University of California, Irvine Professor Marek Kaminski

Political Science Designing Institutions of Democracy

Sample Midterm

There is a total of 40 points + 4 extra points.

The number of points for each problem is indicated in [brackets].
Numerical calculations are easy and should not pose any problems.
Be careful not to make arithmetical mistakes.
Please, be specific. Give short and clear answers.
Write your solution under the relevant problem. Do not use additional sheets of paper.
You can use a single sheet of paper with hand-written formulas and whatever you wish to put
on it.
Do not give up: for incomplete answers, you may still get a partial credit.

GOOD LUCK !

Problem 0 [1]: Please, write down your name here in CAPITAL letters:

Problem 1:

A B C D

(a) (a) (a) (a)

(b) (b) (b) (b)

(c) (c) (c) (c)

(d) (d) (d) (d)

Problem 2:

(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)

T T T T T T T T T

F F F F F F F F F
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PROBLEM 1 [8p total, two points per question]

Select one option out of (a)-(d). Exactly one option is true.

A. An alternative x is a Condorcet winner if and only if it has the following property:

(a) all voters prefer x over any other alternative;

(b) at least one voter prefers x over any other alternative;
(c) x wins in a pairwise majority contest against any other alternative;
(d) x wins under any voting rule.

B. Logrolling is a different name for:

(a) misrepresenting one's preferences;

(b) applying logarithms to voting;
(c) vote trading;
(d) manipulating the agenda.

C. Assume that there are 2n+1 voters distributed along a single left-right dimension. All voters
have single-peaked preferences. The median voter is a voter M such that

(a) n or fewer voters have their ideal points to the left of M’s ideal point and n or fewer
voters have their ideal points to the right of M’s ideal point;
(b) M’s ideal point is located half way between the left and right ends of the issue space;
(c) there are exactly n voters with their ideal points to the left of M’s ideal point and exactly
n voters with their ideal points to the right of M’s ideal point;
(d) less than n voters have their ideal points to the left of M’s ideal point and less than n
voters have their ideal points to the right of M’s ideal point.

D. In the binary voting model with two alternatives, Dictatorship of voter 1 (D1) is a rule that
makes the winner the first choice of voter 1, or that returns a tie when voter 1 is indifferent
between x and y. D1 satisfies:

(a) Anonymity;
(b) Neutrality;
(c) Positive Responsiveness;
(d) None of the above.
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PROBLEM 2 [9p total, one point per question]

Mark each statement below true if that statement is always true and false otherwise.
Please put your choices on the first page!

____ (a) In approval voting, voters choose their single most preferred alternative.

____ (b) In Borda count, voters rank m alternatives from the most preferred one to the least
preferred one. The top alternative gets m points, the second-best gets m-1 points,
etc. Then the total number of points is calculated for every alternative and the one
with the highest total score is the winner.

____ (c) For a given voting profile with three voters with strict preferences, at least three
alternatives, and the majority contest, if there is no Condorcet winner, then there
must be a cycle.

____ (d) With two competing parties, by skillful gerrymandering, one can get any
distribution of seats among the parties.

____ (e) In some cases, a voter who votes strategically may be better off than when she votes
sincerely.

____ (f) The definition of single-peaked preferences says that a voting profile is single-
peaked if for all arrangements of alternatives along a line, the preferences of every
voter have a single peak.

____ (g) With managing ordering, three voters and four alternatives, if voters vote sincerely
and unanimously prefer x to y, then for no agenda and no preference profile y can
be the winner.

____ (h) A cycle in a majority contest arises when there are at least three alternatives x1, x2,...,
xn such that x1 beats x2 (a majority of voters prefer x1 to x2), x2 beats x3, ... , xn beats
x1.

____ (i) If an alternative x wins a plurality of votes, then x must be a Condorcet winner.
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PROBLEM 3 [7p: 1+1+1+1+1+1+1 Voting methods and their properties]

The probability that such a problem makes the midterm is very high!

Six candidates A, B, C, D, E, and F compete for a seat. The voting profile is as follows:

[22] AEDBCF
[23] BEDACF
[18] CEDABF
[35] FEDABC
[2] DEABCF

Calculate the winner, assuming that all voters vote sincerely:

(a) Under plurality;
(b) Under alternative vote;
(c) Under Copeland rule;
(d) Under plurality runoff.
(e) Who is the Condorcet winner for this profile?
(f) If the Condorcet winner is deleted, who would be the Condorcet winner
among the five remaining alternatives?
(g) Who is the Condorcet loser for this profile?
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PROBLEM 4 [10p: 1-1-2-2-1-3 Agendas and strategic voting]

... And for this problem the probability is even higher!
The voting profile for three voters and four alternatives is as follows:

1: b c d a
2: a b c d
3: c d a b

The voting agenda is the amendment procedure (managing ordering) b a c d, i.e.:

Round 1: b versus a
Round 2: the alternative that wins in round 1 versus c
Round 3: the alternative that wins in round 2 versus d

(a) Draw a picture representing this agenda;

(b) Calculate which alternative wins if voting is sincere at each stage.
(c) What is the best outcome voter 2 could achieve if she voted strategically
and all other voters voted sincerely? Explain!
(d) Find winning agendas (under the assumption of sincere voting) for all alternatives.

Now assume that the voting method is the Borda count:

(e) Calculate the Borda scores for all alternatives;

(f) For all voters, find the best alternative, or a subset of alternatives in the case of ties, that they can
obtain under the Borda score through strategic voting. Assume that all other voters vote sincerely.
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PROBLEM 5 [6p: 2 + 2 + 2]

A new state “Orange County” is represented in the Congress by three representatives. There are two
parties in the state, Conservative Communists (CC) and Progressive Extremists (PE). Supporters
of both parties are geographically clustered. Every thousand supporters of CC is represented by a
star (*) and every thousand supporters of PE is represented by a point (€). You have to design
electoral districts for the state in single-member-district plurality elections. A district must come
in a single piece (be contiguous) and it must include between 9 and 11 thousand of voters. Design
the districts to obtain all three possible distributions of seats between the parties. Note: all pictures
below represent identical distributions of voters.
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EXTRA EXTRA EXTRA EXTRA EXTRA EXTRA

[4p: 1 + 1 + 1 + 1]

(a) Give an example of a preference profile such that alternative x is a Condorcet winner but x is
not the first choice of any single voter. Hint: look among the examples with four alternatives and
three voters.

(b) Give an example of a preference profile with four voters and four alternatives x, y, z, v such that
(i) the voting rule is: x beats y if there are at least three times as many votes for x than for y. If
neither x beats y nor y beats x, then there is a tie between x and y;
(ii) there is a cycle according to the rule from (i).

(c) Give an example of a binary voting rule that satisfies neutrality, unrestricted domain and positive
responsiveness but violates anonymity.

(d) Draw an example of a single-peaked voting profile with two voters and three alternatives such
that there are exactly three medians.