Between Couch and Piano

Between Couch and Piano links well-established psychoanalytic

ideas with historical and neurological theory to help us begin to
understand some of the reasons behind music's ubiquity and
power.

Drawing on new psychoanalytic understanding as well as advances

in neuroscience, this book sheds light on the role of the arts as
stimulus, and as a key to creative awareness. Subjects covered
include:

• Music in relation to the trauma of loss.

• Music in connection with wholeness and the sense of identity.
• The ability of music to jump-start normal feelings, motion and
identity where these have been seemingly destroyed by neuro-
logical disease.
• The theory of therapeutic efficacy of music and art.

Between Couch and Piano is a comprehensive overview that will be

of interest to all those intrigued by the interrelation of psycho-
analysis and the creative arts.

Gilbert J. Rose is in private practice of psychiatry and psycho-

analysis and is a member of the Muriel Gardiner Program in
Psychoanalysis and Humanities at Yale.
This page intentionally left blank
Between Couch and Piano

Psychoanalysis, music, art and

neuroscience

Gilbert J. Rose
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To Graciela
I learned that words are no good; that words don't ever fit even
what they are trying to say at ... sin and love and fear are just
sounds that people who never sinned nor loved nor feared have
for what they never had and cannot have until they forget the
words ....
(William Faulkner, As I Lay Dying)

The cosmos works by harmony of tensions, like the lyre and

bow.
(Heraclitus)
Contents

Foreword by Jonathan D. Kramer: a musician

listens to a psychoanalyst listening to music IX
Preface XXVll
Acknowledgments XXXlll

1 Between words and music 1

2 On the shores of self: Samuel Beckett's Molloy -

irredentism and the creative impulse 19

3 Whence the feelings from art: communication or

concordance? 36

4 The music of time in Faulkner's Light in August 57

5 Music as temporal prosthesis: reflections from the

Sundown Syndrome 78

6 In pursuit of slow time: modern music and a

clinical vignette 94

7 The birth of music in the context of loss: music

and affect regulation 112

8 The power of implicit motion: "it goes straight

through" 132
viii Contents

9 A psychoanalyst listens to a musician listening to

himself composing 153

Bibliography 163
Index 175
Foreword: a musician listens to a
psychoanalyst listening to music

Gilbert Rose's book is full of fascinating and sophisticated insights

about the musical experience. As a music theorist, composer, and
listener, I have learned a lot from what he has written. Since my
knowledge of psychoanalysis is rudimentary, I no doubt have a
partially skewed view of his work. But this is inevitable: as Rose
explains, each reader creates in his/her mind a unique version of a
verbal text (more on that later). And so I write as a musician,
reading this book and taking from it (and constructing out of its
words and ideas) something of value to me.
Some parts of the book naturally speak to me more directly than
others, and it is those about which I am writing. I am pleased to
find many of Rose's ideas on communication, for example, paral-
leling my own. Furthermore, his centralizing of time in the musical
experience certainly wins the warm approval of the author of a
book called The Time of Music! I also find his explanations of the
therapeutic powers of music to be fascinating.

Communication
In Chapter 3, Rose bravely tackles a challenging and problematic
question: does music communicate? Are a composer's ideas actu-
ally in the music, and if so do they emerge through a performance
in order to reach a listener? Does the listener hear what the com-
poser has "said"?
In attempting to answer these difficult questions, we need to be
aware (as Rose clearly is) of the distinctions between music as
conceived by a composer, as represented in the product of the
composer's activity (what music theorist Jean-Jacques Nattiez calls
the "trace"), and as understood by a listener (Nattiez, 1990: 10-
x Foreword

32). The composer's creative processes depend on his/her inspira-

tion, personality, intentions, influences, moods, techniques, etc.
The performer subsequently exercises his/her own creative (as well
as re-creative) processes to make a performance, using not only the
score but also his/her own inspiration, personality, intentions, etc.
In other words, the performer receives, perceives, and reconceives
the score by means of a personal receptive process, which is then
turned around into a creative process.
Since he does not fully distinguish different traces of the musical
work - score, performance, and recording (or broadcast) -
Nattiez's ideas need further refinement. If the performance is
recorded and/or broadcast (as many performances are), then an
additional receptive- creative link is added to the chain. The record-
ing engineer receives, perceives, and reconceives the performance,
which is then turned into a creative product dependent not only on
the performance but also on the engineer's inspiration, influences,
techniques, equipment, etc. When this recording is heard, the
listener's receptive processes make sense of it and personalize the
music. This process is also creative, as the listener constructs a
mental image of the music which depends not only on the recorded
sounds as heard but also on the listener's predilections, preferences,
prior listening experiences, musical abilities, etc.
If it actually existed, the complete communication chain (with
every link present) would be long and complex: from the com-
poser's initial thoughts and intentions through his/her creative act
to the score, which is altered somewhat by an editor and/or
publisher, and then through the performer to the performance, and
then through the recording engineer to the recording, and then
through the listener to an internalized representation of the music.
While a particularly strong idea may actually be communicated
through this chain all the way from composer to listener, I such
message-sending is relatively rare, I believe. Each person in the
chain interprets, reads, misreads, and adds his/her own ideas,
which may well alter or replace those of the composer. In cases
where the chain is shorter - a jazz improviser playing unamplified
to a live audience, for example - the communication may be more
direct. But when all links are present, the communication model for
musical transmission is quite suspect. Expressiveness, yes: music is
a means and a context for composers, performers, engineers, and
listeners to express themselves. Emotion, yes: the expression can be
quite moving. But communication? Rarely, I believe.
 Foreword xi

Even language is not fixed. As Rose says, "Words are flexible,

meanings change, language is a living organism." And people who
speak and people who listen are in flux. Rose writes of " the
improbability of conveying anything more than very partial truth
by language. Facts, yes [I would have said 'maybe']; the feelings
about facts, no." Objective communication - verbal as well as
musical - is difficult. As Rose writes, language " leaves out more
than it includes, yet it includes so much that any number of con-
nections can be made among the elements that are encompassed."
We express ourselves all the time, in all sorts of ways. And we
listen to one another. But we do not simply, passively receive a
communication. We construct the message (and even the sender!)
for ourselves, using a mix of what we have heard, what we think we
have heard, what we want to have heard, what we hope we did not
hear, who we are, who we think the message sender is, what our
values and expectations are, what our moods and contexts are, our
memories of previous interactions, etc. So, misunderstanding
between two people is inevitable, no matter how much they try to
communicate, no matter who they are, no matter what their
relationship. This situation is inevitable, and it should be accepted
rather than fought.
The same is true of reading as it is of conversation: as Rose
writes, each "reader uses the given narrative as material from
which to form his own fantasy." And so it is with music: each
listener uses the sounds presented to his/her ear, sounds which the
composer may have conceived in terms of some narrative structure,
to create his/her own personal narrative-fantasy.
In a previous article I related an incident that showed me just
how tenuous the communication model can be for music:

I asked a graduate analysis seminar to study [Ives's] Putnam's

Camp. Several of the seminar participants were from countries
other than the United States and hence had little knowledge of
American folk music and patriotic songs. Even some of the
American participants did not recognize most of the quota-
tions in Ives's score. One student recognized only "The Star-
Spangled Banner" in the penultimate measure - a possibly
obscure quotation, since it contains only the first four notes,
which constitute a generic major triad. I suggested that those
who did not recognize the distinction between quoted and
original material, and those who did not know anything about
xii Foreword

the historical and cultural contexts of the quoted music, had a

skewed understanding of the music. Several students objected
vehemently, claiming that they recognized American verna-
cular idioms as such and that was sufficient. I am not so
concerned with how valid or complete the understanding of
such students was, as I am intrigued by how utterly different
the piece must have been for them compared to how it was for
me. Despite a lot of analysis about shared perceptions (of such
structural aspects as rhythmic irregularities, harmony, set con-
structs, interplay of tonality and atonality, etc.), everyone in
the seminar had different (as well as common) experiences with
the music. In a certain sense, there were as many pieces as there
were seminar members!
(Kramer, 1997: 34- 45)

Putnam 's Camp may be an extreme case, given the large number of
quotations and references to other music it contains, but I believe
that all music elicits individual associations, responses, and mean-
ings in listeners. As Rose states about a study of reading, "each
reader interacted with the story in terms of his own personality and
intrapsychic life and in the light of this constructed something new
which was most consonant with himself . . . . In short, he takes
from the work what is most consonant with himself, rewrites it in
his own mind and becomes its co-author . . . . Art does not
'communicate' meanings; it generates them in the receptive mind."
Similarly, if each listener to a piece of music constructs "something
new," something which reflects the self more than it reflects the
music heard, then how can anyone maintain that there is direct
communication from composer to listener?
I do not deny that it is tempting, and comforting, to believe that
composers speak to listeners. Rose offers many insights into why
the communication model of art is appealing. But it is, if not
outright false, then at best less than half the story.
What I am suggesting may sound heretical: a listener who is
deeply moved by a performance is not primarily responding to a
message sent out by a composer. The composer has not, to any
appreciable degree, communicated with this listener. I am not
denying the validity or the depth of the listener's response, but
rather its source. The listener himself/herself has a lot to do with
his/her emotional experience - otherwise, how could we explain
different people having different experiences while hearing the
 Foreword xiii

same performance? The performer also influences the listener's

reaction, although probably less than the listener himself/herself.
And the audio technician (if there is one in the chain) has an
impact on the listener. But the composer's expression must traverse
a long, circuitous route, during which what may have been
intended as communication is inevitably distorted and altered.
Rose's thinking parallels these ideas. He courageously goes
against accepted psychoanalytic ideas about " the emotional appeal
of art." In writing about "the 'communication' by the artist
through the work to the recipient," he states quite rightly that " the
possibility of such communication retains little credit in the field of
aesthetics." Many in the music community, however, continue to
accept the communication metaphor as literal truth. Often listeners
do believe they have received a communication from the composer.
Consider this not uncommon example, which appeared in a news-
paper account of how Mozart's G Minor Symphony was believed
to have helped a man recover from a serious operation.

I blissfully sink back as the opening chords of his glorious 40th

Symphony start easing every sore spot in my body .... The
first movement, Molto Allegro, is . .. a cloud that picks me up,
lifts me up from the pains and fear of my hospital stay . . . .
Today, where there was pain, the life-assuring hand of Mozart
once again leads me back to joy .... [In the second movement]
Mozart will not just rescue me from despair. He will tell me of
the glorious paths I have yet in front of me . .. . [In the third
movement] Mozart sprays me with a dozen more clear
inspirations. I hear him saying, "All those delights are there for
you. I know you can do them. I know your will" . . . . The
music [of the last movement] is Mozart at his highest
appreciation of life.
(Atlas, 1995: 5E)

These feelings originated in this particular listener, not in the man

Mozart (who most likely did not intend to offer solace to ailing
patients), and not even really in the G Minor Symphony. I do not
mean to belittle the profundity of this man's experience with the
symphony. I believe his account, if I take the more direct invoca-
tions of communication as metaphorical. Nor do I mean to suggest
that his experience came only from within, that the actual music
had nothing to do with it. This man would surely not have had a
xiv Foreword

comparable experience listening, for example, to rap music.

Mozart's symphony certainly has something to do with the
man's cathartic experience, even if the experience depended even
more on the listener: on his needs ("I know Mozart will have
something I need to hear and to hear now," (Atlas, 1995: 5E)), his
desires, his veneration of Mozart's work, his prior experiences with
the symphony, and possibly the opinions others have expressed of
K. 550.
Indeed, this particular work - like the second movement of
Beethoven's Seventh Symphony, as Rose reports - seems to have
elicited a wide variety of responses throughout its 200-year
existence:

Otto Jahn, for example, called it " a symphony of pain and

lamentation" (1856), while C. Palmer called it "nothing but joy
and animation" (1865). Alexandre Dimitrivitch Oulibicheff
(1843) wrote of the finale, "I doubt whether music contains
anything more profoundly incisive, more cruelly sorrowful,
more violently abandoned, or more completely impassioned, "
while A.F. Dickinson (1927) felt that "the verve of this
movement is tremendous. It is ... the best possible tonic for
the low in spirits. " Georges de Saint-Foix wrote in 1932 of
"feverish precipitousness, intense poignancy, and concentrated
energy," while Donald Francis Tovey wrote at about the same
time of "the rhythms and idioms of comedy." Robert Dearling
called it "a uniquely moving expression of grief," while H.
Hirschbach thought it " an ordinary, mild piece of music."
While Alfred Einstein found the symphony "fatalistic" and
Pitts Sanborn thought it touched with "ineffable sadness,"
composers seem to have had happier opinions. Berlioz noted
its "grace, delicacy, melodic charm, and fineness of workman-
ship"; Schumann found in it "Grecian lightness and grace";
Wagner thought it "exuberant with rapture."
(Kramer, 1988b: 480)

A traditional music analyst might discourage all such responses to

the G Minor Symphony, saying that the composer never intended
to convey such images (or, even if he had, that his intentions are
irrelevant: only the music counts, not how or why it came to be)?
Confronted with a student writing a comparable interpretation,
such a music analyst might try to get him/her to listen more
 Foreword xv

abstractly, more in terms of patterns of tension and release,

rhythmic development, motivic derivation, metric structure, and
harmonic drive. But we should accept that the student's hearing is
perfectly appropriate - for that particular student.
Musical amateurs (such as the man who believed that Mozart
helped him recover after surgery) are hardly the only ones to
anthropomorphize works of music into their composers, to identify
the force behind the perceived music with the actual person who
wrote it. This tendency is common among performers, who readily
speak of, for example, "how Serkin plays Beethoven. " This phrase
is a telling abbreviation of "how Serkin plays the music composed
by Beethoven. " Such an identification of the music with its com-
poser may be taken as a tacit equation of the music and the person
who created it. To the extent that such a locution is a personi-
fication of the music, I find little trouble with it: there is something
about music that is not badly served by the concept of a person-
ality. But is it Beethoven's personality? Or is it a personality (or
persona) created (only in part, since both Serkin and his listeners
have a role in the construction of musical personae) by Beethoven,
much as Shakespeare (and actors, directors, and theatergoers)
created Hamlet? Because Hamlet has his own name, we do not
usually conflate him with Shakespeare. We know that Hamlet's
ideas came (in part) from the man Shakespeare, but we also know
that a playwright is capable of creating diverse personae, none of
whom need be the author's alter ego. The characters in a piano
sonata of Beethoven do not have individual names, and indeed it is
not obvious just how they inhabit the music. But the sense of
personality in the music is palpable. Lacking anyone else to
identify with the personalities, musicians (and listeners) happily call
the personalities by the name of the composer (or, sometimes, by
that of the performer: commentators have written about the
personality - whether or not they use that exact word - of a Glenn
Gould performance, for example). This is especially evident when
performers refer, in rehearsals and other contexts, to "playing the
Mozart." Less often do we hear them say they are playing the C
Major Quartet, or K. 465, or the " Dissonant" Quartet.
As I have tried to indicate, the pseudo-communication chain is
problematic. Nowadays music scholars are beginning to shift their
focus from one end of the chain (the composer) to the other (the
listener). Thus Rose's ideas are particularly valuable, as he writes
of the ways music becomes meaningful, and even therapeutic, for
xvi Foreword

individual listeners. If the listener is understood to be active in the

creation of musical meaning, then he/she - more than the com-
poser - is the source (not simply the destination) of what is loosely
taken to be communication. Yet many listeners - such as the
essayists writing on K. 550 quoted above - still think they have
received communications from composers. The composers who
allegedly communicate with them are not the real flesh-and-blood
people who created the scores that the performers interpreted, but
rather a mental construct. Music theorist Nicholas Cook writes of
denying " that the author is a free agent, the source from which
meaning flows; instead the author is seen as a construction of
ideological forces, and meaning is seen as being negotiated between
those forces and the reader" (Cook, 1995: 426).
In their minds, each of the people who wrote interpretations of
the G Minor Symphony created their own Mozart, who is only
tangentially related to the Mozart who actually lived. These virtual
Mozarts are believed to communicate to these listener- interpreters,
but since all these Mozarts are different their "communications"
are different.

Time and therapy

Rose is quite right when he states in Chapter 5 that music " is
meaningful primarily through time." I find fascinating Rose's
explanations of how music's temporality gives it its power to help
neurologically damaged individuals, such as those suffering from
the sundown syndrome. Up to a point, it would seem to be the
cyclic and repetitive nature of music (e.g. the constant beat to
which listeners may entrain their bodily motions, and the four-
measure phrases succeeding one another throughout much of a
piece) that makes it calming. But if this were the whole story, it
would be the repetitive, unchanging nature of music, more than its
march through time, to which disturbed patients react. And then
we might expect the most repetitive music to be the most soothing.
But I wonder if that would be the case. I do not know if anyone
has tried to soothe patients by playing pieces like Steve Reich's
Piano Phase, Philip Glass's Music in Fifths, Maurice Ravel 's
Bolero, Erik Satie's Vexations, or certain piano sonatas of
Clementi, but I would doubt that such music would be as tran-
quilizing as the examples Rose cites, extending from country music
to that of Bach and Handel. This is because excessive repetition ,
 Foreword xvii

excessive sameness, begins to produce not an inner calm but rather

an inner tension: there is only so much repetition or predictability
that a listener can take before beginning to feel trapped by the
music, before experiencing the tension of a small sound-world
seeming to close in on the self. This is where temporal orderliness
can turn against itself: musical calm, I suspect, comes not from a
maximum of order but from a balanced admixture of (mostly)
order and (some) disorder, of regularity and irregularity, of pre-
dictability and surprise. Excessive order (as in the works just
mentioned) and excessive disorder (as in the second movement of
Ives's Fourth Symphony, for example, or in certain compositions
of Iannis Xenakis) can produce a profoundly unsettling experience
of musical time.
And so, let us not lose sight of music's ability to produce the
opposite effect from calming: music can upset otherwise calm
people! I am not sure it is the same music which does both, but
music with irregularities, discontinuities, etc. - music that goes
against the expected regularity which (as Rose demonstrates) is
what makes it a powerful tranquilizer - can be disturbing. The
harrowing effects of, for example, Beethoven's Grosse Fugue or the
first movement of Mahler's Seventh Symphony, or the barbaric
asymmetries of Stravinsky's Rite of Spring, depend in part on the
denial of regularity and of expectation. This music unsettles as
much as regular music that Rose mentions soothes. Hence this
music requires some getting used to, as does any new learning.
I do not wish to discount the extraordinary calming power of
certain music, but I do believe that music which deeply disquiets us
has an equally wondrous power. This is the ability to induce
strangely new, at once unfamiliar and shockingly familiar, emo-
tional states in listeners who are able to give themselves over to the
vulnerability of such musical experiences.
The question of the orderly versus the disorderly is ultimately
temporal: soothing music tends to be predominantly (but not
exclusively) temporally regular. Unsettling music tends to com-
promise its temporal regularity with striking irregularities. And so I
can, on one level, scarcely object to Rose's idea that "one normal
function of music is to support the illusion that time 'flows' in an
ultimately orderly way." But on another level this statement hardly
tells the whole story (nor does Rose believe that it does). Music
whose time flow is mostly ordered may soothe disturbed patients,
but it can bore other listeners. It may provide a comforting context
xviii Foreword

for dancing, or for entering into the rituals of a rock concert, or for
humming away in the background as we go about other tasks. But
music which is listened to with deep involvement and complete
concentration, without accompanying other activities, often
appeals not because of its even temporal flow but precisely because
of its deviations from the expected regularity to which listeners
have become entrained.
Rose calls musical time flow an illusion, and I agree. Perhaps it is
not time that flows in music but rather music that flows through
time. Perhaps time is not a river flowing by us, but rather it is we
who move, along with the music we hear, through a temporal
landscape. Whether or not time flows is a major philosophical
question, not likely to be resolved here. But it is useful to keep clear
these two alternative ways to regard musical temporality - the flow
of time through music versus the flow of music through time. Thus,
I think Rose is being too loose when, in discussing nonrational
intuition, he equates "the flow of time" with "human advance
through time. " One of these two concepts says that time moves
(and we observe it do so), the other that we move through (a
presumably static or eternal) time.
Rose is aware of this distinction, and of its insolubility. Thus he
is able to end one section of Chapter 5 by stating that " it is not
time that passes but we," yet near the beginning of the next section
he invokes music's power to destroy the sense of time's passage. 3
We can have such seemingly contradictory views of time because
time is not like any other life experience, nor like any other entity
or concept we know. Trying to pin it down as either in motion or
static serves only to obscure its profound pervasiveness in all we do
and all we are. As Rose states elsewhere, music offers the opportu-
nity for reordering beyond the conventional categories of temporal
succession.
If time neither solely flows nor solely stands still, what can we
say about music? That it too neither flows nor stands stilI? I prefer
to think of music as both moving through time and standing still.
Music accomplishes the apparent impossibility of moving and not
moving simultaneously. This is because virtually all music is at once
progressive and cyclic, linear and nonlinear, diachronic and syn-
chronic, irregular and regular, becoming and being. Music in which
cyclic, nonlinear, synchronic, and regular qualities predominate
may be the music that is most soothing, the music that works best
as "temporal prosthesis" for the neurologically impaired. Music in
 Foreword xix

which the progressive, linear, diachronic, and irregular qualities

prevail is the music which can shake some listeners to the depths of
their souls.
Interestingly, Rose discusses Javanese gamelan music, which is
unusually cyclic. The temporal regularity of this music would seem
to make it a good candidate for temporal prosthesis. I would
indeed be curious to know what their responses would be if
gamelan music were played for disturbed Western patients (J would
also be interested in its effect on troubled Javanese). Would its
unfamiliar sound world preclude it from calming them, or would
its ordered cyclicity soothe the patients?4
Actually, traditional Western music also contains temporal
cycles embedded within larger cycles, somewhat like those in
Javanese music. I am referring to musical meter and its hierarchic
properties (for example, a prototypical four-measure phrase acts
like a large, slow 4/4 measure). What is the distinction between
Javanese musical cycles and those of the West? A major temporal
difference is that the higher levels of the hierarchy in most Western
music contain frequent irregularities (when, for example, a phrase
expected to last four measures is extended by one or two "extra"
measures). These irregularities are subtle: we do not realize we are
experiencing, for example, a five-measure phrase until it fails to end
in its fourth measure. These so-called "hypermetric" irregularities
might make Western classical music not the best candidate for
"temporal prosthesis," and indeed the soft rock and country music
Rose mentions generally have regular hypermetrical structures.
Since Rose is particularly interested in music's temporal regu-
larity, it is hardly surprising that he is attracted to Epstein's theory
of proportional tempo. Epstein has shown a predilection in much
music for proportional tempos. Proportional tempo is indeed a
seductive force in music, particularly since the relative tempos of
the levels of the hypermetric hierarchy are usually 2: I and some-
times 3: I but only occasionally some other ratio. Neither com-
posers nor performers (nor, let us hope, listeners), however, are
slaves to proportional tempo. Not every performance or every
composition follows Epstein's theories. Non-proportional tempos
can be startling or even upsetting to a listener, but it is sometimes
in the very process of being confused - as in any new learning -
that listeners ultimately gain their greatest meanings from music.
Epstein does not discuss exceptions very much, since he is trying
to explicate the widespread occurrence of proportionality. However,
xx Foreword

as a composer and a listener, I know that I often relish, and am

taken by, and moved by unpredictable tempo relationships - pre-
cisely those that do not follow simple proportions. Unusual tempo
ratios can jolt me out of my complacency, and cause me to pay close
attention to the temporality of the music I am hearing. Such music
can be exhilarating precisely because of its unpredictability. In our
praise of music's orderliness, let us not lose sight of the irrational
nature of certain music (here I specifically go beyond Rose's "non-
rational" qualities of music), which can be among the most pro-
found music we have. Proportional tempo may well be the norm, it
may be expected, it may (as Epstein claims) have a biological basis,
and it may possibly even contribute to temporarily resetting a
dementing process in those who listen to it, but it is not inevitable.
I would caution Rose not to accept all of Epstein's ideas
uncritically. Epstein certainly offers a strong case for proportional
tempo (and for the cubic curve underlying rubato), but these ideas
remain controversial and have been challenged on a number of
grounds by various scholars.
I am impressed by the numerous instances Rose discusses
wherein music integrates and cures (to use Sacks's terms, as quoted
in Chapter 5). I find that the therapeutic uses of music speak
volumes about its fundamental importance. And I imagine that
well people react to music in some of the same ways. But I think it
is important to remember that not all music has therapeutic
potential, and that well listeners may react to aspects of the music
other than its temporal regularity. Disturbed patients, and patients
with Parkinson's disease, may respond to music's soothing regu-
larity because it fulfills a need they have for stability. But those of
us who live in the outside world, which in some ways is already too
full of order and predictability, may well crave - or at least
respond deeply to - musical instances of instability, irregularity,
discontinuity, unexpectedness, or irrationality. This may be
because we need some amount of those qualities, precisely because
they unsettle us. As Morse Peckham (1965) has suggested, in
dealing with the most challenging art - in trying to impose some
sort of order on, or discover some sort of order within, its apparent
disorder - we grow, as individuals and ultimately as a culture. This
kind of intellectual and emotional growth, occasioned by challeng-
ing and seemingly irrational music, is as necessary for the well
among us as the stability provided by temporally regular music is
for the disturbed and sick among us.
 Foreword xxi

Rose explains in Chapter 3 that music tends to lose some of its

irregularities in memory: "a system left to itself [I would have said
'to a perceiver'] tends to lose asymmetries and become more
regular. Memory reinforces this tendency; less good shapes tend to
be forgotten." Indeed, this fact has been substantiated through
experiments in music perception. Irregular music is often recalled
in a version more regular than what was originally heard. This
process of regularization is similar to what happens with muzak,
when it uses some music of the classical or romantic eras. Muzak's
arrangers often recompose the music they borrow so as to remove
striking harmonies or irregular meters or rhythms - things which
they believe may be too startling, too noticeable. As a result, the
music is supposed to soothe people in grocery stores or wherever,
and even encourage them to buy. It tends to annoy rather than
soothe those who are deeply involved in the music that is being
watered down, however. But background use of simplified music is
akin to the use of temporally regular music to calm the disturbed. I
am not against such uses of music, of course, but I think it is
important to remember the power of music, when carefully listened
to, to do just the opposite. "Music heard so deeply that it is not
heard at all, but you are the music while the music lasts," as T.S.
Eliot (1943) wrote.
Music's therapeutic power may go beyond temporal regularity
and muzak's simplifications. As Rose remarks (in Chapter 5),
music "may have to do with self-recognition, union, reinforce-
ment." This is, according to Rose, because of not only music's
periodicity and motion but also its patterns of tension and release.
Music may indeed mirror the mind in these ways. But, again, let us
also remember the darker side of music. Challenging music,
unusual music, may force us beyond our selves. It may help us to
forge new selves. It may provoke us with disunion rather than
welcome us with union. It may not mirror our minds as they are
but rather suggest ways to expand our minds, ways to have new
temporal experiences, ways to find new meanings, new personae.
Rose ends up saying that we create music "in our own image."
But some of the most profound composers (of all eras) have gone
beyond that, creating a music in the image not of what we are but
of what they glimpse we might become. Theirs is the music of the
greatest profundity, but it may also be the least useful as temporal
prosthesis. This is music in which there may, in fact, be an imba-
lance of tension and release (Rose suggests in Chapter 3 that a
xxii Foreword

dynamic balance of tension and release is central to all art), and in

which the frame is not always "secure and sensitive. " When I think
about the music that has moved me, and changed me, the most -
Beethoven's A Minor String Quartet (Opus 132), Mahler's Ninth
Symphony, Schubert's C Major String Quintet, Sibelius's Tapiola,
Bach's B Minor Mass, Brahms's Clarinet Quintet, Mozart's G
Minor Quintet, Ives's Trio, Bartok's Music for Strings, Percussion,
and Celeste, Stravinsky's Symphonies of Wind Instruments,
Messiaen's Chronocromie, Xenakis's Eonta - I find music of con-
siderable tension (with releases, to be sure, but not necessarily with
a balance between the two). This is music in which "returning to
the central tonality of the 'home' key" (Chapter 3) may not
"always bring a relief of tension." This is music which does not
consistently offer "a dynamically-balanced holding environment of
virtual tension and release." I have difficulty imagining such pieces
as soothing mentally or physically impaired patients, because
soothing is precisely what they do not try to be.

Music and words

In Chapter 7, Rose recounts fascinating stories about people turn-
ing to music at times of severe stress. These stories are compelling
and moving. They make me want to know more: how does music
serve to comfort the frightened? I suspect the answer is something
more than music's temporal regularity, something more than what
seems to calm disturbed mental patients. Echoing Zuckerkandl,
Rose suggests that singing together melts away people's separate-
ness. This is no doubt true, but why is music-making such an
efficient communal activity for bringing people together? How does
music succeed so well in uniting people under stress?
Since the music produced by people bonding together in the face
of adversity is usually texted, I wonder particularly why singing has
its unique power, compared to simply reciting verses or humming
music without words. Rose is on the right track when he states in
Chapter 7 that "the content of the song was always secondary to
the music." By "content" he must mean verbal content. But does
not the real content of song lie in the amalgamation of the words
and the tones? In the most effective songs - including of course
songs that bring a sense of strength to threatened people - the total
experience of singing and/or listening is more than the sum of the
experiences of hearing the words and listening to the music.
 Foreword xxiii

Rose suggests a reason why people under emotional stress turn

to song, why words alone are not sufficient to provide comfort and
solidarity. As he notes, tunes are experienced as entities, not note
by note. 5 The unitary wholeness of a musical melody is not an
objective fact. Composers and performers do not communicate
wholeness in the melodies they produce. As Rose explains in
Chapter 3, a musical line is not literally an organic whole, but if it
has certain requisite characteristics, listeners will sense in it a
sufficient similarity to their own inner notion of wholeness that
they will mentally constitute it as unitary.
The same is true of words, I believe, but less so. When I listen to
speech, I of course take in the meaning (as I construe it in my
mind) of a verbal phrase as a whole, but I am also aware of the
individual words and morphemes 6 that help to convey that mean-
ing. But I am less aware of the individual phonemes, 7 just as I am
less aware of individual tones in a melody.8
I would like to suggest, on a hunch and without any scientific
justification, that people are less aware of individual notes in a
heard melody than of morphemes (or syllables or words) in heard
speech. Why would this be? Perhaps because we are all experts at
listening to and parsing speech, whereas most of us are amateurs at
singing and at analytic listening to music. Amateur musicians hear
complete gestalts more than individual components; experts hear
both. When words are sung to music, the integrated listening that
is second nature to music listeners casts its unifying influence over
the words, so that we hear musical gestalts binding together verbal
morphemes.
The reason that melodies may be experienced as more nearly
unitary than speech may be this: there are far fewer possible tones
that can continue a melody begun than there are words that may
come next in a speech pattern. The repertory of tones available in
most musical languages is far smaller than the repertory of words
or syllables available in most natural languages. Hence strings of
morphemes may go many places, but strings of notes are more
constrained, and hence are understood more as a unit.
It is true that natural languages have relatively small repertories
of phonemes, however, but I do not believe that we construct
meanings from the phonemes as we hear them so much as we react
to the morphemes, which have far greater variety. The phonemes
have a basic importance, of course - it is they that we literally hear.
But it seems to me that the morphemes, more than phonemes,
xxiv Foreword

correspond to individual notes of a melody, and musical notes

create greater continuity and greater unity than do spoken
morphemes.
Music can provide a comfort of wholeness that is stronger than
that of speech. By singing we bind the words together into unitary
experiences, and being unitary is precisely what is needed in the
face of the fragmented experiences of fear and loss. Words alone
can support the fragmentation of a damaged personality, whether
hurt through loss of a loved one, fear, or illness. But words sung to
music resist that breaking apart and offer to the person who sings,
and to the people who listen, the integration that has been taken
from their lives.
As a professional musician, and in particular as a professional
analyst of music, I have a more difficult time achieving that
wholeness than does someone who listens to melodies only as
entities, someone who does not have the habit of pulling melodies
apart to look for relationships between individual tones. It is often
noted that professional musicians and music scholars may lose
some of their emotional responses to music, the very responses that
attracted them to music earlier in their lives. This paradoxical
change is sometimes explained by an alleged shift of musical
responses from the right to the left brain hemisphere (relevant
research is cited in Kramer, 1988b: 404, notes 31 - 32). But another
explanation is what I have just suggested, inspired by Rose's ideas:
that amateur listeners and singers sense mainly the wholeness of
melodies, which have the power to concatenate possibly disparate
words. Music for them is an integrating and an integrated experi-
ence, an ordered experience, an experience of continuity and
wholeness. Once musicians begin to pull melodies apart into indi-
vidual motives or single notes - whether in rehearsal or under
music analysis - then it becomes less automatic, and possibly more
difficult, to sense only their wholeness. And so music performers
(particularly those who play or sing from notated scores) and
music theorists may have a richer understanding of music than
amateurs do, but they also may find it rare to be profoundly moved
by continuous, integrated melodies.
For most people, music is comforting and integrative, and it has
the ability to console and to cure. It is therefore hardly surprising
that music plays an important part in almost everyone's life. There
are no cultures on earth without music. Music pervades our daily
lives, our rituals, our religions, our leisure activities, our times of
 Foreword xxv

stress and loss. Few people have asked how or why music is so
potent and pervasive. Now, thanks to Rose's groundbreaking
work, we can begin to understand from a psychoanalytic perspec-
tive some of the reasons behind music's ubiquity and power - the
power to stretch as well as to soothe. 9

Jonathan D. Kramer
Professor of Music
Columbia University

Notes
2 An example: Justin London suggested (in a private conversation) that
communication must be present for the jokes in Haydn's music to work.
Even today, two centuries after the composer placed his rather specific
messages into his scores, listeners "get" the jokes. The communication
chain is complete, and listeners understand what Haydn wanted them to
understand. So, communication is possible. But jokes are more specific
than most musical expression, and I maintain that, on average, most
Western art music fails to communicate specific ideas from composer to
listener.
2 Perhaps the most influential statement of this attitude is Wimsatt and
Beardsley's (1954) "Intentional Fallacy."
3 I suggest that these apparent contradictions arise from trying to think of
time in the same way we conceive other life experiences and other
entities. The best way out of this conundrum, I believe, is that offered by
Arlow (as quoted in Chapter 5): "time does not flow or stand still."
Seeger's idea (also quoted in Chapter 5) is equally relevant: "the
experience of time flow . .. is . . . a socially constructed form of order
imposed on experience."
4 Indeed, Rose does not tell us enough about therapeutic music, although
he does mention, in Chapter 7, that not all music works therapeutically,
and some pieces may even be epileptogenic. Some of the things I still
want to know are: Does the same music always calm the same patients?
Different patients? Does some music soothe some patients but not
others? What aspects, if any, do the most soothing musics have in
common?
5 This is certainly true of short melodies, but those whose duration
exceeds that of the perceptual present may be conceived, but are not
perceived, as entities. However, listeners do chunk longer tunes into
segments of manageable length, which are felt as unitary entities.
6 A morpheme is the smallest unit of language that carries meaning, such
as a syllable. A morpheme cannot be subdivided without losing its
meaning. Thus a morpheme is analogous to a molecule (but not to an
atom, which does not possess the same characteristics as does the
substance of which it is a part). The musical analog of a morpheme is a
xxvi Foreword

motive - a small figure with a recognizable rhythmic and/or melodic

shape.
7 A phoneme is the smallest unit of language that has a distinct sound,
such as what is represented in written language by a letter. In spoken
language, a phoneme consists of a single sound. Morphemes usually
consist of more than one phonemes. A phoneme is thus analogous to an
atom. The musical analog of a phoneme is an individual note or tone.
8 Unless I force myself to listen analytically, something I do reasonably
often because I am a music theorist but which I did far less often in my
younger years, before I had learned how to pull apart and analyze
melodies.
9 I would like to acknowledge the help of Norma Kramer and Deborah
Bradley, who carefully and critically read preliminary versions of this
foreword.

References
Atlas, E.E. (1995), "The Magic of Mozart's Music Soothes a Hurting
Heart", Sarasota Herald-Tribune, 22 January.
Cook, N.J. (1995), "Music Theory and the Postmodern Muse: An
Afterword", in E.W. Marvin and R. Hermann (eds), Concert Music,
Rock, and Jazz Since 1945: Essays and Analytical Studies, Rochester,
NY: University of Rochester Press.
Eliot, T.S. (1943), "The Dry Salvages", Four Quartets, New York:
Harcourt, 1968.
Kramer, J.D. (l988a), Listen to the Music, New York: Schirmer Books.
- - (I 988b), The Time of Music, New York: Schirmer Books.
- - (1997), "Postmodern Concepts of Musical Time", Indiana Theory
Review 17/2.
Nattiez, J.-J. (1990), Music as Discourse, trans. e. Abbate, Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Peckham, M. (1965), Man's Rage for Chaos, Philadelphia: Chilton.
Wimsatt, W. and Beardsley, M.e. (1954), "The Intentional Fallacy", The
Verbal Icon, Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press.
Preface

Why do music and abstract art pack universal emotional appeal?

And, sometimes, "therapeutic" efficacy?
The main thesis of this book is that they tap into a biological
need to grow and develop by newly reintegrating thought and
feeling .
This is key to a creative expansion of awareness. Thus, the
inquiry itself sheds light on the creative process.
My focus on this theme stems from long-standing interest in the
arts and from clinical experience as a psychoanalyst. In the latter
capacity, I continue to be struck by the shortcomings of words
alone to touch emotions in order to effect change and growth. In
contrast, abstract art, especially music, can have a direct emotional
appeal. Without having to be representational, and irrespective of
words or eventual verbalization, they both generate feelings and
help to process them.
Closely related to this is their mysterious "therapeutic" efficacy.
Like truly satisfying work or the magical mutuality of love, music
and art appear to rank among the " natural" means for expanding
the apprehension of the riches of reality.
My psychoanalytic understanding suggests that this draws upon
the earliest wordless - largely vocal and kinesthetic - emotional
rapport between infants and their parents. The infant's survival
actually depends on the quality of this nonverbal relationship. So,
too, do emotional growth and development. Later on, one's
attachment to art encourages ongoing elaboration and refinement
of emotions, thus deepening the quality of life.
This volume is based on my trilogy on nonverbal aesthetic form
and psychoanalysis (G.1. Rose, 1980, 1987, 1996). It incorporates
an overview of that work but also advances the project of building
xxviii Preface

a theory of psychoanalytic aesthetics with new material, as well as

by concentrating primarily on music as the ultimate abstract art.
While fundamentally beholden to Winnicott's (1953) theory of an
intermediate transitional area between self and objects, and the spirit
of Marion Milner, it is essentially an original body of work. Most of
the chapters have never been previously published, apart from "On
the Shores of Self: Samuel Beckett's Molloy" (1973); "The Music Of
Time in Faulkner's Light in August" (1979); " In Pursuit of Slow
Time: Modern Music and a Clinical Vignette" (1984).
The nature of the project is such that it seems fitting to share
some of its personal background .
As a youngster I kept being reminded by my parents that these
were the best years of my life. I had every reason to be happy, they
rightly said; and they, every reason to expect that I be grateful in
return. I could only agree. But felt more woeful than ever.
Fortunately, along the way I learned that nothing could beat
Beethoven's piano sonatas for expressing emotion - safely. And
the best place to listen to my sister play Beethoven's sonatas (far
better than I could ever hope to) was lying under the piano. From
rage to yearning, I could connect with a whole range of emotion
without being accused of being ungratefully unhappy.
There I could listen to myself, too: feel feelings, think thoughts,
think feelings, feel thoughts. And be whole again.
The same baby grand piano and a couch have long shared space
in my office. There, my entire adult professional life has been spent
listening - behind the couch or often face to face - to other people's
thoughtful feelings , feelingful thoughts - and my own responsive
resonances. The organizing principle has been the importance of
exercising minds of our own in such a way that feeling and thought
are equal partners.
In my office I listen for the "music" - i.e., the feeling - behind
others' speech and behavior as I try to help them with their task of
mastery and integration. As music led me under the piano to find a
wholeness of thoughts and feelings, the "music" of feeling guides
me through seemingly endless variations toward the inner
coherence of underlying identity themes.

***
It is astonishing that, until recently, feelings - the very origin of
psychoanalysis - have been down-played in psychoanalysis.
Likewise, art. It has been almost a mantra in organized psycho-
 Preface xxix

analysis that it is a science and hence worthy of respect. Art is not

only not science, it is based on its very opposite: illusion. Art is also
worthy of respect, of course. There is no denying that great writers
anticipated psychoanalytic truths.
Whatever the reasons, whether the security of a century of
accumulated experience and expansion, or the threat from rival-
rous contenders - its own intellectual offspring - the centrality of
feelings is being restored into the field of psychoanalysis. Art
stands ready to be mined as a treasured resource for their study.
Just as psychoanalysis can shed light on why one needs art, art can
help teach psychoanalysis more about emotions.
Since art can play a significant role in helping to modulate
emotions, as indeed I so maintain, then we need to rethink the
primacy accorded to psychoanalytic insight via verbalization on
the couch as the royal route to access and integrate feelings with
thought. Nonverbal affect embodied in abstract art like music may
need to be assigned a status alongside the established importance
of narrative fantasy, free association, interpretation and insight.
Contrary to what I was taught to believe in years of school-room
Latin, it appears that first-class thinking may not be substantially
limited to if not synonymous with language.
It may be suspected that raising such possibilities reflects early,
unresolved rebelliousness now aimed at analytic orthodoxy. And so
it may. But, if so, it also arises from a richly savored personal and
cultural life and , most importantly, the privilege of a fulsome
career in clinical psychoanalysis, itself. So I believe.

***
It remains to say a few words about the use of the terms "feeling,"
"emotion" and " affect," which I have been using fairly loosely.
"Feeling" and "emotion" are almost synonymous except that while
we are aware of feelings we may not always be aware of emotions.
Emotions are accompanied by physical manifestations such as
shortness of breath, or rapid heart beat; these may then call one's
attention to the existence of underlying feelings. As for the term
"affect," because of the metapsychological thicket that surrounds
the concept, I try to limit its use to technical matters such as affect
regulation or nonverbal affect.
A recent explication (Matthis, 2000) brings needed clarification to
the concept. Affect arises from an affective matrix whose ultimate
location is embodied within the nervous system. Affect comprises
xxx Preface

feelings, emotions, and "affect equivalents" in the form of psycho-

somatic symptoms or somatic illnesses. Because of its basic origin in
the body, affect reflects an ongoing bodily potential to react in two
different directions: psychically with conscious, subjective feelings
or emotions, as well as to respond physically with the objective
physical signs of "affect equivalents." Thus, most importantly, the
term " affect" emphasizes the fact of embodiment for feelings, emo-
tions and affect equivalents.
The same bodily aspect holds for words. To Lacan's dictum that
the unconscious is structured like a language we may rejoin that the
ego is first and foremost a bodily ego. As Freud pointed out in one of
his earliest works (On Aphasia, 1891), words are also physical events
arising from sensory sources in parental language and intonation.
Early analysts found bodily sources of language in the infant's
gestures (Ferenczi, 1913), sphincter activity (Sharpe, 1940), and
nursing patterns (Spitz, 1957). The philosopher, Cassirer (1923),
demonstrated the first conceptual differentiations of language in
the body.
The physicality of words is exploited most eloquently in poetry
where a context of pulse and silences convey sense through sound
(Rose, 1980). Thus relating poetry to music.
Words, music, feelings - and embodiment.
As music led me originally to what I consider the heart of psy-
choanalysis, namely, feeling, it seems a natural development that
the perspectives of psychoanalysis now lead me more deeply into
the nature of music and abstract visual art.
As I sought words to express feelings, I learned to value music
the more: it frames the silences untouched by words. And the
mystery. Contemplating which seems not an unfitting task for the
later days of one's years.
Among the most puzzling mysteries is the almost magical way in
which music can sometimes almost instantly, if temporarily, "jump-
start" normal feelings , motion and identity where these have been
seemingly destroyed by inexorable neurological disease. Specula-
tions are offered in terms of (I) the power of "implicit motion" in
music reinforcing faulty neurobiological rhythms, and (2) all art
stimulating affect-regulating internalizations - both old, preverbal
ones and perhaps providing external transferential models for
building new, nonverbal ones.
This book is not primarily a clinical investigation. Therefore,
although it makes use of case examples, it does not rely mainly on
 Preface xxxi

psychoanalytic observational data as evidence emerging from the

couch. Rather, the methodology makes use of basic psychoanalytic
concepts - the interplay of primary and secondary processes, the
implicit motion embedded in their patterns of tension and release -
plus trauma theory and data from early development and neuro-
science; it applies these tools to such questions as how nonverbal
abstract art integrates thought and feeling.
The effort succeeds, I believe, in contributing new heuristic per-
spectives to perplexing problems. Perhaps more importantly, it
stimulates new questions such as how ongoing emotional differ-
entiation and psychic integration take place other than by verbal
insight and analytic working through.
For the benefit of lay readers who are put off by technical
jargon, I try as far as possible to favor ordinary usage. For
example, primary and secondary processes are often rendered into
imagination and knowledge or cognition. However, these terms,
whether technical or popular, are never divorced from their under-
lying economic attributes of tension (the long-circuiting of second-
ary process) or release (the short-circuiting of primary process).
These are retained as fundamental to the argument.
Freud's own writing style might well serve as a model. It
illustrates a "marriage" of primary process imaginative freedom
with secondary process logical control such that the "music" of his
prose "enacts" the ideational content (Mahoney, 1987). I would
like to think that a combination of some degree of poetical style
and terse, nontechnical clarity helps bring my work to the
appreciative attention of receptive readers.

***
The book as a whole owes its being to my life companion.
Deprived of self and memory in the long dying of vascular
dementia, a radiant smile at times still bore witness that a soul yet
lived. None other than hers who was our Anne, it inspirits this
effort.
This page intentionally left blank
Acknowledgments

I gratefully acknowledge the use of personal material by Etienne

Abelin; the generous guidance to pertinent references by Eugene
Goldberg; the council of Morton Reiser and Robert Scharf not to
exceed a prudent depth in neuroscience; a shared intellectual
affinity with the late David Epstein across the boundaries of our
respective fields of psychoanalysis and music; the tactful correction
by Jonathan Kramer of errors in the use of musical terminology;
the drawings of Giacometti's figures contributed by an anonymous
artist; the reliable backing of friend and agent, Sidney Kramer; the
enthusiastic interest of grandson , Alexander Rose; the unfailing
moral support of John Gedo; the late Jose Barchilon; and others.
Thanks are extended to the publishers for permission to reprint
(as Chapters 2, 4 and 6) the following previously published article
and chapters by the author: Rose, G.J. (1973), "On the Shores of
Self: Samuel Beckett's Molloy", Psychoanaly tic Review 60: 587-
604, © 1973 The Guilford Press, New York; Rose, G.J. (1980),
" The Orchestration of Time in William Faulkner's Light in
August", in G .J . Rose The Power of Form: A Psychoanalytical
Approach to Aesthetic Form by permission of International
Universities Press, Inc., © 1980 International Universities Press,
Inc.; Rose, G.J. (1987), " In Pursuit of Slow Time" , in G.J. Rose
Trauma and Mastery in Life and Art (expanded with an original
docudrama, 1996) by permission of International Universities
Press, Inc., © 1987 International Universities Press, Inc.
This page intentionally left blank
Chapter 1

Between words and music

Where does aesthetic responsiveness arise? A prototype may well

lie in the nonverbal emotional rapport and empathy of the
earliest infant- parent interplay. Within this matrix are found, too,
the rhythmic sing-song and syllables that universally comprise the
rudiments of music and words. Reaching further back, there is
the interactional synchrony that neonates manifest within twenty
minutes of birth: they react to voices with synchronized movements
(cited by Benzon, 2001). And still further, since auditory systems
become active three to four months before birth, perhaps the fetus
becomes entrained to speech patterns in utero. Little is known about
any of this.
We know perhaps even less about the continuum between
knowing and feeling. Or words and music. We do know that words
and music are both rooted in the body. As Freud (1891) made clear
in a number of his writings beginning with On Aphasia, every word
has been bathed in sensory sources coming from parental speech
and intonation. There is no such thing as a disembodied word.
Emboldened by recent neuroscience, it would seem more apparent
than ever that cognition and feeling are basically inseparable and not
only in infancy. In the course of development and the attrition of
daily life they become more differentiated from each other.
It is a common problem of clinical practice to attempt to rejoin
them and thereby help restore a sense of inner and outer wholeness
without the danger of flooding. The early discovery of transference,
then counter-transference, and now an increased sensitivity to
intersubjectivity are among the tools in this direction.
As for words and music, words tend to cluster towards the
knowing end of the intellect- feeling spectrum; music towards the
opposite pole.
2 Between words and music

Let us begin with clinical technique and then turn to other

matters which arguably can be located somewhere in the mid-range
between words and music: the difference in how verbal and
nonverbal information is registered; the contribution of musical
sensitivity to therapeutic communication including predicting
suicidality; some bodily correlates of poetry and music; and
recent thinking about the neurobiological basis of the sensory
qualities of our subjective world. We will return specifically to
words and music via one musician's brave attempt to translate
eight bars of music into words - only to demonstrate once again its
ineffability within what has been termed the "mysterious leap"
between body and mind.

