[G.R. No. L-6120. June 30, 1953.

CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, Petitioner, v. FELICISIMO OCAMPO, as Judge-at-

large presiding over Branch C of the Court of First Instance of Manila and
EUGENIO ANGELES, as City Fiscal of Manila, representing the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Claro M. Recto for Petitioner.

City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ASSESSORS; TRIAL WITH AID OF ASSESSORS, A

SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT. — The right to a trial by assessors is substantive in the sense that
it must be created and defined by express enactment as opposed to a mere remedy
devised to enforce such right or obtain redress therefor. The trial with the aid of assessors
as granted by section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 2477 of the old
Charter of Manila are parts of substantive law and as such are not embraced by the rule-
making power of the Supreme Court. This is so because in said section 154 this matter
is referred to as a right given by law to a party litigant. Section 1477 of the Administrative
Code of 1917 is couched in such a manner that a similar right is implied when invoked
by a party litigant. It says that the aid may be invoked in the manner provided in the
Code of Civil Procedure. And this right has been declared absolute and substantial by the
Supreme Court in several cases where the aid of assessors had been invoked (Berbari v.
Concepcion Et. Al., 40 Phil., 320; Colegio de San Jose v. Sison, 56 Phil., 344).

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBSTANTIVE MATTER, DISTINGUISHED FROM PROCEDURAL. — A

substantive law creates, defines or regulates rights concerning life, liberty or property,
or the powers of agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of public affairs,
whereas rules of procedure are provisions prescribing the method by which substantive
rights may be enforced in courts of justice. (1 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
1952 ed., p. 4; Bustos v. Lucero, 46 Off. Gaz., Jan. supp., pp. 445, 448.)

3. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; ASSESSORS; TRIAL; RIGHT TO ASSESSORS STILL EXISTS

IN MANILA AND IN PROVINCES. — The promulgation of the Rules of Court did not have
the effect of repealing the provisions on assessors embodied in the Code of Civil
Procedure. These provisions have not been incorporated by the Supreme Court in the
present Rules of Court because they are substantive in nature. This remedy may be
invoked not only in Manila but in all other places where it existed prior to the promulgation
of the Rules of Court. The provisions on assessors embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure
are still in force and the same may still be invoked in the light of the provisions of section
49 of Republic Act No. 409.

DECISION

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This is a petition which seeks to prohibit respondent Judge from proceeding with the
trial of two criminal cases which were then pending against petitioner without the
assistance of assessors in accordance with the provisions of section 49 of Republic Act
No. 409 in relation to section 154 of Act No. 190, and as an auxiliary remedy, to have a
writ of preliminary injunction issued so that the trial may be held pending until further
orders of this court.
This petition was originally filed with the Court of Appeals, but was later certified to this
court on the ground that the main basis of the petition is section 49 of Republic Act No.
409, otherwise known as Revised Charter of the City of Manila, approved on June 18,
1949, and respondents assail the constitutionality of said section in that it contravenes
the constitutional provision that the rules of court "shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade . . ." (Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution.)

Petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila with two statutory
offenses, namely, (1) with a violation of Commonwealth Act No. 606, which was
docketed as criminal case No. 18374, in that he knowingly chartered a vessel of
Philippine registry to an alien without the approval of the President of the Philippines
and (2) with a violation of section 129 in relation to section 2713 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 18375, in that he failed
to submit to the Collector of Customs the manifests and certain authenticated
documents for the vessel "Antarctic" and failed to obtain the necessary clearance from
the Bureau of Customs prior to the departure of said vessel for a foreign port.

On April 23, 1952, before the trial of said criminal cases, petitioner filed a motion
praying that assessors be appointed to assist the court in considering the questions of
fact involved in said cases as authorized by section 49 of Republic Act No. 409,
otherwise known as Revised Charter of the City of Manila, which provides that "the aid
of assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the Municipal Court, or the
Court of First Instance, within the City, may be invoked in the manner provided in the
Code of Civil Procedure." This motion was opposed by the City Fiscal who appeared for
the People of the Philippines.

On April 28, 1952, the court issued an order denying the motion holding in effect that
with the promulgation of the Rules of Court by the Supreme Court, which became
effective on July 1, 1940, all rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts of the Philippines previously existing were not only superseded but expressly
repealed, that the Supreme Court, having been vested with the rule- making power,
expressly omitted the portions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding assessors in
said Rules of Court, and that the reference to said statute by section 49 of Republic Act
No. 409 on the provisions regarding assessors should be deemed as a mere surplusage.
Believing that this order is erroneous, petitioner now comes to this court imputing
abuse of discretion to the respondent Judge.

The issues now posed by petitioner are: jg c:ch an rob les.com.p h

"I. The right of the petitioner to a trial with the aid of assessors is an absolute
substantive right, and the duty of the court to provide assessors is mandatory.

"II. The right to trial with the aid of assessors, being substantive right, cannot be
impaired by this court in the exercise of its rule-making power.

"III. Section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 2477 of the Old Charter of
Manila, creating the right to trial with the aid of assessors, are substantive law and
were not repealed by Rules of Court.

"IV. Granting without admitting that the provisions on assessors of the Code of Civil
Procedure and the old Charter of Manila were impliedly repealed, nevertheless, the
same provisions were later reenacted by reference in section 49 of the Revised Charter
of Manila, which is now the source of the right to trial with the aid of assessors and
which refers to the Code of Civil Procedure merely to indicate the procedure for
appointing assessors.

"V. Section 49 of the Revised Charter of Manila is not invalid class legislation and does
not violate the constitutional provision that the rules of pleading, practice and
procedure ’shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade.’"

A brief summary of the historical background of the legislation regarding trial with the
aid of assessors in the Philippines may be of help in the determination of the issues
posed by petitioner. The first provision which allowed trial with the aid of assessors in
civil cases in inferior courts and Courts of First Instance is contained in Act No. 190 of
the Philippine Commission, otherwise known as the Code of Civil Procedure, which took
effect on October 1, 1901 (Sections 58-62; 154-161). Almost simultaneously, or on
October 17, 1901, the trial with the aid of assessors both in civil and criminal cases was
allowed in the Manila courts upon the enactment of Act No. 267, amending Act No. 183,
the original Charter of Manila. In 1914, the trial by assessors was allowed in criminal
cases in the courts of first instance in the provinces with the enactment of Act No.
2369. And in 1915, Act No. 2520 was passed extending the same trial by assessors to
the courts of first instance and justice of the peace courts in the Department of
Mindanao and Sulu.

In connection with the use of assessors in Manila, section 44 of Act No. 183, the
original Charter of Manila, as amended by section 13 of Act No. 267, was reenacted as
section 2449 of the Administrative Code 1916, Act No. 2657. Section 2449 of the
Administrative Code of 1916 became section 2477 of Act No. 2711, otherwise known as
the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. And section 2477 in turn became section 49
of the Republic Act No. 409, which is the present Charter of the City of Manila. This
section 49 is the law now invoked by petitioner in support of his claim to a trial With the
aid of assessors in the two criminal cases now pending against him. Its pertinent
provisions are quoted hereunder for ready reference: jg c:ch an rob les.com .p h

"SEC. 49. Assessors in the courts in the city. — The aid of assessors in the trial of any
civil or criminal action in the municipal court, or the Court of First Instance, within the
city, may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. It shall be
the duty of the Municipal Board to prepare one list of the names of twenty-five
residents of the City best fitted by education, natural ability and reputation for probity
to sit as assessors in the trial of actions in the municipal court and a like list of persons
to sit as assessors in the trial of the action in the Court of First Instance. The Board
may at any time strike any name from the list so prepared, by reason of the death,
permanent disability, or unfitness of the person named; and in case names are so
stricken out, other names shall be added in their place, to be selected as in this section
provided. Parties desiring to avail themselves of the use of assessors in the municipal or
Court of First Instance shall proceed as provided for by law or rules of court; and the
method of summoning assessors, enforcing their attendance, excusing them from
attendance, their compensation, oath duties and effect of dissent from the opinion of
the judges shall be as provided in those laws or rules." cralaw virt u a1 aw lib rary

A careful analysis of the above provisions is interesting. Their most salient features are:
The aid of assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the Municipal Court for
the Court of First Instance may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil
Procedure. The parties desiring to avail themselves of the use of assessors "shall
proceed as provided for by law or rules of court", and "the method of summoning
assessors, enforcing their attendance, excusing them from attendance, their
compensation, oath, duties, and effect of the dissent from the opinion of the judge shall
be as provided in those laws or rules." If we are to be guided merely by these
provisions, the right to trial with the aid of assessor would seem to be beyond dispute.
These provisions are simple and clear and appear to be mandatory. But where the
difficulty arises is in their relation or bearing on the directive of the Constitution which
provides that "the existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared rules of courts subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same." Pursuant to this rule-making power, the
Supreme Court promulgated the present Rules of Court, which became effective on July
1, 1940, but because it failed to incorporate therein the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure on assessors, respondents now contend that the right to trial with the aid of
assessors, with all its concomitant provisions, cannot now be invoked because, being
procedural in nature, the same must be deemed to have been impliedly eliminated.

This claim would be correct if we were to hold that the right to trial with the aid of
assessors is not substantive but procedural or adjective in nature. If it were merely
procedural, not having been incorporated in the Rules of Court, the logical conclusion is
that the rule-making power has deemed wise to eliminate it. But no such presumption,
nor conclusion, can be drawn for the reason that the right to a trial by assessors is
substantive in the sense that it must be created and defined by express enactment as
opposed to a mere remedy devised to enforce such right or obtain redress therefor.
"Rules of procedure should be distinguished from substantive law. A substantive law
creates, defines or regulates rights concerning life, liberty or property, or the powers of
agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of public affairs, whereas rules of
procedure are provisions prescribing the method by which substantive rights may be
enforced in courts of justice." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. I, 1952
ed., p. 4.)

In Bustos v. Lucero, * (46 Off. Gaz., January Supp., pp. 445, 448), this Court cited with
approval the following definitions of substantive law: jg c:ch an rob les.com .p h

"Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be
said to be synonymous. Substantive rights in a term which includes those rights which
one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. (60 C. J.
980.)

"Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or
which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of
the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial
law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their
invasions (36 C. J. 27; 52 C. J. S. 1026)." cralaw v irt u a1 aw l ib rary

The trial with the aid of assessors as granted by section 154 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and section 2477 of the old Charter of Manila are parts of substantive law
and as such are not embraced by the rule making power of the Supreme Court. This is
so because in said section 154 this matter is referred to as a right given by law to a
party litigant. Section 2477 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is couched in such a
manner that a similar right is implied when invoked by a party litigant. It says that the
aid may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. And this
right has been declared absolute and substantial by this Court in several cases where
the aid of assessors had been invoked (Berbari v. Concepcion, Et Al., 40 Phil., 320;
Colegio de San Jose v. Sison, 54 Phil., 344). Thus, it was there said that these
provisions "necessarily lead to the conclusion that the intervention of the assessors is
not an empty formality which may be disregarded without violating either the letter or
the spirit of the law. It is another security given by the law to the litigants, and as such,
it is a substantial right of which they cannot be deprived without vitiating all the
proceedings. Were we to agree that for one reason or another the trial by assessors
may be done away with, the same line of reasoning would force us to admit that the
parties litigant may be deprived of their right to be represented by counsel, to appear
and be present at the hearings, and so on, to the extent of omitting the trial in a civil
case, and thus set at naught the essential rights granted by the law to the parties, with
consequent nullity of the proceedings." (Colegio de San Jose v. Sison, 54 Phil., 344,
349.)

Being substantive in nature, it is not difficult to see why the provisions concerning trial
by assessors embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure have not been incorporated by
the Supreme Court in the present Rules of Court. To have done so, it would have been
a travesty of its rule-making power which, by direct mandate of the Constitution, is
limited to matters referring to pleading, practice and procedure. The application that
the respondents draw from the failure to incorporate these provisions in the present
Rules of Court to the effect that the intention was to eliminate them or repeal them all
together cannot, therefore, stand in the light of the observations and authorities we
have above adverted to.

There is a point in the claim that the provisions concerning trial by assessors embodied
in the Code of Civil Procedure are not wholly substantive but portions thereof are
remedial such as those which refer to the method of summoning assessors, enforcing
their attendance, excusing them from attendance, their compensation, oath, duties and
effect of dissent from the opinion of the judge, as to which no cogent reason is seen for
their non-incorporation if the intent is not to eliminate them from the Rules of Court.
This is true; but it is likewise true that because said remedial provisions are inextricably
interwoven with the substantive part, it must have been deemed wise and proper to
leave them as they were for reasons of coordination and expediency, it being a truism
that the one cannot be detached from the other. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Remedial
measures are but implementary in character and they must be appended to the portion
of the law to which they belong. Mention should be made here that not all of the
provisions appearing in the Code of Civil Procedure are remedial in nature, such as
those pertaining to prescription, the requisites for making a will, and the succession of
the estate of an adopted child, which are admittedly substantive in character and for
that reason were not incorporated in the Rules of Court. To this group belong the
provisions under consideration.

Granting arguendo that the provisions on assessors of the Code of Civil Procedure and
even in the old Charter of Manila are purely remedial in nature and because of the
failure to incorporate them in the Rules of Court they are deemed to have been
impliedly repealed as claimed by respondents, we are of the opinion that they can still
he invoked by a litigant upon the theory that they had been reaffirmed and reenacted
by Republic Act No. 409, which was approved in 1949, or nine years after the Rules of
Court became effective. As already stated, section 49 of said Act states that the aid of
assessors may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. It
likewise states that the parties desiring to avail themselves of the use of assessors shall
proceed as provided for by law. The mention made of the Code of Civil Procedure in
said section indicates in itself a re-enactment or incorporation by reference of the
provisions concerning assessors contained in said law. Congress, whose members were
mostly lawyers, must be presumed to know that at the time said Act was approved the
Rules of Court had already been promulgated without incorporating therein the
provisions concerning the aid to assessors, and fully cognizant of this situation, and not
desiring to omit this right granted to a litigant, they must have deemed it wise and
proper to re-enact them by reference in said section 49. This Congress can do, for,
while our Constitution has given the power to adopt rules of procedure to the Supreme
Court, such grant did not preclude Congress from enacting any procedural law or
altering, amending, or supplementing any of the rules that may be promulgated by the
Supreme Court (Section 13, Article VIII, Philippine Constitution).

The practice of making such reference has long been sanctioned. Our Congress did this
not only in connection with courts in the City of Manila. It also did it in connection with
courts in Quezon City (Republic Act No. 537). Statutes which refer to other statutes and
make them applicable to the subject for legislation are called "reference statutes."
These statutes are frequently used "to avoid encumbering the statute books by
unnecessary repetition, and they have frequently been recognized as an approved
method of legislation, in the absence of constitutional restrictions." [50 Am. Jur. 57;
Gruen v. Tax Commission, 211 P. (2d) (1949) 651, 666.]

Again, it has been held that "The adoption of an earlier statute by reference makes it as
much as a part of the latter act as though it had been incorporated at full length. This is
true of a legislative act which refers to another act for the procedure to be taken." (50
Am. Jur. 58.) The reference in Republic Act No. 409 to the provisions on assessors must
be deemed, therefore, to have incorporated therein the pertinent provisions on the
matter contained in the Code of Civil Procedure in much the same manner as if the
whole provisions had been reproduced. Consistent with this theory, we cannot but hold
that the observations made by respondents to the effect that the reference made to
said provisions in section 49 is a mere surplusage, or was due to a mere oversight, has
no legal basis, as such innuendo would be tantamount to imputing lack of foresight, if
not brazen negligence, to our legislative body.

It is finally contended that section 49 of Republic Act No. 409 is unconstitutional

because it violates the constitutional provisions that procedural rules "shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade" and, therefore, it is a class legislation. This contention
cannot be entertained: firstly, because it is raised for the first time in this instance, a
procedural defect which would bar any further discussion on the matter following well-
known precedents 1 and, secondly, because it is not correct that at present only in
Manila trial with the aid of assessors may be invoked if we will sustain the theory that
the promulgation of the Rules of Court did not have the effect of repealing the
provisions on assessors embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure.

The contention of respondents — we reckon — is predicated on the assumption that the

provisions on assessors of the Code of Civil Procedure had been impliedly repealed.
Such is not the case. We have already pointed out that the basic provisions on the
matter partake of the nature of substantive law and as such they were left intact by the
Supreme Court. The corollary to this conclusion is that this remedy may be invoked out
only in Manila but in all other places where it existed prior to the promulgation of the
Rules of Court. This is true in civil cases. With regard to criminal cases, we have seen
that they are allowed by Act No. 2369; and we have already said that the same remedy
may be invoked in the cities of Cebu, Iloilo and Quezon, with the particularity that their
charters make express reference, either directly or indirectly, to the provisions of the
code of Civil Procedure. With this historical background, the claim that under the theory
we have entertained the trial with the aid of assessors can only be invoked in the City
of Manila is certainly without merit.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the provisions on assessors embodied in the
Code of Civil Procedure are still in force and that the same may still be invoked in the
light of the provisions of section 49 of Republic Act No. 409. It is therefore our opinion
that the respondent Judge acted with abuse of discretion in denying petitioner his right
to the aid of assessors in the trial of the two criminal cases now pending in the Court of
First Instance of Manila.

Wherefore, petition is hereby granted, without pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Jugo and Labrador, JJ.,
concur.

Separate Opinions

REYES, J., concurring: ch an rob 1 es virt u al 1 aw lib rary

In view of section 49 of Republic Act No. 409, approved June 18, 1949, authorizing the
use of assessors in the trial of civil and criminal cases in the city of Manila, I concur in
the result.
 G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017

SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. Y ASUELA, Petitioner, v. HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO,

PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 3, LEGAZPI
CITY, ALBAY, AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition1 is the constitutionality of

Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002,"2 which provides:

SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this Act
regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on
plea-bargaining.3
The facts are not in dispute.

Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No.
13586 for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous
Drugs). The Information alleged: ch an Rob lesv irt u alLaw lib rary

That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any regulated drug and without the
corresponding license or prescription, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have, in his possession and under his control and custody, one (1) piece
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked as VOP 03/21/16-1G containing 0.084
[gram] of white crystalline substance, which when examined were found to be positive
for Methamphetamine Hydrocloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea
Bargaining Agreement,5 praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a
plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of
Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with
a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal
quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued that Section 23 of
R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2
thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among the
three equal branches of the government.

In its Comment or Opposition6 dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for the
denial of the motion for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to
be justified by the Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea
bargaining. Later, in a Comment or Opposition7 dated June 29, 2016, it manifested that
it "is open to the Motion of the accused to enter into plea bargaining to give life to the
intent of the law as provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.] 9165, however,
with the express mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea bargaining,
[it] is left without any choice but to reject the proposal of the accused."

On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's motion. It was
opined:ch an Rob lesvirt u alL awlib rary

The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which prohibits plea
bargaining, encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules of procedure because plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure." Indeed,
plea bargaining forms part of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly under Rule
118, the rule on pre-trial conference. It is only the Rules of Court promulgated by the
Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power that breathes life to
plea bargaining. It cannot be found in any statute.

Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is
unconstitutional because it, in effect, suspends the operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of
Court insofar as it allows plea bargaining as part of the mandatory pre-trial conference
in criminal cases.

The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the intendment of
the law, R.A. No. 9165, to rehabilitate an accused of a drug offense. Rehabilitation is
thus only possible in cases of use of illegal drugs because plea bargaining is disallowed.
However, by case law, the Supreme Court allowed rehabilitation for accused charged
with possession of paraphernalia with traces of dangerous drugs, as held in People v.
Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13 December 2010. The ruling of the Supreme Court in this
case manifested the relaxation of an otherwise stringent application of Republic Act No.
9165 in order to serve an intent for the enactment of the law, that is, to rehabilitate the
offender.

Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there might be plausible basis
for the declaration of Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which bars plea bargaining as
unconstitutional because indeed the inclusion of the provision in the law encroaches on
the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court.

While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from resolving, whenever
warranted, constitutional questions, the Court is not unaware of the admonition of the
Supreme Court that lower courts must observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions. Upon which admonition, it is thus not for this lower court to
declare Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional given the potential ramifications that
such declaration might have on the prosecution of illegal drug cases pending before this
judicial station.8
Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order 9 dated July
26, 2016; hence, this petition raising the issues as follows:ch an Rob lesvirt u alLa wlib rary

I.

WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH PROHIBITS PLEA

BARGAINING IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR
BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE
LAW.

II.

WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT

ENCROACHED UPON THE POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES OF
PROCEDURE.

III.

WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO,

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DECLARE SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
9165 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.10
We grant the petition.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
contends that the petition should be dismissed outright for being procedurally defective
on the grounds that: (1) the Congress should have been impleaded as an indispensable
party; (2) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be attacked
collaterally; and (3) the proper recourse should have been a petition for declaratory
relief before this Court or a petition for certiorari before the RTC. Moreover, the OSG
argues that the petition fails to satisfy the requisites of judicial review because: (1)
Estipona lacks legal standing to sue for failure to show direct injury; (2) there is no
actual case or controversy; and (3) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165
is not the lis mota of the case.

On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe correct. Nonetheless,
without much further ado, it must be underscored that it is within this Court's power to
make exceptions to the rules of court. Under proper conditions, We may permit the full
and exhaustive ventilation of the parties' arguments and positions despite the supposed
technical infirmities of a petition or its alleged procedural flaws. In discharging its
solemn duty as the final arbiter of constitutional issues, the Court shall not shirk from
its obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching
implications.11

Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when issues
of substantial and transcendental importance are present.12 We have acknowledged
that the Philippines' problem on illegal drugs has reached "epidemic," "monstrous," and
"harrowing" proportions,13 and that its disastrously harmful social, economic, and
spiritual effects have broken the lives, shattered the hopes, and destroyed the future of
thousands especially our young citizens.14 At the same time, We have equally noted
that "as urgent as the campaign against the drug problem must be, so must we as
urgently, if not more so, be vigilant in the protection of the rights of the accused as
mandated by the Constitution x x x who, because of excessive zeal on the part of the
law enforcers, may be unjustly accused and convicted."15 Fully aware of the gravity of
the drug menace that has beset our country and its direct link to certain crimes, the
Court, within its sphere, must do its part to assist in the all-out effort to lessen, if not
totally eradicate, the continued presence of drug lords, pushers and users. 16

Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this petition, technical
matters should not deter Us from having to make the final and definitive
pronouncement that everyone else depends for enlightenment and guidance. 17 When
public interest requires, the Court may brush aside procedural rules in order to resolve
a constitutional issue.18
x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the application of the rules of
procedure as a necessary complement of its power to promulgate the same. Barnes v.
Hon. Quijano Padilla discussed the rationale for this tenet, viz.:ch an Rob lesvirt u alLawlib rar y

Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The
power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to
alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final, x x x.

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules
must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice. 19
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

Rule-making power of the Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution

Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides: ch an Rob lesvirt u alL awlib rary

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive
domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative
departments.20 In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice,21 then Associate Justice (later
Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puna traced the history of the Court's rule-making power and
highlighted its evolution and development.
x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence,
for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will
lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of
justice." Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it
enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it
appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of
Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:ch an Rob lesvirt u alLaw lib rary

"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.
Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to
the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have
the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines."
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its
surface. In In re: Cunanan Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the
Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act
of 1953 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar
examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar
examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr.
Justice Diokno held that "x x x the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment - a
judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar
candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments
even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the
legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these
departments would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in
question." The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate
power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the
law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other
authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this
Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission
to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For
the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be
repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x." More completely,
Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
ch an Rob lesvirt u alLawl ib rary

xxxx

"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers. x x x x

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may
be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights."
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence
of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the
integration of the Bar.

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary.
Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article
VIII provides:

xxx
"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court."
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was
given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to
disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most
importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court
with Congress, more so with the Executive. x x x22
Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)23 further
elucidated:ch an Rob les virt u alLa wlib rary

While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts
is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5
(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

xxxx

In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its
rule-making authority, which, under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, had been priorly
subjected to a power-sharing scheme with Congress. As it now stands, the 1987
Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent
power of Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's
rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a
"[s]tronger and more independent judiciary."

The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show that the
Framers debated on whether or not the Court's rule making powers should be shared
with Congress. There was an initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The National
Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and
concurrence of the Supreme Court," right after the phrase "Promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and
legal assistance to the underprivileged[,]" in the enumeration of powers of the Supreme
Court. Later, Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence
and, instead, after the word "[under]privileged," place a comma(,) to be followed by
"the phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually, a compromise
formulation was reached wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to Commissioner
Aquino's proposal to delete the phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or
supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court" and
(b) in turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase
with the concurrence of the National Assembly." The changes were approved,
thereby leading to the present lack of textual reference to any form of
Congressional participation in Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. The prevailing
consideration was that "both bodies, the Supreme Court and the Legislature,
have their inherent powers."

Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure. x x x.24
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has
erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. 25 The other branches
trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal,
alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.26 Viewed from
this perspective, We have rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress, in
the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:ch an Rob lesvirt u alLa wlib rary

1. Fabian v. Desierto27 - Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an
administrative disciplinary case should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the
provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as
provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.

2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc.28 - The

Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons under
Rule 14 of the Rules.

3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal
Fees;29Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Han.
Judge Cabato-Cortes;30In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from
Payment of Filing/Docket Fees;31 and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al.32 -
Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt from
the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.

4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)33 - The first paragraph of Section

14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts except the Supreme Court from issuing
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin an
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, Is unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule
58 of the Rules.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted
its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the
exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the
Court's authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive
and one of the safeguards of Our institutional independence. 34

Plea bargaining in criminal cases

Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing in our jurisdiction since July
1, 1940, when the 1940 Rules took effect. Section 4, Rule 114 (Pleas) of which
stated:ch an Rob les virt u alL awlib rary

SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. - The defendant, with the consent of the court
and of the fiscal, may plead guilty of any lesser offense than that charged which is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the complaint or information.
When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964, the same provision was
retained under Rule 118 (Pleas). Subsequently, with the effectivity of the 1985 Rules on
January 1, 1985, the provision on plea of guilty to a lesser offense was amended.
Section 2, Rule 116 provided: ch an Rob lesvirt u alL awlib rar y

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused with the consent of the
offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a
lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime
charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No
amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (4a, R-118)
As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first mentioned and expressly required during
pre-trial. Section 2, Rule 118 mandated: ch an Rob lesvirt u alL awlib rar y

SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. - The pre-trial conference shall consider the
following: ch an Rob lesvirt u alLaw lib rary

(a) Plea bargaining;

(b) Stipulation of facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (n)
The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of Section 2, Rule 118 was
retained, Section 2, Rule 116 was modified in 1987. A second paragraph was added,
stating that "[a] conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the
offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy."

When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998") was enacted,35 Section 2, Rule 118 of
the Rules was substantially adopted. Section 2 of the law required that plea bargaining
and other matters36 that will promote a fair and expeditious trial are to be considered
during pre-trial conference in all criminal cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the
Sandiganbayan.

Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the 2000 Rules37 are quoted
below:ch an Rob lesvirt u alLa wlib rary

RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the
consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to
plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged.
After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to
said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)

RULE 118 (Pre-trial):

SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases cognizable by

the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after
arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or
circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following: ch an Rob lesvirt u alLa wlib rary

(a) plea bargaining;

(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a
lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil
aspects of the case. (Sec. 2 & 3, Cir. 38-98)
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure

The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is
limited to the preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish,
increase or modify the latter.38 "Substantive law is that part of the law which creates,
defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a
cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as
opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights
or obtain redress for their invasions."39Fabian v. Hon. Desierto40 laid down the test for
determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in nature.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes
which are procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and
those which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context
and substantive in another. It is admitted that what is procedural and what is
substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty. It is not, however, an
insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the
context of our own procedural and jurisdictional system.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the
test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a
vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal,
it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.41
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates
substantive rights. For example, in People v. Lacson,42 Section 8, Rule 117 of
the Rules on provisional dismissal was held as a special procedural limitation qualifying
the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right
or as an inherent part thereof, so that its expiration operates to extinguish the right of
the State to prosecute the accused.43 Speaking through then Associate Justice Romeo J.
Callejo, Sr., the Court opined:ch an Rob lesvirt u alL awlib rary

In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of
one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the
express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-
bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court
balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy
disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It
took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due
process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to
revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the
offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown
that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of
justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-
bar.

The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and
approved by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal
justice system and the rights to due process of the State and the accused by
eliminating the deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal
cases on motion of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no time-
bar for the revival thereof or with a specific or definite period for such revival by the
public prosecutor. There were times when such criminal cases were no longer revived
or refiled due to causes beyond the control of the public prosecutor or because of the
indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of
the State and the accused despite the mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to
expedite criminal proceedings.

It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually

operates in his favor, especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and
conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant cases have
been known to expire.

The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the
capacity of the State to prove its case with the disappearance or nonavailability of its
witnesses. Physical evidence may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have
grown dim or have faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult. The
accused may become a fugitive from justice or commit another crime. The longer the
lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is
to prove the crime.

On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does
not terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived at any time
may disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail
his association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family.
He is unable to lead a normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety.
He continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the
presumption of innocence. He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade
with the passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend himself
and thus eschew the fairness of the entire criminal justice system.

The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that
plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State
and the accused; not for the accused only.44
Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al.45 that Section 6, Rule 120 of
the Rules, which provides that an accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of
the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available against the judgment, does
not take away substantive rights but merely provides the manner through which an
existing right may be implemented.
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the
convicted accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the
accused to appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of
the judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies
against the judgment.

It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or
modifies the substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power
of the Supreme Court to "provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases." This provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy
disposition of criminal cases - delay arising from the simple expediency of
nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled promulgation of the judgment of
conviction.46
By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure
for the speedy disposition of cases in all courts47 that the rules on plea bargaining was
introduced. As a way of disposing criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea
bargaining is considered to be an "important," "essential," "highly desirable," and
"legitimate" component of the administration of justice.48 Some of its salutary effects
include:ch an Rob lesvirt u alLa wlib rary

x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading
guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious his exposure is reduced, the
correctional processes can begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are
eliminated. For the State there are also advantages - the more promptly imposed
punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the objectives of
punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources
are conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's
guilt or in which there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of
proof. (Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 [1970])

Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to prompt and largely final
disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced
idleness during pretrial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; it
protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal
conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge
and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty
when they are ultimately imprisoned. (Santobello v. New York, 404 u.s. 257, 261
[1971])

The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and
uncertainties of a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the chance to
acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in realizing whatever potential there may be
for rehabilitation. Judges and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources. The
public is protected from the risks posed by those charged with criminal offenses who
are at large on bail while awaiting completion of criminal proceedings. (Blackledge v.
Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 [1977])
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused
and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to
court approval."49 There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining.50 The
essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make
concessions to avoid potential losses.51 Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be
encouraged because the chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and finality -
can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court. 52

Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage,53 the rules on plea bargaining

neither create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to
implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and
duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress
for a disregard or infraction of them.

The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of
the prosecution's case against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency
should a guilty plea be offered and accepted.54 In any case, whether it be to the offense
charged or to a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a "serious and sobering occasion"
inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, to be heard by himself and counsel, to meet the witnesses
face to face, to bail (except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong), to be convicted by proof beyond reasonable
doubt, and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself.55

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed
by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he
prefers to go to trial.56 Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead
guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party 57 and
the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser
offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged.58 The reason for this is that
the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to
always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the
evidence on hand can sustain.59
[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute. The
reasons for judicial deference are well known. Prosecutorial charging decisions are
rarely simple. In addition to assessing the strength and importance of a case,
prosecutors also must consider other tangible and intangible factors, such as
government enforcement priorities. Finally, they also must decide how best to allocate
the scarce resources of a criminal justice system that simply cannot accommodate the
litigation of every serious criminal charge. Because these decisions "are not readily
susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake," we have
been "properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute."60
The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow
the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the
offense charged. The word may denotes an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on
whether to allow the accused to make such plea.61 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in
mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not
supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of
the accused.62

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point
when the prosecution already rested its case.63 As regards plea bargaining during the
pre-trial stage, the trial court's exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave
abuse thereof.64 "Grave abuse of discretion" is a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility; it arises when a court or
tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. 65
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or
after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the
prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime
charged.66 The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in
allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less
than the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor has submitted a comment
whether for or against said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the
prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made
his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be
served.67 The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the
prosecution's evidence.68 Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the
judge's acceptance of the defendant's change of plea is improper and irregular. 69

On whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates the equal protection clause

At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is
contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to
preempt any future discussion by the Court on the policy considerations behind Section
23 of R.A. No. 9165. Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory
provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, We deem it proper to declare as invalid
the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of
the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.

WHEREFORE, the petttton for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Section 23 of

Republic Act No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making
authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 156284 February 6, 2007

AUGUSTO GOMEZ, as Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo

Gomez, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIA RITA GOMEZ-SAMSON, MARCIAL SAMSON, JESUS B. GOMEZ, and the REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF PASIG and MARIKINA, RIZAL, Respondents.

x----------------------x

AUGUSTO GOMEZ, as Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo

Gomez, Petitioner,
vs.
ARISTON A. GOMEZ, SR. (who died during the pendency of the cases below and substituted
by his surviving wife, LUZ BAYSON GOMEZ, and children namely: ARISTON B. GOMEZ, JR.,
MA. RITA GOMEZ-SAMSON, JESUS B. GOMEZ, MA. TERESA G. BLOOM, MARIANO B.
GOMEZ, and CARLOS B. GOMEZ) and ARISTON B. GOMEZ, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Which came first, the chicken or the egg?

This age-old question has spurned millions of debates in scientific and religious circles, and has
stimulated the imagination of generations of children and adults. Many profess that they are certain
of the answer, and yet their answers are divergent.

The case at bar involves a similarly baffling question, but in significantly lesser proportions of
philosophical mystery. Petitioner claims that, in the two Deeds of Donation he is impugning, the
signatures of the donee were jotted down before the bodies of the Deeds were typewritten.
Respondents maintain that the bodies of the Deeds were encoded first, and then, a clashing
presentation of expert witnesses and circumstantial evidence ensued. Petitioner’s expert claims she
is certain of the answer: the signature came first. Respondents’ expert, on the other hand, says that
it is impossible to determine which came first accurately. As both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of respondents, petitioner is furious how these courts could adopt an opinion
that was "neither here nor there."

However, as it is with the chicken and egg riddle, is the person certain of which came first
necessarily the one who is more credible?

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision 1 and Resolution2 dated 4 September 2002
and 27 November 2002, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40391 affirming the
Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City dated 8 April 1992 in Civil Cases No.
36089 and No. 36090.

The facts of the case, as summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

On February 15, 1980, [petitioner] instituted these cases, to wit: (1) Civil Case No. 36089, entitled:
"Augusto Gomez, as Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez, Plaintiff,
versus Maria Rita Gomez-Samson, Marcial Samson, Jesus B. Gomez, and the Registers of Deeds
of Pasig and Marikina, Rizal, Defendants"; and (2) Civil Case No. 36090, entitled: "Augusto Gomez,
as Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez, Plaintiff, versus Ariston Gomez,
Sr., and Ariston B. Gomez, Jr., Defendants", both in the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City.

CONSUELO, ARISTON, SR. and Angel, all surnamed Gomez, were sister and brothers,
respectively. MARIA-RITA Gomez-Samson, JESUS Gomez and ARISTON Gomez, JR. are the
children of ARISTON, SR. while AUGUSTO Gomez is the child of Angel.

In Civil Case No. 36089, plaintiff AUGUSTO alleged in his complaint that CONSUELO, who died on
November 6, 1979, was the owner of the following real properties:
 "(a) A parcel of land, with all the improvements thereon, situated in Marikina, Metro Manila,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 340233 in her name, x x x;

"(b) A parcel of land, with all the improvements thereon, situated in Marikina, Metro Manila,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 353818 in her name, x x x,"

"(c) A parcel of land, with all the improvements thereon, situated in Pasig, Metro Manila,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 268396 in her name, x x x;"

that after the death of Consuelo, defendants Rita and Jesus fraudulently prepared and/or caused to
be prepared a Deed of Donation Intervivos; that in the said document, Consuelo donated the above
described properties to defendants Rita and Jesus; that the said defendants forged or caused to be
forged the signature of the donor, Consuelo; that the notarial acknowledgement on the said
document was antedated to April 21, 1979; that on the basis of the said document defendants
sought the cancellation of the certificates of title in the name of Consuelo and the issuance of new
ones in the names of defendants Rita and Jesus.

On the basis of the foregoing, plaintiff prayed that the Deed of Donation Intervivos be declared false,
null and void ab initio, and/or be nullified; that TCT Nos. 340233, 353818, and 268396 be reinstated
or be replaced by titles in the name of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez; and, that defendants
be ordered to pay damages, by way of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation plus costs.

On April 24, 1980, private defendants, and nominal defendants Registers of Deeds of Pasig and
Marikina, Rizal, filed their common answer, denying the material allegations in the complaint and
asserting that a copy of the deed of donation was submitted to the Notarial Section of the CFI of
Quezon City as early as July 2, 1979; that the said document is valid and not a forgery or otherwise
subject to similar infirmity; that the said document being valid, the properties covered therein passed
in ownership to private defendants, as early as April 20, 1979; that defendants have the perfect and
absolute right to cause the cancellation of TCT Nos. 340233, 353818, and 26839 and request for the
issuance of new certificates of titles in their respective names; that they have the right to use, enjoy,
possess, dispose and own these properties; that no law was violated by the nominal defendants
when the old certificates of title were cancelled and new certificates were issued in the name of the
private defendants, hence, plaintiff has no cause of action against the nominal defendants neither
has the court jurisdiction over the foregoing issue.

Defendants thereafter prayed for moral damages of ₱2,000,000.00; compensatory damages of

₱1,000,000.00; exemplary damages of ₱500,000.00; attorney’s fees of ₱200,000.00; and that
individual plaintiff be made jointly and severally liable with the estate of Consuelo Gomez.

In Civil Case No. 36090, the same plaintiff alleged in his complaint that Consuelo was also the sole
and absolute owner of the following personal properties:

(a) Seventy-five (75) common shares of stock of V-Tri Realty, Inc. with a total par value of
₱75,000.00 and covered by Stock Certificate No. 003;

(b) Eleven thousand eight hundred fifty three (11,853) common shares of stock of First
Philippine Holdings Corporation with a total par value of ₱118,530.00 covered by Stock
Certificates Nos. A-02614 (7,443 shares) and A-02613 (2,040 shares) and A-09018 (2,370
shares);

(c) Jewelries and collector’s items, contained in Consuelo Gomez’s Safe Deposit Box No. 44
at the PCI Bank, Marikina Branch, which were inventoried on January 9, 1980 per Order of
the Court in Special Proceedings No. 9164;

(d) A four-door sedan 1978 Mercedes Benz 200 with Motor No. 11593810-050706,
Serial/Chassis No. 12302050-069893, Plate No. A6-252 and LTC Registration Certificate No.
0140373 valued at ₱200,000.00, more or less at the time Consuelo Gomez died;

(e) A four-door sedan 1979 Toyota Corona with Motor No. 12RM-031643, Serial/Chassis No.
RT-130-901150, Plate No. B-09-373 and LTC Registration Certificate No. 0358757, valued
at ₱50,000.00, more or less at the time Consuelo Gomez died;
 (f) Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000.00) including accrued interests on money market
placement with the BA Finance Corporation per its promissory note No. BAT-0116 dated
March 9, 1978.

that after the death of Consuelo, defendants fraudulently prepared and/or caused to be prepared a
Deed of Donation Intervivos; that in the said document Consuelo donated the above described
properties to defendants Ariston, Sr. and Ariston, Jr.; that the said defendants forged or caused to be
forged the signature of the donor, Consuelo; that the notarial acknowledgment on the said document
was antedated to April 21, 1979; that on the basis of the said document defendant Ariston, Sr., [in]
December 1978, effected or tried to effect a change of the LTC registration of the two (2) vehicles;
that defendant Ariston, Jr., for his part, pre-terminated the money market placements with BA
Finance and received checks in the sums of ₱187,027.74 and ₱4,405.56; that with the exception of
the jewelries, which are with the bank, defendant Ariston, Sr., has benefited and will continue to
benefit from the use of the two (2) vehicles and from the dividends earned by the shares of stocks.

