article 12 (4), Book I of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines45 (Revised Penal Code)
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. - The following are exempt from criminal
liability:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxx

4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident
without fault or intention of causing it.

The basis for exemption under the above-stated provision is the complete absence of negligence and
intent. The accused commits a crime but there is no criminal liability. An accident is a fortuitous
circumstance, event or happening; an event happening wholly or partly through human agency, an
event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.46 It
is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove by clear and convincing
evidence.47chanrobleslaw

To successfully claim the defense of accident, the accused must show that the following circumstances
are present: (1) a person is performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) he causes an injury to another
by mere accident; and (4) he had no fault in or intention of causing the injury.48None of these
circumstances are present in this case.
To start, Nieva was not performing a lawful act when he drew a gun and pointed it at Judy. Thus, in
People v. Nepomuceno, Jr.,49 we ruled that drawing a weapon in the course of a quarrel, the same not
being in self defense, is unlawful, as it at least constitutes light threats.50 Subsequently, Nieva fired the
gun several times. In his initial attempts, the bullet of the gun jammed; yet, Nieva did not stop until the
gun finally fired and hit its target.

This clearly shows that Nieva intentionally and persistently performed the act complained of in order to
successfully maim Judy. He cannot now claim that he is without fault.

As his last defense, Nieva submits that he has no intent to kill Judy considering that the gun was pointed
to the ground when it was fired and Judy's wound was not fatal.51chanrobleslaw

Nieva's contentions are untenable.

Intent to kill was present.54 It is undisputed that Nieva used a gun, a deadly weapon, in assaulting Judy.
At that time, Judy was unarmed and could not have defended herself. Nieva fired the gun several times
towards Judy. If the bullets had not jammed, Nieva could have killed Judy through multiple gunshot
wounds. As it was, the gun's bullets jammed and the gun fired only once; albeit, leaving Judy with a
wound on her upper right leg, which according to Dr. Serrano could have caused her death if not for the
timely medical intervention at the MCU Hospital. Prior to the incident, Nieva also admitted that there
had been several quarrels between him and Judy. 55 These circumstances showing the weapon used, the
nature of the wound sustained by Judy, and the conduct of Nieva before and during the incident,
manifest Nieva's intent to kill Judy.
 [G.R. Nos. 140900 & 140911. August 15, 2001.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RODERICK LICAYAN @ RUDY, ROBERTO LARA @

TUNGKOY/UNYOK, PEDRO MABANSAG @ PUTOL (At large), ALEX PLACIO (At large), JOJO SAJORGO
(At large), ALLAN PLACIO (At large), NOEL DELOS REYES (At large), DODONG ADOLFO (At large), and
BENJIE MABANSAG (At large), Accused,

RODERICK LICAYAN @ RUDY, ROBERTO LARA @ TUNGKOY/UNYOK, Accused-Appellants.

FACTS:

On August 15, 2001, this Court affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (R TC) of Marikina City
convicting two of herein accused-appellants, Roderick Licayan (Licayan) and Roberto Lara (Lara), of the
crime of Kidnapping for Ransom and sentencing them to death.

On August 15, 2001, this Court affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (R TC) of Marikina City
convicting two of herein accused-appellants, Roderick Licayan (Licayan) and Roberto Lara (Lara), of the
crime of Kidnapping for Ransom and sentencing them to death.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the exempting

