Property Activity Case Digests

(10/22/2020)

Members:
Candido, Angelica
Edig, Kim O.
Omandac, Edda Joy
Resma, Elizabeth Anne

1. BORBAJO VS. HIDDEN VIEW HOMEOWNERS, INC.

Facts:
In an agricultural land which was surveyed and approved into a subdivision by its registered
owners, the resulting lots were sold to different individuals and 3 road lots of which were to
herein petitioner, Borbajo.
Using the advance payments of the lot purchasers, Bontuyan, one of the original registered
owners, proceeded to develop the same subdivision under the name Hidden View Subdivision I.
Borbajo likewise decided to develop into a subdivision, two other properties, namely the St.
Ville Properties and the Hidden View Subdivision II which were both located at the back of
Hidden View Subdivision I.
The residents and homeowners of the latter subdivision heard reports that Borbajo had purchased
the entire subdivision from Bontuyan through an oral agreement, and that they have no right to
use the road lots, since the lots have already been registered in Borbajo's name. Borbajo
confirmed her claim of ownership over the subdivision and the road lots. She also told them that
they have no right regarding the road right-of-way in a meeting. This incident prompted the
inquiry into Borbajo’s registration of the subdivision into the HLURB. The latter replied that
under the law the owner or developer of the subdivision should have legal title or right over the
road lots of the subdivision and that if the title or right is in the name of other persons it follows
that there is failure to comply with the requirements of the law therefore, Borbajo could not have
filed an application for registration and license to sell for the subdivisions she developed.
Consequently, the homeowners caused the construction of a guardhouse and prevent
unauthorized persons and construction vehicles from passing through their subdivision thereby
adversely affecting the residents of the subdivisions at the back as well as Borbajo herself hence,
Borbajo filed for damages and injunction against respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents may legally prevent Borbajo from using and passing through the
three road lots within Hidden View Subdivision?
Held:
No, the evidence reveals that Borbajo and a co-owner were issued TCTs all dated 30 July
1991 for the three road lots situated within the Hidden View Subdivision I pursuant to a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated 18 June 1991 which also mentioned the road lots as such. As a registered co-
owner of the road lots, Borbajo is entitled to avail of all the attributes of ownership under the
Civil Code — jus utendi, fruendi, abutendi, disponendi et vindicandi. Article 428 of the New
Civil Code is explicit that the owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other
limitations than those established by law. A co-owner, such as Borbajo, is entitled to use the
property owned in common under Article 486 of the Civil Code. Therefore, respondents cannot
close the road lots to prevent Borbajo from using the same.
However, If the court finds that the titles of Borbajo were obtained fraudulently, her right
to the road lots ceases as well as her right-of-way by virtue of said titles. In the meantime, we are
bound by the value in law and the evidentiary weight of the titles in the name of Borbajo. As
long as the titles are not annulled, Borbajo remains a registered co-owner and therefore her right
to use the road lots subsists.
As a co-owner it is pointless to discuss her entitlement to the easement of right of way
because the dominant estate cannot be the servient estate at the same time. One of the
characteristics of an easement is that it can be imposed only on the property of another, never on
one's own property. An easement can exist only when the servient and the dominant estates
belong to different owners, therefore inapplicable in this case.

