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Maintain International Peace and Security

The UN maintains international peace and security in three main ways: 1. It works to prevent conflicts through diplomacy, mediation, and peacekeeping missions. 2. If conflicts do occur, it helps parties make peace through negotiation and peace agreements. 3. It deploys peacekeepers to conflict areas and creates conditions for peace to take hold through postwar initiatives like disarmament and peacebuilding. The Security Council, General Assembly, and Secretary-General all play key roles in these efforts.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
143 views58 pages

Maintain International Peace and Security

The UN maintains international peace and security in three main ways: 1. It works to prevent conflicts through diplomacy, mediation, and peacekeeping missions. 2. If conflicts do occur, it helps parties make peace through negotiation and peace agreements. 3. It deploys peacekeepers to conflict areas and creates conditions for peace to take hold through postwar initiatives like disarmament and peacebuilding. The Security Council, General Assembly, and Secretary-General all play key roles in these efforts.

Uploaded by

Ariel Oyardo
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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Maintain International Peace and Security

The United Nations was created in 1945, following the devastation of the Second World
War, with one central mission: the maintenance of international peace and security. The UN
accomplishes this by working to prevent conflict, helping parties in conflict make
peace, deploying peacekeepers, and creating the conditions to allow peace to hold and
flourish. These activities often overlap and should reinforce one another, to be effective.

The UN Security Council has the primary responsibility for international peace and security.
The General Assembly and the Secretary-General play major, important, and
complementary roles, along with other UN offices and bodies.

Security Council
The Security Council takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or an act of
aggression. It calls upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommends
methods of adjustment or terms of settlement. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security
Council can take enforcement measures to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Such measures range from economic sanctions to international military action. The Council also
establishes UN Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions.

General Assembly
The General Assembly is the main deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the UN.
Through regular meetings, the General Assembly provides a forum for Member States to express
their views to the entire membership and find consensus on difficult issues. It makes
recommendations in the form of General Assembly resolutions. Decisions on important questions,
such as those on peace and security, admission of new members and budgetary matters, require a
two-thirds majority, but other questions are decided by simple majority.

How does the UN maintain international peace and security?


Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation

The most effective way to diminish human suffering and the massive economic costs of
conflicts and their aftermath is to prevent conflicts in the first place. The United Nations plays
an important role in conflict prevention, using diplomacy, good offices and mediation.
Among the tools the Organization uses to bring peace are special envoys and political
missions in the field.

Special and Personal Representatives, Envoys and Advisers of the


Secretary-General
The Secretary-General of the United Nations has Special and Personal Representatives,
Envoys and Advisers in many areas of the world.
UN Office for West Africa
The UN Office for West Africa, in Dakar, Senegal was the first regional conflict prevention
and peacebuilding office of the United Nations. Its overall mandate was to enhance
contributions of the UN towards the achievement of peace and security in West Africa and
promote an integrated regional approach in addressing issues that impact stability in West
Africa. It was recently merged with the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel (OSES) into
a single entity.

Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping has proven to be one of the most effective tools available to the UN to assist
countries to navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace. Today's multidimensional
peacekeeping operations are called upon not only to maintain peace and security, but also
to facilitate political processes, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization
and reintegration of former combatants; support constitutional processes and the
organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule
of law and extending legitimate state authority.

Peacekeeping operations get their mandates from the UN Security Council; their troops and
police are contributed by Members States; and they are managed by the Department of
Peace Operations and supported by the Department of Operational Support at UN
Headquarters in New York.

There are 12 UN peacekeeping operations currently deployed and there have been a total
of 71 deployed since 1948. In 2019, the Secretary-General launched the Action for
Peacekeeping Initiative (A4P) to renew mutual political commitment to peacekeeping
operations.

Peacebuilding

United Nations peacebuilding activities are aimed at assisting countries emerging from


conflict, reducing the risk of relapsing into conflict and laying the foundation for sustainable
peace and development.

The UN peacebuilding architecture comprises the Peacebuilding Commission,


the Peacebuilding Fund and the Peacebuilding Support Office.

The Peacebuilding Support Office assists and supports the Peacebuilding Commission with


strategic advice and policy guidance, administers the Peacebuilding Fund and serves the
Secretary-General in coordinating United Nations agencies in their peacebuilding efforts.
Countering Terrorism
The United Nations is being increasingly called upon to coordinate the global fight against
terrorism. Eighteen universal instruments against international terrorism have been
elaborated within the framework of the United Nations system relating to specific terrorist
activities. In September 2006, UN Member States adopted the United Nations Global
Counter-Terrorism Strategy. This was the first time that Member States agreed to a
common strategic and operational framework against terrorism.
Disarmament
The General Assembly and other bodies of the United Nations, supported by the Office for
Disarmament Affairs, work to advance international peace and security through the pursuit
of the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and the
regulation of conventional arms.

Global Issues

As the world’s only truly universal global organization, the United Nations has become the
foremost forum to address issues that transcend national boundaries and cannot be
resolved by any one country acting alone.

To its initial goals of safeguarding peace, protecting human rights, establishing the
framework for international justice and promoting economic and social progress, in the
seven decades since its creation the United Nations has added on new challenges, such as
AIDS, big data and climate change.

While conflict resolution and peacekeeping continue to be among its most visible efforts, the
UN, along with its specialized agencies, is also engaged in a wide array of activities to
improve people’s lives around the world – from disaster relief, through education and
advancement of women, to peaceful uses of atomic energy.

This section offers an overview of some of these issues, and links to other resources, where
you can get additional information.

Africa
The UN system plays a crucial role in coordinating assistance of all kinds — to help Africa
help itself.  From promoting the development of democratic institutions, to the establishment
of peace between warring nations, the UN is present on the ground
supporting economic and social development and the promotion and protection of human
rights.
Ageing

The world’s population is ageing: virtually every country in the world is experiencing growth
in the number and proportion of older persons in their population. The number of older
persons, those aged 60 years or over, has increased substantially in recent years in most
countries and regions, and that growth is projected to accelerate in the coming decades.