circumstance of uncontrollable fear
should be considered in favor of
Delos Reyes

RULING

With respect to accused DELOS REYES, he did not refute the testimony of MR. CO that he was one (1) of
his abductors who [was] seated at the middle portion of the Tamaraw FX and who demanded from him
the key of said vehicle. Instead he admitted going to the house of Pedro Mabansag on August 10, 1998
accompanying a friend who would buy a fighting cock. According to DELOS REYES, after he asked
permission from Pedro Mabansag, he entered his house to drink water, but he was met by a certain
"TATA" and "JOJO" and they pointed a gun at him and he was told not to leave. He claimed that Tata
Placio and his companion after poking a gun at him threatened him that they would kill him if he reports
the matter to the police. He admitted that he saw two (2) persons inside the house near the kitchen and
the woman was hand tied. After he arrived at the said safehouse at 3 :00 p.m., of August 10, 1998, he
was allowed to leave at 4:00 p.m., of said date. And after he left the safehouse, he admitted that he
feels not anymore being threatened by the group of Tata Placio, but still he did not report what he
witnessed in the house of Pedro Mabansag to the police authorities. Said accused also claimed that
when "TAT A" and "JOJO" poked a gun at him and was told not to leave and not to report to the police,
he acted under the "compulsion of an irresistible force, hence, one of the exempting circumstances
under Article 12, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court begs to disagree. DELOS REYES
testified that even before August 10, 1998, he knows already TATA and JOJO because they went to the
house of his Ninang together with Pedro Mabansag for three (3) times. Since they all know each other,
then the court cannot comprehend why TATA and JOJO still need to poke a gun at DELOS REYES and
threatened him. This is only a last ditch effort of said accused to deny any participation in the conspiracy
in kidnapping the two (2) victims. As could clearly be gleaned from the testimony, DELOS REYES made
inconsistent and improbable statements. The Court also observed the demeanor of said accused when
he testified and he is obviously lying [through] his teeth. Manifest falsehood and discrepancies in the
witnesses' testimony seriously impair their probative value and cast serious doubts on their credibility. 45

The Court of Appeals affirmed these findings, adding that the testimony of Delos Reyes was self-serving
and could not stand on its own to prove the elements of the exempting circumstance relied
upon.46 Before this Court, Delos Reyes again pursues that he is exempt from criminal liability based on
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. -The following are exempt from criminal
liability:

xxxx

5. A.ny person who act under the compulsion of irresistible force.

Delos Reyes claims exemption from criminal liability under Article 12, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal
Code, because he allegedly acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force, specifically the fact that
a co-accused, who is still at-large up to this date, pointed a gun at him. Delos Reyes has been invoking
practically the same defense even before the trial: in his Radio Veritas interview by reporter Zony
Esguerra, he insisted that "wala akong kasalanan" and that he was merely forced to guard the victims. 47

In People v. Dansal,48 this Court held that a person invoking the exempting circumstance of compulsion
due to irresistible force admits in effect the commission of a punishable act, and must therefore prove
the exempting circumstance by clear and convincing evidence. Specifically: He must show that the
irresistible force reduced him to a mere instrument that acted not only without will but also against his
will. The compulsion must be of such character as . to leave the accused no opportunity to defend
himself or to escape.

The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending; and it must be of such
a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not
done. A threat of future injury is not enough. A speculative, fanciful or remote fear, even fear of future
injury, is insufficient.49

The appellate court did not err when it relied on the doctrine that the matter of assigning values to
declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge, who had
the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various indicia
available but not reflected on the record. It is the trial judge that can capture the truth from the
"forthright answer or the hesitant pause, the quivering voice or the angry tone, the flustered look or the
sincere gaze, the modest blush or the guilty blanch." 50 In the case at bar, the trial court even expressly
stated that it observed the demeanor of Delos Reyes when he testified and found that he is obviously
lying through his teeth.51 This is in contrast to the testimony of Co which the trial court described as very
clear, positive and straightforward.52 Even without the advantage of being able to observe the demeanor
of Delos Reyes, however, a mere examination of the transcript of his testimony convinces us of the
hesitation and untruthfulness of his testimony. Delos Reyes kept on changing details and correcting
himself even without inducement from opposing counsel. The content of the testimony was itself
incredible. This Court finds it hard to believe that a person who accidentally discovers kidnap victims
would be held at gunpoint by the kidnappers to guard said victims; or that a mastermind of a kidnapping
syndicate, instead of conducting his fighting cock selling activities in the regular meeting place, would
invite a recent affiliate to the place where he is holding prisoners; or that Delos Reyes did not find it
unusual to see a woman with her hands tied.

