MANIPAL UNIVERSITY JAIPUR

Department of chemical Engineering

Mini project
II YEAR, SEMESTER-5

Improving the Depth and Accuracy of HAZOP Analysis for Safer

Process Development in Chemical Industries

INSTRUCTUR
Dr. Harsh Pandey

NAME-Amoluck Bhatia
ID-209101001

DATE OF EXPERIMENT-07/11/2022
 INTRODUCTION
HAZOP analysis (Hazard and Operability Analysis) is a safety assurance
technique predominantly applied in chemical engineering industry to identify
the potential hazards, root causes, protective measures together with long-
term preventions. It is a systematically team activity facilitated by HAZOP
leader and multidisciplinary professionals, involving rigorous review of design
documents and control schemes [1]. With half century of development since
its inception in 1960s, HAZOP technique has now evolved into a powerful tool
for industrial risk assessment and prioritization comparing with traditional
methods. It has been used for diverse industries such as petrochemicals,
pharmaceuticals, oil and gas, and nuclear fields, spanning the entire project life
cycle from initial design stage, through operation and modification, to
decommissioning at the end [2]. The core significance of HAZOP analysis is
through early process screening and rectification to address potential hazards
and deliver facilities with improved safety and operability. Nowadays, HAZOP
technique has become one of the systematically design review methods led by
enterprises to ensure plant intrinsic safety and process safety [3, 4].
HAZOP analysis has become a versatile tool for industrial risk assessment and
optimization in the past decades. It facilitates systematic design review with
wide applications spanning across entire project lifecycle, from initial design to
operation and decommission stages. Traditional qualitative HAZOP process
that largely depends on historical experience and brainstorming can lead to
inaccurate hazard identification and severe accident consequences. analysis
will be more profound with enhanced accident prevention and risk awareness
in the overall industrial environment.

PROBLEMS WITH HAZOP ANALYSIS

Since HAZOPs are not applicable for all situations,
• The HAZOP analysis focuses on single failure conditions rather than on
combinations of possible events leading to a resultant failure This would mean
that the HAZOP analysis has no means to assess hazards involving interactions
between different parts of a system or process. Additional, since process
failure often result from multiple failed inputs, HAZOP processes do not
capture and analyse these scenarios.
• Most HAZOP analysis have no means to assess effectiveness of existing or
proposed controls, based on its design. As such, process engineers will need to
interface their HAZOP analysis procedures with other risk management tools
like HACCP, to be able to carry out such functions.
• HAZOP process can be time consuming, can become overly detailed and
complex and often requires some form of expert facilitation. Since the HAZOP
reports are usually very detailed and complex, someone who does not have
any background in process engineering will not be able to understand the
jargon and information covered in the report without the aid of an expert.
Additionally, most plants contain many pipes and vessels each of which need
to be examined by the application of the various guidewords.
• HAZOP relies heavily on "guide words" to progress the analysis. Since HAZOP
reports identify deviations in processes using sets of "guide words" as a
systematic list of deviation perspectives, it runs the risk of being missed by the
HAZOP analysis. This is because, potential failures cannot always be linked to
"guide words".
• The HAZOP analysis requires more resources compared to the Checklist and
What-if methods which are other PHA methods. This is because the HAZOP
method, requires up-to-date process safety information and a multidisciplinary
team who understands the processes well
The right strategy is to develop an overall plan and ensure necessary PSI in
place before initiating any HAZOP activities. It is hereby a good practice to
review P&ID designs in advance to ensure full compliance with industry
standards and project required functions. Finally, it is recommended to submit
all the technical preparations one week earlier to identify any gaps and allow
the team to get familiar before the formal HAZOP process.
INADEQUATE INFORMATION/DETAILS AVAILABLE
This is always a problem. Ideally, the HAZOP should be performed on firm
P&IDs, frozen for the HAZOP and all support documentation (Specifications,
drawings, calculations etc.) should be available. In practice it is rare that this
occurs, the HAZOP dates are a fixed deadline, often set months in advance;
and the engineering often hits problems causing delays. So, the only flexibility
available is the quality of the information provided. The other common reason
for this problem is the attempt to perform a HAZOP too early in the project
development when a different study such as a process hazard study 2 or HAZID
would be more appropriate
INSUFFICIENT TIME
There is always pressure on a team leader to reduce the time taken to do the
HAZOP for schedule and cost reasons. A thorough HAZOP takes time to be
performed properly and short cuts should not be taken Based on experience,
the leader will be able to estimate the time requirements by reviewing the
drawings. The estimate is likely to be different to that in the project schedule
and the leader must agree the time requirements with the project manager
whilst finalising the terms of reference. If insufficient time is allocated, then it
is better to miss areas out of the review rather than compromise on the
quality. If quality is compromised there are numerous implications, and this
could result in the whole HAZOP having to be redone. It is possible to speed
things up a little through selecting larger nodes and working extra hours but
there are limits to this.
FOLLOW UP OF HAZOP ACTIONS
This is a very common problem. Often the recommendations are not dealt
with or not dealt with appropriately. It is important that there is a single point
of responsibility for this, and an auditing activity takes place to ensure follow
up. Approval/rejection of the actions also requires an experienced engineer at
a senior level in the organisation who has the authority to make decisions.
Some companies follow the practise to make the HAZOP leader responsible for
the close out of the actions, although with the use of independent or external
HAZOP leaders this is not usually feasible.

. Summary of Critical Factors on HAZOP Depth and

Accuracy
The most crucial yet challenging step in the process is making sure the HAZOP
analysis is thorough and accurate. aiming to enhance industrial HAZOP's
overall quality
Using an analysis, this study outlined the crucial elements and protective
measures from the security and assurance perspectives.
Effective protective layers and thorough process hazard identification would
considerably reduce the likelihood of events occurring and their effects.
Figure 2 offers a clear representation for future use and implementation to
showcase the study’s main conclusions more effectively.
Several Issues Deserving Special Attention
To deliver in-depth and accurate HAZOP outcomes, there are several issues easily to get overlooked
and deserving particular attention below.

Effectiveness of the safeguards

Before the HAZOP analysis is closed, it is important to make sure the
protections are functioning properly. Confirming the efficiency of present
protective measures is a crucial step for a specific deviation or scenario,
however it is simple to misuse this information in HAZOP efforts. Examples
include check valves that aren't regularly inspected, alarms that aren't given
enough time to be addressed, safety interlocks that aren't separate from
process control, and a lapse in SOP application. All of these safeguards are
thought to be ineffective. Various organisations have different acceptable risk
thresholds and risk management philosophies. A corporation should adopt its
own risk regulations and formal HAZOP processes to ensure that they are
carried out consistently
Coming Up with Recommendations

if any HAZOP problem is found to be related to any of the following

circumstances, engineering recommendations should be given:
significant impact on the process or hazard , inadequate administrative or
safety measures to lessen the impact , There is a serious operability worry but
no safety danger.
inadequate adherence to industry standards or corporate rules When crafting
the recommendations, be sure to include the following essential elements: 1) a
precise problem definition and technical context highlighting the problem's
importance 2) Be succinct but detailed when describing specifics like
equipment and pipe numbers. 3) Specify the area that need improvement and
the workable solutions the team has developed in accordance with the
anticipated timeline.

CONCLUSION
This paper examines the value of HAZOP analysis and current problems in
contemporary companies. The traditional HAZOP technique has been
employed as a qualitative risk evaluation method for decades. This method
heavily relies on prior knowledge or brainstorming, which can result in
erroneous hazard identification and serious accident consequences. By
emphasising important effect aspects and offering a quantitatively integrated
framework with the lessons learned from traditional industrial instances, this
paper seeks to increase the breadth and accuracy of HAZOP analysis.
In the study that is being given, two categories of impact variables—
prerequisite factors and assurance elements—are rigorously analysed.
Technical conditions, HAZOP team management, execution strategy, and HSE
culture make up the former and are the cornerstones of HAZOP analysis. Even
though the latter is connected to systematic PSI data, quantitative for long-
term HAZOP optimization, analytical frameworks and efficient accident
evaluation are required. an extensive case examination utilising a semi-
quantitative technique (such as a risk matrix and LOPA components) were
shown.
To produce the best results with the least amount of time investment,
application concerns relating to resource allocation and efficiency
improvement can be investigated in future study. In the interim, further in-
depth research can be done on various project types, from newly constructed
to special revamped ones, to establish tailored HAZOP tactics. It should be
highlighted that the HAZOP framework should act more as a concept for
solving problems than as a single instrument. To solve more general problems,
it would be effective to apply HAZOP technique to other sectors.
Enterprise HAZOP analysis will have a greater impact with improved accident
prevention and risk awareness in the broader industrial environment thanks to
management of the essential factors and an integrated quantitative approach.