 
AIDS
New HIV infections have fallen by 35% since 2000 (by 58% among children) and AIDS-
related deaths have fallen by 42% since the peak in 2004. The global response to HIV has
averted 30 million new HIV infections and nearly 8 million  AIDS-related deaths since 2000.
The UN family has been in the vanguard of this progress.
Atomic Energy
More than 30 countries worldwide are operating 444 nuclear reactors for electricity
generation and 66 new nuclear plants are under construction. In 2014, 13 countries relied
on nuclear energy to supply at least one-quarter of their total electricity.
Big Data for Sustainable Development
The volume of data in the world is increasing exponentially. New sources of data, new
technologies, and new analytical approaches, if applied responsibly, can allow to better
monitor progress toward achievement of the SDGs in a way that is both inclusive and fair.
Children

Every child has the right to health, education and protection, and every society has a stake
in expanding children’s opportunities in life. Yet, around the world, millions of children are
denied a fair chance for no reason other than the country, gender or circumstances into
which they are born.

 
Climate Change

Climate change is one of the major challenges of our time. From shifting weather patterns
that threaten food production, to rising sea levels that increase the risk of catastrophic
flooding, the impacts of climate change are global in scope and unprecedented in scale. 

 
Decolonization

The wave of decolonization, which changed the face of the planet, was born with the UN
and represents the world body’s first great success. As a result of decolonization many
countries became independent and joined the UN.

 
Democracy

Democracy is a universally recognized ideal and is one of the core values and principles of
the United Nations. Democracy provides an environment for the protection and effective
realization of human rights.

 
Disarmament
Since the birth of the United Nations, the goals of multilateral disarmament and arms
limitation have been central to the Organization’s efforts to maintain international peace and
security.
Ending Poverty
While pre-pandemic global poverty rates had been cut by more than half since 2000, the
COVID-19 pandemic could increase global poverty by as much as half a billion people, or
8% of the total human population.
Food
The world is not on track to achieve Sustainable Development Goal 2, Zero Hunger by
2030. The food security and nutritional status of the most vulnerable population groups is
likely to deteriorate further due to the health and socio-economic impacts of the COVID-19
pandemic.
Gender Equality

Women and girls represent half of the world’s population and, therefore, also half of its
potential. Gender equality, besides being a fundamental human right, is essential to achieve
peaceful societies, with full human potential and sustainable development.

 
Health
The United Nations, since its inception, has been actively involved in promoting and
protecting good health worldwide. Leading that effort within the UN system is the World
Health Organization (WHO), whose constitution came into force on 7 April 1948.
Human Rights

Promoting respect for human rights is a core purpose of the United Nations and defines its
identity as an organization for people around the world. Member States have mandated the
Secretary-General and the UN System to help them achieve the standards set out in the UN
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

 
International Law and Justice
The UN continues to promote justice and international law across its three pillars of work:
international peace and security, economic and social progress and development, and
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Migration
Since the earliest times, humanity has been on the move. Today, more people than ever
before live in a country other than the one in which they were born.
Oceans and the Law of the Sea

Life itself arose from the oceans. The ocean is vast, some 72 per cent of the earth's surface.
Not only has the oceans always been a prime source of nourishment for the life it helped
generate, but from earliest recorded history it has served for trade and commerce,
adventure and discovery.

 
Peace and Security

Saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war was the main motivation for
creating the United Nations, whose founders lived through the devastation of two world
wars.

Population

In 1950, five years after the founding of the United Nations, world population was estimated
at around 2.6 billion people. It reached 5 billion in 1987 and 6 in 1999. In October 2011, the
global population was estimated to be 7 billion.

 
Refugees

There were 79.5 million people forcibly displaced world-wide in 2019. Among those were 26


million refugees, half under the age of 18 (20.4 million refugees under UNHCR's mandate,
and 5.6 million Palestine refugees under UNRWA's mandate). 
 

Water

Fresh water sustains human life and is vital for human health. There is enough fresh water
for everyone on Earth. However, due to bad economics or poor infrastructure, millions of
people (most of them children) die from diseases associated with inadequate water supply,
sanitation and hygiene.

 
Youth

As youth are increasingly demanding more just, equitable and progressive opportunities and
solutions in their societies, the need to address the multifaceted challenges faced by young
people (such as access to education, health, employment and gender equality) have
become more pressing than ever.

A dichotomous negative and positive peace framework is perhaps the


most widely used today. Negative peace refers to the absence of direct
violence. Positive peace refers to the absence of indirect and structural
violence, and is the concept that most peace and conflict researchers adopt.
The basic distinction between positive and negative peace was popularized
by prominent peace theorist Johan Galtung.

Long Description
Galtung, Johan. “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 6, no. 3,
1969, pp. 167–191.

While the dichotomy is often credited to Galtung, he was not the first to
describe it. Martin Luther King in the Letter from a Birmingham Jail in 1953,
in which he wrote about "negative peace which is the absence of tension"
and "positive peace which is the presence of justice."
These terms were likely used first by Jane Addams in her1907 book Newer
Ideals of Peace. Berenice A. Carroll and Clinton F. Fink note: "Addams
expressed this idea in 1899...in saying that the concept of peace had
become 'no longer merely absence of war.' But in Newer Ideals of Peace,
Addams used the term "negative peace" also in a different and more
complex sense, to characterize certain older ideals of peace that she held to
be negative or inadequate. In this sense her use of the term brought with it
the implication that peace should be understood to encompass more
adequate and positive goals and principles."

Religion as a driver of conflict


Religion is often seen as a key cause of conflict, both in individual
societies and on the international scene. While the proponents of this
viewpoint are numerous, one scholarly figure ought to be remembered
as the central point of reference for this argument. Samuel Huntington
(1993; 1997), borrowing partly on an idea put forward by British-American
historian, Bernard Lewis (1990), became the most prominent voice
claiming that religious and cultural identities would be the main driver
of international conflict in the new world order following the end of the
Cold War. He argued that although the nation state would remain the
most powerful actor in the international arena, the ‘clash of civilizations’
would become the new force fueling conflict. His categorization of the
world into nine different civilizations is based mostly along religious
lines. He contends that conflicts can occur both on a local level within
a state with groups belonging to different civilizations, or among neighboring
states (‘fault-line conflicts’); and also on a global level between
and among states that belong to different civilizations (‘core-state conflicts’).
He argues that civilizations compete on the international scene,
and that this competition can turn into violent conflict, most importantly
because of the different religions that have formed these civilizations.
Conflict lines on the international scene, he maintains, are primarily
those between the Muslim and the non-Muslim world, which have
shaped the history of conflict for centuries (Huntington 1993, 1997).