On the basis of the foregoing, the plaintiff prayed that the Deed of Donation Intervivos be declared
false, null and void ab initio, and/or be nullified; that defendant Ariston, Sr., be ordered to deliver the
stock certificates, jewelries, collector’s items, and vehicles in his possession plus all the cash
dividends earned by the shares of stock and reasonable compensation for the use of the two (2)
motor vehicles; that defendant Ariston, Jr. be ordered to pay the amount of ₱191,533.00 received by
him from BA Finance, with interest from the time he received the amount until he fully pays the
plaintiff; and, damages, by way of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, plus costs.

On March 19, 1980, defendants Ariston, Sr. and Ariston Jr., filed their answer, denying the material
allegations in the complaint and asserting that a copy of the Deed of Donation was submitted to the
Notarial Section of the CFI of Quezon City as early as July 2, 1979; that the said document is valid
and not a forgery or otherwise subject to similar infirmity; that the said document being valid, the
properties covered therein passed in ownership to defendants, as early as April 20, 1979; and that
defendants have the perfect and absolute right to use, enjoy, possess and own these properties.

Defendants thereafter prayed for moral damages of ₱2,000,000.00; compensatory damages of

₱1,000,000.00; exemplary damages of ₱500,000.00; attorney’s fees of ₱200,000.00; and that
individual plaintiff be made jointly and severally liable with the estate of Consuelo Gomez.

On May 27, 1980, the plaintiff filed a Motion to Consolidate, in both cases, which the trial court in
Civil Case No. 36090 granted in its Order dated June 6, 1980. Whereupon, the records of Civil Case
No. 36090 were transmitted to the RTC, Branch 23.

After appropriate proceedings, the trial court directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda thirty (30) days from their receipt of the transcript of stenographic notes.

In its joint decision dated April 8, 1992, the trial court dismissed the complaints. 3

The dispositive portion of the RTC Joint Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, it is Ordered:

1. That the instant complaints be dismissed;

2. That the replevin bonds nos. 2223, 2224, 2225, and 2226 of the Stronghold Insurance
Company, Incorporated be cancelled;

3. That Augusto Gomez and the estate of the late Consuelo Gomez, jointly and solidarily,
should pay to Ariston Gomez, Jr. the following amounts:

Moral damages of ₱1,000,000.00;

Exemplary damages of ₱250,000.00

Attorney’s fees of ₱200,000.00

And costs of suit; with legal interest on all the amounts, except on costs and attorney’s fees,
commencing from February 15, 1980, until fully paid.4
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. The latter affirmed the RTC’s Joint
Decision in the 4 September 2002 assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto.5

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in the
assailed Resolution dated 27 November 2002.

Petitioner filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, bringing forth before us the following
issues for our consideration:

1) Whether or not the instant petition presents several exceptions to the general rule that an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 may only raise questions of law and that factual findings
of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Honorable Court;

2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals’ Decision is based on a misapprehension of facts and
on inferences that are manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

3) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in its finding of fact that Consuelo
Gomez herself paid the donor’s tax of the properties subject of the donation on 09 October
1979 when the evidence on record point to the contrary;

4) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in giving credence to the testimony of
former judge Jose Sebastian, the Notary Public who notarized the assailed Deeds of
Donation;

5) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in dismissing the irregularities
apparent on the face of the assailed Deeds of Donation as mere lapses of a non-lawyer who
prepared them;

6) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in totally disregarding the very
unusual circumstances relative to the alleged totally execution and notarization of the
assailed Deeds of Donation;

7) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred and is manifestly mistaken in inferring
that respondents were able to sufficiently and substantially explain the reason for the belated
transfer of the pertinent properties covered by the assailed Deeds of Donation;

8) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred and is manifestly mistaken in not
giving due weight to the expert opinion of the NBI representative, which the lower court itself
sought; and

9) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in not finding that the totality of
circumstantial evidence presented by petitioner produced a single network of circumstances
establishing the simulation and falsification of the assailed Deeds of Donation. 6

As acknowledged by petitioner, findings of fact of the trial court, especially when upheld by the Court
of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court.7 Petitioner, however, seeks refuge in the following
established exceptions8 to this rule:

1) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible. 9

2) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts. 10

3) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. 11

4) Where the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; 12 and

5) Where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent, or where
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on absence of evidence but are
contradicted by the evidence of record. 13
Weight and Credibility of the Expert Witnesses

The core issue in this Petition, as in that in the lower courts, is whether petitioner was able to prove
that the Deeds of Donation were merely intercalated into two sheets of paper signed by Consuelo
Gomez (Consuelo).

The only direct evidence presented by petitioner on this matter is the testimony of Zenaida Torres,
Document Examiner14 of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Respondents, on the other
hand, presented their own expert witness, Francisco Cruz, Chief of Document Examination 15 of the
PC-INP Crime Laboratory. Other direct evidence presented by respondents includes testimonies
positively stating that the Deeds of Donation were signed by Consuelo in their completed form in the
presence of Notary Public Jose Sebastian. These testimonies are that of Jose Sebastian himself,
and that of several of the respondents including Ariston Gomez, Jr. (Ariston, Jr.), who allegedly
drafted said Deeds of Donation.

As the testimony of Zenaida Torres is the single most important evidence of petitioner, it is
imperative to examine the lengthy discussion of the trial court analyzing her testimony, and the
contradictory findings of Francisco Cruz.

Zenaida Torres’s testimony, as noted by the trial court, was that she had examined the two Deeds of
Donation, denominated as Documents No. 401 and No. 402, and her findings were that the
signatures therein were indeed those of Consuelo. However, she opined that Documents No. 401
and No. 402 were not typed or prepared in one continuous sitting because the horizontal lines had
some variances horizontally. Nevertheless, she admitted that the vertical lines did not show any
variance.

Zenaida Torres also testified that with respect to Document No. 401, the typewritten words
"Consuelo C. Gomez" were typed after the handwritten signature "Consuelo C. Gomez." This is
based on her analysis of the letter "o" in the handwritten signature, which touches the letter "n" in the
typewritten name "Consuelo C. Gomez." She could not, however, make any similar findings with
respect to Document No. 402, because the typewritten words "Consuelo C. Gomez" and the
handwritten signature "Consuelo C. Gomez" "do not even touch" in the latter document.

Zenaida Torres failed to convince the trial court that the Deeds of Donation were not prepared in one
sitting:

To start with, it is very significant that Torres herself admits that the signatures of Consuelo in the
Donations 401 and 402 are genuine.

(This is contrary to the allegations of Augusto in his complaint; wherein he alleged that the
signatures of Consuelo were forged. In fact, as per the allegations, in Augusto’s complaint, the
signatures were forged, after the death of Consuelo).

(In effect, Augusto is now trying to shift the thrust of his attack, to a scenario wherein Consuelo
allegedly signed two papers in blank, and thereafter, said Donations 401 and 402 were typed on
top.)

Furthermore, Torres fell apart during, cross-examination. Torres admitted that she had not taken any
specialized studies on the matter of "Questioned Documents," except on one or two seminars on
"Questioned Documents." She admitted that she had not passed the Board Exams, as a Chemist;
she further admitted that she has not written any thesis or similar work on the subject matter at
issue.

Regarding non-typing in one continuous sitting, she admitted that she had never seen the typewriter
used to type the Donations 401 and 402, nor even tried to get hold of it, before she made the report;
that there were no variances insofar as the vertical alignments of the typewritten documents were
concerned; that there were only variances insofar as the horizontal alignments are concerned; she
admitted that if anybody had wanted to incorporate a document into a blank sheet of paper, on top of
a signature, the normal step to be taken would be to be careful on horizontal alignment, which can
be seen via the naked eye; and not the vertical alignment. Yet, the vertical alignment, as admitted by
her, was perfect.
In fact, she had to admit that it is possible that if the paper roller is loose, the horizontal alignment
will have a variance; whereas, the vertical alignment would have no variance, and there would be
nothing sinister about this. She had to admit this, because she was confronted with an authority on
the matter, more particularly the book of Wilson Harrison (vide Exhibit "17"). She admitted that she
had not used bromide when she took the photographs of the two (2) Donations 401 and 402, which
photographs she later on enlarged. She admitted that when she had taken the photographs of the
two (2) Donations, she had not put the typewritten pitch measure on top. She admitted that when the
photographs were enlarged, the alignment of the typewritten words became distorted; more so when
a typewriter pitch measure is not used, when photographing the documents.

In effect, insofar as the issue of typewriting in one sitting or not, is concerned, the testimony of
Torres was completely discredited (Vide TSN of May 19, 1986). 16

On the other hand, the trial court gave weight to the testimony of Francisco Cruz:

Cruz testified on this point that the Donations 401 and 402 were both typed in one continuous sitting.
He elucidated clearly on how he arrived at this conclusion.

To start with, he was able to determine that the typewriter used was the elite typewriter, because as
per Cruz, when his typewriting measuring the instruments were placed over the documents, there
were twelve (12) letters that went inside one inch, which is a characteristic of an elite typewriter.

Secondly, he noticed that the color tone of the typewriter ink is the same, thru the entire documents.

As per Cruz, this is another indication that the Donations 401 and 402 were prepared in one
continuous sitting, because, as per Cruz, if the typewriter is used one time and sometime after that,
the typewriter is used again, the color tone will most probably be different.

He further concluded that both the horizontal and vertical alignments are in agreement. He explained
how he arrived at this conclusion.

As per Cruz, by using an instrument which is a typewriting measuring instrument produced by the
Criminal Research Co., Inc. in the USA and placing said instrument to test the vertical alignment
from the top down to the bottom, there is a perfect vertical alignment.

In fact, as per Cruz, when he took photographs of the documents, he had already placed the
typewriting measuring instrument over the document and he showed to the court the enlarged
photographs, indicating clearly that all the vertical alignments are all in order.

He also found out that the horizontal and vertical alignments are in agreement.

He explained that the slight variances as to the spacing of the words "Know All Men By These
Presents" and the words "That I Consuelo C. Gomez, single, of legal age, Filipino, and a resident of
24 Pine Street, New Marikina Subdivision, Marikina", there is a slight disagreement in the spacing,
but not in the alignment.

He explained that the normal reason for such discrepancy in the spacing is because the typist
sometimes tries to push the variable spacer; the [button] on the left side of the roller, and if you press
that round [button], there will be a variance spacing namely one space, two spaces, and three
spaces; and these are not attached so there is a variable in the spacing.

In short, this was due to the pushing of the variable paper by the typist.

Furthermore, he emphasized that the left margins are aligned and this signifies that there was typing
in one continuous sitting, because if you type on a paper and re-insert it again, there are differences
in the left hand margin. All of his findings appear in the blow up photographs which were marked as
Exhibits "31" to "34".

He even pointed out the differences in the Jurat wherein admittedly, Judge Sebastian inserted the
date "21ST" and "1" (page number), "401" (document number), "I" (book number), and "82" (series);
and also his signature "Jose R. Sebastian" and his "PTR Number" (vide pages 12 to 19, TSN of April
25, 1982).
All attempts by opposite counsel to discredit the testimony of Cruz on this issue, proved futile. 17

As stated above, petitioner also alleges that the signature "Consuelo C. Gomez" was written before
the typewritten name "Consuelo C. Gomez." In this second round of analysis of the respective
testimonies of Zenaida Torres and Francisco Cruz, the trial court arrived at the same conclusion:

[ZENAIDA TORRES’S] FINDINGS ARE BASED SOLELY ON A SINGLE HANDWRITTEN LETTER

"O", WHICH TOUCHES (DOES NOT EVEN INTERSECT) THE TYPEWRITTEN LETTER "N".
BASED ON THIS, WITHOUT MORE, TORRES CONCLUDED THAT THE TYPEWRITTEN NAME
"CONSUELO C. GOMEZ" CAME AFTER THE HANDWRITTEN SIGNATURE "CONSUELO C.
GOMEZ".

We need but cite authorities on the matter (with which Authorities Torres was confronted and which
authorities she had to admit), which read as follows:

The Intersection of Ink Lines with Typescript. It is often stated that is possible to determine whether
an ink line which intersects typescript was written before or after the typing. The theory is simple;
most typewriter inks are greasy and an ink line tends to shrink in width as it passes over a greasy
place on the paper. If, indeed, an ink line is observed to suffer a distinct reduction in width every time
it intersects the typescript it may safely be concluded that the ink line was written after the typescript.

In practice, however, ink lines written across typescript are rarely seen to suffer any appreciable
shrinkage in width, since the amount of oily medium transferred from the ribbon to the paper is rarely
sufficient to have any effect. Indeed, if the ink happens to be alkaline, surplus ink, instead of
shrinking, may spread out into the typescript to increase the width of the inkline at the intersection. In
the case the proof that the ink followed the typescript would be the presence of a swelling rather
than a shrinkage.

Experience has shown that it is rarely possible for any definite opinion as to the order of appearance
on the paper for intersecting ink lines and typescript to be justified on the [meager] amount of
evidence which generally available.

A similar state of affairs will be found to hold for carbon paper and waxer; which have much in
common with typewriter ribbons in the way the mark they make on paper react with intersecting ink
lines". (Wilson, Suspect Documents; Exhibits "19"; "19-A"; "37"; "37-D"; underscoring ours).

In fact, the very authority of Torres on the matter, states as follows:

"Sequence of Writing

Intersecting writing strokes may have distinctive patterns, depending upon the order of writing the
lapse of time between the two writings, the density of the two strokes and the kind of inks, writing
instruments, and paper used. With a binocular microscope or a hand-magnifier aided by skillfully
controlled light and photography, the true order of preparation may be revealed and demonstrated to
a lay observer.

What appears to be the obvious solution may not always be the correct answer. For example, the
line of deepest color usually appears on top even if it was written first. Careful study and testing is
necessary before reaching a conclusion. Some of the more common criteria for determining
sequence are considered in the following paragraphs.

If we considered the intersection of two writing strokes or the intersection of writing and typewriting
the majority of problems are covered. Substantial, repeated intersections of two writings offer a
higher probability of success than a single indifferent intersection, such as a weak stroke crossing
another which only very infrequently can produce a clear indication of the order of writing". (Exhibits
"V" and "V-1" (underscoring ours).18

The trial court again sided with Francisco Cruz who testified, citing authorities, 19 that it is impossible
to determine accurately which came first, because there were no intersections at all. 20 The trial court
added: "[i]n fact, common sense, without more, dictates that if there are no intersections (between
the typewritten and the handwritten words), it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
determine which came first."21 The Court of Appeals found nothing erroneous in these findings of the
trial court.22
Petitioner claims that the testimony of Zenaida Torres, having positively maintained that the
handwritten signatures "Consuelo C. Gomez" in both Deeds of Donation were affixed before the
typewritten name of Consuelo C. Gomez, cannot possibly be overcome by the opinion of Francisco
Cruz that was "neither here not there."23

Petitioner also puts in issue the fact that Zenaida Torres was a court-appointed expert, as opposed
to Francisco Cruz who was merely designated by respondents. Petitioner also assails the credibility
of Francisco Cruz on the ground that he had once testified in favor of respondent Ariston, Jr. 24

Finally, petitioner stresses that Zenaida Torres conducted her tests on the carbon originals of both
Deeds of Donation that were then in the possession of the Notarial Register of Quezon City. On the
other hand, Francisco Cruz conducted his tests, with respect to Document No. 401, on the original in
the possession of Ariston, Jr.

On the first point, we agree with petitioner that positive evidence 25 is, as a general rule, more
credible than negative evidence.26 However, the reason for this rule is that the witness who testifies
to a negative may have forgotten what actually occurred, while it is impossible to remember what
never existed.27

Expert witnesses, though, examine documentary and object evidence precisely to testify on their
findings in court. It is, thus, highly improbable for an expert witness to forget his examination of said
evidence. Consequently, whereas faulty memory may be the reason for the negative testimonies
delivered by ordinary witnesses, this is unlikely to be so with respect to expert witnesses. While we,
therefore, cannot say that positive evidence does not carry an inherent advantage over negative
evidence when it comes to expert witnesses,28 the process by which the expert witnesses arrived at
their conclusions should be carefully examined and considered.

On this respect, Prof. Wigmore states that the ordinary expert witness, in perhaps the larger
proportion of the topics upon which he may be questioned, has not a knowledge derived from
personal observation. He virtually reproduces, literally or in substance, conclusions of others which
he accepts on the authority of the eminent names responsible for them.29 In the case at bar, the
expert witnesses cited sources as bases of their observations. Francisco Cruz’s statement that "no
finding or conclusion could be arrived at,"30 has basis on the sources presented both by him and by
Zenaida Torres. Both sets of authorities speak of intersecting ink lines. However, the typewritten
words "Consuelo C. Gomez" barely touch and do not intersect the handwritten signature Consuelo
C. Gomez in Document No. 401. In Document No. 402, said typewritten words and handwritten
signature do not even touch.

In the case at bar, therefore, the expert testimony that "no finding or conclusion can be arrived at,"
was found to be more credible than the expert testimony positively stating that the signatures were
affixed before the typing of the Deeds of Donation. The former expert testimony has proven to be
more in consonance with the authorities cited by both experts.

As regards the assertion that Zenaida Torres conducted her tests on the carbon originals of both
Deeds of Donation found in the notarial registrar, whereas Francisco Cruz merely examined the
original in the possession of Ariston, Jr. with respect to Document No. 401, suffice it to say that this
circumstance cannot be attributed to respondents. After the examination of the documents by
Zenaida Torres, fire razed the Quezon City Hall. The carbon originals of said Deeds were among the
documents burned in the fire. Petitioner never rebutted respondents’ manifestation concerning this
incident, nor accused respondents of burning the Quezon City Hall.

Other than the above allegations, petitioner’s attack on the entire testimony of Francisco Cruz
(including the part concerning whether the Deeds were typed in one continuous sitting) rests
primarily in the contention that, while Zenaida Torres was court-appointed, Francisco Cruz’s
testimony was solicited by respondents, one of whom had previously solicited such testimony for
another case.

In United States v. Trono,31 we held:

Expert testimony no doubt constitutes evidence worthy of meriting consideration, although not
exclusive on questions of a professional character. The courts of justice, however, are not bound to
submit their findings necessarily to such testimony; they are free to weigh them, and they can give or
refuse to give them any value as proof, or they can even counterbalance such evidence with the
other elements of conviction which may have been adduced during the trial. (Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, in Espiritu v. Court of Appeals32 and Salomon v. Intermediate Appellate Court,33 this Court
held:

Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place whatever weight they
choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and
sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide,
considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight
and process of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the
side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for study or
observation of the matters about which he testifies, and any other matters which serve to illuminate
his statements. The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the
court in view of all the facts and circumstances in the case and when common knowledge utterly
fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effect (20 Am. Jur., 1056-1058). The problem of the
credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial
court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of that
discretion. (Underscoring supplied.)

Thus, while the expert witness’ possible bias in favor of the side for whom he or she testifies, and the
fact that he or she is a paid witness, may be considered by the trial court, the latter should weigh the
same with all the other evidence adduced during trial, as well as with the witness’ deportment,
actions, ability, and character upon the witness stand. The trial court is consequently given the
discretion in weighing all these circumstances in its determination of the expert witness’ credibility,
as it is in a better position than the appellate courts to observe the demeanor of these witnesses. As
there is no evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in such determination, the
latter is not reviewable by this Court.

Alleged patent irregularities on the face of the assailed Deeds of Donation

As previously mentioned, the testimony of Zenaida Torres constitutes the only direct evidence
presented by petitioner to prove that the Deeds of Donation were merely intercalated over the
signature of Consuelo. Petitioner, however, also presents the following circumstantial evidence and
arguments to prove the same, claiming that there are patent irregularities on the face of the assailed
Deeds of Donation:

1) Both deeds are each one-page documents contained in a letter size (8" ½" x "11") paper,
instead of the usual legal size (8" ½" x "14") paper, and typed single spaced, with barely any
margin on its four sides;34

2) In Doc. 401, three parcels of land located in two different municipalities were purportedly
donated to two donees in the same document;35

3) In Doc. 402, shares of stock in two corporations, jewelries and collector’s items in a bank
deposit box, two registered cars, cash and money placement in another bank, and a bodega
were donated to three donees in the same document;36

4) The bodega mentioned in Doc. No. 402 was not owned by Consuelo. If the Deeds were
executed by Consuelo, she would surely have known this fact as she was the treasurer of V-
TRI Realty Corporation;37

5) If Doc. 401 is superimposed on Doc. 402, the signature of Consuelo on both documents
appear almost in the same place;38

6) The whole of both Deeds of Donation, including the notarial acknowledgement portion and
the TAN Numbers and Residence Certificates of the signatories, were typed with only one
typewriter. The only portions that seemed to have been typed with a different machine are
the date ("21st") below the acknowledgement and the filled-in numbers of the "Doc. No. ___;
Book No. ___; Page No. ___’" portion, the name "Jose R. Sebastian" above the words
NOTARY PUBLIC and the PTR Number with date and place of issue; 39

7) The PTR Number and its date and place of issue appear in the right hand side of the
name and signature of Jose Sebastian, instead of below it; 40
 8) The inserted date (which was typed with the same machine used for typing the name of
notary public Jose Sebastian) is different from the date of the clause "In WITNESS
WHEREOF, the parties hereunto set their hands in Quezon City, on the 20th day of
April/1979" (which was typed with another machine; the one used in typing the body of the
deed and the body of the acknowledgment);41

9) The TAN Numbers and the Residence Certificate Numbers of the purported donor and
donees have already been typed with the same machine that was used in typing the body of
the deed and the body of the acknowledgement;42

10) It is highly questionable that a supposedly well-educated person like Ariston Gomez, Jr.
would not have thought of preparing at least five copies of each document as there were four
donees and one donor.43

The Court of Appeals ruled:

As to the alleged intercalation of the text of the deeds of donation above the supposedly priorly
affixed signature of CONSUELO on a blank sheet of bond paper, as shown by the one-page
document in a letter size paper, typed single space with barely any room left on the top, bottom and
left and right margins, as well as the lack of copies thereof, it has been explained that the same was
due to the fact that the said documents were prepared by defendant ARISTON, JR., a non-lawyer
inexperienced with the way such documents should be executed and in how many copies. x x x.

xxxx

Accordingly, it is not surprising that someone as unfamiliar and inexperienced in preparing a deed of
donation, or any deed of conveyance for that matter, as ARISTON, JR., prepared the documents
that are the subject matter of the case at bar in the manner that he did.44

Petitioner counters that the alleged irregularities "do not relate to the proper construction or manner
of writing the documents as would necessitate the expertise of a lawyer. Rather, they relate to
matters as basic as observing the proper margins at the top, left, right and bottom portions of the
document, using the appropriate paper size and number of pages that are necessary and observing
appropriate spacing and proper placement of the words in the document."

All these alleged irregularities are more apparent than real. None of these alleged irregularities
affects the validity of the subject Deeds of Donation, nor connotes fraud or foul play. It is true that the
condition and physical appearance of a questioned document constitute a valuable factor which, if
correctly evaluated in light of surrounding circumstances, may help in determining whether it is
genuine or forged.45 However, neither the expert witnesses, nor our personal examination of the
exhibits, had revealed such a questionable physical condition.

Legal documents contained in 8 ½ x 11 paper are neither unheard of, nor even uncommon. The
same is true with regard to single-spaced legal documents; in fact, petitioner’s Supplemental
Memorandum was actually single-spaced.

That the subject Deeds of Donation appear to have conveyed numerous properties in two sheets of
paper does not militate against their authenticity. Not all people equate length with importance. The
simplicity and practicality of organizing the properties to be donated into real and personal
properties, and using one-page documents to convey each category, are clearly appealing to people
who value brevity. The same appeal of conciseness had driven petitioner to make a single-spaced
Supplemental Memorandum whose only object was to summarize the arguments he has laid down
in the original twice-as-long Memorandum,46 an endeavor that we, in fact, appreciate.

The allegation concerning the use of one typewriter to encode both Deeds of Donation, including the
notarial acknowledgment portion, TAN, and residence certificates, is purely paranoia. Being in the
legal profession for many years, we are aware that it is common practice for the parties to a contract
to type the whole document, so that all the notary public has to do is to input his signature, seal, and
the numbers pertaining to his notarial registry.

The use of single-paged documents also provides an explanation as to why the PTR number and
the date and place of issue are found in the right-hand side of the name and signature of Jose
Sebastian, instead of below it. We agree with respondents that it is irrational, impractical, and
contrary to human experience to use another page just to insert those minute but necessary details.
Such use of single-paged documents, taken together with the fact that the Deeds of Donation are of
almost the same length, are also the reasons why it does not baffle us that the signatures of
Consuelo appear at around the same portions of these Deeds. Indeed, we would have been
suspicious had these documents been of varying lengths, but the signatures still appear on the same
portions in both.

The only observations concerning the physical appearance of the subject Deeds of Donation that
truly give us doubts as to their authenticity are the relatively small margins on the sides of the same,
the lack of copies thereof, and the alleged inclusion in Document No. 402 of a bodega allegedly not
owned by Consuelo. However, these doubts are not enough to establish the commission of fraud by
respondents and to overturn the presumption that persons are innocent of crime or wrong. 47 Good
faith is always presumed.48 It is the one who alleges bad faith who has the burden to prove the
same,49 who, in this case, is the petitioner.

The small margins in the said Deeds of Donation, while indicative of sloppiness, were not
necessarily resorted to because there was a need to intercalate a long document and, thus, prove
petitioner’s theory that there were only two pieces of paper signed by Consuelo. Respondents admit
that the use of one sheet of paper for both Deeds of Donation was intentional, for brevity’s sake.
While the ensuing litigation could now have caused regrets on the part of Ariston, Jr. for his decision
to sacrifice the margins for brevity’s sake, there still appears no indication that he did so maliciously.
Indeed, law professors remind bar examinees every year to leave margins on their booklets. Despite
the importance examinees put into such examinations, however, examinees seem to constantly
forget these reminders.

The testimonies of Ariston Gomez, Sr. (Ariston, Sr.), Ariston, Jr., Maria Rita Gomez-Samson (Maria
Rita), and Notary Public Jose Sebastian tend to show that there were one original and two copies
each of Documents No. 401 and No. 402. Of these documents, it was the original of Document No.
402 and a duplicate original of Document No. 401 which were actually presented by petitioner
himself before the trial court, through the representative of the notarial registrar of Quezon City, who
testified pursuant to a subpoena. The latter two documents were submitted to the NBI for
examination by petitioner and by the NBI Handwriting Expert, Zenaida Torres.

Petitioner testified that he could not find copies of the two Deeds of Donation with the Bureau of
Records Management. He, however, was able to find certified true copies of these documents with
the Register of Deeds and the Land Transportation Commission. 50

According to the testimony of Ariston, Jr., the original of Document No. 401 was separated from the
brown envelope, containing the other copies of the Deeds of Donation, which Jose Sebastian left
with respondents, as they were trying to fit the same into a certain red album. On the other hand,
Maria Rita testified that one copy each of the duplicate originals of Documents No. 401 and No. 402
were lost. Maria Rita explained that when she was about to leave for Spain to visit her sister in
Palma de Mallorica, her father, Ariston, Sr., gave her the brown envelope, containing duplicate
originals of the Deeds of Donation in question, to show to her sister in Palma de Mallorica. 51 Maria
Rita explained in detail how her handbag was stolen as she was praying in a chapel while waiting for
the connecting flight from Madrid to Palma de Mallorica. The handbag allegedly contained not only
duplicate originals of the said Deeds of Donation, but also other important documents and her
valuables. Maria Rita presented the police report of the Spanish police authorities 52 and her letter to
the Valley National Bank of U.S.A.,53 regarding these losses.

Notary public Jose Sebastian retained two copies of the Deeds of Donation in his files. Jose
Sebastian explained that he did so because Consuelo wanted two copies of each document. Since
Jose Sebastian had to transmit to the Notarial Registrar duplicate originals of the document, he had
to photocopy the same to keep as his own copies, and transmit to the Notarial Registrar whatever
duplicate original copies he had. Jose Sebastian did not notice that, instead of retaining a duplicate
original of Document No. 402, what was left with him was the original.54

While it cannot be denied that the unfortunate incidents and accidents presented by respondents do
arouse some suspicions, the testimonies of Ariston, Jr., Maria Rita, and Jose Sebastian had been
carefully examined by the trial court, which found them to be credible. Time and again, this Court
has ruled that the findings of the trial court respecting the credibility of witnesses are accorded great
weight and respect since it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they
testified before the court. Unless substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked or
misunderstood by the latter which, if considered, would materially affect the result of the case, this
Court will undauntedly sustain the findings of the lower court. 55

All petitioner has succeeded in doing, however, is to instill doubts in our minds. While such approach
would succeed if carried out by the accused in criminal cases, plaintiffs in civil cases need to do
much more to overturn findings of fact and credibility by the trial court, especially when the same had
been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It must be stressed that although this Court may overturn a
conviction of the lower court based on reasonable doubt, overturning judgments in civil cases should
be based on preponderance of evidence, and with the further qualification that, when the scales
shall stand upon an equipoise, the court should find for the defendant. 56

Respondents also point out that Ariston, Jr., the person they claim to have prepared said Deeds of
Donation, was never confronted during the trial with all these alleged irregularities on the face of the
Deeds of Donation. As such, the trial court was never given a chance to determine whether Ariston,
Jr. would have given a rational, logical and acceptable explanation for the same.

Respondents are correct. As the alleged irregularities do not, on their faces, indicate bad faith on the
part of respondents, it is necessary for petitioner to confront respondents with these observations.
Respondents would not have thought that the Deeds of Donation would be impugned on the mere
basis that they were written on short bond paper, or that their margins are small. Respondents were
thus deprived of a chance to rebut these observations by testimonies and other evidence, and were
forced to explain the same in memoranda and briefs with the appellate courts, where these
observations started to crop up. It would have been different if the date of the documents had been
after Consuelo’s death, or if there had been obvious alterations on the documents. In the latter
cases, it would have been the responsibility of respondents’ counsel to see to it that Ariston, Jr.
explain such inconsistencies.

Payment of donor’s tax before the death of Consuelo

In ruling that there had been no antedating or falsification of the subject Deeds of Donation, the
Court of Appeals was also persuaded by the following evidence: (1) the finding that it was the
deceased CONSUELO herself who paid the donor’s tax of the properties subject of the donation, as
evidenced by the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) check she issued to the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on 9 October 1979, in the amount of
₱119,283.63, and (2) the testimony and certification dated 22 November 1979 of Jose Sebastian
that the said documents were acknowledged before him on 21 April 1979. 57 Respondents had
presented evidence to the effect that Consuelo made an initial payment of ₱119,283.63 for the
Donor’s Tax on 9 October 1979, while respondent Ariston, Sr., supplied the deficiency of ₱2,125.82
on 4 December 1979.

Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in its finding of fact that Consuelo herself
paid the donor’s tax of the properties subject of the donation on 9 October 1979, as the evidence
allegedly shows that the Donor’s Tax was paid on 4 December 1979, or a month after Consuelo’s
death.58 Petitioner thereby calls our attention to his Exhibit "O," a certificate dated 4 December 1979
issued by Mr. Nestor M. Espenilla, Chief of the Transfer Taxes Division of the BIR, confirming the
payment of the donor’s tax. The certificate reads:

LUNGSOD NG QUEZON

December 4, 1979

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that MS. CONSUELO C. GOMEZ of 8059 Honradez St., Makati, Metro Manila, paid
donor’s tax on even date in the amount of ₱121,409.45 inclusive of surcharge, interest and
compromise penalties as follows:

RTR No. 2814499, PTC Conf. Receipt No. 2896956 – ₱119,283.63

RTR No. 2814500/PTC Conf. Receipt No. 2896957 – 2,125.82
---------------
Total
₱121,409.45
This certification is issued upon request of Mr. Ariston Gomez, Sr.

(SGD)NESTOR M. ESPENILLA
Chief, Financing, Real Estate and Transfer

Taxes Division
TAN E2153-B0723-A-759

Petitioner highlights the fact that the Revenue Tax Receipts (RTRs) and the Confirmation Receipts
for the payments supposedly made by Consuelo on 9 October 1979 and by respondent Ariston, Sr.
on 4 December 1979 bore consecutive numbers, despite being issued months apart. Petitioner also
points to the fact that the tax was stated in the certification to have been paid "on even date" --
meaning, on the date of the certification, 4 December 1979.

Petitioner presented further the check used to pay the Donor’s Tax, which, petitioner himself admits,
was signed by Consuelo.60 Petitioner draws our attention to the words "RECEIVED – BIR, P.T.C.
CUBAO BR., NON-NEGOTIABLE, T-10 DEC. 4." Petitioner concludes that Philippine Trust
Company Bank, Cubao Branch, received the check on 4 December 1979 as a collection agent of the
BIR.

Respondents, on the other hand, presented the following documents to prove payment of the
Donor’s Tax before the death of Consuelo on 6 November 1979:

1) The covering letter to the BIR Commissioner dated 24 September 1979 and prepared by
Mariano A. Requija, accountant of Consuelo and Ariston, Jr., which included the Donor’s Tax
Return for the properties covered by the two Deeds of Donation. The letter was stamped
received by the BIR Commissioner on 8 October 1979;61

2) Another letter dated 24 September 1979 executed by Mariano A. Requija containing the
breakdown of the donations received by the BIR on 8 October 1979; 62

3) A schedule of gifts which was also dated 24 September 1979 and which was also
received by the BIR on 8 October 1979, enumerating all the donated properties included in
the Deeds of Donation.63

4) The Donor’s Tax Return covering the properties transferred in the two Deeds of Donation
filed, received, and receipted by the BIR Commissioner on 8 October 1979; 64

5) The 9 October 1979 PCIB Personal Check No. A144-73211 issued by Consuelo in favor
of the BIR Commissioner in the amount of ₱119,283.63.65

6) An "Authority to Issue Tax Receipt" issued by the BIR Commissioner on 21 October 1979
for a total amount of ₱119,283.63.66

Before proceeding further, it is well to note that the factum probandum67 petitioner is trying to
establish here is still the alleged intercalation of the Deeds of Donation on blank pieces of paper
containing the signatures of Consuelo. The factum probans 68 this time around is the alleged payment
of the Donor’s Tax after the death of Consuelo.

Firstly, it is apparent at once that there is a failure of the factum probans, even if successfully
proven, to prove in turn the factum probandum. As intimated by respondents, payment of the
Donor’s Tax after the death of Consuelo does not necessarily prove the alleged intercalation of the
Deeds of Donation on blank pieces of paper containing the signatures of Consuelo.

Secondly, petitioner failed to prove this factum probandum.

Ariston, Jr. never testified that Consuelo herself physically and personally delivered PCIB Check No.
A144-73211 to the BIR. He instead testified that the check was prepared and issued by Consuelo
during her lifetime, but that he, Ariston, Jr., physically and personally delivered the same to the
BIR.69 On the query, however, as to whether it was delivered to the BIR before or after the death of
Consuelo, petitioner and respondents presented all the conflicting evidence we enumerated above.
The party asserting a fact has the burden of proving it. Petitioner, however, merely formulated
conjectures based on the evidence he presented, and did not bother to present Nestor Espenilla to
explain the consecutive numbers of the RTRs or what he meant with the words "on even date" in his
certification. Neither did petitioner present any evidence that the records of the BIR Commissioner
were falsified or antedated, thus, letting the presumption that a public official had regularly performed
his duties stand. This is in contrast to respondents’ direct evidence attesting to the payment of said
tax during the lifetime of Consuelo. With respect to respondents’ evidence, all that petitioner could
offer in rebuttal is another speculation totally unsupported by evidence: the alleged fabrication
thereof.

Credibility of Jose Sebastian

Petitioner claims that no credence should have been given to the testimony of the notary public,
Jose Sebastian, as said Jose Sebastian is the same judge whom this Court had dismissed from the
service in Garciano v. Sebastian.70 Petitioner posits that the dismissal of Judge Jose Sebastian from
the service casts a grave pall on his credibility as a witness, especially given how, in the course of
the administrative proceedings against him, he had lied to mislead the investigator, as well as
employed others to distort the truth.

Petitioner further claims that the reliance by the Court of Appeals on the 22 November 1979
Certification by Jose Sebastian is misplaced, considering the questionable circumstances
surrounding such certification. Said certification, marked as petitioner’s Exhibit "P," reads:

November 22, 1979

HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO

Executive Judge
CFI – Quezon City

Sir:

In connection with the discrepancies noted by the Acting Clerk of Court in my notarial report
pertaining to another document submitted to the Notarial Section last July 2, 1979 I have the honor
to certify that documents Nos. 401 and 402 referring to Donations Inter Vivos executed by Donor
Consuelo C. Gomez in favor of Donees Ma. Rita Gomez-Samson et. al. were signed in my presence
by all the parties and their instrumental witnesses on April 21, 1979 in my office. I hereby further
certify that said two documents among other documents were reported by me in accordance with
law on July 2, 1979, for all legal intents and purposes.

In view of the above, it is respectfully requested that the certified true copies of the said two
documents officially requested by one of the Donees be issued.

Very respectfully,

(Sgd.) JOSE R. SEBASTIAN

Notary Public71

Petitioner points out that the Certification was made after the death of Consuelo, and claims that the
same appears to be a scheme by Jose Sebastian to concoct an opportunity for him to make mention
of the subject Deeds of Donation intervivos, "despite the plain fact that the latter had utterly no
relation to the matter referred to by Jose Sebastian in the opening phrase of the letter." 72

It is well to note that, as stated by the Court of Appeals, Jose Sebastian was originally a witness for
petitioner Augusto. As such, Rule 132, Section 12, of the Rules of Court prohibits petitioner from
impeaching him:

SEC. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. – Except with respect to witnesses referred to in
paragraphs (d) and (e) of section 10, the party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his
credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon adequate
showing of his adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having misled the party into
calling him to the witness stand.

The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an adverse party, may be
impeached by the party presenting him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party,
except by evidence of his bad character. He may also be impeached and cross-examined by the
adverse party, but such cross-examination must only be on the subject matter of his examination-in-
chief.

This rule is based on the theory that a person who produces a witness vouches for him as being
worthy of credit, and that a direct attack upon the veracity of the witness "would enable the party to
destroy the witness, if he spoke against him, and to make him a good witness, if he spoke for him,
with the means in his hands of destroying his credit, if he spoke against him." 73

Neither had there been declaration by the court that Jose Sebastian was an unwilling or hostile
witness. Jose Sebastian is also neither an adverse party, nor an officer, director nor a managing
agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party. 74

Be that as it may, even if Jose Sebastian had been declared by the court as an unwilling or hostile
witness, the third paragraph of Section 12 as quoted above, in relation to Section 11 75 of the same
Rule, only allows the party calling the witness to impeach such witness by contradictory evidence or
by prior inconsistent statements, and never by evidence of his bad character. Thus, Jose
Sebastian’s subsequent dismissal as a judge would not suffice to discredit him as a witness in this
case.