***
It is a truism of psychoanalysis that insight without emotional
involvement is of little therapeutic value. How can treatment unite
thinking and feeling?
The long-established principle is that of "working through." For
however long it takes, one hopes that a new cognitive insight will
eventually percolate down toward the depths of one's affective
core; at the same time, the defenses that keep deeper feelings
sequestered from mature thought may gradually yield to the
emotional constancy of the treatment alliance and tactful, timely
interpretations of its transferential distortions.
Alas, life is short and psychoanalysis - perhaps necessarily -
long.
In actual practice, experienced therapists find their own guiding
principles the better to bridge between abstract theory and the
pressing needs of reality.
Here are some of mine.
The arts sensitized me, and clinical experience confirmed, that
psychic boundaries are permeable rather than being firm structures.
Accomplishing what language does not readily do, the arts sub-
jectify the outer world and objectify the inner; they show that the
boundaries of subjectivity and objectivity are more permeable than
traditional psychoanalytic theory used to teach. (Think of Munch 's
painting of the experience of a kiss as a graphic representation of a
meltdown of boundaries. Or the conflation of inner and outer
surfaces in a Mobius strip.) They pioneered the insight that there
is no immaculate perception without subjective interpretation, no
 Between words and music 3

reality without imagination, no thought without feeling . Con-

temporary neuroscience is adding heft to these principles.
It is useful to think that the constant interplay of imagination
and knowledge helps each evolve to higher levels of development
and complexity. One does not simply outgrow and abandon earlier
forms of imagination and graduate to mature secondary process
knowledge of reality. A less simplistic (and less dour) view: the past
is an ever-present accompaniment and an only partially accessible
resource, supplying the potential for both harmony and dissonance.
A child may outgrow an actual comfort blanket or other tran-
sitional object; but much of adult feelingful thinking continues to
take place in Winnicott's (1953) intermediate area. Here a transi-
tional process of continuous interplay of inner and outer (Rose,
1978) in an open system (von Bertalanffy, 1968) reflects the
dynamic between a breathing self and a changing reality - each
shaping the other to create a unique synchronous totality. It is a
minor, everyday version of the creative process bringing novelty to
the tired, old familiar and building a bridge to the new and
heretofore strange.
Ego boundaries expand and constrict as a person's need for
privacy alternates with the wish to share, be silent as well as com-
municate, savor distance as well as closeness, regress perhaps to
consolidate further before venturing again to progress and explore.
All these dynamic shifts arise out of a field of dynamic forces
which may be understood in time. Or not. In the meantime, pro-
fessional name-calling such as "Resistance!" connotes an adver-
sarial static state and recalls an outdated early era in the history of
psychoanalysis.
The therapeutic process may usefully be thought of in terms of
music. Music is not about playing notes; music consists of silences
that breathe and shape the sound, engendering depths of feeling to
be experienced without the necessity for immediate understanding.
As in music, a holding environment based on attunement
and stability provides a reliable structure conducive to affect.
Unrelieved structure, however, like a blank screen, may degenerate
into a shared torpor rather than encouraging the freedom to
discover and learn to express affect.
In addition to interpretation, other active measures consistent
with objective neutrality and abstinence may well be required to
promote affective interaction and keep the process from languish-
ing. Flexible spontaneity and a readiness to improvise are called for,
4 Between words and music

such as introducing discrete doses of controlled dissonance like

changes of tempo and rhythm.
All this depends, of course, on the therapist's own subjectivity:
constraints and possibilities inherent in one's character and
humanity, assurance arising from the thoroughness of one's
personal training analysis, an ingrained habit of self-appraisal, and
the confidence that accrues from successful clinical experience and
learning from one's mistakes. For the practitioner, the immense
good fortune of a full personal life may be nothing less than a
mental hygiene necessity.
Flexibility and spontaneity, however much hedged with cautions
about respecting traditional parameters of neutrality and abstin-
ence, the constancy of a reliable holding environment, and the
necessity for self-appraisal should not be dismissed as mere boiler-
plate. On the other hand, since nothing short of a handbook of
clinical illustrations would be sufficient, I will limit myself to
sketching some of the ways I try to connect with a patient's
unverbalized affect - without scrupling too much about whether
this is " real analysis" or "just therapy."
Simply put, I try to discern and speak in the person's natural
language. This includes noting, accommodating and perhaps
matching - not aping - phonological features of speech such as
tempo, rhythm and volume. Also pertinent are the frequency and
quality of silences, accompanying body language, congruity or
discrepancy between style and content. I pay particular attention to
trying to discover the latently operating metaphors that so often
connect content with underlying feeling. All this may happen
quickly or take many sessions.
The phonology and metaphors seem closely related to and
embodied in much that is nonverbal. As I become comfortable with
the style, like attending to a new language and adopting some of it,
I frequently notice a mutual unbending taking place. Even the
breathing seems easier. These considerations must be closely
related to empathy, for it has been noted that adult partners who
match their patterns of vocalization and pauses tend to feel more
empathically related (Jaffe and Feldstein, 1970: 95- 96).
A personal example far removed from professional life comes to
mind and may convey what is difficult to express. As a pre-
adolescent I spent some summers on a farm and hung out with the
adult son of the owner, who seemed to enjoyed teaching me how to
do some of the chores like milking. As a young adult years later I
 Between words and music 5

traveled to that part of the country and looked for the farm. It was
boarded up and seemingly abandoned. Walking over the fields I
saw a man. As we approached each other I called out, "Fred?" He,
squinting, replied: "You look kinda natural!"
I often wondered later what went into the homey acknowledge-
ment. Had I unconsciously reverted to an earlier gait, and/or
perhaps mirrored his? Was it this whole gestalt, as well as my voice
and "tonality" - certainly not my features for I was now grown in
total appearance - that had allowed him to recognize me through
himself as " kinda natural" ?
As in relating this anecdote, as time has gone on I am not shy
about using personal examples to illustrate something or make a
point if it is apposite. It sets an example of my feeling comfortable
and inviting the other to join me. I may also free associate aloud to
something the person has said, or has not said, or expressed
posturally or in some other nonverbal way. It sets an example of
daring to be free even if it risks looking foolish or making a
mistake, which I am also ready to admit. An instructor long ago
defined doing therapy as: "two people sitting in a room, one is
probably anxious, and it better not be you!"
In the ambience that I am describing, humor comes naturally to
me. At its best, its use does not detract from always remaining
serious if seldom solemn. In the course of time I have refined its
use in therapy and have previously discussed it (Rose, 1969). It
is an important aspect of my style along with striving to find
the right metaphors, being guided largely by nonverbal cues, and
using myself as a human instrument to invite a freer affective
interchange.
As an example of using myself as an instrument, there are times
when ironic self-directed humor emerges spontaneously. This can
serve as an inoculation against unhealthy self-importance. It also
sets a further example that there be no immunity - myself included
- from detached objectivity. When directed towards the other
person, it licenses me to be direct without being cruel, as it also
counteracts any tendency to infantilize by being overly compassio-
nate and over-identified. When it occasionally misfires, it offers an
opportunity for clarification and a yet closer working alliance in
which it is clear that I am not above - indeed, I invite - mutual
criticism and candor.

***
6 Between words and music

Progress in cognitive psychology has brought a clarifying restate-

ment of the problem of connecting underlying feeling with con-
scious thinking, if not how to solve it. Instead of feeling versus
thinking, it offers a different duality: verbal versus nonverbal
information processing. They are encoded and organized in differ-
ent formats and are stored in separate systems specialized for each
type. We turn now to summarizing some of the work of Wilma
Bucci (1985, 1997).
Mental representations appear to be stored in dual codes: verbal
and nonverbal. Verbal information is encoded and stored in lin-
guistic form and may involve abstract phonological or semantic
codes. The verbal system is activated by words, whether in the
form of inner speech or verbal thought.
Nonverbal input is encoded and stored in perceptual forms
which includes kinesthetic and visceral as well as other sensory
representations. The nonverbal system is directly activated by
pictures, sounds, tastes, smells and feelings.
Experimental studies show how important imagery is in forming
mental representations; and that both imagery and emotion are
associated with the nonverbal system. Since thought depends on
mental representations, which require imagery, which is stored
in the nonverbal system, it follows that the nonverbal system is
closely implicated in thought. More cogently, language can no
longer be considered the major vehicle of thought; the nonverbal,
imagistic component of thought - closely related to affect - may
be an equal if silent partner in cognition.
Repression is more likely to involve the nonverbal system. This is
where much painful material may be stored, de-linked from words
and never represented in verbal form.
The problem for psychoanalytic treatment is that the verbal and
nonverbal systems are linked but often insufficiently. A person's
affective core is linked to nonverbal perceptual schemata. Treat-
ment must go beyond dealing with verbalizable mental contents
and reach down to the nonverbal levels where so much of the
emotion is encoded. Free association and dreams aid in this. So,
too, do the various devices beyond verbal interpretation that we
have been discussing, like humor, and the analyst using his/her own
personal style as an instrument for attunement and change.
Verbal interpretations often leave untouched emotional material
that either has never been linked to words, as in alexithymia or
somatization, or has been wrongly named. Language is necessary
 Between words and music 7

to disentangle faulty verbal connections that reflect emotional

confusions.
Common examples in my own experience: disagreeing and being
disagreeable; liking and being alike; objective aloneness and sub-
jective loneliness; having wishes or needs and being wishful or
needy; being objectively broke as against feeling poor, deprived, or
helpless; authoritative and authoritarian; making judgments and
being judgmental; moral and moralistic.
In addition to such linguistic disentanglement, Bucci appears
to support the traditional view that conveying insight through
language is the goal of psychoanalysis. Is linkage to language
necessary to influence emotions encoded in the nonverbal system
and thus effect structural change? One may question this partly on
the basis of her own work, which shows that there is more to
thought than language.
By now, many therapists agree that there is more to treatment
than words. Much change in analytic therapy comes by way of an
internalization of the emotional ambience of the therapeutic rela-
tionship, which in turn effects a more benevolently critical relation
with oneself. Though this may never become fully conscious or
verbalizable, it may yet prove enduring.

***
A recent book (Knoblauch, 2000) is a treasury of clinical illus-
trations of the phonological as contrasted to the semantic
significance of verbalization. As a former jazz musician as well as
therapist, the author is able to spell out how music can serve as a
descriptive analog for tuning in to affect. This has the merit of
helping to make manifest what has undoubtedly been implicit and
intuitive in the hands of many therapists.
The following summarizes relevant aspects.
Jazz provides a way of thinking about some nonverbal dimen-
sions of psychoanalytic dialogue like tone, rhythm , tempo, volume,
and gesture. In therapy these are intuitive and silent considerations;
but among members of a musical ensemble group playing and
improvising together they are explicitly musical. Improvising and
accompaniment in jazz can be used as a metaphor for a clinical
technique for interacting with certain patients.
In a therapeutic dialogue musical considerations can serve to
sensitize a therapist to nonverbal cues and thereby do more
8 Between words and music

skillfully what he/she may be doing intuitively - such as bring out a

nonverbalized affect, introduce a new facet of personality, or
prevent a premature closure.
Rhythm, especially, is the connecting link between music and the
body's respiration and pulse. Respiration and pulse may become
entrained - namely, synchronized - with musical rhythms to pro-
vide either soothing regularity or jolting tempo shifts and breaks.
Some of the elements that provide order in ensemble playing
are rhythm, tone, and each performer taking turns for soloing. In
therapy, such nonverbal elements assume equal importance with the
semantic content of the verbal interchange. A therapist may employ
a rhythmic dimension to slow or accelerate the pace, increase the
arousal, or, by using an upward turn of tone, to avoid sounding
officious.
These microdimensions of nonverbal communication were first
recognized in infant- caregiver observations. There it was repeat-
edly observed that each of the pair influences the other's actions
and feelings long before verbal communication is available to
them. Out of such interactions with each other, temporal shapes of
feeling emerge continuously. As music structures the experience of
time, so do these interactions.
Attending to the nonverbal, musical dimensions of the dialogue
can provide a point of departure for dealing with otherwise inac-
cessible, dissociated affects. As in the original work with infants,
one may, for example, match a patient's vocal rhythm, tone, and
volume and then slowly reduce and soften them in a gradual
process of nonverbal affect regulation.
Knoblauch makes clear that the type of patient he is describing is
often so inarticulate and sensitive to intrusiveness that little more
than the most tactfully timed, nonverbal accompaniment - informed
by musical considerations - is tolerable until considerable progress is
accomplished. This is a slow process of symbolic elaboration and
silent dialogue. At a much later stage this may be supplemented by
verbal interpretation to facilitate gradual verbal articulation of
feelings and eventually self-regulation and integration.
A cautionary note may still be added, however. If the interplay
between patient and therapist be thought of as a musical collabora-
tion, we must respect that each intrinsically represents a different
perspective. Also, the balance between them is constantly shifting
in focus and weight. A "democratic" principle of intersubjective
equality can be misleading if applied uncritically.
 Between words and music 9

On the one hand, it is the patient who has composed the material
and is the primary performing artist; the therapist is the sensitively
attentive, supportive, non-intrusive accompanist and as such is
essential but secondary.
However, while the therapist surely acts as accompanist, there is
more to his/her function to be applied when it becomes possible:
for example, experienced listener, critic and professional tutor. The
patient does not come (and pay!) in order to enjoy solo privileges
only, but for a basically asymmetrical working partnership.
Patient and therapist each has priority in the area where he/she
has most to contribute. From this, meaning may emerge or be
discovered, and perhaps surprise either one or both and eventually
turn out to be the work primarily of either, both, or, indeed,
essentially indivisible.

***
In contrast to the foregoing account of what makes for "musically"
good sessions, the following communication from a young
musician friend just beginning treatment offers a lucid account of
what getting off to a bad "musical" start feels like. I quote with his
permission.

In the first session I felt rather free but there were things that I
felt uncomfortable with: his interest and way of listening and
talking seemed a bit acted. I had a hard time feeling where he is
as a person. As it was the first session I didn't let it bother me
too much.
I walked out of my second session really down and out and
after today's (third) session I'm really not sure if I want to
continue working with him.
I can't locate him as a person and feel like it's a space of
theatre (the theatre of therapist and patient) which wouldn't be
all that bad if I didn't feel that there's not much space for
emotions. In the way he talks and moves, somehow affected,
nervous. I imagined him on stage as a musician. I believe I
would be really put off. I can imagine having a creative session
with him every now and then but I don't see a basis for a
relationship of several years.
It all reminds me of the feeling I get (and other musicians,
too) when I play chamber music with a new person: he/she may
10 Between words and music

be a great musician, but if the chemistry isn't right and the

energy and soundcolors don't match, it just doesn't work.
I think what bothered me most was a lack of smooth tran-
sition between this guy's silences and his talking. The language
- the sound - did not meet the silence. So I wasn't able to
perceive an organic rhythm of breath etc. - and the silence
(and the talking) didn't mean much. The silences seemed empty
and the sounds forced, that is, not enough tension or too
much.
Wonder what you think ...

***
GeneralIy speaking, musicians like the one just cited are probably
more sensitive to attributes of pitch, prosody and voice quality. A
work in progress by two authors (Silverman and Silverman, 2002),
one a jazz musician, has to do with the sound of the voice of
individuals judged to be at immediate risk of suicide. As such it
offers another contrast to the foregoing accounts of good and bad
"ensemble playing" by a patient and therapist.
It is a familiar finding that suicidal speech seems often to trigger
in the listener a wish to deny communications of end-stage despair.
However, for one who is attuned to the musical qualities of speech,
the sound of a person's voice, irrespective of the content, can often
alert one to a significant suicidal risk.
Silverman and Silverman studied audiotapes, both private and
loaned by nationwide suicide organizations, of individuals who
either had completed suicide or had attempted it with lethal means.
DiagnosticalIy they covered a broad range: bipolar illness, depres-
sion and both histrionic and psychotic character disorders, includ-
ing a number with histories of prior suicide attempts and familial
suicides.
Not surprisingly, some of the vocal patterns included features
commonly noted in depression: loss of energy and power, and
monotonous, repetitious, uninflected speech. The most compelling
finding, however, was that the voice sounded hollow and toneless,
as though lacking a center, and, irrespective of volume and tempo,
already "dead and gone." In contrast to the holIowness of
depression, the lifelessness of near-term suicidal persons' voices
may reflect a decrease in harmonic overtones and resonance,
reflecting an internal state different from depression. (Further
 Between words and music 11

acoustic studies are in process, e.g. the distribution of overtones in

spectral patterns.)
These persons report an experience of "falling into a hole" -
suggesting radical disturbances in representation and imagery. In
contrast to the voice of the depressed person, which strikes the
listener as that of one suffering an illness, the high-risk near-term
suicidal person sounds as though already dying. Also in contrast to
depression, and probably unique for suicidality, is an absence of
vocal patterns associated with anxiety, such as tremulousness.
Another compelling feature is that of unexpected accent. This
can take the form of an abrupt affective burst of sudden effort, out
of keeping with the ongoing rhythm, followed by an abrupt
depletion. (The authors speculate that this dysrhythmia may reflect
a sympathetic/parasympathetic autonomic imbalance.)
They conclude that, overall, the vocal patterns of near-term
suicidal patients are sufficiently distinct from the depressive profile
as to warrant designating the former to be a unique pathological
configuration.

***
We turn now from the already nearly dead atonal sound of
suicidality to the living pulse of the body softly beating in the
voices of poetry and music. First we shall consider a paper eluci-
dating the relationship between poetic meter and the body (Turner
and Poppel, 1988).
The fundamental unit of metered poetry, the line, nearly always
takes from two to four seconds to recite (peak distribution 2.5 to
3.5 seconds). The three-second poetic line is the salient feature of
metered poetry. Its prevalence in human poetry appears to be
universal, being found in cultures as diverse as classical Greece and
Japan.
The sense of hearing essentially makes temporal distinctions; it
hears time. That is to say, it detects differences between temporal
periods and organizes them in a hierarchy.
Less than three thousandths of a second (0.003 s) apart, sounds
are perceived as simultaneous. Between three thousandths of a
second (0.003 s) and three hundredths of a second (0.03 s) one can
hear that they are separate sounds but not which came first. When
two sounds are about three hundredths of a second (0.03 s) apart
one can passively experience their sequence but not yet organize a
12 Between words and music

response before the second sound arrives. Three tenths of a second

(0.3 s) is enough time to initiate a response, but not yet sufficient to
formulate a comparison between the two stimuli as discrete parcels
of experience. To make a comparison, like recognizing a melody,
takes about three seconds. This is the fundamental " parcel of
experience. "
Like the poetic line, the parcel of experience is about three
seconds - the length of the human "specious present" or present
moment. (The eye is much slower than the ear.) Thus it is that a
speaker will pause every three seconds or so to organize the next
three seconds' worth of syntax; a listener will absorb about three
seconds' worth of heard speech and then pause briefly to integrate
what he has heard. This three second period to bundle information
together to be sent on for processing to higher cortical centers
constitutes a sort of pulse.
That the three second poetic line is identical to the three second
pulse of the auditory information-processing system suggests a rela-
tionship between them: the former (a cultural universal) is tuned to
the latter (a biological basic). It holds out the possibility of building
an explanatory bridge between universally observed features of
human verse and these latest findings about human audition.
The apparent identity between the three-second pulse of metered
verse and that of the brain 's fundamental auditory processing
system may account for the easy memorability of metered verse as
well as the subjective relaxation that commonly accompanies it.
Regarding the soothing effect of poetry, it is as if poetry is
" natural nutriment. " It appears to do much of the work that the
brain must usually do for itself. For example, it has been suggested
(Turner and Poppel, 1983) that poetic meter enlists the musical and
pictorial power of the right brain to cooperate with the linguistic
power of the left. In addition, poetry is concerned with "organizing
information into rhythmic pulses, integrating different types of
information - rhythmic, grammatical, lexical, and acoustic - into
easily assimilable parcels and labeling their contents as belonging
together. Like intravenous nourishment, the information enters our
system instantly, without a lengthy process of digestion" (Turner
and PoppeJ, 1983: 84).
On a more psychological level, how do poetic devices manage to
stimulate and soothe at the same time? Through the simultaneous
use of differentiation and integration: the former stimulates; the
latter soothes (G.J. Rose, 1980).
 Between words and music 13

Consider: Meter uses a fixed number of syllables, thus producing

a rhythmic pulsation. Rhythm combines movement with constancy.
Rhyme combines the same sound with different meanings -
acknowledging as well as overcoming duality (Faber, 1988). Alli-
teration, the clustering of words beginning with the same con-
sonant, is the mirror image of rhyme. All these devices - as well as
simile, allusion and metaphor (Gorelick, 1989) - "tease" the psyche
by "playing peek-a-boo" (Akhtar, 2000: 235) with its double task:
to differentiate and integrate.
A final example of integration: onomatopoeia joins sound to
sense (Siomopoulos, 1977). The sound of sense was important to
Robert Frost. He believed it was inherent in every meaning and
instinctively familiar to each individual. He set himself the task of
making music out of it (G.J. Rose, 1980).
This brings us to music.

***
Just as humans everywhere appear to possess an innate (i.e. bodily
based) competence to understand grammar and syntax in language,
there is also an inborn competence to feel tempo and tempo
changes. Musical aesthetic perceptions and judgments being closely
associated with tempo and feeling, it would therefore seem that the
emotional appeal of music comes largely from the body.
In music as in poetry we find a bodily temporal attunement in
the phenomenon of proportional tempo or continuous pulse. This
has been closely studied by Epstein (1988) and refers to the idea
that all tempos in a work of music are intrinsically related to one
another. This arises from a composer's conception of the work as a
unified and coherent whole. These relationships of tempo can be
expressed by whole number ratios of a low order (I: 1, 1:2, 2:3, 3:4,
or the inverse). They constitute a powerful integrating force both in
the structure of the work and in its presentation to an audience.
In order to determine whether this is a universal phenomenon,
tape recordings of seven cultures were sampled in a random order:
two from the Pacific (New Guinea), two from Asia (Tibet, Nepal),
two from Africa (Botswana), and one from South America
(Venezuela).
One example is worth citing because it did not involve music,
strictly speaking, but rather a long-winded, ritualized negotiating
" bargain chant" of the Yanomami Indians of the Orinoco River,
14 Between words and music

Venezuela. During the course of almost 38 minutes, 143 tempo

timings were measured. They all conformed to a ratio of either 2: 1
or I :2, confirming that tempo changes take place in relation to
some governing pulse.
Epstein concludes that these data support the theory that tempos
in musical performance change by low-order integral ratios and
that this appears to be a universal phenomenon. The fact that this
proportional tempo-keeping is so precise strongly suggests that it
must be based on a biological foundation. Such a biological basis
might well account for the constancy of proportional tempo in
music of widely varying affect, purposes and settings, and even in
rhythms and tempos accompanying ritualized bargaining.

***
The sensory qualities of consciousness of our subjective world are
referred to as " qualia. " These are the qualities of color, music,
smells, and the other vivid sensations we value so highly. Speci-
fying their neurobiological basis in terms of the location and
character of the neurons whose firing determines these qualities of
consciousness is of current interest to neuroscience.
Contemporary neuroscience appears to agree with earlier philo-
sophers and Freud (1900), who wrote that consciousness was "a
sense-organ for the perception of psychical qualities" (p. 615)
whose underlying mental processes were themselves unconscious.
Some neuroscientists doubt that consciousness can be reduced to
sensory representations only - whether imagined or remembered -
and based on relatively few neurons functioning mysteriously as
these so-called qualia. The internal modality of affects - degrees of
pleasure/un pleasure - may constitute an additional dimension to
the five basic modalities of sensory qualia (sight, hearing, touch,
taste and smell) (Solms, 1997).
Elements of intentionality and action also playa role. Whenever
we perceive or think of anything we always implicitly formulate a
plan of achieving it through action. This further dimension has
been termed " agentic qualia" (Humphrey, 2000).
Other neuroscientists suggest that the neural correlates of con-
sciousness are probably located on some intermediate level further
forward than sensory ones and involve attention, affective valu-
ations, understanding and decision making (Jackendoff, 2000).
 Between words and music 15

The perspective of evolution emphasizes the critical role of

emotions in the construction of consciousness. Many of the
affective experiences that human and animals have are said to arise
from implicit knowing systems of the brain (evolutionary equalia) .

Emotions are fundamentally value coding mechanisms that

emerged to provide organisms with an evolutionarily prepared
motoric capacity to approach life-sustaining resources and to
avoid the life-detracting pitfalls of the world .... The basic
infrastructure of emotionality was a major force in the evolu-
tion of cognitive capacities.
(Panksepp, 2000: 25- 26)

A brief survey such as this might lead one to question the value of
the term "qualia" for the sensory qualities of consciousness. If, for
example, the neurobiological basis of the qualities of experience are
as widely distributed as consciousness itself (Damasio, 1999), is the
term little more than a linguistic trap, like the mythical ether of
astronomy? On the other hand, are qualia more akin to the case of
subatomic particles that were postulated before being discovered?
In contrast to the disputed status of qualia, language, at any
rate, is no longer considered an essential key to consciousness. This
is based on the findings from neurological conditions where
individuals have lost all language capacity yet remain quintessen-
tially conscious despite radically limited ability to communicate.
Returning to music: music is unquestionably a sensory experi-
ence, richly involving many sensory modalities and not merely
auditory. A passive experience? Certainly not. Ordinary self-
observation and introspection inform us how active an experience
is listening to music, every listener an instrumentalist and con-
ductor at the same time, inherently "performing" in concert with
the music. It is worth emphasizing that the (mostly invisible) motor
activity that accompanies the experience of music probably reflects
and possibly generates and enhances emotionality.

***
Earlier I cited the young musician who expressed what it was like
to try to begin therapy with someone he felt out of tune with. On
another occasion he tried to put into words what it was like to
16 Between words and music

listen to the first eight measures of Nicola Matteis' (\ 650- 1714)

Preludio of Ayr in D. I quote with his permission.

The Preludio of N. Matteis ' Ayr in D starts in a horizontally

balanced calmly flowing quality (one could imagine that this
energy has started flowing a long time ago and only now
reaches the realm of perceptible sound). The calmly flowing
quality slightly expands, as if caught by a breath of wind and
collapses into a short, touched moment of dense, warm fric-
tion, resolves briefly and then gains a very similar friction
again, this time a bit longer and therefore more tense before
resolving longer and more fully.
In the meantime underneath the wind-like airy turbulences,
a line of thicker quality (like a thick, slow moving river on a
stream of lava) has joined in unspectacularly and initiates a
movement towards a wide expanded body. The inner space of
that body is expanded and open (empty); the borders are
stretched and create a certain tension - as if the two lines that
form the borders are in conflict and push each other away as
much as possible (while still relating). One can anticipate the
following collapse into hot inner tension, where the whole
body is connected again and vibrating.
That is in fact what follows and resolves, but only into
another body of hot tension with its own longing for
resolution.
As there is so much tension built up by now, the following
movement to resolution releases all of it - in an explosive
upward leap of the low thick line initiating an accelerating
delirious movement upward into the sky.
This energy condenses into an intensely burning high quality
(the highest so far) that carried forward as if caught by a
strong warm wind, lowering slightly only to find new hot
friction carrying it up again where the airy line is now hanging
in the air like a leaf in the wind - holding itself up against the
forces of gravity that appear to expand as the thick low line
descends. The tension increases to the point where suddenly
the leaf collapses and begins to descend only to be carried up
again by an almost imperceptible rising wind.
The process repeats a third time, only now the expanded
tension lasts longer and is almost painfully intense and
immobile. The airy line finally gives in and, more gradually
 Between words and music 17

than in the quick collapses previously, resigns itself into a dark

gray, foggy area of ambiguity. The tension is so high it feels
like one is holding their breath. Intense colors appear in the
foggy gray, snakelike and hesitatingly groping as if searching
for the path.
Suddenly there is a release. The path and the light are found,
the air is released in an exhalation and now the movement
progresses calmly in a warm upwind, then descends and gains
a bit of red-orange, glowing tension and calmly releases into
the clear blue water.

Then my musician colleague supplements verbal expressiveness

with harmonic analysis.

In musical terms, the basis of all this is the drama of tonality:

the dominant area is one of density and contraction. It is a
thick, hot, rich and colorful world of rednesses. The con-
tracted, vibrating tension of the dominant longs to be released
into the tonic - which is balanced, even-keeled, round. The
subdominant area is one of expansion, thin air, open empti-
ness, airy- watery light blue colors. Characteristic is a lack of
inside tension. It tends to collapse into dominant tension, but
can be stretched for long periods of time; maybe at times it is a
temporary dreamlike escape from the painfully short-lived
intensity of the dominant world. When in that context the
collapse into the dominant area takes place, it can be experi-
enced as painful over-tension.

He concludes by expressing his doubts about the success of his

experiment with translation.

I wonder whether the visual metaphors promote a physical

tuning in to the described patterns of tension and release or
whether they distract and disguise what is physical\y
happening.
I recal\ an ear-training class some years ago: listening to the
same Bach piece played by S. Richter and G. Gould. Richter's
interpretation evoked a physical feeling in which tension and
release seemed to be filtered out by many evoked metaphors.
My body reacted calmly and the imagination shut down.
Gould's interpretation did not allow me to have that slight
18 Between words and music

distance of metaphors but was physically immediately capti-

vating, like the experience of dancing.

In contrast to these two different reactions to actual musical

performance, my friend seems to suspect that his own valiant effort
to transpose music into words does not succeed. Despite his syn-
esthetic imagery - of color (gray, red-orange, blue) and tempera-
ture (cold, warm, hot) - words only seem to defeat the experience
as music.
Like reducing literature to grammar? I agree.
Parodying such attempts is a possibly apocryphal anecdote
concerning a Harvard academic musicologist admonishing his
harmony class: "Remember, gentlemen: music is to be seen and not
heard!"

***
As music is in performance, so, too, I believe, IS clinical
psychoanalysis.
My personal convictions are:

2 Its location is a one-to-one human relationship composed of

equal parts conceptual precision of words and emotional
attunement akin to music.
2 It stands or falls on the evidence of long-term clinical obser-
vations, honed on actual responsibility for real people, and
hopefully tested and verified one day by neuroscience.
Chapter 2

On the shores of self

Samuel Beckett's Molloy - irredentism
and the creative impulse

A human being is a part of the whole, called by us "Universe,"

a part limited in time and space. He experiences himself, his
thoughts and feelings as something separated from the rest - a
kind of optical delusion of his consciousness. This delusion is a
kind of prison.
(A. Einstein)

The irredentist principle in politics refers to the wish to restore

territory of which one has been deprived and reincorporate it
within one's own boundaries. In the psychology of the artist this
lost territory is the original dual unity with the mother. It is
characterized by fluidity of time, space, and sense of self. As each
did in the beginning, the artist resamples this undifferentiated state
and renegotiates a new equilibrium between inside and outside, self
and others.
While "rematriation" has long been a central tenet in the psy-
chology of creativity associated with the British school of psycho-
analysis, its reinterpretation in the light of primary narcissism and
early ego states seems warranted. This, and not an "explanation"
of art, is the aim of this chapter. It is taken for granted that there is
a far reach between the impulse to create and its fulfillment in
anything more than garden-variety growth processes like higher
levels of self-identity. However, while art is a rare outcome, the
creative impulse and the growth of self are interrelated in ways that
help to elucidate both.
When the artist destroys old forms and harmoniously integrates
new ones in the light of his ego ideal of perfection, he achieves a
temporary reconciliation between his ego and his superego. This in
turn gratifies an unconscious wish to recapture the original sense of
20 On the shores of self: Samuel Beckett's Mol/oy

oneness with the mother. He may temporarily feel elated over the
new aesthetic unity that has been achieved, or perhaps have
mystical or religious emotions. The new unity, however, echoing
the original oneness with the mother, soon threatens to return the
artist to that loss of self inherent in the merging of self with
mother. This is equivalent to psychological death. Sooner or later,
then, he will be impelled to a fresh, perhaps irritable, anxious, or
depressive need for a further delineation of self and world. This
means he needs to do more creative work. The important point for
our purpose is that the new irredentist sense of inner and outer
balance carries with it its own imbalance and impetus for further
change. In other words, it fuels a creative impulse that may be
defined as an urge toward growth and differentiation via remerging
and redefinition.
Creative work perpetuates the child's imaginative, restless
searching for basic answers, his unwillingness to close the door
on questioning. The creative person has a firsthand view of the
constant variability of inner life and outer world, the endlessly
shifting qualities of what we carelessly and monolithically refer to
as self and reality.
Art is a projection of this delicate balance amidst the constant
movement of inner and outer as well as between the continuously
flowing regressive and progressive tides within the mind. This
constant progressive- regressive flux reflects the current of life itself.
Within the art-work this flux probably helps account for the work
being experienced as "living."
In modern times Picasso, as well as particle physics, is partly
responsible for having opened our eyes to the latent instability and
mobility of seemingly solid forms. This permanent alteration of our
perception of the world is the hallmark of authentic creativity.
Having once seen the world through his recreated images, we
find our reality has been transformed: "stable" forms can never
appear the same; movement is everywhere. Picasso is quoted as
follows:

I'm like a river that rolls on, dragging with it the trees that
grow too close to its banks or dead calves one might have
thrown into it . ... I carryall that along with me and go on.
It's the movement of painting that interests me .... In some of
my paintings ... I have been able to stop the flow of life
around me . . .. What I have to say is increasingly something
 On the shores of self: Samuel Beckett's Mol/oy 21

about what goes on in the movement of my thought .. . the

movement of my thought interests me more than the thought
itself.
(Gilot and Lake, 1965: 114- 118)

One might say that Picasso has been able to concentrate more and
more on the movement of his thoughts and perceptions because he
could examine them through a unique analyzing, organizing, and
reintegrating aesthetic vision, thus enabling him to deal with the
Many through the One.
The problem of continuity amidst constant change, so central to
the analysis of identity, is as old as philosophy. While our senses
record that the world consists of an infinite variety of things, our
understanding is incapable of comprehending them, perhaps even
of recording them, without the aid of some organizing principle or
idea. Philosophers have long tried to reconcile the infinite variety
with the unity, the Many and the One, the endless forms of
becoming with the fundamental , indivisible being. The pre-Socratic
philosopher Heraclitus of Ephesus tried to solve the antithesis by
the proposition that change itself is the fundamental principle; it is
represented in his philosophy by fire as the basic element, since it is
both matter and a moving force .
The physicist, Werner Heisenberg (1958: 63), pointed out that
contemporary physics is extremely close to the ideas of Heraclitus:
"If we replace the word 'fire' by the word 'energy' we can almost
repeat its statements word for word." Energy is the substance from
which all elementary particles are made, and energy is that which
moves; energy is a substance since its total amount does not
change, and it is the fundamental cause for all change in the world.
Henri Bergson (1944) gave one of the most eloquent statements
of the view that reality is a perpetual becoming, that consciousness
is marked by successive births and rebirths of awareness, and that
living time is experienced as moments of choice:

My mental state, as it advances on the road of time, is con-

tinually swelling with the duration which it accumulates: it
goes on increasing - rolling upon itself, as a snowball on the
snow .. .. [po 4]. The apparent discontinuity of the psychical
life is then due to our attention being fixed on it by a series of
separate acts: actually there is only a gentle slope ... . [po 5].
Duration is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws
22 On the shores of self: Samuel Beckett's Molloy

into the future and which swells as it advances .... [po7]. With
regard to the moments of our life, of which we are the artisans,
each of them is a kind of creation ... what we do depends on
what we are; but it is necessary to add also that we are, to a
certain extent, what we do, and that we are creating ourselves
continually. This creation of self by self is the more complete,
the more one reasons on what one does .... For a conscious
being to exist is to change, to change is to mature, to mature is
to go on creating oneself endlessly [pp. 9- 10]. Reality is a
perpetual growth, a creation pursued without end . ... Every
human work in which there is invention, every voluntary act in
which there is freedom , every movement of an organism that
manifests spontaneity, brings something new into the world .. . .
[po 261]. The idea of creation becomes more clear, for it is
merged in that of growth [po 263].

Psychoanalytic findings lend substance and details to these

philosophical- poetic intuitions. Psychological growth begins with
the development of the sense of self from the primary unity of
mother- child. In the beginning there is a coalescence of child with
all that is, unbounded as to time, space, and sense of self. At first
the boundaries between them are hazy, with constant remerging
taking place. Little by little, satisfactions and disappointments
repeat themselves; forms begin to emerge and acquire meanings.
The idea of mother distinct from oneself begins to take shape and
with it the idea of a self and one's separateness in the world. The
sense of identity contributes to the growing sense of constancy and
direction. The distinctions between thought and action, and time
and causality, also impose order on things to build reality.
Reality itself, however, always remains somewhat fluid rather
than static. Throughout life the boundaries of our separateness and
identity keep being dissolved and recreated as we repeatedly dip
back and re-emerge from looser and earlier arrangements of
reality. We continuously fashion new syntheses between ourselves
and the outside, creating areas of relative constancy and temporary
balance in the midst of change.
It is from this pool of early fluid boundaries of self and reality
that each person draws to "create" his own identity and construct
viable forms of reality for himself. Growth is a form of self-creation.
The ego's coordinated functioning is a garden variety of creativ-
ity. And it is from this same pool of early fluid boundaries of self
 On the shores of self: Samuel Beckett's Molloy 23

and reality that the artist draws to create imaginative forms. This is
not to say that imagination is synonymous with the infant's efforts
to distinguish himself from the external world. Imagination is the
ability to make images and elaborate memories and combine them
playfully with new ingredients as they are observed. The point is
this: the greater the mobility of elements, the less sacrosanct the
categories, the freer the imaginative play. And these conditions are
most fully met in the flexibility of early boundaries of self and
reality toward which the artist is drawn in his irredentist urge to
regain the lost unity with mother and separate out anew (Rose,
1966).

***
In the novel Molloy, Beckett (1955) composes melodies of prose out
of the flowing lines of time and space. His art explores what we may
call the shores of the earliest sense of self. No less than scientific
concepts, his aesthetic forms, acting as metaphors, effect new link-
ages and reorder the data of experience. Like analytic insight, his
work accords a lasting reality to aspects of the world that would
otherwise have existed only as traces of unconscious memory.
When he deals with time, it has little to do with the conventional
wristwatch units that measure our workaday activities. It is felt
time; it has the volume and cadences of music; it refers to the great
reverberating circles of prescience and memory where past and
future merge in a greatly expanded horizon of the present:

My life, my life, now I speak of it as of something over, now as

of a joke which still goes on, and it is neither, for at the same
time it is over and it goes on, and is there any tense for that?
[Molloy, p. 36]

Spatial dimensions, too, are elastic. Remote reaches of space feel

intimately close, parts of the body seem remote, and the felt
boundaries of the body are endlessly variable, sexually indetermi-
nate, or even absent. It is unclear whether the stars seem to tremble
or it is his hand upon his knee. The bodily boundaries are as fluid
as the endlessly shifting, sometimes evanescent sense of self.

Yes, it sometimes happens .. . that I forget who I am and strut

before my eyes, like a stranger . ... [po 42]. Yes, there were
24 On the shores of self: Samuel Beckett's Molloy

times when I forgot not only who I was, but that I was, forgot
to be .... You have to be careful, ask yourself questions, as
for example, whether you still are, and if no when it stopped,
and if yes how long it will still go on, anything at all to keep
you from losing the thread of the dream. [po 49]

The thread of the dream is the sense of one's identity, and its loss is
death of the self and with it the absence of any meaning.

It is not you who are dead but all the others. So you get up
and go to your mother, who thinks she is alive. That is my
impression. [po 27]

Is it mother who is alive and he who is dead, or vice versa? The

novel searches for a return to the oneness with the mother that was
in the beginning, and with it a taste of the oblivion of loss of self,
and then a rebirth of awareness of separate aloneness and renewed
longings for union.
There follows the mystery of beginnings. Not just biological
conception but the beginnings of self. For Beckett makes clear that
the self has not yet been born. Molloy cannot distinguish himself
from others, or memory from imagination. He imagined he saw
two men who looked alike, "but no more than others do" (p. 9)
who go down into the same trough, meet, and separate. One goes
back into town, the other out into the treacherous hills of the
world. He longs to follow both, be less lonely.
Are they both the same person on different occasions, or which
is which? And what is the significance of their different directions?
One out into the hills and the other into the town. Or are they, too,
really the same? Journeys into "all that inner space one never sees,
the brain and heart and other caverns where thought and feeling
dance their sabbath" (p. lO). Or could this be a dream of descent
into the primal trough of life, where the seed is flung toward its
union for new beginnings, and the sower departs to journey with-
out, both sower and seed longing to return to oneness, through
death or conception?
The storyteller suddenly decides to go seek his mother. This must
be the common path for both travelers, if they are two - two routes
toward mother "in this world for you without arms" (p. 12).
After two transparently masturbatory sequences the author is
well along on his journey through the "mythological present," past
 On the shores of self: Samuel Beckett's Molloy 25

Oedipal and homosexual way-stations back toward a return, via

sucking and sleep, to mother. On his bicycle he runs over and kills
a little dog that was like a child to Lousse, the woman who owned
it. She turns him into a substitute for the dog- infant he killed, and,
unmanned, he awakens naked in her house in a woman's night-
dress, locked up in a barred, dark room, perfumed and beardless.
The details of his loss of identity are now made more explicit. He
cannot distinguish whether the room is moving from right to left.
He listens to the voice of the frozen world collapsing endlessly to
its death. He resigns himself to a dreamy torpor in her garden -
lying on his back, side, stomach, fed and talked to and watched by
her. His life becomes united to that of the garden . He hears words
as sounds freed of meaning, his own sounds becoming like the
buzzing of an insect. He can no longer understand language, judge
distance, or discriminate smells and tastes. He remains in a waking
sleep for vague months up to perhaps a year, eating hardly at all
or, at times, voraciously; sometimes bounding into the air or col-
lapsing without control.
Sexual stirrings commence. If, before, his journey returned him in
imagination to some of the early fusions between himself and his
world, he now ventures out from infancy through homosexual way-
stations toward Oedipal ones. But not for long. When his mother's
image intrudes in his sexual fantasies, he finds it intolerable and
suddenly decides he must leave the woman Lousse's garden.
It might be autumn by now. He passes time in a blind, cloacal
alley, full of rubbish, excrement, a meeting place for lovers, and
crawls into a hole or cave by the sea, where he remains an indefi-
nite time. He sucks on stones, has trouble breathing or retaining
urine, and stumbles through the forest feeling, as he did in Lousse's
garden, that he must get out or he will be powerless ever to leave.
It is now winter. He is crawling, flat on his belly, crutches out in
front like grappling hooks. He crawls on his back, too. On his way
to mother. All his imperatives bear on this relationship, as if all his
life he has been going to his mother. Sometimes he says "Mother"
to himself to encourage himself. Day and night toward mother.
The day comes when the forest ends. He sees light. He opens his
eyes and sees he has arrived . Will they roll him onto his mother's
doorstep?
The forest ends in a ditch. It is the fall into the ditch which
makes him open his eyes and see he is out of the forest. The plain
seems familiar. He hears a voice telling him help is coming. It must
26 On the shores of self: Samuel Beckett's Molloy

be spring. He remembers the two travelers, one with a club. It is

spring. He longs to go back into the forest, but Molloy can stay
where he happens to be.
Where he happens to be is the trough where the men met and
separated from each other. He has followed the path of one of
them on his inward journey toward union, conception, germination
through the apparent death of winter, life stirrings, growth and
rebirth in spring.
What of the other traveler? He is Jacques Moran, and he has a
son of the same name. He, too, is called to journey out in the
treacherous hills, to see about Molloy. It is a Sunday in August,
and his son is sleeping, thinking that he's on the threshold of life.
Moran rudely rouses his son, ill with a fever, and departs from the
house holding his son's hand behind him, toying with the idea of
attaching his son to him with a rope or chain around both their
waists to prevent his son from ever breaking away. As they walk
out into the night, one behind the other, he wonders if people will
imagine that he is a widower whose wife died in childbirth. His son,
contrary to orders, is carrying his raincoat rolled into a ball on his
belly, making it stick out.
As the homosexual imagery becomes more and more elaborated,
reaching baroque proportions, Moran must, perforce, retreat from
the obvious. He declares that both he and his son are innocent and
retreats further yet by imagining himself a fetus or horizontal on
mother's lap, incapable of motion, mute, memoryless, and deaf,
and he almost swoons. When he sends his son away to the village
and they part from each other, each masturbates alone.
Moran lapses deeper into passivity, surrendering himself to the
scene, wondering if he secretly welcomes his infirmity and helpless-
ness. His self-absorption increases as he gazes at his image in the
stream and experiences homosexual hallucinations at night. When
his son returns, he looks at Moran as if his fly were open. Rejoined
with his son, astride the bicycle behind his son, his own testicles
swinging low, he feels happy and well taken care of. But longings
for a father of his own become stirred up, and he wishes he were
one of the shepherd's flock of sheep, or Molloy's son. The wish for
dependent passivity on a man leads to his being deserted again by
his son, his masculinity, and he is robbed of his money as well as
his bicycle. He lapses into deeper helplessness, growing weaker still,
stretched out in the shelter, crawling out only in the evening,
longing to lose consciousness in time.
 On the shores of self: Samuel Beckett's Molloy 27

Finally Gaber comes and orders him to return home. It takes

from August or September till spring to get there. This is nine or ten
months, a gestational period. He tells a farmer that he is making a
pilgrimage to the Madonna, that he is going to mother, that he has
lost his infant boy but kept his mother. Does this mean he has lost
his masculinity and retained his identification with his mother? He
skirts the graveyard and arrives home - to his mother's womb. But
it is a dead womb, or she is dead: The house is empty, without light,
the bees and hens dead. In the house he writes.
Moran is back where the story of Molloy started - in mother's
room. In the opening pages:

It's I who live there now. I don't know how I got there .... I'd
like to . . . say my goodbyes, finish dying . . . . Was [my
mother] already dead when I came? Or did she only die later? I
mean enough to bury. I don't know. Perhaps they haven't
buried her yet. In any case I have her room. I sleep in her bed.
I piss and shit in her pot. I have taken her place. I must
resemble her more and more. All I need now is a son. Perhaps
I have one somewhere. [po 7]

Perhaps, then, Moran is Molloy, reborn as his own son.