Religion as a Mediating Factor


Besides examining religion as a driver of violent conflict, scholars have
also been concerned with the extent to which religion may indirectly
foster or tolerate violence. The nexus between faith and conflict is
thus addressed by referring to religion as a cause of structural violence
through discrimination and exclusions. This line of reasoning is supported
by the fact that religious identities can erect potent boundaries
and provoke fierce confrontation within a group when there is excessive
emphasis on claims by some that they belong and adhere to or
are protecting a set of absolute truths. Anthropologists often examine
how, within and across societies, religion is used to create differences
among people. Political scientists argue that religion, through its
inherent distinction between an in-group and an out-group, can lead to
structural violence both within societies and on the international scene.
Urging that we take into consideration the existence of various levels
of violence, Galtung (1969) argues that religion is often the source of
‘cultural violence’, a form of violence that is used to legitimise other
forms of violence. Without seeking to establish a direct cause and effect
between religion and violence, Galtung shows how different factors
such as religion, ideology, language and ethnicity become intertwined
to shape ways of thinking and behaviours that can lead to situations of
exclusion, discrimination and eventually also physical violence.
Another way of establishing an indirect relationship between religion
and violence is by focusing on the inaction of religious groups. Boulding
(1986), for example, argues that religions have not succeeded in using
their potential for peacebuilding, and thus they have lent support to
states when they are at war. While religion has not ignited a conflict,
it has worked as ‘an obstacle to peace’.

The majority of experts on religion and politics, nationalism, and conflict


and peace, however, concur that conflicts are usually characterised
by a set of motivations and their interactions, and thus an analysis of
conflict factors cannot be limited to only one of these dimensions, be
it religious, political, historical, or economic (see, for example, Berdal
2003, 492; Laitin 2007; Mayall 1990; Toft 2007).

The Iraqi-born British historian Elie Kedourie (1960) became famous


for his controversial view of nationalism as a Western invention. He
regarded nationalism as the greatest evil of the twentieth century, the
export of which was particularly catastrophic in the Middle East. While
likening nationalism to religion because of its despotic and divisive qualities,
Kedourie did not, however, attribute the emergence of nationalism
to religion; indeed he regarded the two as being essentially opposed.
Scholars with expertise on the Indian subcontinent (among them: Talbot
2007; Bhatt 2001; Mayall and Srinivasan 2009; Waseem 2010) argue for
more nuanced readings of the apparent inter- and intra-state religious
conflicts affecting India and Pakistan. This means examining central
elements in the emergence of violent attacks on religious minorities
and on sacred sites. Among those are the historical legacy (from both
during and before the colonial era), attempts to elaborate modern
(secular) nationalist projects, weak state institutions, and blatant
competition for political power among and within ethnic groups and
competing religious and political leaders. It is against the background
of these factors and in the changing context as societies feel the
pressures of modernity, globalisation and multicultural society, that
violence becomes morally and religiously sanctioned, argues Indian
psychoanalyst Sundhir Kakar (1996).

Taking into account economic factors, a global study coordinated by


Oxford professor Frances Stewart (2008) reaches similar conclusions.
It centres on the hypothesis that violent conflict in multicultural
societies occurs in the presence of major horizontal inequalities among
culturally defined groups. The argument is that when cultural differences
coincide with economic and political differences between groups, this
can cause deep resentment that may in turn lead to violent struggles.
This builds on the work of Gurr (1993) and Collier et al. (2003), whose
theories stress the centrality of mobilisation based on group identity and
poverty and deprivation in conflict. It also confirms the finding by Fearon
and Laitin (1996) that multicultural societies do not generate conflict just
because they are multicultural. It is rather the combination of multiple
factors that ignites conflicts.

Wolff (2006) proposes comprehensive elaboration on these factors.


He usefully distinguishes between ‘underlying’ (structural, political,
economic, social, cultural, perceptual) and ‘proximate’ causes of conflict
(i.e. the role of leaders and their strategic choices, both domestically
and in neighbouring countries). Underlying causes are ‘necessary, but
not sufficient conditions for the outbreak of inter-ethnic violence’ (Wolff
2006, 68). The ‘proximate’ causes, by contrast, enable or accelerate
conflicts in situations ‘in which all or some of the underlying “ingredients”
are present’ (Wolff 2006, 70–71). Accepting the existence of this
multiplicity of factors leading to multiple configurations thus explains
‘why, despite similar basic conditions, not every situation of ethnic tensions
leads to full-scale civil war’ (Wolff 2006, 71). Ethnic conflicts, Wolff
argues, are not necessarily always about ethnicity; rather, this is often
‘a convenient common denominator to organize a conflict group in the
struggle over resources, land, or power […] a convenient mechanism to
organize and mobilize people into homogeneous conflict groups willing
to fight each other for resources that are at best indirectly linked to
their ethnic identity’ (Wolff 2006, 64–65). Ethnicity and religion are not
synonyms but they frequently overlap. Thus it seems safe to conclude
that religion – as any other factor – can be part of the picture but cannot,
alone, be a cause of conflict.
Fox (2003) has demonstrated that self-determination and nationalism
are the primary causes of ethnic conflicts, while religious factors
can influence the dynamics of the conflict and increase its intensity.
Furthermore, religion causes violence only when it is combined with
these other factors (Fox 2004b). Fox (2001) specifically examines
the role of religion in conflicts in the Middle East and their resulting
characteristics, based on the Minorities at Risk dataset and religious
factors, and he finds that religion plays a disproportionately important
role in ethno-religious conflicts in the region, more so than in non-
Middle Eastern states with Muslim majorities. States in the Middle
East are also disproportionately more autocratic than in other regions.
However, despite the unique importance of religion, Fox argues that
the prevalence of religious conflict is not explained by either the Islamic
or autocratic character of the states, and in reality the ethno-religious
conflicts in the Middle East are not significantly different from similar
ethnic struggles around the world. This, he concludes, contradicts
Huntington’s (1993) notion of Islam’s ‘bloody borders’, as the conflicts
in the Middle East are not more violent than other ethnic conflicts. He
warns, however, that actions based on Huntington’s notion could lead to
a self-fulfilling prophecy. In a further study also based on the Minorities
at Risk dataset, Fox (2004) does argue that religious conflict is more
contagious than non-religious conflict; however, only violent conflicts
cross borders while non-violent ones do not.

