Hebron V Ca

This is a quo warranto case involving the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of
Carmona, Province of Cavite.
In the general elections held in 1951, Bernardo Hebron, a member of the Liberal
Party, and respondent Eulalio D. Reyes, of the Nacionalista Party, were elected
mayor and vice-mayor, respectively, of said municipality, for a term of four (4)
years
OP wrote to Hebron that the Pres has decided for the good of the public service, to
assume directly the investigation to the administrative charges against him for
alleged oppression, grave abuse of authority and serious misconduct in office, and
has designated the Provincial Fiscal of that province as Special Investigator of
the said charges.
Thereupon Reyes acted as mayor and the provincial fiscal investigated the charges.
Inasmuch as the same did not appear to be forthcoming, and the term of petitioner,
who remained suspended, was about to expire, on May 13, 1955, he instituted the
present action for quo warranto, upon the ground that respondent was illegally
holding the Office of Mayor of Carmona, and had unlawfully refused and still
refused to surrender said office to petitioner, who claimed to be entitled thereto.
The issue is whether a municipal mayor, not charged with disloyalty to the Republic
of the Philippines, may be removed or suspended directly by the President of the
Philippines, regardless of the procedure set forth in sections 2188 to 2191 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
RULING:
Laws governing the suspension or removal of public officers, especially those

chosen by the direct vote of the people, must be strictly construed in their favor.
"By all canons of statutory construction and, I might say with apology, common
sense, the preceding sections should control in the field of investigations of
charges against, and suspension of, municipal officials. The minuteness and care,
in three long paragraphs, with which the procedure in such investigations and
suspensions is outlined, clearly manifests a purpose to exclude other modes of
proceeding by other authorities under general statutes, and not to make the
operation of said provisions depend upon the mercy and sufferance of higher
authorities. To contend that these by their broad and unspecified powers can also
investigate such charges and order the temporary suspension of the erring officials
indefinitely is to defy all concepts of the solemnity of legislative pronouncements
and to set back the march of local self-government which it has been the constant
policy of the legislative branch and of the Constitution to promote." (Villena v.
Roque)
Laws governing the suspension or removal of public officers, especially those

chosen by the direct vote of the people, must be strictly construed in their favor.
section 79(C) was inserted in the Administrative Code by Act No. 3535, passed by
the Philippine Legislature, during the American regime, in line with section 22 of
the Jones Law, pursuant to which "all Executive functions of the Government must be
directly under the Governor General or within one of the Executive departments
under the supervision and control of the Governor General." As already stated,
however, this authority of the Executive has been constricted in our Constitution,
which maintains the presidential "control of all the executive departments, bureau
and offices," but limits the powers of the Executive over local governments to
"supervision" of a "general," not particular, character, and this only "as may be
provided by law."
Thus, despite the "direct control" and "supervision" of every Department Head over
all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction, and his specific power to "repeal
or modify the decisions of the . . . bureaus and offices" under his department,
pursuant to said section 79(C), and the fact that "provinces, municipalities,
chartered cities and other local political subdivisions" were among the "bureaus
and offices under the Department of Interior", according to the above-quoted
section 86, the word "offices", as used in section 79(C), was not deemed to include
local governments, even before the adoption of the Constitution. Greater adherence
to this view is, obviously, demanded by the provision of the fundamental law
reducing the presidential authority over local governments, from "control" to mere
"general supervision."
Thus, despite the "direct control" and "supervision" of every Department Head over
all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction, and his specific power to "repeal
or modify the decisions of the . . . bureaus and offices" under his department,
pursuant to said section 79(C), and the fact that "provinces, municipalities,
chartered cities and other local political subdivisions" were among the "bureaus
and offices under the Department of Interior", according to the above-quoted
section 86, the word "offices", as used in section 79(C), was not deemed to include
local governments, even before the adoption of the Constitution. Greater adherence
to this view is, obviously, demanded by the provision of the fundamental law
reducing the presidential authority over local governments, from "control" to mere
"general supervision."
In Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83), it was held that the power of removal
does not imply the authority to suspend for a substantial period of time, which, in
said case, was only one (1) year.
As early as April 7, 1900, President McKinley, in his Instructions to the Second

Philippine Commission, laid down the policy that our municipal governments should
be "subject to the least degree of supervision and control" on the part of the
national government; that said supervision and control should be "confined within
the narrowest limits"; that in the distribution of powers among the governments to
be organized in the Philippines, "the presumption is always to be in favor of the
smaller subdivision"; that the organization of local governments should follow "the
example of the distribution of powers between the states and the national
government of the United States';and that, accordingly, the national government
"shall have no direct administration except of matters of purely general concern."
If such were the basic principles underlying the organizations of our local
governments, at a time when the same were under the control of the Governor-General
(the direct representative of the United States, which has delegated to us some
governmental powers, to be exercised in the name of the United States), with more
reason must those principles be observed under the Constitution of the Philippines,
pursuant to which "sovereignty resides in the (Filipino) people and all government
authority emanates from them" and the power of the President over local governments
is limited to "general supervision . . . as may be provided by law."
It is urged that the authority of the President over our municipal corporations is
not identical to that of State Governors in the United States, for the former is
the Executive, with more comprehensive powers than those of the latter, who are
merely chief executives||| (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-9124, [July 28, 1958], 104
PHIL 175-221)

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This is a quo warranto case involving the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of

Carmona, Province of Cavite.

Laws governing the suspension or removal of public officers, especially those

Laws governing the suspension or removal of public officers, especially those

As early as April 7, 1900, President McKinley, in his Instructions to the Second

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