2. SPOUSES DELA CRUZ VS RAMISCAL

Facts:
The subject matter of this case is a 1.10-meter wide by 12.60-meter long strip of land owned by
respondent which is being used by petitioners as their pathway to and from the nearest public
highway from their property. Petitioners had enclosed the same with a gate, fence, and roof.
It was upon a relocation survey for the sale of its property that respondent discovered that the
aforementioned pathway being occupied by petitioners is part of her property. Respondent
immediately demanded that petitioners demolish the structure constructed by them on said
pathway but the letter went unheeded and the conciliation proceedings failed to arrive to a
settlement, hence respondent filed this complaint contending, among others that petitioners have
an existing right of way to a public highway other than the current one they are using, which she
owns.
On the other hand, petitioners aver that respondent knew all along of the 1.10-meter pathway and
had, in fact, tolerated their use thereof. Petitioners further implore respondent to give them the
disputed easement which they will reciprocate with an equivalent 1.50-meter wide easement of
another adjacent estate. Additionally, that they were made to sign a document stating that they
waived their right to ask for an easement along the eastern side of respondent's property, which
document was among those submitted in the application for a building permit by the person in
charge of the construction of the motor shop in respondent’s property.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS ARE NONETHELESS ENTITLED TO A LEGAL
EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY, ASSUMING NO VOLUNTARY RIGHT OF WAY WAS
GRANTED THEM BY THE RESPONDENT?
Held:
No, The conferment of a legal easement of right of way under Article 649 is subject to
proof of the following requisites: (1) it is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway; (2) payment of proper indemnity; (3) the isolation is not the result of
its own acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate;
and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest. The first three requisites are not obtaining in the
instant case.
Contrary to petitioners' contention, the trial court found from the records that Concepcion
de la Peña had provided petitioners with an adequate ingress and egress towards Boni Serrano
Avenue via a 1.50-meter wide alley of the subdivision survey which the respondent is also aware
of. Inasmuch as petitioners have an adequate outlet to a public highway, the Boni Serrano
Avenue, they have no right to insist on using a portion of respondent's property as pathway
towards 18th Avenue and for which no indemnity was being paid by them.
Furthermore, It is the owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or
use any immovable surrounded by other immovable pertaining to other persons, who is entitled
to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates. In this case, petitioners fell short of
proving that they are the owners of the supposed dominant estate. Nor were they able to prove
that they possess a real right to use such property. Neither were petitioners able to produce the
Deed of Sale evidencing their alleged purchase of the property from de la Peña. Hence, by the
bulk of evidence, de la Peña, not petitioners, is the real party-in- interest to claim a right of way
although, as explained earlier, any action to demand a right of way from de la Peña's part will not
lie inasmuch as by her own acts of building houses in the area allotted for a pathway in her
property, she had caused the isolation of her property from any access to a public highway.
3. G.R. No. L-10619 February 28, 1958
LEOGARIO RONQUILLO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
JOSE ROCO, as Administrator of VICENTE, ROCO Y. DOMINGUEZ ET AL.,
defendants-appellees.
Facts:
The plaintiffs have been in the continuous and uninterrupted use of a road or passage way which
traversed the land of the defendants and their predecessors in interest, in going to Igualdad Street
and the market place of Naga City, from their residential land and back for more than 20 years;
that the defendants and the tenants of Vicente Roco, the predecessors in interest of the said
defendants have long recognized and respected the private legal easement of road right of way of
said plaintiffs . On May 12, 1953, the defendants Jose Roco thru his co-defendants, Raymundo
Martinez and their men with malice aforethought and with a view to obstructing the plaintiffs’
private legal easement over the property of the late Vicente Roco, started constructing a chapel in
the middle of the said right of way which disturbed the continuous exercise of the rights of the
plaintiffs over said right of way.
On July 10, 1954 the new defendants Natividad Roco and Gregorio Miras, Jr. with the approval
of the defendant, Jose Roco and with the help of their men and laborers, by means of force,
intimidation, and threats, illegally and violently planted wooden posts, fenced with barbed wire
and closed the road passage way and their right of way in question against their protests and
opposition.
The plaintiffs in their amended and supplemental complaint, claim to have acquired the easement
of right of way over the land of the defendants and the latter’s predecessors in interest, Vicente
Roco, thru prescription by their continuous and uninterrupted use of a narrow strip of land of the
defendants as passage way or road in going to Igualdad Street and the public market of Naga
City, from their residential land or houses, and return.