The nature of grievances and demands in a conflict is central to the


analyses of Svensson (2007) and Fox (2003). Fox argues that ‘when
religious issues are important, they will change the dynamics of
the conflict’, (2003, 125). This can be attributed both to the role of
religious institutions within the state and to the way in which religion
influences international intervention in ethnic conflict. Internally,
religious institutions tend to facilitate a reaction if the grievances have
religious importance; however, if they have no religious importance the
religious institutions often inhibit protest. With regards to international
intervention, Fox maintains that other states are more likely to intervene
if they have religious minorities in common and if the conflict is
ethnoreligious.
Using data from international interventions, he shows that
Islamic states are most likely to intervene and that Islamic minorities
are most likely to benefit from that intervention.

Svensson (2007) argues that across religions, where the grievances or


demands are based on explicit religious claims, the negotiated settlement
of conflict is less likely to succeed than if there are no religious
claims. He demonstrates that the chances for negotiated settlement
are not affected if the conflicting parties are from different religious
traditions. Svensson’s argument is based on data from intra-state
armed conflicts between 1989 and 2003, using the Uppsala Conflict
Data Programme. He concludes that efforts should be made to prevent
conflicting parties from developing their demands in religious terms,
given that negotiated settlements are more likely if religious claims are
not involved.

Galtung’s (2014) theory of the peace potential of religions essentially


focuses on the factors that can make religions prone to promoting
violence and then extrapolates from these to identify and develop the
factors that lend to the potential of religions to maintain or build peace,
arguing that the latter can and should be promoted. Although he notes
that different religions have different degrees of potential to promote
peace, he clearly acknowledges that there is no automatic connection
between the belief system of a specific religion and the use of force
by its followers. He also rejects the notion of ‘religious conflicts’, as
conflicts are multi-dimensional and complex and cannot usually be
reduced to only one causal factor (Galtung 2014, 32). To understand the
peace potential of religions, he looks to what extent religions are prone
to promote or reject direct violence and structural violence.
With regard to direct violence, Galtung (2014) argues that the idea of
‘being a Chosen People’ and the value of ‘aggressive missionarism’
built into the core belief system of a religion can lead to direct violence
perpetrated by its followers. ‘Holy War’ and ‘Just War’ become terms
used to justify the use of violence against other people.
He notes that all religions advocate a special relationship with their
god(s) and fellow believers, thus creating in-groups and out-groups.
However, different religions also have different potential to promote
other forms of structural violence, such as economic exploitation and
political repression. Galtung cites the example of slavery, which was
legitimised in religious terms by some Christians.
Based on this theory, Galtung develops a generalised model of major
religions in the world and classifies them according to their inherent
potential to reject both direct and structural violence. Most importantly,
he argues that, in general, Hinduism rejects both forms of violence and
thus has a large potential for peace. However, Hinduism is less than
explicit about rejecting direct (physical) violence, and it also tolerates
and promotes structural (cultural) violence through its caste system.
Islam rejects a societal caste system (structural violence), but is prone
to promote direct violence through its doctrine obliging all its followers
to defend the faith. Other religions, in particular Christianity, are
predisposed
to promote both structural and direct violence. Galtung clearly
accepts that this theory is a general one, and that there are many
possibilities
to cite counter-examples. However, he uses his theory mainly
to justify the need for more dialogue, both intra-religious and inter-faith,
which can promote the peace potential of religions (Galtung 1997).
In the light of the research evidence presented so far, it is clear why
many – if not all – scholars of religion and politics subscribe to the
expression ‘ambivalence of the sacred’; religion itself is also neither
good nor bad, but its power can be used to accelerate violence (bad) or
promote peace (good) across societies (Appleby 2000; Haynes 2011;
Philpott 2007a). Trying to distinguish between ‘religious’ and ‘secular’
violence is not only useless but also dangerous (Cavanaugh 2009)
since, ‘privileging religious explanations also serves to depoliticise
and securitise in the political realm’ (Jackson and Gunning 2011, 382).
The consensus seems to be that while religion should not be taken
for granted as the main driving force of violence and conflict, it cannot
be excluded from accounts of international relations, impacting both
interstate relations and domestic politics (see among others Fox 2004a;
Thomas 2005).

Islam and Conflict


Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Islam has been centre
stage when it comes to research on the links between religion and
conflict. Popular commentaries facilely point to the ideological sources
of conflict, maintaining that the Qur’an is inherently violent and that all
forms of Islamism are nothing but an antecedent of violence, terrorism
and totalitarianism. Indeed, a dataset of suicide attacks from 1981 to
March 2008 shows not only an escalation of these from 2000 onwards,
but also that ‘most contemporary suicide attacks can be attributed to
jihadist groups’ (Moghadam 2009), while until recently the evidence
(from a study taking into account data up to 2003) was that secular and
religious groups had been responsible for a roughly equal number of suicide
actions (Pape 2003). Several scholars, including Moghadam (2009)
and Khosrokhavar (2005) have shown how key the religious ideology of
martyrdom is to explaining this sudden rise of Islam-motivated suicide
missions. Yet other experts on Islam and terrorism play down – without
ignoring – the ideological component. In their view, the escalation of
violence carried out in the name of Islam must be attributed to a
combination
of factors where contextual variables, individual psychologies and
opportunity structures in a society are central (Hafez 2003; Jackson and
Gunning 2011; Mandaville 2007; Wiktorowicz 2005a). Looking at entire
processes rather than examining individual factors, ideas or actors
appears to be more productive in capturing the shifting role of religion,
and of Islam more specifically, in the current challenges of conflict and
terrorism that the international community faces.