In all, we find no reason to doubt that Delos Reyes was part of the plan to abduct and detain Co and
Manaysay.
G.R. No. 215424, December 09, 2015

ADINA B. MANANSALA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS

On May 31, 1999, private complainant Kathleen L. Siy (Siy), former Vice President for Finance of Urban
Finance and Leasing Corporation, now UMC Finance and Leasing Corporation (UMC), instructed her
secretary, Marissa Bautista (Bautista), to withdraw via Automated Teller Machine (ATM) the amount of
P38,000.00 from her Metrobank and Bank of the Philippine Islands bank accounts. However, Bautista
was not able to make such withdrawal as the ATM was offline so she took it upon herself to get such
amount from the petty cash custodian of UMC instead, but she forgot to inform Siy where she got the
money. On June 9, 1999, UMC Finance Manager Violeta Q. Dizon-Lacanilao (Lacanilao) informed Siy that
as per the Petty Cash Replenishment Report (subject report) of the same date prepared by UMC Petty
Cash Custodian Manansala, she allegedly made a cash advance in the amount of P38,000.00 which
remained unliquidated. It was only then that Siy found out what Bautista had done, and she
immediately rectified the situation by issuing two (2) checks to reimburse UMC's petty cash account. As
the checks were eventually encashed resulting in the replenishment of UMC's petty cash account,
Lacanilao instructed Manansala to revise the subject report by deleting the entry relating to Siy's alleged
cash advance, to which Manansala acceded.

RULING

METC RULING:

the MeTC appreciated the mitigating circumstance of acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear in
favor of Manansala, noting that she merely acted upon Lacanilao's instructions and that she only
performed such acts out of fear that she would lose her job if she defied her superior's orders.

COURT RULING;

While the conviction of Manansala for the aforesaid crime was proper, it was error for the MeTC to
appreciate the "mitigating circumstance" of acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear and for the
RTC and the CA to affirm in toto the MeTC's ruling without correcting the latter court's mistake.

To begin with, "acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear" is not among the mitigating
circumstances enumerated in Article 13 of the RPC, but is an exempting circumstance provided under
Article 12 (6) of the same Code. Moreover, for such a circumstance to be appreciated in favor of an
accused, the following elements must concur: (a) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (b) that the
fear must be real and imminent; and (c) the fear of an injury is greater than, or at least equal to, that
committed.29 For such defense to prosper, the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present,
imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or
serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough.
In the instant case, while the records show that Manansala was apprehensive in committing a falsity in
the preparation of the subject report as she did not know the repercussions of her actions, 31 nothing
would show that Lacanilao, or any of her superiors at UMC for that matter, threatened her with loss of
employment should she fail to do so. As there was an absence of any real and imminent threat,
intimidation, or coercion that would have compelled Manansala to do what she did, such a circumstance
cannot be appreciated in her favor.

Hence, as there should be no mitigating circumstance that would modify Manansala's criminal liability in
this case
 G.R. No. 200026, October 04, 2017

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARMANDO

DELECTOR, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS:

At about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 8, 1997, the late Vicente Delector was talking with his
brother, Antolin, near his residence in Barangay Diaz in Gandara, Samar when the accused, another
brother, shot him twice. Vicente was rushed to the Gandara District Hospital where he was attended to
by Dr. Leonida Taningco, but he was later on transferred to the Samar Provincial Hospital where he
succumbed to his gunshot wounds at about 1:00 a.m. of the next day.3

Vicente's son, Arnel, identified his uncle, the accused, as his father's assailant. Arnel attested that the
accused had fired his gun at his father from their mother's house,4 and had hit his father who was then
talking with Antolin. Corroborating Arnel's identification was Raymond Reyes, who had happened to be
along after having come from his school. Raymond also said that Vicente had been only conversing with
Antolin when the accused shot him twice.