We have also ruled in People v. Dominguez,76 which, in turn cited Cordial v. People,77 that:

(E)ven convicted criminals are not excluded from testifying in court so long as, having organs of
sense, they "can perceive and perceiving can make known their perceptions to others."

The fact of prior criminal conviction alone does not suffice to discredit a witness; the testimony of
such a witness must be assayed and scrutinized in exactly the same way the testimony of other
witnesses must be examined for its relevance and credibility. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

The effect of this pronouncement is even more significant in this case, as Jose Sebastian has never
been convicted of a crime before his testimony, but was instead administratively sanctioned eleven
years after such testimony. Scrutinizing the testimony of Jose Sebastian, we find, as the trial court
and the Court of Appeals did, no evidence of bias on the part of Jose Sebastian. On top of this, Jose
Sebastian’s testimony is supported by the records of the notarial registry, which shows that the
documents in question were received by the Notarial Registrar on 2 July 1979, which was four
months before the death of Consuelo on 6 November 1979.

Alleged unusual circumstances relative to the execution and notarization of the subject Deeds of
Donation

The last set of circumstantial evidence presented by petitioner to prove the alleged intercalation of
the subject Deeds of Donation on two blank papers signed by Consuelo are the following allegedly
unusual circumstances relative to the execution and notarization of the said deeds. According to
petitioner:

1. The signing and acknowledgement of the Deeds of Donation on 21 April 1979 is highly
improbable and implausible, considering the fact that Consuelo left the same day for the
United States on a pleasure trip;78

2. The flight time of Consuelo on 21 April 1979 was 11:00 a.m.. And even assuming that the
flight time was 1:00 p.m., as contended by respondents, the ordinary boarding procedures
require Consuelo to be at the airport at least two hours before flight time, or 11:00 a.m..
Petitioner points out that respondents’ alleged time frame (from 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.) is
not enough to accomplish the following acts: respondents and Consuelo leaving Marikina at
7:00 a.m. and arriving at the notary public Jose Sebastian’s house at Pag-asa, Q.C. at about
8:00 a.m. to 8:30 a.m.; some "small talk with Jose Sebastian; Jose Sebastian examining the
documents; Jose Sebastian having a closed meeting with Consuelo to discuss the
 documents; Jose Sebastian reading the documents to respondents line by line and asking
the latter whether they accepted the donation; Jose Sebastian typing the notarial entries; the
parties signing the deeds; Jose Sebastian talking privately with Consuelo, who paid the
former in cash for his services; Ariston Gomez, Jr. driving Consuelo and other respondents
back to Marikina, and dropping the other respondents at their respective residences; picking
up Consuelo’s luggage; and Ariston Gomez, Jr. bringing Consuelo to the Manila International
Airport;79

3. It is contrary to human experience for Consuelo and respondents not to make a prior
arrangement with the notary public Jose Sebastian and instead take a gamble on his being
in his office;80

4. It is illogical for Consuelo to rush the execution of the donations when she was in fact
planning to come back from her pleasure trip shortly, as she did; 81 1awphi1.net

5. The choice of a notary public from Quezon City is highly suspect, when Consuelo and
respondents reside in Marikina. It is also illogical that Consuelo would have chosen a notary
public whom she met only on the same day she executed the Deeds, especially when
Consuelo had a regular lawyer whose notarial services she availed of only two weeks before
her death;82

6. It is improbable that Consuelo paid Jose Sebastian in cash, for there is no reason for her
to carry much cash in peso when she was about to leave for the United States in that same
morning;83

7. Maria Rita’s residence certificate was obtained from Manila when she is a resident of
Marikina. Also, Maria Rita obtained said residence certificate on 20 April 1979, and yet Maria
Rita testified that she was surprised to know of the donation only on 21 April 1979.84 Also
suspicious are the circumstances wherein Ariston Gomez, Jr. obtained a residence
certificate on 17 April 1979, when he testified that he knew of the schedule for signing only
on 20 April 1979, and Consuelo had two residence certificates, as she used different ones in
the Deeds of Donation and the document notarized two weeks before her death; 85 1awphi1.n et

8. If Consuelo was really frugal, she could have also made a will; 86

9. All the instrumental witnesses of the Deeds of Donation are biased, being themselves
either donees of the other Deed of Donation, or a relative of a donee; 87 and

10. Respondents were not able to sufficiently and substantially explain the belated transfer of
the properties covered by the assailed Deeds of Donation. Petitioner points to Maria Rita’s
testimony that the real properties were transferred after the death of Consuelo. While
respondents assert that the personal properties were transferred to them prior to Consuelo’s
death, evidence shows otherwise.88

This Court does not find anything suspicious in a person wanting to transfer her properties by
donation to her loved ones before leaving for abroad via an airplane. While many believe these days
that taking the plane is the "safest way to travel," this has not always been the case. The fear that
planes sometimes crash, now believed to be irrational, has always been at the back of the minds of
air travelers. Respondents maintain in their testimonies before the RTC that the Deeds were
completed to the satisfaction of Consuelo only on 20 April 1979. She allegedly wanted to have the
documents signed and notarized before she left for abroad.

The claim that the flight time of Consuelo was at 11:00 a.m. is hearsay thrice removed, and thus
cannot be given any weight. Petitioner claims that he was told by his twelve-year old son that
Consuelo was leaving at 11:00 a.m. on 21 April 1979, such son having learned about this from the
maid of Consuelo when the son called Consuelo’s house that day. 89 This is in contrast to Maria
Rita’s positive testimony that the flight time was at 1:00 p.m. on the same day. 90 Maria Rita joined
Consuelo in this flight.

As regards petitioner’s claim that respondents’ alleged time frame in the morning of 21 April 1979
was insufficient, this Court is not convinced. As held by the Court of Appeals, petitioner did not
present any proof that it had been impossible to perform those alleged acts within three hours. 91 As
argued by respondents, the one-paged documents can be read aloud without difficulty within five to
ten minutes each. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that traffic is usually very minimal on
Saturday mornings, and was much less of a problem in 1979.

Respondents and Consuelo’s decision not to make a prior arrangement with notary public Jose
Sebastian does not surprise us either. Respondents explain that, since the telephone lines of
Marikina were inefficient in the year 1979, they decided to take a calculated gamble. It is not at all
unreasonable to expect that Jose Sebastian would be at his house on a Saturday, at around 8:00
a.m.

With respect to the choice of a notary public from Quezon City, we find the explanation relative
thereto satisfying. We quote:

Moreover, ARISTON, JR. disclosed that they could not have gone to the notary public whom his
aunt, CONSUELO, knew because she did not want to go to said notary public since our cousins
whom she didn’t like had access to him and she wanted to keep the execution of the deeds
confidential. Thus:

Q: And also you know for a fact that your auntie had a regular Notary Public for the preparation and
notarization of legal documents in the name of Atty. Angeles, now Congressman Angeles of
Marikina, is that correct?

A: It depends on the frame of time. Yes and No. He was a regular Notary Public, but way before that
date. But after that, he fall out of graces of my auntie. He was not anymore that regular.

Q: How long before April 30 did he fall out of graces of your auntie, year before that?

A: I don’t specifically remember but what I do know is such confidential document like this, we would
not really go to Angeles.

Q: Even for notarization purposes?

xxxx

A: Even for notarization purposes, no sir. This confidential nature, no.

ATTY. FERRY:

Are you saying that your auntie trusted more Sebastian than Angeles?

A: No. He is trusting her own experience about Atty. Angeles.

Q: Are you saying that she had sad experience with Atty. Angeles in connection with the latter’s
performance of his duty as Notary Public, as a lawyer?

A: That is what she told me.

Q: When was that?

A: She will tell me that regularly.

xxxx

ATTY. FERRY:

Q: Mr. Gomez, you testified last April 6, 1989 that after the execution of the two documents in
question dated April 20, 1979, Atty. Angeles fell out of the graces of your auntie and you added that
as a consequence, your auntie did not avail of the notarial services of Atty. Angeles when it comes
to confidential matters, is that correct?

A: Yes. After that particular execution of the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos, Atty. Angeles especially if
the documents are confidential in nature.
Q: You used confidential matters, did your aunt spell out what these confidential matters are?

A: This particular document, Deed of Donation was under the category "confidential".

Q: But did you discuss this, the matter of notarizing this document by Atty. Angeles with your auntie
such that she made known to you this falls under confidential matters?

A: Yes we did.

Q: So in other words, you intimated to your auntie that Atty. Angeles would possibly notarized these
documents?

A: No.

Q: How did it come about that your auntie gave that idea or information that these documents should
be notarized by other notary public other than Angeles, because it is confidential?

A: It came from her.

Q: Yes, did she tell you that?

ATTY. GUEVARRA:

That’s what he said. "It came from her".

ATTY. FERRY:

My question is, how did it come about your auntie told you that these two documents are of
confidential matters?

A: Well, no problem. I said that it has to be notarized, she said more or less, "ayaw ko kay Atty.
Angeles".

Q: She said that?

A: That’s correct.

Q: And you were curious to know why she told you that?

A: No. I knew why she told me that. She said that Atty. Angeles….well, my cousins whom she didn’t
like have access to Atty. Angeles.92

The Court of Appeals had fully explained that the belated transfer of the properties does not affect
the validity or effects of the donations at all, nor dent the credibility of respondents’ factual
assertions:

Per our perusal of the records, we find that the defendants were able to sufficiently and substantially
explain the reason for the belated transfer of the pertinent properties, i.e., after the death of
CONSUELO. Thus, the testimony of MA. RITA revealed, insofar as the real properties are
concerned, the following:

"Q: Since you were already aware as you claim that as early as when you went to the States in the
company of your auntie, Consuelo Gomez, these 2 parcels of land together with the improvements
consisting of a house were transferred to you, you did not exert efforts after your arrival from the
States to effect the transfer of these properties?

"A: No, I did not.

"Q: Why?
"A: Well, for delicadeza. My auntie was still alive. I am not that aggressive. Tita Elo told me "akin na
iyon" but I did not transfer it in my name. "Siempre nakakahiya."

"Q: That was your reason for not effecting the transfer of the properties in your name?

"A: Yes, that was my reason.

"Q: Did you not know that the deed supposedly executed by Consuelo Gomez was a donation inter
vivos, meaning, it takes effect during her lifetime?

"A: I do not know the legal term donation inter vivos. I have also my sentiment. Tita Elo was very
close to us but I did not want to tell her: "Tita Elo, ibigay mo Na iyan SA akin. Itransfer mo na sa
pangalan ko." It is not my character to be very aggressive."

In addition, Article 712 of the Civil Code provides:

"ART. 712. Ownership is acquired by occupation and by intellectual creation.

"Ownership and other real rights over property are acquired and transmitted by law, by donation, by
testate and intestate succession, and in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition.

"They may also be acquired by means of prescription."

Clearly, the issuance of the titles in the names of the defendants is not the mode by which they
acquired ownership of the properties, but rather the fact that the same were donated to them. The
circumstance that aforesaid properties were actually transferred in the names of the donees only
after the death of the donor, although the deeds of donation were dated April 21, 1979, does not by
itself indicate that the said documents were antedated.93

Petitioner seems to unduly foreclose the possibility – one which experience tells us is not a rare
occurrence at all – that donations are often resorted to in place of testamentary dispositions, often
for the purpose of tax avoidance. Such properties usually remain in the donor’s possession during
his or her lifetime, despite the fact that the donations have already taken effect. Nevertheless, the
purpose of utilizing donation as a mode to transfer property is not in issue here.

Finally, the allegations concerning the payment of Jose Sebastian in cash, the suggestion that
Consuelo should have also made a will, and the claim that all the instrumental witnesses of the will
are biased, are purely speculative.

In sum, all these circumstantial evidence presented by petitioner had failed to comply with the strict
requirements in using circumstantial evidence, for which Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
provides:

SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for

conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

While the above provision seems to refer only to criminal cases, it has been pointed out that in some
jurisdictions, no distinction is made between civil and criminal actions as to the quality of the burden
of establishing a proposition by circumstantial evidence. In such jurisdictions the rule is generally
stated to be that the circumstances established must not only be consistent with the proposition
asserted but also inconsistent with any other rational theory. 94

In all, what petitioner has succeeded in doing is to raise doubts in our minds. Again, while such
approach would succeed if carried out by the accused in criminal cases, plaintiffs in civil cases need
to do much more to overturn findings of fact and credibility by the trial court, especially when the
same had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Leniency in the weighing of petitioner’s evidence could only produce a mere equipoise:

When the scales shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall
incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant.

Under this principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the
weaknesses of the defendant’s claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that
of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on his side if such evidence is
insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action."95 (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner’s liability for damages

The last part of the trial court’s decision, which was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, involves
the award of damages in favor of Ariston, Jr. The trial court held Augusto Gomez and the estate of
the late Consuelo "jointly and solidarily liable" for moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s
fees.

The trial court held:

The records are clear, that plaintiff was so desperate for evidence to support his charges, that he
repeatedly subpoenaed the defendants themselves; at the risk of presenting evidence contradictory
to his legal position and which actually happened, when plaintiff subpoenaed Ariston Gomez Jr.,
Ariston Gomez Sr., and Maria Rita Gomez-Samson, as his witnesses.

All told, the court finds plaintiff was motivated not by a sincere desire to insure the totality of the
estate of Consuelo, but rather by his desire to cause injury to defendants, and to appropriate for
himself and the rest of the Gomez brothers and nephews, other than the donees, properties which
were clearly validly disposed of by Consuelo, via Donations Inter Vivos.96

Our own examination of the records of the case, however, convinces us of the contrary.
Respondents never assailed the authenticity of petitioner’s evidence, and merely presented their
own evidence to support their assertions. As previously stated, petitioner’s evidence had
successfully given us doubts as to the authenticity of the subject Deeds of Donation. While such
doubts are not enough to discharge petitioner’s burden of proof, they are enough to convince us that
petitioner’s institution of the present case was carried out with good faith. The subpoenas directed
against respondents merely demonstrate the zealous efforts of petitioner’s counsel to represent its
client, which can neither be taken against the counsel, nor against its clients.

While, as regards the alleged intercalation of the Deeds of Donation on two blank sheets of paper
signed by Consuelo, the burden of proof lies with petitioner, the opposite is true as regards the
damages suffered by the respondents. Having failed to discharge this burden to prove bad faith on
the part of petitioner in instituting the case, petitioner cannot be responsible therefor, and thus
cannot be held liable for moral damages.

This Court has also held that, in the absence of moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages, no exemplary damages can be granted, for exemplary damages are allowed only in
addition to any of the four kinds of damages mentioned. 97

The attorney’s fees should also be deleted, as it was supposed to be the consequence of a clearly
unfounded civil action or proceeding by the plaintiff.

WHEREFORE, subject to the modification of the assailed Decision, the Petition is DENIED. The
Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Civil Cases No. 36089 and No. 36090,
which was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the
following portion be DELETED:

3. That Augusto Gomez and the estate of the late Consuelo Gomez, jointly and solidarily should pay
to Ariston Gomez, Jr. the following amounts:

Moral damages of ₱1,000,000.00;

 Exemplary damages of ₱250,000.00

Attorney’s fees of ₱200,000.00

And costs of suit; with legal interest on all the amounts, except on costs and attorney’s fees,
commencing from February 15, 1980, until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
.R. No. 117487 December 12, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ARNEL ALICANDO y BRIONES, accused-appellant.

PUNO, J.:

The case at bar involves the imposition of the death penalty. With all our frailties, we are asked to
play the role of an infallible God by exercising the divine right to give or take away life. We cannot err
in the exercise of our judgment for our error will be irrevocable. Worse, our error can result in the
worst of crimes — murder by the judiciary.

The records reveal that appellant Arnel Alicando was charged with the crime of rape with
homicide1 in an Information which reads:

That on or about the 12th day of June 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and by means of force, violence and intimidation to wit: by then and there
pinning down one KHAZIE MAE PENECILLA, a minor, four years of age, choking her
with his right hand, succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her and as a result
thereof she suffered asphyxia by strangulation fractured cervical vertebra and
lacerations of the vaginal and rectal openings causing profuse hemorrhages and
other injuries which are necessarily fatal and which were the direct cause of her
death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On June 29, 1994, appellant was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the
PAO, Department of Justice. Appellant pleaded guilty.

After appellant's plea of guilt, the trial court ordered the prosecution to present its evidence. It also
set the case for reception of evidence for the appellant, if he so desired.2

The prosecution evidence shows that in the afternoon of June 12, 1994, Romeo Penecilla, father of
the four year old victim Khazie Mae, was drinking liquor with Ramil Rodriguez and Remus Gaddi in
his (Penecilla's) house at Barangay Rizal, Zone 1, Pulo Bala, Iloilo. Appellant joined them but every
now and then would take leave and return. Appellant was living in his uncle's house some five (5)
arm's length from Penecilla's house. At about 4:30 p.m., Penecilla's group stopped drinking and left.

Luisa Rebada also lives in the Penecilla neighborhood, about one and a half (1-1/2) arm's length
from the house of appellant. At about 5:30 p.m. of that day, she saw the victim at the window of
appellant's house. She offered to buy her "yemas" but appellant closed the window. Soon she heard
the victim crying. She approached appellant's house and peeped through an opening between its
floor and door. The sight shocked her appellant was naked, on top of the victim, his left hand
choking her neck. She retreated to her house in fright. She gathered her children together and
informed her compadre, Ricardo Lagrana, then in her house, about what she saw. Lagrana was also
overcome with fear and hastily left.

Romeo Penecilla returned to his house at 8 o'clock in the evening. He did not find Khazie Mae. He
and his wife searched for her until 1 o'clock in the morning. Their effort was fruitless. Rebada was
aware that the Penecillas were looking for their daughter but did not tell them what she knew.
Instead, Relada called out appellant from her window and asked him the time Khazie Mae left his
house. Appellant replied he was drunk and did not know.

As the sun started to rise, another neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago went down from his house to
answer the call of nature. He discovered the lifeless body of Khazie Mae under his house. Her
parents were informed and so was the police. At 9:00 a.m., Rebada suffered a change of heart. She
informed Romeo Penecilla and his wife Julie Ann, that appellant committed the crime. Forthwith,
appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without
the assistance of counsel. On the basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up
interrogations, the police came to know and recovered from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green
slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of which were
presented as evidence for the prosecution.

The body of Khazie Mae was autopsied by Dr. Tito Doromal, a medico-legal officer. His autopsy
report reveals the following injuries sustained by the victim:

HEAD & NECK/THORACO-ABDOMINAL REGIONS:

1) Contusion , purple in color, 11 x 11.3 cm., in dia., from left and right anterior neck,
down to the medial portion of the left and right infraclavicular area.

2) Contusion, bluish purple, 5.5 x 6.3 cm., in dia., antero-lateral left chest wall.

3) Contusion, bluish in color, 3 in nos., 1, 0.5 & 1.1 cm., in dia., right antero- inferior
chest wall.

4) Contusion, purple in color, 4 x 3.2 cm., in dia., left sub-costal arch.

5) Contusion, purple in color, 4.5 x 5 cm., in dia., supero-lateral, left iliac crest.

ON OPENING THE SKULL 7 THORACO-ABDOMINAL CAVITIES:

a) Fractured, 2nd cervical vertebra.

b) Fractured, crecoid cartilage.

c) Both lungs, expanded with multiple petechial hemorrhages.

d) Other internal organs, congested.

EXTREMITIES:

1) Confluent abrasion, 3 x 2.6 cm., in dia., posterior aspect, lower 3rd,

left forearm.

2) Old wound, 2 x 1.5 cm., in dia., posterior middle 3rd, left forearm.

3) Old wound, 1.5 x 1 cm., in dia., antero-lateral aspect, middle 3rd,

right forearm.

VAGINAL FINDINGS/ANAL FINDINGS:

a) Lacerated wound, from the fourchette up to the dome of the

rectum..

b) Hematoma, from the fourchette up to the rectum.

c) Lacerated wound, lateral wall of the vagina up to the level of the

promontory of the sacrum with a length of 8 centimeters.

d) A cylinder with a diameter of 2 cms., easily passes the vaginal and

anal openings.

CAUSE OF DEATH:

A) ASPHYXIA BY STRANGULATION.

B) FRACTURED, 2nd CERVICAL VERTEBRA.

 C) HEMORRHAGE, 2nd DEGREE TO LACERATED VAGINAL &
RECTAL OPENINGS.

Appellant adopted the autopsy report of Dr. Doromal as his documentary evidence to prove that the
proximate cause of Khazie Mae's death was asphyxia by strangulation.

On July 20, 1994, the trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to death, viz:

WHEREFORE, the court hereby finds the accused, Arnel Alicando, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for (sic) the Crime of Rape with Homicide penalized under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by paragraphs 6 and 7 (No. 4) Section
11 of Republic Act No. 7659. Arnel Alicando is hereby sentenced to suffer a (sic)
penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of the offended party, Khazie Mae D.
Penecilla, the sum of P50,000.00.

The death sentence shall be executed by putting the person under sentence to death
by electrocution (electric chair). As soon as facilities are provided by the Bureau of
Prisons, the method of carrying out his sentence shall be changed by gas poisoning
(sic).

Here ends Khazie Mae's quest for justice. Her tormentor must suffer for the grievous
offense he had committed. He deserves no mercy.

Cost against the accused.

SO ORDERED.

The case is before us on automatic review considering the death penalty imposed by the trial court.
A new counsel, Atty. Joel Tiongco, took the cudgel for appellant. In his Brief, appellant assails the
decision of the trial court as a travesty of justice.

We find that the Decision of the trial court sentencing the appellant to death is shot full of errors, both
substantive and procedural. The conviction is on an amalgam of inadmissible and incredible
evidence and supported by scoliotic logic.

First. The arraignment of the appellant is null and void. The trial judge failed to follow section (1) (a)
— of Rule 116 on arraignment. Said section provides:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. —

(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or
information has been filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment must be made in
open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or
information with the list of witnesses, reading the same in the language or dialect
known to him and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecutor
may, however, call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or
information.

The reading of the complaint or information to the appellant in the language or dialect known
to him is a new requirement imposed by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. It
implements the constitutional right of an appellant ". . . to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him." 3 The new rule also responds to the reality that the
Philippines is a country divided by dialects and Pilipino as a national language is still in the
process of evolution.4 Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that many Filipinos have limited
understanding either of the Pilipino or English language, our official languages for purposes
of communication and instruction. 5 The importance of reading the complaint or information to
the appellant in the language or dialect known to him cannot thus be understated.

In the case at bar, the records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant was read in
the language or dialect known to him. The Information against the appellant is written in the English
language. It is unbeknown whether the appellant knows the English language. Neither is it known
what dialect is understood by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that the Information couched in
English was translated to the appellant in his own dialect before his plea of guilt. The scanty
transcript during his arraignment, reads:6

xxx xxx xxx

Prosecutor Edwin Fama — Appearing as public prosecutor

Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera — For the accused, Your Honor. Ready for arraignment.

Interpreter — (Reading the information to the accused for arraignment and pre-trial.)

Note: (After reading the information to the accused, accused pleads guilty)

One need not draw a picture to show that the arraignment of the appellant is a nullity. It
violated section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the constitutional right of the
appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. It also
denied appellant his constitutional right to due process of law. 7 It is urged that we must
presume that the arraignment of the appellant was regularly conducted. When life is at stake,
we cannot lean on this rebuttable presumption. We cannot assume. We must be sure.

Second. The plea of guilt made by the appellant is likewise null and void. The trial court violated
section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant. Said section provides:

Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.—

When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences
of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.

The records reveal how the trial judge inadequately discharged this duty of conducting a
"searching inquiry." In the hearing of June 28, 1994, the transcripts reveal the following: 8

Note (After reading the information to the accused,

accused pleads guilty.)

Court Question (sic) of the court to the accused.

Q Considering that this is a crime and under the

amended law is a heinous crime, because of your
plea of guilty without the consent or even against the
discretion of the court, the court will give you a
mandatory death penalty because of the crime
charged, do you understand?

Accused Yes, Your Honor.

Q Did you enter a plea of guilty on your own voluntary

will or without any force or intimidation from any one
or whatever?

Accused None, Your Honor.

Q Are you sure?

Accused Yes, Your Honor.

Q Or maybe because you were manhandled or

maltreated by anyone and that will just be the
consideration for you to plead guilty?
 Accused No, Your Honor.

Court Were you not manhandled, please let us see

your body?

Note (Accused raised his prison uniform or shirt and

showed to the court his body from waist up.)

Accused No, Your Honor.

Court You were not maltreated in the jail?

Accused No, Your Honor.

Court Please let us see whether you have bruises so

that you will be examined by a physician to the order
of the court?

Accused No, Your Honor.

Court If you will plead guilty, that plea of guilty has no

use because there will be a mandatory death penalty,
do you still insist on your plea of guilty?

Accused Yes, Your Honor.

Court If you plead guilty to the crime charged there

will be some effects on your civil rights hut not until
the decision will be affirmed by the Supreme Court.

Accused Yes, Your Honor.

Note (See Order dated June 28, 1994 attached to the

records of this case.)

In the next hearing on July 11, 1994, the following verbal exchange transpired, viz:9

xxx xxx xxx

Fiscal Fama: Appearing as the public prosecutor,

ready, Your Honor.

Our first witness is Dr. Tito Doromal, Your Honor.

Atty. Antiquiera: For the accused, Your Honor.

Court Before the court will proceed with the reception

of evidence by the prosecution Arnel Alicando, please
come here. (at this juncture, Arnel Alicando, come
near to the court)

The court is warning you again that this is reception of

evidence by the prosecution after you plead guilty to
the crime charged at, do you understand?

A Yes.

Q Do you still affirm and confirm to your plea of guilty

of rape with homicide?

A Yes, Your Honor.

 Q Do you still insist that your plea of guilty is voluntary
without force, intimidation or whatsoever?

A Yes.

Q The court is warning you that after reception of

evidence, the imposable penalty is mandatory death?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Despite of that, you still insist on your plea of

guilty?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Court Okey, proceed.

Section 3 of Rule 116 which the trial court violated is not a new rule for it merely incorporated the
decision of this Court in People vs. Apduhan, Jr., 10 and reiterated in an unbroken line of cases. 11 The
bottom line of the rule is that the plea of guilt must be based on a free and informed judgment. Thus,
the searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2)
the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The questions of the trial court failed to
show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant nor did the questions demonstrate
appellant's full comprehension of the consequences of his plea. The records do not reveal any
information about the personality profile of the appellant which can serve as a trustworthy index of
his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilt. The age, socio-economic status, and
educational background of the appellant were not plumbed by the trial court. The questions were
framed in English yet there is no inkling that appellant has a nodding acquaintance of English. It will
be noted too that the trial court did not bother to explain to the appellant the essential elements of
the crime of rape with homicide.

A cursory examination of the questions of the trial court to establish the voluntariness of appellant's
plea of guilt will show their utter insufficiency. The trial court simply inquired if appellant had physical
marks of maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant when he was arrested, who arrested him, how
and where he was interrogated, whether he was medically examined before and after his
interrogation, etc. It limited its efforts trying to discover late body marks of maltreatment as if
involuntariness is caused by physical abuse alone. Regretfully, it even turned a blind eye on the
following damning entry on the June 13, 1994 Record of Events of the Iloilo PNP (Exh. "M") showing
that after his arrest, the appellant was mobbed by inmates while in jail and had suffered hematoma,
viz:

c-0262-94

INFORMATION

2:50 PM, — P02 Salvador Pastoloro, Jr., PNP assigned at 327th PNP MFC,
informed this office thru SPO1 W. Garcera alleging that at about 9:00 AM this date
when the suspect ARNEL ALICANDO Y BRIONES, 24 yrs. old, residence of Rizal,
Palapala Zone I, CP, been arrested and mobbed by the irrate residents of Zone II
Rizal, Palapala, GP, in connection of the Rape with Homicide case wherein the
victim KHAZIE MAE PENECILLA Y DRILON, 4 yrs, old, residence of same place
who was discovered dead under the house thereat. Suspect when turned over to this
office and put on lock up cell was also mobbed by the angry inmates thus causing
upon him hematoma contusion on different parts of his body.

Likewise, the trial court's effort to determine whether appellant had full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea is fatally flawed. It warned the appellant he would get the mandatory death
penalty without explaining the meaning of "mandatory" It did not inform the appellant of the indemnity
he has to pay for the death of the victim. It cautioned appellant there ". . . will be some effects on
your civil rights" without telling the appellant what those "effects" are and what "civil rights" of his are
involved.
Appellant's plea of guilt is void and the trial court erred in using it to sentence him to death. We
stress that under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a conviction in capital offenses cannot rest
alone on a plea of guilt. Section 3 of Rule 116 requires that after a free and intelligent plea of guilt,
the trial court must require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant and the precise degree
of his culpability beyond reasonable doubt. This rule modifies prior jurisprudence that a plea of guilt
even in capital offenses is sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the information without need
of further proof. The change is salutary for it enhances one of the goals of the criminal process which
is to minimize erroneous conviction. We share the stance that "it is a fundamental value
determination of our system that it is far worse to convict an innocent person than let a guilty man go
free. 12

Third. Some prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea of guilt of the appellant,
were inadmissible, yet, were considered by the trial court in convicting the appellant.

Thus, the trial court gave full faith and credit to the physical evidence presented by the prosecution.
To quote its Decision, 13 viz:

xxx xxx xxx

Further, there are physical evidence to prove Khazie was raped. These consists of a
pillow with bloodstains in its center14 and the T-shirt 15 of the accused colored white
with bloodstains on its bottom. These physical evidence are evidence of the highest
order. They strongly corroborate the testimony of Luisa Rebada that the victim was
raped.

These are inadmissible evidence for they were gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City
PNP as a result of custodial interrogation where appellant verbally confessed to the crime
without the benefit of counsel. PO3 Tan admitted under cross-examination, viz: 16

xxx xxx xxx

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY ATTY. ANTIQUIERA:

Q Mr. Witness, when for the first time did you see
Arnel Alicando?

A June 13, 1994, when I arrested him.

Q Previous to that you have never seen him?

A Yes, sir.

Q When for the first time did you start investigating

Arnel Alicando?

A After I finished investigating the body of the victim,

Khazie Mae Penecilla.

Q And that was also after you were informed that

Arnel Alicando was a suspect in the raping of Khazie
Mae Penecilla?

A Yes, sir

Atty. Antiquiera:

Q And who was that person who informed you of the

suspect?

A Luisa Rebada.
Q Mrs. Rebada who is the witness in this case?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you started investigating Arnel Alicando in the

morning of June 13, 1994?

A Yes, sir.

Q How long did you interrogate Arnel Alicando in the

morning of June 13, 1994?

A I cannot remember the length of time I investigated

him.

Q Did it take you the whole morning of June 13, 1994

in interrogating and investigating Arnel Alicando?

A Yes, sir.

Q And the investigation you conducted continued in

the afternoon of the same date?

A Yes, sir.

Q The following day, June 14, 1994, you still

investigated and interrogated Arnel Alicando.

A Yes, sir.

Q And when did you stop, finally, investigating and

interrogating Arnel Alicando?

A After I finished recovering all the exhibits in relation

to this case.

Q What date did you stop your investigation?

A June 14, 1994, when I finished recovering the white

T-shirt and pair of earring.

Atty. Antiquiera:

Q You testified in this case, Mr. Witness, you never

informed the court that you apprised the accused of
his constitutional rights, is that correct?

A I apprised him.

Q My question is, during your testimony before this

court under the direct examination of the prosecution
you never informed the court that you apprised the
accused of his constitutional rights?

Pros. Fama:

I did not ask him that question. How will he answer?

Court:

Sustained.
 Atty. Antiquiera:

Q When did you inform, the date when you informed

Alicando of his Constitutional rights?

A On June 13.

Q On what hour did you inform him?

A After the witness identified him.

Q What constitutional rights did you inform Alicando

of?

A The right to remain silent, and right to get his lawyer

and I have interpreted in Visayan language.

Q And during your investigation for almost two (2)

days the accused was never represented by counsel,
is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Atty. Antiquiera:

Q Are you aware of the law that enjoins a public

officer to inform the person of his constitutional rights?

A Yes, sir.

That is all, Your Honor.

It is now familiar learning that the Constitution has stigmatized

as inadmissible evidence uncounselled confession or admission. Section 12 paragraphs (1)
and (3) of Article III of the Constitution provides:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible against him.

In the case at bar, PO3 Tan did not even have the simple sense to reduce the all important
confession of the appellant in writing. Neither did he present any writing showing that appellant
waived his right to silence and to have competent and independent counsel despite the blatant
violation of appellant's constitutional right, the trial court allowed his uncounselled confession to flow
into the records and illicitly used it in sentencing him to death.

It is not only the uncounselled confession that is condemned as inadmissible, but also evidence
derived therefrom. The pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains were evidence derived
from the uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the police from the appellant. Again, the
testimony of PO3 Tan makes this all clear, viz: 17

xxx xxx xxx

Q Did the accused Arnel Alicando accompany you to the place of the
incident?

A Yes, sir.

Q When you arrived at the place of the incident what did you do?

A He pointed to the fish basin.

Q Can you identify this fish basin which you said pointed to you by
Arnel Alicando?

A Yes, sir.

Q Please point?

A (Witness pointing to the fish basin already marked as Exhibit "H".)

Q Did you ask the accused what he did with this fish basin?

A I asked the accused what he did with the fish basin and he
answered that he used the fish basin to cover Khazie Mae Penecilla
when she was already dead.

Pros. Fama:

Q You mean to say to conceal the crime?

A Yes, sir.

Q What else aside from this fish basin, what else did you recover?

A At around 7 o'clock in the evening he further pointed to us the old

mat and the pillow wherein he layed the victim Khazie Mae Penecilla

Q You mean to say that you returned back to the scene of the
incident that time?

A It was already night time and it was only Kagawad Rodolfo Ignacio,
my companion, who went to the place of the incident.

Q You mean to say you were verbally instructed by the accused?

A Yes, sir.

Q In what particular place did you recover those things?

A Inside the room where he raped the child.

Q Whose house is that?

A The house of Imelda Alicando.

Q The wife of Romeo Alicando?

A Yes, sir.

Q In what particular place is that situated?

A Inside the room where the accused was sleeping at Rizal-Palapala.

Pros. Fama:

Q You mean to say inside that room the victim was raped by the
accused?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you point that pillow which you said you recovered inside the
room of Imelda Alicando?

A Yes, sir.

Q And the mat?

A (Witness taking out from the fish basin the mat and pillow.)

Q Did you find something on the pillow?

A The pillow have bloodstain in the middle.

. . This was already marked as Exhibit "J", Your Honor and the mat
as Exhibit "I".

Q Aside from this what did you recover from the place of incident?

A On June 14, 1994, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning the

accused Arnel Alicando further informed me that he kept the gold
earring of the victim and her clothes inside the room of the house of
Imelda Alicando.

Q Where?

A I saw the clothes of Khazie Mae Penecilla inside the room where
the rape took place hanged on the clothes line. And I found the pair of
earring at the bamboo post of the fence.

Court:

Q Where is that bamboo post of the fence situated?

A Around the fence of Imelda Alicando situated at the from gate on

the right side.

Pros. Fama:

Q You mean to say you returned back on June 14, you recovered the
items accompanied by the accused?

A No more, I only followed his direction.

Q He made verbal direction to you?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you please show us the white t-shirt?

A (Witness taking out a white t-shirt from the fish basin.)

Q Please examine that white t-shirt?

A The t-shirt have a bloodstain.

 We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction. We have also
adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree," a phrase
minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone v. United
States. 18 According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been
unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the " fruit " ) derived from it is also
inadmissible. 19 Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the
illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal
act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized
evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence
illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the
originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. 20 We applied
this exclusionary rule in the recent case of People vs. Salanga, et al., 21 a ponencia of Mr.
Justice Regalado. Salanga was the appellant in the rape and killing of a 15-year old barrio
lass. He was, however, illegally arrested. Soldiers took him into custody. They gave him a
body search which yielded a lady's underwear. The underwear was later identified as that of
the victim. We acquitted Salanga. Among other reasons , we ruled that "the underwear
allegedly taken from the appellant is inadmissible in evidence, being a so-called "fruit of the
poisonous tree." 22

But even assuming arguendo that the pillow and the t-shirt were admissible evidence, still, the trial
court erred in holding that they "strongly corroborated the testimony of Luisa Rebada that the victim
was raped." For one, there was no basis for the trial court to conclude that the stains on the pillow
and t-shirt were human bloodstains. The pillow and the t-shirt were not examined by any expert. To
hold that they were human bloodstains is guesswork. For another, there was no testimony that the
stains were caused by either the blood of the appellant or the victim. In addition, there was no
testimony that the t-shirt was the one worn by the appellant when he allegedly committed the crime.
It must also be noted that it is not unnatural for appellant to have bloodstains on his shirt. He is a
butcher by occupation. Romeo Penecilla himself, the father of the victim, testified he knows the
appellant "because he used to accompany me during butchering of animals." 23

The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain silent and the right to counsel before
making a confession under custodial interrogation rests with the prosecution. It is also the burden of
the prosecution to show that the evidence derived from confession is not tainted as "fruit of the
poisonous tree." The burden has to be discharged by clear and convincing evidence. Indeed, par. 1
of Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution provides only one mode of waiver — the waiver must
be in writing and in the presence of counsel. In the case at bar, the records show that the
prosecution utterly failed to discharge this burden. It matters not that in the course of the hearing, the
appellant failed to make a timely objection to the introduction of these constitutionally proscribed
evidence. The lack of objection did not satisfy the heavy burden of proof that rested on the
prosecution.

There is no and there ought not to be any disagreement on basic principles. The Court should be
concerned with the heinousness of the crime at bar and its despicable perpetration against a 4-year
old girl, an impersonation of innocence itself. The Court should also be concerned with the
multiplication of malevolence in our midst for there is no right to be evil, and there are no ifs and buts
about the imposition of the death penalty as long as it remains unchallenged as part of the laws of
our land. These concerns are permanent, norms hewn in stone, and they transcend the
transitoriness of time.

Be that as it may, our commitment to the criminal justice system is not only to convict and punish
violators of our laws. We are equally committed to the ideal that the process of detection,
apprehension, conviction and incarceration of criminals should be accomplished with fairness, and
without impinging on the dignity of the individual. In a death penalty case, the Court cannot rush to
judgment even when a lowlife is involved for an erroneous conviction will leave a lasting stain in our
escutcheon of justice.

In sum, the Court cannot send the appellant to die in the electric chair on the basis of the procedural
irregularities committed by, and the inadmissible evidence considered by the trial court. In Binabay
vs. People, et al., 24 ponencia of Mr. Chief Justice R. Concepcion, this Court held that no valid
judgment can be rendered upon an invalid arraignment. Since in the case at bar, the arraignment of
the appellant is void, his judgment of conviction is also void. In fairness to the appellant, and in
justice to the victim, the case has to be remanded to the trial court. for further proceedings. There is
no philosophy of punishment that allows the State to kill without any semblance of fairness and
justice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision in Criminal Case No. 43663, convicting accused Arnel Alicando
of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death is annulled and
set aside and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Vitug, Francisco and Panganiban,
JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

KAPUNAN, J., dissenting:

The civilized mind normally recoils at the idea of taking a man's life by way of retribution for the
commission of a crime. However, every so often, a crime so dastardly and repulsive comes along
that even an individual usually predisposed towards rehabilitating the hard-core criminal would no
longer wish to suffer in silent rage at society's kid-glove treatment of such offender, but would readily
opt to exact a commensurate requital in the form of capital punishment where circumstances so
demand.