The strongest emotion this story conveys, aside from its black
humor and ribaldry, is a longing for contact that is forever
impossible. This note is also struck in the opening pages:

It is a sorry sight to see him solitary after so many years, so

many days and nights unthinkingly given to that rum our rising
at birth and even earlier. What shall I do? What shall I do?
Now low, a murmur, now precise as the headwaiter's ... and
often rising to a scream . . . I watched him recede, at grips
(myself) with the temptation to get up and follow him, perhaps
even to catch up with him one day, so as to know him better,
be myselfless lonely. But in spite of my soul's leap out to him,
at the end of its elastic, I saw him only darkly, because of the
dark and then because of the terrain, in the folds of which he
disappeared from time to time, to re-emerge further on . ... I
felt the first stars tremble .... [po II]

Who are these two men, one small, the other tall, "who went down
into the same trough and in this trough finally met . . . turned
28 On the shores of self: Samuel Beckett's Molloy

towards the sea ... then each went on his way"? (p. 9). Are they
father and son in a furrow of the earth facing the sea of birth
before parting for their separate routes of conception and birth,
death and rebirth, sower and seed? Or are they parts of the same
man, his finiteness and his generativity, his past and future
interlocked and separate? Part of himself goes forth as his own seed
to fuse with the egg, live in the garden-womb or cave on the
seashore, before emerging in spring from the blind alley and dark
forest, to open his eyes on his mother's doorstep, still longing to go
back into the forest.
Born without really wishing to be, how does a man live out his
life while longing to return to the forest of his birth and the union
with his mother? The two men we glimpsed in the beginning, small
and tall, in the trough in the earth, together a few moments before
separating, now return in the motif of Moran and his son. Or
again, are they parts of each other, man and his past and future, or
his body and his phallus?
They must stick together, but they keep separating and rejoining.
If the son represents Moran's masculinity, Moran is constantly in
danger of losing it. More than this , Moran is doing everything
possible to get rid of his son while trying to attach him with ropes
and chains. Is this conflict the consequence of longing to return to
mother? One way to return to her is to become her, but this means
emasculation, homosexual union, or death.
The alternatives are played out. His limbs atrophy, his knee feels
like a clitoris, the hole of his hat becomes a slit, he kills a man who
looks like himself and then feels better, no longer plagued with a
stiff limb. But no sooner has he killed off his masculinity than he
regains it in the form of his son, to whom he becomes joined on the
frame of the bicycle. But again, only to lose him again. It takes him
the period of a gestation to make his way home.
He has gained a sharper and clearer sense of his identity than ever
before: he knows he has been reborn, but as a woman. He has averted
death, at the cost of his masculinity. It is not the end. And he has
learned to listen to an inner voice and to understand a new language.
It tells him to write. It may even make him freer than he was.
This, then, is his salvation: his identity as a writer. Not a his-
torian. The last lines of Molloy are: "It is midnight. The rain is
beating on the windows. It was not midnight. It was not raining"
(p. 176). So he must be a writer of stories. And this is something he
told us in the opening pages:
 On the shores of self: Samuel Beckett's Molloy 29

What I need now is stories, it took me a long time to know

that, and I'm not sure of it. There I am, then, informed as to
certain things, knowing certain things about him, things I
didn't know, things I had craved to know, things I had never
thought of. [po 13]

His gift of imagination is where he lives. The opening lines of the

novel are: "I am in my mother's room. It's I who live there now . ...
I have taken her place" (p. 7). He lives in his imagination in his
mother, in her dead womb. "Was she already dead when I came?"
(p. 7). Because he is joined to her, it is no longer clear that she is a
woman. Was it ever certain that Ruth, his first woman, was a
woman? Or Lousse, in whose garden he lived for almost a year? Or
were they the same? Lousse sounds like baby talk for Ruth.
" Perhaps I'm inventing a little, perhaps embellishing ... perhaps
I'm remembering things" (p. 8).
His imagination lives inside his mother's womb. From her womb
his stories are discharged. Sometimes he shits his stories onto the
earth. Other times he speaks of the plant that springs from the
ejaculation of the hanged that shrieks when plucked.
And his mother? Of her, he says:

I called her Mag, when I had to call her something. And I

called her Mag because for me, without my knowing why, the
letter g abolished the syllable Ma, and as it were spat on it
better than any other letter would have done. And at the same
time I satisfied a deep and doubtless unacknowledged need, the
need to have a Ma, that is, a mother, and to proclaim it,
audibly. [po 17]

He reluctantly acknowledges the need to have a Ma. But Mag does

more than spit on Ma. It adds an appendage. He is the appendage.
By joining with her he has become added to her as a phallus. It is
as a phallic mother that he creates, shits, ejaculates his stories onto
the ground from her dead womb.
Who is Molloy? Molloy is Moran reborn with a son of his own,
an appendage. Molloy 's mother is Mollose. Who is MoIIose?
"After all perhaps I knew nothing of mother Molloy, or MoIIose,
save insofar as such a son might bear, like a scurf of placenta, her
stamp" (p. 112). Mollose might be a contraction of Molloy and
30 On the shores of self: Samuel Beckett's Molloy

Lousse, i.e. Molloy joined to his woman keeper, in the garden of

his helplessness.
The world is a mother without arms. He goes into her furrow to
join her, attached to her placenta, be born, die, and be reborn as a
dual unity of mother and child, female with male.
The remote males who command him and bring him messages
are Y oudi and Gaber. Call them y and g . G is what he adds to Ma;
y is what is added to Mollousse, or Mollose, to make Molloy. Y
and g are male appendages. Problem: how does Molloy hang onto
his y, his g, his youdi, his gaber, his son, his phallus, and still follow
his longing to follow his imperative and return to his mother? He
does it by returning to his mother's body from whence he creates
and discharges his stories.
But why such a strong pull to return to unite with mother? His
longing for a father is rebuffed with silence and distance. He wants
to turn into a dog, a sheep, a baby, a fetus. His longing turns
homosexual and paranoid. Because there is neither father nor
mother, he cannot weep anymore in a world which is constantly
raining down his own tears. It is this intensity of emotion that
cannot be contained and ruptures the boundaries of his identity
and his world again and again, until in imagination he reverts to
the oneness of a hermaphroditic primal mother.
Before he regains and re-enters his dead home, he tells the farmer
who accosts him that he is on a pilgrimage to the Madonna of
pregnant women who took his infant boy but allowed him to keep
his mamma. He confides to the reader that alas this never hap-
pened. What then is the truth? The truth might be the reverse: his
own mother died in childbirth and he survived, longing to return to
her in bodily fusion, spiritual identification, or death.
Was it during his own birth that his mother died or in giving
birth to a sibling, a brother? Is the son, the sight of whom makes
his blood boil with anger, the brother, the cause of his mother's
death? When he looked behind him, he saw the boy with the
raincoat rolled into a ball, carried on his belly, the stomach sticking
out. This must be the image that enrages him. He demands his
son's knife and takes it from him, attributing his own murderous
impulses to his son. He wishes to kill the son, his unborn brother,
and take his place - inside.
Both Molloy and Moran regain the intrauterine shelter for a
time. Molloy accidentally runs over and kills Lousse's dog, who is
like a child to her, and takes its place in her garden, before being
 On the shores of self: Samuel Beckett's Molloy 31

reborn. His son's separate existence is acknowledged finally, and he

manages, if barely, to control his murderous feelings. His son had
been forced out of his bed and house, into the world at night,
finally alone. Moran had his shelter to himself, but uneasily.
Toward the end of the journey, whenever he is inside a proper
shelter, he becomes obsessed with thoughts and images of his son's
raincoat, that reminder of pregnancy. " I literally saw it, I saw
nothing else, it filled all space" (p. 172). And thereafter he
(phobically?) avoids being inside any shelter.
He returns home, skirting the graveyard at midnight, a place and
time where, on setting out, the sight of his son's protruding belly
made his blood boil. The hens are dead, and the bees only a light
ball of dust in the hive. Martha nowhere. House empty.
Face the fact: it is mother who is dead, forever! Child is alive;
not the other way around. "My son was well. He would be. Let us
hear no more about him. He has come back . He is sleeping" (p.
175). Moran would write and submit his report about Molloy, the
Molloy of the enquiry, or the Molloy he stalked within himself.
"How little one is at one with oneself. Good God" (p. 175).

***
If art is the instrument for refining the apprehending sensibility
(Read, 1951), Beckett's art does this by providing the opportunity
to resample the primary union of mother and child and separate
out anew. We experience the rebirth of early forms of self and
world out of the initial fluidity of time, space, and sense of self. The
distinction between subject and object is dissolved, as in an undif-
ferentiated stage of development, in order to be reconstituted
afresh with our sensibilities refined.
Ideally, the child's emergence from primary narcissism should
occur gradually, in its own time. The mother, in contrast to the
nonhuman environment, reflects back to the child a configuration of
its own presence, and the child experiences its existence as reflected
by mother's libidinal attachment (Lichtenstein, 1964). If there is a
disturbance of this " mirroring experience," there is the feeling of
being negated in one's existence and perhaps the coercive uncon-
scious demand for unconditional, total, and unrealistic affirmation
(Lichtenstein, 1971). Such narcissistic personalities will develop
idealizing or mirror transferences as efforts at self-repair through
32 On the shores of self: Samuel Beckett's Molloy

being echoed, approved, confirmed, attended to, and acknowledged

(Kohut, 1971).
Where there is a psychotic outcome, such individuals may use
actual mirrors to try to restore self-identity, as an infant does in a
peek-a-boo game, trying to "retrieve" the ego, self, or boundaries
they fear they are losing (Elkisch, 1957). An alternative result is
premature ego development. A not infrequent cost of this is a grim
and colorless reality that is succumbed to as a restricting cage
rather than meeting and shaping a reality that offers possibilities
for self-completion and liberation.
The irredentist urge to recapitulate primary narcissistic fusion
with the pre-Oedipal mother corresponds to a partial merging of
self and object representations within the ego and an expansion of
ego boundaries between the self and the world (Rose, 1964, 1971,
1972). Whether reinforced by constitutional sensitivity, separation
anxiety, developmental arrests, or the awareness of existential
aloneness, it is far from a regressive defense only. The artist is
explicitly engaged in a continual searching for harmony or balance
between the heightened sensitivity to bodily sensations and to the
outer world; the force of one's own body feelings, throughout the
entire spectrum of sensory modalities, responds and causes a kind
of amalgamation of body imagery with outer forms in the world
and leads to a state of mutual permeability or sense of fusion with
the outer world (Green acre, 1957). From a philosophical domain
the same has been expressed regarding sensitive perception in
general: our sense organs bind, rhythmicize, and filter the world;
where the function of the filter ends, a bodily element sends itself
out to partake of a ground that otherwise would not be grasped,
producing a unity (Buber, 1963).
The search for harmonious union with the universe (mystical,
aesthetic, religious, empathic) is an essential recurrent phase in the
development of a creative relation to the world (Milner, 1952;
Rose, 1966). Again from the perspective of another field, the
" aesthetic moment" has been described as:

That fleeting instant, so brief as to be almost timeless, when the

spectator is at one with the work of art ... or with actuality of
any kind . ... Time and space are abolished and the spectator
is possessed by one awareness.
(Berenson, 1950: 93)
 On the shores of self: Samuel Beckett's Molloy 33

Ecstatic pleasure in music, likewise, relates to the loss of clear

differentiation between oneself and the outside (Kohut, 1957;
Margolis, 1954). The listener experiences the sounds as emotionally
his own and feels his identity enlarged in an oceanic feeling of
union with the nonverbal universe of sound (Kohut and Levarie,
1950). The reason why music invites such an experience of union is
that its elements (rhythm, tempo, duration, pitch, tone, resonance,
and clang) comprise many of the signs and signals that reach an
infant in the first months of its life (Noy, 1968).
The image of seeking self-completion, rather than self-fulfillment,
highlights the fact that Everyman has undergone separation from
what was a primordial, unitary preself. Each is, so to speak, a single
twin, bereft of his original partner. One version of the Narcissus
myth, by Pausanias, has Narcissus gazing into the spring not
entranced with himself only but in order to recall the features of his
dead twin sister. Like other paired objects, twins unconsciously
represent breasts. In dreams they stand for the dreamer and mother
in an oral, pregenital union; this symbolism parallels the widespread
belief in folklore that twins have a magical power to maintain union
with the mother (Brody, 1952).
The artist searches for self-completion (Rose, 1972). His/her
work is a shadow play through which one can better surmise one's
substance. It is a projected part of the self with which one has a
private dialogue, mirroring, smiling, frowning, approaching, and
withdrawing, until the final completion and release. The motor
aspects playa significant part in this dialogue (Rose, 1963). In the
past they conveyed much of the emotional ambience between
mother and child, the shifting ratios of distance and closeness,
rapprochement and detachment, until finally a more or less separ-
ate existence was established for the growing person and, with it,
the acknowledgment of outer reality. Now the artist's work takes
on more and more of a separate reality until it is prepared to stand
on its own. As in an earlier time, the artist may find that it remains
fragile and never quite complete or, conversely, that it has "com-
pleted itself" before he was ready to let it go.
The intrapsychic processes involve a refinement of self and object
representations, further internalization, and the acquisition of
additional psychic structure. The work has discharged sexual and
aggressive tensions. To the extent that it approaches the image of
one's idealized self, the good parents will have been resurrected,
guilt allayed, and self-esteem and secondary narcissism replenished.
34 On the shores of self: Samuel Beckett's Molloy

With the passage of time, however, it turns out that the love
affair with the world is not forever. Separateness and vulnerability
go hand in hand. There may follow a gradual depletion of
" confident expectation," a decrease in self-esteem, and an increased
need for " refueling. " As with the year-and-a-half- to three-year-old
child, renewed rapprochement with the mother is necessary to
protect him from acute deflation of his "omnipotence" and serious
injury to his self-esteem (Mahler, 1966).
Here, as elsewhere, past experience is crucial. Where in the past
the mother has represented an optimal (phase appropriate) balance
of frustration and gratification, providing a resilient buffer against
traumatic overstimulation and a precipitous deflation of omnipo-
tence, the irredentist pull back to narcissistic fusion with her will be
as essential and helpful as healthy sleep. It will, in addition, enrich
with fresh impetus the supply of potentially creative ambiguities
and paradoxes (Rose, 1971).
Where, however, the past has been unduly traumatic and the
reservoir of oral craving remains intense, carrying with it an abun-
dance of unmodified aggression, the wish to consume will be con-
fronted with an equal fear of being devoured. A fear of loss of self in
the mother, their mutual destruction and abandonment by reality,
may generate anxiety on all levels - separation, castration, existen-
tial. The problem may be shifted to one of addiction or of object
craving, each of which will represent an externalization of some
essential psychic structure which is lacking. Or there may be an
indefinite prolongation of the adolescent's moratorium on choice; a
fashionably rationalized " alienation" will conceal the unharnessed
orality lying behind a fear of drowning in lifelong "commitment"; or
of becoming " enslaved" and "dehumanized" by "the establish-
ment." The incapacity to love will show itself in its usual alterna-
tives: hate, the wish to be loved, and a paralyzing indifference.
The artist's solution is to split, project, and externalize. One part
is identified with the primal mother (Rose, 1961 , 1972) and the
other, identified with his infantile self emerging from narcissistic
fusion, is projected onto the creative work. What was one is now
the artist and his work in a narcissistic interaction of rapproche-
ment and detachment, gradual correction in the light of reality-
testing and the ego-ideal, refusion, and finally, again, detachment,
redefinition, separation, and completion.
The creative worker's successive irredentist remergings, rebirths of
self, and reconstructions of reality parallel individual development
 On the shores of self: Samuel Beckett's Molloy 35

and growth. The completed work of art is the mask of one's inner life
at a point in the flow of time. It marks a confluence of thinking,
feeling, and action arrested in flight. If it is truly great, it captures a
new aspect of reality and will live on - offering one the illusion that
our time, too, is not passing.
Chapter 3

Whence the feelings from art:

communication or
concordance?

In the Beginning was the Word.

Words?
Not according to contemporary understanding of the development
of communication. The first communication system is affective.
The second communication system of words and language is based
on the earlier one of affects.
At first the infant is " immersed in a word-bath ," as Spitz (1957)
put it, linking words and things into an inextricable network
of emotional and perceptual experiences. Phonetic and musical
elements of language become imprinted together in a context of
meaning-laden intonations. Early on these come to center around
the mother.
This was borne out by a series of experiments with newborns.
Psycholinguists made use of the fact that a pleasurable event will
cause a small baby to increase his sucking activity. Accordingly, a
newborn baby is offered a pacifier connected to an electrode that
makes it possible to record a graph of the variations in the sucking
movements. Outside his field of vision different people speak
various languages. It was possible to deduce that a four-day-old
baby can distinguish his mother-tongue and, secondly, from among
people speaking in this same language, show a "preference" for his
mother's voice speaking in her usual tone and even without ever
pronouncing his name or using her usual endearments (Eismas,
1971; Piaget and Chomsky, 1979; Mehler and Bertoncini, 1980;
quoted by Amati-Mehler et at., 1993: 139- 140).
By the time the child is learning to walk he/she is also learning to
speak. Thus, he/she enters and explores a new world of spatial
 Whence the feelings from art? 37

organization at the same time as also discovering linguistic con-

nections to the out-of-sight mother. Enter language and its sym-
bolization function: words keep the child connected to mother
while venturing out separately into the world and pending a
welcoming return in accordance with the rapprochement phase of
child development (Mahler, 1966).
At the same time, the world is beginning to become differenti-
ated cognitively as well as linguistically: there are good and bad
objects. The infant learns to distinguish them largely through the
primary affective system - reading other people's affects through
their facial musculature and communicating affects via one's own
facial musculature. This is increasingly accompanied by language.
Thus, the earliest affective communication system continues to
work closely with later linguistic communication.
Language works well but far from perfectly. Modern philoso-
phers have been rediscovering for some time what poets knew and
complained about 2000 years ago: the improbability of conveying
anything more than very partial truth by language. Facts, yes; the
feelings about facts, no. This poses special problems for both psy-
choanalysis and art - specifically the scientific status of the former,
and the inherent difficulty of describing in words the experience of
the latter.
Words are flexible, meanings change, language is a living organ-
ism. As Wittgenstein pointed out, words are not crystal clear; they
are nebulous with an aggregate of extensible, ill-defined meanings.
Chomsky emphasized the limitlessness of human language; mean-
ings press against and dilate the confines of each word. In short,
linguistic meanings are indeterminate and "dilatative."
Here is a homely example.
The Five Mile River is the single most important feature of my
town. It gives it a distinctive character. And its name gives it truth.
It, is, in fact, five miles long.
Such a beautiful conjunction of language and truth! Or so I
thought, until sailing out on it one day Crockett Johnson said,
"Back then they didn't much care about it being five miles long - if
that's what it is. It had five mills on it. That was important. So it
used to be The Five Mills River. But nobody remembers that."
In psychoanalysis, the instrument for both psychological digging
and reassembling of memory fragments is language. Following
Freud's metaphor, we tell ourselves that through language we
discover and reconstruct the subjective truth of one's personal past
38 Whence the feelings from art?

from fragments of memory - much as Sir Arthur Evans believed he

was doing with the archeological fragments of the palace complex
at Knossos. However, as any archeologist now knows, what Evans
succeeded in accomplishing may be less a reconstruction of what
was, than a new creation embodying old building blocks. He did
bring intelligent, plausible, coherent "narrative" meaning to what
had been fields of ruins. But "historical" truth?
Language, the second communicative system, is better designed
to communicate the intellectual content of thought than its emo-
tional coloration. When it comes to the world of one's personal
past, cold facts without warm feelings about the facts will not do.
However, in order to convey feelings through language one must
resort to those qualities that are developmentally closer to its roots
in the early affective system of communication. Those aspects of
language are more like the tools in trade of poetry; while conveying
feeling, they becloud the clarity of intellectual content. This under-
mines the claim of psychoanalysis to be a science.
There seems to be no way around this dilemma. If one wishes to
become really businesslike (i.e. unemotional or scientific) about the
organization of facts, one may invent mathematical signs to get
around the muddy imprecision of words. Some philosophers
express their ideas in this way and succeed in conveying ideas of
quantity and dimension, relation and probability. This, however,
places a mathematical stamp on the world and distorts it precisely
to the extent that everything else has been left out.
Spence (1982) has been persuasive in demonstrating how this
impacts on the scientific status of interpretation in psychoanalysis.
For example, language is not only too coarse a rake to reproduce
thought and feelings faithfully, but it is at the same time too broad
and flexible in scope. It leaves out more than it includes, yet it
includes so much that any number of connections can be made
among the elements that are encompassed, especially given the
wait-and-see analytic attitude and ongoing process of collecting
more data.
This linguistic flexibility makes it possible for the analyst to
create correspondences between the patient's material and the
interpretation offered. By choosing the right words, a lexical over-
lap can be made between what the patient is or has been talking
about and a given interpretation. The formal match or similarity,
as by punning, is enough to convey plausibility, whether or not it is
"demanded" by the material. If the given interpretation also
 Whence the feelings from art? 39

includes a number of known facts that have not been otherwise

accounted for, it gains in plausibility. Yet, even without the inclu-
sion of facts, there is a need for closure and certainty that enables
one to jump over the absence of facts. The greater the degree of
anxiety present, the greater is this need for closure and certainty,
other things being equal.
Even without the power of transference and the therapeutic
alliance, the very fact that a proposition has been stated serves this
need. If the proposition is plausible, familiar, and frequent , it
becomes "true." It orders the data of the present and exerts a
pressure on the anticipation of the future and the reordering of
the past.
In this connection something further should be mentioned
regarding the retroactive power of the present to discover or even
create the past. Gestalt psychology has helped us understand the
principles underlying our perception of formal line patterns. If
transposed to cognition and recollection, these principles of pattern
perception may help us understand the retroactive power of the
present.
For example, in the perception of patterns, other things being
equal, a shape tends to persist in its initial mode of operation. But
the mind, continually striving for completeness, stability, and rest,
tends to regularize irregularites and complete what was incomplete.
Thus, a system left to itself tends to lose asymmetries and become
more regular. Memory reinforces this tendency; less good shapes
tend to be forgotten .
It is possible that these principles governing the perception of
forms are applicable to the ways in which we tend to rework the
past. That is to say, the tendency toward regularity, symmetry, and
completion in our perception of formal line drawings might well be
analogous to our tendency to rework the past in terms of our needs
for narrative flow, plausibility, and certainty. In both areas, we
might be dealing with the aesthetic need for "good shape. "
Both the relevance of these gestalt principles and the "flexibility"
of language touch on a fundamental aesthetic property: the plas-
ticity of a medium, in this case the plasticity of words. Plasticity
means that a medium can be treated as malleable and undergo
many transformations while retaining its integrity and the inter-
connection of its elements. The plasticity of words is seen in the
fact that their separate aspects of physical sound, intellectual con-
tent, and affective weight may be elaborated almost independently.
40 Whence the feelings from art?

Poetry recombines their physical attributes, emotional overtones

and semantic meanings. In poetry, words are the plastic, malleable
medium, just as spatial forms are in painting and time is in music.
Another aspect of the problem for psychoanalysis is that the
aesthetic plasticity of words that makes for dubious science can
also make for effective interpretation. It can convey the essence of
ambiguity, paradox, the coexistence in the mind of logical oppo-
sites. It thus makes it possible to correlate and link various dicho-
tomies, objectifying them in order to make them available for
conscious reflection, resolution, or, if necessary, at least a more
peaceable cohabitation in the mind.
One such linking, fundamental to both art and science, is inner
coherence amidst outer changeability. Conversely, the aesthetic
property of plasticity makes it possible to experience that some-
thing familiar can now assume quite other aspects, or be in a
different place, or take on an unusual character. The concern with
an object not being what it was, and with its becoming something
other than what it is, is a common concern of art and psycho-
analysis. When analysts use words flexibly to show correspon-
dences and suggest new connections between the familiar and the
unfamiliar, they are, knowingly or not, exploiting the aesthetic
plasticity of words and acting as artists.
In art, as in psychoanalysis, meanings depend more on affect
than on words. Words struggle to shape cognitive understanding,
but words alone, someone said, sketch only the contour of a river
bed and not the flowing river of living thought plus feeling -
unless, that is, they approach the status of poetry. In art, affect
draws on the depths of the past and stretches from the rich sen-
suous modalities of the body towards consciousness and the world.
It thus reaches beyond the self to a realm that surpasses mere
cognitive understanding.

***
Since fantasy and language both appear at about 18 months of age,
it was easy for psychoanalysis to assume that thought began with
language and that fantasy would provide a key to early thinking.
However, the study of severe language impairments due to neuro-
logical disease shows that thinking can remain essentially intact
despite the loss of language (Damasio, 1999), suggesting that
thinking takes place prior to the acquisition of language. There can
 Whence the feelings from art1 41

be little doubt that language and verbalization can immeasurably

enhance fantasy and thought, but it is also easy to imagine the
possibility of simple fantasies in the form of nonverbal imagery.
Be that as it may, the capacity for feelings certainly precedes
both fantasy and thought. Indeed, Melanie Klein and her followers
insisted back in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s that the psyche con-
stantly endeavors to relate to feelings by concretizing them in the
form of internal objects: fantasies and story-telling were primarily
vehicles to articulate feelings. In other words, feelings come first
and fantasies are elaborated in order to tell their story (Riviere,
1936; Isaacs, 1943; Klein, 1957: 88).
To put it a little differently, fantasy is a way of packaging
affective tension retroactively; it imposes a cognitive structure of
" explanatory" plausibility and narrative coherence onto otherwise
unbound affect. Now that the developmental priority of affect over
fantasy is once again coming into focus, nonverbal art may be
viewed as representing ongoing attempts to bind intense perceptual
and emotional stimulation that would have exceeded the capacity
of the infant to contain. For the future artist, for example, aesthetic
form offers a means of externalizing and transforming unmodified,
emotional and perceptual intensity into highly elaborated,
nonverbal structures of dynamically balanced tension and release.
In the moment by moment pendulum-like movement between
primary and secondary processes - imagination and knowledge -
affect normally enlivens knowledge as knowledge imposes realistic
boundaries upon imagination in a smoothly working partnership.
Less normally, affect becomes blocked, distorts thought and per-
ception, and may find bodily outlets. In contrast to both, art may
be thought of as a separate developmental path whereby affect
becomes differentiated into novel expressive forms that help
illuminate self and world.
Ironically, this illumination takes place despite the fact that at
the core of art lies illusion. Picasso said: "Of course art is a lie. But
a lie that helps one experience truth."
The question is, "Whose truth?" For psychoanalysis the "truth"
in art consists of the "communication" by the artist through the
work to the recipient. The fact of the matter is that the possibility
of such communication retains little credit in the field of aesthetics
(Dufrenne, 1953). Nevertheless, communication of regressive fan-
tasies of infantile wishes embedded in the art remains the corner-
stone of established psychoanalytic theory about the emotional
42 Whence the feelings from art?

appeal of art. What is at question here is not whether these same

constituents may account for the power of neurosis, the nature of
wit, the ubiquity of dreams, and the universality of religion and
myth, but whether they are communicable from artist through art
to audience.
A recent authoritative article on the aesthetic illusion claims
exactly that. It bases itself on the clinical fact that we all have
unconscious infantile fantasies and wish to regress to enjoy them
with the least possible amount of guilt. Less guilt for more regres-
sion should yield most pleasure, the argument goes. The truth of
art supposedly lies in the artist's specialized talent to "commu-
nicate" typical unconscious fantasies in such a way that we can
have a guilt-free regressive ride. It exempts abstract art, dance and
music from consideration because that entails unspecified " con-
troversial issues" that are " profound" and " numerous," though
my work is recommended (Balter, 1999).
It states:

Typical fantasies are not only the emotional- instinctual foun-

dations of the daydreams communicated through works of art.
They also help to make that communication reliable .. . . [They]
are the lingua franca of artistic communication ... [that] allow
beholders of a work of art to find personal relevance .... For
example, Oedipal fantasies of rivalry and romance; " primal
fantasies " of seduction, castration and the primal scene; rescue
fantasies of the phallic woman; the fantasy of sharing a woman;
beating fantasies; power acquisition fantasies, dismemberment
fantasies; the fantasy of the maimed avenger; fantasies of
intrauterine life; fantasies of dying together; three typical fan-
tasies deriving from primal scene schemata: crucifixion
fantasies, machine fantasies and banquet fantasies; oral incor-
poration fantasies; fantasies of having a double. This list could
be extended.
(Balter, 1999: 1299- 1300; citations omitted)

The thesis postulates a regression of the ego function of reality

testing back to the magical omnipotence of thought: we deny the
reality of the artist as author of the art work, and sign on to accept
his imaginary world as our own. The aesthetic illusion is said to
involve an "emotional withdrawal from [one's] own immediate
personal life ... [and] from the social surround . ... Art .. . is
 Whence the feelings from art1 43

therefore fundamentally asocial and antisocial" (Balter, 1999: 1320).

The author adds, parenthetically, "It may, however, secondarily
take on social and socializing functions, " but this later turns out to
be " social regimentation" (Balter, 1999: 1328).
Among the difficulties raised by this grim and classic formu-
lation are the following.
There is first of all a structural problem, both in the nature of
language and in the nature of the aesthetic experience. The theory
is based on fantasy. To the extent, however, that any but the
simplest fantasy depends on language, language is deeply dis-
advantaged in dealing with art. That is because language makes a
clear distinction between subject and object, while art and the
aesthetic experience do not. As Marion Milner (1957: 161) wrote:
"We are trying to talk about a process ... in which the 'me/not-me'
distinction is not important [art], but to do so at all we have to
make the distinction. "
Milner elaborates. In art and the aesthetic experience, subject
and object interpenetrate within rationality. They are drawn into
the experience of the movement of felt time in music, felt space in
painting, and their mutually influential motion.
In formal , logical thought, on the other hand, subject and object
are separate. Accordingly, from the point of view of formal logic
the whole area of symbolic expression is irrational since the nature
of a symbol is that it is both itself and something else.
But art and the aesthetic experience are not necessarily illogical
or irrational; rather, they are nonlogical and nonrational; they
follow other laws and yet the result is not chaos; it is another form
of order: dynamic, harmonious, organic, simultaneously regressive
and progressive, knowledgeable and imaginative, primary and
secondary processes so balanced that unsuspected meanings may
unfold in the course of time. (More of this later: see pp. 98- 99.)
Another basic problem: the theory does not differentiate the
structure of art from the other phenomena mentioned above -
neurosis, myth, dream, religion, humor.
Thirdly, since the aesthetic experience of pleasure often involves a
hyper-clarity of feelingful awareness rather than regressive instinc-
tual gratification or defensive escape from reality, the regressive
fantasy theory of art does not account for any progressive healthful
aspect in the experience of art.
Nevertheless, if communication of unconscious fantasy does take
place in art, one would suppose that the literary experience would
44 Whence the feelings from art?

be the most likely place to search for it. Reader response studies,
however, appear to show that each reader uses the given narrative
as material from which to form his own fantasy.
In an empirical study, Holland (1975) examined five advanced
English-major undergraduates in regard to their understanding of
Faulkner's story, A Rose for Emily. He found that each reader
interacted with the story in terms of his own personality and
intrapsychic life and in the light of this constructed something new
which was most consonant with himself.
Through interviews and independently administered tests it was
possible to delineate a characteristic identity theme for each of the
readers. Each of the readers experienced and synthesized the story
in the light of that identity theme. The reader who reacts in a
positive way puts the elements together so that they tend to reflect
his own lifestyle.
For this to occur, the defenses of the reader must mesh - in some
subtle balance - with the work; from material in the work one
creates wish-fulfilling fantasies characteristic of oneself. Finally,
one transforms those fantasies into a literary interpretation that is
also the product of personal style. In short, one takes from the
work what is most consonant with oneself, rewrites it in one's own
mind and becomes its coauthor.
This is in line with thinking going back to Descartes, Diderot
and Kant, who held that art does not "communicate" meanings; it
generates them in the receptive mind. It engenders much that is not
contained in the object itself. Perhaps even better, T.S. Eliot said.
The more it urges the mind beyond experience, the more it opens
up the realm of the possible. And what is possible in one age is not
possible in another. Which is why new generations will "bury" old
art or rediscover it in the light of the current Zeitgeist and
experience it in a new way.
There is one form of communication, however, that all artists
engage in and that analysts generally tend to ignore. Van Gogh
commented in his diary on the work of no fewer than 1100 artists.
Other artists are one's critics, exemplars, cautionary signposts.
Matisse and Picasso used each other's work as jumping-off points
for their own. Matisse wrote that when either died there would
be some things the other would never be able to talk of with
anyone else.
If language arts do not "communicate" fantasies but rather
stimulate the receptive reader to generate his/her own fantasies and
 Whence the feelings from art? 4S

then complete the work in his/her own way, it is even less likely
that nonverbal, non-narrative, abstract art will succeed in
transmitting the artists' fantasies. There is much anecdotal evidence
in this direction.
In music: Hindemith (196\) commented that the second move-
ment of Beethoven's Seventh Symphony "leads some people into a
pseudo-feeling of profound melancholy, while another group takes
it for a kind of scurrilous scherzo, and a third for a subdued
pastorale. Each group is justified in judging as it does" (p. 47).
In painting: Gombrich (1972) pointed out that Van Gogh
intended Bedroom at Aries (1888) to depict a haven of tranquility
and in a letter to his brother stresses that there was no stippling or
hatching, nothing but flat areas in harmony. Gombrich (1972: 96)
concludes:

It is this ... that Van Gogh experiences as being expressive of

calm and restfulness. Does the painting of the bedroom com-
municate this feeling? None of the naive subjects I have asked
hit on this meaning .... Not that this failure of getting the
message speaks against the artist or his work. It only speaks
against the equation of art with communication. [my italics]

Here is a final, semi-serious example of non-communication in art.

I own a nonrepresentational oil painting entitled Burning Sky. It is
composed of violent reds and oranges bursting out of a field of
blues and blacks, securely contained by the compositional balance.
The artist, an old friend, said: "I was thinking of that violent
volcanic eruption in Hawaii, but between you and me, this was also
the first painting I did right after my open heart surgery and aortic
valve replacement." I had known of his visit to Hawaii and of his
aortic surgery. Now that he told me and linked them together, it
was easy to imagine both the volcano erupting and his own fears of
the aorta rupturing.
Then, after some more chatting: "Well, don't you see something
else, perfectly obvious?" I admitted I did not. "Huh!" he snorted.
"And you call yourself an old friend, let alone a psychoanalyst!" I
squirmed.

After knowing me for more than forty years don't you realize
I'm still an Hungarian? Think of my accent - almost as fresh
as when I came over before the war. Now look at those hot
46 Whence the feelings from art!

reds: don't you know paprika when you see it? Can't you even
taste it?

Whence the feelings from nonverbal art, such as nonrepresenta-

tional art and music unassociated with a verbal program such as
opera or ballet? My thesis is: the concordance of formal patterns of
virtual tension and release in the nonverbal art appear to be
attuned to actual patterns of tension and release in the structure of
affect, resonating back perhaps all the way to the earliest nonverbal
holding environment.
Consider the following: A line is not just a line. "It is a certain
disequilibrium [my italics] ... within the indifference of the white
paper" (Matisse, quoted in Merleau-Ponty, 1961: 184).
And this: A series of tones are not just flat acoustic sounds
hanging in a void; they are dynamic impulses that strive toward
completion (Sessions, 1950; Zuckerkandl, 1973).
It can be argued that neither statement can be literally true.
Lines and tones are inorganic; they are not alive any more than a
color, though vibrant, is really vibrating. It must be that they are
so close in form to certain of our own living, breathing qualities
that we automatically attribute our own vital qualities to the
outside object, inspiriting it with our own. Enhancing it even, we
may go on to feel inspired by it.
These few paragraphs will serve to thrust us into the center of
the problem of how abstract art, and music in particular, conveys
emotion. A summary of the relevant aspects of an excellent over-
view of the subject (Noy, 1993) will prepare the ground for out-
lining my own contribution (Rose, 1996).
While the discussion of the possible ways in which music may
affect the listener's emotions is centuries old, two significant
theories have emerged in the past fifty years: the theory of isomor-
phism by Suzanne Langer (1942) and c.c. Pratt (1952), and the
theory of ego mastery by H. Kohut and S. Levarie (1950). Both are
probably valid, but the former accounts for more instances.
According to Langer and Pratt, every affect has a specific form
or shape; any message used in human communication that is iso-
morphic (i.e. similar in form) may activate this particular affect.
The visceral organic patterns make emotion; the auditory contours
evoke emotion directly by means of their formal shapes, which are
similar if not identical to the visceral bodily patterns that are the
basis of actual emotion.
 Whence the feelings from art? 47

Noy believes that a person's response to the recognition of the

close similarity of visceral and auditory contours is based on a
preverbal, constitutional, sensitivity and responsiveness to an
other's emotions - a "primary empathy." (This receives support
from current neuroscience: the infant early on learns to read and
express primary affects through facial musculature.)
Kohut and Levarie (1950) claimed that music associated with
frightening sounds stimulates the ego to deal with the resultant
defensive anxiety by organizing and transforming it into recog-
nizable forms; thus the pleasure of mastery indirectly becomes the
pleasure of listening to music. This mode of receiving pleasure calls
attention to how art provokes the recipient into being a participant
and doing active work to deal with the stimulation. Noy is
probably correct that all the higher arts provide pleasure in part by
enticing the brain into more widespread organizational activity
involving both primary and secondary processes.
In the light of clinical psychoanalytic experience and inter-
disciplinary readings, I came to adopt the Langer and Pratt theory
of isomorphism and in the course of time have expanded it with
psychoanalytic dimensions. To distinguish it from its antecedent in
the philosophy of aesthetics, let us refer to my psychoanalytic
elaboration as a theory of "concordance." Here is how it came
about.
Where art had long shown that self and object interpenetrate in
feelingful experience, this runs counter to long-standing psycho-
analytic teaching: in the course of self-differentiating from the
original psychological union with the mother, the infant comes to
establish firm boundaries between Self and World. Where Id was,
Ego shall be. Primary process gives way to secondary process,
fantasy to reality, illusion to truth. So runs the canon.
My own clinical experience, however, taught me that there were
a large group of individuals, often gifted and neither psychotic nor
borderline, for whom reality and the sense of self retained a degree
of sensitive fluidity. Reality was neither self-evident nor monolithic,
let alone average or necessarily expectable; it could be refreshingly
expansive. It is not a given; it is constructed. As one person said,
" Reality is negotiable!"
I described a group of patients whose sense of identity depended
in part on a sense of partial fusion with others, seeing themselves
and others, for example, as extensions of each other, termed
" narcissistic identity disorders" (Rose, 1963, 1964, 1966). Later, I
48 Whence the feelings from art?

came to appreciate Winnicott's description of the child's tran-

sitional object and expanded this idea into that of an ongoing
transitional process related to creativity (Rose, 1978).
Instead of firm separation or fixed structures, more and more
I saw ongoing fluidity and permeable boundaries as part of
growth and openness to change. This was in accordance with Von
Bertalanffy's (1968) thinking about the advantages of an open
system theory over a closed one. I began to appreciate that behind
our clinical predilection to see psychopathology there is also
garden-variety creativity. One example is the gradual formation of
one's self and identity from the original symbiotic unity with the
pre-Oedipal parent. Yes, this may of course become a potential
source of later pathology, but it may also be viewed as an early
stage of a mundane creative process.
That is to say, " the creativity of everyday life" is the healthy
counterpart of the psychopathology of everyday life. Not only
long-term adaptation, but also each moment of perception - scan-
ning, screening, affectively coloring and appraising each sensory
datum in its everlasting mix of inner and outer - is the silent work
of the ego maintaining homeostasis creatively.
As for major creativity, it perpetuates the child's imaginative,
restless probing of reality, resampling early, less differentiated
stages of imagination and reintegrating them with the realistic
perspective of the adult in order, finally, perhaps, to recompose
reality refreshingly. The artistic work, itself, highlights the shifting
qualities of self and reality that went into its creation, projecting
a delicate balance between inner and outer, regression and
progression.
Another example of the fluidity of an open system is the constant
interplay between primary and secondary processes rather than
their isolation as separate entities. An example of this is the joining
of primary process configurations such as condensation and
displacement with the delayed discharge of the secondary process.
In this way the terms of perception, itself, can be slowed down,
magnified and made manifest. Primary process configurations can
be rendered conscious and shown in the course of their unfolding.
Think of the stretching out and unfolding of Bach's (based on
primary process configurations) or Picasso's bold visual condensa-
tions of multiple viewpoints simultaneously. Transposing the terms
"primary and secondary process" into everyday "imagination and
knowledge" make their interplay inherently plausible.
 Whence the feelings from art? 49

As art helped to sensitize me to certain kinds of clinical experi-

ence and the awareness of the permeability of boundaries
intrapsychically, it was analytic theory that allowed me to glimpse
the possibility of a bridge between art and affect. That bridge was
based on the idea of fluctuations of energy.
Freud's central idea about affect was that felt emotions are the
conscious perceptions of an internal process which may be trig-
gered by either external or endogenous events. Contemporary
psychoanalysis and neuroscience agree that when an external event
evokes affects, "the felt emotion is a perception of the subjective
response to that event; it is not a perception of the external event
itself" (Solms and Nersessian, 1999: 6).
In other words, the source is projected. When we listen to music
we enjoy,

We are not just emotionally moved by the music we enjoy, but

the emotions actually appear to flow directly from the music.
Even as we recognize that the information triggering the
feelings is encapsulated within the well-interpreted score, the
resulting mood changes arise from the dynamic responses of
our brains . . . . In short, our brains are designed to project
affect (as well as perceptions, of course) back into the world .. ..
This is the way the brain generates its highly adaptive illusions
of emotional realities.
(Panksepp, 1999: 33)

What then, according to Freud, is the internal process? Affects are

perceptions of "oscillations in the tension of instinctual needs [that]
.. . become conscious as feelings in the pleasure- un pleasure series
. . . [though] it is hard to say . . . by what means . . . these
perceptions come about" (Freud, 1940: 198). He attributed the
quality of the feelings to temporal factors: "the amount of increase
or diminution in a given period of time" (Freud, 1920: 7- 8). More
specifically: "It is probable ... that what is felt as pleasure or
unpleasure is not the absolute height of ... tensions [produced by
stimuli] but something in the rhythm of the changes in them"
(Freud, 1940: 145- 146).
Though Freud tied oscillations of tension to instinctual needs
lying behind conscious pleasure and unpleasure, we do not neces-
sarily have to subscribe fully to instinct theory in order to retain
the usefulness of the notion of energy.
50 Whence the feelings from art?

Consider that, according to analytic theory, secondary process,

logical cognitive thought entails a long-circuiting buildup of the
tension of bound energy, until finally achieving delayed grati-
fication. Primary process imagination, on the other hand, works
with unbound, mobile energy pressing for immediate release of
tension.
Returning now to the idea of a more open system of relatively
fluid boundaries, intrapsychically we would expect a continuous
interplay between primary and secondary processes: imagination
stimulating knowledge and knowledge disciplining imagination.
Such an interplay would involve a flux of energy; knowledge,
increase of tension; imagination, release.
I speculate that this interplay of tension and release either
generates affect, reflects it, or is otherwise closely related to the
nature of affect. Thus, without dissociating ourselves altogether
from instinct theory, the energic connotations of the constant
interplay between the tension and release of knowledge and imagi-
nation offer an approach to Freud's question as to how the
perception of affects comes about. (More of this later.)
If a dynamic of tension and release indeed lies at the core of
affect, it is precisely that which is ready and available to respond to
art, for central to each art there is a similarly dynamic balance of
tension and release held together by formal means within a secure
and sensitive frame (G.1. Rose, 1980). This is especially clear in
nonverbal art like nonrepresentational painting and music, where
the absence of narrative content highlights the abstract form .
In music, for example, one does not have to go back to eigh-
teenth century formulations for the musical expression of certain
typical emotions that characterized so-called affectenlehre of Quant
and P.E. Bach. According to the music theoretician, Schenker
(1935: 189):

The highest principle that is common to all the arts: the prin-
ciple of inner tension and its corresponding fulfillment . . .. If a
differentiation is to be made between "classic" and "roman-
tic", only the degree of tension and fulfillment should be
considered.

While many others could be cited in all the arts, in music Hindemith
(1945) graphically presents the rise and fall of tension in both the
melodic and harmonic realms, with an almost mathematically
 Whence the feelings from art? 51

developed thesis on the tension produced between various melodic

intervals and between various harmonic permutations.
Few from the field of music have specifically explored how music
conveys affect. The work of Epstein (1993, 1995) is an exception.
After closely examining excerpts of Mendelssohn, Mozart, and
Wagner, he concludes that the sense of motion unites form , struc-
ture, and affect. " It is the nuances of motion that effect, modulate,
and ultimately control musical affect . . . . Affect is deeply and
intrinsically wed to structure, and structure inseparably tied to
motion" (Epstein, 1993: 119).
He joins his musical thesis relating musical motion to affect to
my idea that art and affect share the common dynamic of tension
and release:

It is but a small and logical step from the dynamic buildup and
release of tensions ... to the factor of motion, as it operates in
music as the carrier of these tensions and as the means through
which tensions are controlled, modulated, and ultimately
resolved. For our sense of musical motion is in part felt
physically (muscularly) and psychologically in terms of tension
and release. Tensionlrelease may indeed be the essential factor,
conveying the sensation of movement, of motion, in the
absence of true physical motion in space.
(Epstein, 1993: 99)

A composer knows that simple repetition, ornamentation, minor

keys, modulation, remote harmonies, and dissonance may be used
to increase tension. Conversely, returning to the central tonality of
the "home" key, for example, after wandering in other keys, will
always bring a relief of tension.
The foregoing discussion of tension and release in relation to
affect in music is given substantive backing by the finding that
motor areas of the brain are activated in the course of listening
to music (cited in Benzon, 2001). The two come together in
Nietzsche's remark somewhere that one listens to music with one's
muscles.
Turning to tension and release in visual art, an artist knows how
to highlight the dramatics of everyday visual experience and
express them more energetically and clearly than is customary in
daily life. How? For example, by knowing that oblique lines and
rectangular or oval shapes are more tension-producing, and that
52 Whence the feelings from art?

horizontal or vertical lines or square or spherical shapes are more

stable and tension-releasing. Knowing such matters, he can
enhance the expressive qualities inherent in ordinary perception.
Now from the aspect of the viewer or listener and, more
generally, perception itself, a perceptual sensitivity to the qualities
of tension and release inherent in (or attributed to) any situation is
at the root of that most basic aspect of perception, namely,
affective perception. This is the capacity to have an immediate
emotional gut reaction to any situation. It underlies the biological
necessity that an organism be able to make an on-the-spot
appraisal of the outside world's perceived hostility or friendliness
in order to know how to respond: advance, withdraw, or wait.
Needless to say, affective perception gives a first-alert signal. It
must be evaluated and contextualized in the light of long-term
memory and symbolization so that hair-trigger emergency actions
may be aborted.
If there is a linkage in the tension- release deep structure of art
and that of affect, their common dynamic of patterns of tension-
release forms the affective bridge between art object and viewer.
More precisely, the patterns of virtual tension and release in the
artwork are concordant with the patterns of actual tension and
release that constitute a person's capacity for nonverbal affective
responsivity. It makes it appear that the artwork is attuned to the
recipient, who thereupon responds with affective resonance.
By another route, starting in clinical experience, we have arrived
at Langer and Pratt's theory of isomorphism. Note, too, that this
has not required that the art-work communicate feelings; only that
it generate them in receptive minds.
Does it matter? Yes, for reasons that are sufficiently significant
to warrant calling it by a new name, " concordance. " (I) It opens
up a psychoanalytic developmental perspective on art; (2) it relates
itself to neuroscience which may shed further light on our subject;
(3) both points of view, psychoanalytic and neuroscientific, accord
to art a weighty biological significance.
Regarding the first: The fit between virtual and actual patterns of
tension and release can be so finely attuned that it can lead to a
preconscious illusion that art is providing an emotionally respon-
sive, witnessing presence. As in any intimately attuned encounter
(like love or treatment) the aesthetic emotional experience may
encourage one to feel more consciously what was always latent but
inexpressible.
 Whence the feelings from art? S3

This mobilizes deeper emotional resonances from the past, per-

haps even drawing upon the earliest nonverbal affective signaling
that took place within the holding presence of the relationship
between parent and infant. Ideally, this was geared towards the
modulated buildup and resolution of tension in a finely-tuned
dance of mother's attunement and infant's responsiveness. At that
time it promoted a graded differentiation of feelings within the very
beginnings of a sense of self.
Art, too, provides a holding presence of reliably balanced ten-
sion and release; it, too, allows affects to build up with modulated
intensity to differentiate further. Thus, art continues a biological
function of early mothering, namely, helps elaborate transforma-
tions of affect on higher, abstract levels of the same resonating
emotional responsiveness that existed in the beginning.
The foregoing provides a theoretical rationale for a fundamental
role of the arts in accessing affects blocked by trauma, and facili-
tating their differentiation irrespective of whether they eventually
achieve verbalization.
Art theorist and therapist Dr Ernest Zierer pioneered a related
line of thinking to art therapy in the 1950s. His work was largely
unrecognized, perhaps because there was as yet no body of theory
to receive it. (For a first-hand personal account, see Finn, 1992.)
Believing that the task of integrating a painting paralleled over-
coming situations in daily life, he applied his ideas of art theory to
art therapy. He deliberately imposed obstacles ("push marks")
onto the canvas that a patient was working on. The patient's task
was (1) to integrate the imposed obstacle into a finished art-work,
which at the same time (2) achieved a high level of aesthetic
tension. The level of tension (he developed a scale of fourteen
different levels) was determined by the size of a color area, the
degree of color contrast, and skillful brush work. Success in the
task indicated an improvement in both creative ability and coping
capacity.
Just as art therapy is directly related with the ability to cope,
music has an intimate relevance to socialization. Ethnomusicolo-
gists note that dance and music probably evolved together; in
almost all premodern societies members of the social group dance
and make music for and with others (Feld, 1974).
The social action of singing and dancing together can lead to an
altered mental state characterized by increased malleability, and
trusting, cooperative group behavior. Rhythmic behavioral
54 Whence the feelings from art?

activities that are induced by the beating of drums and music can
lead to altered states of consciousness. In extreme form, trance
states help to break down established habits and beliefs.
Thus, far from being a private individual matter, originally the
action of dancing and singing together served an opposite function,
namely, socialization. It probably played an important and per-
haps primary role as a wordless means of bringing about deep
emotional social bonding (Freeman, 2000).
Returning now to the isomorphism or concordance of patterns
between art and affect, a bridge toward current brain neuroscience
begins to appear possible.
According to Damasio (1999), from whose text the following is
abstracted, there are six primary emotions: happiness, sadness,
fear, anger, surprise, disgust. They are associated with a repertoire
of facial expressions and varied temporal profiles. Some tend to
" burst" patterns of rapid onset, peak of intensity and rapid decay.
There are also secondary or "background emotions" that reflect
the organism's ongoing physiological process or interactions with
the environment, or both. These consist largely of reflections of
body-state changes associated with musculoskeletal changes like
body posture and movements. They are practically inseparable
from the continuously generated "pulses" of core consciousness.
Their patterns are more "wavelike" and are present continuously
like an ongoing melodic line (Damasio, 1999: 93; my italics). They
are: well-being/malaise, tension/relaxation, fatigue/energy, balance/
imbalance, harmony/discord.
It is worth emphasizing at this point that one of the background
emotions, tension- relaxation, appears to be a common attribute or
underlying feature of all. This conforms to the central dynamic
we have postulated regarding both aesthetic form and affect,
namely, a pattern of interplay between tension and release in their
virtual and actual forms. Further, musculoskeletal elements play an
important role in the affective response to art - as they do in
background emotions.
When the organism interacts with an object, Damasio continues,
neural images map the organism, the object and the interaction
between them. The maps pertaining to the object cause changes in
the maps pertaining to the organism, which in turn enhance the
object. All these changes can be re-represented in yet other, non-
verbal, second-order maps. The neural patterns of second-order
maps can become mental images describing in wordless but feeling
 Whence the feelings from art? 55

stories of how all this came about. While these can be converted
immediately and automatically into language, it is again worth
emphasizing that they exist initially in nonverbal form.
The experience of feelings is achieved in two ways, either a
"body-loop" or an " as-if body" loop. May this correspond to the
distinction we have made between the actual tension and release of
affect and the virtual tension and release in the formal structure of
art?
The experience of feelings through a "body-loop" is achieved
through neural and chemical signals which change the map of the
body landscape. It is represented in somatosensory structures of
the nervous system on many levels.
In the experience of feelings by an "as-if body" loop, the rep-
resentation of body-related changes due to feelings is represented in
changed body landscape maps via direct sensory body maps under
the control of other neural sites such as in the prefrontal cortices.
They bypass the body proper, partially or entirely, indicating "as
if" the body has really been changed but it has not; they bypass the
body and create "as-if" body states based on empathy, mirroring,
fantasy.
" As-if body" loops are important for internal simulation
(Damasio, 1999: 281; my italics). Further, " The brain can get
direct neural and chemical signaling from organism profiles that fit
background emotions" (Damasio, 1999: 293).
Either route - body maps registering body-state changes or
simulated " as-if body" loops - gives rise to a full gamut of feelings.
Again, while these exist initially in nonverbal form, they can readily
be converted into language. They include, for example, the emo-
tional "chills" induced by music (Panksepp, 1995; Blood and
Zatore, 2001 ; as cited by Damasio, 2003: 137).
Let us extend this in a way that attempts to approximate psy-
chological discourse. The stimulating yet secure "holding environ-
ment" of balanced tension and release inherent in aesthetic
structure is a profile that fits " background emotions. " As such, it
provides the brain with direct neural and chemical signaling. The
experience of feeling evoked by nonverbal art like music would be
registered via an "as-if body" loop involving "internal simulation. "
This interdisciplinary exercise offers a lure and a limit. It offers a
neural basis for the power of imagination - "as-if" loops and
" internal simulation" - but it also highlights a limit. For a neural
map of the power of imagination encompasses both the benign
56 Whence the feelings from art?

illusion of an empathic presence lying embodied in aesthetic

experience, and the intensity of non-organic hallucinatory imagery
and animistic fetishism, for example. So-called "reality testing"
remains to a significant extent on the uncertain ground of judgment
which, as we all know, is captive to the transient spirit of an age.
In other words, the interactive nature of mental contents in the
form of body-based neural maps induced by real or simulated
body-states necessarily involves an irreducible element of subjec-
tivity. Hence, the nonveridicity of perception, the inevitability of
ambiguity: a potential formula for pathology - and art!
All of this suggests an offering to Music as Metaphor:

My mind is my piano,
playing and played upon by a sentient world,
its co-creator.

Identity themes and internalized chords:

resonating pulses
of cumulative Time.
Chapter 4

The music of time in

Faulkner's Light in August

Jean-Paul Sartre (1951: ISO- lSI) wrote that "The novelist's aes-
thetic always sends us back to his metaphysic . . . . And it is
obvious that Faulkner's is a metaphysic of time." He went on to
state that, like other great contemporary writers - Proust, Joyce,
Dos Passos, Gide and Virginia Woolf - Faulkner tries to mutilate
time; his technique arrests motion in time and reaches real time by
negating clock time. The nature of this "real time" and how his
technique attains it are matters we will examine in this chapter.
Faulkner's style has perplexed, fascinated and infuriated critics
from the beginning. One of the principal complaints registered
against him has to do "with his 'perverse' maneuvering of syntax,
his reckless disregard of grammatical 'decency', and the exorbitant
demands he has made upon the reader's attention" (Hoffman,
1951: 2S). Some have been troubled by the fact that by combining
contradictory elements in oxymoron he makes logical resolution
impossible, and his synesthetic images make precise sense localiza-
tion impossible. It has been charged that although these devices are
admirably suited for depicting inner mental states, they enable him
to deliberately hold elements in suspension. Some claim that this
avoidance of "commitment" seriously limits his stature (Slatoff,
1963).
Aiken (1960) described Faulkner's style as "strangely fluid and
slippery and heavily mannered prose" (p. 135) with passion for
over-elaborate sentence structure: "trailing clauses, one after
another, shadowily in apposition ... parenthesis after parenthesis,
the parenthesis itself often containing one or more parentheses"
(p. 137). He went on to point out that these constituted in a curious
and inevitable way "an elaborate method of deliberately withheld
meaning of progressive and .. . delayed disclosure" (p. 13S). Aiken
58 Music of time: Faulkner's Light in August

compared the repetitiveness to a kind of chanting, a living pulse,

and used such musical terms as fugue-like and symphonic. Beck
(1951) called attention to the contrast between the irresistible
rhythm of Faulkner's prose and the sense of suspension brought
about by lengthy sentences and a full vocabulary. Abel (1969)
compared Faulkner's images of time and found that they were
essentially those of Bergsonian duration.
Our discussion will begin by providing a synopsis of the plot of
the story. Then the various circles of time represented by the char-
acters in Light in August will be described, largely in Faulkner's
own words. Imitating his style of writing will serve as a general
illustration before discussing it in some detail later. For it is
through his style that Faulkner evokes an early time of life and
conveys a sense of endless recurrence or timelessness: fluid bound-
aries between the genders and the tenses, images of fusion, rework-
ings of the "primal scene" and use of rhythm are the powerful
stylistic devices he employs. Counterpoising these intimations of
timelessness there is a manifest insistence that time is also non-
recurrent and its consequences irreversible. This contrast results in
a sustained uncertainty. A system of reverberating tension is set in
motion, mirroring the mind's own task of maintaining a dynamic
balance between objective events and subjective needs. The
recognition of the concordance between the tensional system in
the novel and in ourselves may be a key to the aesthetic experience
and will be discussed in the following chapter.

Synopsis
Lena, a young, unmarried orphan in the last stages of pregnancy,
has been deserted by Lucas Burch, the father of her child. She has
been seeking him by hitchhiking wagon rides for four weeks from
Alabama to Jefferson, Mississippi. She is mistakenly directed to
Byron Bunch, an older bachelor. He realizes that the man Lena is
looking for is going under the alias of Brown to avoid being found
by her. Brown now has a bootlegging partner, Joe Christmas, a
wanderer of unknown origin and rumored to be part Negro.
Christmas has been carrying on a secret affair with Joanna Burden,
a middle-aged Yankee spinster who lives alone on the old farm.
While Byron Bunch and Lena are talking we learn that the Burden
farm is on fire; Joanna Burden has been murdered. A drunken
Brown is taken into custody and, to claim the reward, accuses
 Music of time: Faulkner's Light in August 59

Christmas of the murder. Christmas eludes the posse, running in

circles for seven days; finally he is apprehended walking brazenly
on the main street of a nearby town .
Doc Hines, a Negro-hating religious fanatic, and his wife are
convinced that Christmas is the bastard son of their daughter who
had run off with a part-Negro circus worker thirty years before.
Doc Hines had killed the man and refused to allow a doctor to
attend his daughter's delivery. After she died in childbirth he had
taken the newborn boy on Christmas night and left him on the
orphanage steps. The young doctor there found the child and he
and his mistress, the dietician, took him in and named him Joe
Christmas. Doc Hines took a job as the orphanage janitor. At the
age of five Christmas was adopted by a sadistic, religious funda-
mentalist, Mr McEachern, and his wife. When he was a young
adolescent he ran away, living as an itinerant worker until he
returned to Jefferson and struck up a bootlegging partnership with
Brown (Lena's Burch) and an affair with Joanna Burden. Doc and
Mrs Hines go to Jefferson where Christmas has been jailed. There
they meet Byron Bunch, who has them installed in the cottage
where Christmas and Brown had been living and where Lena is
awaiting the birth of her child. The next day Lena is delivered of a
baby boy by Byron's friend, Reverend Hightower, a recluse and a
minister without a congregation. Mrs Hines imagines that the baby
is her lost grandchild and Brown, brought to see Lena and the
newborn, flees and thus forfeits his reward for the capture of
Christmas. Christmas escapes from jail; he runs to a Negro cottage
and then to Hightower's. He strikes Hightower on the head with a
gun and is himself gunned down by a vigilante group and emas-
culated by their leader. Although Lena refuses to marry Byron
Bunch, they and the child set out for Tennessee together. The
entire action takes place in only ten days. When we last hear of
them they are reaching Tennessee and Lena is marveling at how far
she has traveled since she left Alabama just eight weeks before.

Characters and time

There are a number of circles of time which Faulkner orchestrates

through the plot: dead , detached time; moralistic, vindictive time;
wishful, undoing time; instinctual, appetitive time; a dawning time
of cause, consequence and personal accountability; and natural,
60 Music of time: Faulkner's Light ;n August

amoral, cyclical time. These circles are embodied in the lives and
thought processes of the principal characters.
Reverend Hightower's time is dead time, detached from present
life. He identifies with his dead grandfather who was shot from his
horse and, instead of having an identity of his own, he dozes in his
daydreams or sleeps in his canvas chair until Bunch wakes him to
take a responsible part in the events unfolding around them. Until
then his life had been defined by resistances to the life around him: he
would not resign from the Church, would not leave Jefferson, would
not deal with the townspeople's needs, would not tell who beat him
up. He did not see his own name on his signpost, nor did he hear the
music he waited for each day to signal nightfall and the return of
familiar dreams of the past. Unlike Bunch, he uses neither watch nor
clock, having needed neither for twenty-five years. Although he lives
dissociated from mechanical, contemporary time, he could know at
any moment where he would be and what doing in his old life in
relation to Wednesday night and Sunday church services. He could
know almost to the second when he should begin to imagine the
distant music from the church to begin.
Mr McEachern and Doc Hines live in moralistic, vindictive time,
each believing himself the instrument of God's punitive will.
McEachern wore a heavy silver watch chain across his vest. From
before breakfast on Sunday mornings the thick silver watch would
lie face up on the table. Exactly on the dot of each hour McEachern
rose deliberately, without haste, took up the watch, closed it and
returned it to its pocket, looping the chain again through his
suspenders. Then he took the boy, Joe Christmas, to the stable, had
him drop his pants and administered ten strokes of the strap. Each
hour he would strike him ten times for not learning his catechism.
Then he would kneel and pray for the boy.
Doc Hines believed that his daughter's pregnancy by a non-white
was the devil 's punishment for his own former drinking. Doc Hines
acted as God's punishing agent when he killed the man responsible.
His daughter's death in childbirth was her punishment. The illegi-
timate mulatto baby was to be the instrument of other people's
punishment. And Doc Hines, with his wide open, blind, fanatical
eyes, was to be the witness of the slow, inexorable working of
God's unhurried will.
Mrs Hines represents wishful time, time that can be undone and
repaired. She wished that just for one day it could be as though the
murder had not been committed; if it could be like that for just one
 Music of time: Faulkner's Light in August 61

day, after that she would not interfere. When Lena's newborn son
cried it was like thirty years were obliterated by wishful thinking;
she imagined this to be her dead daughter brought back, and this
the grandson she had not seen since birth.
Brown and Christmas, part-time bootleggers, were outside the
law and time. Theirs was the amoral time of appetites, governed by
recurrent instinctual need for food (drink) and sex. Brown hollered
that he did not know what time it was since he was not rich enough
to own a watch, but with his new car he had only to drive past the
courthouse often enough to see the clock in order to keep up with
the time.
As for Christmas, time, sex, violence and orality were all tied
together. The first time he bought a watch was before his first date
and sex. He had forgotten to wind it so the watch was dead, for
which he blamed Mrs McEachern. But he knew it was late without
having to look at the watch. In adolescence he had learned about
women's monthly time; when he heard that his waitress girlfriend
was having her period, he struck her, walked into the woods and
vomited. In his affair with Joanna Burden he began to see himself
sucked down into a morass of her insatiable nighttime appetite.
At first it was a torrent, and then it became a tide with an ebb
and flow.
When he fled after killing her he ran in circles for seven days.
While he was trying to remember how many days since he had
eaten, a strange thing came into his mind. The name of the day of
the week seemed more important than the food. At last he felt a
need to keep track of the time spent toward some goal (p. 317). "I
am tired of running of having to carry my life like it was a basket
of eggs" (p. 319).
When he woke in the dawn it was still too dim to see his face
clearly in the water. But now he goes in a straight line. He is like a
man who knows where he is and where he wants to go and how
much time he has to get there. He is not sleepy or hungry or even
tired. In the past seven days he has traveled further than in all the
thirty years before. And yet he is still inside the circle.
What circle? He has always been driven solely by instinctual
needs and, lonely and alienated, has almost drowned in them. Now
for the first time he discovers that he is also part of another circle -
one of cause and effect and accountability: "I have never broken
out of the ring of what I have already done and cannot ever undo,"
he thinks quietly (p. 321).
62 Music of time: Faulkner's Light in August

Accepting cause and consequence, he waits for more light to see

his image reflected in the stream. Now he no longer runs in circles
but goes in a straight line to the nearest town and walk up and down
the main street until he is recognized and, finally, apprehended.
The messenger through whom these various circles come to
intersect as the dramatic action unfolds is Byron Bunch. A middle-
aged bachelor and Sunday choir master, he may be said to live in
mechanical, impersonal time. He works six days a week in the
wood-planing mill, keeping his own time to the final second of an
imaginary whistle as well as on his huge silver watch, not leaving
out even the minutes he stops to rest. He has managed to remain
uninvolved, hidden from the chance to harm anyone, largely
outside of human-relational time, until he falls in love with Lena.
Feeling that there is a price for being good the same as for being
bad, he makes himself responsible for Lena, finds a place for her to
stay and gets Hightower to deliver her baby. In the process of
engaging themselves with her need, these two men are reborn into
life from their own mechanical, dead time spheres. Thus, while they
rescue her, she rescues them.
But, with typical Faulkner irony, Lena remains outside of
human-relational time. The steady, creaking wagons she travels on
take her to a place not very different or worse from the present one
or the last one. Hers is the recurrent time of Nature's unchanging
cycles of seasonal rain and fertility. As the carrier of life, she has
attracted the constructive force of the community; it gathers itself
around her while neither condemning nor approving her illegiti-
mate pregnancy. She conventionally accepts the sacrifices made on
her behalf and, unreflective throughout, remains as unchanged
through the catastrophic changes around her as Nature herself.
She comments in the last paragraph of the book, as in the last
sentence of the first chapter, " My, my. A body does get around"
(pp. 26, 480).
As Brooks (1969) points out, the characters form many con-
trasting pairs. Lena and Joe Christmas stand in obvious contrast.
They are both orphans who escape from home by crawling out the
window. Betrayed by their first loves, they both come to Jefferson;
but Joe Christmas repels while Lena attracts the community into
which they come as strangers. Christmas' alienation and isolation
from the community is similar to that of his executioner, Peter
Grimm. That is why the wounded Hightower sees their images
blurred together. Christmas' rootlessness, knowing nothing of his
 Music of time: Faulkner's Light in August 63

ongms, living only in present appetites, is contrasted with the

absurd, historical rootedness, which is alienated from the present,
of Joanna Burden, Hightower, and Grimm. Joanna's sterility is a
stark contrast to Lena's fertility.
Regarding a fertility theme, it happens that the same day Joe
Christmas is killed, Lena's baby is born. In the mind of Mrs Hines
the baby is little Joey, her daughter's baby of thirty years ago,
reborn. Both the death of Joe Christmas and the birth of Lena's
baby, the new Joey, take place on the ninth day after Lena's arrival
in Jefferson.
Of particular psychoanalytic interest (and this has not escaped
literary critics; see Brooks, 1969) is the likelihood that both
Christmas and Hightower are latently homosexual. It is thus no
wonder that Hightower, having earlier refused to provide an alibi,
now tries to protect Joe by saying that he was with him the night of
the murder, and Grimm accuses him of having taken his pants
down to Christmas.
This ambiguity in their gender identification merits further
examination for, as we shall see, it is paralleled by the particularly
slippery way in which Faulkner handles time and mode, in describ-
ing these characters at crucial times. The tenses move back and
forth , the active and passive modes alternate with each other, and
time is cut off and flattened out until distinctions are almost
obliterated.
It may be asked, "How is the issue of bisexuality related to that
of time?" The characters' bisexuality and the stylistic device of
letting tenses and modes "hang loose" both have the effect of
returning us to a much earlier time of life, a phase of development
in which the knowledge of sex differences has not yet registered,
gender identity is unformed, and the boundaries of time are
similarly fluid . Thus, we are referred back to a time when reality
itself is little more than a playground for the imagination, the realm
of the storyteller's once-upon-a time.
First, then, let us look at the temporal and gender ambiguity of
Hightower; then at that of Christmas.
If there is a "musical" theme associated with Hightower it is his
waiting for the end of each day for the moment of night to hear the
distant choir music, waiting for twilight to cease, for the time to
begin to say, "Soon, now. Now, soon." Between the "soon" and the
"now" and back again, the "now" and the " soon," he can "feel the
two instants about to touch: the one which is the sum of his life . . .
64 Music of time: Faulkner's Light in August

and the suspended instant out of which the soon will presently
begin" (p. 160).
This hinge of time swinging back and forth between the "Soon,
now. Now, soon" future- present- present- future signals the
moment for Hightower's fantasy to return to the past: "The only
day he seemed to have ever lived in - that day when his grand-
father was shot from the galloping horse ... " (p. 57). It was as
though he had been killed too. Time had stopped for him, and his
own life and time had ceased before it began twenty years before.
He lived in the present as though dead, declaring that he is not in
life anymore. He listens as though "in a cathedral to a eunuch
chanting in a language which he does not even need to not under-
stand" (p. 30 I).
The movement is from obliviousness of the living, active present
to passively listening to a eunuch chant in a lost tongue. The
imagery is consonant with a slightly earlier description of High-
tower being transformed into a woman, and a pregnant one at that:
" His obese stomach is like some monstrous pregnancy ... " (p. 291).
And later, when he sleeps in his canvas deck chair, his mouth open,
" loose and flabby flesh sagging away from the round orifice, [it
seems] as though the whole man were fleeing away from the nose
which holds invincibly to something yet of pride like a forgotten flag
above a ruined fortress" (p. 343). And still later, after Hightower
acts as midwife and delivers Lena's child, he thinks, " If I were a
woman now [I'd] go back to bed to rest" (p. 383). He does so, and
dreams of the newborn child as his namesake.
Is the unknown language chanted by a eunuch in a cathedral
perhaps that of an early, unconscious longing for a time, not far
removed from the cathedral of the womb, when the boundaries of
time, gender, the sense of separateness from mother, and the sense
of reality itself, are equally fluid? However intriguing that possi-
bility, we are on firmer ground if we limit ourselves to the claim
that there is an intrinsic connection between Hightower's conscious
wish to return to the past and an unconscious wish to keep his
gender options open or to renounce his masculinity.
Toward the close of the book, we learn that Hightower's grand-
father had not lost his life in a gallant cavalry charge but in a raid
on a henhouse. What are we to make then of his lifelong obsession
with the heroic myth? The recurrent image of his grandfather dying
in battle magnifies his masculinity and unmans him at the same
time, thus emphasizing the loss. His compulsive repetition of this
 Music of time: Faulkner's Light in August 65

particular scene in his imagination suggests that Hightower is

repeatedly killing off the male part of himself in the shape of his
grandfather. It also suggests that cutting off time at precisely this
point is, for Hightower, a symbolic emasculation.
If Hightower killed off the man within, stopped the clock, and
stood still, Christmas killed off the woman within, tore her hands off
the clock and ran in blind circles. One character only remembered
and hardly acted; the other only acted and hardly remembered. Both
are incomplete men and both, being outside the flow between
memory and action, are timeless.
The woman within Christmas is represented by Joanna Burden,
who, Faulkner emphasizes repeatedly, is a woman who seems like a
man. "'My God,' he thought, 'it was like I was the woman and she
was the man'" (p. 222). When he mentally watched himself making
love with her he could have been looking at a sexual struggle within
himself, one which threatened to leave him feeling unmanned (like
Hightower): he watched two creatures in one body.
The day that Christmas murdered Joanna Burden began just
after midnight with a fight with his bootlegging partner, Brown.
He stooped astride Brown and struck him repeatedly in the face .
But he did not reach for the razor. The oral imagery keeps
highlighting the underlying homosexual tension. Brown's mouth
was open, snoring; Christmas went outside, lascivious, naked into
"the cool mouth of darkness, the soft cool tongue" (p. 100). The
imagery then moves from male-oral to female-oral, then back
toward the male: "to smell horses because they are not women ... "
(p. 101).
The bisexual struggle still unresolved, he finds himself by after-
noon in Freedman Town, surrounded by the smell and voices of
invisible Negroes equated with the "hot, wet, primogenitive
Female" (p. 107). Blackness is equated with female, and whiteness
with male. He began to run towards the light - "cold hard air of
white people" (p. 107). And he goes on to murder Joanna Burden
who, being a white, masculine, barren female is suitable to represent
both elements in himself.
While the sexual struggle between his own shifting identifications
is being thus described, the conflict is transposed to the Time
element. The tenses shift back and forth as well as between active
and passive voices: He thought "something is going to happen to
me [future-passive]. I am going to do something [future-active)"
(p. 97). When he awoke he wondered, "maybe I have already done
66 Music of time: Faulkner's Light in August

it [past-active], maybe it is no longer now waiting to be done [past-

passive]" (p. 104).
Later, standing in the lonely, empty road, he heard the bell-
tower clock tolling ten o'clock. The road for Faulkner is a symbol
of time and memory. The ten strokes of the clock are the same ten
strokes that McEachern used to deliver to the bare bottom of
the boy Christmas exactly on the hour as he stood passively in the
stable, and took his punishment, preferring this stern, male justice
to the unpredictable softness of females.
Time recedes and is halted in past memory. A series of negatives,
in both active and passive modes, indicates that time has stopped:
"When he heard eleven he was not thinking ... thinking had not
begun now; the voices had not begun now either. He just sat there
not moving until after a while he heard the clock strike twelve"
(p. 110). To the negatives arresting time, and the interchangeability
of active and passive modes, is now added the reversibility of the
tenses. After a while he heard the clock strike twelve. "Then he
rose. He didn't go fast . He didn't think even then, 'Something is
going to happen'" (p. 110). "He was saying to himself, 'I had to do
it,' already in the past tense" (p. 264).
The conflict within himself between active and passive, male and
female, black and white, the wish to resolve the struggle into
peaceful sameness has been depicted by Faulkner by stylistic
devices centering on time that finally emasculate it. They parallel
Christmas' murder of Joanna Burden and his own death. When he
mounted her stairs the last time he heard her praying. Before when
he had been sitting in the shrubbery outside hearing the last stroke
of the far clock die away, "the dark was filled with the voices out of
all time that he had known, as though all the past was a flat pattern
. . . tomorrow night, all the tomorrows ... that had ever been was
the same as all that was to be, since tomorrow to-be and had-been
would be the same. Then it was time" (p. 266).
Time having been transformed into a flat pattern by Faulkner,
Joe now mounts the stairs the last time and confronts his secret
double, Joanna, who is found to have a hidden gun pointed at him.
He disarms and perhaps decapitates her, loses his memory, runs in
circles for seven days, and then deliberately gets himself caught.
If Faulkner's style of interchanging tenses and active- passive
modes parallels an oscillation in gender identification, certain
imagery suggests also a purposeful blurring of other distinctions
that are first made in early life. The merging of self with outside
 Music of time: Faulkner's Light in August 67

objects rolls time back to the earliest period, before the establish-
ment of a sense of reality. Similarly, when various sensations are
confused and condensed, memory is returned to its origins in raw
sensory date. In both experiences there is obliteration of separate-
ness and a return to early fusion states in which the rudimentary
sense of time is scarcely discriminated from the ebb and flow of
physical needs. If an unconscious memory of these early states
comes close to consciousness it imparts a sense of uncanny fore-
boding as of impending truth. The feeling of conviction that
accompanies it precedes and outlasts conscious understanding,
actual recollection, or imagining.
Faulkner puts it this way: " Memory believes before knowing
remembers. Believes longer than recollects, longer than knowing
even wonders. " He continues in a sentence a third of a page long
which, abstracted, reads: " Knows remembers believes a . . .
building . .. surrounded by smoking factory purlieus and enclosed
... like a penitentiary or a zoo, where ... orphans . . . in and out
of remembering but in knowing constant as the bleak walls, the
bleak windows where in rain soot from the nearly adjacenting
chimneys streaked like black tears" (p. Ill).
In this passage, Faulkner is describing the experience of Joe
Christmas in his earliest years in the orphanage. Christmas knows,
remembers, and believes the black tears of rain soot on the bleak
windows. This image forcefully fuses Christmas' face with the
window, his tears with the rain, the sense of his blackness or
perhaps a dirty face with bleakness and soot. The black tears
running from his eyes down his face are like the rain running down
the sooty windows of his orphanage and are scarcely distinguish-
able from them. This is an imagist picture of the feeling of early
childhood depression; depression that occurs before the establish-
ment of the sense of separateness from the outside world.
Many years later Joe Christmas hears the far clock strike nine
and then ten, and enters Joanna Burden's window like a cat,
perhaps remembering how he used to leave the McEachern's
window and the rope he used to climb out. He moved unerringly
towards the food and ate something from an invisible dish, with
invisible fingers. " His jaw stopped suddenly in midchewing and
thinking fled for twenty-five years back down the street . . . I have
eaten it before, somewhere. In a minute I will memory clicking
knowing I see I see I more than see hear I hear I see my head bent I
hear the monotonous dogmatic voice which I believe will never
68 Music of time: Faulkner's Light in August

cease .. . and peeping I see the indomitable bullet head ... and I
thinking How can he be so not hungry and I smelling my mouth
and tongue weeping the hot salt of waiting my eyes tasting the hot
steam from the dish 'It's peas,' he said aloud. 'For sweet Jesus.
Field peas cooked with molasses' " (p. 217).
Here Faulkner is describing how Christmas struggles to recon-
struct a memory from bits of raw sensory data buried alive years
ago and now stirred up; it is just barely teased out, and now finally
linked to the smell and taste of the unseen food in his fingers, his
mouth; at last it is given a name and identified by the words on his
tongue as field peas. The interminable sentence tells us physically
that waiting to eat them must have felt like an eternity. Weeping
with his eyes, and waiting to taste with his tongue, he smelled the
steam from the dish of peas: " I smelling my mouth and tongue
weeping the hot salt of waiting my eyes tasting the hot steam from
the dish" (p. 217). Weeping and waiting to taste, tears, saliva, and
hot steam merge, and eyes and tongue become fused, so that tears
might as well be coming from a weeping tongue, and saliva from
drooling eyes. In the experience of waiting, weeping, smelling the
steam and wanting to taste the field peas, the senses merge. All the
while McEachern's voice, monotonous, dogmatic and not hungry
coming from his head bent over the food , drones on interminably
saying grace. Taste, smell and the sound of McEachern's voice
come together like wet watercolors without clear boundaries. In
trying to match the present taste and smell with lost memory, all
these old sensations come up at once with their confused regis-
tration and organs of origin. Past and present are joined together
till Christmas speaks the words, "It's peas," and probably simul-
taneous with hearing himself speak, identifies the food and re-
enters the present.
Thus, painting and over-painting with words, the senses are
mixed and spread and stroked over the canvas until a feeling
experience is made to emerge from the depths of past body memory
and freed to live again in the present. This condensation of
Christmas' senses in a kind of synesthesia which is sorted out and
made into a recognizable sense which he can label finally and
communicate to himself resembles some of the minute stages in the
process of perception, thought, and memory.
We will discuss this further later, but now let us repeat: like
gender uncertainty and loose boundaries of time and mode, images
of synesthesia and of fusion between self and outside objects all
 Music of time: Faulkner's Light in August 69

have the effect of returning us to an early, relatively undifferenti-

ated phase of psychological development, and thus evoke a sense of
timelessness.
A particularly forceful image of fusion is that of sexual coupling,
the " primal scene." Observed in childhood, as Joe Christmas did at
age five, it puts special demands on the mind to master the experi-
ence. This often takes the form of total repression of the memory
and sometimes lifelong compulsive repetition of it with its details
altered for disguise. The very act of repetition transforms an
experience which was originally endured passively into one actively
perpetrated. This turning of the tables represents a step towards
psychological mastery. Beating and rape, for example, may often
be unconscious attempts at active mastery of earlier experiences of
having been beaten and raped, although both the original and later
acts may be consciously disavowed. Thus, when Joe Christmas,
having raped Joanna Burden, saw her calm, cold face by day he
could think that he dreamed it and it didn't happen.
Such repeated working through of an early primal scene is
necessary because, as is commonly pointed out in analytic litera-
ture, it may appear to be a mortal battle; it floods the observing
child with a confusion of sexual and aggressive stimulation.
Moreover, as is rarely pointed out, it threatens his fragile sense of
the integrity of his own bodily boundaries to imagine, or view, in
Faulkner's description (p. 246) two creatures appearing to struggle
in one body, drowning in the abyss, merging into each other.
Before the sense of self is fairly developed, such overstimulation
and apparent melting of bodily boundaries threatens to overpower
both the sense of reality and of self, that is, to return the individual
once more to that early, undifferentiated stage of life when reality
and self are first being formed and there is little sense of time.
Faulkner's style deals with these boundaries in their early fluid
state. Nonetheless, he disavows their exclusive authority and,
sometimes, even their existence. We have noted how tense, gender,
and separateness are dealt with as flexible entities. But throughout
the book the disavowal of sight seems particularly insistent.
Indeed, as Millgate (1969) has pointed out, many of the major
events have already taken place before Lena's arrival in Jefferson.
And even much of the present action of the novel is not observed
directly but reported by witnesses not themselves involved in the
incidents. For example, Gavin Stevens interprets the events that led
to Christmas' death; the traveling furniture dealer recounts to his
70 Music of time: Faulkner's Light in August

wife what happens to Byron and Lena at the end of the novel. The
story of Christmas' arrest is also told by an anonymous " they. "
Hightower no longer sees the sign in front of his house. He sits
like an Eastern idol with his eyes closed. Doc Hines, working as a
janitor in the orphanage, looks directly into the dietician's face
with his wide open blind fanatical eyes. Joe Christmas, after being
beaten up, arises like a blind man and enters the fifteen years long
street. When he entered Joanna's window he ate something from
an invisible dish with invisible fingers. In the final murderous
encounter between them, the last thing we see directly is her right
hand reaching out holding an old-style revolver. Then our view is
shifted to the shadowed pistol on the wall and its cocked hammer
when it fires. We see no more of what happened and never really
know.
Even the murdered body of Joanna Burden with its nearly
severed head is described ironically in terms of the disavowal of
looking: " [Miss Burden's body] was laying on her side, facing one
way, and her head was turned clean around like she was looking
behind her, [like] if she could have done that when she was alive,
she might not have been doing it now" (p. 85).
All the careful looking away, not seeing at all or seeing only the
shadows of preliminary actions, is suddenly dispelled and every-
thing turns to an emphasis on looking, even endless gaping, when
the people crowd around to look down at her body. When the
body is taken away there is only the fire to look at. They stare and
stare, imagining the sexual scenes that must have led up to the
killing and the final flames. All the frustrated sexual looking
now becomes concentrated on the symbolic substitutes - fire
truck, rising ladders and hose. They stared at the flames " as if all
their individual five senses had become one organ of looking"
(p. 275).
This careful looking away or hearing without seeing, together
with this sudden avid staring at the flames which consume every-
thing and consummate the affair of Christmas and Joanna Burden,
reminds us of Joe's first sexual experience at age five, which led to
his life-long tragedy. He had heard footsteps in the empty corridor
and did not wait to see, but he heard without listening and hid in
the closet among the woman-smelling garments and saw by feel
alone the worm of tooth paste he squeezed into his mouth and ate;
and the dietician and the young doctor coupled on the bed - and
Joe vomited, and was discovered. The recurrent disavowal of
 Music of time: Faulkner's Light in August 71

looking may refer to this original trauma in the life of Christmas.

The unconscious repetition of this scene in various forms may well
have determined his life and death and is perhaps a key to the
novel. Such a sweeping hypothesis cannot be made lightly, but, as
we will see, there is much to support it.
In this early primal scene trauma at age five there are, besides
hearing and not seeing, three elements that should be noted and
traced through his later sexual life: food, money and punishment.
The woman who was being forcibly taken in sex while Joe
crouched behind the curtain eating toothpaste was the dietician of
the orphanage. In Joe's mind she was associated with the dining
room. Ordinarily, he would have eaten only one mouthful of her
toothpaste. But now, hiding and waiting, he had squeezed the
entire tube into his mouth and swallowed it. Suddenly he vomited
and was discovered.
The punishment which was not forthcoming, and which young
Joe needed to strike the balance and be able to write it off, came
later in full measure at the hands of Mr McEachern: on Sundays,
every hour on the hour, ten strokes to his bare bottom, and Joe
took it stolidly; he even welcomed it as one of the few dependable
things in life.
As for food, after dark on a Sunday when he was beaten, Mrs
McEachern had brought him a tray of food to his bed; and he had
dumped it on the floor. And he stole Mrs McEachern's coins and
told her to remember that he took them without asking because he
was afraid she would give them to him if he asked. (The rela-
tionship with Mrs McEachern is heavy with sexual elements: the
rope, which he uses to get out of the house at night to visit his
whore, he hides in Mrs McEachern's secret hole - the same one in
which she hides the coins he steals from her. And there are many
similar details.)
The same three elements of food, money and punishment are
present in his first sexual affair. The girl (Bobby) is a waitress; he
eats at her counter and is meticulous about paying for it; and he is
beaten into insensibility.
And finally, the fatal affair with Joanna Burden begins with
stealing her food and raping her. Eating her food remains constant
throughout. The affair comes to an end when she wants him to
take charge of her money and he refuses. Whether he kills her or
not we never know because we are not allowed to see. But after
fleeing he allows himself to be caught; and when he escapes and his
72 Music of time: Faulkner's Light in August

executioner corners him he does not fire his gun but again allows
himself to be caught; and this time he is castrated and killed.
Undoing what we have called the original trauma, the primal
scene, appears to have been a determining, if unconscious, theme in
Joe Christmas' life. He does so by repeating it and changing the
essential elements: eating food when and how he wills, or volun-
tarily refusing it though starved, rather than involuntarily vomit-
ing; paying for food or sex, stealing money, and refusing to be
given money, rather than accepting a bribe to keep quiet; and
seeking out punishment and enduring it rather than having the
strain of expecting it and not getting it.
Repetitiveness is inherent in mental life and is not limited to the
undoing and mastery of trauma. In the smallest stages of percep-
tion, thought and memory, there is a moment-by-moment recapitu-
lation of the development of these functions from distant past to
present, a rhythmic alternation between blurring of boundaries and
their redelineation. This melting down and recasting goes on sub-
liminally. In perception it involves the merging of figure and
ground and the re-emergence of forms and boundaries into the
more or less familiar shapes of inner and outer, subject and object,
self and other.
Faulkner's style slows down and makes explicit these split-
second recurrences in mental functioning. He makes the clear, hard
boundaries of conscious discrimination and separateness once
again negotiable, blurred, and flexible. The senses merge, self and
objects fuse, the tenses are flattened out and become inseparable,
active and passive modes alternate, and the genders struggle within
the same body. And then order is restored, reality is reconstituted
with experience replenished, and the moment expanded. Faulkner's
style mirrors the rhythm of the mind which, like music, follows
recurrent time.
In perception and thought there are (primary process) rapid
subliminal oscillations between global, scanning, condensing
operations on the one hand, and (secondary process) discriminat-
ing, abstracting, focusing ones on the other. Both go on simul-
taneously and recurrently; the first one draws on levels of memory
and symbolism, the second of shifting angles of attention. Their
harmonious matching and sorting results in formed perception and
conscious thought, against a matrix of latent personal meaning.
In music, vertical harmonics and horizontal melody lines syn-
chronize two kinds of time: simultaneity and succession. Moreover,
 Music of time: Faulkner's Light in August 73

the statement of a theme is usually followed by variation on it and ,

finally, by a restatement and resolution. In both music and mind,
recurrence in time permits the changing material to be worked
through into patterns on the one hand of aesthetic form or, on the
other, of meaning. Changing thematic material in music may be
worked through many elaborations, while other elements such as
tempo or key maintain constancy in the midst of change. And
in emotional life, endless personal vicissitudes may be worked
through and navigated successfully as long as a reliable sense of
identity provides inner stability in spite of change.
Faulkner's style of rhythm, recurrence, and progression is
peculiarly satisfying, both musically and psychologically, and it
merits further examination.
Faulkner's sentences often appear to flow forward and to ebb
back: "so often our deeds are not worthy of ourselves. Nor we of
our deeds" (p. 382). As in music, an idea may be stated, then
restated with a partial inversion that elaborates the theme: "He will
have no more shame than to lie about being afraid, just as he had
no more shame than to be afraid because he lied" (p. 407). In
addition to employing the restatement with inversion, this example
begins with the future tense and moves back to the past.
Sentences may overlap in describing an action, ebbing part of
the way back, then driving further forward. As in perception or
thought as well as music, there may be a first, fast scanning and
summarizing sweep, then a series of fragmented, discerning exami-
nations from various angles, until feelings are mobilized and
reflections gathered, and then action moves forward again.
In the confrontation between the scoundrel Lucas Brown and
the pregnant woman he had abandoned, Faulkner describes his
eyes darting around the room; Lena is watching him, until he
brings himself to look at her, then he breaks off the contact and
flees. "Ceaselessly here and there about the empty room went his
harried and desperate eyes. She watched him herd them ... like
two terrified beasts and drive them up to meet her own" (p. 406).
We first see the action, then we observe Lena watching the action,
then we examine the scene with the help of a metaphor. His eyes
are like two terrified beasts herded together and forced against
their will in her direction.
The metaphor sets up an anticipation. How might two terrified
beasts behave when herded? The action is repeated, the antici-
pation is made explicit, then broadened: "She watched ... his eyes
74 Music of time: Faulkner's Light in August

.. . like two beasts about to break, [and he] ... would never catch
them . .. and that he himself would be lost" (p. 406). The meta-
phor of the darting eyes and the herded beasts who break and flee
is turned back upon their owner: "He himself would be lost." The
owner of the beasts, the two wild eyes, finds this thought intoler-
able and his observation of the unwelcome scene is immediately
disowned, attributed to his eyes only, and then moved even further
away: "His eyes watched her ... as though they were not his eyes"
(p. 408). Then he fled.
In this confrontation between Brown and Lena and her child, we
are once again back to a reworking of the primal scene. Instead of
the child, Joe Christmas, being trapped while the dietician and her
lover are in bed together, it is Lena and her sleeping newborn who
are in bed together, and it is the former lover, Brown, who looks
and flees out the window.
Indeed, there are a number of images in Light in August that
could be taken as symbolic allusions to the primal scene. For
example, Hightower nurtures his own obsession, the image of his
grandfather being shot from a galloping horse; the figure of horse
and rider unconsciously often stands for coitus. Freezing it into a
silent, statuesque monument is one way of undoing the frightening
impression made on the child by the movements of parental
intercourse, and of dealing with the tumultuous affects observed
and stimulated thereby. The significance is muted and distanced
somewhat by transferring it from parents to a grandfather on
horseback. On the other hand, its symbolic meaning is further
betrayed when we discover much later that the " cavalry charge"
was, in fact , a glorified cover for setting fire to a henhouse, raiding
it, and being shot ignominiously with a fowling piece.
The symbol of horse and rider reappears in still clearer form
when Joe Christmas, after striking down McEachern and stealing
his wife's money from her secret hole, leaves on McEachern's
galloping horse. He strikes it rhythmically across its rump with a
heavy stick taken from Mrs McEachern's garden. When the horse
will move no more he batters its head until the stick is reduced to a
fragment. He then proceeds on foot to his whore where he, in turn,
is beaten into insensibility.
The primal scene, as indicated by these few examples, encom-
passes so many confused affects and anxieties, it comes to stand as
an example of recurrent time and the reworking of the past. So,
when Faulkner finally succeeds in transforming it from rape, death
 Music of time: Faulkner's Light in August 75

and mayhem into a scene in which Lena's former lover, Brown,

abandons her and her sleeping infant, it is - from the infant's point
of view - a happy dream of pure wish fulfillment and total
mastery: father- rival has been excluded and infant is in total
possession of mother by merging with her in sleep. This represents
an Oedipal as well as a pre-Oedipal triumph. As we shall see later,
it prefigures yet another, and final, reworking of this theme.
"If only we could repeat time, change it, set it back," the various
characters of the novel keep repeating. The dietician feels blind
fury at the impossibility of turning back time just for an hour, a
second. Hightower lives out the denial of time every day as though
living in his dead grandfather's life. Mrs Hines asks for just one
day like it hadn 't happened (p. 367). Joe Christmas thinks he only
dreamed it and it didn't happen (p. 226).
Against this recurrent wish for the undoing or negation of time is
the insistent beat of inexorability of causal time and accountability.
It reaches Hightower, who says to Lena about Byron: "You are
probably not much more than half his age .... That, too .. . is
. .. irremediable .... He can no more ever cast back and do, than
you can cast back and undo" (p. 389). Christmas, too, finally
reaches it: "I have never broken out of the ring of what I have
already done and cannot ever undo" (p. 321), he thinks quietly.
And he sets out to let himself get caught and enter the circle of
judgment time.
The insistent beat of God's judgment time, which can be neither
hurried nor delayed, sounds through Doc Hines, speaking as
though with the voice of a ventriloquist in the next room, puppet-
like, without inflection. Instead of inflection there is the drum-beat
of unchanging rhythm: "And old Doc Hines went when God told
him to go. But he kept in touch with God and at night he said,
'That bastard, Lord,' and God said, 'He is still walking My earth,'
and old Doc Hines kept in touch with God and one night he
wrestled and he strove and he cried aloud, 'That bastard, Lord! I
feel! I feel the teeth and the fangs of evil!' and God said, 'It's that
bastard. Your work is not done yet'" (p. 365).
The next line tells us that the sound of music from the distant
church had long since ceased (p. 365). There follows the scene in
which Mrs Hines wishes that time could be set back for one day;
then Byron asks Hightower to alibi for Christmas and Hightower
refuses. The chapter ends with the observation that the sound of
insects beyond the open window had not faltered (p. 370).
76 Music of time: Faulkner's Light in August

Time and Fate do not falter. Moved by an unseen Player who

acts through them, the characters speak words that do not signify
anything (p. 380). Just people playing their parts, and now they
were played out. In Byron's mind they are just like discarded toys
gathering dust in a closet (p. 416).
What remains is natural time and the cycle of unchanging
seasons and perpetual recurrence; and human time with the linear
progression of cause and effect and certain death. But for the
author who has been orchestrating recurrent and non-recurrent
time with devices of plot and style, there is yet one final word. He
brings us the gift of a " happy ending" and the news that human
time is also circular and not linear. Perhaps it can be undone after
all and played backward in memory and forward in hope and made
to feel right, just as the tenses can be used interchangeably and the
feeling of being of both genders can be experienced instead of being
separate, alone, and finite.
The novel closes as a furniture dealer tells his wife how he had
picked up a man, woman and newborn in his wagon: Byron, Lena,
and her child. Within the safety, convention, and good humor of
their marriage - and between two acts of intercourse - the furni-
ture dealer recounts that Byron tried to have sex with Lena but she
refused since it might wake the baby (p. 477). (A speech that
Faulkner later referred to in an interview as "one of the calmest,
sanest speeches I ever heard" ; Stein, 1963: 80.) Byron left but he
returned the next day to remain with her and the baby, saying that
he had come too far now to quit.
So Joe Christmas' original trauma was again repeated and again
corrected. The baby, little Joe of thirty years ago, continued to eat.
He did not have to weep or go unheeded or be interrupted by
his father; his virgin mother never had sex; no need for money
nor cause for punishment. There never was a primal scene or
original sin.

Conclusion
We would like to believe that time recurs, that through little
changes, people do progress. But the flow of an individual's time is
linear and irrevocable. Nor is it at all certain that people progress
in the light of events. Faulkner doubts it. The characters in Light in
August progress little. A few begin to accept that what is done
is irrevocable, and begin to enter human-relational time. They
 Music of time : Faulkner's Light in August 77

become less alienated, more accountable. But then they suffer the
despair that may go with love, one's own limitations, and finite
time. Before dying they persist in doing what they do because they
believe that's what they have to do. All their words, in the mean-
time, "were not even us, while all the time what was us was going
on and going on without even missing the lack of words" (p. 380).
We would like to believe that because the generations renew
themselves and because the rhythm of the season recurs endlessly
we do too; and because each day dispels the night, what is done can
always be undone, or at least somehow mediated . But while Nature
is cyclical and the mind too functions according to the principle of
mastery through repetition and adaptation, the relation of cause to
consequence is inexorable and cannot be rescinded.
While learning the harsh lesson that all things have their price,
and that the consequences of the flow of time cannot be undone,
we have to think, act, and feel as though they might be undone.
Faulkner's style, like human mental processes, resembles recurrent
time. He evokes timelessness by recalling early periods of one's life;
by interchanging tenses and modes, by treating the genders as
ambiguous, and by using synesthesia, oxymoron, and images of
fusion between the self and outside objects. Timelessness is also
conveyed by numerous reworkings of the primal scene in the latent
content of the novel. Finally, his "musical" rhythms express end-
less recurrence and thus stimulate the illusion that the individual,
like Nature herself, is timeless. There is an ebb-and-flow, statement
and reversal, image and inversion, as if an individual's time, like his
mental rhythms or phrases of music, could be reversed; as if it were
not "irremediable."
Faulkner presents us with no solution, no synthetic interpreta-
tion, but the universal dialectic between man's finiteness and his
imagination. It corresponds with the task of the mind in accom-
modating, not necessarily reconciling, two intrinsically discordant
streams of mental activity - and accurate registration of objective
events and subjective needs - and is reflected in the orchestration
of time with timelessness in Light in August.
Chapter 5

Music as temporal prosthesis

Reflections from the Sundown
Syndrome

Music is the temporal art form par excellence. It is meaningful

primarily through time. It projects a temporal process by offering
aural images of temporality. Yet, surprisingly, music as a primary
image of time has been little studied even by specialists in music
(among the few exceptions are Greene, 1982; Kramer, 1988; Epstein,
1995).
It is the temporal element of music that is the focus of this
chapter. My license to enter an area where few musical specialists
dare to tread is the nocturnal delirium referred to as the Sundown
Syndrome and its often remarkable response to music.
Since pathology often highlights a phenomenon that otherwise
remains seamlessly invisible, this response of Sundowning to music
may have something to tell us about the nature and function of
music itself. This is the intended thrust of this chapter - not a
reductively simplistic contribution to clinical neurology. Since the
organization of the central nervous system is hierarchical, when
there is damage the resulting impairment depends on the location
of the insult, the systems involved, the loss of higher functions, the
" release" of lower ones, and the degree of restoration and reinteg-
ration. Reductionism is inappropriate.
Sundowning is a general phenomenon of nocturnal delirium most
commonly seen in the evenings in elderly persons with nonspecific
cerebral damage and resultant dementia. The clinical picture is one
of confusion and agitation, reduced ability to maintain attention to
external stimuli, and disorganized thinking and speech. Perceptual
disturbances such as illusions and hallucinations, and emotional
disturbances such as anxiety, fear, anger, and paranoia, are common.
While those affected may demonstrate little or no dementia during
the day, the change toward the evening can be dramatic and escalate
 Music as temporal prosthesis 79

rapidly so that it becomes clearly evident to those around them .

Advanced age and cerebral damage predispose one to delirium from
a variety of contributing causes such as intercurrent infection,
dehydration, and cardiovascular disease. Sundowning has also been
attributed to increasing fatigue and stress during the afternoon,
medication side-effects, poor sleep, sensory deprivation and,
because the compromised brain cannot handle novelty, the change
of routine prior to the evening meal and preparations for bedtime.
As mentioned, the response to music can often be dramatic even
when major neuroleptic (antipsychotic) and/or tranquilizing medi-
cation is ineffectual.
• A room full of restless, bickering, demented patients calmed
down rapidly when the TV was turned off and replaced by
soothing, orderly, and graceful music on the stereo like that of
Handel or Bach.
• Another resident's crying and screaming stopped instantly
when a Walkman was placed on her head and tuned in to an
FM "soft-rock" station. With this technique it became possible
to reduce her psychotropic medications.
• Playing country music made it possible for another patient to
take regular five-hour car trips to a distant city. She sat up in
her seat clapping her hands until she became sleepy. When she
awakened and became irritable, increasing the volume of the
music would always calm her.
Sacks (1973, 1985, 1995, 1998) has written eloquently about the
dramatic effects of music on conditions other than Sundowning.
The broken speech patterns and jerky movements of Tourette's,
like the stilted ness and skewed posture of autism, can instantly
normalize on singing; Parkinsonian crises and abnormal EEGs can
disappear on imagining rhythmic music.
Tourette's and Parkinson's, however, are motor illnesses with
specific timing problems (autism is a more profound matter) and
do not necessarily speak toward dementia and Sundowning.
Perhaps the most that can be said is that, whatever the contributing
causes of the agitation and delirium of dementia in general, the
temporal regularity of the Sundown Syndrome reflects a disturb-
ance of the temporal sense of experience at some fundamental level.
Since the biological circadian rhythm roughly follows a twenty-
four-hour periodicity in phase with changes of light to dark, this is
one likely site of the temporal desynchrony, probably among others.
80 Music as temporal prosthesis

Supporting this idea is the well-established sleep- wakefulness

disturbance in dementia and its relation to delirium, as well as the
observation that the diastolic blood pressure has been found to fall
in the afternoon instead of its expected normal rise (Evans, 1987).
The ensuing delirium may be viewed in part at least as an esca-
lating panic or catastrophic reaction to a premonition that the
perception of time flow is slipping away and threatening an
imminent and disastrous loss of control. This will be my focus.
In essence, we have here a disorder of major temporal deregu-
lation calmed not infrequently if only temporarily, by a temporal art
form, namely music. The Sundown Syndrome, highlighting, I
believe, the threatened loss of the experience of time flow, suggests
that one normalizing function of music is to support the illusion that
time "flows" in an ultimately orderly way. Thus, when needed, as in
cases of temporal desynchrony due to organic damage to the
nervous system, music can act as a temporal prosthesis. When not so
needed, it silently supports our notion that our world of reality is as
we experience it. And, to be sure, since we have so created it, so it is.

The illusion of time flow

Time is variously defined from different aspects: philosophical,
physical, psychological and biological. The physical aspect of time
will not concern us since from the point of view of physics, time is
not an independent entity like space in a Newtonian universe;
rather, time and space are inseparable aspects of a four-dimensional
universe.
A neurophysiological basis for our experience of time will be
discussed later in connection with the bodily basis for the shaping
of time in music. Briefly, our experience of time may lie in a
hierarchy of biological clocks in the nervous system, ranging from
the vastness of circadian rhythms of sleep and wakefulness that
synchronize with rhythmic phases of environmental change, down
to regulators of periodicity in the metabolism of cells.
Philosophers debate the reality or unreality of time: is it an
objective datum or a subjective projection? The popular view is
that it is a real entity that flows uniformly. For Heraclitus the flow
of time is of the essence of reality and cannot be grasped by reason.
Henri Bergson, like Kant, held that the flow of time, by which he
meant human advance through time, can be grasped only by non-
rational intuition. He even held that the scientific concept of time
 Music as temporal prosthesis 81

as a dimension misrepresents reality. Alfred North Whitehead, too,

believing it to be an important metaphysical fact, referred to time
flow poetically as " the vivid fringe of memory tinged with antici-
pation" (Whitehead, 1920: 72- 73).
The perception of time flow depends on our awareness of
change. In Western societies time is conceptualized as linear and
the experience of time flow is based on our awareness of sequence
and duration. Sequence is the sense that one event follows another.
Sequential events are separated by more or less lengthy intervals
called durations. In other words, succession of mental events and
their duration together constitute fundamental aspects of what we
in the West perceive as change and project onto the external world
in order to create the sense of time flow.
William James (1892) described the present moment as the
"specious present," or " intuited duration." It consists of extending
duration and succession back from the present into the past and
forward into the future:

A sort of saddle-back of time with a certain length of its own,

on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two
directions into time .. . with a bow and a stern, as it were - a
rearward- and a forward-looking end.
(James, 1892: 280)

Its content is in a constant flux, events dawning into its forward

end as fast as they fade out of its rearward one . . .. Mean-
while, the specious present, the intuited duration, stands
permanent, like the rainbow on the waterfall, with its own
quality unchanged by the events that stream through it.
(James, 1892: 286).

A number of factors influence the perception of time flow . Espe-

cially interesting in the present context is the fact that the ear is
particularly adapted to the awareness of change on which the
perception of time flow depends. Thus, the ear is more sensitive
than the eye in this respect. Other factors affecting the experience
of time flow: stimulants make the experience of duration appear
much longer; depressants, sensory deprivation and aging make the
experience of duration seem shorter.
Psychoanalysis has contributed to our knowledge of disturbances
in the experience of time flow, beginning with Freud (as quoted by
82 Music as temporal prosthesis

Bonaparte, 1940), in implicit agreement with Kant (the perception

of time flow is a projection of our inner perception of the passing
of our own life), Schilder (1936) (whatever negates the sense of
self interferes with the sense of time), Orgel (1965) (time difficulties
may sometimes be traced to early overstimulation and abandon-
ment), Hartocollis (1976) (the experience of time should be seen as
an inherent dynamic of all affective experience, especially in rela-
tion to need frustration and the integrity of the self), and Arlow
(1986) (intrapsychic conflict influences how time is consciously
experienced, e.g. deja VU, timelessness and premonition; recurrent
early patterns of need frustration and/or frustration set up endur-
ing future expectations). Anthropology and linguistics have taught
us that the experience of time is culturally relativistic. It is a
Western idea that time is linear with duration and sequence as its
basic constituents. There are many cultures that have nonlinear or
cyclical concepts of time: Tibetans, South Indians, many tribes in
Africa, the Hopi and Coeur d'Alene Native Americans, the Quiche
Indians of Guatemala, the Javanese.
One example will suffice. The Trobriand Islands do not have a
language for past, present and future. There are few words to
communicate ideas of process, change, becoming or continuity.
There are neither tenses nor words corresponding to our words for
causality or comparison. Trobrianders value patterns of sameness,
and draw no inferences from the past or predictions about the
future. Time is part of a holistic pattern that accounts for events
rather than one event leading to the next. Objects are named and
identified by the state in which they are found.
From all this we may reasonably conclude that the experience of
time - contrary to newer conceptions from quantum theory -
serves us subjectively as an ordering principle. "Time does not flow
or stand still, it does not expand or contract, it neither brings nor
takes away, nor does it heal or kill " (Arlow, 1986: 514).
And the everydayism, "time flies" is a facile projection to ease an
insufferable insult to immortal narcissism that it is not time that
passes but we.

Musical images of time

Thanks to music, we have a man-made virtual image of time, just
as plastic art creates virtual images of space (G.J. Rose, 1980). In
music we may manipulate sequence and duration - each culture
 Music as temporal prosthesis 83

and era in its own way - to create an illusion of control over time
flow; even to destroy the sense of its passage.
Motion is the central element of time flow . Rhythm, as organ-
ized movement in time, plays a large role in creating the effect of
organic motion in music rather than merely endless undifferenti-
ated time flow.
An overview of European music reveals that different concepts
of rhythm prevailed at different times. In the thirteenth century
there were strict rhythmic modes. During the Renaissance free
oratorical speech rhythms predominated; in Renaissance poly-
phony there was almost a stressless flow. Strong body rhythms
came to the fore in the Baroque era, and primitivistic rhythms in
the twentieth century.
Greene (1982) offers a closer look at the different aural images of
temporality projected by music. According to his analysis, Bach's
music is an aural image of Newtonian time unfolding with lawful,
inexorable necessity. The course of the music entails considerable
uncertainty, but by the end it appears that everything has hap-
pened for a completely sufficient reason; everything that needed to
happen has taken place in an enduring order that stands outside
the temporal process, subordinate only to the supraordinate
rationalistic principles of the Newtonian world-view.
In contrast, Baroque music contradicts the basic premise of
Newtonian rationalism that the human mind can grasp the world's
fundamental rationality. In its image of temporality it is the past
that determines the future.
Romantic music portrays an inner self struggling with its own
yearnings as well as a resistant world. Greene (1982) claims that it
tells us as little about the external world as classical music tells about
the self. While this may be disputed (Beethoven, Mozart), it is
undoubtedly true that each style highlights what the others pass over.
Yet another perspective on musical images of time is provided by
Kramer (1988). He summarizes the two different ways in which
the dominant and non-dominant cerebral hemispheres program
time, referring to them as linear and nonlinear styles respectively.
Having made the important point that linearity and nonlinearity
coexist and are complementary in all music, he goes on to correlate
them predominantly with Western "horizontal" music and Eastern
"vertical" music.
Western language and thought are linear and typical of the
dominant cerebral hemisphere. Being eminently utilitarian, they
84 Music as temporal prosthesis

have made possible the development of scientific thinking. Linear

concepts of time are sequential and goal-directed; in the linear
mode of time, time is a directional, durational flow from the past
into the future with the present always falling behind us. In line
with this, Western horizontal music is imbued with progress and
change; it requires teleological listening; its tonality always strives
for a return to the tonic, unchallenged by other keys.
Nonlinear thinking is more dreamlike, timeless, holistic and char-
acteristic of the nondominant cerebral hemisphere; in the nonlinear
mode of time the present is all that seems to exist. Eastern or oriental
vertical music deals with consistency and persistence, stasis and
eternity. There is little apparent flow. It does not build or release
tension, it starts rather than begins, ceases rather than ends. There
are no implications or expectations, no symbolism of referential
meanings. It requires cumulative listening.
In addition to the revolutionary changes that have transformed
the modern world in all respects, nonlinearity became more promin-
ent in twentieth-century music more specifically because of the
impact of recording technology and of non-Western music, espe-
cially the influence of the Java gamelan orchestra on Debussy
(Kramer, 1988).
This deserves the following brief digression (summarized from
Becker, 1979). The underlying assumptions of Javanese gamelan
music, played by ensembles of from five to twenty-five instruments,
mostly bronze gongs and bronze xylophones, have little in common
with Western music. In Java, the fundamental governing principle
in gamelan music is the cyclic recurrence of a melodic/temporal
unit, which reflects the way in which the passage of time is also
ordered. Time is represented as several concurrent cycles running
simultaneously. Important days are reckoned as those points of
coincidence between the different, continuously ongoing cycles: the
five-day-week cycle, the seven-day-week cycle, the lunar-month
cycle divided into halves, fourths and eighths.
The basic unit of gamelan music is a cycle marked off by a
gong, subdivided into halves, quarters, eighths, etc., by instruments
playing at successively greater levels of density, or at success-
ively faster rates of speed. In the gamelan tradition, melody or tune
was originally the result of a process of subdivision applied to a
concept of cyclical time. Thus, while melodic variation is highly
relevant to most Western music it is rather insignificant in Javanese
music.
 Music as temporal prosthesis 85

Kramer notes that, under such influence, some recent pieces of

music in the West are totally undifferentiated temporally to pro-
duce unchanging consistency without progression, goal direction,
movement or contrasting rates of motion or phrases. " The result is
a single present stretched out into an enormous duration ... that
nonetheless feels like an instant .... Whatever structure is in the
music exists between simultaneous layers of sound" (p. 55).
As Kramer further notes, such vertical music experience is
consistent with the aesthetic articulated by Stockhausen as "moment
time": each moment is independent and individual, centered in itself,
existing on its own, thereby cutting across horizontal time per-
ception into a timelessness and an eternity present in every moment.
The sensuous present is favored over memory.
Vertical music is a radical cultural stretch. The ability to listen
to it is usually suppressed in our dominant hemisphere-centered
society; like a foreign language of time, listening to it - should one
wish - requires learning, or a creative act.
It should be mentioned that many conditions - meditation,
dreams, certain mental illnesses, hypnosis, psychedelic drugs and
sensory deprivation - can create feelings of timelessness by dimin-
ishing linear thinking and goal orientation. The crucial difference
between vertical time experiences and the common assumptions
about schizophrenic time experiences (now being challenged) is the
continuing availability of reality testing in the former - the tem-
poral continuum is not destroyed (Melges, 1982). (Some examples
of the time experience of dementia will be deferred till later.)

Bodily correlates of musical temporalities

Elsewhere (G.J. Rose, 1980), I have shown that the structure of
aesthetic form - literary- poetic, visual art or music - has to do
with orientation. It harmoniously accommodates the two funda-
mentally different frameworks with which the mind concurrently
processes the data having to do with orientation for time, place,
and person as well as with the many gradations in between.
The two different styles may be succinctly subsumed under
(primary process) imagination and (secondary process) knowledge
of reality: holistic merging as against delineated separateness; simi-
larity versus difference; simultaneity as against change. The last is
especially applicable to music, for example by synchronizing vertical
harmonics and horizontal melodics, duration and succession.
86 Music as temporal prosthesis

I pointed out (G.1. Rose, 1980) there that the characteristics of

imaginative as against knowledgeable processing of data appear to
conform to the different cognitive styles of the two cerebral
hemispheres. Put simplistically, the dominant hemisphere speaks,
the nondominant one sings. As far as the creative process is con-
cerned, it was suggested that a collateral integration of differently
styled information coming from each side with as wide an access as
possible to both seemed a better explanation than postulating a
special cognitive process or regression in the service of the ego.
While the foregoing citation deals globally with the structure of
aesthetic form including music, with special attention to the body
in relation to creative imagination, the following material chiefly
having to do with neuroscience focuses on music as the temporal
art form. It is abstracted from Epstein (1995) and reflects a vast
interdisciplinary literature.
Many biologists believe that oscillation, based on periodicity,
may be the fundamental mode of living systems. There are bio-
logical clocks throughout the nervous system on various hierarchic
levels precisely regulating bodily activities. The nervous system
itself functions by way of periodicity: it sends out intermittent
firings which result in a continuous movement, sensation or state.
A pacemaker in the hypothalamus, in the same area that receives
visual information about day and night, controls circadian rhythms
of wakefulness and sleep. The length of neural loops is another
basic element for estimating time: the larger the loop, the longer is
the interval of time, thus enabling the nervous system to entertain
various time cycles concurrently.
The electroencephalogram registers "brain waves" but there are
also many non-nervous-system organs that contribute rhythmic
information that is integrated by the nervous system, for example,
the cardiovascular, cardiorenal, alimentary, and glandular systems.
Metabolic processes control rhythms in nervous and muscle cells.
Chemical pacemakers control the speed with which oxygen is
metabolized in some cells of the brain on which the time sense of
human beings depends.
The fundamental premise of Epstein's argument is that

Our biological mechanisms are . . . a major basis by which

we make music and control time and timing in music. The
periodic manner in which our biological timing mechanisms
function is seen as the quintessential factor that controls our
 Music as temporal prosthesis 87

sense of [musical] pulse. And pulse is the prime aspect of

tempo. (p. 136)

While these are not universally accepted by specialists, Epstein

finds direct reflections of coordinated biological timing mechanisms
in two musical phenomena: proportional tempo and the cubic
curve description of rate changes in accelerando and ritardando.
Proportional tempo was mentioned in Chapter 1. It refers to the
idea that all tempos in a piece of music, whether made up of single
or multiple movements, are intrinsically related in ratios of a low
order. This helps organize the whole work into a coherent whole.
Epstein writes (1995: 105): "The implications of proportional tempo
. . . involve not music alone but neurobiology as well, and thereby
our psychological perception of our biological response."
Concerning cubic curve, there appears to be an innate tendency
of the nervous system to control changing time series in a manner
that can be described graphically by an S-shaped cubic curve.
Smooth changes of velocity of limb and joint movements, for
example, conform to such a curve. The same curve also describes
the trajectory or shaping of ritardandos and accelerandos in music
when performed with maximal smoothness.
Musical performance, according to Epstein, thus has to do with
playing musical proclivities with and against innate neural ones.
Take tempo rubato, for instance:

Rubato seems the ultimate degree of playing with time. In its

stretching and compression of phrase it tantalizes and dares us,
exerting a kind of musical brinkmanship . ... Done well, it
rescues us from the edge, falling back into phase with our
expectations . ... These various modes by which our innate
sense of periodicity is played with . . . deal with . . . our need to
organize the passage of time .. . [in accordance with] a
physiology that has evolved in a way that makes this organ-
ization possible. (p. 482)

Music as "prosthesis" for time flow

(The following is abstracted from Melges, 1982.) An intact brain is
necessary for the temporal organization of the mind. The human
brain as a whole may be considered to be a highly specialized, time-
88 Music as temporal prosthesis

binding organization since no one brain center is primarily involved

with timing and temporal processes. Different areas contribute to
the temporal processing in different ways. The parietal lobe, for
example, has to do with the sequential ordering of events; its
impairment makes tasks like dressing and undressing oneself nearly
impossible.
Once a time distortion takes place, whatever its cause, it alters the
psychological organization of time flow. When mental sequences
become even mildly disconnected, present experiences seem to last
longer and are relatively isolated from past and future events,
seeming to " stand alone."
In addition, the inability to sustain a continuous train of thought
leads the person to attend to a variety of present stimuli that would
ordinarily be screened out of consciousness. Perhaps it is the
incipient breakdown of sequential thinking that gives rise to the
prolongation of the present which, being focused upon, enhances
one's awareness of current sensations, seeming to heighten them.
As the fragmentation of sequences becomes more pronounced,
past, present and future become telescoped. Past and future col-
lapse into the present which is experienced as a "timeless now" -
"awash in a sea of immediacy" (Gray, 1993: 91): a succession of
moments strung loosely together, all present and immediate with
little yesterday and still less tomorrow.
Memories and expectations seem as real as present perceptions.
For example: " I think I hear [present perception] A- - [daughter]
in your mother's parlor [reference to forty years ago]. Before your
folks [long deceased] come home [future expectation]. My mother is
dead [sobbing about a distant event as though it had freshly
occurred]. "
Fantasy and reality are confused with each other. Example: " I
saw my brother. It was wonderful! But he looks so much worse
since he died!"
Conversing with a person in this situation has been described as
"creating . . . an ... island together in the ceaseless flow of time"
(Gray, 1993: 42), especially as the person may revert to a native
language. Example:

Resident: Je suis morte.

Visitor: What did you say?
Resident: I'm dead. I've been telling you that for six months
[impatiently].
 Music as temporal prosthesis 89

Visitor: What's it like?

Resident: Not bad .. . Compared to here.
Visitor: What's it like here?
Resident: The people. Not exactly my genre.

Several years later the inexorable course of the disease had

destroyed most of the resident's capacity for spontaneous speech,
motility, responsiveness or affect. Nevertheless, a core of identity
was tenaciously preserved. It was elicited by an attendant singing to
her to rouse her from her almost continuous dozing.

Resident: (with pleased surprise) I'm not dead!

Attendant: No, dear. You're alive!
Resident: (tentatively, but with the terse, stubbornly objective
clarity that had always been her trademark) Maybe .. . .

When the whole brain becomes impaired, as in the Sundown Syn-

drome, all components of psychological time - duration, sequence
and temporal perspective - become chaotic and behavior becomes
markedly disorganized. Being unable to locate oneself in the
context of time flow of previous happenings, any event like a door
slamming seems jarringly unfamiliar; it readily triggers panic that
all controls are failing - one is at the mercy of random events.
As mentioned earlier, when the Sundown Syndrome escalates
into delirium, this represents a classic catastrophic reaction based
on the premonition of disastrous loss of control due to organic
deficiency.
Music, a man-made acoustic microcosm of controlled time flow,
would appear to function as a temporal prosthesis for such a
damaged system of temporal regulation. The resident cited above
would often peacefully "keep" time with recorded music, literally
and concretely, torso and shoulders rhythmically swaying "in" time
with the music. This bodily gesture was uncharacteristic of her
before her illness. Music had always been important and she readily
acknowledged that it was more important now, but she could not
say why or how.
This behavior is a surface manifestation of the fact that music
can entrain vital functions of the body, i.e. cause the body to fall
into synchrony with the music. Such entrainment represents a
coupling between external periodicity and the innate periodicity -
90 Music as temporal prosthesis

in this case flawed - within the nervous system. Entrainment by

music has been traced to heart rate, muscular activity and respira-
tion (Harrer and Harrer, 1977). Some experimental subjects tended
to synchronize with the music primarily through heartbeat; others
through breathing. (Animal experimentation succeeded in entrain-
ing periodic oscillators in various aspects of the nervous system
to the periodicity of an external driving force provided it was
within the range of the living system's periodicities.)
The often remarkable response of the Sundown Syndrome to
music would appear to be based on a neurobiological entrainment
of the person to the periodicity of the music. This in turn provides
needed support to temporal regulators throughout the nervous
system. (A later chapter discusses the psychological dynamics of
the affective response to music.)
Two other issues are relevant in the present context. The first has
to do with the earliest stages of perception and reality testing.
Freud (1895, 1925a) speculated that early perception seeks not to
find an object as much as to re-find it. He suggested that primitive
perception and thought aim at establishing an identity between
outside and inside, and so we tend to perceive that which comes
close to what is already inside in the form of a presentation. Freud
guessed that the original one was mother's breast.
Some early infant observations suggest a modification of this
speculation:

2 Severe head-banging in infants may be stopped by a metro-

nome at the same or a slightly greater frequency than that of
the heartbeat (Lourie, 1949).
2 Newborns cry less and gain more weight when a normal
heartbeat is played continuously in the nursery (Salk, 1965).

Perhaps the internal periodicity of neurobiological mechanisms

responds preferentially to concordant, i.e. identical or propor-
tional, external periodicities. Thus, returning to Freud's specula-
tion, primitive reality testing may be seeking not the mother's
breast, literally, but rather the rhythm and motion that is recog-
nized as one's own milieu and the identification with that.
This leads to a second psychological issue relevant to the present
context: self-recognition. Rhythm and motion are crucial to how
adults come to recognize themselves. Allport (1937: 487- 488)
quotes a 1931 German study by W. Wolff. Experimental subjects
 Music as temporal prosthesis 91

frequently failed to identify their own voices, styles of retelling a

story, pictures of their own hands, sometimes not even their own
profiles, but were better at recognizing these corresponding features
in their friends .
In order to study the significance of gait upon one's self-
recognition, subjects were dressed in loose-fitting garments, heads
covered or blocked out to control all extraneous cues, and they were
filmed walking. All subjects recognized their own gait, but subjects
failed in seventy per cent of the trials to identify the gait of friends .
This is a curious finding since one often sees the gait of friends yet
seldom sees one's own. Allport concluded that, in addition to a
number of measurable specific attributes of gait (regularity, speed,
elasticity, etc.), the most important and non-measurable one was
rhythm, probably created by the sum total of all of them.
One might say that these experimental subjects recognized them-
selves kinesthetically, i.e. from within. If this is so, it is perhaps
related to Sacks' observations (previously cited) on the dramatic
response of some neurological conditions to music: music trans-
formed individuals for the moment into their former selves, making
manifest the healthfulness behind the disease.
How did music allow them to rediscover and recognize them-
selves anew? Describing the Parkinsonian crises of obstructive-
explosive behavior of a particular patient, Sacks writes:
This power of music to integrate and cure, to liberate the
Parkinsonian and give him freedom while it lasts ... is quite
fundamental, and seen in every patient .... With this sudden
imagining of music, this coming of spontaneous inner music,
the power of motion, action, would suddenly return, and the
sense of substance and restored personality and reality .. ..
But then, just as suddenly, the inner music would cease, and
with this all motion and actuality would vanish, and she would
fall instantly, once again, into a Parkinsonian abyss . . ..
Music serves to arouse her own quickness, her living-and-
moving identity and will, which is otherwise dormant.
(Sacks, 1973: 60- 61)
As to what kind of music would be effective:
Rhythmic impetus .. . "embedded" in melody. [Neither] shape-
less crooning [nor] raw or overpowering rhythm . . .. The only
music which affected her in the right way was music she could
92 Music as temporal prosthesis

enjoy; only music which moved her " soul" had this power to
move her body. She was only moved by music which moved her
[original italics]. The "movement" was simultaneously emo-
tional and motoric, and essentially autonomous.
(Sacks, 1973: 61 - 62)

The possibility presents itself that music - because of the period-

icity, motion, and tension and release at its inner structure - taps
into our capacity to recognize our unique identities from within. It
becomes an external mirror for the temporal, motional and affec-
tive workings of our mind.
The Sundowning response to music, as in Sacks' patients, may
have to do with self-recognition, union, reinforcement. Inner,
neurobiological periodicity, rhythm and the tension and release of
affect find mimetic reflection and become seamlessly integrated
with the external periodicity, motion, and tension and release of
music. And by dint of this union, there may be sufficient reinforce-
ment of one's own identity to transcend organic and affective
limitations. (This will be discussed further in a later chapter.)
What further implications may we draw regarding the nature
and function of music itself?
From the point of view of physics, space-time is an inseparable
dimension of the universe; time, in and of itself, is not a given.
From anthropological studies we know that the experience of time
flow - as distinct from time itself - is not a universally shared
concept but rather a socially constructed form of order imposed on
experience (Seeger, 1987).
Some form of music, however, is universal. It would appear that
all music is a temporal mirroring of our innermost neurobiology;
on a psychological level, such mirroring would also have to do with
self-recognition.
Just as music itself is universal, so is some kind of experience of
time flow - far-ranging though it may be in all its cultural diversity,
including playing with its absence.
Psychologically, music exploits the experience of time flow . This
supports, as by a prosthesis, the necessary illusion that we shape
time itself.
Why " illusion?" Because music creates virtual time, as art does
virtual space.
Why " necessary?" Because both, though illusional, are under-
pinnings of the constructs of our "reality." We create music and art
 Music as temporal prosthesis 93

in our own image. They are mimetic images, as Leonardo wrote of

painting, of "the motion of mind."
For the neurologically maimed, music may act as a psychobio-
logical temporal prosthesis. For others it acts, like other arts, to
support the illusion that reality is self-centered. They are all self-
created "witnesses" in our own image - no less than religion - to
"verify" oneself against ultimate solitude.
Chapter 6

In pursuit of slow time

Modern music and a clinical vignette

The creative artist is often fine-tuned to currents of unconscious

thought and feeling in inner and outer worlds. This being so, the
arts may not only reflect the times but also prefigure them.
Music, the art of time, may mold the perception of the flow of
time in such a way as to balance defensive with creative purposes.
It may, for example, represent the wishful illusion that the flow of
time is controllable - that time is cyclical as well as linear. Perhaps
in this way it can serve as an unconscious defense against the fear
of death.
The argument of this chapter is that this may be, at least in part,
what some music of the modern era is "getting at" - and fore-
telling. Juxtaposing a clinical vignette to some innovations in the
musical approach to time suggests that some of this music, like
some traumatized patients, responds to the anticipation of immin-
ent yet unpredictable violence by altering the perception of time
itself. Creative and defensive aspects of mastery unite to transform
and expand the perception of this temporal dimension of contem-
porary reality through the means of music.
The art of the novel treats the stuff of personality as a malleable
medium. The novelist reaches into himself/herself to discover the
raw material of memory and imagination, therein fashioning char-
acters and narrative possibilities. They reflect the potential and the
limits of the "multiple personalities" within each of us.
Music, too, treats its material as a malleable aesthetic medium.
However, its material being time, and nonverbal, we are confronted
with especially formidable problems - problems regarding the nature
of time, and the need to use language to discuss a nonverbal art-form.
The Greeks used two different terms, kairos and chronos, to refer
to different modes of experiencing time and organizing behavior in
 In pursuit of slow time 95

relation to it. The term kairos remained in classical Greek only and
did not come down through Latin into the Romance languages. It
denotes the human and living time of intentions or goals. It is
episodic time with a beginning, a middle, and an end. It has to do
with the flux of Heraclitus - a confluence of past memory, present
perception, and future desire. These coexist in the ongoing human
experience, along with preconscious awareness and unconscious
motivation.
Chronos, on the other hand, is clock-time. It refers to the meas-
urable time of succession, before and after, earlier and later. It has
to do with the static atomism of Parmenides, the discontinuous
world of fixed and constant entities in empty space. Instead of a
range of preconscious awareness and a whole field of unconscious
motivational forces, there is a conscious, focused perception of the
passage of units of time.
This is not to say that there are two types of time, one real and
one unreal. Nor, for that matter, are there three types of time -
past, present, and future. There is only one time. It is a mental
abstraction, not a thing. It does not do things, such as "flow" in
any direction, either linear or cyclical. There are cyclical events,
like the seasons, day and night, and serial events, like growth,
aging, and death. Whether one experiences time as primarily
cyclical or serial depends partly on one's attitude toward death.
The cyclical experience of time denies death; the serial experience
of time accepts it.
Chronos and kairos, in other words, are different ways of experi-
encing time as well as of expressing certain truths about the
relations between events (A.N. Whitehead). For Newton, "true"
time was absolute and mathematical time in a uniform flow. For
Bergson, this so-called true time of Newton was a fiction as
opposed to Bergson's duree reele. For Cassirer, neither concept
sufficed; each represented a partial view into a whole - a particular
standpoint of consciousness. Both must be understood as symbols
that the mathematician and the physicist take as a basis in their
view of the outer world, and the psychologist in his view of the
inner one.
The conception of the physical world requires only the chrono-
logical aspect of time. Both views, however, are necessary for a
conception of the human world . Furthermore, while the world is
both atomic and in flux, continuous and discontinuous, static and
flowing, objective and subjective, concrete and abstract, universal
96 In pursuit of slow time

and particular, one cannot experience both of these awarenesses of

time cognitively at the same time. Instead, there is an oscillation
between the two, organizing our experience of the world (Jacques,
1982).
The dual experience that the cognitive mode cannot accomplish,
the aesthetic mode makes possible. By treating time as an aesthetic
medium, music is able to bridge two different dimensions of time
and harmoniously accommodate diversity and unity, change and
constancy. Just as the novel treats the constituents of the person as
having the plasticity of an aesthetic medium suitable for shaping
into new, self-consistent characters, music deals with time as being
infinitely flexible while retaining its inner integrity.
Through the use of various devices (ornamentation, the minor
key, moving from one key to another, dissonance) it causes delay
and arouses the tension of anticipating what will come next
(Meyer, 1956, 1967). At the same time, many of the melodic,
rhythmic and harmonic variations introduced for the sake of
apparent variety are actually repetitions and recurrences in disguise
(Bernstein, 1976). Being experienced as returns to the familiar, they
are associated with the reduction of tension. Thus, in music, one
may experience the tension of change together with the release of
tension that comes with the return to constancy (G.J. Rose, 1980).
Moreover, since the built-in delays and concealed recurrences act
as a steady stimulus to memory as well as an anticipation of what
will come next, there is a conflating of past and future . In music,
past and future coexist with the present as a dynamic whole. This
whole is built up in an accumulation of wave after wave of inten-
sification. In other words, instead of being viewed as a static
measure - divisible into equal parts - of the transient events that
give form to experience, time is revealed as a dynamic force,
reflecting the complexity, volume, and variability of the content of
psychic life (Zuckerkandl, 1956).
How else may one account for the widespread impact of a
"simple" musical structure such as the famous first movement of
Beethoven's "Moonlight Sonata" (no. 14 in C-sharp minor, opus
27/2)? One of the most popular pieces of keyboard music, it has
inspired at least two novels and several paintings and poems . It
has even been arranged for chorus and orchestra with the words of
the "Kyrie" as a text. According to Czerny, Beethoven himself
resented the popularity of the work. Nor did he have anything to
do with its programmatic title. The phrase, "Moonlight, or a boat
 In pursuit of slow time 97

passing the wild scenery of Lake Lucerne in the moonlight," was

applied to the sonata by the poet-musician Rellstab thirty years
after its composition.
The three-note melody is itself only a slight variation of its
three-note accompaniment. The accompaniment figures gradually
become an end in themselves as they rise from the middle to the
upper registers of the piano and back to the role of accompani-
ment. The original melody then returns. The brief coda is based on
the rhythm of the melodic motif, which was itself derived from the
rhythm of the accompaniment.
Obviously, this structure is devoid of any referential meaning to
things outside itself. It has nothing to do with either moonlight
or other scenes from nature, let alone abstract concepts such as
courage or longing. Rather, the accumulation of three-note wave
after similar wave combines near-constancy with minute differ-
ences, and this gradual intensification of focused attentions is
associated with mounting feeling. Such feeling, in fact, is associated
with the same physiological changes that occur during emotional
experience: changes of pulse, respiration, blood pressure, electrical
conductivity of the skin, delay in the onset of muscular fatigue
(Mursell, 1937).
This emotion, according to Langer (1942, 1953), is the "mean-
ing" of music; it is a representation of the emotional quality of
subjective, lived time made audible - an auditory apparition of
felt-time. Instead of vaguely sensing time as we do through our
own physical life processes, we hear its passage. But it is not a
trickle of successive moments as it is in the conceptual framework
of classical physics with which we usually operate in practical life.
"Musical time is not at all like clock-time. It has . . . voluminous-
ness and complexity and variability that make it utterly unlike
metrical time" (Langer, 1957: 37). Music sounds the way feelings
feel , mirroring their ups and downs, motion and rest, fulfillment
and change.
Langer's distinction between discursive and presentational
symbols is a helpful one. Discursive symbols are readily trans-
latable and have fixed definitions. Music, on the other hand, like all
the arts, expresses the quality of emotional life through presen-
tational symbols. Presentational symbols are untranslatable; they
are understandable only through their relations within the total
structure of the work. The meaning of a piece of music lies entirely
within the work - that is, in its own formal structure and inner
98 In pursuit of slow time

relations. Unlike ordinary language, presentational symbols cap-

ture the flux of sensations and emotions.
For example, music can express opposites simultaneously and so
capture the ambivalence of content better than words or language.
In addition to such simultaneity, the linear unfolding of music in the
course of time also mirrors the "shapes" of emotions. Music sets
up expectations, interposes delays, and grants hidden recurrences
before reaching a final resolution. The frustration of expectations is
associated with rising tension , its gratification with release of
tension. Tension- release embodies feeling. And it is precisely this
element - the balance between tension and release - that has been
called the specific dynamic of musical form (Toch, 1948: 157).
Artist-analyst Marion Milner's On Not Being Able to Paint (1957)
and musician-philosopher Victor Zuckerkandl's posthumously
published Man the Musician (1973) provide important insights
into the relationship of language to nonverbal art. Both make a
clear distinction between formal , logical thinking, on the one hand,
and creative or aesthetic thinking on the other. According to formal
logic, all thought which does not make a total separation between
what a thing is and what it is not is irrational. Thus, according to
formal logic, the whole area of symbolic expression is irrational,
since the point about a symbol is that it is both itself and something
else. Formal logic, then, gives a false picture in aesthetics; this false
picture is avoided, Milner writes, only "if we think about art in
terms of its capacity for fusing ... subject and object, seer and seen
and then making a new division of these" (p. 161).
Similarly, Zuckerkandl spells out the differences between
objective hearing and musical hearing. The "I" that hears music,
he writes, is different from the "I" who is the subject of a sentence,
who is going to attend to outside signals in order to react to them
in one way or another. The listener to music is more like the
swimmer who allows himself to be carried by the water as he
swims. Language, being firmly tied to subject- object predicate
structure, fails us here. The " I" that listens to music is no longer
something that " does" - that is, hears and now "has" the results of
what it has done; namely, the sensations of tones. Hearing music
involves hearing not only tones but also their direction, tension,
motion, organic structure. It is the kind of hearing that moves with
the tones and draws the hearer into their motion. Thus, it involves
an interpenetration of subject and object, within rationality, drawn
into the experience of the movement of felt-time (Zuckerkandl,
 In pursuit of slow time 99

1973: 160-162). The similarity to psychoanalytic listening is so

striking as to require no comment.
Both Milner and Zuckerkandl make it clear that aesthetic hear-
ing or viewing is more like creative, nonlogical thinking; also, that
both are quite different from objective perception and cognitive,
logical thinking. The difference lies in the opposition between
subject and object (their separateness) in the case of cognitive,
logical thinking, and in the togetherness of thinker and thought
(their mutually influential motion) in aesthetic, creative thinking.
Milner summarizes the problem neatly:

Clearly the great difficulty in thinking logically about this

problem is due to the fact that we are trying to talk about a
process which stops being that process as soon as we talk
about it, trying to talk about a state in which the "me/not-me"
distinction is not important, but to do so at all we have to
make the distinction. (p. 161)

Turning now from the psychological to the cultural pole, perhaps

nothing less than profound scholarship is able to show satisfactorily
how a musical style is part of the expressive life of a culture. For
example, Charles Rosen (1980) considers the evolution of sonata
form out of eighteenth-century arias and concertos. In the late
eighteenth century sonata form changed from being music for the
court or church into music for a new concert audience, the rising
middle class; musical themes took on the dramatic roles and tensions
found in opera and were resolved with classical order and pro-
portion. In the nineteenth century sonata form became something
else again: it provided prestige, respectability, and constraint for the
romantic impulse and a vehicle for the virtuoso's performance.
A comparable study is yet to be written for music of the modern
era and contemporary times. In the meantime, two considerations
seem obvious. First, the experience of time has become drastically
different from what it was previously. As during other disturbed
periods in history, our era is characterized by pervasive, random
violence, meaningless death, and bankrupt faith. Man has long
known dread of total extinction, of course, but never its actual
feasibility through instruments of destruction of unprecedented
speed, range, and scope. While previous ages had a wider margin of
time to buffer the unpredictability of life and powerful religious
ideologies to rationalize the seemingly senseless, our own age is
100 In pursuit of slow time

largely lacking in both. Secondly, while it would be impossible to

prove that such a profound change in our temporal experience is
reflected in contemporary music, it is plausible to assume it.
As representatives of music in the modern era, if not the most
recent, I have arbitrarily selected Charlie Parker's bebop jazz and
Arnold Schoenberg's twelve-tone atonal music. Both, in reflecting a
new experience of time, also contributed significantly to altering
the musical experience of time. A clinical vignette that throws some
light on the psychological meaning of this altered sense of time is
shown by the case of a woman who thought her appointment was
one hour earlier than it was, at 3:00 p.m. instead of at 4:00. She
then came fifteen minutes late for the imagined appointment (at
3: 15), slept in the waiting room, and left fifteen minutes before the
actual appointment was about to begin (at 3:45). As I hope to
show, she was uprooting time from its usual matrix in a way
somewhat analogous to certain aspects of modern music. But first
to Charlie Parker and Arnold Schoenberg.
At the end of the Second World War, highly educated black
people were coming into the mainstream of American society. Even
Duke Ellington was not sophisticated enough for their taste.
Hindemith and Stravinsky were becoming known to innovative
jazzmen. Hindemith's own instrument was the viola, but he had
played drums in jazz bands in European hotels before coming to
the United States in 1940, and his "Symphonic Metamorphosis on
Themes by Weber" has a strong jazz flavoring. But it was
Stravinsky who was the main hero to jazz musicians because he
was pushing beyond conventions. The great bebop innovators in
America - Charlie Parker, Dizzy Gillespie, Thelonious Monk, Art
Blakey, Kenny Clarke, Max Roach - looked on him almost as a
god. (As did the pioneers of modern jazz, like Miles Davis and
John Coltrane, who later took their music even further out.)
Despite these connections to the past, however, bebop of the
1940s and early 1950s represents a startling break from preceding
jazz styles, and one that still causes some discomfort among today's
listeners. Ron Rose (1980), in an unpublished ethnomusicological
paper, maintains that the musical changes brought about by the
bebop movement strongly reflected the changing black self-image in
America. I am indebted to him for what follows on bebop.

Dixieland had its childhood in New Orleans. It became refined

into the smoother and more "literate" styles in the years to
 In pursuit of slow time 101

follow, reaching its height of polish under the rule of the big
band style where improvisation (the original tenet of jazz)
became the exception rather than the rule . . . . Bebop . . .
appears to be a clear and unsubtle black rebellion against the
white dominated swing scene, as well as the historically estab-
lished caricature of the black entertainer as mindless and
officiously amusing .... The bebop musicians were intent upon
creating a music which would allow a complete break from its
" illiterate" black predecessor, and their white competitors. The
music itself ... with its difficult chord changes and rhythmic
bridges, often executed at breakneck speeds, helped keep the
movement "pure" of musicians not entirely competent, as well
as create a new standard for the white establishment.

The leader of the bebop movement was Charlie Parker. (While he

was considered one of the major innovative forces in the history of
jazz, he himself said that if he could take a year off he would go to
Yale to study with Hindemith.) Perhaps his major contribution was
his conception of the musical phrase as tied to, yet at the same time
free from, limitations of meter. Specifically, while the musical
phrase had previously been restricted to the bar-lines, he extended
it through the bar-lines. This means that, as soloist, he would
sometimes speed up, sometimes slow down, to bring the melodic
line "out of sync" with the underlying metric foundation , which
was all the while being provided reliably by the other instruments.
The relationship between the melodic line and the rhythmic pulse
was thus rendered much more ambiguous; that relationship was no
longer bound to the downbeat. Instead of classic syncopation, with
its stress on up or downbeats, melodic emphasis could now be
placed on any division of the beat on a sixteenth- and thirty-
second-note level. This led other jazz musicians to experiment with
unorthodox meters, fragment the beat until the meter became
indiscernible, or blur the distinction of the downbeat much as a
twelve-tonist avoids the concept of a tonic.
In short, Parker's restructuring of pulse into what might be called
a fluid meter superimposed on a metric foundation turned the
rhythmic conventions of Western popular music on end. One far-
reaching effect was to shift the functions of the other instruments.
The beat could now be displaced to the lighter cymbals, freeing the
drum to become a most articulate instrument on its own. Similarly,
the pianist's left hand was freed to pursue a different path.
102 In pursuit of slow time

Just as Parker's rhythmic innovations loosened the relationship

between the melodic line and the underlying beat, Schoenberg's
twelve-tone scale had already freed musical harmonics from the
concept of the tonic. This also had far-reaching effects on the
musical experience of time. A brief excursion into musical theory is
necessary to show how.
It is possible to consider that the most important fact about
music - its basic ingredient - is not so much sound as movement
(Sessions, 1950). Music embodies, defines, and qualifies movement.
Each musical phrase - that portion of music that must be per-
formed in a single breath - is a unique gesture that moves con-
stantly toward the goal of completing a cadence. Everything else -
the appropriateness of harmonies, melodic intervals, the details of
rhythmic elaboration - depends on it. Hearing music is hearing the
dynamic quality of tones - that is, hearing their direction, their
movement. (In the same way, seeing a picture involves seeing the
force, direction, intention in form and color.)
A musical scale is one of the main ways of organizing the current
of motion. The scale is a system of order among tones. It describes
the relationship among the tones making up the musical organ-
ization of a culture. The scales are based on the physical phenom-
enon of overtones making up the harmonic series. (It is said that
using the overtone series for musical theory actually dates back to
the ancient Greeks and Chinese, who found the overtone series
useful in establishing the norms of pitch relationships, scale
structure, and so on.) The starting point or tonic tone in the key of
C is C; the tonic tone in the key of G is G, and so forth. The main
or dominant overtone of the tonic is five tones away and is called
the fifth. The main overtone or dominant of C in the key of C is G .
One may move from the key of C to its main overtone, G, and then
take that as the starting point, or tonic, of the key of G. One may
move in the key of G to its main overtone or dominant, D, and the
key of D; thence to its main overtone or dominant, A, and the key
of A; thus on to the keys of E, B, F#, and ultimately back to C,
completing the circle. This moving from one key to another, from
tonic to dominant, makes possible a circle of fifths . It is based on
the underlying organization of the scale, namely, a stable relation-
ship of tonics and dominants based on the universal physical phe-
nomenon of the harmonic series of overtones.
A second point: because of the tonal organization of the scale,
the tones strive in certain directions. They have driving qualities.
 In pursuit of slow time 103

This accounts for one of the main ways in which music sets up a
current of motion, a system of expectancies. For example, the tonic
tone of any key is the one of ultimate rest and stability toward
which all other tones tend to move. The octave and fifths and
fourths were already binding forces for the ancients. They were
relationships so fundamental that they became decisive points of
reference around which to organize tones. Together they defined
the space within which melody could coherently move.
In the West, other intervals were gradually incorporated into the
service of musical expression - thirds, sixths, sevenths, seconds,
and finally, augmented and diminished intervals. Each new con-
quest was associated with a new struggle. The use of these intervals
led eventually to the use of chords and a new dimension in music -
namely, tonality - and the modulation from one key to another, as
well as major and minor modes. " Tonality implies a kind of per-
spective in sound, sometimes compared rather shrewdly to perspec-
tive in visual art. For it makes possible a system of relations which
are unequal in strength, in emphasis, or in significance" (Sessions,
1950: 40).
Thus, because of a combination of the universal physical phe-
nomenon of the harmonic series and cultural evolution, tones that
come before lead the Western ear to expect that certain tones will
come after. This is so even though, in order to build up tension,
this motion or expectancy may be delayed in various musical ways
already mentioned.
Tonal music feels like the natural experience of time flow to
Western listeners because it is learned so early, but it is far from
universal. Training and culture are important factors. For example,
a Western listener interprets the vibrato (a slight fluctuation of
pitch often less than a semitone) as a constant pitch with a rich
sound. An Indian musician, however, whose native music is based
on microtones - intervals smaller than the semi tone - may perceive
the Western vibrato as a significant fluctuation of pitch probably
meant to express agitation. Even the basic ability to distinguish the
octave - so basic that it is shared by white rats (Winner, 1982) -
may be lost if one is immersed long enough in another culture
where such an interval is unimportant (the music of Australian
aborigines) .
Now, if we could set up a series of tones which was lifted out of
the gravitational pull of tonics and dominants, the overtones of the
harmonic series, we would no longer be in a secure circle of fifths,
104 In pursuit of slow time

going from one key to another in an orderly way. Any single tone
would no longer carry implications of where it came from or where
it was going. In other words, we would be taken out of the
ordinary flow of time - from past to expected future.
Essentially, this was what Schoenberg did with his twelve-tone
scale. It represents a whole system based on rootlessness from the
harmonic series. The twelve tones and their sequence are selected in
such a way that no tone has any implications regarding the tone
that preceded it or the tone that may follow it; much of the
directedness of tones has been rendered inoperative. Each of the
tones can be played forward, backward, in mirror-image, or back-
ward and mirrored. Since there are twelve tones in the Schoenberg
system, we now have forty-eight possible sequences. All of them
alter the ordinary experience of time as we know it in the West -
not, it must be stressed, by tampering with time directly (for
example, through rhythmic changes) but through changes in the
tonal system, setting up ambiguous expectancies.
In addition to these changes in tonality that modify our expec-
tancies of what will follow what musically, in much of the music
of the twentieth century there is a deliberate dissolution of the
sequential flow of music events as we have come to know it.
Instead of a musical event in a composition depending on at least
one previous musical event in order to build up to a climax or
resolve tension, each musical event arises independently. For
example, the sections of a piece of music may be put together in
any possible sequence from one performance to the next with no
set beginning or ending. Instead of development and recapitulation
as we know them in sonata form, for instance, a piece of music in
so-called vertical time does not purposefully set up expectations or
fulfill any that might arise accidentally. The listener is forced to
give up any expectation, any implication of cause and effect, ante-
cedents and consequents. The sounds are unhampered and also
un helped by referential meaning. The experience has been com-
pared to looking at a piece of sculpture: each viewer is free to walk
around it, view it from any angle, in any possible sequence, linger
long or briefly with each, leave, return, whatever. In "vertical time"
there is nothing to direct the way time passes (Kramer, 1981).
In other words, in the new temporalities in music, past and
future have been collapsed into a present moment which floats in
uncertainty. There being no impulsion from the past, the over-
arching present leads to no-future. More than this: the bond tieing
 In pursuit of slow time 105

cause and consequence together has been loosened and meanings

are cast adrift.
However, having stated this boldly for the sake of clarity, it must
be noted that experienced listeners to contemporary music insist
that while at first it may sound random, expectancies inevitably
emerge and order the musical experience - even that of John Cage.
Thus has it ever been with innovation. What is at first disturbingly
new becomes even comfortably familiar. The dialectic between new
and strange and good old familiar is inherent in any organically
evolving process.
Not only music but art and literature for decades have been
foretelling and mirroring a world unhinged from the conventions
of time, space, and causality that had traditionally supplied order.
Take art: if discontinuity is the key to the new temporalities in
music, fragmentation describes much of art history after the turn of
the twentieth century and before the Second World War. Cezanne
fragmented the image; the cubists fragmented shape; the impres-
sionists and pointillists, light and color; the surrealists, reality itself.
After the Second World War, abstract expressionism and then
minimalist painting rejected the illusion of three-dimensionality as
well as all imagery of symbolism which might permit any con-
ventional meaning to be read into these paintings. Instead, oversize
canvases and large expanse of color draw the viewer "inside" the
canvas, " enclosing" him. Describing a painting by Robert Natkin,
art critic Peter Fuller (1980: 179) wrote:

It is almost as if at this level of your interaction with the work

the skin had reformed by this time around you so that you ,
originally an exterior observer, feel yourself to be literally and
precariously suspended within a wholly illusory space which,
like the unconscious itself, contains its own time.

One is drawn through the skin of paint between successive gauze-

like veils of color so that the viewer feels suspended within some
interior, timeless space.
Such sense of enclosure and oneness is the visual counterpart of
auditory immersion into the "vertical time" of some contemporary
music. Just as in the painting there are layers of color and light
which draw one into a timeless space, in some " vertical time" music
there are layers of dense sound: relationships take place between
layers of simultaneous sound rather than between successive events,
106 In pursuit of slow time

as in conventional music. "The result is a single present stretched

out into an enormous duration ... that nonetheless feels like an
instant" (Kramer, 1981: 549).
In some recent literature, one finds analogous discontinuities and
fragmentations, resulting in a similar prolongation of the present
moment lifted out of the flow of past-to-future. In the years since
her work first began to appear in The New Yorker, Ann Beattie has
become for many readers the representative young American
writer. Here are some of the things she said in an interview with
Joyce Maynard (New York Times, May 11 , 1980):

Beattie: I don't know how to write a novel .... I would like to

take a course on that some time, if I ever take another
course . ... It's very hard for me to work on Monday
and Tuesday, and on Wednesday I wonder what I said
on Tuesday, let alone what I'm moving toward ....
That's why all the chapters jump around. I can't think
how somebody would move from one to the next, so I
have to take a breather and hope that I come up with
something .... I certainly listen to records a lot. But if
I write a story I tend to put on what my husband is
playing on the stereo at that moment ... just what's on
the turntable . . .. I really love the notion of found art.
Warhol soup cans - that kind of stuff. When I write
something, I like to look out the window the night I'm
typing and see what kind of moon it was on July the
15th and put it in ....
Maynard: Do you write about the relationships between men and
women?
Beattie: I just assume that there are going to be moments. But
when I start to write it isn't with the thought that I
want to communicate about the relationship between
men and women. I think, "I'd really like to work that
interesting ashtray I just bought into a story about men
and women .... " I read a lot - mostly modern fiction ,
nothing before 1960 if I can help it. I'm a great time
waster. See what a shiny coat my dog has? I go buy him
vitamins. I rap with him. I brush him.
Maynard: And did you actually know somebody who did what
the two lovers in Falling in Place did, during the early
 In pursuit of slow time 107

days of their relationship - hold hands uninterruptedly

for two days?
Beattie: Yes - four days. They've split up now.

Does a clinical perspective give us an inkling as to the significance of

these shifts away from the usual principles of sense and sequence?
Let us turn to the woman who came late for an appointment she
did not have, slept, and left before her actual appointment was due
to start. While not " removed" from the flow of time from past
to future, this was surely a slippage - whether one thinks of it as
backward or forward - a slippage in the ratcheting of the cogs of
time. Here is more about her and the clinical situation.
I had seen her years before in analysis. Now forty-seven , she had
asked to come in for a few sessions. We greeted each other warmly.
She sat down and smiled. I asked how she had been. She struggled
with her features and said, " Since Nancy was killed it hasn't been
the same," and burst into sobs. Shocked, I blurted, "What?"
Nancy was her daughter, and she would now be about twenty-two.
As we shall see, the way she broke the news was not incidental.
Indeed, her twenty-two-year-old daughter had been killed
instantly in a car accident a year earlier. The patient had managed
to continue all her activities but experienced a numbing
disconnection from her feelings. Not mourning her daughter, she
felt, was like holding onto her, not letting her go. She had only
recently begun to weep, and this brought some relief from the sense
of deadness.
She had entered analysis originally saying that she rarely knew
what she was feeling; whenever she was under stress she would
disconnect herself from her feelings and hide inside. In this way
she could fight off depression and " keep moving and smiling."
Convent upbringing had taught her that it was more important to
maintain a prayerful attitude than to seek to understand many
things. She had cultivated a vague fogginess as a defense against
sexual and aggressive impulses. This was modeled partly on her
mother. Mother was remembered mostly for her bland smilingness
and the way she cultivated stereotyped responses to handle any
situation. Father was a powerful political figure whose family life
was characterized by towering rages and emotional withdrawal.
Neither parent ever exchanged a single word with their daughter
after she married outside the Church. She had been temporarily
expelled from the family in adolescence for always getting into
108 In pursuit of slow time

"trouble," though she was not sure what the trouble had been. She
of course knew there was a past, but the quality of herself in it was
not available to her, and when it was it was like remembering the
feeling of having had a nightmare but not knowing what it was
about.
She had married a driven man who became very successful. She
married him to get herself "organized" by him and play out the
roles he assigned her. She did this very well and became known as a
sophisticated hostess, a responsive friend, a generous volunteer
worker for good causes, and a natural athlete. A few close friends
also knew that she was very bright, had a discerning literary and
musical taste, and had graduated with high honors from a top
college. She experienced modified analytic treatment as the only
calm relationship she had ever known and the first time she had
allowed herself to feel that she was taking something for herself
instead of being selfless.
The clinical vignette relevant to our discussion has already been
related. It was easy to imagine that it represented a conventional
resistance of ambivalence to talking about painful matters, but the
form it took seemed unusual.
At the next session, when we discussed what had happened, I
asked, on the basis of what I knew about her from the past,
whether having come late for an imagined appointment and having
left before a real one was a way of expressing something about
wanting to reverse what was real and unreal. Whether this was
wrong or irrelevant, her answer in any event led elsewhere. She said
that repeatedly when she met someone she had not seen for some
time, the other person would " surprise" her by asking innocently
and casually about her daughter, that the patient would then have
to say her daughter had died, that this would always come as a
shock to the other person and the patient would have to soothe her
down. I said it seemed surprising that it always came as a surprise
to her that someone should ask innocently about her daughter.
Why did she not anticipate this and somehow try to cushion the
news and shield both of them from the shock? She replied that
everything seemed to come as a surprise to her nowadays; she was
just never ready for anything. For example, although she had been
an excellent tennis player, now every time the ball came to her it
seemed to come from the blue; because she did not keep her eye on
her opponent's movements she could not anticipate where the ball
would land, and as a result her return would always be late.
 In pursuit of slow time 109

I wondered if she might be turning every moment into a kind of

shock and a surprise, ripping each moment out of its context in the
flow of time, and in this way perhaps continuously repeating,
actively, the traumatic moment when she was informed of Nancy's
death. As for coming early and leaving before her appointment was
due to start, we might speculate that this was a way of dislocating
time in order to correct and master it, a way of saying, "If only it
had been an hour earlier, or later, Nancy would be alive now." (It
has since been shown (Terr, 1984) that, following trauma, disturb-
ances in all major aspects of time functioning serve adaptive and
defensive functions.)
Any analyst would wish for more data regarding this vignette,
particularly the role of unresolved transference. But since the epi-
sode of the missed appointment arose out of a brief contact many
years following the termination of treatment, this is not possible.
This unavoidable omission, however, helps direct our attention to a
recently revived area of early psychoanalytic interest: the role of
reality and the effect of trauma.
We know that random, meaningless violence can destroy both
the sense of self and reality. A less drastic result of trauma is that
its reality may be denied and disavowed in various ways. Uproot-
ing the connection between cause and consequence by altering
the flow of time from past to future may be one means of blunting
the impact of trauma. One may attempt to master past trauma by
reliving it in an endless repetition compulsion, transforming the
present into that past, thus effectively halting the flow of time.
But what mechanisms help to master and defend against a reality
that is not denied or disavowed - that remains well recognized, in
other words - and yet flies in the face of common sense and logic?
The patient of course understood very well that a head-on collision
led to her daughter's death, but this bears so little relation to sense
that the mind recoils from such "meaning" as absurd. If it cannot
totally sever cause from consequence, past from future, it can at least
defensively modify the experience of time flow - sometimes slowing it
down and at other times speeding it up. Is this what the patient was
doing in coming late for an appointment she did not have and leaving
early for one she did? Or in being too slow in meeting her tennis
opponent's return, too slow in preparing the ground for breaking the
news of her daughter's death, too quick in blurting out the news?
If this seems tenable, we might ask: have the fragmentation,
discontinuity, and "timelessness" - so pervasive in art of the
110 In pursuit of slow time

modern era for so long - been all-too prescient imaginings of an

unthinkable future?
As previously discussed, some of the still newer temporalities of
music represent even more drastic attempts to cool the flow of time
- actually to separate each moment from its historical context, deal
with each like rootless tones, without implications, in the discon-
tinuous Now. Thus, in the words of the folk ballad: " We'll make a
space in the lives we've planned/And here we'll stay,lUntil it's time
for you to go. Don't ask why,lDon't ask forever,lLove me now"
(Buffy St Marie).
If we were to accept the hypothesis that it was the sudden
shocking death of her daughter that led the patient to modify
defensively her experience of time flow, could we make a parallel
hypothesis about some contemporary music? In short, the question
is: should some aspects of modern music and of current clinical
phenomena be bracketed together as defensive alterations in the
experience of time - attempts to modify and thus " master" its
inexorable passage?
The immediate musicological answer might be: " No. The new
temporalities in music represent (1) experimentation, (2) reflecting
the gradual absorption of music of different cultures (for instance,
the Javanese gamelan), (3) making use of technological innovations
like radio, records, electronics and tape-splicing" (Kramer, 1981:
543- 544).
Yet, if all this were true it would not negate one possible
meaning of this musical experimentation: like the patient's reaction
to sudden, random death, the new temporalities in music may still
represent a deeply felt need to suspend time, to deal with the
possibility that any succeeding moment might fracture conven-
tional sense and flood the self. In other words, just as my patient
experienced a defensive alteration in her sense of time in response
to the life-threatening unpredictability of daily life, some contem-
porary music (and art), perhaps in similar response to shared
anxieties of the age, dissolves familiar temporal (and spatial)
frames of reference.
Whatever the cause, it would be misleading to dismiss such
apparent dissolution of familiar structures as simply regressive. It is
a frequent analytic finding that a temporary dissolution of struc-
ture may be a prerequisite for further development. Thus, in the
case of my patient, if what she went through were to lead to further
growth, or in the case of music or art if it is to be an aesthetic
 In pursuit of slow time 111

experience, such partial dissolution will be followed by a rediffer-

entiation of the self (GJ. Rose, 1980).
This two-phase process - partial dissolution and reintegration -
occurring in rapid oscillation appears to be central to creative
experience. Much slowed down, it also describes the process of
growth. We observe it, too, in that particular form of growth we
call psychoanalysis and refer to it there as an alternating movement
of therapeutic regression and working through, losing and
refinding the self, emotional reliving and thoughtful reflection.
Or so we hope.
Chapter 7

The birth of music in the

context of loss
Music and affect regulation

It is said that music was given to mankind by the God Shiva six
thousand years before our era. With the help of music, Orpheus
(son of Apollo and the Muse, Calliope) went to rescue Eurydice
from the Underworld. And he nearly succeeded, until he turned
back to see her. Then she faded away. Was Orpheus' mission only
a dream - a memory - woven through music?
The ancient Maori are said to have navigated over three thou-
sand miles of open Pacific Ocean aided only by Song. One wonders
what data, inscribed in Song, guided their journeys. That they
succeeded was no mere dream. That they thus became masters of
their fates lay surely in themselves. But perhaps also in the stars -
their constellations encoded in the structure of Song?
Australian aborigines have complex songs that map their terrain
acoustically. Rising and falling arpeggios trace mountain paths;
monotones denote flat plains. Songs mimic different footsteps on
particular kinds of soil.
What dreams, memories, or maps go into the body of Song to
orient one in an uncertain reality? We begin with a child humming
to himself to maintain his courage while snorkeling. We will return
via his grandfather, dreaming music while struggling with the
trauma of loss. En route we will touch on early development, some
neurobiological roots of music, and trauma theory - with the aim
of helping to build a psychoanalytic aesthetics.

***
Adam, age eight, has the self-confident spirit and sunny nature of
the family pet. Brave but not a maritime hero particularly, sociable
 Birth of music in the context of loss 113

but also introspective, he is never far behind even when the whole
family goes snorkeling together in tropical waters.
Equipped with flippers and mask, breathing tube clomped
between his jaws, face immersed in the water, he was overheard to
be humming. Later:

I heard you humming while snorkeling. How come?

Sometimes I sort of comfort myself.
What do you mean?
Well, when I come across a whole bunch of fish - big fish - I
don't feel alone.
So what do you hum?
Oh, like mummy would sing to me.
Like?
Like, " You are my sunshine." Things like that.
Do you ever make up your own songs?
Sure. When I come across a little fish all by himself. I sing like,
"Y ou never had a friend like me."

Adam said it: music reaches back and reaches out. Music has long
been associated with the need for hope and comfort, prayer and the
wish for rescue. In the modern era, nowhere was the need for music
better evidenced than in the experience of Jews under Hitler. The
following are two examples.
Herbert Zipper was an inmate of Dachau and Buchenwald
between May 1938 and February 1939 while they were still only
forced labor camps. (The following account is abstracted from
Cummins, 1992.) On the second or third night he and a friend
began to recite lines from Goethe's Faust, going back and forth
between them trying to transcend their hunger and the dirt and
stupidity around them and forget the exhaustion of a day's work
pushing cartloads of stone back and forth .

I have no explanation for what urged me . . . to start in a loud

voice reciting [these] passages . . . while scores of other inmates
were scattered on the ground, exhausted, mute and hopeless .. ..
Soon the inmates on the ground grouped themselves around us
listening with obvious intensity. The dramatic change of mood
that happened to all of us is still vividly in my memory. The
following evenings an ever-increasing crowd urged us to
114 Birth of music in the context of loss

continue ... and we obliged with the best of German poetry

that we could remember. Poetry did its intended work. (p. 84)

Many of the prisoners who gathered around were simple, unedu-

cated laborers, poor farmers, criminals - for many their first
exposure to poetry.
This led to the seemingly preposterous idea of making music. He
composed in his head and memorized it while at forced labor.
He came across two good instrument makers in the wood shop and
set them to working with stolen wood. A sympathetic guard (who
turned out to be a Communist spy) provided violin strings. He was
able to enlist about a dozen players with a peculiar assortment of
instruments, some of them only hollow boxes bound in tight string.
On Sunday afternoons when the guards were often off-duty, and
with a couple of prisoners standing guard, they held "concerts" in
an unused latrine. Twenty to thirty prisoners at a time listened in
absolute silence in shifts of fifteen to thirty minutes for two to three
hours. The music was written in the margins of Nazi newspapers
that had been cut and pasted together by the listening audience.
The ensemble was never discovered.
Zipper learned first hand in Dachau that the arts are no mere
adornment, but essential to life.
Not in a concentration camp, but herded by the Nazis into the
Ghetto of Lodz, Poland, 1940- 1945, the miserable inhabitants
sang for their lives.

In the evening there was not enough light for reading. So we

sat in the darkness and sang. We sang and sang ... for its own
sake .... I think it was one of the things which helped us to
surVIve.
(Flam, 1992: 156)

They sang in their homes, for the family, in public, in private, in

youth groups, on stage, during work.
The songs contained everyday events and ironic commentary.
The content ranged from despair, anger, hope for freedom, call for
revolt, group solidarity, even to humorously poking fun at some of
their own. However serious or light, the content of the song was
always secondary to the music.
Why the necessity for song in particular? Art philosopher, Victor
Zuckerkandl (1973) writes that people sing in order to melt their
 Birth of music in the context of loss 115

separateness into "authentic togetherness" (p. 42). "Music

provides . . . the most natural solvent of artificial boundaries
between the self and others" (p. 51).
A woman of the Lodz ghetto describes how listening to herself
singing helped her to feel less isolated. "Only singing could help.
When one sings, even when he sings a sad song, his loneliness
disappears, he listens to his own voice. He and his voice become
two people ... and afterwards you feel free" (Flam, 1992: 107).
Drawing comfort from being both singer and listener - single but
not "alone" - permits an analytic inference: it likely taps into the
primal safety of an early precursor, namely, the infant- caretaker
pair. In that dual unity, mutually responsive cooing and expressive
vocalization between the two partners long antedated verbalization
and being able to distinguish oneself from a loving Other.

***
What can developmental psychology say about this ancient time of
life? Studies of prenatal and neonatal responses to auditory stimuli
suggest that musical development and responsivity may start even
prior to birth. The anatomical wherewithal is present. In contrast
to the eye and the visual areas of the brain, the cochlea and middle
ear are fully developed by the fifth month of fetal life, and the
sensorimotor cortex and cerebellum are active at birth.
Fetuses respond to music, probably depending mostly on tempo
(OIds, 1984). When musical stimuli were applied directly to the
abdominal skin of pregnant women in five to ten minute periods, in
ten out of thirty subjects the fetus responded with sharp, rapid or
agitated movements to stimulating music, and with rolling, soft or
muted movements to calmer musical selections (Shetler, 1988).
From birth onward, newborns produce sounds that have melodic
structures and rhythms related to neurophysiology and breathing
(Ostwald, 1988). Up to three months of age perception is "amodal,"
i.e., sound may be seen or felt motorically as well as heard. This
results in " global affects" or undifferentiated emotions (Stern,
1985).
Pending elaboration later, we should note here that more differ-
entiated emotions evolve from a matrix of sensations of pleasure/
unpleasure. As need tensions accumulate, delays intervene, and
anticipations rise, muscles contract; as needs are satisfied, muscles
relax. This is not to suggest that tension is equated with unpleasure
116 Birth of music in the context of loss

and release with pleasure as formerly believed; tension is related to

the long-circuiting of secondary process (cognition) and release
with the short-circuiting of primary process (imagination). Rate
and contour of stimulation are also highly relevant.
The motoric patterns of actual tension and release that accom-
pany emotions are the kinesthetic, bodily end of the bridge that
later connects with the virtual tension/release that is built into the
structure of art. My contention is that their concordance triggers
the emotional response to art.
Returning to music, the aspects of speech that most compel the
neonate's attention are the musical ones: first, rhythm and timing;
by six months, the variations of intonation and a tonal range at a
particular pitch (Panel, 1980). Between five and eight months the
infant can discriminate pitch differences of less than half a tone.
Is it a coincidence that parents across cultures exaggerate the
musical features of speech in sing-songing to the infant (Emde,
1983: 171 - 172)? Repetitiveness and rhythm, fine-tuned like a
dance, are important features of this interplay. The baby responds
in kind well before six months of age and matches pitch, intensity,
melodic contour and rhythmic structure of mother's songs. It leads
to a growing attachment between them and this becomes the
central growth-promoting factor and the basis for the baby's well-
being (Stern, 1985).
Thus, from early on there is an open system of responsive
affective signaling between the preverbal infant and its caretakers.
This reciprocal emotional signaling becomes a self-reinforcing
dyadic system of affect- feedback and becomes consolidated by the
first year of life.

***
Since Penfield and Perot (1963) were able to show that precise and
vivid memories, coupled with the emotions of the original experi-
ences, could be evoked by delicate electric stimulation of the
cerebral cortex, it seems likely that the sum total of experience
remains perfectly preserved. Of this total, music makes up a
generous portion - orchestral, vocal, piano, etc.
Nothing seems to be lost, music least likely of all. Oliver Sacks
(1985) presents a case of an eighty-eight-year-old woman with a
sudden onset of stroke due to a thrombosis of her temporal lobe.
She first became aware that something was wrong when she
 Birth of music in the context of loss 117

suddenly felt herself drowning in an ocean of sound which she took

to be due to a loud radio playing old Irish songs deafeningly at
night. She said to the doctor, " I know I'm an old woman with a
stroke in an old people's home, but I feel I'm a child in Ireland
again - I feel my mother's arms, I see her, I hear her voice singing"
(p. 130).
With gradual recovery in the course of four months she gra-
dually lost the songs, was unable to recall them, and missed them.
"It was like being given back a forgotten bit of my childhood
again" (p. 127). On questioning it was determined that her father
had died before she was born, and her mother before she was five.
Sent to America, she had no conscious memory of her first five
years of life.
The music had brought her profound joy, like the opening of a
door that had been closed all her life. As she recovered she said,

The door is closing. I'm losing it all again . .. . I'm glad it

happened .... It was the healthiest, happiest experience of my
life. There's no longer a great chunk of my childhood missing.
I can't remember the details now, but I know it's all there.
There's a sort of completeness I never had before.
(Sacks, 1985: 137- 138)

Sacks presents a number of other cases illustrating the power of

music, dance, narrative and drama to re-access motor sequences
and programs that appear to be otherwise totally lost due to neuro-
logical damage. Apparently art provides forms that may remain
intact and reliably available despite otherwise extreme motor
incompetence and bewilderment. This suggests that the capacity for
aesthetic form (like one's identity/style) is so diffused, embedded
and organized as to hold an overall design together.
In musical perception, for example, tunes are immediately felt
and recognized as indivisible wholes involving warmth, emotion,
even personal relation. They are like "faces," Sacks writes, in that
normally we do not recognize familiar faces by "piecemeal analysis
or aggregation." With a lesion in the right occipital (visual) cortex,
on the other hand, one may have to resort to analysis of separate
features (Sacks, 1985: 198).
An example of this pathology is the case of a distinguished
musician who had lost the ability to visually imagine, represent or
remember faces as well as his own body-image. Instead, he used his
118 Birth of music in the context of loss

musical sensitivity to take the place of image. He took the world in

through his hearing. His wife said:

He does everything singing to himself. But if he is interrupted

and loses the thread, he comes to a complete stop, doesn't
know his clothes - or his body. He sings all the time - eating
songs, dressing songs, bathing songs, everything. He can't do
anything unless he makes it a song.
(Sacks, 1985: 15- 16)

Like this patient, a man who was severely retarded due to

meningitis in infancy also managed to relate himself to healthful
aspects of life through music. The spirit of music evoked his
musician father with whom he had lived all his life on affectionate
terms until he died when the patient was in his thirties. Especially
when singing in church, this spirit could transform him from a
pathetic disabled creature to a vibrant one.
His father had also read aloud to him all nine volumes of Grove 's
Dictionary of Music and Musicians. They - all of them - remained
"indelibly printed upon his son's limitlessly retentive, if illiterate,
cortex. Grove, thereafter was 'heard' in his father's voice - and
could never be recollected by him without emotion" (Sacks, 1985:
180). Apparently it was his father's voice that acted as the personal
affective medium through which music was able to exert its bene-
ficent effect. Or was it that music was the medium that facilitated
the internalization of his father and activated the benevolent effect
of that relationship? We do not have to decide between these
alternatives. They may both have been effective, as in early
development where the musical interplay is inseparable from the
relationship.
How are we to understand these observations attesting to art's
effectiveness in reintegrating the performance of neurologically
devastated individuals? In other words, how do aesthetic forms
help hold the design together?
Consider that the cerebral hemispheres in their moment-by-
moment activity process data differently. It is the task of the ego to
correlate and integrate the different ways the hemispheres deal with
the successiveness and constancy of time, the separateness and
wholeness of space, as well as the person's thoughts and feelings.
These constitute the coordinates of orientation - time, place and
person.
 Birth of music in the context of loss 119

Art reflects what the mind attempts in its moment-by-moment

activity, and does it ideally, slowed down and magnified: integrates
diverse data to aid psychological orientation in an inconstant
reality. At the same time, all the arts reinfuse feeling into thought
and perception and make it more like it was in the beginning. It is
as though painting, for example, were a visual model of the mind,
and music an acoustic one, while all the arts reinvigorate personal
experience with feelingful thought and perception (G.J. Rose, 1980,
1987, 1996).
Therefore, when the ego's integrative function is deficient
because of neurological impairment and, as we will discuss later, in
the case of traumatic stress, the arts may act as prosthetic devices
to lend support where deficiencies exist.
In short, art acts as an external auxiliary ego to aid the con-
tinuous task of integration.

***
Modern trauma theory goes back more than a century to Pierre
Janet, who described hysterical dissociation of memories from
consciousness and ascribed it to congenital disability and the
impact of intense emotion. For Freud, the " failure of mental syn-
thesis" under emotion was due to intrapsychic forces and repres-
sion (1913: 207). In modern terminology, a dissociation between
the observing and the experiencing aspects of the ego has often
been described in traumatized individuals (Fromm, 1965).
Whether we prefer "dissociation" or "failure of synthesis," it is
useful to make a distinction between two different types of " split-
ting off" of ego states: "horizontal" and " longitudinal." The
former characterizes neurosis; unconscious conflicts lie buried by
repression while remaining dynamically active. In the latter, char-
acteristic of traumatic splitting, there is an inability to reflect and
observe oneself objectively while experiencing thoughts and feelings
subjectively. In both, the integrity of the self is compromised.
Traumatized people may act and feel disturbed without knowing
why, or know what has happened but have no feelings about it.
Flashbacks and nightmares of traumatic experience occur with
undiminished intensity and, in some people, without any accom-
panying verbal (narrative) recall; the memory may be entirely
organized on a perceptual level. In short, emotional, sensory, cog-
nitive and behavioral aspects of the traumatic experience are not
120 Birth of music in the context of loss

integrated; sensations and feeling states having achieved little verbal

or symbolic representation, they begin to lead a life of their own.
Various nuanced degrees of fragmentation reflect the degree of
psychological distance that the traumatized person has been able
to take, in respect to the originating massive psychic trauma;
how much the person "knows" or " doesn't know" - the ratio
of acknowledgement to negation - describes the various forms of
traumatic memory (Laub and Auerhahn, 1993). Another way of
stating this is that it is also a measure of the relative intactness
of the observing ego in respect to the experiencing ego - both
within the overall context of a weakened sense of self.
The degree of functional partnership between the observing and
experiencing ego and thus the intactness of the sense of self may
account for the fact that trauma comes in all sizes. It ranges from
what might be experienced as a challenge to resiliency for one
person to the other end of the spectrum, of undeniable vulner-
ability and massive psychic trauma for anyone. In between there is
a complemental series of challenge/trauma combinations.
The emotions accompanying trauma are a complex mixture.
Rage and helplessness are central, including rage at feeling helpless
and unable to trust one's own body and mind to see one through
and continue to feel whole. The various ways in which the ensuing
crisis are expressed are unique to the individual.
One person's silent rage at chronic childhood neglect and abuse
was aggravated by its always being turned against herself as having
caused it. It took the form of compulsively tearing her hair out, thus
also expressing the assault she experienced on her bodily sense of
wholeness. For this she was further blamed and shamed - and was
even less able to stop. Ultimately, with the help of analysis she was
able to reassemble herself and convert her repressed wish to scream
in outrage into voice training and a professional musical career.
At the core of trauma is a breakdown of adaptive mental func-
tioning and consequent flooding - whether triggered by a loss of
trust in a functioning external "other" or to the incapacitation of a
part of oneself, namely, the observing ego. Without the observing
ego's capacity to reflect on what one is experiencing on a primal,
often somatic, level there is no possibility of representing the
trauma to oneself. Indeed, the sense of self itself is fractured .
Without self-witnessing and self-representation, the massive
overstimulation that the individual has undergone can only exist as
a wordless emptiness, or else as chaos that at best can only remain
 Birth of music in the context of loss 121

sequestered. The experiencing ego has been flooded, its connection

to the observing ego disabled, and thus the possibility of self-
representation and subsequent reintegration (" mental synthesis" )
of these two aspects of the ego destroyed (Laub and Podell, 1995).
Hence the relevance of the illusion provided by music (and art) for
the therapy of traumatic stress. By enabling the person to recognize
and feel what had been unformed and therefore inexpressible, as if
by a responsive empathic presence, it helps repair the loss or damage
to a reflective inner "other." As we will discuss later, like mourning it
facilitates internalization. By enhancing mindfulness it helps to
"create symbolic representations of past traumatic experiences, [the
better to] tam[e] the associated terror and desomatiz[e] the mem-
ories" (van der Kolk et ai. , 1996: 205) and reunite the self.
The interplay between the experiencing and observing ego lends
itself to cautious correlation with data concerning the factual
(declarative/explicit) and emotional (procedural/implicit) memory
systems (cf. Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1996; van der Kolk et ai. ,
1996; Yovell, 2000).
The hippocampus and the amygdala are bilateral structures deep
inside the medial part of the temporal lobe, connected to the
orbital frontal cortex. The factual memory system is hippocampal-
based and primarily neocortical; the developmentally older
amygdala-based system is subcortical.
Building a bridge between psychoanalysis and neuroscience, the
significant point has been made that, while neurobiological findings
are incompatible with the structural model of ego-id- superego, the
hippocampal-based system is congruent with the earlier (prestruc-
tural) theory of the ego; and the amygdala-based system is con-
gruent with the dynamic unconscious. Further, " the prefrontal
cortex is the crucial locus of interplay between intellect and feel-
ings" (Slap and Brown, 2001 : 113).
Normally the two memory systems synchronize intellect and
feelings. This suggests that they are, in part at least, also neuro-
anatomical loci underlying the observing and experiencing aspects
of the ego; like the hippocampus, the observing ego is able to
moderate emotional triggering.
The amygdala triggers rapid response survival reactions such as
hyper-vigilance (by releasing ACTH - adrenocorticotrophic hor-
mone). These emergency reactions can be modified or aborted by
neocortical and especially frontal lobe systems as well as the hippo-
campal system. By processing comparable events cognitively and
122 Birth of music in the context of loss

relating them to each other in a spatial and temporal context, the

hippocampal system provides a more objective and narrative
understanding of emotional experience and enables one to dis-
criminate and learn to avoid danger rather than have hair-trigger
responses to each perceived "danger." Thus, in the presence of
emotionally alarming data, it evaluates and is then able to abort or
slow down emergency reactions (by regulating the amount of
ACTH that is released).
Under extreme emotional arousal the integrated functioning of
the amygdala and hippocampus falls apart. Acute panic can cause
instant breakdown. Also, in chronic stress the stress hormone,
cortisol, in the course of time overstimulates the amygdala and
reduces the size of the hippocampus, impairing its operation. The
hippocampus and related structures (the observing ego?) are then
prevented from evaluating incoming information from the
amygdala and its related structures (the experiencing ego?).
The result of new information not being categorized in time and
space or integrated with existing mental schemata is that traumatic
memories are dissociated: the emotional memories of the trauma
remain ready to be triggered while the factual memories of the
trauma are only spottily recalled, if at all. Hence, too, the familiar
clinical finding that traumatic memories are timeless and ego-alien.
Not being collated and transcribed into personal narratives, they
come back as concrete emotional and sensory states with little
verbal representation. This failure to process information sym-
bolically and integrate it with other experience is at the very core of
the pathology of post-traumatic stress disorder (van der Kolk et
al., 1996: 295- 296).
It is striking that this is the converse of the effect of art. Precisely
those functions that one finds damaged or failed due to trauma are
those we have long postulated as being enhanced and even ideally
realized in the dynamics of aesthetic structure and experience. Art
succeeds, above all, in helping one process information symboli-
cally and relating it in novel ways to the self and world at large.
While art is not "traumatolytic," it aids in transforming private
trauma into ego-syntonic and more universal experience.
Neither art nor psychotherapy can always undo all the devastat-
ing effects of trauma. What it can do, however, is to help restore
the synchronous operations of the experiencing and observing ego
- the destruction of which is the structural source of the effects of
trauma.
 Birth of music in the context of loss 123

In terms of neuroscience, psychosocial stress can impair hippo-

campal plasticity, but rhythmic- melodic interactions with care-
takers limit adverse interactions (Panksepp, 2001), neurons continue
to proliferate in the adult hippocampus, and SSRI (selective sero-
tonin reputake inhibitors) antidepressants may protect hippocampal
neurons by increasing the concentration of serotonin. Finally,
modern neuroscience offers some basis for the beneficial results of
playful, joyous and aesthetic activities.
We do not yet know whether art or psychotherapy actually
promotes hippocampal neuron regeneration. We do , however, have
an overarching idea of some neuroanatomical sites of damaged
integration resulting from trauma where antidepressants, psy-
chotherapy and art can all help to facilitate psychological healing.

***
Loss is close to the heart of trauma. We have concentrated on the
intrapsychic aspects of loss: the loss of the sense of wholeness of
the self caused in part by the loss of integration between the
observing and experiencing aspects of the ego; and their possible
neurobiological correlates in the amygdala and hippocampus.
Needless to say, other loci beyond our scope may well be involved;
for example, the orbital frontal lobe, particularly that of the
nondominant hemisphere (Schore, 1997a).
Collective external trauma, like private subjective loss, involves a
loss of an important part of the self. Kai Erikson writes eloquently
of what happens when a common disaster damages the sense of
communality that binds people together in mutual support.

People begin to emerge hesitantly from their protective shells

into which they have withdrawn [and] learn that they are
isolated and alone .... "I" continue to exist, though damaged
and maybe even permanently changed. " You" continue to
exist, though distant and hard to relate to. But " we" no longer
exist as a connected pair or as linked cells in a larger communal
body.
(Erikson, 1976: 154)

The two traumas, he adds, are of course closely related, but distinct
in the sense that either can take place in the absence of the other.
124 Birth of music in the context of loss

Returning to individual trauma, loss is an intrinsic consequence of

" engaged" living - living with emotional attachments and, hope-
fully, the patterns of action to make them real. Loss entails mourn-
ing - more overt grief at first and more private mourning later. It is
not necessary to differentiate it here from clinical depression. It
should be pointed out, however, that a degree of trauma is fre-
quently, perhaps invariably, involved with loss. Some hyper-
vigilance and intolerance of stimulation reflect this. Reactive hyper-
activity of one kind or another may also serve defensive purposes.
Uncomplicated mourning over loss presents a developmental
conflict, perhaps even a crisis, at any age of occurrence. Mourning,
like activity/passivity, bisexuality and autonomy/dependence, is a
"divergent contlict" that requires alternating expression of the two
sides rather than an either/or choice (Kris, 1992).
The painful process of alternation between wishing to hold onto
the lost relationship and wishing to live on in the present and into
the future cannot be resolved by choosing one or the other. Freud
(1917) famously opined that reality req uires that a mourner must
eventually relinquish all libidinal attachments to the lost object and
redistribute them.
Personal experience, however, caused him to modify this paltry
view. In a letter to Ludwig Binswanger, April 12, 1929, he wrote:

My daughter who died would have been thirty-six years old

today . . . . Although we know that after such a loss the acute
state of mourning will subside, we also know we shall remain
inconsolable and will never find a substitute. No matter what
may fill the gap, even if it be filled completely, it nevertheless
remains something else. And actually this is how it should be.
It is the only way of perpetuating that love which we do not
want to relinquish.
(quoted by E.L. Freud, 1960: letter #239, p. 386)

The insight that comes from mourning is different from that which
comes from the lifting of repression. Loss needs to be acknowl-
edged, to be sure, and this is the task of the observing ego. It may
even require cognizance of the fact that a particular emptiness is
not to be averaged out. It is irremediable: notes on the keyboard
are missing; the melody broken.
So what is needed is not only an observing ego but one with the
capacity for self-comforting such that painful affective states can be
 Birth of music in the context of loss 125

moderated and more positive ones reestablished. In other words,

the quality of the pre-existing internalizations determines how the
observing ego accomplishes its task: reestablishing its interplay
with the experiencing ego, influencing the affective tone objectively
but benevolently; as earlier, the holding environment of maternal
attunement and one's responsive resonance converted potential
trauma into the challenge of further emotional differentiation.
Again this returns us to music - and the possibility that it, like
mourning, can facilitate internalization and thereby affect
regulation.

***
Adam reached back for his mother's comforting song and soothed
himself with it when he anticipated the fear of coming across big
fish while snorkeling. When he found another little fish like himself
he offered him his friendship through music.
The embattled woman in the Lodz ghetto who listened to her
own voice singing "became" two people and, even though it was a
sad song, no longer felt lonely.
Adam's grandfather lost his life-companion to a nursing home.
Her mind slowly dying, he compared her paradoxical presence and
absence to him with the pain of a phantom limb. He dreamed as
follows.
He saw his wife approaching on an empty street. She was wear-
ing a black lace dress reminiscent of one his mother wore on special
occasions. They embraced and danced slowly, shyly, solemnly, as
in their ritual first dance at their wedding fifty years ago - several
steps together forward, then walking side by side holding hands,
then several steps dancing backward, and again walking side by
side. The melody was a light airy dance tune with German lyrics
that he remembered from an old 78 r.p.m. record from childhood.
He had never spoken the language and only barely understood it,
but he remembered these words: Schon ist das leben, wenn die musik
spielt (Life is beautiful, as long as the music plays).
He awoke moved but puzzled, because it was the tune on the
other side of the record that he had really loved and now he could
not recall it. Then, suddenly, he did. This melody was slower,
nostalgic, with downward progressions and somber ending. The
words were unsparing, fateful: Es gibt nur einmal. es kommt nicht
wieder. Das ist ein scherz, ein traumerei. (It happens but once, it
126 Birth of music in the context of loss

never returns. It's a plaything, a dream.) And, as he said, the dam

spilled over.
Neither the lilting melody, nor the young lovers' embrace, nor
the image of his mother, could shield him from the latent melody
and words on the other side and what he knew only too well: it was
over; but, also, their music together - intact - was becoming part
of him, internalized, joining the music of other loving presences
there from the beginning.

***
We turn now to internalization and affect regulation. According to
current developmental studies, what the infant internalizes is the
process of mutual affect attunement, fittedness, and regulation and
not the object itself or part-objects. There is general agreement, for
example, that the internalization of the soothing quality of good
affective attunement in early infant- caregiver relationships is the
source of affect regulation itself - the capacity to differentiate,
tolerate and modulate painful affect states.
Neuroscience has much to contribute to this discussion, if with a
different terminology. "Experience-dependent internal regulatory
systems" (Schore, 1996, 1997b) or "internal representations of
external human interpersonal relations" (Hofer, 1984, 1990) encap-
sulate the essence of the psychoanalytic concept of "internalization"
as the transformation of external interactions into intrapsychic
structure and dynamics.
Neuroscience holds that the primary caregiver acts as a "hidden"
regulator of chemical agents that influence the maturation of
centers in the temporal and orbital frontal cortices (Hofer, 1990).
Affect-regulating experiences, as in mutual gaze and facial mirror-
ing, become imprinted in the right orbital frontal cortex and trigger
high levels of endogenous opiates in the child's growing brain.
These are responsible for the pleasurable qualities of social inter-
action, affect and attachment and may have an enduring effect on
the ability to modulate affect and · tolerate negative affect states
(Schore, 1996, 1997b).
Other studies in neuroscience further support the affect-
regulating significance of the internalized caretaker. Moreover,
the withdrawal of these sensorimotor interactions from the begin-
ning and extending into one's contemporary life has a continuing
demonstrable effect on one's mind and internal biologic systems.
 Birth of music in the context of loss 127

It seems possible that the regulating action of important

human relationships upon biologic systems may be transduced,
not only by sensorimotor and temporal patterning of the
actual interactions, but also by the internal experiences of the
relationship ... . [Conversely,] these internal representations
may serve as active but symbolic surrogates that prevent the
release of withdrawal responses after separation through their
associative connections with biologic systems.
(Hofer, 1984: 193; italics added)

Now to the internalization of music and its affect-regulating sig-

nificance. Like poetry, the affective power of music most likely has
its origins in the infant's earliest vocal experience of the mother. Not
that vocal experience can ever be simply vocal: the attributes of
mother's voice are indistinguishable from her touch and movement;
all become fixed in the rhythm of the baby's body and comprise a
rich medley of sensorimotor and affectomotor components, linking
mother and infant prior to the latter's differentiation.
The sensorimotor and affectomotor components of music are
likewise indistinguishable. The affectomotor response to music
comprises many physical concomitants of affects or preverbal affect
precursors - tactile, kinesthetic, rhythmic, respiratory. It can be no
coincidence that listening to music is often accompanied by sub-
vocal singing along with the music, perhaps harking back to one's
earliest musical interplay. (Recall the earlier example of singing to
elicit the illusion of two-ness to relieve loneliness.)
Pablo Casals, Glenn Gould and other instrumentalists were
famous for being hardly able to restrain their singing accompani-
ment to the music they were performing; they seemed merged with
it. It is possible that for them, explicitly, as for others in the
audience of music, less overt and more implicitly, the interaction
with the music becomes itself internalized as a more or less silent
and perhaps enduring affective presence.
If it is possible as I suggest that music (and art) may not only
evoke but perhaps embody internal representations of significant
relationships, how may we conceptualize the relationship between
music and internalization?
This question is intimately connected to the more basic one as
to how we distinguish inside from outside, subjective from objec-
tive. A review article on developments in neuroscience cites the
128 Birth of music in the context of loss

prevailing consensus that current perception requires comparisons

with the past:

The separate features of the environment stimulate particular

patterns of neuronal activity in the brain. The brain does not
perceive the external environment, nor the separate stimulus
features . Rather, the brain recognises the patterns of neuronal
activation within the brain itself. For perception to occur, the
brain searches for a match between the current pattern of
neuronal activation and patterns stored in memory from prior
experience .. . . The brain . . . makes a quick assessment of just
enough details to find a " good enough match." When a "good
enough" match is found, perception occurs.
(pally, 1997: 1025)

How well this " matches" Freud's repeated assertions (in the 1895
" Project" (pp. 327- 330) and the "Dream Book" (1900- 1901: 565-
567)), foreshadowing the following:

All presentations originate from perceptions and are repeti-

tions of them . . . . The antithesis between subjective and
objective ... only comes into being from the fact that thinking
possesses the capacity to bring before the mind once more
something that has once been perceived, by reproducing it as a
presentation without the external object having still to be
there. The first and immediate aim, therefore, of reality-testing
is, not to jind an object in real perception which corresponds to
the one presented, but to rejind such an object . . . . The
reproduction of a perception as a presentation is not always a
faithful one; it may be modified by omissions, or changed by
the merging of various elements .. . . A precondition for the
setting up of reality-testing is that objects shall have been lost
which once brought real satisfaction.
(Freud, 1925a: 237- 238)

As we have repeatedly discussed, the "good enough" match between

the virtual tension and release dynamic of art (music) on the one
hand and affect on the other, recalls early affective attunements
and stimulates affective resonance; the underlying concordance
between art and affect may be so close that it leads to a preconscious
illusion that one's emotional responsiveness to art is mutual and
 Birth of music in the context of loss 129

reciprocated, that is, that music itself is a witnessing presence. This

facilitates further affectomotor responsiveness (GJ. Rose, 1996).
At its least, music thus comes to act as a sensorimotor bridge
between the illusion of an external witnessing presence and latent
affecto-motor memory traces or lasting engrams of early self-
object interactions, namely, internalizations. Because some of these
early self- object interactions or internalizations were symbiotic in
nature - that is, their boundaries having been relatively unformed
and permeable - the affective, memorial experience they give rise
to often has transitional characteristics. They merge self and other.
At its most, the interaction with music may itself become inter-
nalized. In either case, whether by facilitating internalization or the
interplay with music itself becoming an internalization, it may well
be through its relationship to internalization that music contributes
to affect regulation.
In summary, we suggest that:

2 Music elicits preverbal internalizations that embody and

encode affective memories that contribute to affect regulation.
2 The affective interplay with music may itself become inter-
nalized as a nonverbal affect-regulating presence.

***
At the outset we asked: "What dreams, memories or maps go into
the body of Song to orient one in an uncertain reality?" Our
journey has led from developmental psychology, through clinical
neurology, trauma theory and psychobiological aesthetics, pointing
finally to internalization as one possible key to affect regulation.
Summarizing, the emotional response to music lies in the self-
recognition and self-soothing to be found there. It represents an
externalized auxiliary body ego built in concordance with the
tension and release patterns of neurobiological rhythms (cf.
Chapter 5 on music as temporal prosthesis) as well as the structure
of affects.
A person seeks music as a temporal/rhythmic holding environ-
ment within which one can feel both stimulated and protected as in
neonatal life by the responsive presence of the mother. At that
time, infant and primary caretaker together formed a nonverbal
system that contained the tension and release of affect within
tolerable limits.
130 Birth of music in the context of loss

Music is a transformation of this interpersonal system of affect

regulation to an intrapsychic, abstract level; through rhythmic
sensorimotor stimulation, it comes to embody and evoke early
internalizations, in all their unconscious, symbiotic, memorial and
affectomotor aspects. Affective interaction with the music may
itself become internalized.
Ideally, all these internalizations retain the power to promote
self-comforting. Through them , music supports an optimal work-
ing relation between the observing and experiencing aspects of the
ego; this intrapsychic integration helps bring about more positively
toned affect regulation. Likewise, dipping back and touching the
symbiotic elements in internalization in order to repeat for the
moment the separation- individuation process also helps restore
and renew one's sense of wholeness.
From the point of view of neuroscience, the limbic and orbital
frontal systems, especially in the nondominant hemisphere, may be
some of the neuroanatomical sites of these operations.
Is it possible through aesthetic experience, either actively
creating it or responding to it, to reach new levels of integration
of the personality without the intermediation of language?
The lines of thought presented in this book suggest that the
answer is " yes." Nonverbal art may playa fundamental if silent
role in emotional development and accessing affects such as those
blocked by trauma. Perhaps it bypasses verbalization by stimu-
lating internalizations which, in turn, stimulate the reintegration of
experience.
If, by whatever internal route, reintegration occurs through pro-
found aesthetic or other nonverbal experiences, we know little or
nothing about its quality or duration, let alone how it compares
to that achieved by psychoanalysis. Nor do we know if or how this
line of thought is related to learning within the " implicit system"
where, neuroscience holds, learning does proceed without language.
Since internalizations are representations of the quality of
personal interactions, abstracted and transformed into intrapsychic
structure, they are not faithful mirrors of the external world; they
are created images that correspond with rather than reproduce the
outside. Thus, they are prime examples of the creativity of everyday
life - each moment a reciprocal inscription that fuses " objective"
with subjective.
As we move into the unknown we embolden ourselves by pro-
jecting comforting, familiar aspects of ourselves to temper fearful
 Birth of music in the context of loss 131

antlcipations of the strange and foreign. Perhaps more eager to

refind than to discover - whatever may be discoverable through a
system which is necessarily less than fully open yet more than
merely solipsistic.
If such a formulation also describes ongoing personal develop-
ment, how fitting to our subject that a biological process essentially
enacts a fundamental musical gesture and vice versa: recurrences,
variations, and recapitulations, alluding to the past, selectively
amalgamating old and new; advancing - perchance to grow -
through the music of time.
Chapter 8

The power of implicit motion:

"it goes straight through"

A standard musical practice is to recapitulate recurrent themes in

order to develop and elaborate them further. We shall do the same,
aiming always for an overview of art and the creative process in the
light of contemporary psychoanalysis.
Two working assumptions:
2 Psychoanalysis and art each enhance self-recognition; the
former, verbally and explicitly; the latter, nonverbally and
implicitly.
2 The mid-ground between feeling and thought is a seed-bed of
creative imagination.
Neuroscience data and the work of artists, Paul Klee and Alberto
Giacometti, will illuminate the material.
Let us return to the temporary therapeutic miracles that music
and art can sometimes accomplish with victims of neurological
devastation. Recall that listening to music, performing it or just
imagining it can sometimes restore motor ability, emotional range
and psychological identity for a brief period of moments or even
hours. This may be accompanied by a revival of normal EEG
patterns.
Not that all music will work. Some individuals respond to
romantic composers like Chopin or Schubert but not to Bach or
Bartok. Music can be anti-epileptic for some and precipitate seizures
in others; in movement disorders, if the music is overloud or forceful
it can cause some patients to jump or jerk with the beat (Sacks,
1998).
We begin with a clinical vignette.
Anne was in a late stage of vascular dementia. At a much earlier
point she would succumb nightly to escalating panic and agitation
 Power of implicit motion 133

uncontrolled by drugs. Music, however, could often restore a

degree of calm. As we discussed earlier in relation to the Sundown
Syndrome of nocturnal psychosis, perhaps the external periodicity
of music entrained and supported the faulty internal periodicity of
neurobiological mechanisms. In addition, music may recruit early
soothing internalizations that help one regain a core sense of
identity that stabilizes affect regulation.
Now she was no longer subject to panic; she was mostly with-
drawn and indifferent to music as well as the presence of intimates
(whom she mayor may not have still recognized). She rarely spoke.
When she did utter a word or two , it was without affect or any
obvious referential context.
What about art? She had been an avid painter and had twice run
her own art gallery. Painters had been among her closest friends.
One day she was shown colored illustrations of Monet and
abstract paintings of Jimmy Ernst, an old friend . She looked at
them all intently for many minutes and with unswerving attention.
Asked what she thought, she replied immediately and with the
intensity that had once been so characteristic: "This is really
beautiful!" Then, more astonishing still: "It goes straight through!"
What goes straight through? I suggest that implicit motion at the
core of nonverbal aesthetic form evokes implicit motion at the
heart of affective responsiveness. Let us elaborate. Implicit motion
comprises both the tension and release of the virtual motion that
has been built into the formal structure of visual art and music, and
the actual muscular tension and release that makes up a significant
part of one's total bodily responsiveness to affect.
How does it go straight through? We borrow a metaphor from
physics.
A magnet moving inside a coil of wire will generate an electric
current in the wire. Suppose that the formal structure of art and
music acts like a magnet; that is, it shapes perceptual fields of
virtual tension and release - like a magnet sets up actual magnetic
fields of force . The flowing currents of bodily affect that one
experiences in responding to the arts is like the electric current
induced in the coil of wire. In other words, actual waves of affec-
tive bodily response will be generated (the currents in the wire) as
one's perception actively engages the virtual implicit motion that is
built into these nonverbal aesthetic forms.
As to the sudden return to normality brought about by music
and art, a number of elements are involved: range of motion (if this
134 Power of implicit motion

has been disabled) and range of emotion. Also, one's sense of

identity. All respond together.
Is there an underlying factor that bundles these therapeutic
responses together? Motion. Music, art and affective responsive-
ness all involve motion in some form. The relation of identity to
motion is problematic though, arguably, indirectly involved.
We will examine this contention about motion in some detail,
but first a historical point is worth mentioning. Apparently, the
significance of movement at one time connected art history and the
early history of psychoanalysis. It was an established research
theme for both psychoanalysts and art historians in Europe. At the
same time that Freud was exploring the meaning of expressive
movements, hysterical symptoms and dream imagery, art his-
torians were studying the image of movement. Neither discipline
referred to the other (L. Rose, 200 I).
Movement and music. The basic ingredient of music is not sound
but motion (Sessions, 1950). To be more precise, the basic ingredi-
ent of the experience of music is the sense of motion - virtual
implicit motion. Moreover, it is the sense of virtual motion, built
into the structure of music, that some believe conveys affect. This
conclusion, it will be recalled, was derived from a musical analysis
of examples from different composers (Epstein, 1993).
Further, musical - in contrast to musicological - listening leads
to rhythmic engagement with the music. It is heard to "move" or
"breathe." This reflects that each musical phrase must be per-
formed in a single breath as a unique gesture moving toward
completing a cadence. Of course music cannot actually move or
breathe. We "ride" the phrases and cadences within the parameters
of our breathing. It makes bodily sense, for that is the level where
we recreate it.
The main engine that drives the sense of harmonic motion
forward towards a goal is dissonance striving to resolve in con-
sonance. Nietzsche (1870- 1871: 143) put it that dissonance contri-
buted a "forward propulsion" in the course of a "playful shattering
and rebuilding." The most famous example of this - said to be the
starting point of "modern music" - is the first chord of Wagner's
Tristan und Isolde.

It contains within itself not one but two dissonances, thus

creating within the listener a double desire .. . for resolution.
And so the music proceeds: in every chord shift something is
 Power of implicit motion 135

resolved but not everything . . . the musical ear is being

partially satisfied yet at the same time frustrated ... [until] the
final chord of the work.
(Magee, 2000: 208- 211)

According to Magee, this movement of music from expectation to

expectation instantiates Wagner's philosophical understanding of
the world as he understood it from Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer
believed that music corresponded to our deepest human nature:
perpetually besieged by an endless train of unsatisfiable longings,
each following hard on the last. The movement of music, in short,
mirrors the movements of desire - making up so much of our
innermost life.
We return now to the hypothesis that the implicit motion of
virtual tension and release in aesthetic form is what "goes straight
through" to restore affective responsiveness and, perhaps, one's
sense of identity. First, the relation of motion to affect their
"dynamic congruency" (Sheets-Johnstone, 2003: 197).
Rhythm, the felt periodic recurrence of a pattern of stimulation,
bears special mention as one form of the sense of motion. Freud
(1924) speculated that the fluctuating strength of rhythmic motion
underlies sensations of pleasure and unpleasure. It is unquestion-
ably an essential ingredient of many powerful emotional experi-
ences as well as constituting one of the basic elements of aesthetic
form.
Looked at more closely in relation to affect, one may say that
patterns of actual tension and release represent the motoric or
kinesthetic aspects of an individual's affective response. Con-
versely, different contours of tension and release can be reliably
identified with different affects (Tomkins, 1962- 1963; Clynes and
Nettheim, 1982). Further, one may speculate that these rippled
motor discharge patterns of affect provide feedback that enhances
affective intensity, i.e. they are generative as well as expressive.
A metaphorical way of expressing the relation of affect to motion
is to say that just as a body needs a skeleton, feelings require an
armature to bring them to self-awareness. Implicit motor patterns
of muscular tension and release provide such a matrix. Thus, the
remark (attributed to Nietzsche) that one listens to music with
one's muscles highlights the motoric component of the affective
response. This is now validated by finding that the motor areas
of the brain are activated when listening (Benzon, 2001; cf. also,
136 Power of implicit motion

Sheets-lohnstone, 1999: "affective feelings and tactile-kinaesthetic

feelings are experimentally intertwined" , p. 264; "movement-
notation systems demonstrate empirically the dynamic congruency
of movement and emotion in real life", p. 273).
Audition is also intimately involved with motion due to the
abundant connections between the auditory pathways and the
reticular system. The reticular system is concerned with a regulation
of cortical electrical rhythms. It also has extensive connections with
both the whole cerebral cortex and large subcortical areas. Perhaps
the rhythmical component of the auditory input impacts on the
whole brain by dint of the reticular system (Wertheim, 1997).
The reticular system might enable music to bypass cortical
damage and stimulate subcortical areas on which rhythm probably
depends (Henson, 1977). In addition, in the vicinity of the reticular
activating system there are monamine modulators. These produce
momentary facilitation in circuits that are actively involved in
processing significant events (LeDoux, 2002: 313). Moreover, since
the auditory nerve has an intimate and nearly immediate relation
to the limbic system, considered to be the emotional center of the
brain, music would provide access to emotional responsiveness.
Music and audition are widely represented in the brain in both
cortical hemispheres. So even if one is deaf, imagined music will be
processed by both hemispheres and gain immediate access to
emotional centers. This helps provide access, too, for that quality
of wholeness that constitutes each person's identity.
Finally, identity, the third element that along with motion and
emotion sometimes responds with dramatic improvement to music.
Like music and audition, identity is widely represented in the brain.
This is reflected in the fact that it is perhaps the last psychic
property to be lost.

Identity has such a robust, widespread neural basis ... as if

personal style is so deeply ingrained in the nervous system, that
it is never wholly lost, at least while there is still any mental life
present at all .... This makes a continuing possibility of being
affected by music, even in the most deeply damaged patients
... . The same [widespread neural representation] is true for
music too ... and not only cortical but subcortical .. . . Where
there is human consciousness, there can be a response to
music; and it may be too ... even when there is not.
(Sacks, 1998: 10- 11)
 Power of implicit motion 137

Self-recognition being an important aspect of one's sense of

identity, let us recall the significance of movement as the basic way
by which people recognize the constancy at the core of their identity.
We earlier discussed the old (1931) experiment (reported by Allport,
1937) on how people recognize themselves. When all extraneous
cues are blocked out, the experimental subjects frequently could not
identify their own voices, styles of speech, pictures of their own
hands or profiles. When they were filmed walking, however, they all
recognized their own gait. Yet 70 per cent of the time they failed to
identify the gaits of friends, despite the fact that one often sees the
gait of friends but seldom one's own. We concluded earlier in
discussing this that the most important element of self-recognition
was not simply one's own motion observed but the inner, kinesthetic
experience of rhythmic motion.
Another dimension by which we recognize ourselves, and are
recognized by others, is that inner constancy throughout the
apparent movement and variations in the course of time. It is what
characterizes the unchanging nature of a person's identity. It lends
itself by analogy to a musical theme and all its possible variations.
It is worth a detour to consider two examples.
Bach's thirty Goldberg variations have been described by pianist
Vladimir Feltsman as two two-sided mirrors. They start out facing
each other, move toward each other, pass through each other to
the other side to end at the same point in space and time where it
began. Since there are a total of four sides, the result is the reflec-
tion of the whole piece inside and an eternity from outside.
Beethoven, who was brought up on Bach, crosses paths with him
in his thirty Diabelli variations. They consist of melodic, harmonic,
chromatic and dynamic variations which, as many writers have
noted, are less transformations than, at moments, transfigurations
to the sublime.
Both the Goldberg and the Diabelli variations show how wide a
range of variations are possible on a single theme. Bach's Goldberg
takes off on a single aria; Beethoven's Diabelli on an insipid waltz
tune. Each builds a world.
As alluded to earlier, the idea of psychological identity describes
an inner world of sameness and consistency despite and alongside
the changes of time. This useful biological organizational principle
does not imply that identity necessarily means inner homogeneity;
there are many facets of an enduring identity. While this diversity
within unity has been highlighted recently and referred to as
138 Power of implicit motion

requiring " normal dissociation" or "a necessary illusion of integ-

ration" of "self-states" (Bromberg, 1998), these terms carry an
inevitable pathological coloration.
The older literature, on the other hand , enhanced the concept of
identity with a felicitous musical image. The idea of theme and
variations was intended to illustrate the coexistence of change with
constancy. Applying a developmental perspective, Lichtenstein
(1961) postulated that the early contact with the mother imprints
an invariant primary identity theme on the infant. (I would
say: " on the infant's constitutional givens.") He compared it to
the unchanging inner form of a musical theme that remains
constant despite subsequent transformations of that theme on
other levels.
This " primal identity" at the beginning is based on nar-
cissistic mirroring whereby self and other are seen as extensions
of each other. In the course of time, later developmental vari-
ations of the primary identity theme include lessening degrees of
symbiosis extending on to autonomy and true mutuality. It is
significant that the earlier and later variations may continue to
fluctuate among each other. (Freud (l925b) referred to a rhythm
of transformation between ego libido and object libido; Lich-
tenstein preferred "rhythmic changes in the patterns of identity"
(1964: 55).)
A contemporary take on identity might be that many identity
patterns coexist as part of a rhythmically shifting polyphony of
voices from the past. They consist of a spectrum of internalized
object relations, ranging from symbiotic narcissism to separate
mutuality and autonomy, each with its own contours of feeling.
They might be termed "feeling forms of identity" to indicate both
aspects - the range of internalized object relations and the feelings
that inhere to them - together maintaining an equilibrium of
constancy throughout the changes of Time.
Clinically, one measure of health is the ability to stay in touch
with them and tolerate the ambiguity and complexity inherent in a
broad spectrum of affective identity patterns - one that comprises
both the capacity to let boundaries melt when appropriate as well
as regain separateness. Another consideration is that some aspects
contribute to a person's stability and others detract from it. In
contemporary culture, especially, the sheer diversity and need for
accommodation predispose to problems of identity diffusion. (We
will discuss this later in relation to postmodernism.)
 Power of implicit motion 139

***
Let us suppose we are about to enter a new situation with few
anticipatory clues as to what to expect. At our disposal are a
number of different facets of one's self or identity to deploy and
project like antennae or radar to probe the atmosphere. Intuiting
the presence or absence of aspects of one's self in others goes a long
way initially to allay or alert, confirm or discomfit.
This may be conceptualized in various ways: significant internal-
izations, "feeling-forms of identity," representations of one's body
ego. It is an automatic and preliminary narcissistic test of how well
one's bodily self-feelings are attuned to resonate with unfamiliar
others.
When the new territory to be explored is some creative activity
of one's own, such narcissistically-based testing - intrinsic to any
initial approach to novelty - is probably central. Is it perhaps
because the creative impulse puts so much at stake, springing from
so intimate a need and attached to so bold an aspiration?

A verse seeking a rhyme

A note its overtones
A Rhythm - Resonance.

On some level creative work is bound to be a self-portrait of one's

own active mind in constantly shifting focus. Reaching into one's
sense of self invites the projection of inner experience, to be objec-
tified, re-subjectified and re-externalized. Filtering, replenishing,
refining; losing, recovering, (re )discovering.
A clinical example will lead us into the therapeutic usefulness of
creative work. A woman reacted to separation from her therapist
with a feeling of being left without a skin.

At the worst moment I thought about painting in order to feel

better, and in fact I succeeded in painting three little pictures;
and when I looked at them I felt a lot better. It was as if I
could see myself, as if I could see that I existed. I recognized
myself more than if I was looking at myself in the mirror.
(Gaddini, 1982: 382-383)

Perhaps she recognized herself better than in a mirror because it was

the functioning of her own mind projected onto the canvas, slowed
140 Power of implicit motion

down and magnified, that she recognized. Her own creative efforts
of decomposing and recomposing on the canvas (Nietzsche's "shat-
tering and rebuilding") allowed her to experiment and discover out
there the healing process of loss and recovery.
The feeling-forms of her body-ego, projected, could be played
with, refined and perfected in the course of making art. Working on
the canvas offered a better external scaffold or prosthesis - a more
proficient auxiliary ego - than her own workaday one. In its
externalized version of decomposing in order to recompose more
ideally, it could provide that improved narcissistic support its
author required in order to function better when deprived of
therapeutic support.
Artistic composition demands a peak level of integration; it
presupposes a prior disassembly before attaining a new assemblage.
To state it another way: art is mind playing repeatedly with
decomposition and reintegration - idealized and realized.
This suggests a rationale as to why participating in art, either
actively or passively, can temporarily "normalize" a mind, even
one crippled with psychosis (e.g. Wolfli; see Rose, 1996). The
artistic act is one of objectification of subjectivity; objectified, it
offers the opportunity for vicarious reintegration. Needless to say,
the same holds equally for an already well-functioning mind to
optimize itself through artistic objectification and reintegration.
The therapeutic value of the arts lies in their offering an oppor-
tunity and a model of high-order reintegration. Either as an
observer or as a participant one may feel consciously that which
may have been unformed and latent - and thereby experience an
enhanced sense of wholeness. Needless to say, this is independent
of the work's creative status, if any.
Creative art, on the other hand, transforms subjective personal
affects into more objective and relatively conflict-free nonverbal
aesthetic forms . If an audience can avoid reflexively rejecting what
is radically new and potentially traumatic (is there enough there
that is reassuringly familiar?) , the objective feeling-forms may
resonate with emotional recognition of one's own mind, illumi-
nated and transcended .

***
Just as the sense of motion plays a crucial a role in listening to
music, this also holds for looking at art. The artists Paul Klee and
 Power of implicit motion 141

Alberto Giacometti both managed to bypass and/or transcend the

content of personal problems by shifting their focus to the abstract
forms of perception. Of special interest to us is the importance to
both artists of the implicit virtual motion in visual perception.
Their examples also illustrate how art can simultaneously serve
privately defensive and publicly creative ends.
For Paul Klee color held many intensely personal meanings. As
we will later describe, he learned to deal with these weighty contents
through artistic forms.
The second entry of his diary (Klee, 1964) records how the colors
red and gray became connected with infantile shame and conflict.
At ages two to three years he had to wear his older sister's under-
wear that was too long for him. So, when the doorbell would ring he
would hide to keep the visitor from seeing the gray flannel with the
wavy red trimmings. White became related to gender envy at age
three to four years when he wished he were a girl so he could wear
lace-trimmed white panties. The color black was associated with his
mother's morbid pessimism and always " seeing black" - she was
wheelchair-bound for the last twenty-three years of her life.
Being intensely introspective and articulate, he was able to
describe in later life not only his early color-related conflicts but his
multifaceted identity. Self as a dramatic ensemble of prophetic
ancestor, brutal hero, bon vivant, professor - all of whom amaze
him!
Throughout his diary (Klee, 1964) we learn how, almost from
the beginning, music permeated his life. His father taught music at
a college in Berne. As a young man Paul regularly played violin or
sometimes viola in both a quartet and a symphony orchestra. The
diary is full of spirited references to concerts he attended or in
which he participated.
Central to Klee's intuition about the nature of art is the idea of
music as a metaphor to approach the dynamics of light and color
movement. "I must some day be able to improvise freely on the
chromatic keyboard of the rows of watercolor cups" (p. 244).
"Colored bass notes ... ward off flabbiness, not too dark" (p. 244).
During the course of fourteen years, Klee discovered that the
essential thing in a work of art is how forms move. He described
this in sexual terms:

In the beginning ... insertion of energy ... form-determining

sperm: the primitive male component .... [Then) shaping of
142 Power of implicit motion

form : the primitive female component . . . . The final

consequence of both . .. is form . The energetic stimulus. Then
the fleshly growth of the egg. (pp. 310, 312)

For Klee, light and color are manifestations of the movement of

energy in the creation of forms .

I am now trying to render light simply as unfolding energy.

Light as color movement is somewhat newer. (p. 253)

Color possesses me. I don't have to pursue it. It will possess me

always, I know it. That is the meaning of this happy hour:
Color and I are one. I am a painter. (p. 297)

The real truth ... remains invisible beneath the surface. The
colors that captivate us are not lighting, but light ... diffused
clarity .... It is difficult to catch and represent this, because
the moment is so fleeting. It has to penetrate into our soul. The
formal has to fuse with the Weltenschauung . .. . Simple
motion [is] banal. The time element must be eliminated.
Yesterday and tomorrow as simultaneous. In music, poly-
phony helped .. . to satisfy this need ... . Polyphonic painting
is superior to music in that, here, the time element becomes a
spatial element. (p. 374)

I understand this to mean that, in Klee's view, music provides the

illusion of having vanquished temporality by means of interweav-
ing many voices simultaneously and recurrently. " Polyphonic
painting," however, goes a step further. It converts the flow of time
into spatial forms that appear to move by dint of the implicit
virtual motion inherent in the perception of light and color.
This construction allowed Klee to explore the movement and
qualities making up the nature of light and color perception. Safe
on an abstract plane far from the originating source of stressful
color, he succeeded in liberating color from infantile shame and
conflict. At the same time, however, let us not forget that his
theoretical formulation of how he determined and shaped aesthetic
forms retained its sexual construction unabashedly. As the saying
goes: he could have his cake and eat it, too. "What a fascinating
fate it is to master painting today (as it once was to master music)"
(Klee, 1964: 393).
 Power of implicit motion 143

A recent study (Danckwardt, 2002) independently supports the

view of how aesthetic form can transcend personal conflict. It even
details the formal means by which Klee bypassed the problematic
content of color, directing attention instead to exploring the
movement of light and color. It describes how, in Untitled 1914/94,
multiple small squares encourage the eye to "enter only step by
step." By circumscribing the scope and order of one's visual
inspection, Klee is in effect dosing it out - to himself and us - in
small amounts. The tonality of complementary colors guides the
direction of one's visual inspection into a rhythm of motion. A
yellow square at the bottom interacts with a pillar of color on
either side: red-brown and gray-olive; their interaction with the
yellow "creates an intense stretching of the light . . . the yellow has
suddenly turned into energy"; overlaying it with varnish trans-
forms it into green; this prevents its light from escaping forward;
forced backwards, the light appears to diffuse and emerges as
though from inside the whole watercolor.
This strategy encourages deep viewing "into the origins of the
colors and the light" and on to an expanded way of seeing. Look! A
color can be bent, boxed in, covered up, made to turn corners,
diffuse and come up elsewhere. As Marion Milner (1957: 163) wrote:
a color needs "listening to ... allowing it to call for what colors it
need[s] around it, colors that gr[o]w out of its own nature." Colors
that "call" to each other and "grow" are colors that move and call
out to each one's own perceptual motion to respond affectively.
The central importance of the movement of forms was Klee's
transformative insight into his own work. The contrast with
Giacometti's oeuvre is illuminating for, on the surface, the latter's
creative vision appears to have been just the reverse. He endlessly
explored the absolute immobility of figures as they are suspended in
the void of space (and "silence") that surrounds them.
I argue, however, that their effect is essentially identical by
opposite means: Giacometti's work forces the viewer into an
aesthetic partnership. One has no choice but to project the move-
ment of one's own perceptual processes into what is objectively
total immobility. This subjective enactment is restorative and
fortifying, for by just barely "reanimating" the artistic portrayal
with one's own breath of life, one can imaginatively tolerate
Giacometti's visions of the "silence" of Death.
It is apposite to interpose that this projection of one's own
movement is well known to experimental psychology, where it was
144 Power of implicit motion

termed the "autokinetic phenomenon." It refers to the fact that a

dot of light in a dark space without any referential frame will
appear to move. The apparent direction of such perceived
movement can be unconsciously conditioned experimentally. It is
particularly pertinent to our discussion of implicit motion that the
durability and speed of this perceptual learning is correlated with
the amount of muscular effort explicitly exerted in recording the
movement by pencil on paper (Haggard and Rose, 1944).
Returning now to Giacometti, we offer some background to his
life and the importance of the element of trauma therein.
Giacometti suffered from a stultifying creative block for more
than nine years until he saw a newsreel containing documentary
footage from the Nazi death camps. His creative energy was
suddenly released.
He described what happened in an ecstatic letter to his mother:
"I see reality for the first time . ... Every day I find something new.
I almost never sleep .... I haven't read a paper for eight days or
more" (quoted by Wilson, 2003).
Years later in an interview (Clay, 1963), he stated:

I no longer knew just what it was that I saw on the screen.

Instead of figures moving in three dimensional space I saw
only black and white specks shifting on a flat surface. They
had lost all meaning . . . . The unknown was the reality all
around me, and no longer what was happening on the screen!
. .. At the same time, there was a total revalorization of reality.
It became passionate, unknown, marvelous ....
By contrast . .. to the black and white specks [on the screen
that] had lost all meaning ... the Boulevard [Montparnasse]
had the beauty of the Arabian Nights . . . . Everything was
different, spaces and objects and colors and the silence,
because the sense of space generates silence, bathes objects in
silence . . .. I began to see heads in the void, in the space that
surrounds them ... fixed, immobilized definitively in time ...
not like any other object, but like something simultaneously
living and dead . .. as if I had just crossed a threshold, as if I
was entering a world never seen before. All the living were
dead .. . . The waiter . . . become immobile, leaning toward
me, with his mouth open, without any relation to the pre-
ceding moment, to the moment following, with his mouth
open, his eyes fixed in an absolute immobility. And not only
 Power of implicit motion 145

people but objects at the same time underwent a trans-

formation .
(quoted by Lord, 1983: 258- 259)

Note within the space of a page or so the repetition: " immobilized,"

"immobile," " immobility."
Giacometti is describing two phenomena: derealization of the
human images on the screen transforming them into black and
white specks; and a manic hyper-appreciation of brand new aspects
of the appearance of the world at large around him. In addition,
the transformation represents a drastic shift away from the content
and affective charge of the visual images of dead and dying humans
on the screen. In its place he discovers a novel way of viewing the
world at large. He reverses figure and ground. Instead of focusing
on objects in the visual field he forces us to become feelingfully
aware of the spaces in which his made-objects are suspended. In
which all objects - we too, potentially - become disconnected from
the steady din and its diverting illusion that we occupy a reserved
place in the flow of time.
Such a radical shift from objects to the surrounding space
defamiliarizes the world. It necessarily stimulates affect in each
viewer according to one's personal memories and associations. We
are immersed in a strange new perceptual landscape of Death in
Life and back again and again and yet again, with each of us both
victim and agent.
As, indeed, Giacometti must have experienced. His clinical ela-
tion was tantamount to a rebirth following a near-death encounter.
Nearly flooded by what he saw, though denying it, he transformed
the images into black and white specks. Then he dosed it out to
himself in small tolerable amounts, yes - but drawing from these
unliving and abstracted "specks" of living skeletons - managing
also to stretch us into a novel experience, at once profoundly
destabilizing and reassuring, of the unspeakably precarious world-
space we blithely inhabit.
Needless to say, viewing a documentary film of the Holocaust
cannot be equated with the actual and sustained physical traumatic
experience of the Holocaust. The film was thrice removed from
actual experience; at most, Giacometti had a mediated "traumatic"
experience. Secondly, the typical outcome of massive psychic
trauma is to precipitate or aggravate a creative block. Giacometti's
experience rather seems to have allowed him to overcome his
146 Power of implicit motion

previous block and stimulated him to produce a flood of new work

in a new style.
Massive and prolonged psychic trauma, on the other hand, lead-
ing to excess cortisol secretion, ultimately destroys the hippocampal
memory system. This impairs the capacity to reflect, contextualize
and experience and leaves only the now unregulated and over-
stimulated amygdala to flood the organism with unassimilable
memories. Thus, instead of finally working through memories to a
successful conclusion, their repetition leads to the opposite -
retraumatization (for a review, see Yovell, 2000).
Giacometti's coping with the Holocaust documentary mobilized
his creative perceptual and contextual flexibility. He transformed
private raw passions and conflicts into a new organizational struc-
ture of malleable, abstract perceptual data in new and relatively
non-conflicted contexts. This made it possible to convoy intense
and potentially traumatic stimulation safely through his own
normal stimulus barriers and those of his audience.
In his charge as an artist, Giacometti provides a dynamic new
aesthetic balance to allay the psychic imbalance of his disturbing
vision of death in the midst of life. He provides us, the viewers,
with tools to recompose new visual and psychic balances of our
own. These had come out of his own phenomenological analysis of
common visual experience. "Every time I look at the glass, it seems
to remake itself" (Giacometti, 1990: 273). "The nearer you get the
farther away the thing goes. It's an endless quest" (Giacometti,
1990: 275).
In other words, his own astutely observed optical experience
invests his work with subjectivity and creates a new synthesis that
forces the observer to experience the implicit motion in apparent
immobility (Figures 8.1 - 8.4). In Figure 8.1 , Man Pointing (1947),
the observer's eye and bodily tension are forced in the same direc-
tion; likewise in Man Walking II (Figure 8.2, 1960), the downward
drag of Dog (Figure 8.3, 1951); or, in Man Falling (Figure 8.4,
1950), in the direction of the fall. This last example is one of his
most slender and fragile figures, perched on tiptoe and about to fall
from its tiny pedestal while its head is hyper-extended backwards
as if ecstatically. It creates an almost intolerable tension between
" about to fall " and " not falling" (thus embodying what some
consider the central dynamic of the art of dance).
As Giacometti wrote: "The heads, the figures , are nothing but
continual movement . . . . They constantly remake themselves"
 Power of implicit motion 147

Figure 8.1 Representation of Giacometti's Man Pointing (1947).

(p. 218). A viewer must constantly refocus his/her gaze. In Large

Head of Diego (1954), it shifts between the distances within the face
and the security and weight of the narrow front-view torso. On the
other hand, in other examples one is not forced to enact the implicit
motion. It is implied in the tension between a tiny head and a heavy,
sloping pedestal, as in Woman of Venice, 11, V, VIII (1956). Or it is
148 Power of implicit motion

Figure 8.2 Representation of Giacometti's Man Walking 1/ (1960).

referred to symbolically, as in The Chariot (1950), where a filiform

figure is mounted on a small platform between two immense wheels.
Distortions, ambiguities and asymmetries - widely distributed
and illusory - turn each moment of concentration into flickering
immediacy. They force one to see, sort and re-sort with quickened
affects at the same time that they impose delay along the path of
 Power of implicit motion 149

Figure 8.3 Representation of Giacometti's Dog (1951).

habitual perception. The normally lazy search for familiarity is

defeated and one must look and listen again. All this magnifies and
recruits into awareness the normally subliminal pre-stages of per-
ception - stimulating the interplay of primary and secondary
process perception that underlies everyday perception (as so
importantly disclosed by Charles Fisher's (1954, 1956) tachisto-
scopic studies).
This visual equilibrium of apparent mobility and stasis is to be
found in the auditory sphere in the music of late Beethoven. The
Diabelli variations, the slow movements of the string quartets, the
Adagio movements of the Sonata in C Minor, opus Ill, seem
outside space and time. How is this brought about? According to
recent musical analysis (Solomon, 2003), in opus Ill, for example,
a combination of accelerated motion, rhythmic diminution and
minimal harmonic action leads to a blurring of any distinction
between rapid movement and stasis. They condense into a time-
stopping experience - a "shimmering sonic barrier" (pp. 207- 209).
Thus, art and music both have their ways to reopen paths for the
perception of implicit motion to "go straight through" to an
increased tolerance for the coexistence of logical opposites - lead-
ing, in turn, to a more rapid interplay of feeling and thought. To
what end? To rediscover how much more lies out there and inside
beyond the unattended moment.
Current knowledge at the interface of visual art and neurology
suggests that artists, especially those of the late 19th and 20th
centuries, have tapped into brain specialization the details of which
150 Power of implicit motion

Figure 8.4 Representation of Giacometti's Man Falling (1950).

are only now becoming clear. Recent research discloses that the
brain harbors a whole mosaic of interconnected visual receptive
areas. Some cells are responsive to color, others to movement, and
still others to the direction a line makes along a visual field.
The art of Cezanne, the Cubists, of Mondrian and Malevich
reflects the thesis (Zeki, 200 I) that there is a strong relation
between painting and how the brain works. Abstract and rep-
 Power of implicit motion 151

resentational modes of painting enlist different cerebral systems.

Many artists have distilled the same essential features of the visual
world as physiologists have revealed based on anatomical proper-
ties of the central nervous system. In other words, modern art
and neuroscience have both been exploring the outer dimensions
of perception.
In a late letter to Stefan Zweig (July 27, 1938) in relation to
art, Freud (1960: 444) mentioned " the quantitative proportion of
unconscious material and preconscious treatment." Where was he
pointing?
What is the relationship between the system Unconscious (Ucs)
and the preconscious pre-stages of perception? I would surmise
that the more equal distribution of (primary process) imagination
in the former and (secondary process) realistic perception in the
latter, as in dream imagery, provides the essential quality of
ambiguity. This can be " ridden" into either neurotic regression, or
- given the necessary gift - creative progression, or both.
In the course of their work, both Klee and Giacometti seemed
also to have been engaged in self-healing and identity clarification.
As Klee said of himself, from a cramped self he gradually experi-
enced the reemergence of a self without blinkers. Both apparently
succeeded in parallel evolutions of personal and artistic develop-
ment - transforming inner problems into externalized aesthetic
forms for which they could discover a new balance through
creative play.
Much of how this comes about remains an enigma. How does a
musical performer transfer the expression of affects via muscles to
musical instrument? Or a painter via the brush?
How can distinct finger pressure patterns corresponding to
various emotions be correctly recognized - though not necessarily
transmitted - as the emotions they represent (Clynes and
Nettheim, (982)?
As for the separate acts of making and responding to art, let us
try to describe the path of (bodily) affect.
Whether a painter working with pigment, or a musician with
sound, an artist treats the aesthetic medium as plastic material.
Through imaginative play, he/she transmutes an inner world of
thought and feeling into an external art-product.
In the making of art, affect may often be experienced in waves of
actual bodily tension and release of implicit motion accompanied by
excitation and/or discomfiture. However they become mysteriously
152 Power of implicit motion

embodied in the art-work, their objective realization there

ultimately forms the dynamic balance of virtual implicit motion of
tension and release that characterizes aesthetic structure. This, in
turn, is conducive to stimulating an other's responsive affect in the
form of the implicit motion embodied in actual tension and release
patterns. Not, be it again noted, necessarily by dint of communi-
cation, whether conscious or unconscious, of the art-maker's own
affects; rather, by the concordance between the implicit motion -
virtual and actual tension and release - that constitutes the dynamic
inner structures of both art and affect.
As to words, in Speak, Memory, Nabokov (1947: 217) writes that
poetry is a sign "of passing or having passed, or hoping to pass,
through certain intense human emotions." In the course of this
passage, the verbal transmission of "certain intense human emo-
tions" into an expressive medium remains as much a mystery as the
bodily transmission of affect in nonverbal art.
In summary, the implicit motion of mind, itself, generates states
of being and activates affectomotor pathways that somehow trans-
mute the mind's own motion into the virtual motion of nonverbal
art. This, in turn, reflects, magnifies and thus makes the implicit
motion of mind perceptually manifest to oneself.
The implicit motion of nonverbal art, then, indeed " goes straight
through": it enlivens affective consciousness, and recharges - even
reawakens - bodily sources of identity and the sense of self.
Chapter 9

A psychoanalyst listens to a
musician listening to himself
composing

How does music mean? Does "meaning" include evoking emo-

tions? Whose? Composer's? Performer's? Listener's?
Evoking emotions through music is not the same as musical
"communication," itself a controversial matter. Most musical
scholars adhere to the concept that a composer sends out messages
with objectively ascertainable content. Listeners receive it. This
orthodox view is only now being challenged by a minority of
scholars - "new musicologists."
For a composer the questions around music and emotion are
especially complicated. A composer is not only a musical tech-
nician but a person who may have a deep expressive involvement
with the occasion for which he/she is composing. How do these
theoretical commitments and personal emotions interact? Do they
affect a listener?
My take is that music is not produced by spontaneous genera-
tion in cyber space. Composers and performers have personal
feelings and professional know-how. Together with their audience,
all are listeners, too, each with a history of voice-prints: songs,
sounds, rhythms. These must impart some unique emotional
coloration to any musical experience.
Jonathan D. Kramer, composer, found himself thinking deeply
about what the music meant to him as an individual with expressive
needs uniquely his own. "I simply wrote the music I needed to write,
feeling what it meant (to me) but not pondering too much about
how it meant" (unpublished: 4). He remained " dubious of music's
ability to communicate specific thoughts, ideas, or images" (p. 5).
But he found that "listening to music can be a powerful experience,
evoking real and raw emotions .. . . How this is possible [is] the
major unexplained mystery of the musical art" (p. 5).
154 A psychoanalyst listens to a musician

When Kramer was writing Requiem for the Innocent, a Vietnam

protest piece for orchestra - three minutes of untexted music - it
took only eighteen hours to write what he felt flat out, including
orchestration and copying parts. Deeply involved in a cause, he
felt good, then bad about feeling good because people were dying
in Vietnam while he was writing far away in safety. In this
experience, technical task and personal feelings were inextricably
interwoven.
It took almost nine months to write No Beginning, No End for
orchestra and chorus. This commemorated fifteen Soviet Jewish
poets, intellectuals and leaders whom Stalin had had executed. "It
was obligated to mean something beyond itself," namely, " a
symbol of the indestructibility of truth. " Note " it" - not " I."
It also had a private meaning: as a Jew, a solidarity with the
murdered poets. One of the harrowing experiences of Kramer's
youth was hearing at age ten his grandfather tell of how he
narrowly escaped death in escaping from Lithuania because of
being a Jew - "not because of his beliefs, but because of his being.
And that being is mine."
The third time, thirteen years later, was a Holocaust remem-
brance event. Remembrance of a People, for piano, string orchestra
or string quintet, and optional narrator is more personal and less
political. It took eleven months to write. During that time he kept a
diary because he felt a conflict between his identity as a detached
musical theorist and as an emotionally involved composer: in the
former aspect he remained committed to the belief that music is
incapable of communicating specific ideas, but in the latter he
wished to invoke specific emotional reactions in others.
There was a yet more intimate necessity beyond the technical
matter of crafting the music, and the personal one of wishing to
transmit his feelings. " I needed to use my musical art to help me
come to terms with memories of the Holocaust" (p. 24): composing
as working through.
A painter said, "I paint in order to see what I couldn't see unless
I painted it." Attempting to objectify thoughts and feelings in
whatever form discloses them more fully to oneself. We talk, write,
perform, in part, to uncover what we think and feel as well as to
experience the sense of mastery that comes from expressive self-
actualization. If others can be made to feel deeply within them-
selves what one has projected out there like a message in a bottle,
it may help one recognize oneself the better; reflected back from
 A psychoanalyst listens to a musician 155

out there, and by repeated projections and reflections, one may

continue to learn and grow.
The wish to communicate embodies a full spectrum of objective
and subjective elements. The more subjective end ranges from the
conscious wish to experience a sense of personal attunement and
responsive resonance to a more unconscious impulse for momen-
tary oneness with an other. The latter probably harks back to the
earliest preverbal affective interplay between infant and caretaker.
The act of communicating with oneself by writing a diary in the
course of one's own creative process is an act of objectification in
the service of recruiting more self-involvement. In Kramer's case it
led to his happily achieving a closer collaboration between both
aspects of himself.
In technical jargon, this refers to the subjectively expressive
aspects of one's self working in close harmony with the more
objectively reflective ones - subjectivity and objectivity alternating
and informing each other. Asking which is the more important in
eliciting affective resonance in an audience is probably analogous
to the question of what ultimately is successful in psychoanalysis:
the intellectual insight and perspective one gains, or the emotional
ambience of the therapeutic relationship that one internalizes. A
pragmatic "answer" may lie less in understanding how this works
- we do not know exactly - than in facilitating and trusting the
power of the Unconscious to integrate both aspects.
Turning to Kramer's diary, the first entry has to do with the
"surprising" course the music is taking when the work proceeds
"intuitively." Without conscious intention, Kramer finds the music
moving around transforming themes - something he would have
ordinarily found " utterly uninteresting." Not surprisingly, the
interval of a minor third assumes importance.
The next month, " the movement seems to be done" as it ends
with " the music break[ing] off unexpectedly. " Does this refer, he
wonders, to " lives cut short"? Much of the piano part also "cuts
off." It is rarely integrated with the rest of the ensemble. "It either
plays against the others, accompanies discreetly, is a soloist, or is
silent." Are all these musical metaphors for alienation? Along with
this and also unexpectedly, two fragments intrude; one is from
Tchaikovsky's Pathetique symphony and the other an altered frag-
ment of the Dies frae tune. " Neither quotation [is] intentional. "
Another discovery: towards the end of the second movement, he
realizes that the whole movement has been more tonally integrated
1 S6 A psychoanalyst listens to a musician

in F-minor than he had realized. He asks himself what tonality

or atonality has to do with grief. Theoretically he would have
assumed that atonality would have been more fitting to express
Holocaust grief than tonality. However, since tonality sets up firmer
expectations [of continuity] than does atonality, maybe deliberately
frustrating them is more wrenching and thus actually more suitable.
Valid or not, this is an interesting attempt to correlate musical
tonality/atonality with the actual psychological experience of
continuity/discontinuity; this linkage is the connection to the
matter of loss and grief.
Eight months into the piece, and now in the fourth movement,
Kramer realizes he is fulfilling a long-standing wish.

I had always planned to write a piece that sits on the fence

between tonality and atonality . . . without a huge contra-
diction of language. I have just figured out that the Holocaust
piece is this music . .. . It scares me ... . I must be careful . .. .
[It could] come perilously close to an atonality-as-ugliness
aesthetic. I must not let that happen .. . .
I find myself wanting to write a long (too long?) series of
sighs, or cries, of anguish in the middle of the movement ...
[they] trail off into (brief) silence. This seems to happen again
and again, phrase after phrase . . .. The sighing phrases are
now beginning to resolve toward consonance.

These diary entries sound like a struggle with the power of emotions
and an attempt to use atonality as a defense against expressiveness:
specifically, his own feelings about the Holocaust. Composing has
helped him deal with them. " The Holocaust . . . is no intellectual
exercise. It happened . ... The final movement deals not with specific
images and feelings but with inescapable reality." The nature of this
reality: ultimately inexpressible - awesome.
As the diary proceeds we find Kramer thinking less and less about
technical matters and just writing. Musical relationships work and
become more believable when they arise out of intense involvement
with the materials rather than conscious intention. "The process is
not calculated but felt. " Conceptual logic does not always lead to
musical logic. At one point there was a problem about whole-tones.
It went away when he became "less rigid about ... procedures -
allowing in a few foreign notes when they knocked at the door. The
problem was not with the idea but with its realization. "
 A psychoanalyst listens to a musician 157

Clearly, the very process of composition had taught its composer

to experience first-hand the expressive power of music. Perhaps
closer to the mark, he learned something about the depth and
intensity of his own power to feel - while holding it at arm's length
behind a cognitive shield.
The last dated entry in the diary has to do with a big break-
through in trying to write a "poignant melody" in his imagination.
This had "yielded up awful possibilities." The melody had centered
on a previously missing E-flat. He found it not in his imagination
but in another movement. He then was able to proceed quickly
with the task of editing. Finally, he felt released.
One wonders if this detail represents an important micro-
enactment of a private response to the Holocaust: through com-
posing the music, he put himself through an actual experience of
loss and recovery - of an E-flat.

***

How, then, does music mean? While it remains mysterious, a

possible outline may be ventured.
An early overall view offered by Kramer was that meaning results
from a complex interaction of composer, score, editor, performer,
performance, recording engineer, playback system, and - above all
- listener. A striking example of why " above all, with the listener" is
how two professionally trained musicians heard a particular passage
from one of Kramer's compositions (Serbelloni Serenade, 1995):
one heard Russian contrapuntal music like that found in some
Shostakovich fugues, and the other heard Mexican bullfight music.
My formulation begins with a sense of wholeness as a criterion
of aesthetic form. Such wholeness used to be compared to that of a
whole organism growing out of nature as a living being (Coleridge,
1817). Hence, it was termed an organic unity that succeeds in
making the art "work" or "live" (Hospers, 1967). Every essential
element is present; every non-essential element has been eliminated.
It should be noted, however, that contemporary postmodernism
in music may seek a unity that is not organic; or an organicism that
does not necessarily lead to unity. In short, in postmodern thought,
organicism and unity are not equated.
Kramer (1995) has offered a number of clarifications. For example:
the alleged unity of a composition is textual unity; the performer's
perceptual unity imparts the textual unity of performance; music as
158 A psychoanalyst listens to a musician

constituted by the experiencing person who listens to it is perceptual

unity. These are not the same.
Continuing, Kramer argues that the postmodern aesthetic of
disunity is to force our minds to make sense of disorienting and
disunited experiences inherent in modern life. Those who have
found the concept of order to be oppressive may welcome disunity,
even chaos, and court them as liberating.
While postmodernism and modernism are difficult to distinguish,
the latter incorporates and reinterprets the past; the former takes a
fundamentally ironic attitude to the past and places the burden of
making sense of the pastiche or collage of past and present upon
the individual listener. Fundamentally, the postmodern challenge
arises from a cacophony of contemporary values and processes
that defy any external notion of unity and leaves any ordering
principle up to the individual.
It is claimed (Kramer, 2001) that postmodern music not only
exploits an interpenetration of past and present but reflects multi-
cultural, social, political, and technological contexts. It embraces a
pluralism of contradictions, fragmentations, discontinuities, mean-
ings and temporalities. It shares with contemporary art in general a
common feature: it leaves it up to the audience to ascribe meaning
and apply structure, rather than leaving it primarily with the
musical scores, performances or composers.
The criticism of postmodernism in general is that the seeming
freedom of its cultural relativism and perspectivism presents a
danger: it can be exploited to replace emotion and reason as the
traditional values whereby order replaces cacophony. In other
words, instead of limitations being seen as spurs to creativity, their
abolition in the name of freedom may be declared, ipso facto,
creative. The " saturated self" of a postmodern consciousness,
instead of being enriched by immersion in other perspectives, then
risks losing a reliable sense of identity and drowning (Gergen, 1991).
This direct linkage to " identity" suggests a clinical comparison.
Creative ferment and growth for an individual require a favorable
dynamic balance between the two components of identity, con-
stancy and change. Equal dangers are stagnancy on the one hand
and overstimulation to the point of flooding on the other.
The flooding of overstimulation is the inner essence of psychic
trauma. Under the threat or actuality of trauma, flooding signals
existential anxiety: danger of catastrophic loss of structure and
sense of self.
 A psychoanalyst listens to a musician 159

In clinical situations, one defense against the fear of loss of self is

to create an array of "as-ifs" or "false selves" - often unconscious.
In postmodern art, so-called "appropriations," for example, are
(defiantly) conscious. Whether conscious or unconscious, false
selves offer an illusion of safety and distance behind which one's
true but vulnerable self can hide. The price: loss of authenticity.
"Inauthentic" is, in fact, a criticism leveled against postmodern
art (Kuspit, 2000). Some postmodern artists, however, do not take
this label as a put-down but choose to relish it as celebrating a
virtue. In any case, we may ask: "Is postmodern art a post-
traumatic regression and/or a social and political commentary
more than a movement of aesthetic significance?"
Attempting to extrapolate these considerations to individual
human psychology, one may thus adopt different points of view:
pejoratively diagnose conditions like counterphobia, identity diffu-
sion, a dissociation of thought and feeling; or declare that anomie
- lack of adherence to usual individual or group norms - has
become the new norm. On this latter view, postmodernism would
appear as an attempt to come to terms with pervasive unpredict-
ability and potential trauma. In short, a (short-term?) adaptation
in the name of creativity.
Leaving the significance of postmodernism to history to decide,
how does music mean? I postulate the following guidelines.
Central to a traditional psychological sense of wholeness is a
harmonious coming together of thought and feeling: feelingful
thought, thoughtful feeling. Early in life, in the preverbal period,
they were interwoven; with maturation and conventional education
they become more and more separated; when they are reunited in
love, varieties of religious experience and historical notions of art,
something of this original sense of wholeness is temporarily and
ineffably restored.
The dynamic core of feelingful thought or thoughtful feeling is
an implicit motion of balanced tension and release; tension is
related to thought, and release to feeling.
The same dynamic lies at the center of aesthetic form, except
that now it is a matter of virtual implicit motion of balanced
tension and release.
The recognition of this implicit motion and structural concord-
ance between the external wholeness of aesthetic form and one's
own internal wholeness of thought and feeling leads to an auto-
matic responsive resonance, perhaps even a brief sense of union on
160 A psychoanalyst listens to a musician

the part of an audience. Its own sense of wholeness has been

vicariously validated and reinforced.
However, the specific thoughts and feelings making up any
individual listener's responsive resonance will still depend in large
measure on that person's history, associations and present
circumstances.
An attempt to locate these formulations in a wider context
would go something like this. Nonverbal art, like music:

2 stimulates and gratifies the expectancies of a motivational

system that
2 seeks corroborating reflections of the flow of one's own mental
life by
3 offering augmented and slowed-down external images of
virtual tension and release in the form of aesthetic equivalents
of the flow of mental life. They
4 invite an external- internal interplay of implicit motion that
5 recruits affect and latent memory,
6 approximating the early developmental experience of wordless
attunement and resonance between caretaker and infant. It
thereby
7 enhances a sense of wholeness of self within an expanded
awareness of the world.
8 Not unlike Love.

As for creative gift and neurotic deficit, they may flourish in their
separate spheres or interact. One need neither demonize nor
romanticize any relationship between them as might appear, so
long as they are not conflated.
One is rare and the other run-of-the-mill. Another distinction is
that with art, as with fine wit, less is more. Reality is permanently
enriched as the world, ever-newly experienced, continues to grow.
Whereas, in the compromise formations , condensations and fusions
of neurotic conflict, reality becomes stereotyped, automatized, con-
stricted. Less is, indeed, less.
Much modern art has to do with highlighting the ambiguity and
irreconcilability inherent in reality; it forces one to acknowledge
and live with the contrasts and the coexistence of logical opposites
and existential conflicts. Like grief, these are incapable of emo-
tional " arbitrage."
 A psychoanalyst listens to a musician 161

The power of memory, for example, to repossess lost love is not

to be "averaged out" with the craving to continue to live at the full.
Each is a rich note of a complex chord combining consonance and
dissonance - together propelling the "musical" action forward in
endless elaborations of lived Time.
As one moves into the unknown we embolden ourselves by
projecting comforting, familiar aspects of ourselves to temper
fearful anticipations of the strange and foreign. Our central ner-
vous system is necessarily both less than fully open and more than
merely solipsistic. Perhaps we are all more eager to refind than to
discover - whatever may be discoverable through such a system.
Art experiments with various combinations of self and other,
internal and external, and offers them for objects of contemplation.
This much seems clear. The " truth" of art does not lie simply in
the repressed Unconscious as the surrealists naively believed. Not,
that is to say, in the veridicity of unconscious fantasy . Or in the
psychopathological " return of the repressed." Postmodernism, for
its part, grapples in its own way with its own truth.
Is it too much to say that, in making certain things conceivable
and feel-able - if not reasonable and understandable - (primary
process) imagination and (secondary process) realistic cognition
achieve a dynamic new equilibrium? Or, more simply, that the area
between feeling and thought is the seed-bed of creative imagi-
nation? Where this leads is unforseeable. Limitless. Therefore,
ungraspable. This, our "truth"?

***
One might like to hope that verbalization and psychoanalytic
insight into oneself could also expand one's perceptual awareness
of the world. Likewise, one might hope that a fine-tuned aesthetic
sensibility could bring knowledge and personal insight. Alas, for
both areas. However much harmonious overlap we may attain
between words and music, thought and feeling, mind and body,
conscious and unconscious, a gap and a mystery will remain.
The urge to overcome the earliest sense that a gap exists between
Self and Other lends itself to later epiphanous experiences pack-
aged in various forms, including mystical, sexual, aesthetic,
chemical, philosophical and religious varieties. It is opposed by
the biological necessity to preserve the integrity of the self. The
tension between the twin impulses for fusion and separateness can
162 A psychoanalyst listens to a musician

spark moments of instant spontaneous engagement from within.

As with music.
Why is music instantaneously apprehensible in contrast to
speech about music that reflects a secondary interpretive approach?
In answer to this, an ethnologically based theory (Keil and Feld,
1994) holds that a listener is enticed into a feelingful engagement
with music - " getting into" and "getting off on" it - by minor
discrepancies or subtle irregularities in performance. For example,
timing being a split second apart, pitch being just a shade off,
overtones, harmonics, and textures being maximized . In jazz this
may be referred to as "inflection," "pulse" or " timbre."
This view holds that these micro-discrepancies reflect that "the
universe is open, imperfect, and subject to redefinition by every
emergent self .. . [who] has a different time feel ... a different
signature and . . . dances differently" (Keil and Feld, 1994: 171).
Hence the instantaneous joyful participation in the delights of
music.
A psychoanalyst might intuit that the attraction of the " slight
out of syncness" and " out of tuneness" might itself reflect that the
original developmental union we hypothesize between infant and
caretaker was less perfect than the one we are inclined to idealize in
safe retrospect.
For psychoanalysis, reason is a weak reed to lean on but it is the
best we have to try to answer unconscious conflict now made
conscious; and it probably does nothing to cure artistic insensi-
tivity. As for the arts, except for the greatest literature, they may
as well lay down their arms before the problem of understanding
neurosIs.
If aesthetic feeling-forms succeed in expanding perception and
with it the apprehension of our representations of reality -
knowing they are but representations as well as irreducibly circular
- and thereby gain a greater degree of wholeness of self, they serve
their author and a grateful audience well.
Why "grateful?"
But for the grace of Art - and its double mirror - we might have
continued in the semi-torpor of habitual daily-ness. Music above
all bypasses language and concepts to give explicit shape to the
implicit motion of mind.
Identity is the internal face of feeling and thought; creative form,
its outer one. With fresh affect and clarified perception we glimpse
the richness within and without, and learn not answers, but awe.
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Index

abandonment 34, 73 anger 30, 54, 78

accelerandos 87 anticipation 125, 131, 161
accent 45; unexpected II anxiety 39, 74, 78; castration 34;
ACTH (adrenocorticotrophic defensive 47; existential 34, 158;
hormone) 121 - 2 separation 32, 34; shared 110;
accompaniment 7, 9, 97, 127; vocal patterns associated with
nonverbal 8 11
actuality 32, 158 appraisal: on-the-spot 52; self 4
adaptation 159; long-term 48 Arlow, l .A. 82
aesthetics xxvii, xxviii, 21 , 23, 32, arpeggios 112
39,41,96, 143; false picture in art therapy 112
98; psychoanalytic 112; see also associations xii, 145, 160
form; illusion; structure; tension; asymmetries xxi, 39, 147
unity Atlas, E.E. xiv
affect xxix- xxx, 14, 37, 50, 89; art atonality xii, 100, 10 I, 102, 156
and 49, 52, 54; blocked 41 , 53; attachment 126; emotional 124;
confused 74; dynamic inner libidinal 31, 124; maternal
structures of 152; learning to 116
express 3; motion and 135; attention 14, 72, 78, 133; neonate's
non verbalized 8; perception of 116
50; regulation of 112- 31,133; attunement 1, 3, 6, 139, 155;
responsive 151; unverbalized 4 affective 126, 128; bodily
agitation 78, 79, 103, 132 temporal 13; maternal 53, 125;
Aiken, C. 57 wordless 160
Akhtar, S. 13 audition 136
alexithymia 6 auditory processing 12
alienation 34, 62, 63 Auerhahn, N .C. 120
Allport, G .W. 90- 1, 137 authenticity 20, 115; loss of 159
aloneness 7, 24; existential 32 autokinetic phenomenon 143
altered states 53, 54, 100 autonomy 124, 138
Amati-Mehler, J. 36 awareness 32, 81, 148; creative
ambiguity 17,34, 40, 56, 104, 138, expansion of xxvii; feelingful 43;
147, 160; gender 63 preconscious 95; rebirth of 21,
amygdala 121 , 122, 123, 146 24; self 135
176 Index

Bach, C.P.E. 50 bonding xxii; social 54

Bach, l.S . xvi, 17, 48, 79, 83 , 132; B boundaries 41, 47, 64; artificial 115;
Minor Mass xxii; Goldberg blurred 72; bodily 23, 69; ego 3,
variations 137 32; permeable 48, 49; psychic 2;
balance 20, 34, 44, 48, 54; relatively fluid 50; self and reality
compositional 45; continual 22- 3; time 63
searching for 32; dynamic 50, 58, Brahms, Johannes: Clarinet Quintet
151 , 158; psychic 146; temporary XXII
22 brain xxiv, 12,47,54, 55, 115, 128;
Balter, L. 42- 3 auditory input and 136;
Bartok, Bela 132; Musicfor Strings, compromised 79; dynamic
Percussion and Celeste xxii responses of 49; intact 87- 8;
Beattie, Ann 106- 7 interconnected visual receptive
bebop 100- 1 areas 149; motor areas 51, 135;
Becker, J . 84 see also central nervous system;
Beckett, Samuel xxviii, 23- 31 cerebral hemispheres
Beethoven, Ludwig van xv, xxviii, breath 102, 134
83; Diabelli variations 137, 149; Brody, M.W. 33
Grosse Fugue xvii; Seventh Bromberg, P.M . 137
Symphony xiv, xvii, 45; Sonata Brooks, C. 63
No.14 in C# minor Brown, J.H. 121
("Moonlight") 96- 7; Sonata Buber, M. 32
No.32 in C minor (Op. lll) 149; Bucci, Wilma 6, 7
String Quartet in A Minor
(Op.132) xxii cadences 102, 134
Benzon, W.L. 1,51 , 135 Cage, John 105
Berenson, B. 32 cardiovascular disease 79
Bergson, Henri 21 - 2,80,95 Casals, Pablo 127
Berlioz, Hector xiv Cassirer, E. xxx, 95
Bernstein, L. 96 causality 22, 82, 105
Bertalanffy, L. von 3, 48 cause: and consequence 62, 105;
Binswanger, Ludwig 124 and effect 76, 104
biology xx, 14, 52, 53, 86, 87, central nervous system 78, 86, 87,
126- 7, 131 90, 136, 150
birth 21, 28; see also rebirth cerebral damage 78, 79
bisexuality 63, 65, 124 cerebral hemispheres 83- 4, 85, 86,
Blakey, Art 100 116, 118, 123, 130, 136
Blood, A. 55 Cezanne, Paul 105, 150
bodily motions xvi, 86 change 6, 73, 100; awareness of 81;
body: baby's 127; emotional appeal body-related 54, 55; catastrophic
of music comes largely from 13; 62; constancy and 138;
felt boundaries of 23; mind and environmental 80; fundamental
2; music can entrain vital cause for 21; structural 7;
functions of 89; poetic meter and temporary balance in the midst
II; rhythms 83 of 22
body-image 117 chanting 58
body language 4 chaos 120- 1
body-states 55, 56 characters 59- 76, 94
Bonaparte, M. 82 Chomsky, Noam 36
 Index 177

Chopin, Frederic 132 consistency 84, 85, 137

chronos 94- 5 constancy 22, 96, 97, 118, 136;
clarification 5, 151, 162 change and 138
clarity 38, 43, 105, 142 continuity xxiv, 21, 82, 95, 156
Clarke, Kenny 100 contradictions 138, 158
Clay, J. 144 control 83; loss of 89
Clementi, Muzio xvi Cook, Nicholas xvi
closure 39; premature 8 correspondences 38
Clynes, M. 135, 151 cortex 121, 126, 136
cognition 6, 39, 50, 116, 161 country music 79
Coleridge, S.T. 157 creativity 19-35,48, 130, 139; spurs
colors 17, 18,53,102,105, 141,144; to 158
complementary 143; problematic crisis 120, 124
content of 142-3 criticism 159; mutual 5
Coltrane, John 100 crying 79, 90
comedy xiv Cubists 150
commitment: avoidance of 57; cues: extraneous 91, 137; nonverbal
lifelong 34 5,7
communication x, xiii, xvi, 36-56, cultural relativism 82, 103, 158
152, 153; direct xii; nonverbal 8; Cummins, P.F. 113- 14
objective xi; therapeutic 2; cyclicity xvi, xviii, xix, 84, 86, 94, 95
unconscious; verbal xi Czerny, Carl 96
completeness 39, II 7
completion 34; self 32, 33 damage 121, 123; cerebral 78, 79
complexity 3, 97, 138 Damasio, A. 15,40, 54, 55, 121
composers xii, xix, xxiii, 13, dance 53, 54,117,125
153- 62; creative process x; ideas Danckwardt, J.F. 142
ix; listeners think they have Davis, Miles 100
received communications from Dearling, Robert xiv
XVI death 24, 25, 26, 28, 30, 66, 74, 109,
composition 45, 140, 157 145; certain 76; denial of 95;
concordance 47, 52, 54, 152 disturbing vision of 146; fear of
concretization 41 94; in childbirth 60; meaningless
condensation 48, 67, 68 , 160 99; psychological 20; random 110
conflict 16,28,65,66, 141, 142, Debussy, Claude 84
146; developmental 124; defense 107, 124; unconscious 94
divergent 124; intrapsychic 82; dementia xx, 78, 79, 80, 85;
neurotic 160; unconscious 119 vascular 132
confusion 67, 78; emotional 7 depression 10, II, 124; early
congenital disability 119 childhood 67; fighting off 107
congruence 58, 116, 121, 128 Descartes, Rene 44
connections xi, 64; linguistic 37 de somatization 121
consciousness 14, 19,21,26,40,67, despair: end-stage 10; rescue from
95; core 54; critical role of XIII
emotions in construction of 15; destruction 99; mutual 34
hysterical dissociation of desynchrony 79, 80
memories from 119; postmodern detachment 33, 34
158 development and recapitulation 104
consequence 141; cause and 62, 105 developmental arrests 32
178 Index

dialogue: private 33; silent 8 Ellington, (Edward) Duke 100

Dickinson , A.F. xiv emasculation 28; symbolic 65
Diderot, D. 44 Emde, R.N. 116
differentiation 20, 33, 50, 126, 127; emotion(s) x, xxix, xxx, 2, 30, 49,
emotional 125; graded 53 116, 136, 152, 153; background
disavowal 69, 70- 1 54, 55; basis of 46; coded 6, 7;
discomfort/discomfiture 100, 151 critical role in construction of
disconnection 107, 145 consciousness 15; expressing
discontinuity xvii, xx, 21 , 95, 105, safely xxviii; intense 119; mystical
106, 109, 156 or religious 20; primary 54; range
discrimination 72; pitch 116 of 134; release of 92; sensations
disorder xvii, xx and 98; undifferentiated 115
disorganization 78, 89 empathy 1,4,55,56, 121; primary
dissociation 60, 119, 122, 137, 159 47
dissonance 3, 51 , 96, 134, 161; emptiness 120, 124
controlled 4 energy 10, 16,21 , 54, 143; bound
distance 3, 30, 33, 159; 50; creative 144; fluctuations of
psychological 120 49; insertion of 141 ; unfolding
distinction 43 , 99, 160 142
distortion 88, 147; transferential 2 entrainment 89- 90, 133
disturbed patients xvi, xvii , xix, xx, Epstein, D. xix, xx, 13, 14, 51, 78,
xxi; calming xxii 86- 7, 134
disunity 158 Erikson, Kai 123
Dixieland 100- 1 Ernst, Jimmy 133
dogma 67, 68 Eternity 84, 85, 137
dreams 6, 24, 33, 85; happy 75; ethnomusicologists 53, 100
ubiquity of 42 Evans, Sir Arthur 38
Dufrenne, M. 41 Evans, L.K. 80
duration 21 - 2, 82, 85, 89; expectations xi, xvii, 87, 88, 98, 104,
enormous 106; intuited 81 135, 156
dysrythmia 11 explanatory plausibility 41
expression xiii, 103; facial 54;
EEGs (electroencephalograms) 79, symbolic 43, 98
86, 132 expressiveness x, 156
ego xxx, 3, 19, 22, 42, 118; auxiliary external world 23, 83
119, 140; body 139, 140; externalization 34, 41, 140
experiencing 120, 121 , 122, 123,
125; observing 120, 121 , 122, 123, facts 37; interpretation and 38- 9
124, 125; premature development failure of synthesis 119
32; silent work of 48; stimulated familiarity xvii, 105, 140, 148
47; trying to " retrieve" 32 fantasy xi, 40, 41 , 45, 47, 55, 64;
Einstein, Albert 19 infantile 42; narrative xxix;
Einstein, Alfred xiv Oedipal 42; reality confused with
Eismas, P. 36 88; regressive 43; sexual 25;
elaboration 47, 115,132, 133; unconscious 42, 43, 161 ; wish-
symbolic 8 fulfilling 44
elderly persons Faulkner, William xxviii, 44, 57- 77
Eliot, T.S. xxi, 44 fear xiii, xxiv, 54, 78; anticipated
Elkisch, P. 32 125
 Index 179

feeling-forms 139, 140 gestures xxx, 89; musical 131, 134;

feelingful thoughts xxviii, 3, 119, unique 102
159 ghettos 114, \15, 125
Feld, S. 53, 162 Giacometti, Alberto 132, 140,
Feldstein, S. 4 143- 50, 151
Feltsman, Vladimir 137 Gillespie, (John Birks) Dizzy 100
Ferenczi, Sandor xxx Gilot, F. 20- 1
fertility 62, 63 Glass, Philip xvi
fetishism 56 Goethe, J.W. von 113
fetuses 115 Gombrich, Sir Ernst H. 45
Finn, D . 53 Gorelick, K. 13
Fisher, Charles 149 Gould, Glenn xv, 17- 18, 127
Flam, G. 114, 115 gratification 19, 34, 98; delayed 50;
flashbacks 119 regressive instinctual 43
flexibility 3, 4, 23, 146 Gray, D.D. 88
flight 34 Greece/Greeks II, 94- 5, 102
flooding 120, 121, 158 Greenacre, P. 32
fluidity 22, 31 , 48, 63, 64, 69, 138; Greene, D.B. 78, 83
sensitive 47 grief 124, 156
folklore 33 group behavior 53
form 46, 98, 102, 141 ; aesthetic 73, growth 19, 20, 22, 26, Ill ; central
117,133, 135, 140, 142, 151, 157, promoting factor 116;
159; sonata 99, 104 development and 34-5
formulation 43, 50, 131 guilt 42; allayed 33
fragmentation xxiv, 105, 106, 109,
158; nuanced degrees of 120 Haggard, E.A. 144
free association xxix, S, 6 hallucinations 56, 78; homosexual
Freud, E.L. 124 26
Freud, Sigmund xxx, xxxi, 1, 14, Handel, G.F. xvi, 79
37, 49, 50, 81 - 2, 90, 119, 124, harmony xii, xxi, 3, 45, 50-I, 54,
128, 134, 138, 151 72, 85; appropriateness of 102;
friends/friendship 91 , 125, 133, 137 continual searching for 32;
Fromm, E. 119 remote 51; variations of 96
Frost, Robert 13 Harrer, G. and H. 90
frustration 34, 82, 98 Hartocollis, P. 82
fugue 58, 157 healing 123, 139; self 151
fulfillment 19, 50; wish 44, 75 hearing xv, 98, 99, 102, 118; see also
Fuller, Peter 105 audition
fusion 25, 32, 69, 161 ; images of 58; Heisenberg, Werner 21
narcissistic 34 helplessness 7, 26, 30, 120
Henson, R.A. 136
Gaddini, E. 139 Heraclitus of Ephesus vi, 21 , 80,
gait 91 , 137 95
gamelan music xix, 84, 110 hierarchy xix, II
gender 63, 64, 66, 68, 69, 72, 76 Hindemith, Paul 45, 50, 100, 101
generativity 28 hippocampus 121 - 2, 123, 145- 6
Gergen, K.J. 158 Hirschbach, H. xiv
gestalts xxiii,S, 39 Hofer, M.A. 126, 127
gestation 27, 28 Hoffman, F .J. 57
180 Index

holding environment 3, 125; imagination 23, 24, 25, 29, 30,

nonverbal 46; reliable 4; 48,94, 151; creative 132;
stimulating yet secure 55 knowledge and 41, 50, 85, 86;
holistic merging 85 neural basis for power of 55- 6;
Holland, N. 44 no reality without 3; playground
Holocaust 145, 146, 154, 156, 157 for 63 ; release and 116; visual
homosexuality 25, 26, 28, 30, 65 117
horizontal music 83 imbalance 20, 54; autonomic 11;
Hospers, J. 157 psychic 146
humor 6, 43, 76; black 27; self- immobility 143, 145
directed 5 imprinting 138
Humphrey, N. 14 improvisation x, 3, 7, 101
hypnosis 85 impulse: creative 19- 35, 139;
romantic 99; sexual and
id 47, 121 aggressive 107; unconscious
idealizations 33, 140, 162 155
ideas 38, 154; composers' ix; strong India 82, 103
x infants 1,8,23,47,75, 115, 155;
identification xv, 27, 90; gender 63, earliest vocal experience of
66; shifting 65; spiritual 30 mother 127; gestures xxx; parents
identity 19,22,28,44,60,91, 135, and xxvii, 53, 116, 138; pitch
136, 152, 158, 162; affective 138; discrimination 116; severe head-
analysis of 21; clarification of banging 90
151; core 89, 133; diffusion of information: auditory processing
159; enduring 137; enlarged 33; 12; failure to process
feeling-forms of 139; gender 63; symbolically 122; nonverbal 2, 6;
multifaceted 141; narcissistic 47; triggering feelings 49; verbal 2;
primal 138; psychological 132, visual 86
137; reinforcement of 92; self 19, inner life 20, 35, 135
32 inner "other" 121
ideologies xvi; religious 99 inner world 94, 137, 151
illegitimacy 60, 62 innovation 101, 102, 105;
illusion xvii, xviii, 35,49, 78, 83, 93, technological 110
105, 127, 129, 142, 159; aesthetic insight xxix, 2, 98, 161; conveying
42; benign 56; diverting 145; through language 7; intellectual
necessary 92; "necessary" 137; 155; transformative 143
preconscious 128; relevance of instability xx, 20
121; time flow 80- 2; wishful 94 instinct theory 49, 50
imagery 105; body 32; dream 134, integration xxiv, 8, 118, 119, 122;
151 ; hallucinatory 56; damaged 123; intrapsychic 130;
homosexual 26; oral 65; radical necessary illusion of 137; peak
disturbances in II; synesthetic level of 140
18 integrity 82, 95, 119, 161
images 30, 31, 58, 74, 138; ability to intellect 121, 155
make 23; aural 83; blurred 62; intensification 96, 97
derealization of 145; fragmented intensity 116, 119, 133; affective
105; mimetic 93; mother's 25, 135; modulated 53
126; neural 54; recreated 20; intentionality 14
synesthetic 57 intentions xiv, 95
 Index 181

interactions xi, 8, 54, 127, 130; kinesthetics 91, 116, 127, 135,
affective 3; external 126; 137
narcissistic 34; rhythmic- melodic Klee, Paul 132, 140, 141-3, lSI
123; social 126 Klein, Melanie 41
internalization x, 7, 33, 118, 121, Knoblauch, S.H. 7, 8
126, 138, 155; affect-regulating knowledge 3, 41, 48,85, 161;
xxx; early soothing 133; music imagination stimulating 50
can facilitate 125, 129; symbiotic Kohut, Heinz 32, 33, 46
elements in 130 Kramer, J.D. xi- xii, xiv, xxiv, 78,
interpretation 17-18; effective 40; 83, 84, 85, 104, 106, 110, 153- 8
literary 44; status in Kris, A. 124
psychoanalysis 38; subjective 2; Kuspit, D. 159
verbal 6, 8
intersubjectivity 8; increased Lacan, Jacques xxx
sensitivity to 1 Lake, C. 20-1
intervals 102, 103 Langer, Suzanne 46, 47, 52, 97
intonation I, 116; meaning-laden 36 language xi, xxix, 4, 6- 7, 10, IS, 36,
intrapsychic processes xii, 33, 49, 83-4, 88-9; bodily sources of
50, 119, 123 see also conflict; xxx; clear distinction between
integration; structure subject and object 43; conveying
introspection 15, 141 feelings through 38;
intuition 139; nonrational xviii, 80; intermediation of 130; musical
philosophical-poetic 22 xxiii; nonverbal art and 98;
irrationality xx, 43, 98 symbolization function 37;
irredentism 19- 35 verbalization and 41
irregularity xii, xvii, xviii, xx, xxi, Laub, D. 120, 121
39; hypermetric xix LeDoux, J. 121, 136
Isaacs, S. 41 Levarie, S. 46
isomorphism 47, 52, 54 libido 31, 124; ego and object
Ives, Charles: Fourth Symphony 138
xvii; Putnam's Camp xi-xii; Trio Lichtenstein, H. 31, 138
XXll light 142, 143
linearity 83-4
Jackendoff, R. 14 Lodz 114, 115, 125
Jacques, E. 96 loneliness 115, 127
Jaffe, J. 4 longing 16, 24, 28, 30, 97;
Jahn, Otto xiv unsatisfiable 135
James, William 81 Lord, J. 144
Janet, Pierre 119 loss xxiv, xxv, 24, 34, 123, 124, 139,
Java xix, 82, 84, 110 157; birth of music in the context
jazz x, 7, 10, 100-1 of 112-31
Jews 113, 154 Lourie, R.S. 90
Johnson, Crockett 37 love xxvii, 62, 124; incapacity to 34;
joy xiii, 117 lost 161
judgment 7, 13,56, 75
Magee, B. 134- 5
kairos 94-S Mahler, Gustav: 7th Symphony
Kant, Immanuel 44, 80, 82 xvii; 9th Symphony xxii
Keil, C. 162 Mahler, M. 34, 37
182 Index

Mahoney, P.l . xxxi metaphor xiii, 4, 5,7, 13, 18,23,37,

Malevich, K. 150 73, 133, 135; music as 56; visual
Maori people 112 17
Margolis, N.M. 33 meter II, 12, 13, 101
masculinity 26, 27, 28, 64 Meyer, L.B. 96
mastery 47, 69, 72, 94 micro tones 103
masturbation 24, 26 Millgate, M. 69
Matisse, Henri 44, 46 Milner, Marion xxviii, 32, 43, 98,
Matteis, Nicola 16 99, 143
Matthis, 1. xxix mind 20, 40,85, 139, 140, 162; body
Maynard, Joyce 106- 7 and 2; receptive xii, 52; temporal
meanings xi, xvi, xix, xxi, 13, 22, 97, organization of 87; well-
157; absence of 24; absurd 109; functioning 140
art does not communicate xii, 44; mirroring 31, 32, 55, 98, 105, 126;
cast adrift 105; intensely personal narcissistic 138
141; latent 72; linguistic 37; modernism 158
narrative 38; psychological 100; modes 103
referential 104; semantic 40; modulation 51, 103
sounds freed of 25; symbolic 74; moment-by-moment activity
unsuspected 43 119
Mehler, J. 36 "moment time" 85
Melges, F.T. 85, 87- 8 monamine modulators 136
melody xxiii, xiv, 50, 51, 54, 72, 85, Mondrian, Piet 150
97; broken 124; nostalgic 125- 6; Monet, Claude 133
"out of sync" 101 ; rhythmic Monk, Thelonius 100
interaction with 123; space and morphemes xxiii- xxiv
103; underlying beat and 102; mother-tongue 36
variations of 96 mothers 19,28, 90, 125; attunement
memory xxi, 24, 39, 65, 66, 72, 76, of 53; baby shows "preference"
88,94,95, 112, 145; affectomotor for her voice 36; dead 31;
traces 129; emotional 121, 122; hermaphroditic 30; identification
factual 121, 122; hippocampal with 27; images of 25, 126;
145- 6; hysterical dissociation infants and 127, 138; out-of-
from consciousness 119; lost 68, sight, linguistic connections to
117; patterns stored in 128; 37; phallic 29; pre-Oedipal 32;
power to repossess lost love 161; primal 30, 34; rapprochement
precise and vivid 116- 17; with 34, 37; responsive presence
reassembling 37-8; repression of of 129; separateness from 64;
69; traumatic 120, 122; unity/oneness with 20, 23, 24, 30,
unconscious 23, 67 33
Mendelssohn, Felix 51 motion xxx, 85, 90, 102, 103;
mental impairmentlillnesses xxii, 85 alternating Ill; arrested in time
mental states 57; altered 53; 57; implicit 132- 52, 159;
breakdown of adaptive mutually influential 43, 99;
functioning 120 nuances of 51
mental synthesis 119, 121 motor aspects 33, 116, 132, 135
Merleau-Ponty, M. 46 motor illnesses 79, 117
Messaien, Olivier: Chronocromie mourning 124
XXII movement see motion
 Index 183

Mozart, W.A. 51 , 83; C Major object relations 138

Quartet (K465) xv; G Minor object representations 32, 33
Quintet (K516) xxii; G Minor objectification 40, 139, 140, 155
Symphony (K550) xiii- xiv, xv, objectivity 128, 130; boundaries of
xvi 2
Munch, Edvard 2 obstructive- explosive behavior 91
murderous impulses/feelings 30, 31 Oedipus 25, 42
Mursell, J. 97 Olds, C. 115
muscles 51 , 54, 135, 151 omnipotence 34, 42
mutual gaze 126 oneness 20, 24, 30
mutuality xxvii, 138 onomatopoeia 13
open system theory 3, 48
Nabokov, V. 152 orality 34, 42; time, sex, violence
narcissism 34, 82, 139, 140; primary and 61
19, 31 , 32; secondary 33; order xvii, xx, 43, 83, 99, 158
symbiotic 138 Orgel, S. 82
narcissistic identity disorders 47 orientation 118; goal 85;
Native Americans 82 psychological 119
Natkin, Robert 105 Orinoco River 13- 14
Nattiez, Jean-Jacques ix- x ornamentation 51 , 96
Nazis 114, 144 Orpheus and Eurydice 112
needs 7, 67; expressive 153; oscillation 86, 96, III
instinctual 61; subjective 58 Ostwald, P. 115
Nersessian, E. 49 Oulibicheff, A.D. xiv
Nettheim, N . 135, 151 outer world 20, 32, 94
neural loops 86 overstimulation 69, 120, 122, 158;
neurobiology xxx, 2, 14, 15, 90, traumatic 34
112,121 , 123,129, 133 overtones 10, II , 102, 103, 139
neurological impairmen t/disease
xviii, xxx, 40, 91 , 93 , 117, 118, pain Xlll , xiv
119; therapeutic miracles 132 Pally, R. 128
neurology 78 Palmer, C. xiv
neurons 123 Panel 116
neurophysiology 115 panic 80, 89, 133; acute 122;
neuroscience 1, 14, 18, 47, 49, 54, escalating 132
123, 126, 132; developments in Panksepp, 1. 15, 55, 123
127- 8; modern art and 150- I; paradoxes 34, 40
psychoanalysis a nd 121 paranoia 30, 78
neurosis 42, 43, 119; problem of parcel of experience 12
understanding 162 parents I, 74; good 33; infants and
New Guinea 13 xxvii, 53, 116, 138; pre-Oedipal
Newton, Sir Isaac 83 , 95 48
Nietzsche, Friedrich 51 , 134, 139 Parker, Charlie 100, 10 I, 102
nightmares 119 Parkinson 's disease xx, 79, 91
nocturnal delirium see Sundown Parmenides 95
Syndrome passivity 26, 124
nonlinearity 83, 84 pathology 78 , 117
nostalgia 125 Pausanius 33
Noy, P. 33, 46, 47 Peckham, Morse xx
184 Index

Penfield, W. 116 progression 73, 85; creative 151

perception xxi, 13, 39, 48, 50, 68, projection 143, 155
117, 133; abstract forms of 140; proportional tempo xix, xx
affective 52; alteration of 20; prosthetic devices 119
" amodal" 115; clarified 162; psycholinguists 36
conscious 49; current, and the psychology 19, 90, 159; cognitive 6;
past 128; early 90; feelingful 119; experimental 143
formed 72; habitual 148; psychopathology 48
immaculate 2; light and color psychosis 133
142; objective 99; outer psychosomatic states xxx
dimensions of 151; primary and psychotic disorder 10, 32
secondary process 148- 9; psychotropic medication 79
primitive 90; sensitive 32, 52; pulse 8, 12, 14, 54, 58, 87, 97
shared xii; time flow 82, 94, 95 punishment 60, 71
performances x, xiii, 87; "push marks" 53
reintegrating 118; textual unity of
157; virtuoso 99 qualia 14, 15
periodicity xxi, 86, 89, 90, 92, 133 Quantz, J.J. 50
permeability 48, 49; mutual 32
Perot, P. 116 rage 30, 107, 120
personality xv, 8, 44, 94; damaged rap music xiv
xxiv; restored 91 rape 69, 71, 74
phallus 28, 29, 30, 42 rapport xxvii, I
philosophy 21, 37, 80 rapprochement 33, 34, 37
phonemes xxiii rationality 43, 83, 98
phrases 85, 10 I, 102, 134 Ravel, Maurice: Bolero xvi
physiology 54, 87 reactions xiii, xvi 18, 139;
Piaget, J. 36 catastrophic 80; emergency 121 ,
Picasso, Pablo 20- 1, 41 , 44, 48 122; gut, emotional 52
pitch 102, 103, 116 reactive hyperactivity 124
play 23, 151 Read, H. 31
playwrights xv reality xxvii, 2, 3,21 , 22,47,80,93,
pleasure 14, 42, 43, 47, 115- 16, 135; 105, 124; apprehension of
conscious 49; ecstatic 33 representations of 162; child's
Podell, D . 121 restless probing of 48; defensive
poetry xxx, 2, 12- 13, 38, 40, 152; escape from 43; emotional 49;
first exposure to 114; meter and fantasy confused with 88; grim
the body II and colorless 32; new aspect of
polyphony 138, 142 35; not denied or disavowed
Poppel, E. II , 12 109; outer 33; permanently
post-traumatic stress disorder 122 enriched 160; reconstituted 72;
postmodernism 138, 158, 159, 161 restored 91 ; revalorization of
posture 54; skewed 79 144; self and 20, 22- 3, 69;
Pra tt, c.c. 46, 47, 52 temporal dimension of 94; testing
predictability xvii, xx 56, 85, 90, 128; uncertain 112,
pregnancy 30, 31 , 58, 62, 64, 115 129
prescience 23, 110 realization 156
primal scene 58, 69, 72; reworking rebirth 21, 24, 26, 27, 28, 31, 34, 63 ,
of 74 145
 Index 185

recall 11 7, 119 responses/responsiveness xii, xiv,

recapitulation 131, 132; 47, 53, 78, 79, 89, 110, 157;
development and 104 affective 90, 127, 133, 134, 135;
recovery 139, 157 affectomotor 129; bodily 133;
recurrence 58, 62, 73, 76, 96, 131, dynamic 49; emotional xxiv, 116,
132, 135, 142; cyclic 84; hidden 128, 129, 136; hair-trigger 122
98 responsivity 52, 115
reflection 73, Ill, 137, 146, 155; rhythm xiv, xv, 4, 8, 14,49, 72, 73,
conscious 40 90, 97, 115; behavioral activities
regression 3, 42, 48, III 53- 4; body 83; changes in 104;
regression: neurotic 151; post- circadian 79, 80, 86; cortical
traumatic 159 electrical 136; fluctuating
regularity xvii, xviii, xix, xxi, xxii, strength of 135; irregularities xii ;
39; soothing xx, 8 irresistible 58; melodic
regulation 112- 31, 133, 136 interaction with 123;
Reich, Steve xvi neurobiological xxx, 129; organic
reinforcement xxi, 160 motion effect 83; overpowering
reintegration 78, Ill, 118, 121, 130; 91; primitivistic 83; sing-song I;
high-order 140; vicarious 140 speech 83; timing and 116;
relationships 9, 25, 106; variations of 96; see a/so meter;
benevolent 118; lost 124; one-to- motion
one 18; parent- infant 53; pitch Richter, S. 17
102, 103; therapeutic 7; tonal ritardandos 87
xxiv ritualized bargaining 13- 14
release 33, 78; see a/so tension and Riviere, J. 41
release Roach, Max 100
relief xxii, 107 rootlessness 62-3, 104, 110
Rellstab, L. 97 Rose, Gilbert J. x- xxvii passim, 3,
"rematriation" 19 5, 12, 13,23,32, 33,34, 46,47- 8,
remembering/remembrance 29, 67, 50,82,85, 86,96, Ill, 119, 140,
154 144
Renaissance 83 Rose, L. 134
repair 121; self 31 Rose, Ron 100
repetition 51, 69, 96; compulsive Rosen, Charles 99
64-5; excessive xvi- xvii rubato xx, 87
repetitiveness xvi, 58, 116
representations 130, 139; Sacks, Oliver xx, 79, 91 - 2, 116-18,
internalized x, 126, 127; mental 6; 132, 136
radical disturbances in 11; self sadness xiv, 54
and object 32, 33; symbolic 120, safety 115, 159
121; verbal 120, 122 St Marie, Buffy 110
repression 69, 119, 120; lifting of Saint-Foix, Georges de xiv
124 Salk, L. 90
rescue xiii, 113 Sanborn, Pitts xiv
resolution 73, 98, 104, 156 Sartre, Jean-Paul 57
resonance 1, 10, 33, 139; affective Satie, Erik xvi
52, 128; emotional 53; responsive satisfaction 22, 128
125, 155, 159, 160 scales 102, 104
respiration 8, 90, 97 Schenker, H.K. 50
186 Index

Schilder, P. 82 Sibelius, Jean: Tapiola xxii

Schoenberg, Arnold 100, 102, signals: first-alert 52; neural and
104 chemical 55; responsive affective
Schopenhauer, A. 135 116
Schore, A.N. 123, 126 silence 3,4, 30, 114, 144; empty
Schubert, Franz 132; C Major 10
String Quintet xxii Silverman, S.E. and M.K. 10
Schumann, Robert xiv similarity xxiii, 38, 85
self 152; false 159; inner 83; simultaneity 72, 85, 98, 105, 142
intactness of sense of 120; sing-songing 1, 116
integrity of 82, 119, 161; and singers/singing xxiv, 79, 114-15,
objects xxviii, 66-7; on the 125; and dancing 54
shores of 19- 35; redifferentiation Siomopoulos, G. 13
of III Slap, J.W. 121
self-recognition 90, 91, 132, 136-7, sleep 25, 26, 31, 34, 75, 86; poor/
140 disturbed 79, 80
self-representation 120, 121 socialization 53, 54
semantics 8, 40 Solms, M. 14,49
sensations 14, 32, 98, 115, 120; Solomon, M. 149
confused and condensed 67 soma 120
senses 68, 70, 72 somatic illnesses xxx
sensibilities 31, 161 somatization 6
sensitivity 1, 2; constitutional 32, sonata form 99, 104
47; musical 117; perceptual 32, songs xxii-xxiii, 112, 114, 116, 117;
52 comforting 125
sensorimotor patterning 127, 129 sounds xi, 11-12, 13, 115, 117;
sensory qualities 1,2,6, 14, 15,32, freed of meaning 25;
48, 68, 122 simultaneous 85, 105;
sentences 57; lengthy 58, 67, 68 unhampered 104
separateness 22, 31, 34, 64, 67, 69, space 31, 43, 51, 103; illusory 105;
72,85,99,118,161; melting separateness and wholeness of
into "authentic togetherness" 118; time and 19, 22,23,32,
115 122
separation 26, 28, 33, 34, 130; speech xxiii, xxiv, 12, 116, 137;
reaction to 139 broken 79; disorganized 78; inner
sequence 81, 82, 89, 104, 107; 6; oratorical 83; phonological
mental 88; motor 117 features of 4; spontaneous 89;
Serkin, Rudolf xv suicidal 10
serotonin 123 Spence, D. 38
Sessions, R. 46, 102, 103, 134 Spitz, R.A. xxx, 36
sexual intercourse 74, 76 splitting off 119
sexual struggle 65 spontaneity 22, 89; flexible 3, 4
Shakespeare, William xv SSRI (selective serotonin reuptake
shame 73, 120; infantile 141, 142 inhibitors) 123
shape 39, 46, 52, 98 stability xx, 3, 20, 39, 103, 138;
Sharpe, E.F. xxx inner 73
Shetler, D.J . 115 Stalin, Joseph 154
Shiva 112 Stein, J. 76
Shostakovich, D. 157 Stern, D. 115, 116
 Index 187

stimulation 128, 129, 130, 135, syncopation 10 I

148- 9; ego 47; internal 55; synesthesia 18, 57, 68
intolerance of 124; perceptual syntax 12, 13, 57
and emotional 41 ; potentially
traumatic 146; rate and contour taste 68, 100, 108
of 116; sexual and aggressive 69; Tchaikovsky, P.I. 155: Pathetique
see also overstimulation symphony 155- 6
stimuli 12, 96; auditory 115; tears 30, 67, 68
energetic 141 ; external 78; tempo xix- xx, 4, 13, 14, 115; prime
tensions produced by 49 aspect of 87
Stockhausen, Karlheinz 85 temporal prosthesis xviii, xix, xxi,
story-telling 41, 91 79- 93 , 129
Stravinsky, Igor: Rite of Spring tenses 63, 66
xvii; " Symphonic tension 10, 49, 54, 99, 103, 104, 115;
Metamorphosis on Themes by aesthetic 53; almost intolerable
Weber" 100; Symphonies of Wind 146; homosexual 65; inner xvii,
Instruments xxii 16; reduction of 96; sexual and
stress xxii, xxiii, xxv, 79; chronic aggressive 33; virtual 128; see
122; psychosocial 123; traumatic also tension and release
119, 121 , 122 tension and release xv, xxi- xxii,
stroke 116- 17 xxxi, 16, 17, 41,50, 51,52, 92, 96,
structure 43, 51 , 134; aesthetic 55, 129; balanced 55, 98, 159; bodily
85, 86, 122; catastrophic loss of 151 ; implicit motion embodied in
158; cognitive 41; formal 55, 97, 152; interplay between 54;
133; hypermetrical xix; muscular 135; pleasure/
intrapsychic 126, 130; melodic unpleasure and 115- 16; reliably
115; psychic 33, 34; sentence 57; balanced 53; virtual 116, 133, 135
" simple" 96; somatosensory 55; Terr, L.c. 109
unrelieved 3 terror 121
stylistic devices 58, 63, 66 themes 155; and variations 73, 137,
subject and object 31 , 43, 98 , 99 138
subjectivity 4, 56, 97, 128, 130, 155; therapeutic alliance 39
boundaries of 2; objectification threat xxii, 158
of 140 Tibet 82
succession 72, 81 , 85, 95 time 11 , 26, 40, 43, 49,94- 111, 142;
suicide 10, II characters and 59- 76; constancy
Sundown Syndrome xvi, 78- 93, of 118, 138; lived 161 ; mutilating
133 57; non-recurrent 58; space and
superego 19 19, 22, 23, 32, 122; successiveness
surprise xvii, 54 of 118; therapy and xvi- xxii; see
syllables xxiii, 1, 29 also temporal prosthesis
symbiosis 130, 138 timelessness 58, 65, 69, 82, 85, 109
symbolism/symbolization 33, 43, timing 116
52, 66, 70, 72, 74, 95, 105; Toch, E. 98
discursive 97; presentational 97, Tomkins, S. 135
98 tonality xii, xxii, 17, 84, 102, 103,
symptoms: hysterical 134; 156; central 51; changes in 104;
psychosomatic xxx complementary colors 143;
synchrony I, 8, 72, 89, 122 vocalS
188 Index

tone(s) 8, 36, 98, 103, 116; variations 96, 131; theme and 73,
directedness of 104; dynamic 137, 138
quality of 102; rootless 110 verbalization xxvii, xxix, 6, 7, 40,
Tourette's syndrome 79 53, 115, 130, 161 ; antedated
Tovey, Donald Francis xiv 115
"trace" ix- x vernacular idioms xii
trance states 54 vertical music 83, 84, 85
transference: early discovery of I; "vertical time" 104, 105
idealizing or mirror 31; power of vibration 16, 17, 46
39 vibrato 103
transfigurations 137 violence 94, 99, 109
transformation 41 , 130, 138, vision: aesthetic 21 ; creative 143
145 vocabulary 58
trauma xxxi, 34, 71, 72, 94, 112, vocalization 4, 115
119, 124; affects blocked by 130; voice(s) 4, 11,65,66,67- 8, 115,
affects blocked by 53; blunting 142; father's 118; hollow and
the impact of 109; collective toneless 10; identification of own
externa l 123; emotional 91, 137; mother's 36
memories of 122; loss close to the vomit 70, 71, 72
heart of 123; potential 125, 140, vulnerability 34, 120
159; psychic 120, 145, 158;
undoing and mastery of 72 Wagner, Richard xiv, 51; Tristan
triggering 49, 121, 122, 126 und Isolde 134- 5
Trobriand Islands 82 well-being 54, 116
trust 53; loss of 120 Weltenschauung 142
truth 30, 41 , 161; " historical" 38; Wertheim, N. 136
indestructiblity of 154; partial Whitehead, Alfred North 81 , 95
37 wholeness xxiii, xxiv, 118, 130, 136,
Turner, T. II, 12 160, 162; enhanced sense of 140;
twelve-tone scale see atonality; inner and outer I; psychological
Schoenberg sense of 159
Wilson, L. 144
uncertainty 58, 83; gender 68 Winner, E. 103
unconscious 105, 151 ; dynamic Winnicott D.W . xxviii, 3, 48
121 wish-fulfillment 44, 75
understanding xxiv, 14, 21; wishes 7, 155, 156; repressed 120;
cognitive 40; narrative 122; unconscious 19, 64
skewed xii wit 42
unfamiliarity xvii, xix, 89, 139 withdrawal 42, 107
uniqueness 102, 120 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 37
unity 19, 32, 157; aesthetic 20; lost Wolff, W. 90- 1
23; mother- child 22, 30, 31 ; Wolfli, A. 140
perceptual 158 womb 27, 28, 64
un pleasure 49, 115, 135 women 29- 30, 65; phallic 42
unpredictability xx, 99, 110, 159 words xi, 25, 36- 56; and music
xxii- xxv, 1- 18
values xi, 158 working through 69, III
Van der Kolk, B. 121 , 122
Van Gogh, Vincent 44, 45 Xenakis, Iannis xvii ; Eonta xxii
 Index 189

Yanomani Indians 13 Zierer, Ernest 53

Yovell, Y. 121 , 146 Zipper, Herbert 113- 14
Zuckerandl, V. xxii, 46, 96, 98- 9,
Zatore, R. 55 114- 15
Zeki, S. 150 Zweig, Stefan 151