Issue:
Whether Ronquillo, et al. had acquired the easement of right of way through prescription.
RULING
NO, they have not acquired the easement of right of way through prescription.
An easement of right of way though it may be apparent is, nevertheless, discontinuous or
intermittent and, therefore, cannot be acquired through prescription, but only by virtue of a title.
Under old as well as the New Civil Code, easements may be continuous discontinuous
(intermittent), apparent or non-apparent, discontinuous being those used at more or less long
intervals and which depend upon acts of man (Articles 532 and 615 of the Old and New Civil
Codes, respectively). Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either, by title or
prescription, continuous non-apparent easements and discentinuous ones whether apparent or
not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title (Articles 537 and 539, and 620 and 622 of the Old
and New Civil Codes, respectively).
 Both Manresa and Sanchez Roman are of the opinion that the easement of right of way is
a discontinuous one. Under the provisions of the Civil Code, old and new, particularly the
articles thereof aforecited, it would therefore appear that the easement of right of way may not be
acquired through prescription. Even Article 1959 of the Old Civil Code providing for
prescription of ownership and other real rights in real property, excludes therefrom the exception
established by Article 622 (then Article 539), referring to discontinuous, easements, such as,
easement of right of way.
In the case of Cuayong vs. Benedicto , the court held that no vested right by user from
time immemorial had been acquired by plaintiffs at the time the Civil Code took effect. Under
that Code (Article 539) no discontinuous easement could be acquired by prescription in any
event.
The minority of which the writer of this opinion is a part, believes that the easement of
right of way may now be acquired through prescription, at least since the introduction into this
jurisdiction of the special law on prescription through the Old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No.
190. Said law, Particularly, Section' 41 thereof, makes no distinction as to the real rights which
are subject to Prescription, and there would appear to be no valid reason, at least to the writer of
this opinion, why the continued use of a path or a road or right of way by the party, specially by
the public, for 10 or more, not by mere tolerance of the owner of the land, but through adverse
use of it, cannot give said party a vested right to such right of way through prescription.
The opinion of the majority must prevail, and it is held that under the present law,
particularly, the provisions of the Civil Code, old and new, unless and until the same is changed
or clarified, the easement of right of way may not be acquired through prescription.
In his separate but concurring opinion, Justice Puno held that the essence of this easement
(“servidumbre de paso”) lies in the power of the dominant owner to cross or traverse the servient
tenement without being prevented or disturbed by its owner. As a servitude, it is a limitation on
the servient owner’s rights of ownership, because it restricts his right to exclude others from his
property. But such limitation exists only when the dominant owner actually crosses, or passes
over the servient estate because when he does not, the servient owner’s right of exclusion is
perfect and undisturbed. Since the dominant owner cannot be continually and uninterruptedly
crossing the servient estate, but can do so only at intervals, the easement is necessarily of an
intermittent or discontinuous nature.
Because possession of a right consists in the enjoyment of that right (old Civil Code, Art.
430; Art. 423, new Civil Code) and to enjoy a right is to exercise it, it follows that the possession
(enjoyment or exercise) of a right of way is intermittent and discontinuous. From this premise, it
is inevitable to conclude, with Manresa and Sanchez Roman, that such easement cannot be
acquired by acquisitive prescription (adverse possession) because the latter requires that the
possession be continuous or uninterrupted.
4. G.R. No. 124699. July 31, 2003
BOGO-MEDELLIN MILLING CO., INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO VALDEZ SR., Respondents.
FACTS:
Magdaleno Valdez, Sr., father of herein private respondents the heirs of Magdaleno Valdez Sr,
(the heirs), purchased from Feliciana Santillan, on December 9, 1935, a parcel of unregistered
land He took possession of the property and declared it for tax purposes in his name. ry
Prior to the sale, however, the entire length of the land from north to south was already traversed
in the middle by railroad tracks owned by petitioner Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc.
(Bomedco). The tracks were used for hauling sugar cane from the fields to petitioner’s sugar
mill.
When Magdaleno Valdez, Sr. passed away in 1948, herein private respondents inherited the land.
However, unknown to them, Bomedco was able to have the disputed middle lot which was
occupied by the railroad tracks placed in its name in the Cadastral Survey of Medellin, Cebu in
1965. The entire subject land was divided into three, namely, Cadastral Lot Nos. 953, 954 and
955. Lot Nos. 953 and 955 remained in the name of private respondents. However, Lot No. 954,
the narrow lot where the railroad tracks lay, was claimed by Bomedco as its own and was
declared for tax purposes in its name.
It was not until 1989 when private respondents discovered the aforementioned claim of Bomedco
on inquiry with the Bureau of Lands. Through their lawyer, they immediately demanded the
legal basis for Bomedco's claim over Cadastral Lot No. 954 but their letter of inquiry addressed
to petitioner went unheeded, as was their subsequent demand for payment of compensation for
the use of the land. cräläwvirtualibräry
On June 8, 1989, respondent heirs filed a Complaint for Payment of Compensation and/or
Recovery of Possession of Real Property and Damages with Application for Restraining
Order/Preliminary Injunction against Bomedco before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not Bomedco acquired ownership over Cadastral Lot No. 954.
(2) Whether or not BOMEDCO acquired the easement of right of way by prescription under
Article 620 of the Civil Code.
RULING:
(1) No, Petitioners claim of ownership through extraordinary acquisitive prescription cannot
be sustained.
Possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under
a claim of title, that is, it must be adverse. However, for the years 1930, 1937, 1949, 1962 and
1963, petitioner unequivocally declared the property to be a central railroad right of way or sugar
central railroad right of way in its real estate tax receipts. Instead of indicating ownership of the
lot, these receipts showed that all petitioner had was possession by virtue of the right of way
granted to it. Were it not so and petitioner really owned the land, petitioner would not have
consistently used the phrases central railroad right of way and sugar central railroad right of way
in its tax declarations until 1963. A person cannot have an easement on his own land, since all
the uses of an easement are fully comprehended in his general right of ownership.
The mere expiration of the period of easement in 1959 did not convert petitioners
possession into an adverse one. Mere material possession of land is not adverse possession as
against the owner and is insufficient to vest title, unless such possession is accompanied by the
intent to possess as an owner. There should be a hostile use of such a nature and exercised under
such circumstances as to manifest and give notice that the possession is under a claim of right. In
the absence of an express grant by the owner, or conduct by petitioner sugar mill from which an
adverse claim can be implied, its possession of the lot can only be presumed to have continued in
the same character as when it was acquired.