Sociological theory at least since Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) has posited the idea that setting
absolute outer limits on deviance is a necessary component of group identification and survival.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes may have sensed this truth when he wrote, in The Common
Law (1881), "The first requirement of a sound body of law is that it should correspond with the actual
feelings and demands of the community, whether right or wrong (1938 ed:, p. 41)." 1

Thus, impelled by the alarming upsurge of crime resulting in the loss of human lives and wanton
destruction of property affecting the nation's efforts towards sustainable development and prosperity
while at the same time undermining the people's faith in the Government, Congress enacted
Republic Act 7659,2 imposing capital punishment on certain heinous crimes.

The early Spartans had word for such crimes: haineus, hateful, abominable, from the Greek
prefix haton, denoting acts so hatefully or shockingly evil. The acts charged in the case at bench
belong to this genre.

A totally innocent child was forever denied the opportunity to enjoy life beyond the age of four by the
gruesome and hideous acts allegedly committed by the appellant who, according to the prosecution,
was not content merely with satisfying his beastly desires on her, but also strangled her to death.
Whether or not the circumstances of the present case require the imposition of the death penalty is
the ultimate issue before us. After a thorough review of the facts and the evidence, I am afraid, I
have to dissent from the majority. The legal evidence available to us overwhelmingly supports the
lower court's conclusions. We should not shirk from our legal duty to impose the death penalty.

In the afternoon of June 12, 1994, Romeo Penecilla, father of four-year-old Khazi Mae, was having a
drinking spree with Ramil Rodriguez, Remus Goddi and the appellant at his (Romeo's) house at
Barangay Rizal, Zone 1, Pulo Bala, Iloilo. At about 4:30 p.m., everybody left, except for the
appellant. Appellant was residing at his uncle's house about five (5) arm's length away from the
Penecilla's house.
When Romeo Penecilla arrived home at 8:00 that evening, he could not find Khazi Mae. He and his
wife looked for her until 1:00 in the morning to no avail.

The next morning, Leopoldo Santiago, a neighbor, got the shock of his life when, answering the call
of nature outside his house, he chanced the dead body of Khazi Mae. Immediately, the girl's parents
were informed. The small, lifeless body was brought to their house.

The matter was reported to the police at once. At this point, Luisa Rebada, who lived about 1-1/2
arm's length away from the house of appellant related to the girl's distraught parents what she knew.3

Rebada recounted that at about 5:30 of the afternoon before, she saw Khazi Mae at the window of
appellant's house. She called out to her and offered to buy "yemas," for her. Appellant suddenly
closed the window. Later on, Luisa heard Khazi Mae cry and then squeal. Her curiosity aroused, she
crept two steps up the appellant's house, peeped through an opening between the floor and the
door, and saw appellant naked on top of Khazi Mae, his right hand choking the girl's neck. Rebada
became frightened and went back to her house to gather her children. She told her compadre,
Ricardo Lagranai who was in her house at that time, of what she saw. The latter got nervous and
left. That evening when she heard that Khazi Mae's parents were looking for the little child, she
called out from her window and asked appellant what time Khazi Mae left his house. Appellant
replied that he did not know since he was drunk.4 With Luisa Rebada's revelation, appellant was
arrested.

During the investigation conducted by PO3 Danilo Tan, appellant readily admitted raping and killing
Khazi Mae.5 The police were able to recover from appellant's house Khazi Mae's green slippers, a
pair of gold earrings placed on top of a bamboo post, a bloodied buri mat, a pillow with a blood stain
in the middle, and a stained T-shirt owned by appellant.

An autopsy conducted and Dr. Tito Doromal, the medico-legal officer, revealed the following
findings:

BEAD & NECK/THORACO-ABDOMINAL REGIONS:

1) Contusion, purple in color, 11 x 11.3 cm., in dia., from left and right
anterior neck, down to the medial portion of the left and right infra-
clavicular area.

2) Contusion, bluish purple, 5.5 x 6.3 cm., in dia., antero-lateral left

chest wall.

3) Contusion, bluish in color, 3 in nos., 1, 0.5 & 1.1 cm., in dia., right
antero-inferior chest wall.

4) Contusion, purple in color, 4 x 3.2 cm., in dia., left sub-costal arch.

5) Contusion, purple in color, 4.5 x 5 cm., in dia., supero-lateral, left

iliac crest.

ON OPENING THE SKULL & THORACO-ABDOMINAL CAVITIES:

a) Fractured, 2nd cervical vertebra.

b) Fractured, crecoid cartilage.

c) Both lungs, expanded with multiple petechial hemorrhages.

d) Other internal organs, congested.

EXTREMITIES:

1) Confluent abrasion, 3 x 2.6 cm., in dia., posterior aspect, lower 3rd,

left forearm.
 2) Old wound, 2 x 1.5 cm., in dia., posterior middle 3rd, left forearm.

3) Old wound, 1.5 x 1 cm., in dia., antero-lateral aspect, middle 3rd,

right forearm.

VAGINAL FINDINGS/ANAL FINDINGS:

a) Lacerated wound, from the fourchette up to the dome of the

rectum.

b) Hematoma, from the fourchette up to the rectum.

c) Lacerated wound, lateral wall of the vagina up to the level of the

promontory of the sacrum with a length of 8 centimeters.

d) A cylinder with a diameter of 2 cms., easily passes the vaginal and

anal openings.

CAUSE OF DEATH:

A) ASPHYXIA BY STRANGULATION

B) FRACTURED, 2nd CERVICAL VERTEBRA.

C) HEMORRHAGE, 2nd DEGREE TO LACERATED VAGINAL &

RECTAL OPENINGS.6

Consequently, an information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 38,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 43663, charging Arnel Alicando with the crime of rape with homicide,
committed as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of June, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force, violence and intimidation to wit: by
then and there pinning down one KHAZIE MAE PENECILLA, a minor, four years of
age, choking her with his right hand, succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her
and as a result thereof she suffered asphyxia by strangulation, fractured cervical
vertebra and lacerations of the vaginal and rectal openings causing profuse
hemorrhages and other injuries which are necessarily fatal and which were the direct
cause of her death thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

On June 28, 1994, appellant, assisted by Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO), pleaded guilty to the crime charged.

The trial court ordered the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability. It likewise set the case for reception of evidence for the accused, if
he wished to.8

In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented (1) Luisa Rebada; (2) Dr. Tito Doromal, the
medico-legal officer; (3) SPO1 Manuel Artuz, the exhibit custodian of Iloilo City Police Station; (4)
PO3 Danilo Tan; (5) SPO3 Rollie Luz, police investigators; and (6) Romeo Penecilla, the victim's
father.

The defense, for its part, merely presented the autopsy report of Dr. Tito Doromal to show that the
proximate cause of death was asphyxia by strangulation.

On July 20, 1994, the trial judge rendered a decision imposing the death penalty on Arnel Alicando.

The case is now before us on automatic review. Disagreeing with the trial court's conviction of the
accused for the crime of Rape with Homicide and the said court's imposition of the death penalty the
Court's majority has decided to overturn the conviction and remand the case to the trial court on the
basis of the following alleged procedural irregularities:

First, that the arraignment of the appellant is null, and void;

Second, that the plea of guilt made by the appellant is likewise null and void;

Third, some prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea of guilt of the appellant, were
inadmissible, yet were considered by the trial court in convicting the appellant.

I strongly disagree.

II

THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL, IF NOT FULL COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING RULES ON

ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA.

A thorough review of the record reveals that there was full compliance with existing rules on
arraignment and plea.

It is plainly obvious from an examination of the appropriate rules and the record of the case that: 1)
there is absolutely nothing on the record which would warrant a finding the information was not read
in the language or dialect known to the appellant; 2) the rule on arraignment and plea does not
absolutely require that the same be indicated in the record of every criminal case; 3) Rule 116
Section 1 contains nothing requiring trial courts to indicate in the record the fact that the information
was read in the language or dialect known to the defendant, even if the same was in fact actually
complied with by the lower court.

The rule on arraignment, Rule 116 provides the following:

Sec. 1: Arraignment and plea; how made. — (a) The accused must be arraigned
before the court where the complaint or information has been filed or assigned for
trial. The arraignment must be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing
the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses, reading
the same in the language or dialect known to him and asking him whether he pleads
guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may, however, call at the trial witnesses other
than those named in the complaint or information.

(b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his
plea. Both arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but a failure to enter of
record shall not affect the validity of the proceedings.

(c) If the accused refuses to plead, or makes a conditional plea of guilty, a plea of not
guilty shall be entered for him.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3: Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. When the accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require
the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. the accused
may also present evidence in his behalf.

When an accused is arraigned in connection with a criminal charge, it is the duty of the court to
inform him of its nature and cause so that he may be able to comprehend the charges against him
as well as the circumstances attendant thereto. When the charge is of a serious nature, it becomes
the imperative duty of the lawyer present not only to assist the accused during the reading of the
information but also to explain to him the gravity and consequence of his plea.9

Trial judges are enjoined to refrain from accepting with alacrity the accused's plea of guilty. While
justice demands speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it
that when an accused pleads guilty, he fully understands the meaning of his plea and the import of
an inevitable conviction.10
Consequently, three things need to be accomplished after the accused in a criminal case enters a
plea of guilty to a capital offense:

(1) the court should conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of the accused's plea;

(2) the lower court should require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise
degree of his culpability; and

(3) the court should inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence on his behalf and
should allow him to do so if he so desires. A judge who fails to observe this requirement commits a
grave abuse of discretion.

These requirements have been complied with in this case, which the following pertinent portions of
the appellant's arraignment, quoted from the record support:

Prosecutor Edwin Fama —

Appearing as public prosecutor.

Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera —

For the accused, Your Honor. Ready for arraignment.

Interpreter:

(Reading the information to the accused for arraignment and pre-

trial.)

Note:

(After reading the information to the accused, accused pleads guilty.)

Court:

Question of the court to the accused.

Q Considering that this is a crime and under the amended law is a

heinous crime, because of your plea of guilty without the consent or
even against the discretion of the court, the court will give you a
mandatory death penalty because of the crime charged, do you
understand that?

Accused:

Yes, Your Honor.

Q Did you enter a plea of guilty on your own voluntary will or without
any force or intimidation from any one or whatever.

Accused:

None, Your Honor.

Q Are you sure?

Accused:

Yes, Your Honor.

 Q Or maybe because you the were manhandled or maltreated by
anyone and that will just be consideration for you to plead guilty?

Accused:

No, Your Honor.

Court:

Were you not manhandled, please let us see your body?

Note:

(Accused raised his prison uniform or shirt and showed to the court
his body from waist up).

Accused:

No, Your Honor.

Court:

You were not maltreated in the jail?

Accused:

No, Your Honor.

Court:

Please let us see whether you have bruises so that you will be
examined by a physician to the order of the court?

Accused:

No, Your Honor.

Court:

If you plead guilty to the crime charged there will be some effects on
your civil rights but not until the decision will be affirmed by the
Supreme Court.

Accused:

Yes, Your Honor. 11

Again, before the prosecution presented its evidence on July 11, 1994, the trial judge once more
asked appellant if he was sure of his plea.

Fiscal Fama:

Appearing as the public prosecutor, ready, Your Honor.

Our first witness is Dr. Tito Doromal, Your Honor.

Atty. Antiquiera:

For the accused, Your Honor.

Court:
 Before the court will proceed with the reception of evidence by the
prosecution, Arnel Alicando, please come here. (At this juncture,
Arnel Alicando, come near to the court)

The court is warning you again that this is reception of evidence by

the prosecution after you plead guilty to the crime charged at, do you
understand?

A Yes.

Q Do you still affirm and confirm to your plea of guilty of your rape
with homicide?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Do you still insist that your plead of guilty is voluntary without force,
intimidation or whatsoever?

A Yes.

Q The court is warning you that after reception of evidence, the

imposable penalty is mandatory death?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Despite of that, you still insist of your plea of guilty?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Court:

Okey, proceed. 12

It is crystal clear, from the above-quoted portions of the transcript of the appellant's arraignment that
the trial judge made every effort to ascertain the voluntariness of the plea, and that he repeatedly
warned the defendant of the consequences of his plea. In other words —

A) The above-quoted proceedings satisfy the requirement of a searching inquiry.

There is no hard and fast rule requiring judges to conduct their searching inquiry in the detailed
manner suggested by the majority opinion, although judges should ideally strive to conduct as
detailed an inquiry as would be reasonable under the circumstances. In People v. Dayot13 we held
that:

A searching inquiry . . . compels the judge to content himself reasonably that the
accused has not been coerced or placed under a state
of duress — and that his guilty plea has not therefore been given improvidently —
other by actual threats of physical harm from malevolent quarters or simply because
of his, the judge's, intimidating robes.

xxx xxx xxx

While there can be no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct searching
inquiry, as to the number and character of questions he may put to the accused, or
as to the earnestness with which he may conduct it, since each case must be
measured according to its individual merit, taking into consideration the age,
educational attainment, and social status of the accused confessing guilt, among
other things, the singular barometer is that the judge must in all cases, fully convince
himself that: (1) the accused, in pleading guilty, is doing so voluntarily, and (2) he, in
so doing, is truly guilty, and that there exists a rational basis for a finding of guilt,
based on his testimony. This Court leaves to judges, considering their training, ample
 discretion, but expects them at the same time, that they will be true to their calling
and be worthy ministers of the law.

The purpose of a searching inquiry is to satisfy the judge that the defendant's plea was entered into
voluntarily and that the defendant understood the consequences of his plea. There is no hard and
fast rule, as the Dayot case states, as to the number and character of the questions propounded.
Judges are not required to go into obsessive detail about the psychological, educational and
sociological background of the accused if from a reasonable inquiry conducted through a reasonable
number of questions he is fully convinced a searching inquiry has been met. There is a world of
difference between a fastidious attention to detail which furthers the end of justice and an attention
to detail and minutae bordering on obsessiveness which ultimately obstructs justice and defeats the
purpose of the law. Apropos to this there is —

B) No evidence that the information was not read in a language or dialect known to the
appellant.

The records in an overwhelming number of criminal cases brought before us contain informations
written in the English language without any indication, whatsoever, that the same was translated
from a language or dialect known to the defendant. And yet, even in Metro Manila alone, one
observes that the bulk of proceedings in our trial courts, including the process of arraignment, is
conducted in the vernacular. On the record of these cases normally printed in English, courts hardly
bother to point out those sections of the trial conducted in the vernacular and translated into English.
Because of this widespread practice, which the section on arraignment in the Rules of Court does
not proscribe — the presumption of regularity ought to apply. Otherwise, we should compel
ourselves to review the criminal cases decided by this Court since the imposition of the 1985
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure and see whether there was any indication that the
arraignment of these criminal cases were, the records therein then ought to show, conducted in a
language known to the defendants. The absurdity of this argument by the defense then becomes
apparent, because it would be fairly obvious to all of us that most of these proceedings were actually
conducted in the vernacular, but the fact was never put on record. In fact, Section 1 (b) of Rule 116
even states that while the arraignment and plea be made of record failure to enter (the same) of
record shall not affect the validity of the proceedings. Even the rule on placing the arraignment and
plea on record is not absolute, and I cannot see how we can be too strict about indicating on record
whether proceedings were made in the vernacular in cases where in fact the proceedings were so
conducted. The argument that the information was not read in the language or dialect known to
appellant merely grasps on straws and ought to be dismissed for being so inconsequential as to be
bereft of merit.

Moreover, it is a matter of common practice that in every court, especially in the provinces, an
interpreter is always at hand to translate to the parties all questions propounded to them in the
language or dialect known to them. It is also common practice that the transcript of stenographic
notes submitted to the court only reflect the court proceedings conducted in the English language.
While again, the records do not categorically indicate that the information was read in the language
or dialect known to the defendant or that the questions asked were mandated in the vernacular or
dialect understood by him it is presumed, as we have actually done in many cases before this, that
such duty was regularly performed in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.14 In the face of
this common practice, the burden now lies on the defense to prove the contrary. Under the principle
of equal application of laws, we cannot have varying degrees of fastidiousness in the enforcement of
procedural rules based on the gravity of the penalty.

THE PLEA OF GUILTY IN THE CASE AT BENCH WAS CLEARLY NOT IMPROVIDENT

In the case before us, when the appellant pleaded guilty in open court on June 28, 1994, appellant
was clearly assisted by counsel. The court took pains to repeatedly remind him of the grave
consequences of a plea of guilty, which appellant said he understood. One very such occasion, he
had every opportunity, through his counsel, to ask the court for clarification.

The trial court, on its own, in fact went out of its way to repeatedly inform the defendant of the nature
of his plea and the implications of the plea he was making. On July 11, 1994, before the presentation
of evidence for the prosecution, he was once again asked by the court if he was sure of his plea. At
this time, appellant had more than sufficient time or about thirteen days to reflect on all the possible
consequences of his plea. If indeed it was not voluntarily made during his arraignment, he had
enough time and opportunity with the assistance of his lawyer to recant or at least express
reservations about the same. However, in spite of several warnings given by the trial court on
different occasions, appellant stood pat with his judicial admission.

Significantly, the records fail to indicate that appellant questioned his plea of guilty at any stage of
the trial. He had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution. He did not put
up any defense nor denied the inculpatory testimonies, documents and real evidence presented
against him (in fact, it was appellant himself who directed the police investigators to the location of
the various physical evidence, e.g. green slippers, earrings15).

Appellant's silence as to the accusations made against him in open court from the time of his
arraignment and during his entire trial therefore assumes a great deal of significance in the context
of the majority's insistence that herein appellant's plea of guilty was improvident and therefore void.
In the face of the seriousness of the accusations against him, his reticence was eloquent. As the
Court held in People vs. Pillones:

Silence is assent as well as consent, and may, where a direct and specific
accusation of crime is made, be regarded under some circumstances as a quasi-
confession. An innocent person will at once naturally and emphatically repel an
accusation of crime, as a matter of self-preservation and self-defense, and as a
precaution against prejudicing himself. A person's silence, therefore, particularly
when it is persistent, will justify an inference that he is not innocent. (Underhill's
Criminal Evidence, 4th Ed., p. 401.)16

The absence of an extrajudicial confession does not detract from the efficacy or validity of
appellant's plea of guilty, it does not affect the requirement compelling the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability. No where in the rules does it state that
an extrajudicial confession is a prerequisite for a conviction based on a plea of guilty. While the
constitutional infirmities that attended the custodial investigation of the appellant were serious and
should not be glossed over, his conviction was based mainly on his plea of guilt made in open court
and not on the extrajudicial confession, which formed but a small aspect of the prosecution's case.
An extrajudicial confession only serves to confirm or substantiate a plea of guilty entered in open
court. As between an extrajudicial confession and a judicial admission, the latter significantly is given
evidentiary weight. Even assuming the extrajudicial confession in this case could not be given
evidentiary weight because of mistakes committed by authorities in conducting their custodial
investigation and in their gathering evidence, his plea of guilty on arraignment, his repeated
admissions to the same in spite of repeated warnings of the trial judge of the consequences of his
plea and the presence of ample corroborating testimony from a credible eyewitness to the crime
establish appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The essence of the plea of guilty in a trial is that the accused admits his guilt freely, voluntarily and
with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act, and with a clear understanding of
the precise nature of the crime charged in the complaint or information. 17 A plea of guilty, when
formally entered on arraignment is sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the information
without need of further proof.18 This, notwithstanding, (in line with the pronouncement of the Court in
several cases19) the trial court received evidence to determine if the appellant erred in admitting his
guilt. Independent of such plea, there was more than sufficient evidence adduced to prove that
appellant indeed committed the acts charged.

THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OBJECTED TO FALLS UNDER ONE OF THE EXCEPTIONS

TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

Objections were vigorously raised by the defense regarding certain pieces of evidence obtained by
law enforcement authorities following the uncounseled custodial investigation of the accused in the
case at bench. These objections have been thoroughly threshed out and weighed against the other
factual material obtained at trial in order to determine whether or not, on the balance, the accused's
conviction ought to be sustained, modified in favor of a lesser penalty, or altogether thrown out. I
shall discuss them in the interest of thoroughness.

Central to these objections were the pieces of physical evidence allegedly obtained by law
enforcement officers as a result of information volunteered by the accused during his uncounseled
custodial investigation. Since the information obtained, it has been pointed out, was taken
supposedly in violation of the Constitution, the pieces of evidence derivatively gathered should have
been excluded by the court below, following the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
The 1987 Constitution's exclusionary rules absolutely forbid evidence obtained from illegal searches
and seizures or evidence resulting from uncounseled custodial investigations of accused individuals.
The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine extends these prohibitions to pieces of evidence derivatively
flowing from illegal searches and seizures or from admissions made by accused individuals under
conditions proscribed by the Constitution. However, the doctrine is not without its exceptions, and
the evidence in dispute in the instant case falls within those exceptions.

The discovery of the victim's body near the house of the accused would have naturally led law
enforcement authorities to undertake a more thorough investigation of the site, particularly in those
areas where the victim was last seen. Assuming local police had enough logistical capabilities to
form two teams to undertake two separate searches, one for physical evidence and other clues and
one for the possible suspects, the evidence objected to would have been inevitably discovered with
a thorough search of the site. Under the circumstances of this case where only one search was
initially conducted (obviously because of logistical reasons), primarily for a suspect, it would have
logically followed had a suspect not been found at the time, or, had the accused not made his
voluntary, though uncounselled confession, that a search for evidence would have been undertaken,
under conditions which would have validated a warrantless search, where the same physical
evidence would have been inevitably discovered. In other words, with or without appellant's
volunteered information, the pieces of evidence objected to — the blood-stained pillow, the T-shirt
and the victim's earring — would have fallen into police hands by legal means which would have
normally been undertaken by the authorities in any case.

Courts have generally approved the view that it is not necessary to hold that all evidence is fruit of
the poisonous tree. Under one of the recognized exceptions, the more appropriate question in such
cases is whether the evidence to which the objection is made would not have been discovered at all
but for the illegality or would have been discovered anyway by sources or procedures independent
of the illegality. Another exception refuses to treat the doctrine as absolutely sacred if the evidence
in question would have been inevitably discovered under normal conditions.

I submit, that under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the evidence objected to would have
been inevitably discovered anyway. In a long line of cases, courts have recognized that evidence
derived from information obtained illegally is not absolutely inadmissible under the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine where it is shown that such evidence would have been inevitably gained
even without the unlawful act.20 The case of U.S. vs. Seohnlein, for instance, held the view that a
confession by the accused in a bank robbery case was not fruit of the poisonous tree for the reason
that the information which led to his confession, though the product of an illegal search would have
been discovered in the absence of such illegality.21 The Court in Lockridge vs. Superior Court was of
the opinion that where a witness is discovered as a result of illegal police conduct, his testimony is
admissible is he would have been discovered in the normal course of a normally conducted
investigation. 22 These and other recognized limitations to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine do
not have the effect of diluting the effect of our exclusionary rules. Rather, they serve the purpose of
the rule well by maintaining a reasonable balance between the need to deny evidence come by
through the exploitation of an illegality on one hand and the need to minimize opportunity for the
defendant in a criminal case to reap an undeserved and socially undesirable bonanza. 23 Certainly it
could not be argued that with nothing in their hands, the police would not have gone back to the site
for a better inspection.

THERE IS ENOUGH LEGAL EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN THE TRIAL COURT'S CONVICTION

OF THE ACCUSED WITH MORAL CERTAINTY

Assuming arguendo the validity of the defense's arguments over the pieces of evidence recovered
by the police in the case at bench above-mentioned, a thorough review of the evidence utilized by
the trial court leads us to the conclusion that the defendant's conviction would have been sustained,
in any case, without the pieces of evidence objected to.24 Lest we mistake the trees for the forest, a
shifting of the pieces of evidence, and a separation therefrom of the physical evidence objected to
would nevertheless still leave the prosecution with enough legal evidence to convict the accused
with moral certainty. These include:

1. The defendant's own repeated admissions, in the presence of counsel and in open court that he
committed the acts charged;

2. The essentially uncontradicted testimony of the prosecution's eyewitness, Luisa Rebada.

Having discussed the first point, I shall go directly to Rebada's testimony, which the majority opinion
let pass without comment. For a better perspective of Rebada's testimony, allow me once again to
quote from the transcript:

Q Can you recall where were you on June 12, 1994, at around 5:30
P.M.?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Where were you?

A I was at home.

Q Where is your house situated?

A Brgy. Rizal, Pala-pala, Zone I, Iloilo City.

Q Do you have any neighbor in that residence of yours at Rizal Pala-

pala?

A Yes, Sir, Arnel Alicando.

Q How far is the house of Arnel Alicando from your house?

A One and a half (1 1/2) arm's length.

Q On that time at 5:30 P.M. have you seen Arnel Alicando?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Where was Arnel Alicando at that time?

A He was upstairs, inside the house of Romeo Alicando.

Q What is the relation of Romeo Alicando to Arnel Alicando if you

know?

A Romeo is the uncle of Arnel.

Q Did Arnel Alicando have any companion while he was in the house
of his uncle, Romeo Alicando?

A Khazie Mae was his companion.

Q You are referring to Khazie Mae Penecilla, the victim in this case?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Aside from them, the two of them, Arnel Alicando and Khazie Mae
Penecilla, are there any person inside the house of Romeo Alicando
at that time?

A No more, only the two of them.

Q Now, at that precise time at 5:30 of June 12, 1994, what have you
observed if you observed any in the house of Romeo Alicando
wherein Arnel Alicando and Khazie Mae Penecilla was at that time?

A I saw the child looking out in the window and I invited her for a
yemas candy, and Arnel Alicando suddenly closed the window.
Q When Arnel Alicando you said closed the window, what did you
observe after that if there is any?

A The child cried.

Q You are referring to the victim, Khazie Mae Penecilla when you
said the child was crying?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And after that, after the child was crying, what have you observed
at that time?

A And then she squealed.

Q After that, what did you do after hearing that and she, the child
squealed, what did you do if there was any?

A So, I went down from the house to the house of Romeo Alicando,
where I saw between an opening between the two slots. I went up
two steps.

Q And then what did you do?

A And so, I peeped between the floor and the door because there
was an opening.

Q Have you seen anything inside that house?

A Yes, Sir.

Q What have you seen if there is any?

A I saw Arnel Alicando who was naked/nude at that time lying on top
of the child wherein his left hand was holding the neck of the child.

Q When you said child, you are referring to the victim, Khazie Mae
Penecilla?

A Yes, Sir.

Q What did you do after seeing that?

A Because I was afraid at that time and I got nervous, so I went down
from that house and went to my own house and gathered my . . . . . . .

Q When you went to your house, was there any person inside your
house?

A My friend.

Q Who is the name of your friend?

A Ricardo Lagrana (Compare).

Q Have you talked to our compare, Ricardo Lagrana who was in your
house? Have you told about the incident that you have seen in the
house of Romeo Alicando wherein Arnel Alicando was at the top of
the victim, Khazie Mae Penecilla, without clothes at all?

A Yes, Sir.
Q What action did your compare do if there was any?

A When I told the incident to my compare he also felt nervous and he

went home.

Q How about on the same day of June 12, 1994, at around 6:00 P.M.,
where were you?

A I was inside the house.

Q And you have observed what is happening in your barangay at that

time?

A Yes, Sir.

Q What have you observed?

A The parents of Khazie Mae Penecilla were looking for her.

Q When you have observed, have you known that the parents of
Khazie Mae Penecilla were looking for her, it did not occur to your
mind to report the incident to the parents of Khazie Mae Penecilla on
what you have seen at that time?

A I did not go out of the house because I was afraid of Arnel

Alicando.

Q Have you seen on the same day after that incident of 5:30 in the
evening, have you seen again Arnel Alicando?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Where?

A I saw Arnel Alicando inside the house going around.

Q Did you talk to him?

A One June 12, 1994, at 10:45 in the evening, I told Arnel Alicando
and asked him, what time did the child go down from the house.

Q Where were you at that time when you asked Arnel Alicando?

A I was inside my house.

Q Because you are very near neighbor to each other?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And it is one and a half (1 1/2) arm's length your house from Arnel
Alicando's house?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Did Arnel Alicando answer you?

A He answered, I do not know because I was drank at that time.

Q How about one June 13, 1994 in the morning at around 8:00
o'clock, what did you observe in your barangay?
 A None.

Q You have not observed anything?

A None.

Q Do you know when the parents of the victim, Khazie Mae Penecilla
found their daughter?

A Khazie Mae Penecilla was found at around 8:00 A.M.

Q Of what day?

A June 13, 1994.

Q Why do you know that this Khazie Mae Penecilla was only found
by their parents?

A Because Leopoldo (Torong) Santiago, when he went down from

their house and answered the call of nature, he found the child under
their house. 25

It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the testimony of a lone witness, free from signs of impropriety
or falsehood, is sufficient to convict an accused even if uncorroborated. In this case, Rebada's
testimony was positive and straightforward. I see no reason why the same should not be given the
credence and the weight that it deserves, without our ignoring established principles in the law on
evidence. Such factual findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of a witness are accorded
great weight and respect on appeal, as it should have been in the instant case, because the trial
court had the every available opportunity to observe the demeanor of the lone witness during the
trial. Her belated reporting of the incident the next morning, to which the defense urged the lower
court to accord great weight, is hardly out of the ordinary.

Individual reactions are motivated by varied and varying environmental factors. There is no standard
norm of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful
experience.26 Fear and self preservation are strong motivating factors. It is common for people to
choose not to get involved when a crime is committed, otherwise there should only be a few
unsolved crimes.27 Rebada, in this case, was obviously terrified with what she saw. Self-preservation
and fear of possible reprisals from the appellant would have initially overwhelmed any desire on her
part to reveal what she had seen during the incident. She tried her best to remain as calm and
casual as possible, and pretend that she did not see anything the instant she saw Alicando, when
she asked appellant what time Khazi Mae got down from his house following the incident. 28 Given
these factors, it would have been too much to expect Rebada in her mixed state of dread, fear,
revulsion and instinctive self-preservation to harness superhuman reserves of courage to stop
appellant when she saw him
in that compromising position. Man's actions and reactions cannot be stereotyped. 29 Some
individuals flee from an adverse stimulus, others confront it. Upon seeing the dead girl's distraught
parents, and overcoming her fear with some prodding from her husband, Luisa Rebada was finally
driven by conscience to reveal what she knew the following morning.

The minor inconsistencies in Rebada's testimony are understandable under these circumstances.
However, it should be stressed here that the trial court's conclusions were founded principally on the
direct, positive and categorical assertions made by Rebada as regards material events in the crime.
It is worthy to stress, moreover, that Rebada never wavered in her oral testimony even on intense
cross-examination from the defense. In her affidavit, she declared that she saw Khazi Mae at
appellant's house; that appellant closed the window; and after hearing the child's cry and squeal,
peeped into the opening and saw appellant on top of the victim. These were the very same
declarations she made when she took the witness stand. While she may have wavered on a minor
detail (as to whether it was the right or the left hand of the appellant which was used in choking the
victim) these should not be sufficient to debunk her credibility. 30 She had no reason to falsely testify
against the appellant and there were no possible motives alleged for her to do so. She is not in any
way related to the Penecillas, and there was no evidence adduced to show that she harbored any ill-
feelings towards the appellant. In a sense, her credibility is even enhanced by the absence any
improper motive.31
Together with the direct testimony of the eyewitness, Rebada, there is, I repeat, sufficient evidence
corroborating and unmistakably pointing to the appellant as the author of the crime. Khazi Mae was
last seen in the company of the appellant. Rebada testified that she saw appellant naked on top of
Khazi Mae. Recovered from the latter's house were Khazi Mae's green slippers, pair of gold
earrings, her dress, bloodied buri mat and pillow. The fact of shoddy police work in the recovery of
these pieces of evidence does not escape us. But whether on not these pieces should have been
admissible is on hindsight hardly relevant in the face of ample legally admissible evidence justifying
the trial court's guilty verdict.

As a last resort, appellant would want to drive home the point that rape was not committed. He
argues that 1) while Rebada saw him on top of Khazi Mae, she did not see him in a push and pull
movement 2) the requested NBI report on the examination of Khazi Mae's underwear to show the
presence or absence of the male semen was not presented; and 3) the autopsy report revealed that
the proximate cause of death was asphyxiation by strangulation.

In the first place, witness PO3 Danilo Tan testified that when he arrived at the Pencilla's house to
take a look at the dead body, he looked at Khazi Mae's underwear and saw that it was bloodied. The
underwear was sent to the NBI Laboratory for examination. Considering, however, the inadequate
facilities of the NBI Laboratory at Iloilo, the underwear was referred to Manila for examination. Since
it will take time for the court to wait for the results from Manila, the trial court dispensed with it as this
would only serve as corroborating evidence to the fact of rape. 32

Moreover, rape is committed whenever there is penetration, no matter how slight into the genital
organ of the victim.33 The vaginal and anal findings of Dr. Tito Doromal revealed that the lacerated
wound from the fourchette up to the dome of the rectum was caused by a forcible entry of an object.
In view of settled jurisprudence to the effect that rape is committed by the mere touching of the male
genital organ on the vagina, it hardly is relevant whether or not semen or sperm are present or
absent. Absence of emission does not negate rape. Rebada's testimony that she saw appellant
naked on top of the victim when she peeped through an opening between the floor and the door of
appellant's house and the autopsy report revealing the laceration of the vagina eloquently testify to
the crime committed and its authorship in the case at bench. As correctly observed by the Solicitor
General, the corpus delicti was there for all to see. The trial court, therefore, did not err in dispensing
with the results of the NBI laboratory examination of Khazi Mae's underwear to determine the
presence of male semen, a fact of little relevance after the rape was established by definitive legal
evidence.

Finally, notwithstanding the fact that the proximate cause of death was asphyxiation by
strangulation, it cannot be denied that Khazi Mae was raped and killed on the same occasion. As we
observed in People v. Yu,34 unity of thought and action in the criminal purpose of the accused cannot
be altered by the circumstances that both the crime of rape and the crime of murder resulted. The
accused had to choke and strangle the girl at the same time that he was satisfying his lust on her. 35

Based on all of the foregoing, it is clear and inescapable that appellant committed the heinous crime
or Rape with Homicide under Sec. 11 of R.A. 7659 which provides:

Art. 335 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

xxx xxx xxx

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty
shall be death.

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following circumstances:

xxx xxx xxx

(4) When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.

xxx xxx xxx

Having thoroughly evaluated the evidence utilized by the trial court in convicting the accused with
the crime of subject to our automatic review, it is painfully clear — even to those who have
reservations about imposing the death penalty among us — that we have reached the point of moral
certainty necessary to the imposition of the supreme punishment of death in this case.

Convictions for the crime of rape have been sustained by this Court in an overwhelming number of
cases on uncorroborated evidence given almost exclusively by the complainant alone. Against this
backdrop (of most cases of rape where reliance is placed solely on the victims allegations) the trial
Court in the case at bench, arrived at its conclusions principally on the basis of two key pieces of
testimonial evidence: 1) the accused's admission of guilt in not one but two occasions in open court
(in the presence of his lawyer) even after being warned on both occasions by the judge of all the
possible consequences of his admission the accused's admission of guilt; and 2) the essentially
uncontradicted testimony of an eyewitness to the crime itself. Even with the relatively minor
inconsistencies of the latter's testimony — which the defense spiritedly tried to magnify — the net
effect of the same was to enhance, not diminish, the testimony of the lone eyewitness because
minor incongruencies are on the whole indicative of honest and unrehearsed declarations and often
amplify the credibility of such declarations. 36 Ordinarily, as stated earlier, convictions for rape have
been obtained on the basis far less evidence. Parenthetically, either one of these testimonies,
standing alone, would have been adequate to obtain the accused's conviction.

In fine, let me reiterate my position in People vs. Veneracion, that the reimposition of the death
penalty for specific offenses under Republic Act 7659 has left our courts with no choice but to
impose the penalty for crimes clearly enumerated in the said law. If a court, after leaving no stone
unturned, finds it necessary to impose the penalty, I believe that it does not do so as an infallible
God exercising a divine right to give or take away human life, but as a fallible human institution
recognizing the importance of according majesty to laws so indispensable to maintaining social
order. In the instant case, after a thorough and searching review of the evidence and an evaluation
of the procedural and constitutional objections adduced either in support of an acquittal or of
imposing a less severe penalty it should be fairly obvious to us that the trial court committed no error
in finding the accused guilty as charged. Recognizing our fallible nature, the quantum of evidence
necessary to convict has never been absolute proof beyond any doubt but merely proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The death penalty in the instant case was clearly imposed in conformity with the
mandate of law and the Constitution.

Padilla, Bellosillo, Mendoza and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

KAPUNAN, J., dissenting:

The civilized mind normally recoils at the idea of taking a man's life by way of retribution for the
commission of a crime. However, every so often, a crime so dastardly and repulsive comes along
that even an individual usually predisposed towards rehabilitating the hard-core criminal would no
longer wish to suffer in silent rage at society's kid-glove treatment of such offender, but would readily
opt to exact a commensurate requital in the form of capital punishment where circumstances so
demand.

Sociological theory at least since Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) has posited the idea that setting
absolute outer limits on deviance is a necessary component of group identification and survival.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes may have sensed this truth when he wrote, in The Common
Law (1881), "The first requirement of a sound body of law is that it should correspond with the actual
feelings and demands of the community, whether right or wrong (1938 ed:, p. 41)."1

Thus, impelled by the alarming upsurge of crime resulting in the loss of human lives and wanton
destruction of property affecting the nation's efforts towards sustainable development and prosperity
while at the same time undermining the people's faith in the Government, Congress enacted
Republic Act 7659,2 imposing capital punishment on certain heinous crimes.

The early Spartans had word for such crimes: haineus, hateful, abominable, from the Greek
prefix haton, denoting acts so hatefully or shockingly evil. The acts charged in the case at bench
belong to this genre.
A totally innocent child was forever denied the opportunity to enjoy life beyond the age of four by the
gruesome and hideous acts allegedly committed by the appellant who, according to the prosecution,
was not content merely with satisfying his beastly desires on her, but also strangled her to death.
Whether or not the circumstances of the present case require the imposition of the death penalty is
the ultimate issue before us. After a thorough review of the facts and the evidence, I am afraid, I
have to dissent from the majority. The legal evidence available to us overwhelmingly supports the
lower court's conclusions. We should not shirk from our legal duty to impose the death penalty.

In the afternoon of June 12, 1994, Romeo Penecilla, father of four-year-old Khazi Mae, was having a
drinking spree with Ramil Rodriguez, Remus Goddi and the appellant at his (Romeo's) house at
Barangay Rizal, Zone 1, Pulo Bala, Iloilo. At about 4:30 p.m., everybody left, except for the
appellant. Appellant was residing at his uncle's house about five (5) arm's length away from the
Penecilla's house.

When Romeo Penecilla arrived home at 8:00 that evening, he could not find Khazi Mae. He and his
wife looked for her until 1:00 in the morning to no avail.

The next morning, Leopoldo Santiago, a neighbor, got the shock of his life when, answering the call
of nature outside his house, he chanced the dead body of Khazi Mae. Immediately, the girl's parents
were informed. The small, lifeless body was brought to their house.

The matter was reported to the police at once. At this point, Luisa Rebada, who lived about 1-1/2
arm's length away from the house of appellant related to the girl's distraught parents what she knew. 3

Rebada recounted that at about 5:30 of the afternoon before, she saw Khazi Mae at the window of
appellant's house. She called out to her and offered to buy "yemas," for her. Appellant suddenly
closed the window. Later on, Luisa heard Khazi Mae cry and then squeal. Her curiosity aroused, she
crept two steps up the appellant's house, peeped through an opening between the floor and the
door, and saw appellant naked on top of Khazi Mae, his right hand choking the girl's neck. Rebada
became frightened and went back to her house to gather her children. She told her compadre,
Ricardo Lagranai who was in her house at that time, of what she saw. The latter got nervous and
left. That evening when she heard that Khazi Mae's parents were looking for the little child, she
called out from her window and asked appellant what time Khazi Mae left his house. Appellant
replied that he did not know since he was drunk.4 With Luisa Rebada's revelation, appellant was
arrested.

During the investigation conducted by PO3 Danilo Tan, appellant readily admitted raping and killing
Khazi Mae.5 The police were able to recover from appellant's house Khazi Mae's green slippers, a
pair of gold earrings placed on top of a bamboo post, a bloodied buri mat, a pillow with a blood stain
in the middle, and a stained T-shirt owned by appellant.

An autopsy conducted and Dr. Tito Doromal, the medico-legal officer, revealed the following
findings:

BEAD & NECK/THORACO-ABDOMINAL REGIONS:

1) Contusion, purple in color, 11 x 11.3 cm., in dia., from left and right
anterior neck, down to the medial portion of the left and right infra-
clavicular area.

2) Contusion, bluish purple, 5.5 x 6.3 cm., in dia., antero-lateral left

chest wall.

3) Contusion, bluish in color, 3 in nos., 1, 0.5 & 1.1 cm., in dia., right
antero-inferior chest wall.

4) Contusion, purple in color, 4 x 3.2 cm., in dia., left sub-costal arch.

5) Contusion, purple in color, 4.5 x 5 cm., in dia., supero-lateral, left

iliac crest.
 ON OPENING THE SKULL & THORACO-ABDOMINAL CAVITIES:

a) Fractured, 2nd cervical vertebra.

b) Fractured, crecoid cartilage.

c) Both lungs, expanded with multiple petechial hemorrhages.

d) Other internal organs, congested.

EXTREMITIES:

1) Confluent abrasion, 3 x 2.6 cm., in dia., posterior aspect, lower 3rd,

left forearm.

2) Old wound, 2 x 1.5 cm., in dia., posterior middle 3rd, left forearm.

3) Old wound, 1.5 x 1 cm., in dia., antero-lateral aspect, middle 3rd,

right forearm.

VAGINAL FINDINGS/ANAL FINDINGS:

a) Lacerated wound, from the fourchette up to the dome of the

rectum.

b) Hematoma, from the fourchette up to the rectum.

c) Lacerated wound, lateral wall of the vagina up to the level of the

promontory of the sacrum with a length of 8 centimeters.

d) A cylinder with a diameter of 2 cms., easily passes the vaginal and

anal openings.

CAUSE OF DEATH:

A) ASPHYXIA BY STRANGULATION

B) FRACTURED, 2nd CERVICAL VERTEBRA.

C) HEMORRHAGE, 2nd DEGREE TO LACERATED VAGINAL &

RECTAL OPENINGS.6

Consequently, an information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 38,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 43663, charging Arnel Alicando with the crime of rape with homicide,
committed as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of June, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force, violence and intimidation to wit: by
then and there pinning down one KHAZIE MAE PENECILLA, a minor, four years of
age, choking her with his right hand, succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her
and as a result thereof she suffered asphyxia by strangulation, fractured cervical
vertebra and lacerations of the vaginal and rectal openings causing profuse
hemorrhages and other injuries which are necessarily fatal and which were the direct
cause of her death thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

On June 28, 1994, appellant, assisted by Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO), pleaded guilty to the crime charged.
The trial court ordered the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability. It likewise set the case for reception of evidence for the accused, if
he wished to.8

In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented (1) Luisa Rebada; (2) Dr. Tito Doromal, the
medico-legal officer; (3) SPO1 Manuel Artuz, the exhibit custodian of Iloilo City Police Station; (4)
PO3 Danilo Tan; (5) SPO3 Rollie Luz, police investigators; and (6) Romeo Penecilla, the victim's
father.

The defense, for its part, merely presented the autopsy report of Dr. Tito Doromal to show that the
proximate cause of death was asphyxia by strangulation.

On July 20, 1994, the trial judge rendered a decision imposing the death penalty on Arnel Alicando.

The case is now before us on automatic review. Disagreeing with the trial court's conviction of the
accused for the crime of Rape with Homicide and the said court's imposition of the death penalty the
Court's majority has decided to overturn the conviction and remand the case to the trial court on the
basis of the following alleged procedural irregularities:

First, that the arraignment of the appellant is null, and void;

Second, that the plea of guilt made by the appellant is likewise null and void;

Third, some prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea of guilt of the appellant, were
inadmissible, yet were considered by the trial court in convicting the appellant.

I strongly disagree.

II

THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL, IF NOT FULL COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING RULES ON

ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA.

A thorough review of the record reveals that there was full compliance with existing rules on
arraignment and plea.

It is plainly obvious from an examination of the appropriate rules and the record of the case that: 1)
there is absolutely nothing on the record which would warrant a finding the information was not read
in the language or dialect known to the appellant; 2) the rule on arraignment and plea does not
absolutely require that the same be indicated in the record of every criminal case; 3) Rule 116
Section 1 contains nothing requiring trial courts to indicate in the record the fact that the information
was read in the language or dialect known to the defendant, even if the same was in fact actually
complied with by the lower court.

The rule on arraignment, Rule 116 provides the following:

Sec. 1: Arraignment and plea; how made. — (a) The accused must be arraigned
before the court where the complaint or information has been filed or assigned for
trial. The arraignment must be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing
the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses, reading
the same in the language or dialect known to him and asking him whether he pleads
guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may, however, call at the trial witnesses other
than those named in the complaint or information.

(b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his
plea. Both arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but a failure to enter of
record shall not affect the validity of the proceedings.

(c) If the accused refuses to plead, or makes a conditional plea of guilty, a plea of not
guilty shall be entered for him.

xxx xxx xxx

 Sec. 3: Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. When the accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require
the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. the accused
may also present evidence in his behalf.

When an accused is arraigned in connection with a criminal charge, it is the duty of the court to
inform him of its nature and cause so that he may be able to comprehend the charges against him
as well as the circumstances attendant thereto. When the charge is of a serious nature, it becomes
the imperative duty of the lawyer present not only to assist the accused during the reading of the
information but also to explain to him the gravity and consequence of his plea.9

Trial judges are enjoined to refrain from accepting with alacrity the accused's plea of guilty. While
justice demands speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it
that when an accused pleads guilty, he fully understands the meaning of his plea and the import of
an inevitable conviction.10

Consequently, three things need to be accomplished after the accused in a criminal case enters a
plea of guilty to a capital offense:

(1) the court should conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of the accused's plea;

(2) the lower court should require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise
degree of his culpability; and

(3) the court should inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence on his behalf and
should allow him to do so if he so desires. A judge who fails to observe this requirement commits a
grave abuse of discretion.

These requirements have been complied with in this case, which the following pertinent portions of
the appellant's arraignment, quoted from the record support:

Prosecutor Edwin Fama —

Appearing as public prosecutor.

Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera —

For the accused, Your Honor. Ready for arraignment.

Interpreter:

(Reading the information to the accused for arraignment and pre-

trial.)

Note:

(After reading the information to the accused, accused pleads guilty.)

Court:

Question of the court to the accused.

Q Considering that this is a crime and under the amended law is a

heinous crime, because of your plea of guilty without the consent or
even against the discretion of the court, the court will give you a
mandatory death penalty because of the crime charged, do you
understand that?

Accused:
Yes, Your Honor.

Q Did you enter a plea of guilty on your own voluntary will or without
any force or intimidation from any one or whatever.

Accused:

None, Your Honor.

Q Are you sure?

Accused:

Yes, Your Honor.

Q Or maybe because you the were manhandled or maltreated by

anyone and that will just be consideration for you to plead guilty?

Accused:

No, Your Honor.

Court:

Were you not manhandled, please let us see your body?

Note:

(Accused raised his prison uniform or shirt and showed to the court
his body from waist up).

Accused:

No, Your Honor.

Court:

You were not maltreated in the jail?

Accused:

No, Your Honor.

Court:

Please let us see whether you have bruises so that you will be
examined by a physician to the order of the court?

Accused:

No, Your Honor.

Court:

If you plead guilty to the crime charged there will be some effects on
your civil rights but not until the decision will be affirmed by the
Supreme Court.

Accused:

Yes, Your Honor. 11

Again, before the prosecution presented its evidence on July 11, 1994, the trial judge once more
asked appellant if he was sure of his plea.

Fiscal Fama:

Appearing as the public prosecutor, ready, Your Honor.

Our first witness is Dr. Tito Doromal, Your Honor.

Atty. Antiquiera:

For the accused, Your Honor.

Court:

Before the court will proceed with the reception of evidence by the
prosecution, Arnel Alicando, please come here. (At this juncture,
Arnel Alicando, come near to the court)

The court is warning you again that this is reception of evidence by

the prosecution after you plead guilty to the crime charged at, do you
understand?

A Yes.

Q Do you still affirm and confirm to your plea of guilty of your rape
with homicide?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Do you still insist that your plead of guilty is voluntary without force,
intimidation or whatsoever?

A Yes.

Q The court is warning you that after reception of evidence, the

imposable penalty is mandatory death?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Despite of that, you still insist of your plea of guilty?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Court:

Okey, proceed. 12

It is crystal clear, from the above-quoted portions of the transcript of the appellant's arraignment that
the trial judge made every effort to ascertain the voluntariness of the plea, and that he repeatedly
warned the defendant of the consequences of his plea. In other words —

A) The above-quoted proceedings satisfy the requirement of a searching inquiry.

There is no hard and fast rule requiring judges to conduct their searching inquiry in the detailed
manner suggested by the majority opinion, although judges should ideally strive to conduct as
detailed an inquiry as would be reasonable under the circumstances. In People v. Dayot13 we held
that:

A searching inquiry . . . compels the judge to content himself reasonably that the
accused has not been coerced or placed under a state
 of duress — and that his guilty plea has not therefore been given improvidently —
other by actual threats of physical harm from malevolent quarters or simply because
of his, the judge's, intimidating robes.

xxx xxx xxx

While there can be no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct searching
inquiry, as to the number and character of questions he may put to the accused, or
as to the earnestness with which he may conduct it, since each case must be
measured according to its individual merit, taking into consideration the age,
educational attainment, and social status of the accused confessing guilt, among
other things, the singular barometer is that the judge must in all cases, fully convince
himself that: (1) the accused, in pleading guilty, is doing so voluntarily, and (2) he, in
so doing, is truly guilty, and that there exists a rational basis for a finding of guilt,
based on his testimony. This Court leaves to judges, considering their training, ample
discretion, but expects them at the same time, that they will be true to their calling
and be worthy ministers of the law.

The purpose of a searching inquiry is to satisfy the judge that the defendant's plea was entered into
voluntarily and that the defendant understood the consequences of his plea. There is no hard and
fast rule, as the Dayot case states, as to the number and character of the questions propounded.
Judges are not required to go into obsessive detail about the psychological, educational and
sociological background of the accused if from a reasonable inquiry conducted through a reasonable
number of questions he is fully convinced a searching inquiry has been met. There is a world of
difference between a fastidious attention to detail which furthers the end of justice and an attention
to detail and minutae bordering on obsessiveness which ultimately obstructs justice and defeats the
purpose of the law. Apropos to this there is —

B) No evidence that the information was not read in a language or dialect known to the
appellant.

The records in an overwhelming number of criminal cases brought before us contain informations
written in the English language without any indication, whatsoever, that the same was translated
from a language or dialect known to the defendant. And yet, even in Metro Manila alone, one
observes that the bulk of proceedings in our trial courts, including the process of arraignment, is
conducted in the vernacular. On the record of these cases normally printed in English, courts hardly
bother to point out those sections of the trial conducted in the vernacular and translated into English.
Because of this widespread practice, which the section on arraignment in the Rules of Court does
not proscribe — the presumption of regularity ought to apply. Otherwise, we should compel
ourselves to review the criminal cases decided by this Court since the imposition of the 1985
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure and see whether there was any indication that the
arraignment of these criminal cases were, the records therein then ought to show, conducted in a
language known to the defendants. The absurdity of this argument by the defense then becomes
apparent, because it would be fairly obvious to all of us that most of these proceedings were actually
conducted in the vernacular, but the fact was never put on record. In fact, Section 1 (b) of Rule 116
even states that while the arraignment and plea be made of record failure to enter (the same) of
record shall not affect the validity of the proceedings. Even the rule on placing the arraignment and
plea on record is not absolute, and I cannot see how we can be too strict about indicating on record
whether proceedings were made in the vernacular in cases where in fact the proceedings were so
conducted. The argument that the information was not read in the language or dialect known to
appellant merely grasps on straws and ought to be dismissed for being so inconsequential as to be
bereft of merit.

Moreover, it is a matter of common practice that in every court, especially in the provinces, an
interpreter is always at hand to translate to the parties all questions propounded to them in the
language or dialect known to them. It is also common practice that the transcript of stenographic
notes submitted to the court only reflect the court proceedings conducted in the English language.
While again, the records do not categorically indicate that the information was read in the language
or dialect known to the defendant or that the questions asked were mandated in the vernacular or
dialect understood by him it is presumed, as we have actually done in many cases before this, that
such duty was regularly performed in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.14 In the face of
this common practice, the burden now lies on the defense to prove the contrary. Under the principle
of equal application of laws, we cannot have varying degrees of fastidiousness in the enforcement of
procedural rules based on the gravity of the penalty.
 THE PLEA OF GUILTY IN THE CASE AT BENCH WAS CLEARLY NOT IMPROVIDENT

In the case before us, when the appellant pleaded guilty in open court on June 28, 1994, appellant
was clearly assisted by counsel. The court took pains to repeatedly remind him of the grave
consequences of a plea of guilty, which appellant said he understood. One very such occasion, he
had every opportunity, through his counsel, to ask the court for clarification.

The trial court, on its own, in fact went out of its way to repeatedly inform the defendant of the nature
of his plea and the implications of the plea he was making. On July 11, 1994, before the presentation
of evidence for the prosecution, he was once again asked by the court if he was sure of his plea. At
this time, appellant had more than sufficient time or about thirteen days to reflect on all the possible
consequences of his plea. If indeed it was not voluntarily made during his arraignment, he had
enough time and opportunity with the assistance of his lawyer to recant or at least express
reservations about the same. However, in spite of several warnings given by the trial court on
different occasions, appellant stood pat with his judicial admission.

Significantly, the records fail to indicate that appellant questioned his plea of guilty at any stage of
the trial. He had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution. He did not put
up any defense nor denied the inculpatory testimonies, documents and real evidence presented
against him (in fact, it was appellant himself who directed the police investigators to the location of
the various physical evidence, e.g. green slippers, earrings15).

Appellant's silence as to the accusations made against him in open court from the time of his
arraignment and during his entire trial therefore assumes a great deal of significance in the context
of the majority's insistence that herein appellant's plea of guilty was improvident and therefore void.
In the face of the seriousness of the accusations against him, his reticence was eloquent. As the
Court held in People vs. Pillones:

Silence is assent as well as consent, and may, where a direct and specific
accusation of crime is made, be regarded under some circumstances as a quasi-
confession. An innocent person will at once naturally and emphatically repel an
accusation of crime, as a matter of self-preservation and self-defense, and as a
precaution against prejudicing himself. A person's silence, therefore, particularly
when it is persistent, will justify an inference that he is not innocent. (Underhill's
Criminal Evidence, 4th Ed., p. 401.)16

The absence of an extrajudicial confession does not detract from the efficacy or validity of
appellant's plea of guilty, it does not affect the requirement compelling the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability. No where in the rules does it state that
an extrajudicial confession is a prerequisite for a conviction based on a plea of guilty. While the
constitutional infirmities that attended the custodial investigation of the appellant were serious and
should not be glossed over, his conviction was based mainly on his plea of guilt made in open court
and not on the extrajudicial confession, which formed but a small aspect of the prosecution's case.
An extrajudicial confession only serves to confirm or substantiate a plea of guilty entered in open
court. As between an extrajudicial confession and a judicial admission, the latter significantly is given
evidentiary weight. Even assuming the extrajudicial confession in this case could not be given
evidentiary weight because of mistakes committed by authorities in conducting their custodial
investigation and in their gathering evidence, his plea of guilty on arraignment, his repeated
admissions to the same in spite of repeated warnings of the trial judge of the consequences of his
plea and the presence of ample corroborating testimony from a credible eyewitness to the crime
establish appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The essence of the plea of guilty in a trial is that the accused admits his guilt freely, voluntarily and
with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act, and with a clear understanding of
the precise nature of the crime charged in the complaint or information.17 A plea of guilty, when
formally entered on arraignment is sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the information
without need of further proof.18 This, notwithstanding, (in line with the pronouncement of the Court in
several cases19) the trial court received evidence to determine if the appellant erred in admitting his
guilt. Independent of such plea, there was more than sufficient evidence adduced to prove that
appellant indeed committed the acts charged.

THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OBJECTED TO FALLS UNDER ONE OF THE EXCEPTIONS

TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Objections were vigorously raised by the defense regarding certain pieces of evidence obtained by
law enforcement authorities following the uncounseled custodial investigation of the accused in the
case at bench. These objections have been thoroughly threshed out and weighed against the other
factual material obtained at trial in order to determine whether or not, on the balance, the accused's
conviction ought to be sustained, modified in favor of a lesser penalty, or altogether thrown out. I
shall discuss them in the interest of thoroughness.

Central to these objections were the pieces of physical evidence allegedly obtained by law
enforcement officers as a result of information volunteered by the accused during his uncounseled
custodial investigation. Since the information obtained, it has been pointed out, was taken
supposedly in violation of the Constitution, the pieces of evidence derivatively gathered should have
been excluded by the court below, following the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.

The 1987 Constitution's exclusionary rules absolutely forbid evidence obtained from illegal searches
and seizures or evidence resulting from uncounseled custodial investigations of accused individuals.
The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine extends these prohibitions to pieces of evidence derivatively
flowing from illegal searches and seizures or from admissions made by accused individuals under
conditions proscribed by the Constitution. However, the doctrine is not without its exceptions, and
the evidence in dispute in the instant case falls within those exceptions.

The discovery of the victim's body near the house of the accused would have naturally led law
enforcement authorities to undertake a more thorough investigation of the site, particularly in those
areas where the victim was last seen. Assuming local police had enough logistical capabilities to
form two teams to undertake two separate searches, one for physical evidence and other clues and
one for the possible suspects, the evidence objected to would have been inevitably discovered with
a thorough search of the site. Under the circumstances of this case where only one search was
initially conducted (obviously because of logistical reasons), primarily for a suspect, it would have
logically followed had a suspect not been found at the time, or, had the accused not made his
voluntary, though uncounselled confession, that a search for evidence would have been undertaken,
under conditions which would have validated a warrantless search, where the same physical
evidence would have been inevitably discovered. In other words, with or without appellant's
volunteered information, the pieces of evidence objected to — the blood-stained pillow, the T-shirt
and the victim's earring — would have fallen into police hands by legal means which would have
normally been undertaken by the authorities in any case.

Courts have generally approved the view that it is not necessary to hold that all evidence is fruit of
the poisonous tree. Under one of the recognized exceptions, the more appropriate question in such
cases is whether the evidence to which the objection is made would not have been discovered at all
but for the illegality or would have been discovered anyway by sources or procedures independent
of the illegality. Another exception refuses to treat the doctrine as absolutely sacred if the evidence
in question would have been inevitably discovered under normal conditions.

I submit, that under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the evidence objected to would have
been inevitably discovered anyway. In a long line of cases, courts have recognized that evidence
derived from information obtained illegally is not absolutely inadmissible under the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine where it is shown that such evidence would have been inevitably gained
even without the unlawful act.20 The case of U.S. vs. Seohnlein, for instance, held the view that a
confession by the accused in a bank robbery case was not fruit of the poisonous tree for the reason
that the information which led to his confession, though the product of an illegal search would have
been discovered in the absence of such illegality.21 The Court in Lockridge vs. Superior Court was of
the opinion that where a witness is discovered as a result of illegal police conduct, his testimony is
admissible is he would have been discovered in the normal course of a normally conducted
investigation. 22 These and other recognized limitations to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine do
not have the effect of diluting the effect of our exclusionary rules. Rather, they serve the purpose of
the rule well by maintaining a reasonable balance between the need to deny evidence come by
through the exploitation of an illegality on one hand and the need to minimize opportunity for the
defendant in a criminal case to reap an undeserved and socially undesirable bonanza. 23 Certainly it
could not be argued that with nothing in their hands, the police would not have gone back to the site
for a better inspection.

THERE IS ENOUGH LEGAL EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN THE TRIAL COURT'S CONVICTION

OF THE ACCUSED WITH MORAL CERTAINTY
Assuming arguendo the validity of the defense's arguments over the pieces of evidence recovered
by the police in the case at bench above-mentioned, a thorough review of the evidence utilized by
the trial court leads us to the conclusion that the defendant's conviction would have been sustained,
in any case, without the pieces of evidence objected to.24 Lest we mistake the trees for the forest, a
shifting of the pieces of evidence, and a separation therefrom of the physical evidence objected to
would nevertheless still leave the prosecution with enough legal evidence to convict the accused
with moral certainty. These include:

1. The defendant's own repeated admissions, in the presence of counsel and in open court that he
committed the acts charged;

2. The essentially uncontradicted testimony of the prosecution's eyewitness, Luisa Rebada.

Having discussed the first point, I shall go directly to Rebada's testimony, which the majority opinion
let pass without comment. For a better perspective of Rebada's testimony, allow me once again to
quote from the transcript:

Q Can you recall where were you on June 12, 1994, at around 5:30
P.M.?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Where were you?

A I was at home.

Q Where is your house situated?

A Brgy. Rizal, Pala-pala, Zone I, Iloilo City.

Q Do you have any neighbor in that residence of yours at Rizal Pala-

pala?

A Yes, Sir, Arnel Alicando.

Q How far is the house of Arnel Alicando from your house?

A One and a half (1 1/2) arm's length.

Q On that time at 5:30 P.M. have you seen Arnel Alicando?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Where was Arnel Alicando at that time?

A He was upstairs, inside the house of Romeo Alicando.

Q What is the relation of Romeo Alicando to Arnel Alicando if you

know?

A Romeo is the uncle of Arnel.

Q Did Arnel Alicando have any companion while he was in the house
of his uncle, Romeo Alicando?

A Khazie Mae was his companion.

Q You are referring to Khazie Mae Penecilla, the victim in this case?

A Yes, Sir.
Q Aside from them, the two of them, Arnel Alicando and Khazie Mae
Penecilla, are there any person inside the house of Romeo Alicando
at that time?

A No more, only the two of them.

Q Now, at that precise time at 5:30 of June 12, 1994, what have you
observed if you observed any in the house of Romeo Alicando
wherein Arnel Alicando and Khazie Mae Penecilla was at that time?

A I saw the child looking out in the window and I invited her for a
yemas candy, and Arnel Alicando suddenly closed the window.

Q When Arnel Alicando you said closed the window, what did you
observe after that if there is any?

A The child cried.

Q You are referring to the victim, Khazie Mae Penecilla when you
said the child was crying?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And after that, after the child was crying, what have you observed
at that time?

A And then she squealed.

Q After that, what did you do after hearing that and she, the child
squealed, what did you do if there was any?

A So, I went down from the house to the house of Romeo Alicando,
where I saw between an opening between the two slots. I went up
two steps.

Q And then what did you do?

A And so, I peeped between the floor and the door because there
was an opening.

Q Have you seen anything inside that house?

A Yes, Sir.

Q What have you seen if there is any?

A I saw Arnel Alicando who was naked/nude at that time lying on top
of the child wherein his left hand was holding the neck of the child.

Q When you said child, you are referring to the victim, Khazie Mae
Penecilla?

A Yes, Sir.

Q What did you do after seeing that?

A Because I was afraid at that time and I got nervous, so I went down
from that house and went to my own house and gathered my . . . . . . .

Q When you went to your house, was there any person inside your
house?
A My friend.

Q Who is the name of your friend?

A Ricardo Lagrana (Compare).

Q Have you talked to our compare, Ricardo Lagrana who was in your
house? Have you told about the incident that you have seen in the
house of Romeo Alicando wherein Arnel Alicando was at the top of
the victim, Khazie Mae Penecilla, without clothes at all?

A Yes, Sir.

Q What action did your compare do if there was any?

A When I told the incident to my compare he also felt nervous and he

went home.

Q How about on the same day of June 12, 1994, at around 6:00 P.M.,
where were you?

A I was inside the house.

Q And you have observed what is happening in your barangay at that

time?

A Yes, Sir.

Q What have you observed?

A The parents of Khazie Mae Penecilla were looking for her.

Q When you have observed, have you known that the parents of
Khazie Mae Penecilla were looking for her, it did not occur to your
mind to report the incident to the parents of Khazie Mae Penecilla on
what you have seen at that time?

A I did not go out of the house because I was afraid of Arnel

Alicando.

Q Have you seen on the same day after that incident of 5:30 in the
evening, have you seen again Arnel Alicando?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Where?

A I saw Arnel Alicando inside the house going around.

Q Did you talk to him?

A One June 12, 1994, at 10:45 in the evening, I told Arnel Alicando
and asked him, what time did the child go down from the house.

Q Where were you at that time when you asked Arnel Alicando?

A I was inside my house.

Q Because you are very near neighbor to each other?

A Yes, Sir.
 Q And it is one and a half (1 1/2) arm's length your house from Arnel
Alicando's house?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Did Arnel Alicando answer you?

A He answered, I do not know because I was drank at that time.

Q How about one June 13, 1994 in the morning at around 8:00
o'clock, what did you observe in your barangay?

A None.

Q You have not observed anything?

A None.

Q Do you know when the parents of the victim, Khazie Mae Penecilla
found their daughter?

A Khazie Mae Penecilla was found at around 8:00 A.M.

Q Of what day?

A June 13, 1994.

Q Why do you know that this Khazie Mae Penecilla was only found
by their parents?

A Because Leopoldo (Torong) Santiago, when he went down from

their house and answered the call of nature, he found the child under
their house. 25

It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the testimony of a lone witness, free from signs of impropriety
or falsehood, is sufficient to convict an accused even if uncorroborated. In this case, Rebada's
testimony was positive and straightforward. I see no reason why the same should not be given the
credence and the weight that it deserves, without our ignoring established principles in the law on
evidence. Such factual findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of a witness are accorded
great weight and respect on appeal, as it should have been in the instant case, because the trial
court had the every available opportunity to observe the demeanor of the lone witness during the
trial. Her belated reporting of the incident the next morning, to which the defense urged the lower
court to accord great weight, is hardly out of the ordinary.

Individual reactions are motivated by varied and varying environmental factors. There is no standard
norm of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful
experience.26 Fear and self preservation are strong motivating factors. It is common for people to
choose not to get involved when a crime is committed, otherwise there should only be a few
unsolved crimes.27 Rebada, in this case, was obviously terrified with what she saw. Self-preservation
and fear of possible reprisals from the appellant would have initially overwhelmed any desire on her
part to reveal what she had seen during the incident. She tried her best to remain as calm and
casual as possible, and pretend that she did not see anything the instant she saw Alicando, when
she asked appellant what time Khazi Mae got down from his house following the incident. 28 Given
these factors, it would have been too much to expect Rebada in her mixed state of dread, fear,
revulsion and instinctive self-preservation to harness superhuman reserves of courage to stop
appellant when she saw him
in that compromising position. Man's actions and reactions cannot be stereotyped. 29 Some
individuals flee from an adverse stimulus, others confront it. Upon seeing the dead girl's distraught
parents, and overcoming her fear with some prodding from her husband, Luisa Rebada was finally
driven by conscience to reveal what she knew the following morning.

The minor inconsistencies in Rebada's testimony are understandable under these circumstances.
However, it should be stressed here that the trial court's conclusions were founded principally on the
direct, positive and categorical assertions made by Rebada as regards material events in the crime.
It is worthy to stress, moreover, that Rebada never wavered in her oral testimony even on intense
cross-examination from the defense. In her affidavit, she declared that she saw Khazi Mae at
appellant's house; that appellant closed the window; and after hearing the child's cry and squeal,
peeped into the opening and saw appellant on top of the victim. These were the very same
declarations she made when she took the witness stand. While she may have wavered on a minor
detail (as to whether it was the right or the left hand of the appellant which was used in choking the
victim) these should not be sufficient to debunk her credibility. 30 She had no reason to falsely testify
against the appellant and there were no possible motives alleged for her to do so. She is not in any
way related to the Penecillas, and there was no evidence adduced to show that she harbored any ill-
feelings towards the appellant. In a sense, her credibility is even enhanced by the absence any
improper motive.31

Together with the direct testimony of the eyewitness, Rebada, there is, I repeat, sufficient evidence
corroborating and unmistakably pointing to the appellant as the author of the crime. Khazi Mae was
last seen in the company of the appellant. Rebada testified that she saw appellant naked on top of
Khazi Mae. Recovered from the latter's house were Khazi Mae's green slippers, pair of gold
earrings, her dress, bloodied buri mat and pillow. The fact of shoddy police work in the recovery of
these pieces of evidence does not escape us. But whether on not these pieces should have been
admissible is on hindsight hardly relevant in the face of ample legally admissible evidence justifying
the trial court's guilty verdict.

As a last resort, appellant would want to drive home the point that rape was not committed. He
argues that 1) while Rebada saw him on top of Khazi Mae, she did not see him in a push and pull
movement 2) the requested NBI report on the examination of Khazi Mae's underwear to show the
presence or absence of the male semen was not presented; and 3) the autopsy report revealed that
the proximate cause of death was asphyxiation by strangulation.

In the first place, witness PO3 Danilo Tan testified that when he arrived at the Pencilla's house to
take a look at the dead body, he looked at Khazi Mae's underwear and saw that it was bloodied. The
underwear was sent to the NBI Laboratory for examination. Considering, however, the inadequate
facilities of the NBI Laboratory at Iloilo, the underwear was referred to Manila for examination. Since
it will take time for the court to wait for the results from Manila, the trial court dispensed with it as this
would only serve as corroborating evidence to the fact of rape. 32

Moreover, rape is committed whenever there is penetration, no matter how slight into the genital
organ of the victim.33 The vaginal and anal findings of Dr. Tito Doromal revealed that the lacerated
wound from the fourchette up to the dome of the rectum was caused by a forcible entry of an object.
In view of settled jurisprudence to the effect that rape is committed by the mere touching of the male
genital organ on the vagina, it hardly is relevant whether or not semen or sperm are present or
absent. Absence of emission does not negate rape. Rebada's testimony that she saw appellant
naked on top of the victim when she peeped through an opening between the floor and the door of
appellant's house and the autopsy report revealing the laceration of the vagina eloquently testify to
the crime committed and its authorship in the case at bench. As correctly observed by the Solicitor
General, the corpus delicti was there for all to see. The trial court, therefore, did not err in dispensing
with the results of the NBI laboratory examination of Khazi Mae's underwear to determine the
presence of male semen, a fact of little relevance after the rape was established by definitive legal
evidence.

Finally, notwithstanding the fact that the proximate cause of death was asphyxiation by
strangulation, it cannot be denied that Khazi Mae was raped and killed on the same occasion. As we
observed in People v. Yu,34 unity of thought and action in the criminal purpose of the accused cannot
be altered by the circumstances that both the crime of rape and the crime of murder resulted. The
accused had to choke and strangle the girl at the same time that he was satisfying his lust on her.35

Based on all of the foregoing, it is clear and inescapable that appellant committed the heinous crime
or Rape with Homicide under Sec. 11 of R.A. 7659 which provides:

Art. 335 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

xxx xxx xxx

 When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty
shall be death.

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following circumstances:

xxx xxx xxx

(4) When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.

xxx xxx xxx

Having thoroughly evaluated the evidence utilized by the trial court in convicting the accused with
the crime of subject to our automatic review, it is painfully clear — even to those who have
reservations about imposing the death penalty among us — that we have reached the point of moral
certainty necessary to the imposition of the supreme punishment of death in this case.

Convictions for the crime of rape have been sustained by this Court in an overwhelming number of
cases on uncorroborated evidence given almost exclusively by the complainant alone. Against this
backdrop (of most cases of rape where reliance is placed solely on the victims allegations) the trial
Court in the case at bench, arrived at its conclusions principally on the basis of two key pieces of
testimonial evidence: 1) the accused's admission of guilt in not one but two occasions in open court
(in the presence of his lawyer) even after being warned on both occasions by the judge of all the
possible consequences of his admission the accused's admission of guilt; and 2) the essentially
uncontradicted testimony of an eyewitness to the crime itself. Even with the relatively minor
inconsistencies of the latter's testimony — which the defense spiritedly tried to magnify — the net
effect of the same was to enhance, not diminish, the testimony of the lone eyewitness because
minor incongruencies are on the whole indicative of honest and unrehearsed declarations and often
amplify the credibility of such declarations. 36 Ordinarily, as stated earlier, convictions for rape have
been obtained on the basis far less evidence. Parenthetically, either one of these testimonies,
standing alone, would have been adequate to obtain the accused's conviction.

In fine, let me reiterate my position in People vs. Veneracion, that the reimposition of the death
penalty for specific offenses under Republic Act 7659 has left our courts with no choice but to
impose the penalty for crimes clearly enumerated in the said law. If a court, after leaving no stone
unturned, finds it necessary to impose the penalty, I believe that it does not do so as an infallible
God exercising a divine right to give or take away human life, but as a fallible human institution
recognizing the importance of according majesty to laws so indispensable to maintaining social
order. In the instant case, after a thorough and searching review of the evidence and an evaluation
of the procedural and constitutional objections adduced either in support of an acquittal or of
imposing a less severe penalty it should be fairly obvious to us that the trial court committed no error
in finding the accused guilty as charged. Recognizing our fallible nature, the quantum of evidence
necessary to convict has never been absolute proof beyond any doubt but merely proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The death penalty in the instant case was clearly imposed in conformity with the
mandate of law and the Constitution.

Padilla, Bellosillo, Mendoza and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Criminal Case No. 43663, RTC of Iloilo City, Br. 38.

2 Order of June 28, 1994.

3 Section 14 (2) of Article III of the Constitution.

4 See section 6, Article XIV of the Constitution.

5 See section 7, Article XIV of the Constitution.

6 TSN, June 28, 1994, p. 2.

7 Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides: "No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . . "

8 TSN, June 28, 1994, pp. 2-3.

9 TSN, July 11, 1994, p. 2.

10 24 SCRA 798, [1968].

11 E.g., People vs. Abrea, 112 SCRA 83 [1982]; People vs. Alibasa, 118 SCRA 183
[1982]; People vs. Havana, 1199 SCRA 805; People vs. Petalcorin, et al., 180.

12 In re: Winship, 397, US358, 90 S.ct., 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 [1970].

13 Decision, page 7; Records, p. 96.

14 Exh. "J".

15 Exh. "F".

16 TSN, July 12, 1994, pp. 18-21.

17 TSN, July 12, 1994, pp. 14-17.

18 308 US 388, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L ed. 307 [1939].

19 The genesis of the doctrine was laid down in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. US, 251
US 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L. Ed. 319 [1920].

20 Del Carmen, Criminal Procedure, Law and Practice, 3rd Ed., pp. 64-65.

21 G.R. No. 100910, July 25, 1994, 234 SCRA 407.

22 Ibid, p. 416.

23 TSN, July 12, 1994, p. 28.

24 No. L-31008, January 10, 1971, 37 SCRA 445.

KAPUNAN, J., dissenting opinion:

1 The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, pp. 125-126,
1992 ed.

2 RA 7659 Enacted on December 13, 1994.

An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, amending for that
purpose the Revised Penal Code, as amended, other special penal laws, and for
other purposes.

WHEREAS, the Constitution, specifically Article III, Section 19 paragraph (1) thereof,
states "Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty imposed, unless, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. . . .";

WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being
grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or
manifest wickdness, viciousness, atrocity ad perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized and ordered society;
WHEREAS, due to the alarming upsurge of such crimes which has resulted not only
in the loss of human lives and wanton destruction of property but has also affected
the nation's efforts towards sustainable economic development and prosperity while
at the same time has undermined the people's faith in the Government and the
latter's ability to maintain peace and order in the country.

WHEREAS, the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and the rule of law,
and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes,
finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes.

3 TSN, July 12, 1994, pp. 28-32.

4 TSN, July 11, 1994, pp. 14-19.

Q: After you received that information, what did you

do?

A: We invited Arnel Alicando to the headquarters.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: When you invited him to go with you to the Police

Station and when you arrived there,what did you do?

A: I let the witness identify the suspect and the

witness pointed to him.

Pros. Fama:

Q: Do you know who is that witness?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who is that witness?

A: Luisa Rebada.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: After the witness positively identified the suspect

what action did you do?

A: I immediately arrested him and then placed him on

the police blotter.

Q: You mean you arrested him at the Super Market at

the meat section?

A: Yes, sir, at Rizal-Palapala.

Q: When you arrested him where did you bring him?

A: I brought him to the Iloilo City Proper Police

Station.

Q: What did you do there?

A: I entered the matter at the police blotter and I

asked him further. I asked him who raped the child.

Q: Did the suspect answer?

 A: Yes, sir.

Q: What did he answer?

A: He answered that he was the one.

Q: Did you ask him what he did with the victim after
raping?

A: I further asked him why the child died and he

answered that, killed her. (TSN, July 12, 1994, pp. 11-
13.)

6 Records, p. 79.

7 Rollo, p. 5.

8 Order dated June 28, 1994; Records, p. 12.

9 People v. Perete, 1 SCRA 1290; People v. Camay, 152 SCRA 401 (1987).

10 People v. Saligan, 54 SCRA 190 (1973); People v. Aguilar, 37 SCRA 115 (1971);
People v. Simeon, 47 SCRA 129 (1972).

11 TSN, pp. 2-3, June 28, 1994.

12 TSN, p. 2, July 11, 1994.

13 187 SCRA 637 (1990).

14 People v. Evangelista, 235 SCRA 247 (1994); People v. Vivar, 235 SCRA 257
(1994); People v. de Guzman, 229 SCRA 795 (1994).

17 People v. Ariola, 100 SCRA 523 (1980); People v. Gabierrez, Jr., 113 SCRA 155
(1982).

18 People v. Laspardas, 93 SCRA 638 (1979); People v. Formentera, 130 SCRA

114; People v. Gonzaga, 127 SCRA 158 (1984).

19 People v. Dayot, 187 SCRA 637 (1890), People v. Camay, 152 SCRA 401 (1987);
People v. Domingo, 68 SCRA 50 (1975); People v. Serna, 130 SCRA 550 (1984).

20 Somer vs. U.S. 138 F2d 790 (1943); Wayne vs. U.S. 318 F2d 205 (1963);
Lockridge vs. Superior Court, 402 U.S. 910 (1970).

21 U.S. vs. Seohnlein, 399 U.S. 913 (1970).

22 See, Lockridge, supra, note 19.

23 Maguire, How to Unpoison the Fruit — the Fourth Amendment and the
Exclusionary Rule. 55 J Crim Law, Crim and Pol Sci 307 (1964) cited in Spivey, "Fruit
of the Poisonous Tree"

Doctrine Excluding Evidence Derived from Information Gained in

Illegal Search. 43 ALR 36, 385.

24 Moreover, it would have been inevitable for police authorities to go back to the
scene of the crime and ultimately discover the evidence, even without the accused's
volunteered information. This "inevitable discovery" is one of the recognized
limitations to the "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine." See Crispin Nix v. Robert
Anthony Williams, 467 U.S. 431.
 25 TSN, July 11, 1994, pp. 14-18.

26 People v. Arman, 224 SCRA 37 (1993); People v. Danico, 208 SCRA 472 (1992).

27 People v. Lase, 219 SCRA 584 (1993).

28 TSN, July 11, 1994, p. 17.

29 People v. Salazar, 221 SCRA 170 (1994).

30 People v. Bautista, 147 SCRA 500 (1987); People v. Ancheta, 148 SCRA 178
(1987).

31 People v. Castor, 216 SCRA 410 (1992); People v. Ladrera, 150 SCRA 113
(1987).

32 TSN, July 15, 1994, p. 2.

33 People v. Palicte, 229 SCRA 543 (1994).

34 1 SCRA 199 (1961).

35 Id.

36 People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 79896, January 12, 1995.

\
G.R. No. 189206 June 8, 2011

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE 15th DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS and INDUSTRIAL BANK OF
KOREA, TONG YANG MERCHANT BANK, HANAREUM BANKING CORP., LAND BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES, WESTMONT BANK and DOMSAT HOLDINGS, INC., Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

The subject of this petition for certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
82647 allowing the quashal by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati of a subpoena for the
production of bank ledger. This case is incident to Civil Case No. 99-1853, which is the main case
for collection of sum of money with damages filed by Industrial Bank of Korea, Tong Yang Merchant
Bank, First Merchant Banking Corporation, Land Bank of the Philippines, and Westmont Bank (now
United Overseas Bank), collectively known as "the Banks" against Domsat Holdings, Inc. (Domsat)
and the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Said case stemmed from a Loan
Agreement,2 whereby the Banks agreed to lend United States (U.S.) $11 Million to Domsat for the
purpose of financing the lease and/or purchase of a Gorizon Satellite from the International
Organization of Space Communications (Intersputnik).3

The controversy originated from a surety agreement by which Domsat obtained a surety bond from
GSIS to secure the payment of the loan from the Banks. We quote the terms of the Surety Bond in
its entirety.4

Republic of the Philippines

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
GENERAL INSURANCE FUND
GSIS Headquarters, Financial Center
Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City

G(16) GIF Bond 027461

SURETYBOND

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

That we, DOMSAT HOLDINGS, INC., represented by its President as PRINCIPAL, and the
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, as Administrator of the GENERAL INSURANCE
FUND, a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines,
with principal office in the City of Pasay, Metro Manila, Philippines as SURETY, are held and firmly
bound unto the OBLIGEES: LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, 7th Floor, Land Bank Bldg. IV. 313
Sen. Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati City; WESTMONT BANK, 411 Quintin Paredes St., Binondo,
Manila: TONG YANG MERCHANT BANK, 185, 2-Ka, Ulchi-ro, Chungk-ku, Seoul, Korea;
INDUSTRIAL BANK OF KOREA, 50, 2-Ga, Ulchi-ro, Chung-gu, Seoul, Korea; and FIRST
MERCHANT BANKING CORPORATION, 199-40, 2-Ga, Euliji-ro, Jung-gu, Seoul, Korea, in the sum,
of US $ ELEVEN MILLION DOLLARS ($11,000,000.00) for the payment of which sum, well and truly
to be made, we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns, jointly
and severally, firmly by these presents.

THE CONDITIONS OF THE OBLIGATION ARE AS FOLLOWS:

WHEREAS, the above bounden PRINCIPAL, on the 12th day of December, 1996 entered into a
contract agreement with the aforementioned OBLIGEES to fully and faithfully

Guarantee the repayment of the principal and interest on the loan granted the PRINCIPAL to be
used for the financing of the two (2) year lease of a Russian Satellite from INTERSPUTNIK, in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the credit package entered into by the parties.

This bond shall remain valid and effective until the loan including interest has been fully paid and
liquidated,
a copy of which contract/agreement is hereto attached and made part hereof;

WHEREAS, the aforementioned OBLIGEES require said PRINCIPAL to give a good and sufficient
bond in the above stated sum to secure the full and faithful performance on his part of said
contract/agreement.

NOW, THEREFORE, if the PRINCIPAL shall well and truly perform and fulfill all the undertakings,
covenants, terms, conditions, and agreements stipulated in said contract/agreements, then this
obligation shall be null and void; otherwise, it shall remain in full force and effect.

WITNESS OUR HANDS AND SEALS this 13th day of December 1996 at Pasay City, Philippines.

DOMSAT HOLDINGS, INC. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM

Principal General Insurance Fund
By: By:

CAPT. RODRIGO A. SILVERIO AMALIO A. MALLARI

President Senior Vice-President
General Insurance Group

When Domsat failed to pay the loan, GSIS refused to comply with its obligation reasoning that
Domsat did not use the loan proceeds for the payment of rental for the satellite. GSIS alleged that
Domsat, with Westmont Bank as the conduit, transferred the U.S. $11 Million loan proceeds from the
Industrial Bank of Korea to Citibank New York account of Westmont Bank and from there to the
Binondo Branch of Westmont Bank.5 The Banks filed a complaint before the RTC of Makati against
Domsat and GSIS.

In the course of the hearing, GSIS requested for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum to the
custodian of records of Westmont Bank to produce the following documents:

1. Ledger covering the account of DOMSAT Holdings, Inc. with Westmont Bank (now United
Overseas Bank), any and all documents, records, files, books, deeds, papers, notes and
other data and materials relating to the account or transactions of DOMSAT Holdings, Inc.
with or through the Westmont Bank (now United Overseas Bank) for the period January
1997 to December 2002, in his/her direct or indirect possession, custody or control (whether
actual or constructive), whether in his/her capacity as Custodian of Records or otherwise;

2. All applications for cashier’s/ manager’s checks and bank transfers funded by the account
of DOMSAT Holdings, Inc. with or through the Westmont Bank (now United Overseas Bank)
for the period January 1997 to December 2002, and all other data and materials covering
said applications, in his/her direct or indirect possession, custody or control (whether actual
or constructive), whether in his/her capacity as Custodian of Records or otherwise;

3. Ledger covering the account of Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. with Westmont Bank (now
United Overseas Bank), any and all documents, records, files, books, deeds, papers, notes
and other data and materials relating to the account or transactions of Philippine Agila
Satellite, Inc. with or through the Westmont bank (now United Overseas Bank) for the period
January 1997 to December 2002, in his/her direct or indirect possession, custody or control
(whether actual or constructive), whether in his/her capacity as Custodian of Records or
otherwise;

4. All applications for cashier’s/manager’s checks funded by the account of Philippine Agila
Satellite, Inc. with or through the Westmont Bank (now United Overseas Bank) for the period
January 1997 to December 2002, and all other data and materials covering said applications,
in his/her direct or indirect possession, custody or control (whether actual or constructive),
whether in his/her capacity as Custodian of Records or otherwise. 6

The RTC issued a subpoena decus tecum on 21 November 2002. 7 A motion to quash was filed by
the banks on three grounds: 1) the subpoena is unreasonable, oppressive and does not establish
the relevance of the documents sought; 2) request for the documents will violate the Law on Secrecy
of Bank Deposits; and 3) GSIS failed to advance the reasonable cost of production of the
documents.8 Domsat also joined the banks’ motion to quash through its Manifestation/Comment. 9 On
9 April 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion to quash for lack of merit. We quote the
pertinent portion of the Order, thus:

After a careful consideration of the arguments of the parties, the Court did not find merit in the
motion.

The serious objection appears to be that the subpoena is violative of the Law on Secrecy of Bank
Deposit, as amended. The law declares bank deposits to be "absolutely confidential" except: x x x
(6) In cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.

The case at bench is for the collection of a sum of money from defendants that obtained a loan from
the plaintiff. The loan was secured by defendant GSIS which was the surety. It is the contention of
defendant GSIS that the proceeds of the loan was deviated to purposes other than to what the loan
was extended. The quashal of the subpoena would deny defendant GSIS its right to prove its
defenses.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit the motion is DENIED.10

On 26 June 2003, another Order was issued by the RTC denying the motion for reconsideration filed
by the banks.11 On 1 September 2003 however, the trial court granted the second motion for
reconsideration filed by the banks. The previous subpoenas issued were consequently
quashed.12 The trial court invoked the ruling in Intengan v. Court of Appeals, 13 where it was ruled that
foreign currency deposits are absolutely confidential and may be examined only when there is a
written permission from the depositor. The motion for reconsideration filed by GSIS was denied on
30 December 2003.

Hence, these assailed orders are the subject of the petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
GSIS raised the following arguments in support of its petition:

I.

Respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when it favorably considered respondent
banks’ (second) Motion for Reconsideration dated July 9, 2003 despite the fact that it did not contain
a notice of hearing and was therefore a mere scrap of paper.

II.

Respondent judge capriciously and arbitrarily ignored Section 2 of the Foreign Currency Deposit Act
(RA 6426) in ruling in his Orders dated September 1 and December 30, 2003 that the
US$11,000,000.00 deposit in the account of respondent Domsat in Westmont Bank is covered by
the secrecy of bank deposit.

III.

Since both respondent banks and respondent Domsat have disclosed during the trial the
US$11,000,000.00 deposit, it is no longer secret and confidential, and petitioner GSIS’ right to
inquire into what happened to such deposit can not be suppressed. 14

The Court of Appeals addressed these issues in seriatim.

The Court of Appeals resorted to a liberal interpretation of the rules to avoid miscarriage of justice
when it allowed the filing and acceptance of the second motion for reconsideration. The appellate
court also underscored the fact that GSIS did not raise the defect of lack of notice in its opposition to
the second motion for reconsideration. The appellate court held that failure to timely object to the
admission of a defective motion is considered a waiver of its right to do so.

The Court of Appeals declared that Domsat’s deposit in Westmont Bank is covered by Republic Act
No. 6426 or the Bank Secrecy Law. We quote the pertinent portion of the Decision:

It is our considered opinion that Domsat’s deposit of $11,000,000.00 in Westmont Bank is covered
by the Bank Secrecy Law, as such it cannot be examined, inquired or looked into without the written
consent of its owner. The ruling in Van Twest vs. Court of Appeals was rendered during the
effectivity of CB Circular No. 960, Series of 1983, under Sec. 102 thereof, transfer to foreign
currency deposit account or receipt from another foreign currency deposit account, whether for
payment of legitimate obligation or otherwise, are not eligible for deposit under the System.

CB Circular No. 960 has since been superseded by CB Circular 1318 and later by CB Circular 1389.
Section 102 of Circular 960 has not been re-enacted in the later Circulars. What is applicable now is
the decision in Intengan vs. Court of Appeals where the Supreme Court has ruled that the under
R.A. 6426 there is only a single exception to the secrecy of foreign currency deposits, that is,
disclosure is allowed only upon the written permission of the depositor. Petitioner, therefore, had
inappropriately invoked the provisions of Central Bank (CB) Circular Nos. 343 which has already
been superseded by more recently issued CB Circulars. CB Circular 343 requires the surrender to
the banking system of foreign exchange, including proceeds of foreign borrowings. This requirement,
however, can no longer be found in later circulars.

In its Reply to respondent banks’ comment, petitioner appears to have conceded that what is
applicable in this case is CB Circular 1389. Obviously, under CB 1389, proceeds of foreign
borrowings are no longer required to be surrendered to the banking system.

Undaunted, petitioner now argues that paragraph 2, Section 27 of CB Circular 1389 is applicable
because Domsat’s $11,000,000.00 loan from respondent banks was intended to be paid to a foreign
supplier Intersputnik and, therefore, should have been paid directly to Intersputnik and not deposited
into Westmont Bank. The fact that it was deposited to the local bank Westmont Bank, petitioner
claims violates the circular and makes the deposit lose its confidentiality status under R.A. 6426.
However, a reading of the entire Section 27 of CB Circular 1389 reveals that the portion quoted by
the petitioner refers only to the procedure/conditions of drawdown for service of debts using foreign
exchange. The above-said provision relied upon by the petitioner does not in any manner prescribe
the conditions before any foreign currency deposit can be entitled to the confidentiality provisions of
R.A. 6426.15

Anent the third issue, the Court of Appeals ruled that the testimony of the incumbent president of
Westmont Bank is not the written consent contemplated by Republic Act No. 6426.

The Court of Appeals however upheld the issuance of subpoena praying for the production of
applications for cashier’s or manager’s checks by Domsat through Westmont Bank, as well as a
copy of an Agreement and/or Contract and/or Memorandum between Domsat and/or Philippine Agila
Satellite and Intersputnik for the acquisition and/or lease of a Gorizon Satellite. The appellate court
believed that the production of these documents does not involve the examination of Domsat’s
account since it will never be known how much money was deposited into it or withdrawn therefrom
and how much remains therein.

On 29 February 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, the decretal portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Order dated December
30, 2003 is hereby modified in that the quashal of the subpoena for the production of Domsat’s bank
ledger in Westmont Bank is upheld while respondent court is hereby ordered to issue subpoena
duces tecum ad testificandum directing the records custodian of Westmont Bank to bring to court the
following documents:

a) applications for cashier’s or manager’s checks by respondent Domsat through Westmont

Bank from January 1997 to December 2002;

b) bank transfers by respondent Domsat through Westmont Bank from January 1997 to
December 2002; and

c) copy of an agreement and/or contract and/or memorandum between respondent Domsat

and/or Philippine Agila Satellite and Intersputnik for the acquisition and/or lease of a Gorizon
satellite.

No pronouncement as to costs.16

GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied on 19 June 2009. Thus,
the instant petition ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals in ruling
that Domsat’s deposit with Westmont Bank cannot be examined and in finding that the banks’
second motion for reconsideration in Civil Case No. 99-1853 is procedurally acceptable.17

This Court notes that GSIS filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail
the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner availed of the improper remedy as
the appeal from a final disposition of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45 and
not a special civil action under Rule 65.18 Certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal,
nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. That action is not a substitute
for a lost appeal in general; it is not allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment to the
proper forum.19 Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper even if the ground therefor is
grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, when a party adopts an improper remedy, his petition may
be dismissed outright.20 lauuphil

Yet, even if this procedural infirmity is discarded for the broader interest of justice, the petition sorely
lacks merit.

GSIS insists that Domsat’s deposit with Westmont Bank can be examined and inquired into. It
anchored its argument on Republic Act No. 1405 or the "Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits," which
allows the disclosure of bank deposits in cases where the money deposited is the subject matter of
the litigation. GSIS asserts that the subject matter of the litigation is the U.S. $11 Million obtained by
Domsat from the Banks to supposedly finance the lease of a Russian satellite from Intersputnik.
Whether or not it should be held liable as a surety for the principal amount of U.S. $11 Million, GSIS
contends, is contingent upon whether Domsat indeed utilized the amount to lease a Russian satellite
as agreed in the Surety Bond Agreement. Hence, GSIS argues that the whereabouts of the U.S. $11
Million is the subject matter of the case and the disclosure of bank deposits relating to the U.S. $11
Million should be allowed.

GSIS also contends that the concerted refusal of Domsat and the banks to divulge the whereabouts
of the U.S. $11 Million will greatly prejudice and burden the GSIS pension fund considering that a
substantial portion of this fund is earmarked every year to cover the surety bond issued.

Lastly, GSIS defends the acceptance by the trial court of the second motion for reconsideration filed
by the banks on the grounds that it is pro forma and did not conform to the notice requirements of
Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.21

Domsat denies the allegations of GSIS and reiterates that it did not give a categorical or affirmative
written consent or permission to GSIS to examine its bank statements with Westmont Bank.

The Banks maintain that Republic Act No. 1405 is not the applicable law in the instant case because
the Domsat deposit is a foreign currency deposit, thus covered by Republic Act No. 6426. Under
said law, only the consent of the depositor shall serve as the exception for the disclosure of his/her
deposit.

The Banks counter the arguments of GSIS as a mere rehash of its previous arguments before the
Court of Appeals. They justify the issuance of the subpoena as an interlocutory matter which may be
reconsidered anytime and that the pro forma rule has no application to interlocutory orders.

It appears that only GSIS appealed the ruling of the Court of Appeals pertaining to the quashal of the
subpoena for the production of Domsat’s bank ledger with Westmont Bank. Since neither Domsat
nor the Banks interposed an appeal from the other portions of the decision, particularly for the
production of applications for cashier’s or manager’s checks by Domsat through Westmont Bank, as
well as a copy of an agreement and/or contract and/or memorandum between Domsat and/or
Philippine Agila Satellite and Intersputnik for the acquisition and/or lease of a Gorizon satellite, the
latter became final and executory.

GSIS invokes Republic Act No. 1405 to justify the issuance of the subpoena while the banks cite
Republic Act No. 6426 to oppose it. The core issue is which of the two laws should apply in the
instant case.

Republic Act No. 1405 was enacted in 1955. Section 2 thereof was first amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1792 in 1981 and further amended by Republic Act No. 7653 in 1993. It now reads:
Section 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines
including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions
and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not
be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except
upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent
court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money
deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.

Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, which was enacted in 1974, and amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1035 and later by Presidential Decree No. 1246, provides:

Section 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits. – All foreign currency deposits authorized under
this Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well as foreign currency deposits
authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1034, are hereby declared as and considered of an
absolutely confidential nature and, except upon the written permission of the depositor, in no
instance shall foreign currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office whether judicial or administrative or legislative or any other
entity whether public or private; Provided, however, That said foreign currency deposits shall be
exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. (As amended by PD No. 1035, and
further amended by PD No. 1246, prom. Nov. 21, 1977.)

On the one hand, Republic Act No. 1405 provides for four (4) exceptions when records of deposits
may be disclosed. These are under any of the following instances: a) upon written permission of the
depositor, (b) in cases of impeachment, (c) upon order of a competent court in the case of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials or, (d) when the money deposited or invested is the subject
matter of the litigation, and e) in cases of violation of the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA), the
Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) may inquire into a bank account upon order of any
competent court.22 On the other hand, the lone exception to the non-disclosure of foreign currency
deposits, under Republic Act No. 6426, is disclosure upon the written permission of the depositor.

These two laws both support the confidentiality of bank deposits. There is no conflict between them.
Republic Act No. 1405 was enacted for the purpose of giving encouragement to the people to
deposit their money in banking institutions and to discourage private hoarding so that the same may
be properly utilized by banks in authorized loans to assist in the economic development of the
country.23 It covers all bank deposits in the Philippines and no distinction was made between
domestic and foreign deposits. Thus, Republic Act No. 1405 is considered a law of general
application. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 6426 was intended to encourage deposits from
foreign lenders and investors.24 It is a special law designed especially for foreign currency deposits in
the Philippines. A general law does not nullify a specific or special law. Generalia specialibus non
derogant.25 Therefore, it is beyond cavil that Republic Act No. 6426 applies in this case.

Intengan v. Court of Appeals affirmed the above-cited principle and categorically declared that for
foreign currency deposits, such as U.S. dollar deposits, the applicable law is Republic Act No. 6426.

In said case, Citibank filed an action against its officers for persuading their clients to transfer their
dollar deposits to competitor banks. Bank records, including dollar deposits of petitioners, purporting
to establish the deception practiced by the officers, were annexed to the complaint. Petitioners now
complained that Citibank violated Republic Act No. 1405. This Court ruled that since the accounts in
question are U.S. dollar deposits, the applicable law therefore is not Republic Act No. 1405 but
Republic Act No. 6426.

The above pronouncement was reiterated in China Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals,26 where
respondent accused his daughter of stealing his dollar deposits with Citibank. The latter allegedly
received the checks from Citibank and deposited them to her account in China Bank. The subject
checks were presented in evidence. A subpoena was issued to employees of China Bank to testify
on these checks. China Bank argued that the Citibank dollar checks with both respondent and/or her
daughter as payees, deposited with China Bank, may not be looked into under the law on secrecy of
foreign currency deposits. This Court highlighted the exception to the non-disclosure of foreign
currency deposits, i.e., in the case of a written permission of the depositor, and ruled that
respondent, as owner of the funds unlawfully taken and which are undisputably now deposited with
China Bank, he has the right to inquire into the said deposits.
Applying Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, absent the written permission from Domsat, Westmont
Bank cannot be legally compelled to disclose the bank deposits of Domsat, otherwise, it might
expose itself to criminal liability under the same act. 27

The basis for the application of subpoena is to prove that the loan intended for Domsat by the Banks
and guaranteed by GSIS, was diverted to a purpose other than that stated in the surety bond. The
Banks, however, argue that GSIS is in fact liable to them for the proper applications of the loan
proceeds and not vice-versa. We are however not prepared to rule on the merits of this case lest we
pre-empt the findings of the lower courts on the matter.

The third issue raised by GSIS was properly addressed by the appellate court. The appellate court
maintained that the judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, grant the second motion for
reconsideration despite its being pro forma. The appellate court correctly relied on precedents where
this Court set aside technicality in favor of substantive justice. Furthermore, the appellate court
accurately pointed out that petitioner did not assail the defect of lack of notice in its opposition to the
second motion of reconsideration, thus it can be considered a waiver of the defect.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The Decision dated 29 February 2008 and
19 June 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
 G.R. No. 190846, February 03, 2016

TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Petitioner, v. JOSE G. HOSANA, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 challenging the August 28, 2009
decision2 and November 17, 2009 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 88645. ch an Rob lesvirt u alLa wlib rary

The Facts

The respondent Jose G. Hosana (Jose) married Milagros C. Hosana (Milagros) on

January 14, 1979.4 During their marriage, Jose and Milagros bought a house and lot
located at Tinago, Naga City, which lot was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 21229.5 ch an rob lesvirt u alla wlib rary

On January 13, 1998, Milagros sold to the petitioner Tomas P. Tan, Jr. (Tomas) the
subject property, as evidenced by a deed of sale executed by Milagros herself and as
attorney-in-fact of Jose, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by
Jose in her favor.6 The Deed of Sale stated that the purchase price for the lot was
P200,000.00.7 After the sale, TCT No. 21229 was cancelled and TCT No. 32568 was
issued in the name of Tomas.8 ch an rob lesvirt u allawlib rar y

On October 19, 2001, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale/Cancellation of

Title/Reconveyance and Damages against Milagros, Tomas, and the Register of Deeds
of Naga City.9 The complaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62,
Naga City. In the complaint, Jose averred that while he was working in Japan, Milagros,
without his consent and knowledge, conspired with Tomas to execute the SPA by
forging Jose's signature making it appear that Jose had authorized Milagros to sell the
subject property to Tomas.10 ch an rob les virt u allaw lib rary

In his Answer, Tomas maintained that he was a buyer in good faith and for
value.11 Before he paid the full consideration of the sale, Tomas claimed he sought
advice from his lawyer-friend who told him that the title of the subject lot was authentic
and in order.12 Furthermore, he alleged that the SPA authorizing Milagros to sell the
property was annotated at the back of the title.13 ch an rob l esvirt u all awlib rary

Tomas filed a cross-claim against Milagros and claimed compensatory and moral
damages, attorney's fees, and expenses, for litigation, in the event that judgment be
rendered in favor of Jose.14 ch an rob lesvirt u alla wlib rary

The RTC declared Milagros in default for her failure to file her answer to Jose's
complaint and Tomas' cross-claim.15 On the other hand, it dismissed Tomas' complaint
against the Register of Deeds since it was only a nominal party.16 ch an rob lesv irt u allawl ib rary

After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued.17 ch an rob lesvirt u all awlib rary

Jose presented his brother, Bonifacio Hosana (Bonifacio), as sole witness. Bonifacio
testified that he learned of the sale of the subject property from Milagros' son. 18 When
Bonifacio confronted Milagros that Jose would get angry because of the sale, Milagros
retorted that she sold the property because she needed the money. Bonifacio
immediately informed Jose, who was then in Japan, of the sale.19 ch an rob les virt u alla wlib rary

Jose was furious when he learned of the sale and went back to the Philippines. Jose and
Bonifacio verified with the Register of Deeds and discovered that the title covering the
disputed property had been transferred to Tomas.20 ch an rob les virt u alla wlib rary

Bonifacio further testified that Jose's signature in the SPA was forged.21 Bonifacio
presented documents containing the signature of Jose for comparison: Philippine
passport, complaint-affidavit, duplicate original of SPA dated 16 February 2002, notice
of lis pendens, community tax certificate, voter's affidavit, specimen signatures, and a
handwritten letter.22 ch an rob lesvirt u all awlib rar y

On the other hand, Tomas submitted his own account of events as corroborated by
Rosana Robles (Rosana), his goddaughter. Sometime in December 1997, Tomas
directed Rosana to go to the house of Milagros to confirm if Jose knew about the sale
transaction. Through a phone call by Milagros to Jose, Rosana was able to talk to Jose
who confirmed that he was aware of the sale and had given his wife authority to
proceed with the sale. Rosana informed Tomas of Jose's confirmation. 23 ch an rob lesvirt u all awlib rary

With the assurance that all the documents were in order, Tomas made a partial
payment of P350,000.00 and another P350,000.00 upon the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale (Deed of Sale). Tomas noticed that the consideration written by Milagros
on the Deed of Sale was only P200,000.00; he inquired why the written consideration
was lower than the actual consideration paid. Milagros explained that it was done to
save on taxes. Tomas also learned from Milagros that she needed money badly and had
to sell the house because Jose had stopped sending her money.24 ch an Rob lesvirt u alL awlib rary

The RTC Ruling

In its decision dated December 27, 2006,25 the RTC decided in favor of Jose and
nullified the sale of the subject property to Tomas. The RTC held that the SPA dated
June 10, 1996, wherein Jose supposedly appointed Milagros as his attorney-in-fact, was
actually null and void.

Tomas and Milagros were ordered to jointly and severally indemnify Jose the amount of
P20,000.00 as temperate damages.26 ch an Rob le svirt u alL awlib rar y

The CA Ruling

Tomas appealed the RTC's ruling to the CA.

In a decision dated August 28, 2009,27 the CA affirmed the RTC ruling that the deed of
sale and the SPA were void. However, the CA modified the judgment of the RTC: first,
by deleting the award of temperate damages; and second, by directing Jose and
Milagros to reimburse Tomas the purchase price of P200,000.00, with interest, under
the principle of unjust enrichment. Despite Tomas' allegation that he paid P700,000.00
for the subject lot, the CA found that there was no convincing evidence that established
this claim.28
ch an rob lesvirt u alla wlib rary

Tomas filed a motion for the reconsideration of the CA decision on the ground that the
amount of P200,000.00 as reimbursement for the purchase price of the house and lot
was insufficient and not supported by the evidence formally offered before and
admitted by the RTC. Tomas contended that the actual amount he paid as consideration
for the sale was P700,000.00, as supported by his testimony before the RTC. 29 ch an rob lesvirt u all awlib rar y

The C A denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit" in a resolution dated
November 17, 2009.30 ch an Rob lesv irt u alLa wlib rary

The Petition

Tomas filed the present petition for review on certiorari to challenge the CA ruling which
ordered the reimbursement of P200,000.00 only, instead of the actual purchase price
he paid in the amount of P700,000.00.31 ch an rob lesvirt u all awlib rary

Tomas argues that, first, all matters contained in the deed of sale, including the
consideration stated, cannot be used as evidence since it was declared null and
void; second, the deed of sale was not specifically offered to prove the actual
consideration of the sale;32third, his testimony establishing the actual purchase price of
P700,000.00 paid was uncontroverted;33 and, fourth, Jose must return the full amount
actually paid under the principle of solutio indebiti.34 ch an rob les virt u alla wlib rary

Jose, on the other hand, argues that first, Jose is estopped from questioning the
purchase price indicated in the deed of dale for failing to immediately raise this
question; and second, the terms of an agreement reduced into writing are deemed to
include all the terms agreed upon and no other evidence can be admitted other than
the terms of the agreement itself.35 ch an Rob les virt u alLa wlib rary

The Issues

The core issues are (1) whether the deed of sale can be used as the basis for the
amount of consideration paid; and (2) whether the testimony of Tomas is sufficient to
establish the actual purchase price of the sale. ch an Rob lesvirt u alL awl ib rary

OUR RULING

We affirm the CA ruling and deny the petition.

Whether Tomas paid the purchase price of P700,000.00 is a question of fact not proper
in a petition for review on certiorari. Appreciation of evidence and inquiry on the
correctness of the appellate court's factual findings are not the functions of this Court,
as we are not a trier of facts.36 ch an rob lesv irt u allawl ib rary

This Court does not address questions of fact which require us to rule on "the truth or
falsehood of alleged facts,"37 except in the following cases: Ch an Rob lesVirt u alawlib rary

(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when
there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on
misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in
making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record.38ch an rob lesvirt u all awlib rary

The present case does not fall under any of these exceptions.

Whether Tomas sufficiently proved that he paid P700,000.00 for the subject property is
a factual question that the CA had already resolved in the negative. 39 The CA found
Tomas' claim of paying P700,000.00 for the subject property to be unsubstantiated as
he failed to tender any convincing evidence to establish his claim.

We uphold the CA's finding.

In civil cases, the basic rule is that the party making allegations has the burden of
proving them by a preponderance of evidence.40 Moreover, the parties must rely on the
strength of their own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their
opponent.41 ch an rob lesv irt u allawl ib rary

Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence
on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater
weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence."42 Preponderance
of evidence is a phrase that, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is
evidence that is more convincing to the court as it is worthier of belief than that which
is offered in opposition thereto.43 ch an rob lesvirt u alla wlib rary

We agree with the CA that Tomas' bare allegation that he paid Milagros the sum of
P700,000.00 cannot be considered as proof of payment, without any other convincing
evidence to establish this claim. Tomas' bare allegation, while uncontroverted, does not
automatically entitle it to be given weight and credence.
It is settled in jurisprudence that one who pleads payment has the burden of proving
it;44 the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to
prove non-payment.45 A mere allegation is not evidence,46 and the person who alleges
has the burden of proving his or her allegation with the requisite quantum of evidence,
which in civil cases is preponderance of evidence.

The force and effect of a void contract is distinguished from its admissibility as
evidence.

The next question to be resolved is whether the CA correctly ordered the

reimbursement of P200,000.00, which is the consideration stated in the Deed of Sale,
based on the principle of unjust enrichment.

The petitioner argues that the CA erred in relying on the consideration stated in the
deed of sale as basis for the reimbursable amount because a null and void document
cannot be used as evidence.

We find no merit in the petitioner's argument.

A void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very beginning. 47 This rule
applies to contracts that are declared void by positive provision of law, as in the case of
a sale of conjugal property without the other spouse's written consent.48 A void contract
is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. 49 It cannot be
validated either by ratification or prescription.50 When, however, any of the terms of a
void contract have been performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary to
allow restitution of what has been given under it.51ch an rob lesv irt u allawl ib rary

It is basic that if a void contract has already "been performed, the restoration of what
has been given is in order."52 This principle springs from Article 22 of the New Civil
Code which states that "every person who through an act of performance by another,
or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of
the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same." Hence, the restitution of
what each party has given is a consequence of a void and inexistent contract.

While the terms and provisions of a void contract cannot be enforced since it is deemed
inexistent, it does not preclude the admissibility of the contract as evidence to prove
matters that occurred in the course of executing the contract, i.e., what each party has
given in the execution of the contract.

Evidence is the means of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a

matter of fact, sanctioned by the Rules of Court.53 The purpose of introducing
documentary evidence is to ascertain the truthfulness of a matter at issue, which can
be the entire content or a specific provision/term in the document.

The deed of sale as documentary evidence may be used as a means to ascertain the
truthfulness of the consideration stated and its actual payment. The purpose of
introducing the deed of sale as evidence is not to enforce the terms written in the
contract, which is an obligatory force and effect of a valid contract. The deed of sale,
rather, is used as a means to determine matters that occurred in the execution of such
contract, i.e., the determination of what each party has given under the void contract
to allow restitution and prevent unjust enrichment.

Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law
of these rules.54 There is no provision in the Rules of Evidence which excludes the
admissibility of a void document. The Rules only require that the evidence is relevant
and not excluded by the Rules for its admissibility.55 ch an rob l esvirt u all awlib rar y

Hence, a void document is admissible as evidence because the purpose of introducing it

as evidence is to ascertain the truth respecting a matter of fact, not to enforce the
terms of the document itself.
It is also settled in jurisprudence that with respect to evidence which appears to be
of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, the safer policy is to be liberal
and not reject them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admit them unless plainly
irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent; for the reason that their rejection places them
beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or
competent. On the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or
incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring
them.56ch an rob les virt u alla wlib rary

In the present case, the deed of sale was declared null and void by positive provision of
the law prohibiting the sale of conjugal property without the spouse's consent. It does
not, however, preclude the possibility that Tomas paid the consideration stated therein.
The admission of the deed of sale as evidence is consistent with the liberal policy of the
court to admit the evidence: which appears to be relevant in resolving an issue before
the courts.

An offer to prove the regular execution of the deed of sale is basis for the
court to determine the presence of the essential elements of the sale,
including the consideration paid.

Tomas argues that the Deed of Sale was not specifically offered to prove the actual
consideration of the sale and, hence, cannot be considered by the court. Tomas is
incorrect.

The deed of sale in the present case was formally offered by both parties as
evidence.57 Tomas, in fact, formally offered it for the purpose of proving its execution
and the regularity of the sale.58 ch an rob les virt u alla wlib rary

The offer of the deed of sale to prove its regularity necessarily allowed the; lower courts
to consider the terms written therein to determine whether all the essential
elements59 for a valid contract of sale are present, including the consideration of the
sale. The fact that the sale was declared null and void does not prevent the court from
relying on consideration stated in the deed of sale to determine the actual amount paid
by the petitioner for the purpose of preventing unjust enrichment.

Hence, the specific offer of the Deed of Sale to prove the actual consideration of the
sale is not necessary since it is necessarily included in determining the regular
execution of the sale.

The consideration stated in the notarized Deed of Sale is prima facie evidence
of the amount paid by the petitioner.

The notarized deed of sale is a public document and is prima facie evidence of the truth
of the facts stated therein.60 ch an rob lesvirt u all awlib rar y

Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such
evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the
group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense and which if not
rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient.61 ch an rob le svirt u all awlib rary

In the present case, the consideration stated in the deed of sale constitutes prima
facie evidence of the amount paid by Tomas for the transfer of the property to his
name. Tomas failed to adduce satisfactory evidence to rebut or contradict the
consideration stated as the actual consideration and amount paid to Milagros and Jose.

The deed of sale was declared null and void by a positive provision of law requiring the
consent of both spouses for the sale of conjugal property. There is, however, no
question on the presence of the consideration of the sale, except with respect to the
actual amount paid. While the deed of sale has no force and effect as a contract, it
remains prima facie evidence of the actual consideration paid.

As earlier discussed, Tomas failed to substantiate his claim that he paid to Milagros the
amount of P700,000.00, instead of the amount of P200,000.00 stated in the deed of
sale. No documentary or testimonial evidence to prove payment of the higher amount
was presented, apart from Tomas' sole testimony. Tomas' sole testimony of payment is
self-serving and insufficient to unequivocally prove that Milagros received P700,000.00
for the subject property.

Hence, the consideration stated in the deed of sale remains sufficient evidence of the
actual amount the petitioner paid and the same amount which should be returned
under the principle of unjust enrichment.

Unjust enrichment exists "when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of
another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience."62 The prevention of
unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of the State and is based on Article 22
of the Civil Code.63 ch an rob lesvirt u alla wlib rary

The principle of unjust enrichment requires Jose to return what he or Milagros received
under the void contract which presumably benefitted their conjugal partnership.

Accordingly, the CA correctly ordered Jose to return the amount of P200,000.00 since
this the consideration stated in the Deed of Sale and given credence by the lower court.
Indeed, even Jose expressly stated in his comment that Tomas is entitled to recover
the money paid by him in the amount of P200,000.00 as appearing in the contract.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for review on certiorari. The decision
dated August 28, 2009 and the resolution dated November 17, 2009, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88645 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED. cralawla wlib rary

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Leonen, J., on leave.
 G.R. No. 187850, August 17, 2016

ANITA U. LORENZANA, Petitioner, v. RODOLFO LELINA, Respondent.

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
filed by Anita U. Lorenzana (petitioner) from the Court of Appeals' (CA) Decision 2 dated
April 30, 2008 (CA Decision) and the Resolution 3 dated April 27, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 86187. The CA affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision 4 dated March 7,
2005 (RTC Decision) upholding Rodolfo Lelina's (respondent) ownership over the half of
the 16,047 square meters (sq. m.) of land claimed by petitioner, and cancelling the
Deed of Final Conveyance and Tax Declaration in petitioner's name. 5 ch an rob leslaw

Facts

On April 1, 1975, Ambrosia Lelina (Ambrosia), married to Aquilino Lelina (Aquilino),

executed a Deed of Absolute Sale6 over one-half (1/2) of an undivided parcel of land
covered by Tax Declaration (TD) No. 14324-C (property) in favor of her son, the
respondent. The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, specified only an area of 810 sq. m.
as the one-half (1/2) of the property covered by the tax declaration.7 Nevertheless, the
Deed of Absolute Sale contained the description of the land covered by TD No. 14324-
C, as follows: "[b]ounded on the: North by Constancio Batac-& National highway[,] East
by Cecilio Lorenzana, South by Cr[ee]k, and West by Andres Cuaresma." 8]

Immediately after the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, respondent took
possession of the property. Since then, the tenants of the property, Fidel Labiano,
Venancio Lagria, and Magdalena Lopez, continued to deliver his share of the produce of
the property as well as produce of the remaining half of the land covered by TD No.
14324-C until December 1995.9 ch an rob lesla w

Around August 1996,10 respondent and his three tenants were invited at the Municipal
Agrarian Office of Tagudin, Ilocos Sur for a conference where they were informed that
the property is already owned by petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Final Conveyance and
TD No. 11-21367-A both in the name of petitioner.11 Alerted by the turn of events,
respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title and cancellation of documents 12 on
September 24, 1996, with the RTC Branch 25, Tagudin, Ilocos Sur, claiming that there
appears to be a cloud over his ownership and possession of the property.

In her Answer,13 petitioner alleged that she acquired a land with an area of 16,047 sq.
m. through a foreclosure sale. Petitioner claims that she became the judgment creditor
in a case for collection of sum of money14 (collection case) she filed against Aquilino,
and the decision in her favor became final on March 20, 1975, with an Entry of
Judgment issued on April 10, 1975.15 Thereafter, by virtue of a writ of execution to
enforce the decision in the collection case, the sheriff levied on a land with an area of
16,047 sq. m. covered by the TD No. 11-05370-A16 (levied property) under the name of
Ambrosia. Petitioner claimed that she emerged as the sole and highest bidder when the
levied property was auctioned. An auction sale was conducted on September 29, 1977
and a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner. The same Certificate of Sale
was registered with the Register of Deeds on October 18, 1977.17 No redemption having
been made despite the lapse of the one year period for redemption, a Deed of Final
Conveyance18 was issued in her favor on October 9, 1978. The same was registered
with the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur on October 16, 1978.19 ch an rob lesl aw

During trial, it was undisputed that the property is found within the levied
property.20 The levied property has the following boundaries: North by Constancio
Batac; East by National Road and heirs of Pedro Mina & Cecilio Lorenzana; South by
Creek; and West by Andres Cuaresma, Eladio Ma and Creek.21 It was further shown
that the Deed of Final Conveyance expressly describes the levied property as registered
and owned by Ambrosia.22 Petitioner testified that she did not immediately possess the
levied property, but only did so in 1995.23 On the other hand, respondent testified that
sometime in 1975 and prior to the sale of the property to him, the other half of the
levied property was owned by Godofredo Lorenzana (Godofredo).24 He also claimed that
he and Godofredo have agreed that he will hold in trust the latter's share of produce
from the other half of the land.25 crala wred ch an rob lesl aw

After trial, respondent submitted his Memorandum 26 dated December 16, 2004 where
he explained that the land he was claiming was the one-half (1/2) of the 16,047 sq. m.
formerly covered by TD No. 14324-C described in the Deed of Absolute Sale. Thus, he
prayed that his title to the property, i.e. the one-half (1/2) of the levied property, be
upheld.

The RTC upheld respondent's ownership over the half of the levied property.27 It ruled
that the levied property is exclusively owned by Ambrosia, and could not be held to
answer for the obligations of her husband in the collection case. As a result, it declared
the Deed of Final Conveyance dated October 9, 1978, as well as the proceedings taken
during the alleged auction sale of levied property, invalid and without force and effect
on Ambrosia's paraphernal property.29 It also cancelled the TD No. 11-21367-A in the
name of petitioner.30]

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal from the RTC Decision. In her Appellant's
Brief,31 petitioner argued that the trial court erred: (1) in awarding one-half (1/2) of the
levied property, which is more than the 810 sq. m. prayed for in the complaint; (2) in
ruling that the Deed of Final Conveyance in favor of petitioner is invalid; and (3) in
awarding litigation expenses and attorney's fees in favor of respondent.

The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC and upheld respondent's ownership over the
property.32 It ruled that the power of the court in the execution of its judgment extends
only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. Since Ambrosia
exclusively owned the levied property, the sheriff in the collection case, on behalf of the
court, acted beyond its power and authority when it levied on the property.
Consequently, petitioner cannot rely on the execution sale in proving that she has
better right over the property because such execution sale is void. 33 Finding petitioner's
claim over the property as invalid, the CA upheld respondent's right to the removal of
the cloud on his title.34 The CA deleted the award of litigation expenses and attorney's
fees, there being no finding of facts in the RTC Decision that warrants the same. 35
Hence, this petition.
Arguments

Petitioner argues that respondent's sole basis for his claim of ownership over the
property is the Deed of Absolute Sale, the original of which was not presented in court.
Since only the photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented, its contents are
inadmissible for violating the best evidence rule. Thus, respondent's claim of ownership
should be denied.36 ch an rob lesl aw

Petitioner next claims that even if the Deed of Absolute Sale be considered in evidence,
it only proves respondent's ownership over the 810 sq. m., and not the half of the
16,047 sq. m. levied property. Accordingly, the area of the lot awarded should be
limited to what was prayed for in the Complaint.37 ch an rob le sla w

Lastly, petitioner assails the finding that Ambrosia is the exclusive owner of the levied
property. She asserts that at the very least, the levied property is jointly owned by the
spouses Ambrosia and Aquilino and therefore, it may be validly held answerable for the
obligations incurred by Aquilino. Accordingly, she asserts that the Deed of Final
Conveyance should not have been totally invalidated but should have been upheld as to
the other half of the levied property.38 In this connection, she maintains that the lower
courts should not have ordered the remaining half of the levied property be held in
trust by respondent because the alleged landholding of Godofredo was not proven to be
the same or even part of the levied property.39 ch an rob lesl aw
 Issues

I. Whether respondent is the owner of one-half (1/2) of the levied property

comprising of 16,047 sq. m.

II. Whether the Deed of Final Conveyance and TD No. 11- 21367-A, both in the
name of petitioner, were correctly cancelled.

Ruling
We deny the petition.
The issues raised invite a re-determination of questions of fact which is not within the
province of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Factual findings of the trial court affirmed by the CA are final and conclusive and
may not be reviewed on appeal.40 In certain cases, we held that as an exception, a
review of such factual findings may be made when the judgment of the CA is premised
on a misapprehension of facts or a failure to consider certain relevant facts, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 41 Petitioner invokes this
exception urging us to pass upon anew the RTC and CA's findings, regarding the
ownership of the property and levied property which led the lower courts to cancel the
Deed of Final Conveyance and TD No. 11-21367-A under petitioner's name.

We find no reversible error committed by the RTC and CA in ruling that the Deed of
Absolute Sale proves respondent's ownership over the property, and that petitioner
failed to establish a registrable title on the property and levied property.

I. Respondent is the owner of half

of the levied property.

We affirm the finding that respondent is the owner of the property equivalent to half of
the levied property.

A. Waiver of objection to the Best

Evidence Rule.

Petitioner claims that the photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale should not have been
admitted in evidence to prove respondent's ownership over the property. We disagree.

The best evidence rule requires that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself except in
the instances mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. As such,
mere photocopies of documents are inadmissible pursuant to the best evidence
rule.42 Nevertheless, evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly
considered by the court in arriving at its judgment.43 Courts are not precluded to accept
in evidence a mere photocopy of a document when no objection was raised when it was
formally offered.44
ch an rob lesla w

In order to exclude evidence, the objection to admissibility of evidence must be

made at the proper time, and the grounds specified.45 Objection to evidence must be
made at the time it is formally offered.46 In case of documentary evidence, offer is
made after all the witnesses of the party making the offer have testified, specifying the
purpose for which the evidence is being offered.47 It is only at this time, and not at any
other, that objection to the documentary evidence may be made. And when a party
failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in
evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.48 This is true even if by its
nature the evidence is inadmissible and would have surely been rejected if it had been
challenged at the proper time.49 Moreover, grounds for objection must be specified in
any case.50 Grounds for objections not raised at the proper time shall be considered
waived, even if the evidence was objected to on some other ground.51 Thus, even on
appeal, the appellate court may not consider any other ground of objection, except
those that were raised at the proper time.52 ch an rob leslaw
In this case, the objection to the Deed of Absolute Sale was belatedly raised.
Respondent submitted his Formal Offer of Evidence53 on February 12, 2003 which
included the Deed of Absolute Sale as Exhibit A. While petitioner filed a Comment and
Objection54 on February 21, 2003, she only objected to the Deed of Absolute Sale for
being self-serving. In the Order55 dated February 27, 2003, the RTC admitted the Deed
of Absolute Sale, rejecting the objection of petitioner. Having failed to object on the
ground of inadmissibility under the best evidence rule, petitioner is now deemed to
have waived her objection on this ground and cannot raise it for the first time on
appeal.56ch an rob l esla w

B. The Deed of Absolute Sale

sufficiently proves respondent's
ownership over the property.

We stress that petitioner does not question the validity of the sale, but merely the
admissibility of the deed. Having been admitted in evidence as to its contents, the Deed
of Absolute Sale sufficiently proves respondent's ownership over the property. The
deed, coupled with respondent's possession over the property since its sale in 1975
until 1995, proves his ownership.

Petitioner maintains that without conceding the correctness of the CA Decision,

respondent's ownership of the land should only be limited to 810 sq. m. in accordance
with his complaint and evidence presented. Thus, the CA went over and beyond the
allegations in the complaint making its finding devoid of factual basis. 57
ch an rob lesla w

We note that petitioner actively participated in the proceedings below. During the
course of trial she was confronted with the issue of ownership of the levied property,
and she admitted that the property is found within the former. 58 From the beginning,
petitioner was apprised of respondent's claim over the half of the land described in the
Deed of Absolute Sale, which has the same boundaries as the land described in TD No.
11-05730-A. While respondent in his complaint stated a claim for an area of only 810
sq. m., he adequately clarified his claim for the one-half (1/2) of the levied property in
his Memorandum59 dated December 16, 2004 before the RTC. Hence, it could not be
said that petitioner was deprived of due process by not being notified or given the
opportunity to oppose the claim over half of the levied property.

At any rate, we have consistently ruled that what really defines a piece of land is not
the area, calculated with more or less certainty mentioned in the description, but its
boundaries laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. 60 Where land is
sold for a lump sum and not so much per unit of measure or number, the boundaries of
the land stated in the contract determine the effects and scope of the sale, and not its
area.61 This is consistent with Article 1542 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1542. In the sale of real estate, made for a lump sum and not at the rate of a
certain sum for a unit of measure or number, there shall be no increase or decrease of
the price, although there be a greater or lesser areas or number than that stated in the
contract.

The same rule shall be applied when two or more immovables are sold for a single
price; but if, besides mentioning the boundaries, which is indispensable in
every conveyance of real estate, its area or number should be designated in
the contract, the vendor shall be bound to deliver all that is included within
said boundaries, even when it exceeds the area or number specified in the
contract; and, should he not be able to do so, he shall suffer a reduction in the price,
in proportion to what is lacking in the area or number, unless the contract is rescinded
because the vendee does not accede to the failure to deliver what has been stipulated.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the land covered by TD No. 14324-C in the Deed of Absolute Sale, from
where the one-half (1/2) portion belonging to respondent is taken, has the following
boundaries: North by Constancio Batac & National Highway; East by Cecilio Lorenzana;
South by Creek; and West by Andres Cuaresma.62 This is the same extent and location
of the lot covered in the Deed of Final Conveyance, TD No. 11-05730-A in Ambrosia's
name, and petitioner's TD No. 11-21367-A. This description should prevail over the
area specified in the Deed of Absolute Sale. Thus, we agree with the courts below that
respondent owns half of the levied property.

Respondent having been able to make a prima facie case as to his ownership over the
property, it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove her claim of ownership over the
levied property by preponderance of evidence. In Dantis v. Maghinang,
Jr.,63 citing Jison v. Court of Appeals,64 we held:
Ch an Rob lesVirt u alawl ib rary

Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and
upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the
course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor,
the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff’s prima
facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil
cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence
thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon
the weakness of the defendant's. The concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers to
evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in
opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.65 ch an rob lesv irt u allawl ib rary

As correctly found by both the RTC and CA, petitioner failed to establish her claim over
the levied property. Petitioner has been inconsistent in her versions as to how she
acquired ownership over the levied property. In her Answer, she claims that she is the
owner of the levied property by virtue of having been the highest bidder in the public
auction to execute the decision in the collection case.66 During her testimony, however,
she contradicts herself by claiming that the levied property was awarded to her
husband by her father-in-law or the brother of Ambrosia, and the latter's husband
Aquilino was merely appointed as administrator of the land. 67 The inconsistencies
between these claims are glaring because if the levied property was truly awarded to
her by her father-in-law, she could have just vindicated her claim in an independent
action, and not participate in the public auction. Moreover, this is inconsistent with her
claim that Aquilino was the owner of the levied property which is answerable for
Aquilino's debt.68 Thus, the RTC and CA correctly did not give credence to these
versions but instead considered that her claim of ownership is anchored only on the
Deed of Final Conveyance.

Petitioner's ownership anchored on this Deed of Final Conveyance, however, likewise

fails.

II. The Deed of Final

Conveyance and TD No.
11-21367-A were correctly
cancelled.

Money judgments are enforceable only against property unquestionably belonging to

the judgment debtor alone.69 If property belonging to any third person is mistakenly
levied upon to answer for another man's indebtedness, the Rules of Court gives such
person all the right to challenge the levy through any of the remedies provided for
under the rules, including an independent "separate action" to vindicate his or her claim
of ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed property. 70 ch an rob lesl aw

The determinative question here is to whom the property belongs at the time of the
levy and execution sale. To recall, respondent acquired the property through the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated April 1, 1975, while petitioner bought the levied property at the
public auction held on September 29, 1977. Obviously, respondent already owned the
property at the time petitioner bought the levied property, and thus cannot be levied
and attached for the obligations of Aquilino in the collection case.

As to the other half of the levied property, we uphold the CA and the RTC's finding that
prior to its transfer to respondent and one Godofredo Lorenzana, the levied property
was paraphernal property of Ambrosia. The records show that Ambrosia owned the
levied property as evidenced by: (1) TD No. 11-05370-A in her name; (2) a provision in
the Deed of Final Conveyance that it is Ambrosia who exclusively owns the land; 71 and
(3) an admission from petitioner herself in her Appellant's Brief that Ambrosia is the
declared owner of the levied property.72 These pieces of evidence vis-a¬vis petitioner's
inconsistent theories of ownership, undoubtedly have more weight, and in fact had
been given more weight by the courts below.

As a rule, if at the time of the levy and sale by the sheriff, the property did not belong
to the conjugal partnership, but was paraphernal property, such property may not be
answerable for the obligations of the husband which resulted in the judgment against
him in favor of another person.73 The levied property being exclusive property of
Ambrosia, and Ambrosia not being a party to the collection case, the levied property
may not answer for Aquilino's obligations. Even assuming that the levied property
belonged to the conjugal partnership of Ambrosia and Aquilino, it may still not be levied
upon because petitioner did not present proof that the obligation redounded to the
benefit of the family. More importantly, Aquilino's interest over a portion of the levied
property as conjugal property is merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.74ch an rob lesl aw

Thus, we find that the levied property may not answer for the obligations of Aquilino
because the latter does not own it at the time of the levy. Hence, the Deed of Final
Conveyance and TD No. 11-21367-A were correctly cancelled for being the outcome of
an invalid levy.
A final note.
Petitioner does not have a legal claim of ownership over the property because her
alleged title results from an invalid levy and execution. Thus, it is of no moment that
respondent never registered the Deed of Absolute Sale, or that he never declared it for
taxation purposes—petitioner does not have a valid claim over the property that would
benefit from respondent's lapses.

This likewise holds true as to the other half of the levied property determined to be the
property of Godofredo. Petitioner's claim that there is no basis in ordering respondent
to hold in trust the other half of the levied property in favor of Godofredo fails. Records
show that the CA gave credence to respondent's testimony that the other half of the
levied property was sold to Godofredo, and that the latter agreed that respondent shall
receive the proceeds of the produce on behalf of Godofredo.75 Upon such findings, it
became incumbent upon petitioner to show otherwise by proving her ownership. This,
however, she failed to do. Thus, petitioner cannot claim that the courts below erred in
not awarding Godofredo's portion to her.

From the foregoing, we uphold respondent's ownership over the subject property, as
well as the cancellation of Deed of Final Conveyance and TD No. 11-21367-A under the
name of petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. ch an Rob lesvirt u alLawl ib rary

G.R. No. 174673

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
FE ROA GIMENEZ AND IGNACIO B. GIMENEZ, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Rules of procedure are not ends in themselves. The object of these rules is to assist and facilitate a
trial court's function to be able to receive all the evidence of the parties, and evaluate their
admissibility and probative value in the context of the issues presented by the parties' pleadings in
order to arrive at a conclusion as to the facts that transpired. Having been able to establish the facts,
the trial court will then be able to apply the law and determine whether a complainant is deserving of
the reliefs prayed for in the pleading.

Dismissal on the basis of a very strict interpretation of procedural rules without a clear demonstration
of the injury to a substantive right of the defendant weighed against 19 years of litigation actively
participated in by both parties should not be encouraged.

There is likewise serious reversible error, even grave abuse of discretion, when the Sandiganbayan
dismisses a case on demurrer to evidence without a full statement of its evaluation of the evidence
presented and offered and the interpretation of the relevant law. After all, dismissal on the basis of
demurrer to evidence is similar to a judgment. It is a final order ruling on the merits of a case.

This is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari assailing the Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated May 25,
20062 and September 13, 2006.3 The Sandiganbayan deemed petitioner Republic of the Philippines
(Republic) to have waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence 4 and granted the Motion to
Dismiss of respondents Spouses Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez (Gimenez Spouses) based
on demurrer to evidence.5

The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), instituted a
Complaint6 for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages against the
Gimenez Spouses before the Sandiganbayan.7 "The Complaint seeks to recover . . . ill-gotten wealth
. . . acquired by [the Gimenez Spouses] as dummies, agents[,] or nominees of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos[.]" 8

During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to the positions held, business
interests, income, and pertinent transactions of the Gimenez Spouses. 9 The Republic presented the
testimonies of Atty. Tereso Javier, Head of the Sequestered Assets Department of PCGG, and of
Danilo R.V. Daniel, Director of the Research and Development Department of PCGG. 10 Witnesses
testified on the bank accounts and businesses owned or controlled by the Gimenez Spouses. 11

On February 27, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied a motion to recall Danilo R.V. Daniel’s
testimony.12 The Republic then manifested that it was "no longer presenting further
evidence."13 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gave the Republic 30 days or until March 29, 2006 "to
file its formal offer of evidence."14

On March 29, 2006, the Republic moved "for an extension of thirty (30) days or until April 28, 2006,
within which to file [its] formal offer of evidence."15 This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in
a Resolution of the same date.16

On April 27, 2006, the Republic moved for an additional 15 days or until May 13, 2006 within which
to file its Formal Offer of Evidence.17 This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution
dated May 8, 2006.18 Following this, no additional Motion for extension was filed by the Republic.

In the first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan noted that the Republic
failed to file its Formal Offer of Evidence notwithstanding repeated extensions and the lapse of 75
days from the date it terminated its presentation of evidence.19 Thus, it declared that the Republic
waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence.20

The first assailed Resolution provides:

It appearing that the plaintiff has long terminated the presentation of its evidence on February 27,
2006, and it appearing further that it failed or otherwise neglected to file its written formal offer of
evidence for an unreasonable period of time consisting of 75 days (i.e., 30 days original period plus
two extension periods totaling 45 days), the filing of said written formal offer of evidence is hereby
deemed WAIVED.

WHEREFORE, the reception of the defendants’ evidence shall proceed on June 22 and 23, 2006,
both at 8:30 o’clock [sic] in the morning as previously scheduled.21

Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence dated May 30, 2006. 22 He
argued that the Republic showed no right to relief as there was no evidence to support its cause of
action.23 Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss dated June 13, 2006 on the ground of failure to
prosecute.24 Through her own Motion to Dismiss, she joined Ignacio Gimenez’s demurrer to
evidence.25

Two days after Fe Roa Gimenez’s filing of the Motion to Dismiss or on June 15, 2006, the Republic
filed a Motion for Reconsideration [of the first assailed Resolution] and to Admit Attached Formal
Offer of Evidence.26 The pertinent portions of the Republic’s offer of documentary exhibits attached to
the Motion are summarized as follows:

Exhibits A to G and series consist of the Income Tax Returns, Certificate of Income Tax Withheld
On Compensation, Statement of Tax Withheld At Source, Schedule of Interest Income, Royalties
and Withholding Tax, Statement of Assets, Liabilities & Net Worth of Ignacio B. Gimenez from 1980-
1986 proving his legitimate income during said period. Exhibits H -J and series refer to the Deeds of
Sale and Transfer Certificates of Title proving that spouses Gimenezes acquired several real
properties.

Exhibits K and series (K-1-K-4) pertain to Checking Statements Summary issued by the Bankers
Trust Company (BTC) proving that Fe Roa Gimenez maintained a current account under Account
Number 34-714-415 with BTC. Exhibits L and series (L1-L-114) are several BTC checks, proving
that from June 1982 to April 1984, Fe Roa Gimenez issued several checks against her BTC Current
Account No. 34-714-415 payable to some individuals and entities such as Erlinda Oledan, Vilma
Bautista, The Waldorf Towers, Cartier, Gliceria Tantoco, Bulgari, Hammer Galleries and Renato
Balestra, involving substantial amount of money in US Dollars. Exhibits M and series (M1-M-
25) are several The Chase Manhattan Bank (TCMB) checks drawn against the account of Fe Roa
Gimenez under Account Number 021000021, proving that she issued several checks drawn against
her TCMB account, payable to individuals and entities such as Gliceria Tantoco, Vilma Bautista and
The Waldorf Towers, involving substantial sums in US Dollars. Exhibit N is the Philippine National
Bank (PNB), New York Branch Office Charge Ticket No. FT 56880 dated December 9, 1982 in the
amount of US$30,000.00 for Fe Roa Gimenez proving that she received said enormous amount
from the PNB, New York Branch Office, with clearance from the Central Bank, which amount was
charged against PNB Manila. Exhibit N-1 is the PNB New York Branch Advice to Payee No. FT
56535 dated November 12, 1982 in the amount of US$10,990.00 for Fe Roa Gimenez proving her
receipt of such amount as remitted from California Overseas Bank, Los Angeles. Exhibits O and
series (O1-O-8) refer to several Advices made by Bankers Trust AG Zurich-Geneve Bank in
Switzerland to respondent Fe Roa Gimenez proving that she maintained a current account with said
bank under Account Number 107094.50 and that from July 30, 1984 to August 30, 1984, she placed
a substantial amount on time deposit in several banks, namely, Hypobank, Luzemburg, Luxemburg,
Societe Generale, Paris and Bank of Nova Scotia, London.

Exhibit P is the Certification dated March 19, 2002 issued by Director Florino O. Ibanez of the Office
of the President proving that Fe Roa Gimenez, from January 1, 1966 to April 1, 1986, worked with
the Office of the President under different positions, the last of which as Presidential Staff Director
with a salary of P87,072.00 per annum.

Exhibit Q and series (Q-1-Q-18) is the Affirmation of Ralph Shapiro filed with the United States
Court of Appeals in the case entitled, "The Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et
al." which discussed certain acts of Fe Roa Gimenez and Vilma Bautista, among others, in relation
to the funds of the Marcoses.

Exhibits R and S and series (R-1, R-9; S-1-S-10) refer to the Certificate of Filing of Amended
Articles of Incorporation of GEI Guaranteed Education, Inc., the Amended Articles of Incorporation of
GEI Guaranteed Education, Inc., the Treasurer’s Affidavit executed by Ignacio Gimenez and the
Director’s Certificate executed by Roberto B. Olanday, Ignacio Gimenez and Roberto Coyuto, Jr.
proving Ignacio Gimenez and Roberto Olanday’s interests in GEl Guaranteed Education, Inc.

Exhibits T and series (T-1-T-8) are the Advices made by the Bankers Trust AG Zurich-Geneve
Bank in Switzerland to Ignacio Gimenez proving that he maintained a current account with said bank
under Account Number 101045.50 and that from March to June, 1984, he placed a substantial
amount on time deposit in several banks, namely, Credit Lyonnais, Brussels, Societe Generale,
Paris, Credit Commercial De France, Paris and Bank of Nova Scotia, London.

Exhibits U and V and series (U-1-U-5; V1-V-18) consist of the Affidavit dated April 25, 1986 and
the Declaration dated June 23, 1987 including the attachments, of Oscar Carino, Vice-President and
Manager of the PNB New York Branch, narrating in detail how the funds of the PNB New York
Branch were disbursed outside regular banking business upon the instructions of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos using Fe Roa Gimenez and others as conduit.

Exhibits W and series (W-1-W-4) are the Debit memos from the PNB to Fe Roa Gimenez
while Exhibits X and X-1 are the Acknowledgments of said respondent, proving that she received
substantial amounts of money which were coursed through the PNB to be used by the Marcos
spouses for state visits and foreign trips.

Exhibit Y and series (Y-1-Y-2) is the Letter dated August 25, 1986 of Juan C. Gatmaitan, Assistant
Chief Legal Counsel of PNB to Charles G. LaBella, Assistant United States Attorney regarding the
ongoing investigation of irregular transactions at the PNB, New York Branch proving that PNB
cooperated with the United States government in connection with the investigation on the irregular
transactions of Oscar Carino at PNB New York Branch.

Exhibit Z is the service record of Fe Roa Gimenez issued by Florino O. Ibanez of the Office of the
President which proves that she worked with the Office of the President from 1966-1986 holding
different positions, the last of which was Presidential Staff Director.
1âwphi1

Exhibits AA and series (AA-1 –AA-2) are the several Traders Royal Bank checks drawn against
Account No. 74-702836-9 under the account name of Fe Roa Gimenez which prove that she issued
said checks payable to individuals and entities involving substantial amount of money.

Exhibits BB and CC and series (BB-1–BB-17; CC-1-CC-3) are the several Transfer of Funds
Advice from Traders Royal Bank Statements of Account of Fe Roa Gimenez, proving that she
maintained a current account under Account No. 74-7028369 at Traders Royal Bank.

Exhibits HH and series (HH-1-HH-3) are the Certification dated October 3, 2002 of Lamberto R.
Barbin, Officer-in-Charge, Malacanang Records Office, that the Statement of Assets and Liabilities
of spouses Marcoses for the years 1965 up to 1986 are not among the records on file in said Office
except 1965, 1967 and 1969; the Statement of Assets and Liabilities as of December 31, 1969 and
December 31, 1967 of former President Ferdinand Marcos; and the Sworn Statement of Financial
Condition, Assets, Income and Liabilities as of December 31, 1965 of former President Ferdinand
Marcos. These documentary exhibits prove the assets and liabilities of former President Marcos for
the years 1965,1967 and 1969.

Exhibit II and series is [sic] the Statement of Assets and Liabilities as of December 31,1969
submitted by Fe Roa Gimenez which prove that her assets on that period amounted only to
P39,500.00.

Exhibit KK is the Table of Contents of Civil Case No. [0]007 before the Sandiganbayan entitled
"Republic of the Philippines vs. Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez, et. al.", including its
Annexes which prove the assets and liabilities of spouses Gimenezes.

Exhibits KK-1 up to KK-12 are several transfer certificates of title and tax declarations in the names
of spouses Gimenezes, proving their acquisition of several real properties.

Exhibits KK-15, KK-18, KK-20 up to KK-27, KK-30, KK-32 up to KK-38 and KK-40 are the
General Information Sheet, Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation, and Amended
Articles of Incorporation of various corporations. These prove the corporations in which Ignacio B.
Gimenez has substantial interests.
Exhibits KK-41 up to KK-44 are the Writs and Letters of Sequestration issued by the PCGG which
prove that the shares of stocks of Ignacio Gimenez in Ignacio B. Gimenez, Securities, Inc. and the
real properties covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 137638, 132807, 126693 and 126694
located in San Fabian, Pangasinan, were sequestered by the PCGG.

Exhibit KK-45 is the Memorandum dated August 1, 1988 of Atty. Ralph S. Lee and Alexander M.
Berces, Team Supervisor and Investiogator, [sic] respectively, of IRD, PCGG, proving that the
PCGG conducted an investigation on New City Builders, Inc., Transnational Construction
Corporation, and OTO Construction and Development Corporation in relation to Ignacio B. Gimenez
and Roberto O. Olanday.

Exhibits KK-48, KK-49 and KK-50 are certain Lis Pendens from the PCGG addressed to the
concerned Register of Deeds informing that the real properties mentioned therein had been
sequestered and are the subject of Civil Case No. [0]007 before the Sandiganbayan.

Exhibits KK-51, KK-51-A, KK-52 and KK-52-A are the Letter and Writ of Sequestration issued by
the PCGG on Allied Banking Corporation and Guaranteed Education Inc. pursuant to its mandate to
go after ill-gotten wealth.

Exhibits NN, OO, PP, QQ and QQ-1 refer to the Memorandum To All Commercial Banks dated
March 14, 1986 issued by then Central Bank Governor Jose B. Fernandez and the Letter dated
March 13, 1986 of Mary Concepcion Bautista, PCGG Commissioner addressed to then Central Bank
Governor Fernandez requesting that names be added to the earlier request of PCGG Chairman
Jovito Salonga to instruct all commercial banks not to allow any withdrawal or transfer of funds from
the market placements under the names of said persons, to include spouses Gimenezes, without
authority from PCGG.

Exhibits KK and series, NN, OO, PP, QQ and QQ-1 which prove the various real properties,
business interests and bank accounts owned by spouses Gimenezes were part of the testimony of
Atty. Tereso Javier.

Exhibit RR and series (RR-1-RR-23) are the Affidavit dated July 24, 1987 of Dominador Pangilinan,
Acting President and President of Trader’s Royal Bank, and the attached Recapitulation, Status of
Banker’s Acceptances, Status of Funds and Savings Account Ledger wherein he mentioned that
Malacanang maintained trust accounts at Trader’s Royal Bank, the balance of which is
approximately 150-175 million Pesos, and that he was informed by Mr. Rivera that the funds were
given to him (Rivera) by Fe Roa Gimenez for deposit to said accounts.

Exhibits SS and series (SS-1-SS-29) are the Affidavit dated July 23, 1987 of Apolinario K. Medina,
Executive Vice President of Traders Royal Bank and attachments, which include Recapitulation,
Status of Funds, and Messages from Traders Royal Bank Manila to various foreign banks. In his
Affidavit, Medina divulged certain numbered confidential trust accounts maintained by Malacanang
with the Trader’s Royal Bank. He further stated that the deposits were so substantial that he
suspected that they had been made by President Marcos or his family.

Exhibit TT and series (TT-1-TT-3) is [sic] the Memorandum dated July 19, 2005 of Danilo R.V.
Daniel, then Director of the Research and Development Department of PCGG regarding the
investigation conducted on the ill-gotten wealth of spouses Gimenezes, the subject matter of Civil
Case No. [0]007. He revealed that during the investigation on the ill-gotten wealth of spouses
Gimenezes, it was found out that from 1977 to 1982, several withdrawals, in the total amount of
P75,090,306.42 were made from Trust Account No. 128 (A/C 76-128) in favor of I.B. Gimenez, I.B.
Gimenez Securities and Fe Roa Gimenez.

Exhibits RR, SS, TT and their series prove that spouses Gimenez maintained bank accounts of
substantial amounts and gained control of various corporations. These are also being offered as
1âwphi1

part of the testimony of Danilo R.V. Daniel.27 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

In the second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied the
Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration and granted the Gimenez Spouses’ Motion to
Dismiss.28 According to the Sandiganbayan:

While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities and that the higher ends of substantial
justice militate against dismissal of cases purely on technical grounds, the circumstances of this
case show that the ends of justice will not be served if this Court allows the wanton disregard of the
Rules of Court and of the Court’s orders. Rules of procedure are designed for the proper and prompt
disposition of cases. . . .

The reasons invoked by the plaintiff to justify its failure to timely file the formal offer of evidence fail
to persuade this Court. The missing exhibits mentioned by the plaintiff’s counsel appear to be the
same missing documents since 2004, or almost two (2) years ago. The plaintiff had more than ample
time to locate them for its purpose. . . . Since they remain missing after lapse of the period indicated
by the Court, there is no reason why the search for these documents should delay the filing of the
formal offer of evidence.

[Petitioner’s] counsel . . . admits that faced with other pressing matters, he lost track of the time. We
cannot just turn a blind eye on the negligence of the parties and in their failure to observe the orders
of this Court. The carelessness of [petitioner’s] counsel in keeping track of the deadlines is an
unacceptable reason for the Court to set aside its Order and relax the observance of the period set
for filing the formal offer of evidence.29 (Citation omitted)

The Sandiganbayan also found that the Republic failed to prosecute its case for an unreasonable
length of time and to comply with the court’s rules.30 The court also noted that the documentary
evidence presented by the Republic consisted mostly of certified true copies. 31 However, the persons
who certified the documents as copies of the original were not presented.32 Hence, the evidence
lacked probative value.33 The dispositive portion of the assailed Resolution reads:

ACCORDINGLY, there being no valid and cogent justification shown by the plaintiff for the Court to
Grant its Motion for Reconsideration and admit its Formal Offer of Evidence, the plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence is DENIED. The Motion to Dismiss
on Demurrer to Evidence filed by the defendant Ignacio B. Gimenez and adopted by defendant Fe
Roa Gimenez is GRANTED. The case is then DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.34 (Emphasis in the original)

The Republic filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 3, 2006 before this court. 35

The Gimenez Spouses were required to comment on the Petition. 36 This court noted the separate
Comments37 filed by the Gimenez Spouses.38 The Republic responded to the Comments through a
Consolidated Reply39 dated June 22, 2007.

In the Resolution40 dated August 29, 2007, this court required the parties to submit their
memoranda.41

On February 18, 2008, this court resolved to require the parties to "move in the premises[.]" 42

On March 2, 2012, the Republic filed a Motion for Leave to Re-open Proceedings, to File and Admit
Attached Supplement to the Petition for Certiorari.43 In this Supplement, the Republic argued that the
second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006 was void for failing to state the facts and the
law on which it was based.44 This Motion was granted, and the Gimenez Spouses were required to
file their Comment on the Supplement to the Petition.45 Thereafter, the Republic filed its Reply.46

Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Rejoinder47 dated December 19, 2012 which was expunged by this court in a
Resolution48 dated January 23, 2013. Ignacio Gimenez’s Motion for Leave to File and Admit Attached
Rejoinder49 was denied.50

The Republic raised the following issues:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in dismissing the case in the light of the allegations
in the Complaint which were substantiated by overwhelming evidence presented vis-a-vis the
material admissions of spouses Gimenezes as their answer failed to specifically deny that they were
dummies of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and that they acquired illegal wealth grossly
disproportionate to their lawful income in a manner prohibited under the Constitution and Anti-Graft
Statutes.

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in denying petitioner’s Motion to Admit Formal
Offer of Evidence on the basis of mere technicalities, depriving petitioner of its right to due process.
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in making a sweeping pronouncement that
petitioner’s evidence do not bear any probative value. 51

The issues for consideration of this court are:

First, whether a Petition for Review on Certiorari was the proper remedy to assail the
Sandiganbayan Resolutions; and

Second, whether the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that petitioner Republic of the Philippines
waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence and in granting respondents Ignacio Gimenez and
Fe Roa Gimenez’s Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence.

We grant the Petition.

Respondent Ignacio Gimenez pictures petitioner as being confused as to the proper mode of review
of the Sandiganbayan Resolutions. According to him, petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion.52 Hence, petitioner should have filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 and not a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 53 Nevertheless, the
Sandiganbayan did not commit any error, and petitioner has to show that the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction. 54

Observance of the proper procedure before courts, especially before the Sandiganbayan, cannot be
stressed enough. Due process is enshrined in the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights. 55 "Due
process [in criminal cases] guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is
proved[.]"56 "Mere suspicion of guilt should not sway judgment."57

To determine whether a petition for review is the proper remedy to assail the Sandiganbayan
Resolutions, we review the nature of actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution, and
damages.

Actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution, and damages for ill-gotten wealth are
also called civil forfeiture proceedings.

Republic Act No. 137958 provides for the procedure by which forfeiture proceedings may be instituted
against public officers or employees who "[have] acquired during his [or her] incumbency an amount
of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his [or her] salary as such public officer or
employee and to his [or her] other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property,
[which] property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired." 59

This court has already settled the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over civil forfeiture cases:

. . . violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even though
the proceeding is civil in nature, since the forfeiture of the illegally acquired property amounts to a
penalty.60

In Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,61 this court re-affirmed the doctrine that forfeiture proceedings
under Republic Act No. 1379 are civil in nature.62 Civil forfeiture proceedings were also differentiated
from plunder cases:

. . . a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate and different from a
plunder case. . . . In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the commission of
the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. . . . On the other hand, all that
the court needs to determine, by preponderance of evidence, under RA 1379 is the disproportion of
respondent’s properties to his legitimate income, it being unnecessary to prove how he acquired said
properties. As correctly formulated by the Solicitor General, the forfeitable nature of the properties
under the provisions of RA 1379 does not proceed from a determination of a specific overt act
committed by the respondent public officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal wealth. 63 (Citation
omitted)

To stress, the quantum of evidence required for forfeiture proceedings under Republic Act No. 1379
is the same with other civil cases — preponderance of evidence.64
When a criminal case based on demurrer to evidence is dismissed, the dismissal is equivalent to an
acquittal.65

As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to an acquittal; any further
prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.66

Hence, the Republic may only assail an acquittal through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court:

Accordingly, a review of a dismissal order of the Sandiganbayan granting an accused’s demurrer to

evidence may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, based on the narrow
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.67 (Citation omitted)

In this case, a civil forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, petitioner correctly filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of the Rule provides the mode of
appeal from judgments, final orders, or resolutions of the Sandiganbayan:

SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.— A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial
Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition
for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set
forth.

II

Petitioner argues that substantial justice requires doing away with the procedural
technicalities.68 Loss of vital documentary proof warranted extensions to file the Formal Offer of
Evidence.69 Honest efforts to locate several missing documents resulted in petitioner’s inability to file
the pleading within the period granted by the Sandiganbayan.70

Respondent Ignacio Gimenez argues that petitioner cannot fault the Sandiganbayan for its
incompetence during trial.71 Even if the evidence were formally offered within the prescribed period,
PCGG’s evidence still had no probative value.72 It is solely petitioner’s fault "that the persons who
certified to the photocopies of the originals were not presented to testify[.]" 73 It is also misleading to
argue that the pieces of documentary evidence presented are public documents. 74 "The documents
are not public in the sense that these are official issuances of the Philippine government." 75 "The bulk
consists mainly of notarized, private documents that have simply been certified true and faithful." 76

According to respondent Fe Roa Gimenez, petitioner tries to excuse its non-filing of the Formal Offer
of Evidence within the prescribed period by raising its efforts to locate the 66 missing
documents.77 However, the issue of the missing documents was laid to rest during the hearing on
November 16, 2004.78 The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until March 2005 to produce the
documents; otherwise, these would be excluded.79 The testimonies of the witnesses related to the
missing documents would also be expunged from the case records.80

Moreover, respondent Fe Roa Gimenez claims that "[t]he Sandiganbayan did not err when it ruled
that the great bulk of the documentary evidence offered by the PCGG have no probative
value."81 Aside from the 66 missing documents it failed to present, almost all of petitioner’s pieces of
documentary evidence were mere photocopies.82 The few that were certified true copies were not
testified on by the persons who certified these documents. 83

Our Rules of Court lays down the procedure for the formal offer of evidence. Testimonial evidence is
offered "at the time [a] witness is called to testify."84 Documentary and object evidence, on the other
hand, are offered "after the presentation of a party’s testimonial evidence." 85 Offer of documentary or
object evidence is generally done orally unless permission is given by the trial court for a written
offer of evidence.86

More importantly, the Rules specifically provides that evidence must be formally offered to be
considered by the court. Evidence not offered is excluded in the determination of the case.87 "Failure
to make a formal offer within a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it." 88

Rule 132, Section 34 provides:

SEC. 34. Offer of evidence.— The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

The rule on formal offer of evidence is intertwined with the constitutional guarantee of due process.
Parties must be given the opportunity to review the evidence submitted against them and take the
necessary actions to secure their case.89 Hence, any document or object that was marked for
identification is not evidence unless it was "formally offered and the opposing counsel [was] given an
opportunity to object to it or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it."90

This court explained further the reason for the rule:

The Rules of Court provides that "the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered." A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and
their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to
enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the
evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its
admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to review
documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court. 91 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

To consider a party’s evidence which was not formally offered during trial would deprive the other
party of due process. Evidence not formally offered has no probative value and must be excluded by
the court.92

Petitioner’s failure to file its written Formal Offer of Evidence of the numerous documentary evidence
presented within the prescribed period is a non-issue. In its first assailed Resolution dated May 25,
2006, the Sandiganbayan declared that petitioner waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence
when it failed to file the pleading on May 13, 2006, the deadline based on the extended period
granted by the court. Petitioner was granted several extensions of time by the Sandiganbayan
totalling 75 days from the date petitioner terminated its presentation of evidence. Notably, this 75-
day period included the original 30-day period. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence, and the Formal Offer of Evidence.

In resolving petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence,
the Sandiganbayan found the carelessness of petitioner’s counsel unacceptable. According to the
Sandiganbayan, it could not countenance the non-observance of the court’s orders.

This court has long acknowledged the policy of the government to recover the assets and properties
illegally acquired or misappropriated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his wife Mrs. Imelda
R. Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or
nominees.93 Hence, this court has adopted a liberal approach regarding technical rules of procedure
in cases involving recovery of ill-gotten wealth:

In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside
technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court
prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to
the Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now
be relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost two decades have passed since the government initiated
its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the
merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation,
fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the ownership of these funds and other assets
be finally determined and resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying technicalities and
annoying procedural sidetracks.94 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

To be clear, petitioner was able to file its Formal Offer of Evidence, albeit, belatedly. Petitioner
hurdled 19 years of trial before the Sandiganbayan to present its evidence as shown in its extensive
Formal Offer of Evidence. As petitioner argues:

Undeniable from the records of the case is that petitioner was vigorous in prosecuting the case. The
most tedious and crucial stage of the litigation and presentation of evidence has been accomplished.
Petitioner completed its presentation of evidence proving the ill-gotten nature and character of the
funds and assets sought to be recovered in the present case. It presented vital testimonial and
documentary evidence consisting of voluminous record proving the gross disparity of the subject
funds to spouses Gimenezes’ combined declared income which must be reconveyed to the Republic
for being acquired in blatant violation of the Constitution and the Anti-Graft statutes.95
This court is not unmindful of the difficulty in gathering voluminous documentary evidence in cases
of forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth acquired throughout the years. It is never easy to prosecute
corruption and take back what rightfully belongs to the government and the people of the Republic.

This is not the first time that this court relaxed the rule on formal offer of evidence.

Tan v. Lim96 arose from two civil Complaints: one for injunction and another for legal redemption,
which were heard jointly before the trial court.97 The defendant did not file a Formal Offer of Evidence
in the injunction case98 and merely adopted the evidence offered in the legal redemption case. 99 The
trial court held that the defendant’s failure to file his Formal Offer of Evidence in the injunction case
rendered the plaintiff’s evidence therein as uncontroverted.100 The Court of Appeals reversed the
Decision and was affirmed by this court.101 This court ruled that while the trial court’s reasoning in its
Decision was technically sound, a liberal interpretation was more appropriate and in line with
substantial justice:

It may be true that Section 34, Rule 132 of the rules directs the court to consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered and that under Section 35, documentary evidence is offered after
presentation of testimonial evidence. However, a liberal interpretation of these Rules would have
convinced the trial court that a separate formal offer of evidence in Civil Case No. 6518 was
superfluous because not only was an offer of evidence made in Civil Case No. 6521 that was being
jointly heard by the trial court, counsel for Jose Renato Lim had already declared he was adopting
these evidences for Civil Case No. 6518. The trial court itself stated that it would freely utilize in one
case evidence adduced in the other only to later abandon this posture. Jose Renato Lim testified in
Civil Case No. 6518. The trial court should have at least considered his testimony since at the time it
was made, the rules provided that testimonial evidence is deemed offered at the time the witness is
called to testify. Rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid, technical case as they are
devised chiefly to secure and not defeat substantial justice.

....

The logic of the Court of Appeals is highly persuasive. Indeed, apparently, the trial court was being
overly technical about the nonsubmission of Jose Renato Lim’s formal offer of evidence. This
posture not only goes against Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure decreeing a liberal
construction of the rules to promote a just, speedy and inexpensive litigation but ignores the
consistent rulings of the Court against utilizing the rules to defeat the ends of substantial justice.
Despite the intervening years, the language of the Court in Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-
General, still remains relevant:

"x x x. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application
of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts
are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adapted to obtain that
thing. In other words, it is a means to an end. It is the means by which the powers of the court are
made effective in just judgments. When it loses the character of the one and takes on that of the
other the administration of justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to
grave criticism."102 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Furthermore, "subsequent and substantial compliance . . . may call for the relaxation of the rules of
procedure."103

Weighing the amount of time spent in litigating the case against the number of delays petitioner
incurred in submitting its Formal Offer of Evidence and the state’s policy on recovering ill-gotten
wealth, this court is of the belief that it is but only just that the Rules be relaxed and petitioner be
allowed to submit its written Formal Offer of Evidence. The Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions should be
reversed.

III

According to petitioner, the Sandiganbayan erred when it granted the demurrer to evidence filed by
respondents and dismissed the case despite a "prima facie foundation [based on the pleadings and
documents on record] that spouses Gimenezes amassed enormous wealth grossly disproportionate
to their lawful income or declared lawful assets." 104
Similarly, the Complaint alleged specific acts committed by respondent Ignacio Gimenez:

[T]aking undue advantage of his relationship, influence, and connection, by himself and/or in
unlawful concert and active collaboration with former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos for the purpose of mutually enriching themselves and preventing the disclosure and recovery
of assets illegally obtained: (a) acted as the dummy, nominee or agent of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos in several corporations such as, the Allied Banking
Corporation, Acoje Mining Corporation, Baguio Gold Mining, Multi National Resources, Philippine
Oversees, Inc. and Pioneer Natural Resources; (b) unlawfully obtained, through corporations
organized by them such as the New City Builders, Inc. (NCBI), multi-million peso contracts with the
government buildings, such as the University of Life Sports Complex and Dining Hall as well as
projects of the National Manpower Corporation, Human Settlements, GSIS, and Maharlika
Livelihood, to the gross and manifest disadvantage of the Government and the Filipino people; and
(c) in furtherance of the above stated illegal purposes, organized several establishments engaged in
food, mining and other businesses such as the Transnational Construction Corporation, Total
Systems Technology, Inc., Pyro Control Technology Corporation, Asian Alliance, Inc., A & T
Development Corporation, RBO Agro Forestry Farm Development Corporation, Bathala Coal Mining
Corporation, Coal Basis Mining Corporation, Titan Coal Mining Corporation, GEI Guaranteed
Education, Inc., and I.B. Gimenez Securities, Inc.105

Despite the specific allegations in the Complaint, petitioner contends that respondents merely gave
general denials to the allegations in the Complaint.106 "[N]o specific denial [was] made on the material
allegations [in] the [C]omplaint."107

Respondents, on the other hand, assert that the Sandiganbayan was correct in granting the Motion
to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence.

Respondent Ignacio Gimenez claims that petitioner cannot be excused from filing its Formal Offer of
Evidence considering the numerous extensions given by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner had all the
resources and time to gather, collate, and secure the necessary evidence to build its
case.108 Petitioner’s presentation of evidence took 19 years to complete, and yet it failed to submit the
necessary documents and pleading.109

Similarly, respondent Fe Roa Gimenez argues that petitioner was negligent in failing to comply with
the Sandiganbayan’s orders considering the inordinate amount of time given to petitioner to present
evidence, which resulted in only five witnesses in 19 years. 110

To determine the propriety of granting respondents’ Motion to Dismiss based on Demurrer to

Evidence, we review the nature of demurrer.

Rule 33, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.— After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his
evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the
plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present
evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.

In Oropesa v. Oropesa111 where this court affirmed the dismissal of the case on demurrer to evidence
due to petitioner’s non-submission of the Formal Offer of Evidence,112 demurrer to evidence was
defined as:

. . . "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain
the issue." We have also held that a demurrer to evidence "authorizes a judgment on the merits of
the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to
do, if plaintiff’s evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought." 113 (Citations omitted)

This court has laid down the guidelines in resolving a demurrer to evidence:

A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. Where the plaintiff’s evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as may
reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to
evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting every
proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably
inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the material elements of his
case, or when there is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to his claim. It should be
sustained where the plaintiff’s evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery.114

Furthermore, this court already clarified what the trial court determines when acting on a motion to
dismiss based on demurrer to evidence:

What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to evidence is whether the
plaintiff is entitled to the relief based on the facts and the law. The evidence contemplated by the rule
on demurrer is that which pertains to the merits of the case, excluding technical aspects such as
capacity to sue. . . .115 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

Petitioner, in its Supplement to the Petition, argued that the testimonial evidence it had presented
and offered during trial warranted consideration and analysis. 116 The Sandiganbayan erroneously
excluded these testimonies in determining whether to grant the motion to dismiss or not, hence:

. . . even assuming that the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s formal offer of evidence, petitioner
still had testimonial evidence in its favor which should [have] been considered. It behoved then upon
the Sandiganbayan to discuss or include in its discussion, at the very least, an analysis of
petitioner’s testimonial evidence.117

With our ruling reversing the Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions on petitioner’s Formal Offer of Evidence,
what should be determined now by the Sandiganbayan is whether petitioner’s evidence is sufficient
to entitle it to the relief it seeks after the Sandiganbayan rested its case. Petitioner is required to
establish preponderance of evidence.

In the second assailed Resolution, the Sandiganbayan granted respondents’ Motion to Dismiss
based on the lack of Formal Offer of Evidence of petitioner. At the same time, it observed that the
pieces of documentary evidence presented by petitioner were mostly certified true copies of the
original. In passing upon the probative value of petitioner’s evidence, the Sandiganbayan held:

On another note, the evidence presented by the plaintiff consisted mainly of certified true copies of
the original. These certified copies of documentary evidence presented by the plaintiff were not
testified on by the person who certified them to be photocopies of the original. Hence, these
evidence do not appear to have significant substantial probative value.118

Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for making "a general and sweeping statement that the evidence
presented by petitioner lacked probative value for the reason that they are mainly certified true
copies which had not been testified on by the person who certified [them]." 119 Thus, its right to due
process was violated when the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner’s documentary evidence in the
same Resolution which dismissed the case.120

Petitioner argues that: a) respondents unqualifiedly admitted the identity and authenticity of the
documentary evidence presented by petitioner;121 and b) the documents it presented were public
documents, and there was no need for the identification and authentication of the original
documentary exhibits.122 Petitioner relies on the Sandiganbayan Order123 dated August 6, 2002. The
Order reads:

Considering the manifestation of Atty. Reno Gonzales, counsel for plaintiff/PCGG, that the defendant
Fe Roa Gimenez, through counsel, is willing to stipulate that the documents to be presented and
identified by the witness are in her custody as Records Officer of the PCGG, the parties agreed to
dispense with the testimony of Ma. Lourdes Magno.

WHEREFORE, and as prayed for, the continuation of the presentation of plaintiff’s evidence is set
on October 9 and 10, 2002, both at 8:30 o’clock [sic] in the morning.

SO ORDERED.124 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner claims that the following exhibits were acquired in relation to the PCGG’s functions
prescribed under Executive Order No. 1, Section 3(b),125 and form part of the official records of the
PCGG:126 "Certifications as to the various positions held in Government by Fe Roa-Gimenez, her
salaries and compensation during her stint as a public officer, the BIR Income Tax Returns and
Statement of Assets and Liabilities showing the declared income of spouses Gimenezes; the Articles
of Incorporation of various corporations showing spouses Gimenezes’ interests on various
corporations; and several transactions involving huge amounts of money which prove that they acted
as conduit in the disbursement of government funds." 127

On the other hand, respondent Ignacio Gimenez argues that petitioner’s documents are not "official
issuances of the Philippine government."128 They are mostly notarized private
documents.129 Petitioner’s evidence has no probative value; hence, a dismissal on demurrer to
evidence is only proper.130 Respondent Fe Roa Gimenez claims that the Sandiganbayan did not err
in holding that the majority of petitioner’s documentary evidence has no probative value, considering
that most of these documents are only photocopies.131

The evidence presented by petitioner before the Sandiganbayan deserves better treatment.

For instance, the nature and classification of the documents should have been ruled upon. Save for
certain cases, the original document must be presented during trial when the subject of the inquiry is
the contents of the document.132 This is the Best Evidence Rule provided under Rule 130, Section 3
of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions.— When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad
faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them
is only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office.

In case of unavailability of the original document, secondary evidence may be presented 133 as
provided for under Sections 5 to 7 of the same Rule:

SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable.— When the original document has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and
the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated.

SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. — If the document is in the
custody or under the control of adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after
such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary
evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss. (5a)

SEC. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record.— When the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. (Emphasis supplied)

In Citibank, N.A. v. Sabeniano,134 citing Estrada v. Hon. Desierto,135 this court clarified the applicability
of the Best Evidence Rule:

As the afore-quoted provision states, the best evidence rule applies only when the subject of the
inquiry is the contents of the document. The scope of the rule is more extensively explained thus —

But even with respect to documentary evidence, the best evidence rule applies only when the
content of such document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such
document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its
execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible (5 Moran,
op. cit., pp. 76-66; 4 Martin, op. cit., p. 78). Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible
without need for accounting for the original.

Thus, when a document is presented to prove its existence or condition it is offered not as
documentary, but as real, evidence. Parol evidence of the fact of execution of the documents is
allowed (Hernaez, et al. vs. McGrath, etc., et al., 91 Phil[.] 565). x x x

In Estrada v. Desierto, this Court had occasion to rule that —

It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only [a] copy of the Angara Diary as published
in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did not, however,
violate the best evidence rule. Wigmore, in his book on evidence, states that:

"Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court’s discretion, whenever in the case
in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful
purpose will be served by requiring production.

"x x x x x x x x x

"In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has been abandoned, for certain
documents in which ordinarily no real dispute arised [sic]. This measure is a sensible and
progressive one and deserves universal adoption (post, sec. 1233). Its essential feature is that a
copy may be used unconditionally, if the opponent has been given an opportunity to inspect it."

This Court did not violate the best evidence rule when it considered and weighed in evidence the
photocopies and microfilm copies of the PNs, MCs, and letters submitted by the petitioners to
establish the existence of respondent’s loans. The terms or contents of these documents were never
the point of contention in the Petition at bar. It was respondent’s position that the PNs in the first set
(with the exception of PN No. 34534) never existed, while the PNs in the second set (again,
excluding PN No. 34534) were merely executed to cover simulated loan transactions. As for the
MCs representing the proceeds of the loans, the respondent either denied receipt of certain MCs or
admitted receipt of the other MCs but for another purpose. Respondent further admitted the letters
she wrote personally or through her representatives to Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank acknowledging
the loans, except that she claimed that these letters were just meant to keep up the ruse of the
simulated loans. Thus, respondent questioned the documents as to their existence or execution, or
when the former is admitted, as to the purpose for which the documents were executed, matters
which are, undoubtedly, external to the documents, and which had nothing to do with the contents
thereof.

Alternatively, even if it is granted that the best evidence rule should apply to the evidence presented
by petitioners regarding the existence of respondent’s loans, it should be borne in mind that the rule
admits of the following exceptions under Rule 130, Section 5 of the revised Rules of
Court[.]136 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

Furthermore, for purposes of presenting these as evidence before courts, documents are classified
as either public or private. Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 19. Classes of Documents.— For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are
either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered
therein.

All other writings are private.

The same Rule provides for the effect of public documents as evidence and the manner of proof for
public documents:

SEC. 23. Public documents as evidence.— Documents consisting of entries in public records made
in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to
their execution and of the date of the latter.

SEC. 24. Proof of official record.— The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made
by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or
by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state.— Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be
under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a
seal, under the seal of such court.

....

SEC. 27. Public record of a private document.— An authorized public record of a private document
may be proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the
record, with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody.

....

SEC. 30. Proof of notarial documents.— Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and
certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of
acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document
involved. (Emphasis supplied)

Emphasizing the importance of the correct classification of documents, this court pronounced:

The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be
presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or
because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent
public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing
authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be
presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed, or
instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally
authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or
sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document
requires authentication in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as
evidence in court.137 (Emphasis supplied)

The distinction as to the kind of public document under Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Court is
material with regard to the fact the evidence proves. In Philippine Trust Company v. Hon. Court of
Appeals, et al.,138 this court ruled that:

. . . not all types of public documents are deemed prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated:

....

"Public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer" include those specified as
public documents under Section 19(a), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the acknowledgement,
affirmation or oath, or jurat portion of public documents under Section 19(c). Hence, under Section
23, notarized documents are merely proof of the fact which gave rise to their execution (e.g., the
notarized Answer to Interrogatories . . . is proof that Philtrust had been served with Written
Interrogatories), and of the date of the latter (e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories is proof
that the same was executed on October 12, 1992, the date stated thereon), but is not prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated. Additionally, under Section 30 of the same Rule, the
acknowledgement in notarized documents is prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument
or document involved (e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories is prima facie proof that
petitioner executed the same).

The reason for the distinction lies with the respective official duties attending the execution of the
different kinds of public instruments. Official duties are disputably presumed to have been regularly
performed. As regards affidavits, including Answers to Interrogatories which are required to be
sworn to by the person making them, the only portion thereof executed by the person authorized to
take oaths is the jurat. The presumption that official duty has been regularly performed therefore
applies only to the latter portion, wherein the notary public merely attests that the affidavit was
subscribed and sworn to before him or her, on the date mentioned thereon. Thus, even though
affidavits are notarized documents, we have ruled that affidavits, being self-serving, must be
received with caution.139 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In Salas v. Sta. Mesa Market Corporation,140 this court discussed the difference between mere copies
of audited financial statements submitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), and certified true copies of audited financial statements obtained
or secured from the BIR or the SEC which are public documents under Rule 132, Section 19(c) of
the Revised Rules of Evidence:

The documents in question were supposedly copies of the audited financial statements of SMMC.
Financial statements (which include the balance sheet, income statement and statement of cash
flow) show the fiscal condition of a particular entity within a specified period. The financial
statements prepared by external auditors who are certified public accountants (like those presented
by petitioner) are audited financial statements. Financial statements, whether audited or not, are, as
[a] general rule, private documents. However, once financial statements are filed with a government
office pursuant to a provision of law, they become public documents.

Whether a document is public or private is relevant in determining its admissibility as evidence.

Public documents are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and
genuineness. On the other hand, private documents are inadmissible in evidence unless they are
properly authenticated. Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:

....

Petitioner and respondents agree that the documents presented as evidence were mere copies of
the audited financial statements submitted to the BIR and SEC. Neither party claimed that copies
presented were certified true copies of audited financial statements obtained or secured from the
BIR or the SEC which under Section 19(c), Rule 132 would have been public documents. Thus, the
statements presented were private documents. Consequently, authentication was a precondition to
their admissibility in evidence.

During authentication in court, a witness positively testifies that a document presented as evidence
is genuine and has been duly executed or that the document is neither spurious nor counterfeit nor
executed by mistake or under duress. In this case, petitioner merely presented a memorandum
attesting to the increase in the corporation’s monthly market revenue, prepared by a member of his
management team. While there is no fixed criterion as to what constitutes competent evidence to
establish the authenticity of a private document, the best proof available must be presented. The
best proof available, in this instance, would have been the testimony of a representative of SMMC’s
external auditor who prepared the audited financial statements. Inasmuch as there was none, the
audited financial statements were never authenticated. 141 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Indeed, in Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc,142 this court held that mere collection of documents by the
PCGG does not make such documents public documents per se under Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court:

The fact that these documents were collected by the PCGG in the course of its investigations does
not make them per se public records referred to in the quoted rule.

Petitioner presented as witness its records officer, Maria Lourdes Magno, who testified that these
public and private documents had been gathered by and taken into the custody of the PCGG in the
course of the Commission’s investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. However,
given the purposes for which these documents were submitted, Magno was not a credible witness
who could testify as to their contents. To reiterate, "[i]f the writings have subscribing witnesses to
them, they must be proved by those witnesses." Witnesses can testify only to those facts which are
of their personal knowledge; that is, those derived from their own perception. Thus, Magno could
only testify as to how she obtained custody of these documents, but not as to the contents of the
documents themselves.

Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants of these Affidavits or Memoranda submitted
to the court. Basic is the rule that, while affidavits may be considered as public documents if they are
acknowledged before a notary public, these Affidavits are still classified as hearsay evidence. The
reason for this rule is that they are not generally prepared by the affiant, but by another one who
uses his or her own language in writing the affiant’s statements, parts of which may thus be either
omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the
opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being
hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify
thereon.143 (Citations omitted)

Notably, the Sandiganbayan’s evaluation of the evidence presented by petitioner was cursory. Its
main reason for granting the Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence was that there was no
evidence to consider due to petitioner’s failure to file its Formal Offer of Evidence. It brushed off the
totality of evidence on which petitioner built its case.

Even assuming that no documentary evidence was properly offered, this court finds it clear from the
second assailed Resolution that the Sandiganbayan did not even consider other evidence presented
by petitioner during the 19 years of trial. The Sandiganbayan erred in ignoring petitioner’s testimonial
evidence without any basis or justification. Numerous exhibits were offered as part of the testimonies
of petitioner’s witnesses.

Petitioner presented both testimonial and documentary evidence that tended to establish a
presumption that respondents acquired ill-gotten wealth during respondent Fe Roa Gimenez’s
incumbency as public officer and which total amount or value was manifestly out of proportion to her
and her husband’s salaries and to their other lawful income or properties.

Petitioner presented five (5) witnesses, two (2) of which were Atty. Tereso Javier and Director Danilo
R.V. Daniel, both from the PCGG:

Petitioner presented as witnesses Atty. Tereso Javier, then Head of the Sequestered Assets
Department of PCGG, and Danilo R.V. Daniel, then Director of the Research and Development
Department of PCGG, who testified on the bank accounts and businesses owned and/ or under the
control of spouses Gimenezes.144

Several exhibits excluded by the Sandiganbayan were offered as part of petitioner’s testimonial
evidence:

1) Exhibit "KK"145 was offered "for the purpose of proving the assets or properties of the
spouses Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez, and as part of the testimony of Tereso
Javier."146

2) Exhibits "KK-1" to "KK-12"147 inclusive of sub-markings, were offered "for the purpose of
proving the real properties acquired by the spouses Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa
Gimenez, and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier." 148

3) Exhibits "KK-15," "KK-18," "KK-20," "KK-27," "KK-30," "KK-32" to "KK-38" and "KK-
40"149 were offered "for the purpose of proving the corporations in which Ignacio B. Gimenez
has interest, and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier." 150

4) Exhibit "KK-45"151 was offered "for the purpose of proving that the PCGG conducted an
investigation of New City Builders, Inc., Transnational Construction Corporation, and OTO
Construction and Development Corporation in relation to Ignacio B. Gimenez and Roberto O.
Olanday, and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."152
 5) Exhibits "KK-48" to "KK-50"153 were offered "for the purpose of proving that the PCGG
formally filed notices of lis pendens with the Registers of Deeds of Taytay, Rizal, Lucena
City, Quezon and San Fabian, Pangasinan over the properties mentioned in said notices in
connection with Civil Case No. [0]007 pending with the Sandiganbayan, and as part of the
testimony of Tereso Javier."154

6) Exhibits "KK-51" to "KK-52"155 and their sub-markings were offered "for the purpose of
proving that the PCGG sequestered the shares of stock in Allied Banking Corporation and
Guaranteed Education, Inc. as stated in the said writ/letter of sequestration, and as part of
the testimony of Tereso Javier."156

7) Exhibits "NN" to "QQ"157 and their sub-markings were offered "for the purpose of proving
that the PCGG formally requested the Central Bank to freeze the bank accounts of the
spouses Igancio [sic] B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez and that the Central Bank, acting on
said request, issued a memorandum to all commercial banks relative thereto. They are also
being offered as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."158

8) Exhibits "RR" to "RR-23"159 were offered "for the purpose of proving that Dominador
Pangilinan, former Acting President and President of Traders Royal Bank, executed an
affidavit on July 24, 1987 wherein he mentioned Malacanang trust accounts maintained with
the Traders Royal Bank the balance of which was very high, approximately 150-175 million
pesos, as indicated in the monthly statements attached to his affidavit. They are also being
offered as part of the testimony of Danilo R.V. Daniel." 160

9) Exhibits "SS" to "SS-29"161 were offered "for the purpose of proving that Apolinario K.
Medina, Executive Vice President of Traders Royal Bank, executed an Affidavit on July 23,
1987 wherein he mentioned about certain numbered (confidential) trust accounts maintained
with the Traders Royal Bank, the deposits to which ‘were so substantial in amount that (he)
suspected that they had been made by President Marcos or his family. They are also being
offered as part of the testimony of Danilo R.V. Daniel." 162

10) Exhibits "TT" to "TT-3"163 were offered "for the purpose of proving that Director Danilo
R.V. Daniel of the Research and Development Department of the PCGG conducted an
investigation on the ill-gotten wealth of the spouses Ignacio and Fe Roa Gimenez and found
that from 1977 to 1982, the total sum of P75,090,306.42 was withdrawn from the account
No. 128 (A/C 76-128) in favor of I.B Gimenez, I.B. Gimenez Securities and Fe Roa Gimenez.
They are also being offered as part of the testimony of Director Danilo R.V. Daniel." 164

The court cannot arbitrarily disregard evidence especially when resolving a demurrer to evidence
which tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence.

The difference between the admissibility of evidence and the determination of its probative weight is
canonical.165

Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to
[be] considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of
whether or not it proves an issue. Thus, a letter may be offered in evidence and admitted as such
but its evidentiary weight depends upon the observance of the rules on evidence. Accordingly, the
author of the letter should be presented as witness to provide the other party to the litigation the
opportunity to question him on the contents of the letter. Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to
present the author of the letter renders its contents suspect. As earlier stated, hearsay evidence,
whether objected to or not, has no probative value.166 (Citations omitted)

The Sandiganbayan should have considered Atienza v. Board of Medicine, et al.167 where this court
held that it is better to admit and consider evidence for determination of its probative value than to
outright reject it based on very rigid and technical grounds. 168

Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, in
connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or
admissibility, we have held that:

[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting
them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places
them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the
other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be
remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.169 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

A liberal application of the Rules is in line with the state’s policy to recover ill-gotten wealth. In case
of doubt, courts should proceed with caution in granting a motion to dismiss based on demurrer to
evidence. An order granting demurrer to evidence is a judgment on the merits. 170 This is because
while a demurrer "is an aid or instrument for the expeditious termination of an action," 171 it specifically
"pertains to the merits of the case."172

In Cabreza, Jr., et al. v. Cabreza,173 this court defined a judgment rendered on the merits:

A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits "when it determines the rights and
liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory
objections"; or when the judgment is rendered "after a determination of which party is right, as
distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical
point."174 (Citations omitted)

To reiterate, "[d]emurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the
defendant having to submit evidence on his [or her] part, as he [or she] would ordinarily have to do, if
plaintiff’s evidence shows that he [or she] is not entitled to the relief sought." 175 The order of dismissal
must be clearly supported by facts and law since an order granting demurrer is a judgment on the
merits:

As it is settled that an order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is a judgment on the merits, it
is imperative that it be a reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating therein the facts and the law
on which it is based.176 (Citation omitted)

To erroneously grant a dismissal simply based on the delay to formally offer documentary evidence
essentially deprives one party of due process.

IV

Respondents did not fail to specifically deny material averments in the Complaint.

Under Rule 8, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the "defendant must specify each material allegation
of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance
of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial."177 There are three modes of specific denial
provided for under the Rules:

1) by specifying each material allegation of the fact in the complaint, the truth of which the defendant
does not admit, and whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters which he will
rely upon to support his denial; (2) by specifying so much of an averment in the complaint as is true
and material and denying only the remainder; (3) by stating that the defendant is without knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment in the complaint, which
has the effect of a denial.178

In paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the PCGG, through the Office of the Solicitor General, averred
that:

14. Defendant Fe Roa Gimenez, by herself and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, taking undue advantage of her position, influence and connection
and with grave abuse of power and authority, in order to prevent disclosure and recovery of assets
illegally obtained:

(a) actively participated in the unlawful transfer of millions of dollars of government funds into
several accounts in her name in foreign countries;

(b) disbursed such funds from her various personal accounts for Defendants’ own use[,]
benefit and enrichment;
 (c) acted as conduit of the Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos in
purchasing the New York properties, particularly, the Crown Building, Herald Center, 40 Wall
Street, 200 Wall Street, Lindenmere Estate and expensive works of arts;179

In their Answer, respondents claimed that;

9. Defendants Spouses Gimenez and Fe Roa specifically deny the allegations contained in
paragraphs 14(a), 14(b) and 14(c), the truth being that defendant Fe Roa never took advantage of
her position or alleged connection and influence to allegedly prevent disclosure and recovery of
alleged illegally obtained assets, in the manner alleged in said paragraphs.180

Similarly, the PCGG made material allegations in paragraph 16 of the Complaint:

16. Defendant Ignacio B. Gimenez, taking undue advantage of his relationship, influence, and
connection, by himself and/or in unlawful concert and active collaboration with Defendants
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, for the purpose of mutually enriching themselves and
preventing the disclosure and recovery of assets illegally obtained, among others:

(a) acted as the dummy, nominee or agent of Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda
R. Marcos, in several corporations such as, the Allied Banking Corporation, Acoje Mining
Corporation, Baguio Gold Mining, Multi National Resources, Philippine Overseas, Inc. and
Pioneer Natural Resources;

(b) unlawfully obtained, through corporations organized by them such as the the [sic] New
City Builders, Inc. (NCBI), multimillion peso contracts with the government for the
construction of government buildings, such as the University of Life Sports Complex and
Dining Hall as well as projects of the National Manpower Corporation, Human Settlements,
GSIS, and Maharlika Livelihood, to the gross and manifest disadvantage to Plaintiff and the
Filipino people.

(c) in furtherance of the above stated illegal purposes, organized several establishments
engaged in food, mining and other businesses such as the Transnational Construction
Corporation, Total Systems Technology, Inc., Pyro Control Technology Corporation, Asian
Alliance, Inc., A & T Development Corporation, RBO Agro Forestry Farm Development
Corporation, Bathala Coal Mining Corporation, Coal Basis Mining Corporation, Titan Coal
Mining Corporation, GEI Guaranteed Education, Inc., and I.B. Gimenez Securities, Inc. 181

To which respondents specifically denied through the following paragraph:

11. Defendants Spouses Gimenez and Fe Roa specifically deny the allegations contained in
paragraphs 16, 16(a), 16(b) and 16(c) that defendant Gimenez allegedly took advantage of his
alleged relationship, influence and connection, and that by himself or in alleged unlawful concert with
defendants Marcos and Imelda, for the alleged purpose of enriching themselves and preventing the
discovery of alleged illegally obtained assets: (1) allegedly acted as dummy, nominee or agent of
defendants Marcos and Imelda; (2) allegedly obtained multi-million peso projects unlawfully; and (3)
allegedly organized several establishments, the truth being: (1) that defendant Gimenez never acted
as dummy, nominee or agent of defendants Marcos and Imelda; (2) that defendant Gimen[e]z never
once obtained any contract unlawfully; and (3) that defendant Gimenez is a legitimate businessman
and organized business establishments legally and as he saw fit, all in accordance with his own
plans and for his own purposes.182

In Aquintey v. Spouses Tibong,183 this court held that using "specifically" in a general denial does not
automatically convert that general denial to a specific one. 184 The denial in the answer must be so
definite as to what is admitted and what is denied:

A denial is not made specific simply because it is so qualified by the defendant. A general denial
does not become specific by the use of the word "specifically." When matters of whether the
defendant alleges having no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief are plainly and
necessarily within the defendant’s knowledge, an alleged "ignorance or lack of information" will not
be considered as a specific denial. Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules also provides that material
averments in the complaint other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages shall be
deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Thus, the answer should be so definite and certain in
its allegations that the pleader’s adversary should not be left in doubt as to what is admitted, what is
denied, and what is covered by denials of knowledge as sufficient to form a belief.185 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)

However, the allegations in the pleadings "must be contextualized and interpreted in relation to the
rest of the statements in the pleading."186 The denials in respondents’ Answer comply with the modes
provided for under the Rules. We have held that the purpose of requiring specific denials from the
defendant is to make the defendant disclose the "matters alleged in the complaint which he [or she]
succinctly intends to disprove at the trial, together with the matter which he [or she] relied upon to
support the denial."187 The denials proffered by respondents sufficiently disclosed the matters they
wished to disprove and those they would rely upon in making their denials.

To summarize, the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence.
It erred in making a sweeping declaration on the probative value of the documentary evidence
offered by petitioner and in excluding other evidence offered during trial without full evaluation based
on reasons grounded in law and/or jurisprudence.

The third part of Rule 33, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "[i]f the motion [to dismiss] is
granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed [the movant] shall be deemed to have
waived the right to present evidence." As this court held:

[I]f a demurrer to evidence is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed, the movant
shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. The movant who presents a demurrer
to the plaintiff’s evidence retains the right to present their own evidence, if the trial court disagrees
with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both
of them and reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to present their own
evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and render judgment on the merits,
inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged litigations. 188 (Citations omitted)

This procedure, however, does not apply.

In this case, we principally nullify the assailed Resolutions that denied the admission of the Formal
Offer of Evidence. It only follows that the Order granting demurrer should be denied. This is not the
situation contemplated in Rule 33, Section 1.189 Respondents were not able to even comment on the
Formal Offer of Evidence. Due process now requires that we remand the case to the
Sandiganbayan. Respondents may, at their option and through proper motion, submit their
Comment. The Sandiganbayan should then rule on the admissibility of the documentary and object
evidence covered by the Formal Offer submitted by petitioner. Respondents then may avail
themselves of any remedy thereafter allowed by the Rules.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated May 25, 2006 and
September 13, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division in Civil Case No. 0007
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the. Sandiganbayan for further
proceedings with due and deliberate dispatch in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
GR. No. L-7969 October 5, 1912

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CHUA MO, defendant-appellant.

Jos. N. Wolfson, for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Harvey, for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

This defendant was charged with the illegal possession of opium, in violation of the provisions of the
Opium Law.

After hearing the evidence, the Honorable A.S. Crossfield, judge found the defendant guilty of the
crime charged in the complaint, and sentenced him to pay a fine of P300 and the costs of the action,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

From that sentence the defendant appealed. The defendant alleged in his defense in this court that
the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila did not have jurisdiction to try him; that the testimony
adduced during the trial of the cause fails to show where the offense was committed.

The complaint filed in the present cause alleges that "on or about the 19th of March, 1912, in the city
of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Chua Mo, voluntarily, illegally and criminally was the owner
and had in his possession and under his control" a certain quantity of opium.

The judge of the lower court, after hearing the evidence, made the following findings of facts:

From the evidence presented at the trial, I find that internal revenue agents went to the place
described as 717 Calle Sacristia in the city of Manila, and entering the premises there found
the defendant, etc.

It appears, therefore, that the complaint charges that the crime was committed in the city of Manila.
The judge who tried the cause found from the evidence presented that the crime was committed in
the city of Manila. An examination of the evidence adduced during the trial shows simply that the
internal revenue agents, on or about the 19th of March, 192, entered the residence at 717 Calle
Sacristia, etc., etc. There is nothing in the record which shows where or in what political division of
the Philippine Islands the said residence at No. 717 Calle Sacristia is located. The judge of the lower
court evidently took judicial notice of the fact that Calle Sacristia was one of the public streets of the
city of Manila. We have then the question presented whether or not a trial judge can take judicial
notice of the fact that a certain public street is located in a certain city or political division of the
Philippine Islands. Section 275 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions (Act No. 190) provides:

Matters judicially recognized.—The existence and territorial extent of states, and of the
several islands forming the Philippine Archipelago, their forms of government, and symbols
of nationality, the laws of nations, the admirality and maritime and history of the United
States and of the Philippine Islands, the seals of the several departments of the Government
of the United States, and of the States of the Union, and of the Philippine Islands, public and
private, and officials acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United
States and of the Philippine Islands, the laws of nature, and the measure of time, the
geographical divisions and of political history of the world, and all similar matters of public
knowledge shall be judicially recognized by the court without the introduction of proof; but the
court may receive evidence upon any of the subjects in this section stated, when it shall find
it necessary for its own information, and may resort for its aid to appropriate books,
documents, or evidence.

In the case of Marzon vs. Udtujan (20 Phil. rep., 232), this court held, under the provisions of section
275 above quoted, that the trial court had a right to take judicial notice of the fact that a certain
municipality or barrio was within its jurisdiction.
In the present case the question presented is whether or not the trial court had a right to take judicial
notice of the fact that certain house, upon a certain street, was within a city in its jurisdiction. Said
section 275 above quoted provides that trial courts may take judicial notice, among other things, of
the geographical division of the state. Cities and municipalities are created by public law. Their limits
are also prescribed by public law. The streets are laid out, surveyed and established by virtue of
public authority. In the present case the complaint alleged that the crime was committed in the city of
Manila. The court, in his findings of fact "from the evidence, found that the crime was committed in
the city of Manila." We are of the opinion and so hold that the lower court was authorized, under
provisions of section 275, to take judicial notice of the fact that the house located at No. 717 Calle
Sacristia, was located within the city of Manila.

Mr. Justice Gray, of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Jones vs. United States
(137 U.S., 202) in discussing the right of the court to take judicial notice of territorial extent, said:

All courts of justice are bound to take judicial notice of the territorial extent of the jurisdiction
exercised by the government whose laws they administer . . . as appearing from the public acts of
the legislature and executive, although those acts are not formally put in evidence nor are in accord
with the pleadings." (U.S. vs. Reynes, 9 How., 127; Kennett vs. Chambers, 14 How., 38; Hoyt vs.
Russell, 117 U. S., 401-404; Coffee vs. Grover, 123 U.S., 1; State vs. Dunwell, 3 R. I., 127; State vs.
Wagner, 61 Me., 178; Taylor vs. Barclay, 2 Sim., 213.)

So far as the facts of the political organization and operation of the State are determined by law, they
are judicially notices as a part of the law. The chief difficulty comes in distinguishing between what is
contained solely and abstractly in the law and what depends more or less on specific official acts
done under the law or upon the application of the terms of the law to concrete things. Courts should
be permitted to give a liberal interpretation to the law permitting them to take judicial notice of the
facts mentioned in such laws, especially when a technical interpretation would have the effect of
defeating the very purpose and object of the law. (Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 2575.)

In the case of Master vs. Morse (18 Utah, 21) it was held that courts might take judicial notice that a
certain city had been surveyed into lots, blocks and streets and that judicial notice would be taken of
such divisions. 1awphil.n et

In the case of "The Apollon" (9 Wheaton, 362-374) the Supreme Court of the United States held that
"public facts of geographical divisions might be taken judicial notice of."

In the case of Peyrox vs. Howard (7 Peters, 324-342), the Supreme Court of the United States held
that the court would take judicial notice of the fact that the port of New Orleans was within its
jurisdiction, as depending on the ebb and flow of the tide.

In the case of Board vs. State (147 Ind., 476) the supreme court of the State of Indiana held that trial
courts might take judicial notice of the area and boundary lines of a county.

The cases holding that courts may take judicial notice of the fact that certain towns are within the
limits of the jurisdiction of the courts are almost innumerable. (St. Louis I. M. and S. Ry. Co. vs.
Magness, 68 Mo., 289; People vs. Etting, 99 Cal., 577; People vs. Faust, 113 Cal., 172; State vs.
Powers, 25 Conn., 48; Perry vs. State, 113 Ga., 936; Gilbert vs. National C. R. Co., 176 Ill., 288;
Ham vs. Ham, 39 Me. 263; Commonwealth vs. Desmond, 103 Mass., 445; Baumann vs. Trust Co.,
66 Minn., 227.)

In the case of Gardner vs. Eberhart (82 Ill., 316), the supreme court of Illinois held that the trial
courts had authority to take judicial notice of the subdivision of towns and city property into blocks,
lots, etc. (See also Sever vs. Lyons, 170 Ill., 395.)

We believe, considering the ample provisions of said section 275 and the jurisprudence already
established by reputable courts, that we have authority for holding that the lower court committed no
error in taking judicial notice of the fact that the place where the crime was committed was within its
jurisdiction. Therefore the sentence of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Carson, JJ., concur.

Trent, J., dissents.