In his defense, the accused insisted during the trial that the shooting of Vicente had been by accident.
His own son corroborated his insistence. According to them, Vicente had gone to their house looking for
him, but he had earlier left to go to their mother's house nearby in order to avoid a confrontation with
Vicente; however, Vicente followed him to their mother's house and dared him to come out, compelling
Antolin to intervene and attempt to pacify Vicente. Instead, Vicente attacked Antolin, which forced the
accused to go out of their mother's house. Seeing Vicente to be carrying his gun, he tried to wrest the
gun from Vicente, and they then grappled with each other for control of the gun. At that point, the gun
accidentally fired, and Vicente was hit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the exempting circumstance of accident is applicable in this case.

RULING:

The CA opined that the exempting circumstance of accident was highly improbable, stating:

Indeed, given the circumstances surrounding the death of the victim, it is highly improbable that the
same was due to an accident. It is unlikely that the accused-appellant would purposely set out and
grapple with the victim who, if he is to be believed, was already armed with a gun while he (accused-
appellant) was totally unarmed. Such actuation is utterly inconsistent with the ordinary and normal
behavior of one who is facing imminent danger to one's life, considering the primary instinct of self-
preservation. But then, even granting that the accused-appellant merely acted in defense of his other
brother, Antolin, his failure to help or show concern to the victim, who was also his brother, casts
serious doubts to his defense of accident.

Furthermore, a revolver, the gun involved in this case, is not one that is prone to accidental firing
because of the nature of its mechanism. Considerable pressure on the trigger must have been applied
for it to have fired.

In its appeal, the Court affirmed CA’s ruling.

Secondly, the RTC and the CA both observed that the exempting circumstance of accident was highly
improbable because the accused grappled with the victim for control of the gun. We see no reason to
overturn the observations of the lower courts.

Accident could not be appreciated herein as an exempting circumstance simply because the accused did
not establish that he had acted with due care, and without fault or intention of causing the injuries to
the victim. The gun was a revolver that would not fire unless there was considerable pressure applied on
its trigger, or its hammer was pulled back and released. The assertion of accident could have been
accorded greater credence had there been only a single shot fired, for such a happenstance could have
been attributed to the unintentional pulling of the hammer during the forceful grappling for control of
the gun. Yet, the revolver fired twice, which we think eliminated accident. Verily, the CA itself pointedly
debunked the story of the accused as to how the accident had occurred by characterizing such story not
only incomprehensible but also contrary to human experience and behavior.

We adopt and reiterate the following observations by the CA:

... had the accused really been grappling and twisting the victim's right hand which was holding a gun,
the latter would not have sustained the wounds. It was improbable that the gun would fire not only
once but twice and both times hitting the victim, had its trigger not been pulled. Further, the location
of the gunshot wounds belies and negate(d) accused (appellant's) claim of accident.

Also, the Court finds incredible [the] accused (appellant's) allegation that he did not know that the
victim was hit. He admitted there were two gun reports. The natural tendency of (a) man in his situation
would (be to) investigate what was hit. He surely must have known his brother was hit as he even said
he let go of the gun. Then he said his brother went home so he also went home. It is odd that he did not
attempt to help or show concern for the victim, his brother, had his intention (been) really merely to
pacify.17
 [ G.R. No. 223103, February 24, 2020 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. FLORENTINO

LABUGUEN Y FRANCISCO ALIAS "TINONG," AND ROMEO ZUÑIGA[1] Y PILARTA,
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

FACTS:

On 3 January 2002 at about 7:30 in the evening, while spouses Manuel Padre and Nenita Padre and their
two daughters, Rhoda and Rachel, were having dinner at their home at Villaruz, Delfin Albano, Isabela,
five (5) men suddenly barged in, one holding a firearm and one with a bonnet with [a] hole showing the
eyes only. Labuguen, [sic] entered first and pulled Rachel into the comfort room (CR), together with her
mother Nenita and sister Rhoda, who in turn were pulled by Macalinao and by an unidentified man
respectively. Manuel, on the other hand, was brought to the store by an unidentified man. Nenita was
then brought to [the] Padre's store while Rhoda and Rachel were left in the comfort room. A few
minutes later, Labuguen brought Rachel out of the comfort room and she saw Zuniga, standing by the
door of the store and Macalinao, standing guard at the CR door and holding a gun. Upon reaching the
dining area, Labuguen stabbed Rachel with a small knife on the left breast and then Macalinao hit her on
the forehead with the butt of a gun, causing her to fall down. Then Labuguen strangled her and as she
could not remove his hands off her neck, she played dead. As soon as Labuguen stood up and left,
together with the other perpetrators, she immediately ran for help to their neighbor Patricio Respicio
(Respicio), who[,] together with Alex Rodriguez, brought her to the hospital. At the hospital, she learned
from her relatives that her parents and sister died on the night of 3 January 2002. Dr. Gambalan treated
her serious injury on the left chest and less serious wounds on the head and abrasions on the neck.

Meanwhile, after Manuel closed the store and returned to the house, Zuniga, upon the instruction of
Joel Albano (Albano), hit [Manuel hard] on the forehead, causing the latter to fall. Eric Madday, one of
the five men and who also used to work for Manuel Padre, boxed Nenita on the abdomen and when
Zuniga saw the chopping knife, he stabbed her at the back. On the other hand, Rudy Macalinao shot
Rhoda when she tried to run away. On the belief that all members of the Padre family were dead. the
group proceeded to Albano's house, where Zuniga learned that they got the money from the Padre
family. He saw Albano [give] a bundle of money to Rudy Macalinao. He left Delfin Albano, [sic] in Isabela
and went into hiding in Gerona, Tarlac on 7 January 2002.

Upon learning of the incident from Kagawad Alex Rodriguez, the police investigators went to the
hospital on 4 January 2002 and interviewed Rachel, who identified two of the perpetrators - Labuguen,
who happen[ed] to be Padre family's longtime neighbor and who used to work for them, and Macalinao,
also one of the victims' helpers. At that time, she purposely withheld the name of Romeo Zuniga, one of
Padre's longtime customers, as she wanted him to reveal his companions. From the hospital, the police
proceeded to the crime scene, where they found Manuel's body near the store, Nenita's body was
recovered inside the store while that of Rhoda was located inside the house. Rachel was released from
the hospital on 12 January 2002.
Labuguen was apprehended by the police on 4 January 2002. The blood-stained jacket he was wearing
during the custodial investigation was submitted for serological examination at the PNP Crime
Laborarory at Camp Crame. The blood taken from Labuguen's jacket tested positive for human blood
group A. As to Zuniga, Rachel decided to reveal his identity as one of the five men who robbed and killed
her parents and sister Rhoda to Fiscal Dalpig and later to Fiscal Torio. He was arrested in Gerona, Tarlac
by the police operatives in 2006 and narrated to them the incident.7 (Citations omitted)

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellate court erred in not considering in favor of appellant Zuñiga the exempting
circumstance of "irresistible force and/or uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.

RULING:

Zuñiga posits that he "was compelled or forced at gun point by Joel Albano (Albano) to join them in
robbing the house of Manuel Padre, and if he will resist, something bad will happen to him and his
family."18

The contention fails to persuade.

To avail of this exempting circumstance, the evidence must establish: (1) the existence of an
uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater
than or at least equal to that committed. A threat of future injury is insufficient. The compulsion must be
of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused to escape.19

As correctly found by the RTC and the CA, Zuñiga is not entitled to avail of this exempting circumstance.
As noted by the CA, the malefactors had a well-hatched plan to commit the crime of robbery with
homicide and that Zuñiga was not only well-aware of every detail thereof but likewise actively
participated in its commission. As the CA found: "Verily, there was no genuine, imminent, and
reasonable threat to his life and his family as he was an active participant in the commission of the crime
charged. He acted on his own free will and was not under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear as he
claims."20 Moreover, as correctly argued by the Office of the Solicitor General, Zuñiga had every
opportunity to escape while they were passing through the cornfields on their way to the Padre's house.
However, he did not avail of the said chance.21 He did not perform any overt act to dissociate or detach
himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the commission thereof.22 While he
refused to kill Rachel, he nonetheless delivered the fatal blow to Manuel's head and stabbed Nenita at
her back using a chopping knife without any prodding or compulsion from his companions.23