G.R. No. 9116, September 19, 1914

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Supreme Court of the Philippines

28 Phil. 44

G.R. No. 9116, September 19, 1914


ROSENDO PALAD ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. MARIANO CUI, AS
JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE PROVINCE OF
TAYABAS, AND BALDOMERO CALATRAVA, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

MORELAND, J.:
In this proceeding it is prayed that a writ of mandamus issue
directing the respondent Mariano Cui, as judge of the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Tayabas, to approve a proposed bill of
exceptions in civil case No. 600 of that court, and thereby allow an
appeal to the Supreme Court for a review of the judgment, orders,
and decrees of the court in that action.
The complaint also prays, that this court, if it find an appeal from
the judgment, orders, and decrees aforesaid will, not lie, issue a writ
of certiorari, directed to the judge aforesaid to certify to this court a
complete transcript of the record of the court in the cause, so that
the acts of the court may be reviewed and their legality determined
as provided by law; and that the orders and decrees specified
therein be declared null and void as having been made without or in
excess of jurisdiction.
It appears undisputed that on the 10th of January, 1911, Baldomero
Calatrava began an action against the plaintiffs in this case for the
summary possession of real estate in the justice's court of Sariaya,
Tayabas, of which lands, it was alleged, defendants in that case had
deprived the plaintiff by one of the means described in section 80 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. The action was tried and decision
rendered by the justice's court in favor of the plaintiff and
possession of the lands was duly awarded. The defendants appealed
to the Court of First Instance.
After the perfection of the appeal the plaintiff Calatrava reproduced
in the Court of First Instance the complaint which he had filed in
the justice's court, which, after having been amended in some
particulars unimportant here, was received by that court as the
complaint in the case.
On the 16th day of October, 1911, Calatrava, the plaintiff, was
notified by the clerk of the court that the case had been put on the
calendar for trial on the 2d day of November, 1911. There appears
in the record a certificate of such service signed by the clerk in the
following form:
"This 16th day of October, 1911, notices were sent by
mail to Baldomero Calatrava and Rosendo Palad at
Sariaya, notifying them that the present case was set
down on the calendar of the court for the 2d day of
November, 1911."
On the 28th day of October, 1911, the defendants filed a demurrer
to the complaint. It does not appear that a copy of this demurrer was
served upon the attorney for the plaintiff or upon the plaintiff
himself.
On the 2d of November the case was duly called for a hearing upon
the demurrer and the latter having been considered by the court was
sustained and the complaint dismissed. On the same day notice of
the decision was sent by the clerk of the court to the plaintiff,
Calatrava, service of which is certified by the clerk by the following
added to the bottom of the order sustaining the demurrer and
dismissing the complaint:
"This 2d day of November, 1911, a copy of the foregoing
order was sent to plaintiff at Sariaya."
On the 30th of November, 1912, more than one year after the
rendition of the judgment and notice of the same as aforesaid, said
Court of First Instance, but with a different judge presiding, set
aside the order sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the
complaint and reinstated the cause, basing its action upon the
ground that the order sustaining the demurrer had been made and
the cause dismissed without notice to the plaintiff. This order of the
court seems to have been notified to both parties in the case, for,
later, we see the defendants in pursuance thereof answering the
complaint without objection and proceeding with the preparation of
the cause for trial. Issue was later duly joined and the cause tried,
the court rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants.
Portions of the judgment of the court material to the questions
before us are as follows:
"The court finds and decides that the plaintiff is the sole
owner and legitimate possessor of the lands in question,
with a perfect right to the possession of the same and that
the defendants have been unjustly detaining the said lands
since the 3d day of January, 1911.
*******
"That the defendants, their agents and servants, are for
ever prohibited from interfering in any manner whatever
with the plaintiff in the possession of said lands.
*******
"The right is reserved to the plaintiff of bringing an action
against the defendants for the recovery of the value of the
product of said lands and damages resulting from the
detention thereof."
We are of the opinion that mandamus will not lie. The action in the
justice's court was one merely for the summary recovery of the
possession of land and had nothing to do directly with the
determination of the ownership thereof
The case was appealed to the Court of First Instance and was tried
upon the same theory. It has been held by this court, the writer of
this opinion dissenting, that a third instance, that is, an appeal to the
Supreme Court, does not lie in summary proceedings.
That being1 so, no appeal lies in this case from the judgment of the
Court of First Instance, and, accordingly, the petition for the writ
ordering that an appeal be allowed must be denied.
We are also of the opinion that the petitioners are not entitled to the
writ of certiorari as prayed for. We regard the action of the Court of
First Instance vacating the order sustaining the demurrer and
dismissing the action as within its jurisdiction. If the notice of the
hearing of the cause on the 2d of November, 1911, had been given
as required by law our judgment would have been different. In such
case the order would have become final long before the order
vacating it was made and the court would have been without
jurisdiction in the premises upon the showing made.
As will be observed, however, the notice was given by the clerk to
the plaintiff in the case and not to his attorney.
The plaintiff had appeared in the justice's court by E. A. Gala, an
attorney and counselor at law of Lucena, Tayabas, and had also
appeared in the Court of First Instance on appeal by the same
attorney, who signed the complaint. It is the general rule that where
a party appears by attorney in an action or proceeding in a court of
record, all notices thereafter required to be given in the action or
proceeding must be given to the attorney and not the client; and that
a notice given to the client and not to his attorney is not a notice in
law. (Rules 3 and 12, Courts of First Instance.) As a necessary
consequence, the demurrer was sustained and the action was
dismissed without legal notice to the party interested. This being the
case, the plaintiff could apply within a reasonable time after
discovering the dismissal of his action for the vacation of the
dismissing order and the reinstatement of the cause. This was in
fact done soon after the discovery, and we are of the opinion that
the court had jurisdiction to make the order which it made.
There appear to be, however, certain references in the judgment of
the court which seem to decide the question of ownership and
which seem also to have been made upon the theory that the
ownership of the property in question was necessarily determined
by that judgment. We have already quoted those parts of the
decision which seem to do this. In so far as they in any way affect
the title to the land in question, they are beyond the jurisdiction of
the court to make and must be held to be void.
It is a principle established by decisions of this court that, on an
appeal In summary proceedings, the Court of First Instance has no
wider jurisdiction or greater powers than had the justice's court
from which the appeal was taken. A justice of the peace having in
summary proceedings no jurisdiction to determine the title to land,
the Court of First Instance has no such power on an appeal.
The petition for mandamus is, therefore, denied, as is also the
petition for a writ of certiorari except as herein above stated, with
costs.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Batas.org

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