(2) No, it had not acquired the easement of right of way by prescription because it was a
discontinuous and apparent easement.
Under Art. 622 of the Civil Code, discontinuous easements, whether apparent or not may
be acquired only by title and not by prescription. Unfortunately, petitioner Bomedco never
acquired title over the use of the railroad right of way whether by law, donation, testamentary
succession or contract.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals both upheld the view that the railroad right of
way was, according to them, continuous and apparent in nature, and thus prescriptible. The more
or less permanent railroad tracks were visually apparent and they continuously occupied the
subject strip of land from 1959 ,the year the easement granted by Feliciana Santillan to petitioner
expired. Following the logic of the courts a quo, if a road for the use of vehicles or the passage of
persons is permanently cemented or asphalted, then the right of way over it becomes continuous
in nature. The reasoning is erroneous. The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous
because it is exercised only if a person passes or sets foot on somebody elses land.
The easement of right of way of railroad tracks is discontinuous because the right is
exercised only if and when a train operated by a person passes over another’s property. In other
words the very exercise of the servitude depends upon the act or intervention of man which is the
very essence of discontinuous easements. The presence of more or less permanent railroad tracks
does not in any way convert the nature of an easement of right of way to one that is continuous.
It is not the presence of apparent signs or physical indications showing the existence of an
easement, but rather the manner of exercise thereof, that categorizes such easement into
continuous or discontinuous. The presence of physical or visual signs only classifies an easement
into apparent or non-apparent.
 In this case, the presence of railroad tracks for the passage of petitioner’s trains denotes
the existence of an apparent but discontinuous easement of right of way. As the original 30-year
grant of right of way given to Bomedco already expired, its occupation and use of Cadastral Lot
No. 954 came to be by mere tolerance of the respondent heirs. Thus, upon demand by said heirs
in 1989 for the return of the subject land and the removal of the railroad tracks, or, in the
alternative, payment of compensation for the use thereof, petitioner BOMEDCO which had no
title to the land should have returned the possession thereof or should have begun paying
compensation for its use.
5. GARGANTOS vs. TAN YANON
Facts:

A portion of a land owned by the late Francisco Sanz, with house of strong materials thereon,
was sold to Tan Yanon. This house has on its northeastern side, doors and windows over-looking
the third portion, which, together with the camarin and small building thereon, after passing
through several hands, was finally acquired by Juan Gargantos.

Gargantos asked the Municipal Council of Romblon for a permit in order to construct a
combined residential house and warehouse on his lot. Tan Yanon opposed approval of this
application.

Because both the provincial fiscal and district engineer of Romblon recommended granting of
the building permit to Gargantos, Tan Yanon filed against Gargantos an action to restrain him
from constructing a building that would prevent plaintiff from receiving light and enjoying the
view through the window of his house, unless such building is erected at a distance of not less
than three meters from the boundary line between the lots of plaintiff and defendant, and to
enjoin the members of Municipal Council of Romblon from issuing the corresponding building
permit to defendant.

CFI rendered judgment dismissing the complaint and on appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside
the decision of the Court of First Instance of Romblon and enjoined defendant from constructing
his building unless "he erects the same at a distance of not less than three meters from the
boundary line of his property, in conformity with Article 673 of the New Civil Code."

Thus, Gargantos filed this petition for review of the appellate Court's decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the property of respondent has an easement of light and view against the property
of petitioner?

Yes, respondent's property has an easement of light and view against petitioner's
property.
 The law provides that the existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates,
established by the proprietor of both, shall be considered, if one of them is alienated, as a title so
that the easement will continue actively and passively, unless at the time the ownership of the
two estate is divided, the contrary is stated in the deed of alienation of either of them, or the sign
is made to disappear before the instrument is executed.