Certainly, Islamic State and other jihadist groups legitimise themselves


through a repertoire of ‘ideas that have broad resonance among
Muslim-majority populations’ (Hamid 2014). But the fact that radical
jihadi groups resort to Islamic sources to justify their violent acts cannot,
on its own, prove that Islam is inherently violent. Rather, as Wiktorowicz
(2005b, 94) argues, it demonstrates their tactical ability to frame
violence in Islamic terms, which is possible thanks to a gradual ‘erosion
of critical constraints used to limit warfare and violence in classical
Islam’. Many, therefore, have urged moderate Muslims to pre-empt this
manipulation of Islamic knowledge. Yet, Moghadam (2009, 78) warns,
we have to recognise that the factors involved in this type of terrorism
are multiple and diverse and that ‘the battle against suicide attacks will
not be won by exposing the inconsistencies of Salafi jihad alone’.
Following Gellner (see section 2.1.) we could argue that the central
problem is not the religious truth itself, but the exclusivist mindset of
those appropriating and disseminating it. Similarly, for Berman (2007),
the origin of conflict lies not in religion, but rather in extremist thinking,
be it radical Islam/Islamism (which he calls ‘Muslim totalitarianism’),
Christian religious fundamentalism, fascism, secular dictatorships, or
extreme authoritarianism. During the twentieth century, violent conflict
on the international scene was caused by such extremist thinking, rather
than by religion per se. It is also important to remember that adherence
to strict religious practices or conservative views is no guarantee
that fundamentalism has been embraced (Brekke 2012). And while
it has often been the case that violent actions have stemmed from
fundamentalist beliefs, no automatic mechanism has been identified
whereby fundamentalism entails violence (Almond et al.2002).
Terrorism studies experts often seem to look at religion through
a narrow lens that focuses only on ideology. Rapoport (2002) was
central in popularising the term ‘religious’ (or faith-based) terrorism
with his theory of the ‘waves’ of terrorism, while others categorised
it as ‘new’ (Laqueur 1999; Neumann 2009). Juergensmeyer (2003)
warns against the cosmologies of violence emanating from religion,
and Hoffman (2006) too stresses the powerful role of religious
narratives and the position of religious leaders in legitimising acts of
violence. However these scholars are also careful not to demonise
religion per se, and they all acknowledge too that other factors need
to be taken into consideration. For instance, according to Rapoport
(2002), the latest – current – wave of religious terrorism includes
features of previous waves of terrorism (i.e. anarchy, self-determination,
socialism). Even someone like Juergensmeyer (2003), who believes
that religion has provided the motivation, world view and organisation
for either conducting or supporting acts of terrorism, acknowledges
that other contextual variables also need to be addressed in each case
being examined.

Based on a quantitative comparison of Islam-related terrorist attacks


between 1968 and 2005, Piazza (2009, 63) accepts that
‘religiouslymotivated
terrorist groups are indeed more prone than are secular groups to
committing attacks that result in greater casualties’. He shows that in that
period ‘Islamist groups were responsible for 93.6 per cent of all terrorist
attacks by religiously-oriented groups and were responsible for 86.9 per cent
of all casualties inflicted by religiously-oriented terrorist groups’ (Piazza
2009, 64). However he demystifies the assumption that Islamist terrorism is
more ‘lethal’ than other types of terrorism, by pointing out the constellations
of ideologies that fall under the nebulous term
‘Islamism’ and that besides religious ideologies and practice, one should
also focus on groups’ ‘organisational features’ and ‘goal structures’. On
the basis of this type of analysis, he argues, only Al Qaeda and similarly
structured groups are likely to be seriously dangerous.

Many have also asked whether economic factors have a role to play
when people engage in terrorism and in faith-based political violence.
Research by Krueger (2007) as well as by Piazza (2006) and by Canetti
et al. (2010) has found no evidence that poverty or loss of economic
resources are predictors of engagement in terrorism. However, Canetti
et al. (2010) did find that distress and loss of ‘psychological’ (rather than
economic) resources do have a correlation with religion in the context
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Piazza, on the other hand, argues that
state repression and party politics are important predictors of terrorism
(2006) and that countries with minority groups experiencing economic
discrimination have a significant likelihood of being exposed to domestic
terrorist attacks (2011).

Another line of interpretation puts aside religious values and beliefs


to focus instead on particular individuals in privileged/elite positions
within particular religious traditions and communities. Once again,
the argument is not that religion itself leads to violence, but that it is
manipulated by opportunistic and power-thirsty (faith or political) leaders
who appropriate religious language for their own ends. Toft (2007, 103)
has named this phenomenon ‘religious outbidding’; that is, ‘elites
attempt to outbid each other to enhance their religious credentials
and thereby gain the support they need to counter an immediate
threat’. Typically religious language is used to cultivate the identity of
those mobilised and to reinforce out-group markers of the ‘other’. This
process, Stewart (2009) notes, does not happen all at once, but takes
place over a long period of time. Apart from using religion for grand
causes, it is often the case that leaders resort to it to promote their own
underlying interests and so again it is not religion per se that contributes
to conflict but rather the way it is used within societies.

Following this line of analysis, Toft shows that compared with either
Christianity or Hinduism, Islam was greatly over-represented in civil
wars in the twentieth century. She argues that political leaders in the
Islamic world used religion to lend themselves greater legitimacy,
and thus increase their capacity to mobilise the population and
strengthen their power base (Toft 2007). De Juan (2015) arrives at
a similar conclusion in his study of religious elites in intrastate conflict
escalation. Besides providing ‘quotidian norm setting’, religious
leaders ‘communicate specific narratives and shape the religious
self-conception of the believers’ and are also crucial in the ‘constitution
of radical religious conflict interpretations’ (De Juan 2015, 764). His work
examines ‘the motives of religious elites to call for violence’ rather than
‘the structural prerequisites of their success’. Using case studies from
Thailand, Iraq and the Philippines, he shows that ‘competing religious
elites try to mobilize their followers against their rivals to establish
their predominance within their religious community’ (De Juan 2015,
765). He also notes that in this competition ‘for material and dogmatic
supremacy’, these religious elites become inclined to promote violence,
establish alliances with political elites and thus become triggers of
intra-religious and intrastate conflicts (De Juan 2015, 762).

Religion and State Failure


There appears to be a strong correlation between the emergence of
religious conflict and situations of state failure or collapse. Fox (2007),
for instance, tracks state failures between 1960 and 2004, identifying
the shifts in the role of religion and state failure. Using data from the
State Failure dataset, he identifies an increase in state failure related
to religion as a proportion of all state failures during this period, and
finds that it became the most common kind of state failure in 2002,
after which he identifies religion as an element in the majority of all
conflicts that relate directly to state failure.
Since 11 September 2001, state failure and state collapse have been
associated with terrorism and labelled as the ‘Orthodox Failed States
Narrative’, which developed based on the experience of the rise of the
Taliban in the collapsed state of Afghanistan (Verhoeven 2009). Several
studies argue that there was an increase in Islamic extremism in the
state failures experienced in Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia in the 2000s.
However, they also differ in how much the various authors emphasise
the role of religion as a cause of increased extremism and offer different
explanations for the phenomenon.

Mwangi (2012), for example, identifies the combination of state collapse


and Islamism in Somalia as accounting for the legitimacy gained by
Harakat Al-Shabaab Al Mujaheddin (Al-Shabaab), a non-state armed
extremist group that provided local governance in Somalia, confirming
the fears that arise from the Orthodox Failed State Narrative. He
portrays Islamism not as a theological construct but as a political
ideology that helps provide answers to the contemporary social and
political challenges facing the Muslim world. Mwangi argues that radical
Islam is most powerful as a mobilising tool when Muslim populations
feel threatened by secular or Christian states. Following Hoehne (2009),
he links the rise and radicalisation of Al-Shabaab with the joint American-
Ethiopian anti-terror strategy, as well as the difficulties the Somali
people faced under conditions of state collapse, which left the country
with no central authority.

Religion as a Driver of Peace


Academic and policy-oriented literature on religion and international
affairs is rich in publications arguing that religion is a useful – if not
necessary – instrument for achieving peace. More specifically, religious
beliefs/values, religious leaders and faith-based organisations are
thought to have huge potential in promoting peace in any society and/
or in the international arena. Scholars in the US (Johnston and Sampson
1994; Johnston 2003; Appleby 2001; Gopin 2000; Smock 2002; Shah et
al. 2012; Coward and Smith 2004; Little 2007) seem to be leading this
school of thought. In fact, ‘faith-based’ diplomacy was invented in the
US (see for example the journal The Brandywine Review of Faith &
International
Affairs). The US Institute of Peace has developed substantial
resources for interfaith projects and publications, and the US government
recently created an office for ‘religious engagement’ in the State
Department (Johnston and Cox 2003; Mandaville and Silvestri 2015).
However, some important works in this vein are emerging in Europe
too (e.g. Thomas 2005; Galtung and MacQueen 2008). In addition to the
academic literature, numerous faith groups and NGOs are also mobilising
and producing policy reports to promote and enhance the contribution
by religious actors to development and reconciliation.

Religious Beliefs and Values

In The Ambivalence of the Sacred, Appleby (2000) emphasises that


ethics and ethical convictions, as expressed through religious beliefs,
are main drivers for peace. Regardless of which religion may be prevalent,
the ethical power of religion can help to unite divided societies.
For Thomas (2005) too, religion has a role to play, especially as it can
facilitate a dialogue about ‘virtues’ for shaping a better society. However,
while acknowledging this and the useful characteristics of faith-based
networks and NGOs, he warns against a reductionist approach, in which
an instrumentalist perspective of religion and a logic of problem-solving
prevail while the need to address other issues and involve other actors
is downplayed or discounted. prevail while the need to address other issues
and involve other actors is downplayed or discounted.

References to the Christian contribution to non-violence and


peacebuilding are abundant. The key concepts are reconciliation,
which is based on God’s own reconciliation with a sinful humanity,
the powerful model of Jesus’ self-sacrifice to redeem humanity, and
his invitation to ‘turn the other cheek’, and finally his attention to the
poor and the marginalised that encourages Christians to care about
the dignity of the human person. In Christianity, there is a close
relationship between social justice and reconciliation; one cannot
happen without the other. This helps to explain the important work
of Christian denominations in mediation and in promoting transitional
justice (see Philpott 2007b). Christian values are also at the heart of the
Western conception of human rights, even though a parallel, at times
competitive, secular account exists. In the aftermath of World War II,
the work of Christian denominations and the ecumenical movement
were important pillars for the peaceful reconstruction of Europe and in
the establishment of the European Communities (see Thomas 2005;
Byrnes and Katzenstein 2006; Leustean 2014), even though the project
of European integration later took a highly secular and liberal character,
focused mainly on economic and political reasoning.

The majority of case studies in textbooks on religion and politics refer to


mediation work or interfaith activities promoted by Christian denominations,
such as those done in South Africa with Archbishop Desmond
Tutu, in Mozambique with Sant’Egidio, in the US with Martin Luther
King, and also the courageous work in Nigeria, the Middle East and the
Balkans of various priests (see Thomas 2005; Little 2007; Smock 2002;
Lederach 1996, 1997). Buttry (1994) elaborates on the Christian heritage
of non-violence and peacebuilding. He argues that Christian teaching and
values provide the foundations for ‘Christian peacemaking’, i.e. Christianity
provides a whole set of non-violent responses to conflicts worldwide,
both within and between societies (for a similar argument see also
Friesen 1986). The work of Sampson and Lederach (2000) is often regarded
as landmark research in demonstrating the pioneer role played by
Mennonite communities in the history of their non-violent contributions
to peacemaking. In addition, Quakers and Jehovah’s Witnesses, two
groups that are part of the Christian family, have also made explicit their
pacifist stance and rejection of violence (MacCulloch 2010).

Muslim scholar Abu-Nimer (2003) argued that Islam is based on


fundamental
human values encoded in the Qur’an, related religious writings
and the Islamic tradition. Based on those values, Muslim societies have
developed a considerable set of non-violent tools for conflict resolution
and peacebuilding experiences. Traditional Arab-Muslim mechanisms
for dispute resolution include third-party mediation and arbitration
in any form of social conflict. Such mechanisms also included traditional
reconciliation methods, based on the value of forgiveness and
public repentance.

Abu-Nimer (2003) also looks at how Islam developed a theory of de


facto just war principles, both referring to jus ad bellum and jus in bello:
‘War is permissible in self-defense, and under well-defined limits. When
undertaken, it must be pushed with vigour (but not relentlessly), but
only to restore peace and freedom of worship of Allah. In any case,
strict limits must not be transgressed: women, children, old and infirm
men should not be molested, nor trees and crops cut down, nor peace
withheld when the enemy comes to terms’. At the same time, Islam
has a tradition of non-violent resistance, also cited by Abu-Nimer (2003),
which is exemplified by peaceful protests against British colonial rule in
Egypt in 1919, the 1948 Iraqi uprising, the Iran Revolution in 1978–79,
and the Sudanese insurrection of 1985.

Galtung and MacQueen (2008) analyse in detail the contribution


to peacemaking by Asian religions such as Buddhism or Taoism,
with reference to Galtung’s general theory of mentioned above.
By presenting the ideas of 18 eminent Buddhist leaders, Chappell
(1999) enlarged the understanding of Buddhist peacemaking traditions.
Starting from and underlining the central role of achieving inner peace,
he emphasises that Buddhism has a strong track record of providing
peaceful answers to social and political violence, in particular through
its worldwide grassroots work, and points to the responsibility
that Buddhists have for promoting peace. However, others critique
Buddhism for being too much of an individualistic tradition that does
not really stress the importance of being at peace with the others, and
note that it has missed opportunities to achieve peaceful solutions,
in Sri Lanka and Tibet for example (Neumaier 2004).

Religious Leaders and Religious Organizations

A rich strand of research – including a number of works commissioned


by DFID – has examined the role of faith-based organisations
and religious leaders in promoting the peaceful resolution of conflicts
through mediation. Faith-based mediation is seen as an important
contributor to conflict resolution and peace. However, no work sees this
as a complete substitute to traditional diplomatic avenues. The pioneering
work of Johnston and Sampson (1994) brought together scholars
emphasising the comparative advantage of religious actors. Basing their
findings on case studies from East Germany, Philippines, South Africa
and Zimbabwe, they argued that individuals that based their work on
either religious or spiritual thinking were in a better place to reach out to
regional and local actors than were politicians that did not. Similarly, Cox
et al. (1994) argued that religion can be well suited for resolving particularly
prolonged, stalemated or intractable conflicts. The key characteristics
associated with (typically local) religious leaders that enable them to
help in situations of conflict include authority, trust, professionalism and
also cultural and practical/experiential closeness to the people involved
(see among others: Lederach 1996; 1997; Smock 2002).
On a pragmatic level, especially when conflict resolution and peacekeeping
are proceeding in collaboration with development programmes,
religious organisations and leaders have also proven particularly effective
in delivering aid and effective development projects. This is because
faith communities, in addition to being trusted, are inexpensive and they
work rapidly, relying on wide networks of volunteers that are fervently
devoted to the cause and ready to put their lives on the line. This has
proven to be more effective than the work of the salaried staff of large
and bureaucratic international organisations and secular NGOs (Barnett
and Stein 2012).

Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana (2009) focus on the conditions conducive


to the success of faith-based mediation, finding that the legitimacy
and leverage of religious actors can be powerful factors in promoting
successful mediation processes. Aroua (2010) makes a case for mediators
who have a deep understanding of religious beliefs and ideals,
which enables them to promote interreligious dialogue by translating
codes from one value system to another (‘mediators as translators’).
Funk and Woolner (2001) emphasise the role of inter-faith dialogue in
promoting conflict resolution.

Even when peace processes do not lead to a sustainable peace,


religion is nonetheless thought to positively contribute to peace as it
can help build trust between and among social groups and individuals.
Scholars have also noted that many conflicts do not have a religious
component, but that even when that is the case religious leaders can
often play a beneficial role in promoting peace (Aroua 2010).
Religious movements and leaders may also promote the setting of
national and international norms on peace, and generally contribute to
worldwide peace by changing the international discourse on religion and
peace. The historic contribution by Martin Luther King to the spread of
non-violent resistance and international and national anti-discrimination
laws is a prominent example for peace-generating dynamics, discussed
extensively in the scholarly literature.

Case studies have analysed the transformative power of religion and


contributed to scholarly thinking on what religions have in common,
rather than on what divides them. Appleby (2001) gives examples from
different faith traditions: the Catholic NGO Sant’Egidio that promotes
ethical values in conflict situations in Africa and uses mediation as
a tool to promote peace; Buddhist actors promoting human rights in
Cambodia; and Muslim communities that successfully promote peace
in parts of the Middle East. More recently, his work has focused on
‘Catholic approaches to peacebuilding’, looking at the work of many
transnational Catholic NGOs such as Caritas, and exploring how Catholic
social teaching and the ‘preferential option for the poor’ have been
gradually expanded to go beyond social and economic development,
towards ‘reconciliation’ (Schreiter et al. 2010). Michel (2008) specifically
focuses on the role that transnational Islamic movements play in
fostering non-violent relations in the Muslim world. The commitment
to positive societal change, personal transformation, and interreligious
dialogue is fundamental for these movements. ‘Study’ and ‘service’
are key elements underpinning the thinking of their adherents
(Michel 2008).

Peacekeeping

UN peacekeeping operations are, in principle, deployed to support the implementation of a


ceasefire or peace agreement. However, they are often required to play an active role in
peacemaking efforts and may also be involved in early peacebuilding activities. For this reason,
missions aiming to negotiate, maintain, enforce, and promote peace are referred to more
generally as 'peace operations'.

Today's multidimensional peacekeeping operations facilitate the political process, protect


civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants;
support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring
the rule of law.

UN peacekeeping operations may use force to defend themselves, their mandate, and civilians,
particularly in situations where the State is unable to provide security and maintain public order.

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Peace Enforcement

As defined by the United Nations, peace enforcement involves the application of a range of


coercive measures, including the use of military force. It requires the explicit authorization of the
Security Council.

It is used to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has
decided to act in the face of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The
Council may utilize, where appropriate, regional organizations and agencies for enforcement
action under its authority and in accordance with the UN Charter.

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Peacemaking

As defined by the Untied Nations, peacemaking generally refers to measures addressing conflicts
in progress, and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated
agreement.

The UN Secretary-General may exercise his or her “good offices” to facilitate the resolution of
the conflict. Peacemakers may also be envoys, governments, groups of states, regional
organizations or the United Nations. Peacemaking efforts may also be undertaken by unofficial
and non-governmental groups, or by a prominent personality working independently.

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Conflict Prevention

As defined by the United Nations, conflict prevention involves diplomatic measures to keep


intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict.

It includes early warning, information gathering and a careful analysis of the factors driving the
conflict. Conflict prevention activities may include the use of the Secretary-General’s “good
offices,” preventive deployment of UN missions or conflict mediation led by the Department of
Political Affairs.

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Peacebuilding

Within the United Nations system, peacebuilding refers to reducing the risk of lapsing or


relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management,
and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. It is a complex, long-term
process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. Peacebuilding measures
address core issues that effect the functioning of society and the State, and seek to enhance the
capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions.

History of peacebuilding

As World War II ended in the mid-1940s, international initiatives such as the creation of
the Bretton Woods institutions and The Marshall Plan consisted of long-term post-conflict
intervention programs in Europe with which the United States and its allies aimed to rebuild the
continent following the destruction of World War II. The focus of these initiatives revolved
around a narrative of peacekeeping and peacemaking.

After several decades saturated in this narrative, in 1975 Norwegian sociologist Johan


Galtung coined the term "peacebuilding" in his pioneering work "Three Approaches to Peace:
Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding." In this article, he posited that "peace has a
structure different from, perhaps over and above, peacekeeping and ad hoc peacemaking... The
mechanisms that peace is based on should be built into the structure and be present as a reservoir
for the system itself to draw up. ... More specifically, structures must be found that remove
causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur." Galtung's
work emphasized a bottom-up approach that decentralized social and economic structures,
amounting to a call for a societal shift from structures of coercion and violence to a culture of
peace. He catalyzed a major shift in the post-WWII global narrative by emphasizing how
political, economic, & social systems need to address the root causes of conflict and support
local capacity for peace management and conflict resolution.[6]

Then, as the Cold War and the various phenomena of its fizzling came to a close (e.g. civil
wars between Third World countries, Reagonomics, "Bringing the State Back In"), American
sociologist John Paul Lederach further refined the concept of peacebuilding through several
1990s publications that focus on engaging grassroots, local, NGO, international and other actors
to create a sustainable peace process, especially with respect to cases of intractable deadly
conflict where he was actively mediating between warring parties.[9][10][11] From a political-
institutional perspective, he does not advocate the same degree of structural change as Galtung.
[12]
 However, Lederach's influence in the conceptual evolution of peacebuilding still reflects
Galtung's original vision for "positive peace" by detailing, categorizing, & expanding upon the
sociocultural processes through which we address both direct and structural elements of violent
conflict.[13]
Peacebuilding has since expanded to include many different dimensions, such as disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration and rebuilding governmental, economic and civil society
institutions.[6] The concept was popularized in the international community through UN
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 report An Agenda for Peace. The report defined
post-conflict peacebuilding as an "action to identify and support structures which will tend to
strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict".[14] At the 2005 World
Summit, the United Nations began creating a peacebuilding architecture based on Kofi Annan's
proposals.[15] The proposal called for three organizations: the UN Peacebuilding Commission,
which was founded in 2005; the UN Peacebuilding Fund, founded in 2006; and the UN
Peacebuilding Support Office, which was created in 2005. These three organizations enable the
Secretary-General to coordinate the UN's peacebuilding efforts.[16] National governments' interest
in the topic has also increased due to fears that failed states serve as breeding grounds for
conflict and extremism and thus threaten international security. Some states have begun to view
peacebuilding as a way to demonstrate their relevance.[17] However, peacebuilding activities
continue to account for small percentages of states' budgets.[18]

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Practices of Peace

This section encompasses the practical methods or praxis behind achieving peace. The definition
of what constitutes peace is not universally agreed upon, and consequently the practices meant to
enable peace vary significantly.

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Carthaginian Peace

A Carthaginian peace is the imposition of a very brutal "peace" achieved by completely


crushing the enemy. The term derives from the peace imposed on the Carthaginian Empire by
the Roman Republic. After the Second Punic War, Carthage lost all its colonies, was forced to
demilitarize and pay a constant tribute to Rome and could enter war only with Rome's
permission. At the end of the Third Punic War, the Romans systematically burned Carthage to
the ground and enslaved its population.
Giovanni Battista Tiepolo,
The capture of Carthage (1729; NY Met)

Modern use of the term is often extended to any peace settlement in which the peace terms are
overly harsh and designed to accentuate and perpetuate the inferiority of the loser. Thus,
after World War I, many (the economist John Maynard Keynes among them) described
the Treaty of Versailles as a "Carthaginian Peace."

The Morgenthau Plan put forward after World War II has also been described as a Carthaginian
peace, as it advocated the deindustrialization of Germany. It was intended to severely curb the
influence of German power in the region and to prevent its remilitarization, as had occurred after
World War I (German rearmament and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland). The Morgenthau
Plan was dropped in favor of the Marshall Plan (1948–1952), which entailed the rebuilding of
Western European infrastructure, particularly in West Germany.

General Lucius D. Clay, a deputy to general Dwight D. Eisenhower and, in 1945, Military


Governor of the U.S. Occupation Zone in Germany, would later remark that "there was no doubt
that JCS 1067 contemplated the Carthaginian peace which dominated our operations in Germany
during the early months of occupation. This is while the US was following the Morgenthau
Plan."[3] Clay would later replace Eisenhower as governor and as commander-in-chief in Europe.
The Marshall Plan was favored as a revival of the West German economy was considered to be
necessary for the recovery of the economy of Europe. West Germany was regarded as a key
bulwark against the Eastern Bloc.

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