As on said northeastern side of the house, there are windows and doors which serve as
passages for light and view upon purchase and the deed sale did not provide that the easement of
light and view would not be established.

Therefore, by reason of his easement petitioner cannot construct on his land any building
unless he erects it at a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line separating
the two estates.

6. VALDERRAMA vs. THE NORTH NEGROS SUGAR CO., INC.

Facts:
Several hacienda owners in Manapla, Occidental Negros entered into a milling contract with
Miguel J. Osorio, wherein Osorio agreed to install in Manapla a sugar central of a minimum
capacity of 300 tons, for grinding and milling all the sugar cane to be grown by the hacienda
owners, who in turn bound themselves to furnish the central with all the cane they might produce
in their estates for thirty years from the execution of the contract, all in accordance with the
conditions specified therein. Later, the defendant, acquired the rights and interest of Miguel J.
Osorio in the milling contract.
The hacienda owners, who were up to that time customers of the central, could not furnish
sufficient cane for milling, as required by the capacity of said central, the defendant made other
milling contracts with various hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental Negros, in order to obtain
sufficient cane to sustain the central; and this gave rise to the plaintiffs filing their complaint,
alleging that the easement of way, which each of them has established in his respective hacienda,
was only for the transportation through each hacienda of the sugar cane of the owner thereof,
while the defendant maintains that it had the right to transport to its central upon the railroad
passing through the haciendas of the plaintiffs, not only the sugar cane harvested in said
haciendas, but also that of the hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental Negros.
The trial court entered one single judgment for all of them, holding that the defendant had no
right to pass through the lands of the plaintiffs described in their amended complaints for the
transportation of sugar cane not grown from any of the haciendas of the plaintiffs. From this
judgment, the defendant appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of way is limited to the use of the road exclusively to the cane of
the plaintiffs and within their respective haciendas?
 No, for it is against the nature of the easement to pretend that it was established in favor
of the servient estates, because it is a well settled rule that things serve their owner by reason of
ownership and not by reason of easement.

The law provides that the owner of the dominant estate, in making on the servient estate
the necessary works for the use and preservation of the easement, cannot alter it, nor make it
more burdensome; but this does not mean that the defendant cannot transport in the wagons
passing upon the railroad other cane than that of the plaintiffs. What is prohibited by the legal
provision above cited is that the defendant, in excavations or building materials outside of the
area of 7 meters, because in the first case, the easement will be altered, and in the second it
would become more burdensome.

Therefore, as there was no intention to limit the use of the railroad to the transportation of
cane grown by the plaintiffs in their respective haciendas and as it would be unjust to impose
upon the defendant he burden of maintaining a central and prohibiting it to obtain from another
source sufficient cane with which to maintain its business thus there is nothing to prohibit the
defendant from making milling contracts with other planters, and obtain it in that way all cane
necessary to cover the capacity of the central.

7.
SALVADOR BENEDICTO (deceased) ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE A. HERAS, respondents
Facts:
Miriam R. Hedrik is the original owner of the subject land in the present case. She sold Lots Nos.
8, 9, 22 and 23 to Claro M. Recto and retained Lots Nos. 10 and 24 for herself, both of which
contains different buildings. The sale was subjected to a condition of maintaining a 3-4 meters
wide passage for vehicles to be made in both lot of Recto and Hedrik. This agreement between
Hedrik and Recto was annotated on the respective titles of petitioner and respondent. Recto sold
his land covered by TCT No. 31834 to Emmanuel Conty and was later on sold to Salvador
Benedicto. Hedrik also sold a portion of land to Chow Kwo Hsien who sold the same to General
Security and Investment, Co. and was eventually sold to Vicente A. Heras. Heras then
demolished the buildings located on his lot.
On the trial court, it was held that since the respondent Heras, as successor-in-interest of Miriam
R. Hedrick, owned no more than 540.4 square meter, no portion of his property had been
encroached upon by the petitioner Benedicto and likewise found that the easement of way was
found entirely within the property of Benedicto, contrary to the stipulation in the deed of sale
between Miriam R. Hedrick and Claro M. Recto that the easement should be between their
properties and contributing equally to such easement. Court of Appeals rendered a decision
affirming in toto the decision of the trial court and denied the motions for reconsideration filed
by the parties.
Issue:
WON the easement was extinguished by nonuser for more than 10 years?
Ruling:
No, the easement was not extinguished by nonuser for more than 10 years.
Under Art. 631 of the NCC, easements are extinguished:
"(2) By nonuser for ten years; with respect to discontinuous easements, this period shall
be computed from the day on which they ceased to be used; and, with respect to continuous
easements, from the day on which an act contrary to the same took place;
"(3) When either or both of the estates fall into such condition that the easement cannot
be used; but it shall revive if the subsequent condition of the estates or either of them should
again permit its use; unless when the use become possible, sufficient time for prescription has
elapsed, in accordance with the provisions of the preceding number; . . ."
In the case at bar, petitioner merely assumes that the passageway in question had not been
in use since 1941 because the property of Heras has since gained direct access to San Marcelino
Street with the demolition of his house and failed to provide indubitable proof of nonuser. Even
assuming that the 10-year prescription be considered in this case, it was only in 1946 constructed
a fence on the passageway and the case was commenced in 1955, the prescriptive period has not
yet elapsed. Moreover, since the easement is perpetual in character and was annotated in both
titles of petitioner and respondent, the latter must agree to discontinue or obliterate the easement,
which was not done. Hence, the Supreme Court upheld the continued existence of the easement.

8.
EDUARDO C. TAÑEDO, petitioner, vs. HON. JUANITO A. BERNAD, Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch XXI, Cebu City; Spouses ROMEO
SIM and PACITA S. SIM; and Spouses ANTONIO CARDENAS and MAE LINDA
CARDENAS, respondents.
Facts:
Cardenas was the owner of two (2) contiguous parcels of land particularly known as Lot 7501-A,
with an area of 140 square meters and Lot 7501-B, with an area of 612 square meters. On Lot
7501-A is constructed an apartment building, while the improvements on Lot 7501-B consist of
one four-door apartment; one two-storey house; a bodega; and a septic tank for the common use
of the occupants of Lots 7501-A and 7501-B.
On 5 February 1982, Cardenas sold Lot 7501-A to petitioner Tañedo. Cardenas, on that same
day, also mortgaged Lot 7501-B to said Tañedo as a security for the payment of a loan in the
amount of P10,000.00. Cardenas agreed that he would sell Lot 7501-B only to Tañedo in case he
should decide to sell it. However, Cardenas sold it to respondent spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim.
After he refused the offer of redemption by Tañedo, Romeo blocked the sewage pipe connecting
the building on Lot 7501-A to the septic tank in Lot 7501-B and asked the former to remove the
portion of his building encroaching his land.
Tañedo filed an action for legal redemption and damages, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu against the respondents. On
their answer, the Spouses Sim claimed that they are the absolute owners of Lot 7501-B and that
petitioner has no right to redeem the land. The RTC dismissed the complaint and the cross-claim
for lack of cause of action.
Issue: WON petitioner’s right to continue to use the septic tank already ceased?
Ruling:
No, petitioner’s right to continue to use the septic tank already ceased.
Article 631 of the Civil Code enumerates the grounds for the extinguishment of an
easement provi which provides:
(1) By merger in the same person of the ownership of the dominant and servient estates;
(2) By non-user for ten years; with respect to discontinuous easements, this period shall
be computed from the day on which they ceased to be used; and, with respect to continuous
easements, from the day on which an act contrary to the same took place;
(3) When either or both of the estates fall into such condition that the easement cannot be
used; but it shall revive if the subsequent condition of the estates or either of them should again
permit its use, unless when the use becomes possible, sufficient time for prescription has elapsed,
in accordance with the provisions of the preceding number;
(4) By the expiration of the term or the fulfillment of the condition, if the easement is
temporary or conditional;
(5) By the renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate;
(6) By the redemption agreed upon between the owners of the dominant and servient
estates.
As can be seen from the above provisions, the alienation of the dominant and servient
estates to different persons is not one of the grounds for the extinguishment of an easement. On
the contrary, use of the easement is continued by operation of law. In the instant case, no
statement abolishing or extinguishing the easement of drainage was mentioned in the deed of
sale of Lot 7501-A to Eduardo Tañedo. Nor did Antonio Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe
and septic tank by the occupants of Lot 7501-A before he sold said lot to Eduardo Tañedo.
Hence, the use of the septic tank is continued by operation of law. Accordingly, the spouses
Romeo and Pacita Sim, the new owners of the servient estate (Lot 7501-B), cannot impair, in any
manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude..