C. D. Broad - Leibniz - An Introduction-Cambridge University Press (1975)

LEIBNIZ
An Introduction
C. D . B R O A D
Edited by C. Lewy
Cambridge University Press

P u b H s h e d b y the S y n d i c s o f t h e C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press
B e n t l e y H o u s e , 2 0 0 E u s t o n R o a d , L o n d o n N W i 2DB
A m e r i c a n B r a n c h : 32 E a s t 5 7 t h Street, N e w Y o r k , N . Y . 1 0 0 2 2
© C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press 1975
Library ofCongress Catalogue C a r d N u m b e r : 74-31784
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First pubHshed 1975
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W e s t e r n Printing Services L t d . , Bristol
CONTENTS
Editor's preface page i x

Abbreviations xi
,CHAPTER ι Life and works
ι Life
2 Works
3 Influence
CHAPTER 2 General principles used b y Leibniz 6
Predicate-in-Notion Principle 6
1.1 Complete n o t i o n o f an i n d i v i d u a l 6
1.2 Alternative possible individuals 7
1.3 V a r i o u s f o r m u l a t i o n s o f t h e P r i n c i p l e 9
2 Principle o f Sufficient Reason 10
3 Is the Predicate-in-Notion Principle compatible w i t h
contingency? 12
4 Comments o n the Predicate-in-Notion Principle 16
4.1 C o m p l e t e n o t i o n o f a s p e c i e s 16
4.1.1 Geometrical figures 16
4.1.2 A r i t h m e t i c a l notions 18
4.1.3 N a t u r a l kinds 18
4.2 Complete n o t i o n o f an i n d i v i d u a l 20
4.2.1 Does every i n d i v i d u a l have a complete notion? 22
4.2.2 T h e ontological correlate o f t h e complete
notion 24
4.3 Is the Predicate-in-Notion Principle compatible w i t h
there being contingent facts? 25
4.4 Is the Predicate-in-Notion Principle compatible w i t h
h u m a n freedom? 27
4.4.1 Leibniz's views about freedom and determinism 28
5 Principle o f Sufficient Reason, contingency, and infinite
complexity 31
vi CONTENTS
5.1 Contingent facts and God's choice o f t h e best 32

5.2 mfinite c o m p l e x i t y and contingency 34
5.3 Contingency and actual existence 35
6 Denial ofrelations 36
7 Identity o f Indiscernibles 39
8 T h e Principle o f continuity 43
9 Denial o f transeunt causation 45
CHAPTER з Leibniz'stheoryofcorporealsubstances 49
ι Background o f L e i b n i z ' s theories 49
1.1 Scholastic doctrine ofsubstance 49
1.2 The Cartesian v i e w 52
1.3 Leibniz's general reaction to Scholasticism and
Cartesianism 54
2 Extension and m o t i o n 54
3 Relativity ofspace, t i m e and m o t i o n 56
4 D y n a m i c a l properties o f bodies 61
4.1 Impenetrability 61
4.2 Inertial quiescence 62
4.3 Inertial self-propagation 62
4.4 Force (a) Passive 63
(b) A c t i v e 64
4.5 Metaphysical implications ofLeibniz's dynamics 67
5 Endless divisibility 71
5.1 T h e argument for intrinsic units 71
5.2 T h e intrinsic units are o f t h e nature o f l i v i n g
l i v i n g organisms 73
5.3 Organisms and substantial forms 75
5.3.1 Leibniz's o w n v i e w ofsubstantial forms 75
5.3.2 W h y postulate a substantial f o r m for each
l i v i n g organism? 78
6 A r g u m e n t for substantial forms f r o m the Predicate-in-
N o t i o n Principle 81
7 Substantial forms and organic bodies are ingenerable and
incorruptible 82
7.1 Theory ofTransformation ofBodies 83
c н A p τ ΕR 4 T h e o r y o f monads 87
y ι Monads and entelechies 88

2 Corporeal substance is a phenomenon benefundatum 90
CONTENTS Vll
Plurality o f substances 92
Characteristics o f m o n a d s 93
4.1 Monads are minds 94
4.1.1 Appetition 94
4.1.2 Perception 94
4.2 Confusion 97
4.3 P o i n t o f V i e w 98
"5 Pre-established H a r m o n y 99
6 The three kinds o f m o n a d 101
7 The real f o u n d a t i o n o f the various b o d i l y phenomena 102
7.1 Sensible qualities 102
7.2 Geometrical properties 103
7.3 Kinematic properties 105
7.4 D y n a m i c a l properties 105
8 T h e o r y o f organisms 108
8.1 General account 108
8.2 D e a t h a n d b i r t h 114
8.2.1 T h e c a s e o f r a t i o n a l s o u l s 115
9 Apparentinteractionofbodyandmind 118
9.1 H i s t o r i c a l b a c k g r o u n d o f t h e p r o b l e m 118
9.2 Leibniz's solution 121
10 The Vinculum Substantiale 124
;ΗA ρ τ E R 5 Psychology and theory o f knowledge 13 0
Conscious and unconscious experiences 130

1.1 A r e unconscious experiences possible? 130
1.2 Leibniz's arguments f o r unconscious experiences 133
1.3 ' M i n u t e ' and 'confused' perceptions 135
1.4 Leibniz's uses o f t h e doctrine ofunconscious
experiences 136
1.4.1 Is a m i n d always thinking? 137
2 Theinnateandtheapnon' 138
3 Sensation and sense-perception 140
3.1 P r i m a r y a n d s e c o n d a r y q u a l i t i e s 141
3.2 D i r e c t versus representative perception 142
4 Conative and affective experiences 144
CHAPTER 6 Ethics 146

Vlll CONTENTS
CHAPTER 7 Theology 148
1 God's nature and relations t o the w o r l d 148

2 ExistenceofGod 151
2.1 Ontological A r g u m e n t 151
2.2 Cosmological A r g u m e n t 153
2.3 A r g u m e n t f r o m Pre-established H a r m o n y 156
2.4 T h e A r g u m e n t about Eternal Truths 157
3 Defence o f God's character 159
0
4 TheKingdomofEnds 165
4.1 Efficient and final causation 165
4.2 Nature and grace 169
Bibliographical note 173

Index of proper names 175
E D I T O R ' S PREFACE
C. D . B r o a d expressed a w i s h that after his death I should go t h r o u g h

his unpublished w r i t i n g s and consider the possibility o f p r e p a r i n g some
o f t h e m f o r publication.
T h e present v o l u m e contains his Cambridge lectures o n the P h i l o
sophy o f L e i b n i z . B r o a d had lectured o n Leibniz before, b u t the course
i n its present f o r m was first given i n the academic year 1948-9 and
repeated, w i t h some revisions, i n 1949-50. B r o a d always w r o t e o u t
his lectures f u l l y beforehand, and the M S . o n Leibniz is i n a v e r y g o o d
state. B u t his h a n d w r i t i n g is small and close and i n places v e r y difficult
to decipher. I t is probably t o o m u c h to hope that no w o r d s have been
misread.
I have tried t o reproduce the text so far as possible as i t is i n the M S .
B u t I have expanded Broad's abbreviations ofnames and other words,
and have introduced greater u n i f o r m i t y i n spelling, punctuation, and
the use o f italics, quotation marks and capital letters.
Broad's system o f references was, however, inadequate: w i t h v e r y
f e w exceptions he gave n o page references t o the passages w h i c h he
was q u o t i n g or discussing. I have therefore undertaken the labour o f
supplying those references. So far as the original texts are concerned I
generally refer t o Gerhardt's Die Philosophischen Schriften von G. W.
Leibniz. I n addition, I have tried t o provide, whenever possible, a
reference t o a currently available English translation. As a rule I refer
t o Loemker's G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters (2nd
edition) w h i c h contains the fullest selection ofLeibniz's w o r k available
i n English. I n a f e w places I also m e n t i o n other translations w h e n these
are fuller or are o f special interest. A n d o f course I refer t o other trans
lations w h e n the texts w h i c h are discussed do n o t occur i n Loemker.
T h e task o f p r o v i d i n g those references was n o t always easy. I n
particular, i t was sometimes difficult t o locate a passage w h i c h B r o a d
was o n l y m e n t i o n i n g or paraphrasing. As a result the references m a y
i n v o l v e some errors; b u t I hope that most o f t h e m are correct.
I a m v e r y grateful t o m y friend and colleague D r Ian H a c k i n g f o r
helping m e t o provide some o f those references.
I have also appended a short Bibliographical N o t e expanding the
references i n Broad's list o f Leibniz's m a i n w o r k s .
X EDITOR'S PREFACE
R o u n d brackets are Broad's; m y o w n insertions are enclosed i n

square brackets.
Some o f the material included i n the w o r k was published i n the
f o r m o f t w o articles i n Theoria (vol. 12 (1946) and v o l . 15 (1949)^. I
a m grateful t o the E d i t o r for permission to reproduce i t here.
C. LEWY
Trinity College, Cambridge

June 1974
ABBREVIATIONS
G. Die Philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried

Wilhelm Leibniz, herausgegeben v o n C. I .
Gerhardt, 7 vols. (Berlin, 1875-90).
G. Μ . Leibnizens Mathematische Schriften, herausge
geben v o n C. I . Gerhardt, 7 vols. (Berlin
and Halle, 1849-63).
Alexander The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence Together
with Extracts from Newtons 'Principia and
(
Opticks\ edited w i t h an i n t r o d u c t i o n and
notes b y H . G. Alexander (Manchester,
1956).
Couturat Opuscules et fragments inedits de Leibniz.
Extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliotheque
royale de Hanovre, par Louis Couturat
(Paris, 1903).
Langley New Essays Concerning Human Understanding
by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Together with
an Appendix Consisting of Some of His
Shorter Pieces, translated b y A l f r e d Gideon
Langley ( N e w Y o r k and L o n d o n , 1896).
Loemker Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Papers
and Letters, a selection translated and edited
w i t h an i n t r o d u c t i o n b y L e r o y E. Loemker
(2nd edition, Dordrecht, 1969).
Mason The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence, edited
and translated b y H . T . Mason w i t h an
i n t r o d u c t i o n b y G. H . R. Parkinson ( M a n
chester, 1967).
M o r r i s and Parkinson Leibniz: Philosophical Writings, edited b y
G. H . R. Parkinson, translated b y M a r y
M o r r i s and G. H . R. Parkinson (London,
1973).
Russell Bertrand Russell, A Critical Exposition of the
Philosophy of Leibniz with an Appendix of
Leading Passages (Cambridge, 1900).
1
LIFE A N D W O R K S
I Life
Leibniz was b o r n o n 21 January 1646 at Leipzig, where his father

was a lawyer and professor o f philosophy. H e started his career as a
scholar very early. H e w e n t t o the university at the age o f f i f t e e n , and
before that he was interested i n logic. W h i l e at the university he read
Bacon's De Augmentis. H e meant to be a lawyer, and i n 1663 he w e n t
for a year to Jena t o study l a w . Here his mathematical interests were
first strongly stimulated.
k I n 1666 he submitted a legal thesis f o r a doctor's degree at the
University o f Leipzig. T h e degree was n o t granted, probably because
Leibniz was o n l y t w e n t y at the t i m e . B u t i t was accepted b y the
University o f A l t d o r f , w h i c h i n v i t e d h i m to become a professor there.
H e refused the ofFer and w e n t t o Nürnberg, where he stayed for a year.
W h i l e there he studied alchemy and magic, and is said to have been
initiated i n t o the Rosicrucians and made secretary o f the local branch
o f the society.
ψ I n 1667 he entered the services o f the Elector o f M a i n z , where he
remained t i l l 1672. D u r i n g this t i m e most o f his published w r i t i n g s
were political. His political w r i t i n g s were mostly against the ambitious
designs o f the French. Louis X I V was threatening Germany, and
Leibniz formed a plan f o r d i v e r t i n g his a m b i t i o n to the m o r e Christian
object o f expelling the T u r k s f r o m E g y p t . H e w e n t to Paris i n 1672
to explain this plan t o Louis i n person b u t , like most o f Leibniz's
diplomatic schemes, i t came to naught. Leibniz laboured all his life t o
reconcile the Romanists and the Protestants i n Germany, and also the
Lutherans and the Calvinists. His great object was to get b o t h religious
and political peace, b u t he failed. H e attached great importance to the
existence o f l e a r n e d societies; he founded the Academy o f B e r l i n , and
was consulted about the foundation o f the academies o f Vienna and
St Petersburg. H e hoped i n this w a y to get the support o f royal and
noble patrons for scientific and literary research.
Leibniz was i n Paris f r o m 1672 t o 1676, except for a short visit w h i c h
he paid to England i n 1673. W h i l e i n Paris he made a careful study o f the
Cartesian philosophy and o f mathematics. H e had m u c h conversation
2 LEIBNIZ: AN INTRODUCTION
w i t h Malebranche o n philosophy, and w i t h Huyghens o n physics and

mechanics. H e studied the mathematical w o r k s o f Pascal, and invented
a calculating machine t o add, subtract, divide, and m u l t i p l y .
D u r i n g his visit to England i n 1673 he was made a Fellow o f the
R o y a l Society, partly t h r o u g h the influence o f his friend Robert
Boyle, the chemist. Leibniz had read Hobbes's w r i t i n g s , and had been
a good deal impressed b y Hobbes's theories o f physics. H e w r o t e t o
Hobbes and hoped t o see h i m d u r i n g this visit. B u t Hobbes was eighty-
five; he left the letter unanswered, and the t w o philosophers never met.
W h e n he fmally left Paris i n October 1676 he w e n t to L o n d o n f o r a
week and thence to Amsterdam, where he stayed for f o u r weeks w i t h
Spinoza's friend and disciple Schuller. Leibniz had already i n 1675 met
Tschirnhausen, the most intelligent o f Spinoza's correspondents, and
had been interested b y h i m i n Spinoza's w o r k . I n N o v e m b e r 1676
Spinoza, w h o was always v e r y nervous o f letting strangers see his
unpublished w r i t i n g s , finally allowed Leibniz t o meet h i m at T h e
Hague. Leibniz stayed there f o r some t i m e , had m u c h talk w i t h
Spinoza, and pointed out to Spinoza certain fundamental mistakes i n
Descartes's mechanics. I n return he was allowed t o see some parts o f
the Ethics i n manuscript. Later, w h e n Leibniz had completed his o w n
system, he became v e r y critical o f Spinozism. B u t at this t i m e he had
convinced himself that b o t h Cartesianism and Hobbes's materialism
were ultimately unsatisfactory, and he was ready t o accept ideas f r o m
any quarter.
A t the end o f 1676 Leibniz was appointed librarian t o the D u k e o f
B r u n s w i c k at Hanover, a post w h i c h he held t i l l the end o f his life.
The l i b r a r y at Hanover still contains masses o f Leibniz's manuscripts
o n all kinds o f subjects, w h i c h were s l o w l y being published b y the
B e r l i n Academy u n t i l the Second W o r l d W a r . W h i l e there he carried
o n a voluminous correspondence w i t h other learned men, e.g. A r n a u l d ,
J o h n B e r n o u l l i , de Voider, des Bosses, and Clarke. Leibniz's official
d u t y was t o w r i t e a history o f the House o f Brunswick. H e travelled
for some t i m e i n Italy collecting materials, for the first historical m e m
ber o f the Guelf f a m i l y was A z o D'Este, and the noble Italian House
o f E s t e is a collateral line o f t h e House o f B r u n s w i c k .
Leibniz seems t o have been w o r k i n g out his o w n system between
1680 and 1697, and t o have been a g o o d deal influenced d u r i n g this
period first b y Plato and later b y Aristotle, h i 1698 his D u k e o f B r u n s
w i c k died, and was succeeded b y the m a n w h o became K i n g o f E n g l a n d
i n 1714 as George I . George was an ignorant boor, and he disliked
Leibniz for busying himself w i t h foreign monarchs i n t r y i n g t o f o u n d
LIFE AND WORKS 3
academies. A n d Leibniz lost t w o v e r y g o o d friends at the deaths o f

the t w o Electresses Sophia, George's mother and sister, w h o were
h i g h l y intelligent and cultured w o m e n .
Leibniz completed his discovery o f t h e differential calculus i n 1676,
but d i d n o t publish an account o f i t t i l l 1684. N e w t o n published his
o w n f o r m o f t h e calculus i n 1693. There was v e r y acrimonious c o n
troversy about the discovery, t h o u g h there is little doubt that i n fact
the t w o m e n made i t independently o f each other. T o d a y i n use is
L e i b n i z ' s n o t a t i o n and n o t N e w t o n ' s . Neither gave a logically flawless
account o f the principles o f the calculus, b u t N e w t o n was perhaps
nearer the t r u t h than Leibniz. T h e Newtonians i n England poisoned
George I's m i n d against Leibniz, and he failed t o get the office o f
Historiographer R o y a l o f England, w h i c h he had wanted. H e died i n
1716 i n Hanover, almost i n disgrace.
Leibniz was probably the most universal genius that there had ever
been i n Europe. H e had none o f the contempt f o r a n t i q u i t y w h i c h
characterized Descartes, Malebranche, Hobbes, Bacon, and Locke. H e
admired and learnt m u c h f r o m Plato and Aristotle, and he was t h o r
o u g h l y versed i n the Scholastic philosophy. A n d , i n general, he was
extremely eclectic; t h o u g h he had so m u c h originality and such logical
acumen that he t h o r o u g h l y transformed and developed the germs
w h i c h he got f r o m others. H e said that Descartes 'leads us i n t o the
vestibule o f p h i l o s o p h y ' and that Spinoza ' w o u l d be r i g h t i f i t were n o t
for the monads'. H e made an extremely careful study o f Locke's
Essay, and collected his criticisms i n t o a large b o o k - the Nouveaux
Essais. Locke treated his criticisms w i t h a contempt w h i c h they cer
1
tainly d i d n o t deserve. H e also elaborately criticized N e w t o n ' s theories

o f absolute space, t i m e , and m o t i o n , i n his Correspondence with Clarke,
w h o acted as N e w t o n ' s representative. Leibniz was a mathematician
o f the first rank. H e made i m p o r t a n t contributions to the foundation
o f dynamics. H e was one o f the founders o f m o d e r n symbolic logic.
He tried to devise a geometrical calculus, and this afterwards became
the starting-point o f Grassmann's Ausdehnungslehre. H e sketched out 2
the principle o f a universal language o f ideograms. H e was also a v e r y

considerable j u r i s t and historian. A m o n g his m i n o r achievements was
to produce a geometrical argument t o prove that the electors t o the
monarchy o f Poland ought t o choose Philip Augustus o f N e u b u r g as
king.
1
[NouveauxEssaissurVEntendementHumain. G . , V , 39-509. Langley, 41-629.]
2
[ H . G r a s s m a n n , Die lineare Ausdehnungslehre, ein neuer Zweig der Mathematik
(Leipzig, 1844).]
2 Works
Leibniz w r o t e copiously, b u t v e r y little was published i n his lifetime

and m u c h is unpublished still. His most i m p o r t a n t philosophical w o r k s
are probably the f o l l o w i n g : 1
(1) Discours de metaphysique (written 1685, published 1846 by

Grotefend).
(2) Correspondence with Arnauld ( w r i t t e n 1686-90, published 1846
b y Grotefend). The correspondence begins b y Leibniz sending an
abstract o f the Discours to the Landgraf Ernst o f Hessen-Rheinfels, and
asking h i m t o f o r w a r d i t t o A r n a u l d .
(3) The New System (published i n the Journal des Savans f o r 1695).
This is the o n l y complete account o f his system w h i c h Leibniz ever
published. I t omits certain v e r y fundamental considerations w h i c h are
stressed i n the Discours and the Letters to Arnauld. I t led t o a g o o d deal
o f controversy, and Leibniz tried t o explain and defend various points
i n i t i n later articles and letters.
(4) Controversy with Pierre Bayle ( w r i t t e n i n 1698 and r o u n d about
1703; published i n 1716 i n the Histoire critique de la republique des lettres
at the instance o f des Maiseaux.) Bayle had criticized certain doc
trines i n The New System i n the article o n Rorarius i n his Dictionary
(1695-7); Leibniz answered; and Bayle raised further objections i n
the second edition o f h i s Dictionary (1702). Leibniz answered these i n
turn.
(5) Letters to John Bernoulli ( w r i t t e n about 1698; published first w i t h
m a n y omissions i n 1745). J o h n B e r n o u l l i was one o f a f a m i l y o f
extremely eminent mathematicians. T h e correspondence deals largely
w i t h i n f i n i t y , c o n t i n u i t y , and the nature o f bodies.
(6) Letters to de Voider ( w r i t t e n 1699-1706; first published b y Ger
hardt r o u n d about 1880). D e V o i d e r was Professor o f Philosophy,
Physics, and Mathematics at Leyden. H e was a friend o f J o h n B e r n o u l l i .
H e was an eminent Cartesian. The correspondence covers most o f the
m a i n doctrines o f Leibniz's philosophy.
(7) Letters to des Bosses ( w r i t t e n 1706-16; published first b y Dutens
1768). Des Bosses was a learnedJesuit teacher o f t h e o l o g y at Hilder¬
h e i m . B o t h he and Leibniz were interested i n the doctrine o f t r a n -
substantiation, w h i c h is held b y R o m a n Catholics and rejected b y
Protestants. This gave rise t o v e r y elaborate and subtle discussion
about the nature o f substances i n general and bodies i n particular. I n
his correspondence Leibniz develops a theory about c o m p o u n d sub-
1
[ F o r f u r t h e r references see B i b H o g r a p h i c a l N o t e . ]
LIFE AND WORKS 5
stances, v i z . the theory o f the Vinculum Substantiale, w h i c h does n o t

appear elsewhere i n his w o r k s .
(8) Theodicy (published 1710). This is a huge book, published i n
Leibniz's lifetime, i n w h i c h he elaborately tries t o j u s t i f y the ways o f
God to man.
(9) Principles ofNature and of Grace ( w r i t t e n between 1712 and 1714
f o r Prince Eugen o f Savoy; first published 1718) and Monadology
( w r i t t e n about the same t i m e , almost certainly for some other i n d i v i
dual whose name is u n k n o w n ; first published i n 1720 i n a German
translation). These are short and clear b u t somewhat popular accounts
o f Leibniz's complete system i n its final f o r m , w r i t t e n as a help f o r
readers w h o had been interested i n the Theodicy and w a n t e d t o k n o w
m o r e o f Leibniz's philosophy as a w h o l e .
(10) Correspondence with Clarke ( w r i t t e n 1715-16; published first
b y Clarke i n 1717). This deals m a i n l y w i t h the question whether space
and t i m e and m o t i o n are absolute or relative, and w i t h other logical
and philosophical topics connected w i t h i t .
3 Influence
I t appears f r o m the above list that m a n y o f Leibniz's most careful

expositions o f his system were n o t available t o the public u n t i l l o n g
after his death. Nevertheless he had an immense influence i n Germany.
His philosophy was popularized and simplified b y WolfF, and i t be
came the o r t h o d o x system taught t o students i n German universities
i n the eighteenth century. K a n t was b r o u g h t u p i n i t ; he remained i n
i t u n t i l H u m e 'awoke h i m f r o m his dogmatic slumbers'; and there are
m a n y traces o f L e i b n i z i a n doctrines embedded i n Kant's critical p h i l o
sophy. The o p t i m i s m o f L e i b n i z ' s Theodicy is somewhat u n f a i r l y made
f u n o f b y Voltaire i n the character o f D r Pangloss i n Candide. A m o n g
later philosophers Herbart and Lotze i n Germany and W a r d and
M c T a g g a r t i n England were greatly influenced b y Leibniz.
G E N E R A L PRINCIPLES USED BY L E I B N I Z
There are certain general principles o f w h i c h Leibniz makes constant

use. I shall begin b y discussing these.
I Predicate-in-Notion Principle
This plays a very i m p o r t a n t part i n the Discours de metaphysique and the

Letters to Arnauld (1685-90). I t is n o t explicitly mentioned i n The New
System (1695) or i n any o f t h e later w o r k s that I have mentioned. B u t
there is n o reason t o t h i n k that Leibniz himself ever abandoned i t or
ceased t o t h i n k i t o f fundamental importance. F r o m t i m e t o t i m e he
makes remarks w h i c h seem p l a i n l y t o refer t o i t . E.g. i n his Second An
swer to Bayle (c. 1703) he says that i n The New System he p u t f o r w a r d
the theory that each substance represents i n itself all other substances
i n the w o r l d simply as an explanatory hypothesis. B u t i t is i n fact necessary,
1
for reasons w h i c h he had developed i n his Letters to Arnauld. A g a i n , i n

a letter o f 19 August 1715 to des Bosses he says that i t is o f t h e essence
o f a substance that its present state should be pregnant w i t h all its
future states, and that f r o m any one o f its states all the others could be
inferred unless G o d should interfere m i r a c u l o u s l y . 2
T h e principle m a y be stated r o u g h l y as follows. E v e r y substance

has a complete n o t i o n , and the complete n o t i o n o f i t i n some sense
contains every fact about i t d o w n to the very minutest detail o f its
remotest future history. W e w i l l n o w consider i t more i n detail.
1.1 Complete notion o f an individual
I n his letter o f 1 4 J u l y 1686 to A r n a u l d , Leibniz tries to explain w h a t

he means b y the complete n o t i o n o f the actual A d a m . I t is identical 3
w i t h 'the knowledge w h i c h G o d had o f A d a m w h e n he determined

to create h i m ' .
1
[ G . , I V , 554-71· L o e m k e r , 574-85·]
2
[ G . , I I , 503. L o e m k e r , 6 1 3 . ]
3
[ G . , I I , 4 7 - 5 9 . L o e m k e r , 331—8.]
LEIBNIz's GENERAL PRINCIPLES 7
Leibniz then points o u t that w e must carefully distinguish between

specific notions, e.g. that o f the sphere or the ellipse, and i n d i v i d u a l
notions, e.g. that o f A d a m . A l l true propositions about the subject o f a
specific n o t i o n are necessary and independent of God's volitions. B u t a
specific n o t i o n is, i n a certain sense, incomplete. I t applies to an i n d e f i
nite n u m b e r o f actual or possible individuals, and therefore does n o t
provide an exclusive or an exhaustive description o f any one o f t h e m .
The n o t i o n o f a n i n d i v i d u a l is complete. I t applies o n l y t o that i n d i v i d u a l ,
and i t supplies an exhaustive as w e l l as an exclusive description o f i t .
I t therefore always contains explicitly or i m p l i c i t l y predicates referring
to determinate times and places and circumstances. T r u e propositions
w h i c h ascribe such predicates t o an i n d i v i d u a l are contingent and they
depend on God'sfree decisions at the t i m e w h e n he created the w o r l d .
Therefore the complete n o t i o n o f an actual i n d i v i d u a l must contain
the fact that G o d made such-and-such free decisions.
Suppose n o w that w e abstract f r o m the n o t i o n o f a n actual i n d i v i d u a l
the fact that i t exists, and thus regard i t as the n o t i o n o f a merely
possible i n d i v i d u a l . T h e n i t is plain that the n o t i o n o f this possible
i n d i v i d u a l w i l l contain the notions ofthese same free decisions o f G o d ,
considered n o w as merely possible and n o t as actual.
I t should be noted that Leibniz held that the actual laws o f d y n a m i c s
and the actual laws o f h u m a n psychology express certain free decisions
o f God, subordinate t o his p r i m a r y decision to actualize the best o n the
w h o l e o f all the possible worlds. So I take i t that the n o t i o n o f the
actual A d a m w o u l d contain inter alia the actual laws o f h u m a n psycho
l o g y and o f dynamics. I f y o u w a n t t o conceive the actual A d a m as a
merely possible i n d i v i d u a l w h o m G o d m i g h t n o t have decided t o
actualize, y o u w i l l still have to include i n the n o t i o n o f h i m the same
laws, considered n o w as merely possible laws.
I . 2 A l t e r n a t i v e possible i n d i v i d u a l s
Leibniz often talks o f alternative possible individuals w i t h the same

grammatical proper name, e.g. several alternative possible Adams.
A r n a u l d says i n his letter o f 13 M a y 1686 that he finds such phrases
v e r y obscure. I f i t be intelligible t o talk ofseveral alternative Adams,
1
i t should be equally intelligible t o say that there were t w o alternative

possible Arnaulds, one o f w h o m w o u l d become a priest and remain
single and childless (as the actual A r n a u l d d i d ) , and the other o f w h o m
w o u l d become a physician and m a r r y and have several children. A n d
1
[G., I I , 2 5 - 3 4 . M a s o n , 2 4 - 3 4 . ]
i t should be intelligible t o say that G o d deliberately actualized the first

o f these possible Arnaulds and deliberately left the second a mere
unrealized possibility. N o w such sentences seemed t o A r n a u l d t o be
meaningless.
Arnauld's o w n v i e w about merely possible substances may, I t h i n k ,
be p u t as follows. W h e n one talks o f a merely possible substance one
is t a l k i n g intelligibly o n l y i f o n e starts f r o m the n o t i o n o f o n e ' s actual
substance, e.g. the actual A r n a u l d , and then proceeds as follows,
( i ) Y o u m a y consider the nature o f t h a t substance i n abstraction f r o m
its existence, and can imagine that that nature never had been endowed
w i t h existence. (2) Y o u can imagine that certain o f the potentialities
i n v o l v e d i n the nature o f an actual substance had been actualized i n
certain ways instead o f remaining permanently latent or conversely.
E.g. y o u can imagine that the potentiality o f the actual A r n a u l d t o
beget children had been exercised t h o u g h i n fact i t was n o t ; or that the
same potentiality i n his father had n o t been exercised t h o u g h i t i n fact
was. (3) Y o u can imagine that certain o f t h e s e potentialities, w h i c h
were i n fact exercised i n certain ways, had been exercised instead i n
certain other ways. E.g. y o u can imagine that Arnauld's intellectual
and practical gifts had been exercised i n medicine instead o f i n t h e o l -
°gy-
Leibniz deals withthese p o i n t s i n his letter o f 1 4 J u l y 1686. H e admits
1
that the phrase 'several alternative possible Adams' is meaningless i f

y o u take the w o r d ' A d a m ' t o be the proper name o f a certain c o m
pletely determinate individual. B u t , w h e n he uses the phrase, he takes
the w o r d ' A d a m ' t o connote a certain l i m i t e d collection o f properties.
These seem t o us to describe uniquely a certain individual, b u t they do
not i n fact do so. E.g. w e m i g h t take the w o r d ' A d a m ' as denoting any
individual w h o had the p r o p e r t y o f being a m a n w i t h o u t h u m a n
parents, o f having a w o m a n created out o f one o f his ribs, and o f
disobeying God's orders b y eating the f r u i t o f a certain tree at the
instigation o f that w o m a n . I f the story i n Genesis is true, that descrip
t i o n does i n fact apply t o one and o n l y one actual i n d i v i d u a l , and he
has all the other properties possessed b y the actual A d a m . B u t w e can
obviously conceive w i t h o u t contradiction that these f e w properties
(even i f w e include among t h e m the actual laws o f nature) m i g h t be
supplemented i n innumerable different alternative ways. Each such
alternative supplementation w o u l d describe a possible individual, w h o
m i g h t be called an 'alternative possible A d a m ' .
I t h i n k i t is plain that this process could be generalized and applied
1
[G., I I , 4 7 - 5 9 . L o e m k e r , 3 3 1 - 8 . ]
to any actual substance. Y o u start w i t h any finite set o f properties P , s
w h i c h together suffice t o distinguish the actual substance S f r o m all

other actual substances. S w i l l i n fact have innumerable other p r o
perties beside these, and they w i u n o t all be entailed b y the properties
i n P . Y o u can therefore imagine this nucleus P to be supplemented
s s
i n innumerable different alternative ways. Y o u w o u l d thus conceive

so m a n y 'alternative possible 5's'. Leibniz remarks that the o n l y
description w h i c h w o u l d suffice t o distinguish the actual A d a m , n o t
o n l y f r o m all other actual individuals, b u t also f r o m all other possible
individuals, w o u l d be his complete n o t i o n , i.e. the sum-total o f all his
predicates.
Leibniz remarks that anything that is actual can be conceived as
merely possible. I f the actual A d a m w i l l i n course o f t i m e have such-
and-such a history and such-and-such descendants, the same properties
w i l l belong t o the same A d a m considered merely as one possibility
among others. A n y t h i n g is possible, Leibniz says, w h i c h is the subject
o f a genuine proposition; b y w h i c h I take h i m t o mean one that is n o t
self-contradictory.
N o w Leibniz frequently talks o f alternative possible worlds, m the
same letter he tries to explain w h a t he means b y this. Each possible
w o r l d corresponds t o certain possible primary ends or intentions
characteristic o f i t . I f G o d had decided to actualize a certain possible
w o r l d , he w o u l d have made certain primary free decisions, e m b o d y i n g
the m a i n ends or intentions characteristic o f that w o r l d . These w o u l d
have been the most general principles constituting the ground-plan
o f that w o r l d . T h e notions o f all the i n d i v i d u a l substances i n that
w o r l d w o u l d be determined i n v i e w o f these p r i m a r y intentions. I f
there were t o be miracles i n the course o f t h a t w o r l d ' s history, they too
could have been determined f r o m the beginning i n accordance w i t h
these p r i m a r y intentions. For a miracle w o u l d be an exception o n l y to
certain secondary principles w h i c h G o d w i l l e d i n v i e w o f his p r i m a r y
intentions i n creating that w o r l d .
1.3 V a r i o u s formutations o f t h e P r i n c i p l e
Leibniz formulates the Predicate-in-Notion Principle i n various places.

T h e m a i n statement i n the Discours de metaphysique is i n Section 8 . 1
T h e essential points w h i c h he makes there are the f o l l o w i n g . T h e

predicate o f every true affirmative proposition is contained, either
explicitly or i m p l i c i t l y , i n its subject. I f i t is contained explicitly, the
1
[ G . ,I V , 432-3. Loemker, 307-8.]
proposition is analytical. I f i t is contained o n l y i m p l i c i t l y , the p r o

position is synthetic. I t is a characteristic property o f an i n d i v i d u a l
substance t o have a n o t i o n so complete that anyone w h o f u l l y under
stood i t could infer f r o m i t all the predicates, d o w n t o the minutest
detail and the remotest future, w h i c h w i l l ever belong to that substance.
Leibniz takes the case o f Alexander the Great as an example. I n c o n
templating the complete n o t i o n o f Alexander, G o d sees i n i t the
foundation or reason f o r every predicate w h i c h can ever be t r u l y
ascribed t o h i m . I n this w a y G o d k n o w s a priori whether, e.g., A l e x
ander w i l l die b y wounds or b y disease or o f o l d age. B u t n o man can
f u l l y and distinctly comprehend the n o t i o n o f a n y i n d i v i d u a l substance.
So m e n have t o depend o n experience or o n hearsay for their k n o w
ledge o f m a n y o f t h e facts about individuals. Thus, e.g., m e n w h o died
before Alexander's death never k n e w for certain h o w he w o u l d die;
his contemporaries had t o w a i t and see; and his successors k n e w o n l y
b y traditions w h i c h go back t o contemporary eye-witnesses.
I n his letter t o A r n a u l d o f 1 4 J u l y 1686, Leibniz says that w e need a
'reason a prion t o enable us t o say that the same i n d i v i d u a l w h o was
i n Paris last week is i n Germany this w e e k . H e alleges that the o n l y
1
possible a priori reason f o r such statements is that the n o t i o n o f that

individual contains and connects these t w o successive and separated
events, h i the same letter he says: ' m every true proposition, necessary
or contingent, universal or singular, the n o t i o n o f the predicate is
contained i n some w a y i n the subject. I f not, I do n o t k n o w w h a t
t r u t h i s . ' I t w o u l d appear f r o m this that Leibniz thinks that the P r i n
2
ciple emerges f r o m , and isjustified b y , reflecting o n w h a t is meant b y a

proposition being true.
2 P r i n c i p l e o f Sufficient R e a s o n
W h a t Leibniz calls the Principle of Sufficient Reason is so closely b o u n d

up w i t h the Predicate-in-Notion Principle that i t seems desirable t o
consider i t before m a k i n g any criticisms o n the former.
I n Section 13 o f the Discours de metaphysique, Leibniz says that f o r
every contingent fact there is a reason w h y the fact is so and not other
w i s e . H e adds
3
that this is equivalent to the principle that for every
contingent fact there is a p r o o f a priori w h i c h w o u l d show that the
1
[ G . , I I , 53. L o e m k e r , 3 3 5 . ]
2
[ G . , I I , 56. L o e m k e r , 3 3 7 . ]
3
[ G . , I V , 436-9. Loemker, 310-11.]
LEIBNIZ'S GENERAL PRINCIPLES I I
connexion o f t h e subject and the predicate i n the fact is founded o n the

natures o f these t w o terms.
m his letter o f 14 July 1686 to A r n a u l d , shortly after the passage that
I have quoted above i n connexion w i t h the Predicate-in-Notion
Principle, Leibniz writes as f o l l o w s : 'There must always be some
1
foundation for the connexion o f the terms o f a proposition w h i c h is

true, and this foundation must be i n the notions o f the terms.' H e
describes this as ' m y great principle'. H e thinks that all philosophers
w o u l d accept i t , b u t that most o f t h e m have failed to d r a w its m a n y
i m p o r t a n t consequences. H e says that one o f these is the generally
accepted principle: ' N o t h i n g happens w i t h o u t i t being possible to give
a reason w h y i t happened as i t d i d and not i n another w a y . ' H e adds 2
that such reasons 'often incline w i t h o u t necessitating'. T h e latter is

3
a rather mysterious phrase w h i c h he often uses. W e may n o w consider

Leibniz's various statements i n t u r n :
(1) O f Leibniz's various statements the least determinate seems t o
be w h a t he calls ' m y great principle', viz. that there must always be
some foundation f o r the connexion between the terms o f any true
proposition, and that this foundation must be i n the notions o f the
terms. W e m i g h t call this the Principle of Grounded Connexion.
(2) I t seems that Leibniz then makes this more defmite b y specifying
the nature o f t h e foundation. T h e specific principle is that i n every true
afErmative proposition, necessary or contingent, universal or singular,
the n o t i o n o f the predicate is contained either explicitly or i m p l i c i t l y
i n the subject. This is the Predicate-in-Notion Principle. As w e saw,
Leibniz says that i t seems to h i m evident w h e n he considers w h a t is
meant b y a proposition being true.
(3) E v e r y substance has a n o t i o n so complete that anyone w h o f u l l y
understood i t could infer f r o m i t all the predicates, d o w n to the
minutest detail, w h i c h w i l l ever belong t o that substance. I t h i n k that
Leibniz w o u l d regard this as an immediate consequence o f applying
the Predicate-in-Notion Principle to the special case o f true affirmative
propositions about individual substances. W e m i g h t call this the Principle
of Pre-determinate Individual History.
(4) For every contingent fact there is a reason w h y the fact is so and
n o t otherwise, b u t such reasons often incline w i t h o u t necessitating.
This is the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Leibniz says that this is equiv
alent to the principle that for every contingent fact there is a p r o o f
a priori w h i c h w o u l d show that the connexion between the subject
and the predicate is founded o n the natures o f those terms. Thus the
1
[ G . , I I , 56. L o e m k e r , 337.] 2
[ibid.] 3
[ibid.]
Principle ofSufficient Reason seems t o be an immediate application o f

the Principle o f Grounded Connexion t o the particular case o f contin
gent propositions or facts. I do n o t doubt that Leibniz w o u l d have held
that there is also a sufficient reason for every necessary fact, and that
here also there is a $roo(apriori w h i c h w o u l d show that the connexion
between subject and predicate is founded o n the natures ofthose terms.
B u t he w o u l d n o t t h i n k i t necessary t o include i n his Principle o f
Sufficient Reason this further statement, w h i c h n o one wovJd be l i k e l y
t o question. W h a t he wanted t o emphasize was his v i e w , w h i c h m a n y
people w o u l d find h i g h l y paradoxical, that there is a p r o o f a priori
even i n the case o f contingent facts. A n d he wishes t o make explicit a
certain i m p o r t a n t peculiarity here, w h i c h he expresses b y the myster
ious phrase about 'reasons i n c l i n i n g w i t h o u t necessitating . 5
3 I s the P r e d i c a t e - i n - N o t i o n P r i n c i p l e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h
contingency?
There is n o doubt that Leibniz held that there are genuinely contingent
facts or true propositions. A n d there is no doubt that he held that the
Predicate-in-Notion Principle applies to all facts and true propositons.
H e realizes that i t m i g h t seem as i f t h e Principle was incompatible w i t h
there being any contingent facts. H e tries t o deal w i t h this p o i n t i n
Section 13 o f t h e Discours de metaphysique. His argument is as follows.
1
W e must distinguish between absolutely and hypothetically necessary

connexions. W h e n the connexion between the subject and the pre
dicate o f a proposition is absolutely necessary the contradictory o f the
proposition is se^contradictory. W h e n the connexion is o n l y h y p o
thetically necessary the contradictory o f the proposition is not self-
contradictory, and the proposition is contingent. A hypothetically
necessary connexion between t w o terms is founded, n o t simply o n the
natures o f the t w o , b u t also o n certain v o l u n t a r y decisions w h i c h G o d
has freely made. O f these free decisions the most fundamental one is
that G o d has decided t o actualize that possible w o r l d w h i c h is o n the
w h o l e more perfect than any other alternative possible w o r l d . Certain
other decisions o f a more special character are subordinate to this, i n
the sense that G o d w o u l d have been practically inconsistent i f he had
w i l l e d this and had n o t w i l l e d these. T h e y are, nevertheless, free. Thus,
e.g., a m a n w h o has freely decided t o take a certain examination is
still free n o t t o read any o f the set books or to attend any o f the pre
scribed lectures. B u t , unless he makes and keeps to the subordinate
1
[G., I V , 4 3 6 - 9 . L o e m k e r , 3 1 0 - 1 1 . ]
LEIBNIZ'S GENERAL PRINCIPLES i3
decisions to read the books and attend the lectures, he is behaving i n a

practically inconsistent w a y . A m a n can be, and often is, practically
inconsistent; b u t this is a defect i n h i m . G o d could be practically i n
consistent, b u t w e can be sure that he always acts and w i l l s c o n
sistently.
A c c o r d i n g to Leibniz, the laws o f h u m a n psychology and the laws
o f dynamics represent secondary decisions w h i c h G o d has freely made
i n v i e w o f his p r i m a r y decision to actualize the best o f all the possible
w o r l d s . N o w every connexion w h i c h is founded to any extent o n such
decrees is o n l y hypothetically necessary. T h e corresponding true
proposition is contingent, although i t could i n theory be k n o w n w i t h
complete certainty. I t could be k n o w n w i t h certainty because w e can
be quite sure that G o d has chosen t o actualize the best possible w o r l d ,
and that he has made and acted u p o n all such subordinate decisions as
are required i n v i e w o f t h i s p r i m a r y one. I t is none the less contingent,
because these decisions are made freely b y God. G o d rejected the
alternatives w h i c h he d i d reject, n o t because they i n v o l v e d internal
contradiction and were intrinsically impossible, b u t because they were
less perfect o n the w h o l e than a certain other possible alternative,
and he had freely decided t o actualize the best o f the possible
worlds.
H e sums up his discussion o f t h i s p o i n t at the end ofSection 13 o f t h e
Discours as follows. A l l such difficulties are met i f one bears i n m i n d
t w o things. (1) For every contingent fact there is a p r o o f a p n ' o n w h i c h
w o u l d show that the connexion o f t h e subject and the predicate i n the
fact is founded o n their natures. (2) O n the other hand, these proofs
a priori o f contingent propositions are n o t demonstrations that they
are necessary. For the reasons i n all such cases i n v o l v e an appeal to w h a t
Leibniz calls 'the principle o f c o n t i n g e n c y or o f t h e existence o f t h i n g s ' .
This is the p r i m a r y principle that G o d chooses that w h i c h is actually
best o f the alternatives w h i c h are really possible; and the subordinate
principle that every m a n chooses that w h i c h seems to him at the time t o
be the best o f the alternatives w h i c h then seem t o h i m to be possible,
ш the case o f necessary facts the p r o o f is based o n the l a w o f contra
diction and o n the absolute necessity o f the terms being related as
subject and predicate, w i t h o u t reference t o the free volitions o f G o d or
o f h i s creatures.
m his letter o f 13 M a y 1686 A r n a u l d asked Leibniz t o say definitely
w h i c h o f the f o l l o w i n g alternatives he accepts. (1) Is the connexion
1
between A d a m and his predicates intrinsic and necessary, like the

1
[G., I I , 2 8 - 3 0 . Mason, 2 7 ^ ? . ]
connexion between the defming properties o f a circle and any other

property w h i c h is c o m m o n and peculiar t o all possible circles? O r
(2) is i t dependent o n the free decrees o f God? Leibniz, i n his answer
o f 14 J u l y 1686, says that he cannot admit that the t w o alternatives
are m u t u a l l y exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The connexion 1
between A d a m , o n the one hand, and all that w i l l ever happen t o h i m ,

o n the other, is intrinsic, but i t is not necessary independently o f the
free decrees o f God. His argument is as foUows.
The n o t i o n o f a possible A d a m involves inter alia the n o t i o n o f
certain possible free decrees o f God. Leibniz agrees w i t h A r n a u l d that
anything that is possible at all is so independently o f t h e actual volitions
o f God. B u t the n o t i o n o f a possible existent involves the n o t i o n o f
certain possible volitions o f God. For the possibility o f a contingent
fact or o f a n individual existent presupposes the possibility o f i t s cause;
and, i n the l o n g r u n , these possible causes are the possible volitions o f
G o d . O n the other hand, the possibility o f a necessary fact or o f a
species (e.g. the circle) involves n o reference even t o God's possible
volitions.
A r n a u l d also raised an objection w h i c h m a y be p u t as follows.
Suppose that the predicate o f taking a certain j o u r n e y t o Paris at a
certain m o m e n t t were contained i n the n o t i o n o f the actual A r n a u l d .
A n d suppose that the w o r d ' A r n a u l d ' was used t o denote the same i n
dividual i n the t w o sentences ' A r n a u l d started f o r Paris at t' and ' A r n a u l d
d i d n o t start for Paris at t. T h e n the latter sentence w o u l d express a p r o
9
position w h i c h is n o t merely false but self-contradictory, and the former

w o u l d express a proposition w h i c h is n o t merely true b u t tautologous.
B u t this is plainly false. Therefore the predicate o f starting f o r Paris at
t, t h o u g h i t does i n fact belong t o the actual A r n a u l d , is n o t contained
i n the complete n o t i o n o f h i m . This is n o t altered b y the fact, w h i c h
A r n a t d d admits, that G o d k n e w f r o m the first that A r n a u l d w o u l d
start f o r Paris at t. ( h i order t o avoid confusion here the f o l l o w i n g
p o i n t should be noticed. O n the assumption that the w o r d ' A r n a u l d '
denotes the same i n d i v i d u a l i n b o t h sentences, the propositions ex
pressed b y t h e m certainly contradict each other. B u t this is irrelevant.
T h e p o i n t is that neither o f t h e m expresses a proposition w h i c h is
se/^contradictory or tautologous.)
Leibniz's answer is as follows. H e agrees that there is n o general
property possessed b y A r n a u l d (comparable t o the definition o f a
circle) f r o m w h i c h i t necessarilyfollows that he w i l l start f o r Paris at L
B u t , since i t has always been certain that he w i l l do so (for otherwise
1
[G., I I , 5 0 - 1 . L o e m k e r , 3 3 3 . ]
G o d c o u l d n o t have k n o w n i t beforehand) there must be some timeless

connexion between A r n a u l d (the subject) and starting f o r Paris at t
(the predicate). I f h e were n o t t o take t h a t j o u r n e y at that t i m e , this
w o u l d destroy the n o t i o n w h i c h G o d had o f h i m w h e n he decided t o
create h i m . For that n o t i o n , considered as the n o t i o n o f an as y e t
merely possible individual, includes all the future facts about A r n a u l d
and all the decrees o f G o d o n w h i c h these facts w o u l d depend, c o n
sidered also as merely possible. O n the other hand, says Leibniz, the
supposition that A r n a u l d d i d n o t start f o r Paris at t w o u l d n o t conflict
w i t h any necessary t r u t h .
A r n a u l d reinforced the argument w h i c h w e have been discussing
w i t h an epistemological argument, w h i c h m a y be stated as f o l l o w s .
Each person has i n his o w n m i n d a clear and distinct idea o f himself.
N o w , i f y o u have a clear and distinct idea o f a n y t h i n g , y o u can dis
cover w i t h complete certainty, b y inspecting y o u r idea, w h a t the
n o t i o n o f that t h i n g does and does n o t contain. N o w , w h e n A r n a u l d
inspects his idea ofhimself, he sees clearly that e.g. the p o w e r o f t h i n k
ing is contained i n i t . B u t he sees equally clearly that the p r o p e r t y o f
taking a certain j o u r n e y at a certain date is not. N o t h i n g w o u l d have
been A r n a u l d that d i d n o t have the p o w e r o f t h i n k i n g ; b u t A r n a u l d
can see b y inspection that an i n d i v i d u a l c o u l d have been A r n a u l d
w i t h o u t starting for Paris at f. T h e fact that G o d foresaw f r o m the first
that A r n a u l d w o u l d start f o r Paris at t is irrelevant t o the question
whether d o i n g so is contained i n the complete n o t i o n o f A r n a u l d .
Leibniz's answer is as f o l l o w s . I t is n o t at all surprising that mere
inspection o f the idea w h i c h one has o f oneself w i l l n o t enable one t o
k n o w w i t h certainty whether one w i l l o r w i l l n o t make a certain
j o u r n e y at a certain date. T h e complete n o t i o n o f any individual is
infinitely complex. Therefore the idea w h i c h any h u m a n being can
have o f a n y individual (whether i t be h i m s e l f o r another) is inevitably
confused. B u t the n o t i o n o f a species, e.g. the sphere, contains a finite
nucleus o f defining properties f r o m w h i c h all the other properties
f o l l o w ofnecessity. I t is therefore possible f o r a h u m a n being t o h a v e a
distinct idea o f t h e sphere. A n d so i t is possible t o decide w i t h certainty
whether a given geometrical p r o p e r t y does o r does n o t belong t o
spheres as such. N o such certainty is possible i n regard t o the future
action o f a n individual. O t h e r w i s e , ' says Leibniz, ' i t w o u l d be as easy
to be a prophet as t o be a geometer.'
l6 LEIBNIZ: AN INTRODUCTION
4 C o m m e n t s o n the P r e d i c a t e - i n - N o t i o n P r i n c i p l e
I shall n o w make some comments o n the Predicate-in-Notion Principle

and o n some o f t h e ideas w h i c h are associated w i t h i t .
4.1 C o m p l e t e n o t i o n o f a species
I t w i l l be best t o start w i t h w h a t Leibniz w o u l d call a 'specific' n o t i o n ,

as distinct f r o m the n o t i o n o f an i n d i v i d u a l . W e shall need t o take
several examples, and w e w i l l begin w i t h n o t i o n o f a certain k i n d o f
geometrical figure, viz. the circle.
4.1.1 G e o m e t r i c a l figures
There is an u n l i m i t e d n u m b e r o f geometrical properties w h i c h belong

t o all circles and o n l y t o circles. I t h i n k that Leibniz w o u l d say that the
complete n o t i o n o f the circle consists o f all these properties and o n l y
o f these. N o w one and o n l y one o f these w o u l d c o m m o n l y be said t o
be w h a t the w o r d 'circle' means; viz. the p r o p e r t y o f being a plane
curve all o f whose points are equidistant f r o m a certain fixed p o i n t . I
t h i n k that Leibniz w o u l d call this p r o p e r t y 'the essence o f the circle',
and he w o u l d say that i t constitutes 'the real definition', as opposed t o
various possible 'nominal definitions' o f t h e circle. A n o m i n a l definition
p w o u l d be any p r o p e r t y w h i c h belongs t o all circles and o n l y t o circles,
b u t is n o t the meaning o f t h e w o r d 'circle'.
N o w I t h i n k that Leibniz w o u l d say that, i n the case o f the circle,
all the other properties i n the complete n o t i o n f o ü o w necessarily f r o m
the property w h i c h is the real definition. Consider n o w any sentence
o f t h e f o r m 'The circle has the p r o p e r t y P', w h i c h expresses a true p r o
position. Here 'P' must stand either f o r the defining p r o p e r t y or f o r
one o f the other properties i n the complete n o t i o n . I f i t stood for the
defming p r o p e r t y or f o r any part o f i t , I t h i n k that Leibniz w o u l d say
that i t is explicitly contained i n the n o t i o n o f t h e circle, tfit stood f o r
any other p r o p e r t y c o m m o n and peculiar t o circles, I t h i n k he w o u l d
say that i t is implicitly contained i n the n o t i o n o f the circle. B u t i n
either case, he w o u l d say, the proposition is necessary and independent
o f God's free decrees, whether actual or possible.
Before taking other examples I w i l l make the f o l l o w i n g remarks
o n this one. (1) Suppose that w e had taken as an example the ellipse
instead o f t h e circle. N o n e o f t h e innumerable geometrical properties
w h i c h are c o m m o n and peculiar t o ellipses as such can plausibly be
singled o u t as the meaning o f the w o r d 'ellipse'. Thus the ellipse has a

complete n o t i o n ; and, i f y o u choose any one p r o p e r t y f r o m i t , all the
rest f o l l o w i n the same sense i n w h i c h all the other properties o f the
circle f o l l o w f r o m its defming property. B u t none o f t h e m can be
singled o u t as the 'essence' o r 'real d e f i n i t i o n ' o f the ellipse. ( 2 ) Γη the
case o f t h e circle the defining p r o p e r t y follows f r o m any other p r o p e r t y
i n its complete n o t i o n i n precisely the same sense i n w h i c h any other
p r o p e r t y i n its complete n o t i o n follows f r o m its defming property.
These considerations lead one t o suspect that i t is a v e r y contingent
fact that there is a certain outstanding p r o p e r t y i n the case o f t h e circle
w h i c h can plausibly be taken as its agreed o r real definition. I t seems
to depend o n the fact that there happens to be one and o n l y one
p r o p e r t y i n the complete n o t i o n w h i c h almost hits one i n the eye i n
this case. So the distinction between predicates w h i c h are contained
e x p l i c i t l y and those w h i c h are contained o n l y i m p l i c i t l y i n the n o t i o n
o f a certain species o f geometrical figures turns o u t t o be largely
arbitrary. I t depends o n w h i c h o f t h e m y o u take as the defming p r o
perty, and generally there seems t o be n o objective g r o u n d for taking
one rather than another.
(3) E v e n i n the case o f t h e circle i t is n o t strictly true t o say that
the other properties f o l l o w necessarily f r o m the defining property.
T h e presence o f t h e other properties follows f r o m the presence o f the
defining p r o p e r t y together with the axioms o f Euclidean geometry. I
t h i n k therefore that Leibniz w o u l d have t o say that the complete
n o t i o n o f the circle, o r o f any other k i n d o f geometrical figure, c o n
tains inter alia the axioms o f Euclidean geometry. Leibniz w o u l d no
doubt have regarded these axioms as necessary propositions, true i n all
possible w o r l d s , and therefore independent o f God's free decrees and
not needing t o be specifically mentioned any more than the laws o f
logic.
B u t w e k n o w better n o w . W e k n o w that other sets o f axioms, i n
consistent i n certain respects w i t h Euclid's, are self-consistent. I f y o u
take the same definition o f a circle, and combine i t i n one case w i t h the
axioms o f E u c l i d and i n another w i t h those o f Lobachevski, some o f
the properties entailed w i l l be the same b u t others w i l l be different.
E.g. the circumference o f a Euclidean circle is p r o p o r t i o n a l to its
radius, w h i l s t that o f a Lobachevskian circle is n o t .
Y o u w i l l remember that Leibniz says that the n o t i o n o f each alter
native possible A d a m w o u l d contain certain possible free decrees o f
G o d characteristic o f the possible w o r l d o f w h i c h i t is a member. I t
is n o w clear that w e must also talk o f alternative possible kinds o f
circle. W e must say that the n o t i o n o f each alternative possible k i n d

o f circle contains certain possible free decrees o f G o d w h i c h w o u l d
f i x the geometry o f a certain possible w o r l d . T h e same remarks w o u l d
apply mutatis mutandis to any other k i n d o f geometrical figure.
4.1.2 A r i t h m e t i c a l n o t i o n s
I f w e w a n t an example o f a specific n o t i o n i n w h i c h all the predicates

are necessarily connected, and the necessity is absolute and n o t h y p o
thetical, w e must leave geometry and go t o pure arithmetic. Take,
e.g., the n o t i o n o f p r i m e numbers. The accepted definition o f this is an
integer w h i c h is n o t exactly divisible b y any other integer except u n i t y .
The complete n o t i o n o f a p r i m e number w o u l d consist o f all those
properties and o n l y those w h i c h belong t o entities answering to this
definition. A n example o f such a property is that the immediate
successor o f the product o f all the integers b e l o w i t is divisible b y i t .
(Wilson's Theorem). This property is n o t contained explicitly i n the
n o t i o n o f a p r i m e number, i.e. i t is not a part o f i t s defining property.
B u t i t is contained i m p l i c i t l y , i n so far as i t follows f r o m the defining
property, together w i t h principles w h i c h are all propositions o f logic
or pure arithmetic and therefore necessary and independent o f God's
volitions.
I t h i n k that w e can n o w understand Leibniz's destinction between
'absolutely' and 'conditionally' necessary propositions. Suppose that
P is the defming property o f a subject S. Suppose that Q is another
property. I t m i g h t be that ' 5 is Q' follows f r o m 'S is P' alone, as, e.g.,
Negroes are men follows f r o m Negroes are black men. Failing this, i t m i g h t
be that ' 5 is Q ' follows f r o m a combination o f 'S is P' w i t h one o r
more propositions, all o f w h i c h are necessary. I n b o t h these cases
Leibniz w o u l d say that 'S is Q' is absolutely necessary. I n the f o r m e r
he w o u l d say that Q is explicitly contained i n S; i n the latter that i t is
implicitly contained i n S. Lastly, suppose that 'S is Q' follows f r o m the
combination o f 'S is P' w i t h one or m o r e propositions w h i c h are all
true i n the actual w o r l d but are n o t all necessary. T h e n Leibniz w o u l d
call such propositions hypothetically necessary.
4.1.3 N a t u r a l k i n d s
W e w i l l next consider the sort o f species w h i c h M i l l calls 'natural

kinds'. I t m i g h t be a certain k i n d o f m a t t e r , e.g. gold. O r i t m i g h t be a
vegetable or animal species, e.g. oak-tree o r horse.
LEIBNIz's GENERAL PRINCIPLES ^
I t is a fact about the actual w o r l d that there are certain small groups
ofproperties about w h i c h the f o l l o w i n g propositions are true: ( i ) A n y
t w o things w h i c h have all the properties i n such a group have i n n u m e r
able other properties i n c o m m o n , and differ o n l y i n comparatively
m i n o r and u n i m p o r t a n t respects. (2) I f o n e t h i n g has all the properties
i n such a group and another t h i n g lacks any o f t h e m , then the t w o w i l l
differ i n a great many major respects. Take, e.g., the t w o properties o f
m e l t i n g at ю б 2 ° С and having a density o f 19-26 g m per/cc. A n y
t w o bits o f matter w h i c h have these t w o properties agree also i n
having all the innumerable chemical and physical properties character
istic o f g o l d . A n y such small group o f properties constitutes w h a t
w e w i l l call a 'sufficient description o f a natural k i n d .
T h e complete n o t i o n o f a natural k i n d w i l l consist o f a sufficient
description o f i t , together w i t h all the other properties c o m m o n and
peculiar to all substances w h i c h answer to that sufficient description.
I f the omission or the appreciable m o d i f i c a t i o n o f any p r o p e r t y i n a
sufficient description o f a natural k i n d w o u l d make i t insufficient, w e
w i l l call i t a 'minimal sufficient description'. Lastly, w e must notice that
the same natural k i n d may have many different m i n i m a l sufficient
descriptions. E.g. the t w o properties 'rational animal' and 'featherless
biped' are alternative m i n i m a l sufficient descriptions o f the species
man.
I t is o n l y because o f these contingent facts about the clustering
together o f properties i n the actual w o r l d that i t is practicable and
useful t o have specific names l i k e ' m a n ' , ' g o l d ' , etc. A n d i t is o n l y
because o f such facts that w e can talk o f 'definitions' o f such names. I t
is usual, e.g., t o give 'rational animal' as the definition o f man. Really
i t is o n l y one m i n i m a l sufficient description. I t satisfies us because i n the
actual w o r l d these properties carry w i t h t h e m the characteristic h u m a n
f o r m and all the other properties w h i c h are associated i n our minds
w i t h the w o r d ' m a n ' .
Speaking i n Leibnizian terms w e m a y say that the n o t i o n o f a
natural k i n d contains inter alia the n o t i o n o f a free decree o f G o d t o
associate together a certain cluster o f characteristics i n the w a y w h i c h I
have described. I n one o f the possible worlds, e.g., the p r o p e r t y o f
being a rational animal w o u l d be associated, n o t w i t h the other p r o
perties w h i c h are characteristic o f m e n , b u t w i t h those that are charac
teristic ofparrots. m that w o r l d there w o u l d be n o t h i n g that w e should
call men, b u t there w o u l d be a species w h i c h w e should call 'rational
parrots'.
There is prima facie at least one i m p o r t a n t difference between a
species o f geometrical figures and a natural k i n d . A l l the other p r o

perties o f t h e circle, e.g., f o l l o w f r o m any m i n i m u m sufficient descrip
t i o n o f i t together w i t h the axioms o f geometry i n the w o r l d under
consideration. A n d these axioms are n o t specially concerned w i t h
circles; they are extremely general propositions about spatial order and
interconnexion. B u t w e do n o t k n o w , e.g., o f a n y general proposition
about the actual w o r l d w h i c h , i n c o m b i n a t i o n w i t h the proposition x
has two legs and nofeathers, entails the proposition x is rational. Thus, to
speak i n Leibnizian terms, the n o t i o n o f any one rational k i n d seems
to involve a number o f very special divine decrees directly associating
certain properties w i t h certain others. B u t the n o t i o n o f any one k i n d
o f geometrical figure seems to i n v o l v e n o special divine decrees
peculiar to i t . I t involves o n l y v e r y general divine decrees about the
spatial order and interconnexion o f a certain possible w o r l d .
4.2 C o m p l e t e n o t i o n o f a n i n d i v i d u a l
W e can n o w leave specific notions and consider the n o t i o n o f an

individual, e.g. A d a m or A r n a u l d . A v e r y i m p o r t a n t n e w feature w h i c h
enters at this p o i n t is that w e n o w have t o take account o f singular
propositions, w h i c h i n v o l v e perfectly determinate dates and m a y
involve perfectly determinate places; e.g. Queen Elizabeth sneezed at
5 p.m. on Christmas Day 1597.
T h e next p o i n t t o notice is that the n o t i o n o f an i n d i v i d u a l is the
n o t i o n o f something w h i c h persists for a finite t i m e , however short;
and w h i c h is i n a perfectly determinate state i n respect o f each o f its
determinable characteristics at every m o m e n t o f its history. Its states
at every m o m e n t between t w o assigned moments m a y be all exactly
alike, or they m a y n o t . h i the f o r m e r case w e should say that the
individual has remained unchanged between the t w o moments; i n
the latter that i t has changed, either suddenly or continuously, between
them. B u t i n either case the n o t i o n o f any i n d i v i d u a l involves an
infinite number o f singular propositions specifying its states at a
continuous series o f moments. I t is therefore plain, as Leibniz asserts,
that no h u m a n being could have an adequate and distinct idea o f the
complete n o t i o n o f any individual, whether actual or possible.
The various propositions w h i c h are true o f an i n d i v i d u a l , e.g. a
certain b i t o f g o l d , are o f t w o different kinds, viz. поп-dispositional and
dispositional. I t is a non-dispositional proposition that i t has a certain
temperature at a certain m o m e n t . I t is a dispositional proposition that,
if and only if at any t i m e its temperature should be at or above ю б 2 ° С ,
it would then be l i q u i d . The dispositional propositions w h i c h are true

o f a n i n d i v i d u a l are ofvarious orders ofgenerality. Some h o l d equally
o£all bits o f m a t t e r , e.g. the l a w o f i n e r t i a . Some are true o n l y o f t h e
particular k i n d o f matter, e.g. gold, t o w h i c h the i n d i v i d u a l belongs,
e.g. that i t w o u l d melt at ю б 2 ° С . W e must also contemplate the
possibility o f dispositional propositions w h i c h are peculiar t o an i n d i
vidual, and are n o t deducible f r o m m o r e general ones together w i t h
the non-dispositional propositions w h i c h are true o f i t . There m i g h t ,
e.g., be certain dispositional propositions w h i c h are true o f a certain
person and are n o t deducible f r o m the general laws o f h u m a n psycho
l o g y together w i t h non-dispositional facts about that person.
I t is plain that n o t all the propositions w h i c h are true o f a n i n d i v i d u a l
are logically independent o f each other. T h e proposition: This bit of
gold is liquid at the instant t follows logically f r o m This bit of gold has a
temperature of io02°C at t and The melting point ofgold is юб2°С. W e
can therefore conceive a sub-class ofpropositions chosen o n the f o l l o w
i n g principles out o f the sum-total o f propositions w h i c h are true o f a
certain i n d i v i d u a l , ( i ) N o proposition i n the set is t o be entailed b y any
combination o f the others i n the set. (2) E v e r y true proposition about
the i n d i v i d u a l w h i c h is not contained i n the set is t o be entailed b y some
combination o f the propositions w h i c h are contained i n i t . I w i l l call
any such set a 'nuclear sub-set' for that i n d i v i d u a l . There m i g h t , o f
course, be m a n y alternative nuclear sub-sets f o r the same i n d i v i d u a l .
A n y nuclear sub-set w o u l d suffice t o distinguish an i n d i v i d u a l , n o t
o n l y f r o m every other actual i n d i v i d u a l , b u t also f r o m every other
possible i n d i v i d u a l . T h a t is because a nuclear sub-set entails all the
other propositions w h i c h are true o f the i n d i v i d u a l . A selection o f
propositions w h i c h is non-nuclear m a y suffice t o distinguish an actual
individual f r o m all other actual individuals, or t o distinguish a possible
i n d i v i d u a l f r o m all other possible individuals w h i c h belong t o the
same possible world. Thus, e.g., the p r o p e r t y o f being a m a n w i t h o u t
h u m a n parents suffices t o distinguish the actual A d a m f r o m all other
actual individuals. B u t i t does n o t entail all the other predicates w h i c h
belong t o the actual A d a m , and i t does n o t suffice t o distinguish the
actual A d a m f r o m all other possible individuals. Speaking i n Leibnizian
terms, w e m i g h t say that every proposition i n a nuclear sub-set is the
expression o f a free decree o f God, actual or possible, i n regard t o the
actual or possible w o r l d o f w h i c h the i n d i v i d u a l i n question is a m e m
ber.
Before summarizing this account o f w h a t is meant b y the complete
notion of an individual I w i l l define the sense i n w h i c h I shall use the w o r d
22 LEIBNIZ! AN INTRODUCTION
'predicate'. Suppose that a certain b i t o f g o l d was sometimes solid and

sometimes l i q u i d . I shall call 'solidity' and ' l i q u i d i t y ' characteristics, and
n o t predicates, o f t h e g o l d . I shall say that being l i q u i d o n each different
occasion was a different predicate o f the g o l d . W e m i g h t call the k i n d
ofpredicate w h i c h is expressed b y the phrase 'having the characteristic
Q at the m o m e n t t' an 'instantaneous predicate'. Besides these there are
various kinds o(temporallygeneralizedpredicates, e.g. 'characterized b y
Q sometimes', 'characterized b y Q always', 'characterized b y Q at all
moments between t and f '; and so on. I t should be noted that a dis
1 2
positional characteristic may be either permanent or variable. Thus a

bit o f pure i r o n has the same m e l t i n g p o i n t at all times and under all
circumstances; b u t under certain conditions i t is magnetic for a period,
and under other circumstances i t is non-magnetic for a period. O n
the other hand, the characteristic o f being magnetizable and demag-
netizable under certain conditions belongs to a b i t o f i r o n at every
moment.
I w i l l n o w summarize the position as follows. T h e complete n o t i o n
o f an i n d i v i d u a l consists o f every predicate o f i t w h i c h refers t o any
m o m e n t i n its history. This collection w i l l always contain predicates
o f t w o different kinds, viz. non-dispositional and dispositional. T h e
dispositional characteristics w i l l be o f various orders o f generality,
and i t is possible that some o f t h e m m a y be peculiar t o the i n d i v i d u a l
i n question. W i t h i n the complete n o t i o n o f an i n d i v i d u a l there w i l l be
one or more nuclear sub-sets. A n y nuclear sub-set consists ofpredicates
w h i c h are ( i ) logically independent o f each other, and ( 2 ) together
entail all the other predicates i n the complete n o t i o n . A nuclear sub
set w i l l always contain b o t h dispositional and non-dispositional pre
dicates. T h e predicates i n a nuclear sub-set w o u l d suffice t o distinguish
an i n d i v i d u a l f r o m all other individuals, actual or possible. B u t an
actual individual may be distinguished f r o m all other actual individuals,
t h o u g h n o t f r o m all other possible individuals, b y a selection o f pre
dicates w h i c h do n o t constitute a nuclear sub-set.
4.2.I Does every individual have a complete notion?
This question reduces t o the f o l l o w i n g . Does the phrase 'every pre

dicate o f an i n d i v i d u a l w h i c h refers t o any m o m e n t o f its history'
denote a genuine collection w h i c h is, i n some intelligible sense, c o m
plete at every moment, including those moments ( i f such there be) be
fore this individual began to exist? E v i d e n t l y Leibniz thought that the
answer is Yes.
LEIBNIZ'S GENERAL PRINCIPLES 23
T h e case f o r an affirmative answer can be p u t most plausibly as

follows. Suppose i t is a fact that Queen Elizabeth sneezed at 5 p . m .
on Christmas D a y 1597. T h e n anyone w h o at any m o m e n t before
then had said 'Queen Elizabeth will sneeze at 5 p . m . o n Christmas D a y
1597' w o u l d have been speaking t r u l y . A n d anyone w h o at any m o
ment after then had said: 'Queen Elizabeth did sneeze at 5 p . m . o n
Christmas D a y 1597' w o u l d have been speaking t r u l y . I f w e consider
these sentences, and the beliefs w h i c h they w o u l d correctly express,
w e find that w e can distinguish a common content and a difference of tense.
W e can also distinguish between w h a t m i g h t be called the time of
occurrence and the time of reference. T h e c o m m o n content refers to an
individual (Queen Elizabeth), a characteristic (sneezing), and a date.
T h a t date is the date o f reference. T h e difference o f tense is expressed
b y the difference between the copulas ' w i l l ' , 'is n o w ' , and ' d i d ' . I t
seems plausible t o suggest that the c o m m o n content is a fact about
Queen Elizabeth and sneezing and the date o f reference, w h i c h ,
although i t contains that date as a constituent, has itself n o date o f
occurrence. Such a fact m i g h t be expressed b y the f o r m u l a ' 5 is tense-
lessly characterized b y Q at t' T h e various beliefs or utterances, w i t h
their various dates ofoccurrence, are made true b y corresponding w i t h
this tenseless fact about an individual, a characteristic, and a date o f
reference. T h e differences i n tense correspond t o the temporal relation
between the date o f occurrence o f the belief or utterance and the date
o f reference w h i c h is a constituent i n the fact o f tenseless characteriz
ation, Thus, e.g., the total fact w h i c h corresponds t o a true b e l i e f a t i x
that S w i l l be characterized b y Q at r consists o f t w o facts; v i z . (1) the

2
fact that S is tenselessly characterized b y Q at t , and (2) the fact that

2
i is tenselessly either than ( . There are t w o and o n l y t w o kinds o f

x 2
change w h i c h can happen t o a fact o f tenseless characterization. One

is that the date o f reference i n i t alters continually i n respect o f the
purely temporal p r o p e r t y o f pastness, presentness, and f u t u r i t y . I t
becomes less and less remotely future, then present, and then m o r e and
m o r e remotely past. B u t the fact itself, h a v i n g n o date o f occurrence,
undergoes n o such change. The other change is that, whilst such a fact
cannot be known b y any h u m a n being at any date earlier than the date
ofreference i n i t , i t m a y become k n o w n f r o m t i m e t o t i m e at any date
w h i c h is not earlier than that date.
This line o f argument, f o r w h a t i t is w o r t h , is quite independent o f

theological considerations. B u t Leibniz w o u l d no doubt have added
that G o d k n e w at every m o m e n t before 5 p . m . o n Christmas D a y
1597 that Queen Elizabeth w o u l d then sneeze. Therefore, he w o u l d
say, there must have been this fact or true proposition t o be the object
o f God's acts o f k n o w i n g at each o f these moments.
4.2.2 T h e o n t o l o g i c a l c o r r e h t e o f t h e c o m p l e t e n o t i o n
Leibniz thinks that m a n y i m p o r t a n t and surprising ontological c o n

sequences f o l l o w f r o m the principle that every i n d i v i d u a l has a c o m
plete n o t i o n w h i c h contains all its predicates. I t is n o t easy to believe
that any i m p o r t a n t ontological consequences could be entailed b y
such an extremely general logical principle alone. One is inclined t o
t h i n k that other principles must have been u n w i t t i n g l y combined w i t h
i t i n Leibniz's m i n d .
I suspect the reasoning at the back o f L e i b n i z ' s m i n d m a y be illus
trated as follows. Since i t was already true w h e n Queen Elizabeth was
first created that she w o u l d sneeze at 5 p . m . o n Christmas D a y 1597,
she must have been created w i t h a certain special modification corres
p o n d i n g t o this fact about her. Since i t is true at every m o m e n t o f h e r
history up to the date o f reference that she w i l l sneeze at that date,
this modification must have persisted up to then. A n d , since i t is true
at every m o m e n t after that date that she d i d sneeze then, the same
modification must persist i n her as l o n g as she continues t o exist. The
persistent modification i n the actual substance is, so t o speak, the onto
logical correlate o f the fact o f tenseless characterization i n the complete
notion o f the substance. N o w all that happens t o the fact o f tenseless
characterization is that the date, w h i c h is its temporal constituent,
becomes less and less remotely future, then present, and then m o r e
and more remotely past. Similarly, all that happens to the correlated
modification o f the substance is its emergence f r o m quiescence i n t o
activity and its subsequent reversion to quiescence. Corresponding t o
every non-dispositional fact o f tenseless characterization i n the n o t i o n
o f a substance there w o u l d be a special m o d i f i c a t i o n o f the substance.
This persists t h r o u g h o u t the w h o l e o f i t s history, explodes i n t o activity
at the m o m e n t w h e n the date ofreference i n the fact becomes present,
and then reverts for ever i n t o quiescence.
N o w this k i n d o f theory or picture is quite familiar i n regard t o

dispositional properties. T h e conditional fact ' I f a b i t o f g o l d were at
any time raised to io62°C, i t w o u l d then m e l t ' is c o m m o n l y believed
to correspond to a certain persistent structural peculiarity present i n
every b i t o f g o l d at every m o m e n t o f i t s history. This k i n d ofpersistent
modification may, however, burst w i t h activity o n m a n y occasions.
I t w i l l do so whenever the conditions mentioned i n the antecedent
o f the conditional fact are fulfilled. Cf. also the theory o f persistent
traces i n connexion w i t h m e m o r y .
I t seems t o me plain that Leibniz thinks o f any substance as c o m i n g
i n t o existence w i t h a stock o f innate modifications corresponding
(1) t o every non-dispositional fact oftenseless characterization referring
to any m o m e n t i n its history, and (2) to every dispositional fact about
i t , whether referring t o every m o m e n t or t o certain periods i n its
history. This seems t o m e t o be the suppressed premiss w h i c h has t o
be combined w i t h the Predicate-in-Notion Principle i f one is to d r a w
f r o m i t anything like the ontological consequences w h i c h Leibniz
drew.
I t seems plain to me that i t is an independent premiss. I t m a y have
been suggested to Leibniz b y the Predicate-in-Notion Principle, and he
m a y have seen no other w a y i n w h i c h the complete n o t i o n o f a possible
substance could be embodied i n that substance w h e n i t was actualized
b y God's creative act. B u t I do n o t t h i n k that one can pretend that i t
is logically entailed b y the Predicate-in-Notion Principle.
4.3 I s the P r e d i c a t e - i n - N o t i o n P r i n c i p l e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h
there b e i n g c o n t i n g e n t facts?
I n discussing this question i t w i l l be best t o begin b y considering certain

sentences. W e m a y call the sentence ' T h e Protestant daughter o f
H e n r y V I I I was a Protestant' explicitly analytic. T h e sentences 'Queen
Elizabeth was a Protestant' and 'The u n m a r r i e d daughter o f H e n r y
V I I I was a Protestant' are n o t explicitly analytic. B u t that is also true
o f the sentence 'The sun rises i n the east.' I f w e consider this last sen
tence, w e can raise the f o l l o w i n g question. W h a t do w e understand b y
'east'? Does i t mean j u s t 'the quarter i n w h i c h the sun rises'? I f w e
substitute this definiens f o r the w o r d 'east', the sentence becomes
explicitly analytic. B u t suppose that w e take the w o r d 'east' to be
defined b y reference to the w a y i n w h i c h a suspended compass-needle
sets itself. T h e n substitution o f the definiens does n o t make the sentence
explicitly analytic.
Suppose n o w that a sentence, w h i c h is n o t explicitly analytic, c o n
tains a w o r d or phrase w h i c h has a c o m m o n l y accepted definition or
description. Suppose that, w h e n this definition or description is
substituted f o r that w o r d or phrase, the sentence becomes explicitly
analytic. T h e n I should call the original sentence implicitly analytic.
Thus, i f the c o m m o n l y accepted definition or description o f 'east' is
'the quarter i n w h i c h the sun rises', the sentence 'The sun rises i n the
east' is i m p l i c i t l y analytic. A sentence m i g h t have to be transformed

i n several successive stages before i t becomes explicitly analytic. I f a
sentence is neither explicitly n o r i m p l i c i t l y analytic, w e w i l l call i t
synthetic.
N o w a sentence like 'Queen Elizabeth was a Protestant' or 'The
unmarried daughter o f H e n r y V I I I was a Protestant' is certainly n o t
explicitly analytic. A g a i n , since a grammatical proper name, like
'Queen Elizabeth', has n o c o m m o n l y accepted definition or descrip
t i o n , the f o r m e r sentence is n o t i m p l i c i t l y analytic. Lastly, n o sub
stitution o f c o m m o n l y accepted definitions or descriptions f o r the
w o r d 'Protestant' or the phrase 'unmarried daughter' w i l l make the
second sentence explicitly analytic. So these t w o sentences are syn
thetic. T h e same is true o f any sentence whose grammatical subject is
the grammatical proper name o f a n individual. A n d i t is true o f m o s t
sentences i n w h i c h the grammatical subject is a phrase w h i c h uniquely
describes an i n d i v i d u a l .
W h e n a person refers to an historical i n d i v i d u a l b y a grammatical
proper name, such as 'Queen Elizabeth', he must have at the back o f
his m i n d some sort o f description o f the i n d i v i d u a l i n question. I t
m i g h t o f course merely be o f the f o r m 'the person w h o is referred t o
i n books o n English history as " Q u e e n Elizabeth" '. For i t is plain that
no grammatical proper name, used o f an i n d i v i d u a l w h o m one has
never met, can possibly f u n c t i o n as a logical proper name, as the w o r d
'that' m i g h t do i f one pointed t o a certain visible object and said 'That
is a cow.' So, f o r the present purpose, the sentence 'Queen Elizabeth
was a Protestant' is really equivalent t o a sentence o f the f o r m 'The
person w h o answered t o such and such a description was a P r o
testant.'
N o w i n general one does n o t k n o w w h a t description is at the back
o f a person's m i n d w h e n he utters or understands such a sentence.
O f t e n the person himself w o u l d be hard p u t to i t to say w h a t i t is.
Perhaps the most that can be said is that a certain complex mental
disposition, w h i c h he has acquired i n the course o f h i s reading, is active
at the t i m e . This checks h i m and gives h i m a feeling ofintellectual dis
c o m f o r t i f h e uses the name h i m s e l f o r hears i t used b y others outside
a certain l i m i t e d range o f contexts. T h e description w h i c h is attached
to the name w i l l almost certainly v a r y f r o m person to person and
f r o m one occasion t o another w i t h the same person. I t m i g h t happen
f o r a certain person o n a certain occasion t o include the p r o p e r t y o f
being a Protestant. H e m i g h t , e.g., be t h i n k i n g o f Queen Elizabeth as
the first Protestant queen o f E n g l a n d i n her o w n r i g h t . I f s o , w e m i g h t
say that the sentence w o u l d be, for that person and o n that occasion,
i m p l i c i t l y analytic, i n spite o f t h e fact that the name 'Queen Elizabeth'
has n o c o m m o n l y accepted definition or description.
I n general, i f a proposition about a t e r m is t o be necessary, the
f o l l o w i n g conditions must be fulfilled, ( i ) T h e t e r m must have a
c o m m o n l y accepted definition or description. (2) T h e proposition i n
question must be entailed either b y this definition o r description alone,
or b y i t i n combination w i t h premisses all o f w h i c h are necessary. I t is
plain that these conditions are n o t fulfilled i n the case o f most singular
propositions about individuals. N 0 i n d i v i d u a l has a definition, and i n
the case o f m o s t o f t h e m there is n o t h i n g that could be called a generally
accepted description. A n d , even i f the first c o n d i t i o n were fulfilled,
the second w o u l d break d o w n as regards most singular propositions
about individuals.
N o w the Predicate-in-Notion Principle, as I have interpreted i t ,
asserts that there is f o r every i n d i v i d u a l a collection o f facts o f the
f o r m ' 5 is tenselessly characterized b y Q at f'; and that each such fact,
t h o u g h i t contains a date o f reference as a constituent, has n o date o f
occurrence b u t subsists timelessly. I t h i n k i t is plain that this does n o t
entail that an i n d i v i d u a l has a generally accepted definition or descrip
t i o n . A n d i t does n o t entail that, i f an i n d i v i d u a l had such a definition
o r description, every true proposition about i t w o u l d f o l l o w either
f r o m this alone or f r o m this i n conjunction w i t h premisses all o f w h i c h
are necessary. T h e Principle is therefore compatible w i t h there being
contingent facts.
4.4 I s t h e P r e d i c a t e - i n - N o t i o n P r i n c i p l e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h
h u m a n freedom ?
The Principle m i g h t be compatible w i t h there being contingent facts

and yet incompatible w i t h h u m a n freedom. Freedom is impossible
w i t h o u t contingency, b u t contingency does n o t entail freedom. T h e
fact that Vesuvius erupted and destroyed Pompei i n A . D . 79 w o u l d be
held b y Leibniz and b y m a n y other philosophers to be contingent, b u t
n o one regards i t as a free act on the part o f t h e volcano.
I f the Predicate-in-Notion Principle is true, the future is already
determinate. I t was true at the t i m e o f Romulus and Remus that Julius
Caesar w o u l d decide at a certain future date t o cross the Rubicon. B u t
this leaves entirely open the question whether Caesar's decision was
causally determined. T h a t is a question about the connexion o f t h a t event
w i t h contemporary and earlier events and relationships and w i t h
Julius Caesar's dispositional properties. I t is r o u g h l y the question 'Was

there a set o f contemporary and earlier events and relationships f r o m
w h i c h , together w i t h the actual laws o f n a t u r e and the dispositional
properties o f Caesar, i t follows logically that Caesar w i l l decide at a
certainmoment to cross the Rubicon?' I t seems to m e thatthe Predicate-
i n - N o t i o n Principle leaves that question entirely open. I t is therefore
compatible w i t h v o l u n t a r y decisions n o t being completely determined
causally b y other events within nature.
O n the other hand, i t seems to m e clear that Caesar's decision and
every other event i n his history was causally necessitated b y God's
decision to create a person o f that k i n d and w i t h that history i n a w o r l d
w i t h such-and-such laws o f physics and psychology. I t was therefore
determined b y an event outside nature, viz. God's choice o f a certain
possible w o r l d and his creative actualization o f that w o r l d . Leibniz
wriggles a great deal o n this p o i n t , b u t I cannot see that he can evade i t .
4.4.1 L e i b n i z ' s v i e w s a b o u t f r e e d o m a n d d e t e r m i n i s m
The best account that Leibniz gave o f his views is t o be f o u n d i n p p .

16-24 o f C o u t u r a t ' s Opuscules et fragments de Leibniz. T h e theory m a y
1
be stated as follows.
Leibniz first distinguishes between metaphysical necessity and c o n
tingency. This w e have already dealt w i t h . I t remains to consider w h a t
he meant b y 'physical necessity'.
T h e behaviour o f any actual b o d y under given conditions is physi
cally necessary, t h o u g h metaphysically contingent. This means that its
behaviour is entailed b y the nature o f the b o d y and the circumstances
i n w h i c h i t is placed and its past history together w i t h the general laws
o f physics w h i c h h o l d i n the actual w o r l d . B u t these laws are meta
physically contingent. T h e y were freely w i l l e d by G o d because he saw
that a w o r l d i n w h i c h they h o l d w o u l d be better o n the w h o l e than one
i n w h i c h different laws held. I t is, e.g., physically necessary that an
unsupported b o d y at rest near the earth's surface should fall to the
g r o u n d i f its specific gravity is greater than that o f air; f o r this is
entailed b y the nature o f a c t u a l bodies, and the l a w o f g r a v i t a t i o n , and
the principle o f Archimedes. B u t the l a w and the principle are meta
physically contingent; and so the fall o f s u c h a body, t h o u g h physically
necessary, is metaphysically contingent.
There is, however, one further qualification to be made. G o d may
have decided, w h e n he chose o u t a certain possible w o r l d and actualized
1
[Morris and Parkinson, 96-105.]
i t , that the l a w o f gravitation should be suspended i n a certain case,

because he foresaw that i t w o u l d be undesirable o n the w h o l e that a
certain unsupported b o d y should fall t o the g r o u n d o n a certain
occasion. T h e b o d y w o u l d then n o t fall, and w e should call the event
a 'miracle'. So w e can say that physically necessary events are, i n
theory, predictable f r o m a sufficient knowledge o f the circumstances
o f the case and the laws o f the actual w o r l d , p r o v i d e d o n l y that G o d
has n o t prearranged that the laws shall be miraculously suspended.
W e come n o w t o the v o l u n t a r y actions o f intelligent beings.
Leibniz holds that they are determined, b u t are neither metaphysically
nor physically necessary. W e w i l l n o w consider w h a t he means b y
these statements.
( 1 ) H e holds as strongly as Spinoza that all talk o f a n undetermined
event, i n the sense o f an event f o r w h i c h there is no sufficient reason,
is nonsensical. T h e fact that a person w i l l deliberately choose a certain
action at a certain date is timelessly contained i n the complete n o t i o n
o f h i m . G o d contemplated these v o l u n t a r y actions first as mere possi
bilities, and then made his decision t o actualize a certain w o r l d c o n
taining that person, i n v i e w o f w h a t he had foreseen. So the ultimate
reason f o r the occurrence o f any h u m a n action is the fact that a w o r l d
containing a certain person w h o w i l l act i n a certain w a y o n a certain
occasion is, and was foreseen b y G o d t o be, o n the w h o l e better than
any alternative possible w o r l d . T h e action is thus u l t i m a t e l y determined
b y God's decision t o actualize that w o r l d . I t is therefore n o t undeter
m i n e d . G o d k n o w s i n detail the reasons for i t , i.e. he k n o w s h o w
precisely a w o r l d w h i c h had n o t contained this person d o i n g this
action o n this occasion w o u l d have been inferior o n the w h o l e t o the
actual w o r l d . W e cannot k n o w the reason i n detail; w e can o n l y k n o w
i n principle that there must be a reason and that i t must be o f t h a t k i n d .
I said that Leibniz and Spinoza agree that t o talk o f an undetermined
event is nonsensical. Nevertheless, they meant v e r y different things.
Leibniz meant w h a t I have just said. Spinoza meant that all events are
metaphysically necessary.
(2) W h e n Leibniz says that h u m a n v o l u n t a r y actions are n o t even
physically necessary he must, I t h i n k , mean the f o l l o w i n g . E v e n apart
f r o m the possibility o f a miraculous suspension o f the laws o f psycho
l o g y , i t is theoretically impossible to predict w i t h complete certainty
w h a t any m a n w i l l choose i n given circumstances, n o matter h o w
complete a knowledge one m i g h t have o f all the other facts about h i m
and o f the laws o f psychology.
I f this is w h a t he means, I t h i n k i t is i m p o r t a n t and m a y w e l l be
true. H u m a n minds have an i n d i v i d u a l i t y w h i c h , so far as w e k n o w ,

does n o t belong t o bits o f matter. There are certain laws w h i c h h o l d
for all kinds o f matter, viz. the laws o f m o t i o n . T h e n again one can
determine once and for all the characteristic dispositional properties o f
a particular k i n d o f m a t t e r , e.g. copper, f r o m a f e w samples o f i t , and
then conclude that they are present i n other samples w h i c h have n o t
been tested. B u t the dispositional properties o f a h u m a n being can be
discovered o n l y b y observations made o n him. M o r e o v e r they are
liable t o change i n the course o f a person's life i n ways that cannot be
predicted w i t h any certainty. For these reasons the v o l u n t a r y actions
o f a person could n o t be predicted, even i n theory and barring miracles,
w i t h complete certainty f r o m any conceivable extension o f our k n o w
ledge o f t h e laws o f p s y c h o l o g y , o f h i s past history, and o f h i s present
circumstances.
I t remains to notice some m o r e special remarks w h i c h Leibniz makes
o n these topics:
( i ) W h a t does he mean b y saying i n the Letters to Arnauld that, i n
the case o f contingent facts, 'reasons m a y incline w i t h o u t necessitat
i n g ' ? I n considering a proposition and the reasons for i t there are t w o
1
different questions to be raised, (a) A r e the premisses necessary or

contingent? (b) Is the connexion between the premisses and the c o n
clusion demonstrative or merely confirmatory? h i pure mathematics,
e.g., the premisses are neccessary and the connexion is demonstrative.
W h e n a physician makes a diagnosis o f a patient's disease f r o m a
knowledge o f his symptoms and o f r o u g h l y parallel cases i n the past,
the premisses are contingent and the connexion is merely c o n f i r m a t o r y .
N o w , w h e n Leibniz talks o f cases where reasons incline b u t do n o t
necessitate, I t h i n k he must mean, n o t o n l y that the reasons are c o n
tingent, b u t also that they are insufficient to entail the conclusion b u t
sufficient t o give i t a p r o b a b i l i t y greater than one-half. I f w e apply
this to the case o f h u m a n v o l u n t a r y decisions, i t comes t o the f o l l o w i n g ,
(a) I f y o u k n o w enough about a person's past history and present
situation and the laws o f h u m a n psychology, y o u can make v e r y
probable guesses as t o h o w he w i l l decide. B u t (b) however m u c h
y o u r knowledge o n these matters m i g h t be increased, i t w o u l d be
insufficient t o enable y o u t o make a prediction w h i c h w o u l d be
absolutely certain barring miracles.
This interpretation seems t o me t o be supported b y the f o l l o w i n g
quotation f r o m p. 21 o f C o u t u r a t ' s Fragments. Leibniz says there: ' I t
2
1
( G . , I I , 4 6 . M a s o n , 50. C f . G . , I I , 12. M a s o n , 5.]
2
[ M o r r i s a n d P a r k i n s o n , 101.]
LEIBNIz's GENERAL PRINCIPLES 3i
is n o t physically necessary that a m a n shall choose a certain alternative,

h o w e v e r attractive and appreciably g o o d i t m a y seem to h i m , t h o u g h
there is an extremely strong presumption that he w i l l do so.'
(2) Leibniz draws a distinction between m e n i n this life, o n the one
hand, and angels andjust m e n made perfect, o n the other. H e says that
it is impossible that any person should choose w h a t appears t o h i m at
the t i m e t o be the worse o f t w o alternatives. B u t i t is neither meta
physically n o r physically necessary that a m a n i n this life should choose
what appears to h i m to be the better o f t w o alternatives. H e can often
defer decision and t u r n his m i n d t o other subjects, and i t is impossible
t o be sure beforehand whether he w i l l do so or not. This is n o t so w i t h
g o o d angels and just m e n made perfect. I t is physically necessary that
they should always act virtuously, and therefore i t w o u l d be theoreti
cally possible to predict h o w they w o u l d decide o n any occasion i n
w h i c h m o r a l considerations entered, barring miracles.
(3) Leibniz believed that a great m a n y o f the states o f any h u m a n
m i n d are so feeble i n intensity and so m u c h l i k e m a n y other c o n
temporary states o f the same m i n d that they cannot be introspectively
discriminated. Such states he calls 'unconscious perceptions'. H e holds
that the belief that there are undetermined decisions arises f r o m the
fact that w e confme our search for the causes o f our decisions to c o n
scious mental states and ignore the existence and the causal efficacy
o f unconscious ones. Even i f a decision is always completely deter
m i n e d b y previous states, i t is seldom or never completely determined
b y previous conscious states. So, i f w e confine our attention to conscious
states and forget about unconscious ones, w e shall be inclined t o say
that such a decision was n o t completely determined.
5 Principle o f Sufficient R e a s o n , c o n t i n g e n c y , a n d infinite

complexity
There has been a g o o d deal o f controversy as to Leibniz's views o n the

relations between contingency, infinite complexity, and the Principle
o f Sufficient Reason. I w i l l begin b y collecting the most i m p o r t a n t o f
the views w h i c h Leibniz expressed o n various occasions o n this topic.
(1) A l l existential propositions, except the existence o f G o d , are
contingent. Leibniz accepted the Ontological A r g u m e n t , and there
fore held that the existence o f G o d is contained i n the n o t i o n o f h i m .
( 2 ) A contingent proposition is true or false, as the case m a y be, i n the
actual w o r l d ; b u t n o t i n all possible worlds. Necessary propositions are
true i n all possible worlds. (3) Necessary propositions can be seen
directly t o be analytic or they can be reduced t o explicitly analytic

propositions b y a fmite analysis. N o contingent proposition can be
made explicitly analytic, n o matter h o w far the analysis o f its terms
m a y be carried. Leibniz says: ' O n l y G o d , w h o can comprehend the
infinitely complex i n one act, can see h o w the predicate is contained
i n the subject, and can understand a priori the reason for a contingent
fact.' Finite creatures have to learn such facts aposteriori b y experience.
1
Leibniz is also f o n d o f comparing the analysis o f a necessary fact t o

analysing an integer i n t o a fmite number o f p r i m e factors. A n d he
compares the attempted analysis o f a contingent fact to the attempt t o
approximate t o a surd, like y^2, b y means o f infinite series or infinite
continued fractions, w h i c h at n o stage are exactly equal t o i t . (4) T h e
opposite o f any necessary proposition involves a contradiction. W e
m a y therefore say that the L a w o f Contradiction is the principle o n
w h i c h all necessary propositions rest. T h e opposite o f any contingent
proposition is possible and involves n o contradiction; Nevertheless
there is a sufficient reason f o r the t r u t h o f every true contingent
proposition. So w e m a y say that contingent propositions depend
o n the Principle o f Sufficient Reason. (5) Contingent propositions are
dependent o n God's w i l l t o actualize a certain one o f the possible
worlds. Necessary propositions are w h o l l y independent o f God's
w i l l . (6) There are universal contingent propositions as w e l l as
singular and particular ones. T h e actual laws o f nature are universal
b u t contingent. B u t Leibniz seems t o have held that i t is part o f the
n o t i o n o f a w o r l d that there should be some general laws w h i c h h o l d
in it.
5.1 C o n t i n g e n t facts a n d G o d ' s c h o i c e o f t h e best
Let us consider an example w h i c h Leibniz discusses i n his Letters to

Arnauld, viz. Adam's act o f disobedience i n eating the apple. Leibniz
has t o h o l d that this is contained i n the n o t i o n o f t h e actual A d a m ; that
i t is nevertheless contingent; that i t depends o n God's w i l l to create
the actual A d a m ; and that i t is nevertheless i n a sense contrary to God's
w i l l . 1 t h i n k that the essential points m a y be stated as follows.
2
I t is possible i n m a n y different ways t o make a selection out o f the

properties o f the actual A d a m w h i c h w o u l d suffice to distinguish h i m
f r o m all other actual individuals. A n y such selection o f properties
constitutes a sufficient description o f the actual A d a m . I f all superfluous
1
[ C o u t u r a t , 17. M o r r i s a n d P a r k i n s o n , 9 7 . ]
2
[ G . , I I ,47-59- Loemker, 3 3 i - 8 . ]
properties are left out o f a sufficient description o f the actual A d a m w e

have a minimal sufficient description o f h i m . N o w anything that answered
t o any m i n i m a l sufficient description o f the actual A d a m m i g h t be
called a 'possible A d a m ' .
N o w i t is quite certain that some at least o f the m i n i m a l sufficient
descriptions o f the actual A d a m , even i f w e p u t i n t o t h e m the actual
laws o f nature, do n o t contain or logically entail the property o f dis
obeying God. E.g. w e m i g h t sufficiently describe the actual A d a m as a
m a n w i t h o u t h u m a n parents. There is plainly n o direct or indirect
contradiction i n the proposition 'The m a n w i t h o u t h u m a n parents d i d
n o t disobey G o d . ' I n this sense w e can say that there is a possible A d a m
w h o w o u l d have obeyed G o d . h i general, the properties included i n
any m i n i m a l sufficient description o f a n y actual i n d i v i d u a l could, w i t h
o u t contradiction, be supplemented i n innumerable different alter
native ways. A n y proposition, ascribing t o an i n d i v i d u a l w h o answers
t o that description any predicate n o t contained i n or entailed b y that
description, is contingent.
Suppose w e take any m i n i m a l sufficient description o f the actual
A d a m w h i c h does n o t include or logically entail the p r o p e r t y o f
disobeying God. T h e n w e can say that i t depends o n God's choice
whether there should be anything answering t o that description or
not. A n d w e can say that, i f G o d should decide t o actualize an i n d i v i
dual answering to that description, i t w i l l still depend o n God's choice
whether that i n d i v i d u a l does or does n o t have the further p r o p e r t y o f
disobeying G o d .
N o w contrast this w i t h the case o f a k i n d o f g e o m e t r i c a l figure, e.g.
the circle, o n the supposition ( w h i c h he w o u l d n o doubt have assumed)
that the axioms o f E u c l i d are necessary propositions. Any p r o p e r t y
w h i c h is sufficient t o distinguish the circle f r o m other kinds o f geo
metrical figures w o u l d , i n c o m b i n a t i o n w i t h the axioms o f E u c l i d ,
entail all the other geometrical properties c o m m o n and peculiar t o
circles. Suppose w e take any m i n i m a l sufficient description o f the
circle. N o doubt i t w o u l d have been open t o G o d n o t t o create any
t h i n g answering t o that description. B u t , ifhe d i d so and i f t h e axioms
o f E u c l i d were necessary propositions, he could n o t help i t having all
the geometrical properties w h i c h are c o m m o n and peculiar t o circles.
W e see then that there is g o o d sense i n saying that the t r u t h o f the
contingent proposition that A d a m disobeyed G o d is dependent o n
God's w i l l , whilst the t r u t h o f the necessary proposition that ^/2 is
irrational is independent o f God's w i l l . B u t i t sounds paradoxical t o
say that G o d w i l l e d that A d a m should disobey h i m , and that i t was i n
consequence o f God's w i l l that A d a m was disobedient. These para

doxes are, however, merely verbal. T h e solution is as follows.
A c c o r d i n g to Leibniz G o d contemplated all the various possible
w o r l d s and actualized that one w h i c h w o u l d contain the greatest
balance o f g o o d over evil. Some o f the possible w o r l d s w o u l d have
contained an i n d i v i d u a l answering to any description o f A d a m w h i c h
w e m a y take, and some w o u l d not. I n some o f the possible w o r l d s
containing such an i n d i v i d u a l the complete n o t i o n o f h i m w o u l d have
contained the predicate o f disobeying God, i n others i t w o u l d have
contained the predicate o f obeying G o d . Since the actual w o r l d c o n
tains an A d a m w h o disobeyed God, G o d must have seen that that
possible w o r l d was better o n the w h o l e , i n spite o f t h i s , than any w h i c h
contained no A d a m or an obedient A d a m . G o d foresaw the dis
obedience o f the actual A d a m and decided to actualize a w o r l d c o n
taining a disobedient A d a m , because he saw that o n the w h o l e i t was
better than any other possibility open to h i m . T h a t is the sense i n w h i c h
Adam's disobedience was a consequence o f God's w i l l .
W e must distinguish, as Leibniz says, between God's antecedent and
his consequent volitions. God's antecedent v o l i t i o n was for an obedient
A d a m , i.e. he w o u l d have preferred an obedient A d a m to a dis
obedient one i f he could have chosen simply between those t w o
alternatives. B u t he could not. H e had t o choose between a total state
o f affairs containing a disobedient A d a m , and other total states o f
affairs containing n o A d a m or an obedient one. As he saw that the
f o r m e r was on the whole better than any o f the latter, his consequent
v o l i t i o n was for a disobedient A d a m . E.g. w i t h o u t a fall there could
have been no redemption and perhaps no incarnation. A n d G o d m a y
have seen that the value o f the redemption and the incarnation o u t
weighed the disvalue o f the fall.
5.2 Infinite c o m p l e x i t y a n d c o n t i n g e n c y
There is admittedly some close connexion i n Leibniz's m i n d between

infinite complexity, contingency, and the Principle o f Sufficient Rea
son; b u t there is a difference o f o p i n i o n a m o n g commentators as to
w h a t precisely the connexion is. I w i l l first give m y o w n suggestion.
I t h i n k that Leibniz meant b y the Principle o f Sufficient Reason s i m
p l y that there is a sufficient reason for the t r u t h o f every true p r o
position, whether necessary or contingent. I n any particular case w e
must distinguish (1) the general principle w h i c h is appealed t o , and
(2) the detailed process o f s h o w i n g that the case falls under the principle.
I n all necessary propositions the general principle w h i c h is appealed

to is the L a w o f C o n t r a d i c t i o n . T h e detailed process consists i n showing
b y means o f analysis and deductive inference that the predicate is
contained explicitly or i m p l i c i t l y i n the definition or accepted descrip
t i o n o f the subject. I n principle this could always be completed i n a
finite number ofsteps i f t h e subject has a definition or accepted descrip
t i o n . I n all contingent propositions w h i c h are true the general principle
w h i c h is appealed t o is that G o d is perfectly wise and therefore never
chooses capriciously and w i t h o u t a reason, and that he is perfectly g o o d
and therefore his governing m o t i v e is always t o maximize the nett
balance o f g o o d over evil. T h e detailed process w o u l d consist i n show
ing h o w a w o r l d i n w h i c h this contingent proposition is true w o u l d
be better o n the w h o l e than any alternative possible w o r l d i n w h i c h i t
w o u l d have been false.
T h e connexion o f contingency w i t h infinite c o m p l e x i t y is easy t o
understand o n this v i e w . T o k n o w w h i c h w o r l d w o u l d be best o n the
w h o l e w e should have t o consider all the states o f all the substances i n
all the possible worlds at all moments, and t o compare t h e m w i t h each
other. I t is plain that this w o u l d i n v o l v e an i n f m i t e l y extensive survey
and an infinitely m i n u t e analysis, w h i c h n o h u m a n being could possibly
p e r f o r m . So n o one b u t G o d could k n o w in detail the sufficient reason
for the t r u t h o f any true contingent proposition. B u t w e can k n o w
w i t h complete certainty the general principle that there must be a
sufficient reason for i t , and that the sufficient reason must be o f the
k i n d w h i c h w e have indicated.
I suspect that Leibniz sometimes used the phrase 'Principle o f
Sufficient Reason' t o mean thegeneral principle that there is a sufficient
reason for the t r u t h o f every true proposition, and sometimes f o r the
special principle w h i c h gives the sufficient reason f o r the t r u t h o f true
contingent propositions. I n the second sense i t rests o n the principle that
G o d does n o t choose capriciously b u t always has a reason f o r w h a t he
does, and that his ultimate m o t i v e is always the desire to maximize the
nett balance o f g o o d over evil. I n the first sense i t covers b o t h this, as
the sufficient reason f o r the t r u t h o f true contingent propositions, and
the L a w o f Contradiction.
5.3 C o n t i n g e n c y a n d actual existence
( 1 ) There is a v e r y i m p o r t a n t epistemological connexion between

contingency and actual existence. I n the case o f an actual existent, one
can learn, b y one's o w n perception or b y the reports o f others, facts
about i t w h i c h are n o t explicitly or i m p l i c i t l y contained i n the descrip

t i o n b y w h i c h one distinguishes i t f r o m other existents. Thus I learn
that the actual A d a m disobeyed G o d f r o m the report o f the incident
i n the b o o k o f Genesis. N o w this is the o n l y w a y i n w h i c h one can
learn any contingent fact about an i n d i v i d u a l . This w a y is applicable
o n l y to individuals w h i c h can be or could have been perceived; and
o n l y actual existents can be perceived. I t follows at once that the o n l y
contingent propositions w h i c h can be known are about actual existents.
A n y proposition w h i c h can be k n o w n about a merely possible existent
must be one whose predicate is either explicitly or i m p l i c i t l y contained
i n the accepted description o f that possible existent. I t must therefore
be necessary.
( 2 ) Another p o i n t is this. I f t h e r e were a contingent true proposition
about a merely possible i n d i v i d u a l there could be n o sufficient reason
for i t . The reason f o r its t r u t h could n o t consist i n the fact that the
predicate is contained explicitly or i m p l i c i t l y i n the definition or
accepted description o f the subject. For i n that case the proposition
w o u l d be necessary and n o t contingent. A g a i n , the reason f o r its
t r u t h could n o t be that G o d had seen that a w o r l d i n w h i c h this
proposition was true w o u l d be o n the w h o l e better than any alternative
w o r l d i n w h i c h i t w o u l d be false and had therefore decided to actualize
that w o r l d . For b y hypothesis G o d d i d not choose t o actualize that
w o r l d , b u t left i t a mere possibility. So there w o u l d be n o sufficient
reason for the t r u t h o f any contingent proposition about a merely
possible i n d i v i d u a l . I f , then, w e accept the principle that there is a
sufficient reason for the t r u t h o f every true proposition, w e must c o n
clude that there are n o contingent propositions about merely possible
individuals. E v e r y proposition about a merely possible i n d i v i d u a l is
either necessary or impossible. This is w h a t Leibniz held, and I t h i n k
that this is the consistent v i e w f o r h i m t o take.
6 Denial ofrelations
I w i l l begin b y q u o t i n g t w o typical remarks b y Leibniz o n the topic

ofrelations. B o t h occur i n the Letters to des Bosses, b u t plenty o f s i m i l a r
statements can be f o u n d elsewhere i n his w r i t i n g s . ( 1 ) ' N o accident
can be at the same t i m e i n t w o or m o r e subjects. . . Paternity i n D a v i d
is one t h i n g and sonship i n Solomon is another t h i n g . B u t the c o m m o n
relationship is something merely mental, whose foundation is the
modifications o f t h e several t e r m s . ' ( 2 ) 'The relations w h i c h connect
1
1
[G., П, 4 8 6 . L o e m k e r , 6 0 9 . ]
t w o monads are n o t i n either the one or the other, b u t equally i n b o t h

at once; and therefore p r o p e r l y speaking i n neither, b u t o n l y i n the
m i n d . . . I do n o t t h i n k that y o u w o u l d w i s h t o posit an accident w h i c h
w o u l d inhere simultaneously i n t w o subjects - one w h i c h , so t o speak,
has one leg i n one and another leg i n the o t h e r . ' 1
Leibniz's doctrine m a y be stated as follows. U n d o u b t e d l y there are

relational sentences and w e understand t h e m ; e.g. ' D a v i d was father o f
Solomon.' A g a i n , there is a sense i n w h i c h some such sentences express
true propositions and others express false propositions. Cf., e.g., ' D a v i d
was father o f Solomon' and ' W i l l i a m I I I was father o f Queen Anne.
B u t even a relational sentence w h i c h expresses a true proposition p a r t l y
misrepresents the fact w h i c h makes i t true. T h e sentence 'A has R t o
B' suggests that there is a single fact, composed o f t h e t w o terms A and
B and a peculiar k i n d o f attribute R w h i c h joins t h e m and is attached
t o b o t h o f t h e m . This is misleading. I f t h e relational sentence is true, i t
is made true b y a conjunction o f t w o facts, one entirely about A and
the other entirely about B. T h e facts are o f t h e f o r m 'A has the quality
q' and 'B has the quality q ' T h e relational f o r m is a fiction imposed
2
b y the m i n d o f t h e person w h o makes the relationaljudgment. Leibniz

expresses this b y saying that relations are o n l y phenomena, b u t they are
phenomena benefundata. T h e foundations are those qualities i n the t w o
terms w h i c h are present w h e n the relational j u d g m e n t w o u l d c o m
m o n l y be said t o be true, and absent w h e n i t w o u l d c o m m o n l y be
said t o be false.
T h e f o l l o w i n g comments m a y be made o n this, (ι) I do n o t t h i n k
that Leibniz has produced any real argument against the reality o f
relations. T h e idea o f a relationjust is the idea o f a n attribute w i t h one
leg i n one t e r m and another leg i n another. T o say that there cannot
be such attributes is just a picturesque w a y o f saying that there cannot
be relations. So all that Leibniz really does is t o ask us whether w e do
n o t find i t self-evident, as he does, that all attributes must be pure
qualities. I f w e do n o t , then he has n o t h i n g m o r e t o say.
( 2 ) I t h i n k that b o t h Leibniz and his opponents make the mistake
o f t h i n k i n g o f relationship i n general b y means o f a picture d r a w n
f r o m one particular k i n d o f relation. T h e picture is that o f t w o bits
o f w o o d connected b y a b i t o f string w h i c h is glued at one end t o one
o f t h e m and at the other end t o the other. T h e string represents a
relation, the bits o f w o o d represent the terms, and the glue represents
the inherence o f the relation i n each t e r m . Such a picture is quite
1
[ G . , I I , 517. C f . also F i f t h L e t t e r to C l a r k e i n G . , V I I , 4 0 1 . L o e m k e r , 7 0 4 .
Alexander, 71.]
hopeless; for the string and the glue are substances, and n o t attributes,
just as m u c h as t h e b i t s o f w o o d themselves. B u t criticisms o n the
defects o f a certain very crude w a y o f p i c t u r i n g the n o t i o n o f re
lationships, and o n the absurd implications w h i c h i t has i f taken liter
ally, are not fatal t o the n o t i o n itself.
(3) I t seems t o me that a true relational sentence expresses something
genuine w h i c h w o u l d be left unexpressed i f one merely made state
ments about the qualities o f the terms. Take, e.g., the j u d g m e n t 'A
is longer than B', where A and B are t w o bits o f s t r i n g . I suppose that
the facts w h i c h Leibniz w o u l d call the foundations o f the phenomenon
w o u l d be, e.g., that A is so l o n g and that B is so l o n g . B u t these are
plainly n o t equivalent t o 'A is longer than B'. Either w e must add
'The length o f A is greater than the length o f B\ or w e must par
ticularize and say e.g., 'A is 2 inches l o n g and B is 1 inch l o n g . ' O n the
first alternative, w e have simply substituted a relational proposition
about lengths f o r our original relational proposition about bits of string.
O n the second alternative w e are reduced t o relational propositions
at the second move. For, i n the first place, t o say that 'A is 2 inches
l o n g ' involves stating a relationship between A and a standard rule.
A n d , i n the second place, w e require the relational proposition that
the number 2 is greater than the number 1. Moreover, i t is plain that
the t w o propositions about A alone and about B alone are i n a certain
sense more determinate than the proposition expressed b y 'A is longer
than B. T h e fact that A is longer than B does n o t entail that A is o f
9
any one determinate length or that B is o f any one determinate

length.
(4) I suspect that relations are t h o u g h t t o be fictions introduced b y
the m i n d o f the observer for the f o l l o w i n g reason. I t is particularly
obvious that a g o o d deal o f preliminary mental and even b o d i l y
activity is often needed before one is i n a position t o make a relational
j u d g m e n t . T o take a v e r y simple case, i t m a y be necessary to b r i n g A
and B together and lay t h e m side b y side w i t h one end o f each c o i n
ciding, before one can j u d g e w i t h certainty that A is longer than B.
Such preliminary activity is n o t needed before m a k i n g , e.g., the
qualitative j u d g m e n t 'A is blue.' N o w i t is easy t o t h i n k that the
activities w h i c h are needed i n order t o recognize a relation i n some sense
create the idea of a relation and project i t u p o n facts w h i c h are themselves
non-relational. There is m u c h less temptation to t h i n k this i n the case
o f qualitative judgments. B u t there seems no reason t o believe that
this interpretation o f the precedent mental activity as creative and
projective and n o t merely revelatory is correct.
(5) I do n o t t h i n k that Leibniz ever makes m u c h use otthegeneral

principle that all ostensibly relational facts are reducible to conjunctions
o f purely qualitative facts. W h a t he really thinks i m p o r t a n t is a m u c h
m o r e restricted principle w h i c h m i g h t be p u t as f o l l o w s : 'There are
no n o n - f o r m a l relations between different substances' B y ' f o r m a l re
lations' I mean such relations as similarity, identity, otherness, the
subject-predicate relation, and so on. B y ' n o n - f o r m a l relations' I
m e a n s u c h relations as spatial, temporal, and causal relations, and so
on. (a) Leibniz assumes, e.g., that there is a p l u r a l i t y o f substances
w h i c h are similar i n m a n y fundamental respects, i.e. he accepts the
f o r m a l relations o f n u m e r i c a l diversity and similarity between different
substances, (b) His theory o f Pre-established H a r m o n y , w h i c h w e
shall deal w i t h later, presupposes that one can talk o f certain states o f
different substances as being contemporary w i t h each other, (c) His
general account o f simple substances presupposes that each total state
o f s u c h a substancepreceJes some o f i t s states zndfollows others o f t h e m ,
and that the successive states are causally interconnected. So the position
is this. Leibniz makes assertions w h i c h , i f they were v a l i d at all, w o u l d
be fatal t o all relations. B u t i n the rest o f h i s system he presupposes the
reality o f f o r m a l relations between different substances; o f temporal
relations between total states o f different monads; and o f b o t h t e m
poral and causal relations between the various total states ofeach simple
substance.
7 I d e n t i t y 0fb1discernibles
This is a famous principle o f Leibniz's. H e recognizes t w o kinds o f

difference, viz. numerical diversity or otherness, and qualitative
dissimilarity or unlikeness. T h e principle is that whenever there is
numerical diversity there must be qualitative dissimilarity; or, t o
put i t quite simply, that there cannot be t w o individuals w h i c h are
exactly alike i n all their qualitative predicates. As M c T a g g a r t said,
a better name f o r the principle w o u l d be 'The Dissimilarity o f the
Diverse'.
(1) I n the Letters to Arnauld Leibniz asserts, b u t does n o t attempt t o
prove, that this follows f r o m the Predicate-in-Notion P r i n c i p l e . Does1
i t really follow? Consider the f o l l o w i n g sentence: 'There m i g h t be t w o

minds, A and B, whose dispositional properties were identical, whose
histories occupied precisely the same period, and such that at each
m o m e n t i n the period the state o f ^ was exactly like the contemporary
[G., I I , 4 2 . Mason, 4 5 . ]
1
state o f В' I do n o t w i s h t o assert positively that this sentence is sig

nificant. I t m i g h t very w e l l be alleged that, although i t is unobjection
able i n grammatical f o r m , i t does n o t present any proposition to the
consideration o f a person w h o utters or hears i t . B u t I do assert the
f o l l o w i n g t w o things, (a) T h e question whether the sentence is
significant or n o t is quite independent o f the Predicate-in-Notion
Principle, (b) I f the sentence does express a proposition, then the
Predicate-in-Notion Principle does n o t refute i t , unless w e add the
assumption that a substance is a complex w h o l e composed o f its
predicates (or rather o f the 'modifications' w h i c h correspond t o its
predicates) and containing no other constituent.
(2) The Identity o f Indiscernibles plays an i m p o r t a n t part i n the
Letters to Clarke, where i t is used i n connexion w i t h the controversy
between the absolute and the relational theories o f space, t i m e and
m o t i o n . I t is v e r y difficult t o be sure w h i c h o f the t w o f o l l o w i n g
alternatives Leibniz means t o assert: (a) T h a t the v e r y supposition
that there m i g h t be t w o things exactly alike i n their qualities is self-
contradictory and meaningless, (b) T h a t although the supposition is
n o t logically impossible, w e can be sure that G o d w o u l d n o t create
t w o such things. As Clarke points out, Leibniz seems n o w t o say one
t h i n g and n o w the other. E.g. i n the F o u r t h Letter Leibniz says: 'to
suppose t w o indiscernible things is t o suppose the same t h i n g under
t w o names'. This certainly suggests that he held that the alleged
1
supposition, i f taken literally, is self-contradictory and meaningless.

I f so, the principle is necessary. B u t elsewhere i n this Letter, and still
more explicitly i n the Fifth Letter, he seems t o take the other v i e w . For
instance, i n the Fifth Letter he says that he does not maintain that i t is
absolutely impossible t o suppose that there are t w o bodies w h i c h are
exactly alike, b u t o n l y that i t w o u l d be contrary t o God's w i s d o m t o
create t w o such bodies, and therefore w e can be certain that there are
n o t t w o such bodies. This w o u l d seem t o make the principle c o n t i n
2
gent.
I t h i n k that there are t w o things t o be said about this apparent
inconsistency, (a) There is certainly a sense i n w h i c h i t is possible t o
make, and t o argue correctly and i n t e l l i g i b l y f r o m , a supposition
w h i c h is, i n another sense, impossible. T h a t is precisely w h a t happens,
e.g., w h e n one proves b y reductio ad absurdum that there cannot be
a rational fraction i n its lowest terms whose square is equal to t w o .
(b) Leibniz m i g h t merely be m a k i n g a concession f o r the sake o f a r g u -
ment w h e n he seems to adopt the second alternative. His position m i g h t
1
[G., V I I , 372. L o e m k e r , 6 8 7 . ] 2
[G., V I I , 3 9 4 . L o e m k e r , 6 9 9 . ]
LEIBNIz's GENERAL PRINCIPLES 4i
perhaps be expressed as f o l l o w s : ' I can see that the supposition that

there m i g h t be t w o things exactly alike is self-contradictory. B u t , even
i f y o u w i l l n o t grant me this, I can show that G o d never w o u l d create
t w o such things and therefore that the supposition w i l l always be
false/
(3) h i the Letters to Clarke there is a closeconnexion between the
Identity o f Indiscernibles and the Principle o f Sufficient Reason. T h e
argument m a y be p u t as follows. Suppose, i f that be an intelligible
supposition, that there were t w o coexisting material particles A and B,
exactly alike i n all their qualities and dispositional properties. T h e y
w o u l d have t o be i n different places at every m o m e n t o f t h e i r coexist
ence. N o w f o r the present purpose i t does n o t matter whether w e assume
the absolute or the relational theory ofspace. I f P and Q are points o f
absolute space, there could be n o possible reason f o r preferring t o p u t
A at P and B at Q rather than B at P and A at Q . B u t a similar c o n
sequence follows o n the relational theory, h i that case the p o i n t P is
defined b y certain spatial relations t o a certain set o f material particles
taken as a system o f reference, and the p o i n t Q is defined b y certain
other relations to the same set ofparticles. N o w , i f ^ and B are exactly
alike i n all their qualities and dispositional properties, there can be n o
possible reason f o r preferring t o p u t A i n t o the f o r m e r relation and
B i n t o the latter rather than d o i n g the opposite w i t h t h e m . I f t h e n G o d
were t o create t w o such particles, he w o u l d (a) be b o u n d to p u t t h e m
i n different places, and yet (b) w o u l d have n o reason f o r choosing
between the t w o alternatives w h i c h w o u l d arise b y i m a g i n i n g the t w o
particles being interchanged. N o w G o d never acts w i t h o u t a sufficient
reason. So w e can conclude, either that the supposition is meaningless,
or that, i f i t is n o t , G o d w i l l never create t w o precisely similar particles
and therefore there never w i l l be t w o such particles.
Clarke was n o t satisfied w i t h t h i s . H e pointed out that a person
1
m i g h t k n o w that i t w o u l d be m u c h better to actualize one or other o f

t w o alternatives A and A' than t o actualize neither o f t h e m , w h i l s t at
the same t i m e he m a y see that i t is a matter o f complete indifference
whether i t should be A or A' that is actualized. O n Leibniz's principle
a person i n this position w o u l d actualize neither, s i m p l y because he
cannot actualize both, and has n o reason t o prefer one t o the other;
although he has a v e r y g o o d reason f o r preferring t o actualize one or
other o f t h e m t o actualizing neither. Clarke says that i n such a case o f
indifference a free agent chooses a certain one o f the indifferent alter
natives b y a 'mere act o f w n T . Leibnizanswers that, i f t h i s werepossible,
1
[G., V I I , 381. L o e m k e r , 6 9 1 . ]
w h i c h * i t is n o t , such motiveless choice w o u l d be indistinguishable

f r o m pure objective chance. ( I m i g h t remark that a m a n i n this k i n d
1
o f s i t u a t i o n w o u l d probably decide t o associate the head o f a coin w i t h

one o f t h e alternatives and the tail w i t h the other, t o spin the coin, and
to choose the alternative w h i c h he had associated w i t h the side that
should fall uppermost. B u t Leibniz w o u l d say that there must be some
reason, however far-fetched, f o r his associating the head rather than
the tail w i t h the particular alternative w i t h w h i c h he does decide t o
associate i t . A n d i n any case this expedient w o u l d n o t be open t o G o d .
For he w o u l d k n o w beforehand h o w the coin w o u l d fall. So he w o u l d
already be deciding o n a certain alternative w h e n he associated i t w i t h
the face w h i c h he foresaw w o u l d fall uppermost.)
h i any case these arguments i n the Letters to Clarke w o u l d at most
prove that there cannot be t w o coexistent material particles w h i c h are
exactly alike. I do n o t see that they could refute m y supposition about
t w o coexisting minds w h i c h were exactly alike, i f i t be admitted that
that supposition is intelligible.
(4) I t h i n k that there w o u l d be the f o l l o w i n g connexion between
the Identity o f Indiscernibles and Leibniz's doctrine about relations
being phenomena henefundata. Suppose i t were true i n the phenomenal
sense that A stands i n the relation R t o B, where R is an asymmetrical
relation, such as earlier than or to the right of. A c c o r d i n g t o Leibniz the
facts corresponding t o this must be a conjunction o f t w o p u r e l y
qualitative facts o f the f o r m A has the quality ql and 'B has the
(
quality q \ N o w i f t h e relation is asymmetrical q and q must p l a i n l y

2 x 2
be different qualities. So w e could say that i t follows f r o m Leibniz's

v i e w ofrelations that any t w o substances w h i c h , phenomenally speak
ing, stand i n any asymmetrical relation t o each other must differ i n the
qualities w h i c h are the foundation o f t h a t phenomenon, however m u c h
they m a y be alike i n every other respect. I f one could add the premiss
that any t w o substances must, phenomenally speaking, stand i n some
asymmetrical relation t o each other the I d e n t i t y 0fh1discernibles w o u l d
f o l l o w . B u t I do n o t t h i n k that there is any reason t o admit this pre
miss.
(5) Sometimes Leibniz appeals t o the empirical fact that, h o w e v e r
m u c h alike t w o things m a y seem at first sight, y o u w i l l always find
qualitative differences between t h e m i f y o u l o o k m o r e carefully, use
a microscope, etc. T h e argument w o u l d be that every increase i n o u r
powers o f discrimination discloses qualitative differences i n things
w h i c h seemed exactly alike at the previous stage. Hence w e m a y c o n -
1
[ G . , V I I , 390. L o e m k e r , 697.]
clude that all cases o f plurality o f apparently exactly similar things are
really cases o f dissimilarity concealed b y our imperfect powers o f
discrimination. This, I t h i n k , can be meant o n l y as a popular illus
tration, or as a w a y o f r e m o v i n g an apparent conflict between the
Principle and observed facts. Leibniz w o u l d n o t expect t o prove a
fundamental metaphysical principle b y empirical arguments.
8 T h e Principle o f continuity
Russell points out that Leibniz asserted three kinds o f c o n t i n u i t y , viz.

spatio-temporal c o n t i n u i t y , c o n t i n u i t y ofcases, and c o n t i n u i t y o f k i n d s
o f actual substance. Leibniz d i d n o t regard any o f these kinds o f
1
c o n t i n u i t y as metaphysically necessary. H e seems t o have t h o u g h t

that a breach o f any o f t h e m w o u l d be either an aesthetic defect or
w o u l d mean that less had been created where m o r e m i g h t have been
w i t h o u t any compensating disadvantage. N o w Leibniz t h o u g h t that
mere quantity ofexistence, other things being equal, is a positive good.
Therefore a breach o f any o f these kinds o f c o n t i n u i t y w o u l d be
inconsistent w i t h the w i s d o m or the goodness o f God. H e speaks o f
t h e m as 'principles o f t h e order o f t h i n g s ' .
( 1 ) T h e principle o f spatio-temporal c o n t i n u i t y rules out such
possibilities as that a b o d y should occupy a certain position at a certain
m o m e n t and a certain other position at a certain later m o m e n t w i t h
o u t occupying successively d u r i n g the intervening period a c o n
tinuous series o f intermediate positions. Leibniz says i n his Letters to de
Voider that G o d could transcreate a b o d y f r o m one place to a remote
place w i t h o u t its m o v i n g f r o m the one t o the other t h r o u g h a c o n
tinuous series o f intermediate positions. I suppose that G o d could do
2
this either instantaneously or after a lapse o f t i m e d u r i n g w h i c h the

b o d y ceased t o exist. B u t experience shows that he does n o t i n fact
do this, and i t w o u l d conflict w i t h 'the l a w o f order' i f he were t o do
so. (Since Leibniz's t i m e there is some empirical evidence w h i c h can
be interpreted t o mean that electrons sometimes j u m p instantaneously
f r o m one o r b i t t o another w h i c h is discontinuous w i t h i t . ) Leibniz
says explicitly that any objection w h i c h there is to discontinuity i n
changes o f place applies equally t o discontinuity i n changes o f state.
H e uses this principle i n dynamics i n his theory o f the impact o f
bodies.
(2) Leibniz develops and applies c o n t i n u i t y o f cases i n geometry
1
[RusseU, Section 27.]
2
[ G . , I I , 168. L o e m k e r , 5 1 5 - 1 6 . ]
and particularly i n dynamics. H e puts the principle as follows. ' I f t w o

cases or data continuously approach each other, so that at length one
passes i n t o the other, the same must be true o f their consequences.'
H e says that this depends o n a m o r e ultimate principle, viz. ' I f the
data are ordered, the quaesita must be ordered also' (Principium quoddam
generale. G. Μ . [ V I ] , 129). Thus a circle can be regarded as a special
1
case o f an ellipse where the t w o axes have become equal. Rest can be
regarded as infinitely slow m o t i o n . E q u a l i t y can be regarded as
inflnitesimally small differences. B y using these criteria Leibniz made
an annihilating criticism ofDescartes's proposed laws o f t h e impact o f
bodies o f various masses and w i t h various velocities. H e showed that
they do n o t answer t o these criteria.
Leibniz admits that i n composite bodies a small change i n the c o n
ditions can make a great change i n the effects. (Cf., e.g., a stone
o n the edge o f a precipice or a spark i n gunpowder.) B u t there is
no doubt that his principle is o f v e r y w i d e application and o f great
utility.
(3) C o n t i n u i t y o£kinds of actual substance is used t o show that every
k i n d o f substance whose existence is compatible w i t h the laws o f the
actual w o r l d w i l l i n fact exist. A c c o r d i n g t o Leibniz, the real quality
w h i c h underlies the phenomenon ofspatial position is something w h i c h
he calls ' p o i n t o f v i e w ' . N o w the determinates under this determinable
f o r m a continuous three-dimensional aggregate. I t w o u l d have been
possible f o r G o d to have o m i t t e d to create substances w i t h certain o f
these determinate qualities. I f so w e should have had the phenomenon
o f e m p t y spaces w i t h i n the w o r l d o f matter. B u t w e can be sure that
G o d has created a substance f o r every p o i n t o f v i e w w h i c h is c o m
patible w i t h the general scheme ofspatial relations w h i c h he laid d o w n
for the actual w o r l d . Therefore, phenomenally speaking, space is
everywhere filled w i t h matter. A g a i n there is a continuous range o f
possible degrees o f clearness and confusion i n the cognitive powers o f
any m i n d . W e can be sure that G o d has created a m i n d w i t h every
possible degree o f clearness and confusion f r o m the lowest t o the
highest l i m i t .
1
[The Latin sentence reads 'Datis n i m i r u m ordinatis etiam quaesita esse
o r d i n a t a . ' P e r h a p s o n e m i g h t translate i t as f o l l o w s . ' A s t h e data a r e o r d e r e d , so t h e
solutions o n e is l o o k i n g f o r m u s t b e o r d e r e d also.' T h e r e is a F r e n c h v e r s i o n o f t h e
p a p e r i n G . , I I I , 5 1 - 5 , a n d a n E n g H s h t r a n s l a t i o n o f that v e r s i o n i n L o e m k e r ,
3 5 1 - 4 . I n t h e F r e n c h v e r s i o n o f t h e p a p e r t h e sentence reads ' D a t i s ordinatis e t i a m
quaesita sunt o r d i n a t a . ' C f . also C o u t u r a t , 5 4 4 . ]
9 Denial oftranseunt causation 1
Leibniz held that i t is impossible f o r t w o created substances t o interact

w i t h each other. This is one o f h i s most characteristic general principles.
W e must n o w consider his reasons.
(1) I n the Letters to Arnauld he explicitly says that this is one o f t h e
m a n y i m p o r t a n t consequences o f the Predicate-in-Notion P r i n c i p l e . 2
B u t he does n o t explain i n detail h o w i t follows f r o m that principle.

I n discussing this q u e s t i o n w e must bear i n m i n d the f o l l o w i n g t w o
facts.
(a) Leibniz never denied or doubted that certain kinds ofstate i n one
substance are accompanied or i m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w e d b y certain kinds
o f state i n other substances i n accordance w i t h general rules. As w e shall
see later, he p u t f o r w a r d the hypothesis o f Pre-established H a r m o n y
i n order t o account for this fact. N o w m a n y people nowadays w o u l d
say that this is all that transeunt causation means, and therefore that
i t must be consistent w i t h the Predicate-in-Notion Principle i f that
principle is true. I t is plain that Leibniz, like all his contemporaries,
neither accepted n o r even contemplated this analysis o f causation. I t
is therefore futile t o discuss the question o n t h e assumption that he
w o u l d have done so.
(b) This is reinforced b y the f a c t t h a t Leibniz held that there is
immanent causation, i.e. that a state o f a substance genuinely causes its
immediate successor and is genuinely caused b y its immediate pre
decessor. Since w e have regularities ofsequence b o t h as regards states
o f different substances and as regards states o f the same substance, and
since Leibniz denies causation i n the f o r m e r case and asserts i t i n
the latter, i t is plain that he cannot have identified causation w i t h
regular sequence. H e must have t h o u g h t that there is something i n the
n o t i o n o(transeunt causation w h i c h is incompatible w i t h the Predicate-
i n - N o t i o n Principle, b u t that there is n o t h i n g i n the n o t i o n o f
immanent causation t o conflict w i t h i t . W h y should he have t h o u g h t
this?
I should guess that his m i n d m a y have m o v e d somewhat as follows.
H e w o u l d h o l d that genuine transeunt causation involves constraint or
1
[ A s w a s c o m m o n at t h e t i m e , B r o a d uses t h e s p e l l i n g ' t r a n s e u n t ' w h e n t h e
w o r d h a s this p a r t i c u l a r m e a n i n g , r a t h e r t h a n ' t r a n s i e n t ' , w h i c h i s p e r h a p s m o r e
c o m m o n at present. F o r a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n i m m a n e n t a n d
t r a n s e u n t c a u s a t i o n cf., e.g., W . E . J o h n s o n , Logic, P a r t I I I ( C a m b r i d g e , 1924)»
Chapter 9.]
2
[ G . , I I , 70. M a s o n , 8 5 . ]
interference exercised b y one substance o n the natural course o f develop

ment o f another. T h e t w o most obvious instances o f ostensible trans
eunt action are the f o l l o w i n g : (i) w h e n a b o d y w h i c h , i f l e f t t o itself
w o u l d have remained at rest or w o u l d have continued t o m o v e w i t h
constant velocity i n a certain straight line, is set i n m o t i o n o r is forced
t o m o v e differently either b y the impact o f another m o v i n g b o d y o r
b y the pressure or tension o f a constraining body, like a rail o r a string,
and (ii) w h e n a person w h o , i f left t o his o w n devices, w o u l d have
remained idle o r w o u l d have acted i n a certain w a y t o please himself,
is set at w o r k o r compelled t o act i n a different w a y b y the commands
or threats o f another. T h e n o t i o n o f immanent causation is b o u n d u p
w i t h the n o t i o n o f h o w thehistory ofasubstance w o u l d h a v e developed
i f i t had been left t o itself. T h e n o t i o n o f transeunt causation is b o u n d
up w i t h the n o t i o n o f modifications imposed o n that natural course
o f development b y the interference o f other substances; either c o n
tinuously, as i n the case o f fixed constraints i n dynamics, or sporadic
ally, as i n the case o f occasional impacts o r occasional threats.
N o w I suspect that Leibniz w o u l d have argued as follows. E v e r y
fact about the occurrence o f any state o f a substance at any m o m e n t i n
its history subsists timelessly. Each substance is p r o v i d e d f r o m the
beginning w i t h a special persistent modification corresponding t o each
such fact about i t . A l l that ever happens t o i t is the emergence o f each
such disposition f r o m quiescence t o activity at the appropriate m o
ment, and its subsequent reversion f r o m activity t o quiescence. So
there is n o meaning i n the suggestion that i t is f r o m t i m e t o t i m e
constrained t o develop i n a different w a y f r o m that i n w h i c h i t w o u l d
have developed i f left t o itself. Its actual development is prescribed i n
every detail b y its o w n complete n o t i o n , and is therefore identical w i t h
its natural unconstrained development.
I f this is Leibniz's argument, m y comment w o u l d be as follows.
T h e fact that every state o f a substance is present i n i t f r o m the first
as a disposition does n o t preclude the possibility that some o f its states
w i l l be i n part determined b y the action o f other substances u p o n i t .
Suppose that the n o t i o n o f S contains the fact that i t w i l l swerve t o the
left at m o m e n t t. W h y should i t n o t also contain the fact that this
swerve w i l l be imposed o n i t then b y the impact o f substance S' u p o n
it? I f s o , ofcourse, the n o t i o n o f S ' w i l l contain a complementary fact.
T o p u t i t generally, the doctrine that every fact about the state o f a
substance at any m o m e n t is timeless entails n o t h i n g about the content
o f s u c h facts. I n particular i t entails n o t h i n g , positive o r negative, about
causation. I t is compatible w i t h some states being uncaused, w i t h some
being caused purely i m m a n e n t l y , and w i t h others being caused trans-

euntly t h r o u g h the action o f other substances. O n either o f these
alternatives there w o u M be additional facts o f a higher order, w h i c h
w o u l d be n o less timeless and no less contained i n the complete n o t i o n
o f the substance.
( 2 ) T h e denial oftranseunt causation w o u l d presumably f o l l o w f r o m
the denial o f the metaphysical t r u t h o f relational propositions. For t o
say that such-and-such an event i n S causes such-and-such an event i n
S' is certainly t o make a relational statement. I f L e i b n i z ' s theory is true
the facts that correspond to i t must be a fact w h i c h is entirely about S
and another fact w h i c h is entirely about S'. I t seems t o me, however,
that, i f this line o f argument were used, i t w o u l d apply to immanent
causation also. T o say that the state 5 o f 5 causes the state 5 o f S is
X 2
also t o make a relational statement, t h o u g h i t n o w conceives t w o

states o f the same substance and n o t t w o different substances. I f the
general argument about relations were sound, w e should have to say
that this relational statement too can o n l y be phenomenally true. T h e
facts corresponding t o i t w o u l d be a fact w h i c h is entirely about the
state s and another fact w h i c h is entirely about s . This general a r g u
lt 2
ment w o u l d also have t o be applied to the statement that G o d creates

and sustains fmite substances. This t o o w o u l d have t o correspond t o a
conjunction o f facts, one w h o l l y about G o d and the other w h o l l y
about the fmite substances. B u t this is n o t at all w h a t Leibniz wants.
H e wants to deny transeunt causation between^m'ie substances, and to
keep b o t h immanent causation w i t h i n each fmite substance and transeunt
causation between G o d and fmite substances.
(3) I n m a n y places Leibniz uses an argument w h i c h is independent
o f h i s other general principles. I n the Letters to des Bosses, e.g., he says
that interaction is impossible because w e cannot conceive h o w i t could
take place; and that i t w o u l d be superfluous, even i f i t were possible,
because o f the Predicate-in-Notion P r i n c i p l e . This line o f argument
1
is stated m o r e f u l l y i n the Monadology. I t runs as f o l l o w s : 'Accidents

cannot separate themselves f r o m substances n o r go about outside
them. . . Thus . . . no accident could come i n t o . . . [a substance] . . . 2
f r o m outside.' 3
I t seems to me that this, like the argument against relations i n

general, is really v a l i d o n l y as against a certain v e r y crude imaginative
picture. The picture is that w h e n A intersects w i t h B something w h i c h
1
[ G . , I I , 503. L o e m k e r , 613.]
2
[ T h i s insertion is B r o a d ' s . ]
3
[ G . , V I , 608. L o e m k e r , 643.]
was a state o f A leaves A, travels t o B d u r i n g a period i n w h i c h i t is

n o t a state o f anything, and then joins up and becomes a state o f B.
This m i g h t be a m o r e or less plausible picture o f w h a t happens i n some
cases o f transeunt causation, e.g. w h e n a h o t b o d y heats up a cooler
one b y radiation or conduction and itselfgets cooler. B u t i t is only a
picture even i n such cases. A n d i n m a n y others i t is n o t even a plausible
picture, e.g. i t w o u l d n o t cover the case o f a spark causing a m i x t u r e
o f oxygen and h y d r o g e n t o explode.
(4) A n o t h e r argument w h i c h is used i n the Monadology runs as
f o l l o w s : 'There is n o w a y o f e x p l a i n i n g h o w a m o n a d could be altered
i n quantity or internally changed b y any created t h i n g . For i t is i m p o s
sible t o change the place o f anything i n i t , or to conceive any internal
m o t i o n w h i c h could be produced, described, increased or diminished
in it.' 1
This argument presupposes that all substances have been p r o v e d t o

be monads, i.e. unextended mental substances. W e shall have t o c o n
sider the grounds f o r this later on. B u t the argument also presupposes
that, i f one substance could influence another substance at all, i t could
do so o n l y b y m o v i n g i t as a w h o l e or altering the existing m o t i o n o f
some part o f i t . I can see n o reason t o accept this. A m i n d can admittedly
change its states as a result ofprevious changes i n itself; e.g. a desire may
cause experiences o f active exertion and these m a y cause a feeling o f
tiredness. W h y should i t be impossible t o suppose that some such
change i n one m i n d m i g h t be caused telepathically b y the action o f
another mind?
1
[ G . , V I , 608-9. Loemker, 643.]
3
L E I B N I Z ' S T H E O R Y OF C O R P O R E A L
SUBSTANCES
I a m going t o use the technical t e r m 'corporeal substance' instead o f

the ordinary t e r m 'matter', because, as w e shall see, Leibniz used
'matter' i n a technical sense taken f r o m the Scholastic philosophy, and
i n that sense even purely mental substances contain 'matter' as an
essential factor.
I B a c k g r o u n d o f L e i b n i z ' s theories
Leibniz says i n Section 11 o f the Discours that at one t i m e he shared

the c o m m o n v i e w o f contemporary 'advanced thinkers', i.e. o f
Descartes and his followers, o f H o b b e s , o f B a c o n , etc., that the Schol
astic philosophy is f u t i l e . B u t further reflexion forced h i m t o recog
1
nize that i t contains features w h i c h are essential to any sound philosophy.

I n his letter o f 1 4 J u l y 1686 t o A r n a u l d he says that he has been driven
back, against his w i l l , t o the Scholastic doctrine o f substantial forms. 2
The Scholastic philosophy i n general, and the doctrine o f substantial

forms i n particular, w o u l d be perfectly familiar to Leibniz and all his
educated contemporaries. B u t i t is quite strange t o most o f u s . I do n o t
t h i n k that i t is possible to understand Leibniz p r o p e r l y unless one
k n o w s something about the Scholastic doctrine o f substance. So I shall
begin w i t h a short sketch o f i t .
1.1 Schotasticdoctrineofsubstance
The fundamental concepts i n the Scholastic philosophy are the cor

related notions o(form and stuff. ( I shall use the w o r d stuff to translate
the technical t e r m materia; to translate i t as 'matter' is misleading
nowadays.) E v e r y b o d y was regarded as i n v o l v i n g the t w o factors
o f f o r m and stuff. Thus, e.g., a m a n , a l i o n , and an oak-tree are u l t i
mately composed o f the same k i n d o f stuff. T h e i r characteristic
differences arise f r o m the different forms w h i c h i n f o r m different
parcels o f this c o m m o n stuff.
1
[ G . , I V , 435. L o e m k e r , 309.] 2
[ G . , I I , 58. L o e m k e r , 3 3 8 . ]
W e notice t w o v e r y different kinds ofchange i n the external w o r l d ,

( i ) I n some cases w e should say that the same substance has persisted
and has merely changed its states. Thus a m a n is sometimes asleep and
sometimes awake; a b o d y is sometimes cold, sometimes h o t , some
times solid, and sometimes l i q u i d ; and so o n . (2) h i other cases w e
are inclined t o say that a n e w substance has been generated o r an o l d
one destroyed. A typical example o f t h e f o r m e r is w h e n a caterpillar
changes i n t o a m o t h or a tadpole i n t o a f r o g . T h e most typical example
o f the latter is w h e n an organism dies, and first ceases t o p e r f o r m its
characteristic functions and then begins t o r o t and break u p .
N o w all changes i n bodies were regarded as changes i n f o r m . I t
was held that the ultimate stuff (materiaprima) can neither be generated
n o r destroyed i n the course o f nature. B u t the distinction between the
t w o kinds o f change led t o a distinction between t w o kinds o f f o r m ,
viz. accidental and substantial. W h e n a certain b o d y continues t o exist
but changes, e.g. f r o m being solid t o being l i q u i d , its stuffkeeps the
same substantial f o r m and simply exchanges one accidental f o r m f o r
another. B u t , w h e n an acorn becomes an oak-tree and a caterpillar
becomes a m o t h , certain stuff acquires a n e w substantial f o r m . This
stuff, or more often other stuff w h i c h gradually replaces i t , keeps this
substantial f o r m so l o n g as this oak-tree or this m o t h continues t o live.
I t imposes i t s e l f o n and organizes the n e w stuffthat is taken i n the f o r m
o f f o o d and d r i n k and air. I t is capable w i t h i n limits o f restoring the
organism t o a n o r m a l state i t i t is injured. B u t gradually the organizing
power o f t h e substantial f o r m over the stuffgets weaker. A t length the
stuff-constituent i n the organism loses its substantial f o r m and then
the organism ceases t o exist as an oak-tree o r a m o t h . T h e stuffbecomes
the stuff o f a corpse, w h i c h is n o t a single substance b u t is an aggregate
o f bodies o f various kinds w i t h o u t any one substantial f o r m t o h o l d
t h e m together as a single l i v i n g organism o f a certain species.
I t w i l l be seen that the n o t i o n o f substantial f o r m applies most
obviously t o those bodies w h i c h are natural units, such as a l i v i n g
h u m a n body, a m o t h , or an oak-tree. I t w o u l d n o t apply at all obviously
t o a l u m p o f g o l d o r a drop o f w a t e r , t h o u g h i t m i g h t perhaps apply
t o a single crystal o r a t o m o f g o l d o r a single crystal o f i c e o r molecule
o f water. So the clearest instances o f the n o t i o n are p r o v i d e d b y m e n
and the higher kinds o f animal and vegetable organism.
T h e next p o i n t t o notice is that many, t h o u g h n o t all, Scholastics
held that there can be and i n fact are certain substances w h i c h are pure
forms w i t h o u t stuff. Everyone held that G o d was such a substance, and
the Thomists held that every angel is such a substance. O n the other
THEORY OF CORPOREAL SUBSTANCES 5i
hand, n o one held that there could be stuffcompletely devoid o f f o r m .

The n o t i o n oimateriaprima was regarded as a factor incapable ofactual
separate existence.
N o w , according to the Thomists at any rate, a h u m a n soul is i n a
very peculiar position. I t is a substantial f o r m , b u t i t is n o t b y itself a
substance, as an angelic f o r m is. Its nature is t o i n f o r m a certain l i v i n g
b o d y o f a characteristic k i n d , viz. that o f a certain i n d i v i d u a l man.
B u t i t is capable o f existing i n a k i n d o f anomalous state d u r i n g l o n g
intervals i n separation f r o m any k i n d ofstuff. T h a t is w h a t happens to a
h u m a n soul between the death o f its b o d y and the D a y o f J u d g m e n t ,
w h e n i t is once more reunited w i t h an appropriate h u m a n body. T h e
substantial f o r m o f a non-rational animal o r a plant, o n the other hand,
was n o t generally supposed to exist w h e n i t is n o t actually i n f o r m i n g
the stuff o f a l i v i n g cat or oak-tree or whatever i t m a y be.
So there are at least three kinds o f substantial f o r m , w h i c h can be
arranged i n a hierarchy as follows, ( i ) Forms w h i c h suffice b y t h e m
selves, w i t h o u t any stuff, t o constitute a substance. A c c o r d i n g t o the
Thomists, each angel is an instance o f such a f o r m . (2) Forms w h i c h
are capable o f existing t e m p o r a r i l y and i n a k i n d o f dormant state
w i t h o u t i n f o r m i n g any stuff, b u t w h i c h do n o t suffice w i t h o u t s t u f f t o
constitute a substance. W h e n such a f o r m informs the stuff appropriate
to i t the t w o together constitute a substance w h i c h is a genuine i n
dividual unit. A c c o r d i n g to the Thomists h u m a n souls are such forms.
A substance composed o f such a f o r m and the stuff w h i c h i t informs
is a particular h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l , e.g. the m a n J o h n S m i t h . (3) Forms
w h i c h were generally held to be incapable o f e x i s t i n g even t e m p o r a r i l y
unless they are i n f o r m i n g stuff o f an appropriate k i n d . W h e n such a
f o r m informs the stuff w h i c h is appropriate to i t the t w o together
make up a substance w h i c h is a genuine i n d i v i d u a l o f a certain species,
e.g. a cat or an oak-tree or perhaps) a crystal o f g o l d .
T h e functions o f a substantial f o r m are therefore t w o - f o l d . (1) I t is
because o f its presence i n certain stuff that there is a substance o f a
certain specific kind, e.g. a m a n or a cat or an oak-tree. (2) I t is because
o f its continued presence that a substance is and remains a single per
sistent natural unit, i n spite o f h a v i n g a p l u r a l i t y o f c o n t e m p o r a r y parts,
i n spite o f continual gradual changes o f stuff, and i n spite o f occasional
sudden changes o f stuff due t o accidents and injuries.
i . 2 T h e Cartesian v i e w
W e must next consider the Cartesian v i e w . This was a reaction against

the Scholastic theory. I t was based partly o n the n e w scientific methods
and discoveries o f m e n l i k e Galileo; p a r t l y o n a reversion to Platonic
and Augustinian philosophy, as opposed to the Aristotelian philosophy
o f w h i c h T h o m i s m was a development; and p a r t l y o n Descartes's o w n
mathematical, scientific and philosophical discoveries. For the present
purpose the essential points are the f o l l o w i n g .
(1) O f t h e three kinds ofsubstantial forms Descartes rejected all b u t
the first. H e held that each h u m a n soul is a pure f o r m w i t h o u t stuff,
capable o f a f u l l existence w i t h o u t a body, and i n fact v e r y m u c h like
an angel as conceived b y the Thomists. H e denied that irrational
animals and plants have substantial forms. T h e y are completely devoid
ofconsciousness, and arejust extremely complicated natural machines.
A l l their physiological and their biological characteristics can be and
should be f u l l y accounted f o r mechanically i n terms o f their structure
and the general laws o f m o t i o n .
(2) A h u m a n soul, t h o u g h i t is a k i n d o f substantial f o r m , is n o t the
f o r m o f its b o d y i n the sense i n w h i c h the Scholastics believed. A
h u m a n b o d y is as m u c h a machine as the b o d y o f an irrational animal
or a plant. A l l its physiological and biological characteristics are to be
accounted f o r mechanically. B u t there is a temporary and v e r y m y s
terious connexion, w h i c h lasts f o r a longer or shorter period, between
each l i v i n g h u m a n b o d y and a certain h u m a n soul. Certain processes
i n a h u m a n b o d y produce sensations, images and emotions i n the soul
w h i c h is attached t o i t ; and volitions i n a h u m a n soul produce certain
effects i n the b o d y to w h i c h i t is attached. These effects are v e r y strictly
l i m i t e d . I n the first place, there is o n l y one p o i n t i n a h u m a n b o d y at
w h i c h the soul w h i c h is attached to i t can affect i t , viz. a certain part o f
the brain called the 'pineal gland'. Secondly, the o n l y effect w h i c h i t can
produce is to alter the direction o f a current o f f l u i d called 'animal spirits'
w h i c h circulates i n the nerves and the cavities i n the brain. Descartes
thought he could prove f r o m the perfection o f G o d that the total quan
t i t y o f m o t i o n i n the corporeal universe as a w h o l e cannot be changed.
So the o n l y effect that a soul can have is t o make changes i n the direction
o f certain already existing motions, w i t h o u t increasing or diminishing
the amount. (The action m i g h t be compared t o that o f a pointsman w h o
shunts a train i n t o this, that, or the other branch.) The remote conse
quences ofthese actions o f a soul o n the pineal gland o f t h e b o d y w i t h
w h i c h i t is connected are rational speech and planned action b y that
THEORY OP C O R P O R E A L SUBSTANCES 53
b o d y . I t is obvious that Descartes's views o n this p o i n t are very unsatis

factory and that his position was unstable. I t had already been severely
attacked b y the Occasionahsts and others w h e n Leibniz began to w r i t e .
(3) Descartes held that the o n l y essential properties o f a n y corporeal
substance are geometrical and kinematic, i.e. shape, size, position, and
motion-or-rest. H e held that colour, temperature, taste, smell, etc. are
mind-dependent and do n o t belong t o bodies themselves but are, so
t o speak, projected i n t o t h e m b y the observer. B u t , i f h e is t o be taken
literally, he w e n t further than this. I f the o n l y essential properties
o f corporeal substances are geometrical and kinematic, then they have
n o dynamical properties, such as mass, force, energy, etc. These also
must be projected i n t o t h e m b y the observer, h i effect Descartes seems
to have identified the^materiaprima o f t h e Scholastics w i t h an infinitely
extended, perfectly homogeneous, continuous, incompressible fluid,
w i t h n o qualities o f its o w n . I t is differentiated o n l y b y there being
various currents and w h i r l p o o l s i n various parts o f i t . Particular bodies
are parts o f t h i s fluid marked out f r o m the surrounding fluid b y particu
lar kinds o f m o t i o n . So i t m i g h t be said that the s t u f f o f a l l bodies is this
universal fluid, and that the f o r m o f a n y particular b o d y is the m o d e o f
m o t i o n w h i c h marks out one part o f the fluid f r o m its surroundings.
(4) A l t h o u g h Descartes spoke o f h u m a n souls and o f all kinds
ofbodies as 'substances', he held that there is an i m p o r t a n t sense o f t h e
w o r d i n w h i c h these can be called 'substances' o n l y b y courtesy. I n
this sense the o n l y genuine substance is G o d . T h e p o i n t is this. H e held
that i t is a mistake t o t h i n k that a m i n d or a b o d y is first created b y
God, and thereafter continues to exist and t o pursue its adventures
w i t h o u t any further action o n God's part. H e thinks that unless G o d
actively intervened at every m o m e n t t o maintain i t , any created t h i n g
w o u l d at once cease t o exist. A created t h i n g persists o n l y i n so far as
G o d continually re-creates i t f r o m m o m e n t to m o m e n t . G o d is the
o n l y existent w h i c h does n o t need t o be kept i n existence f r o m o u t
side itself, and i n that sense he is the o n l y genuine substance. A h u m a n
soul or an a t o m w o u l d count as a substance, i n contrast, e.g., t o a
particular experience o r a particular v o l i t i o n , i n so far as i t depends o n
nothing but the creative action o f G o d f o r its continued existence. A
particular experience depends p r i m a r i l y o n the soul i n w h i c h i t occurs,
and secondarily o n G o d w h o creates and sustains that soul. Therefore
it is n o t a substance even b y courtesy. B y Leibniz's t i m e this doctrine
had been w o r k e d out t o v e r y startling consequences, i n one direction
b y the Occasionalists culminating i n Malebranche, and i n another
direction b y Spinoza.
1.3 L e i b n i z ' s general r e a c t i o n to S c h o l a s t i c i s m a n d

Cartesianism
Leibniz accepted m u c h i n the n e w scientific o u t l o o k and i n the p h i l o

sophic basis w h i c h Descartes had tried to provide for i t . H e also made
v e r y i m p o r t a n t contributions t o mathematics and dynamics. H e states
explicitly again and again that every particular phenomenon i n the
corporeal w o r l d (including physiological and biological phenomena)
must be explained mechanically. H e held that there is a certain general
principle i n dynamics, viz. w h a t w e should call the 'Conservation o f
M o m e n t u m ' , w h i c h rules o u t even the small amount o f action o f
souls o n bodies w h i c h Descartes had admitted. H e w h o l l y agrees w i t h
the Cartesians that i t is useless to appeal, as the Scholastics d i d , to sub
stantial forms i n order to explain scientifically any particular natural
phenomenon. H e agrees also w i t h t h e m , and w i t h nearly all the
leading scientists and philosophers o f his day, i n h o l d i n g that colour,
temperature, etc. do n o t belong to corporeal substances as such, b u t
are i n some sense projected i n t o t h e m b y the m i n d o f the observer.
H e agrees also that the external w o r l d is a p l e n u m , w i t h n o e m p t y
volumes w i t h i n i t , and n o e m p t y region surrounding i t .
B u t here his agreement ends. H e holds that the doctrine that cor
poreal substance has n o t h i n g b u t geometrical and kinematic properties
is b o t h internally inconsistent and impossible t o reconcile w i t h the
facts o f dynamics. H e holds that the laws o f m o t i o n i n v o l v e i n the
last resort something w h i c h is n o t merely geometric or kinematic, viz.
the n o t i o n offorce; and that force implies something l i k e the Scholastic
substantial f o r m . H e thinks that w e are led t o substantial forms also b y
considering the implications o f the endless divisibility o f corporeal
substance. Lastly, he thinks that the Predicate-in-Notion Principle
leads t o the same conclusion.
W e w i l l n o w consider his arguments. I n d o i n g so w e must r e m e m
ber that he m i g h t be perfectly successful i n the negative part, i.e. i n
showing that the Cartesian account o f c o r p o r e a l substance is untenable,
but the f o l l o w i n g question w o u l d still remain: is i t either (a) necessary
or (b) sufficient to postulate substantial forms i n order t o give a
satisfactory account o f corporeal substance?
2 Extension and motion
Leibniz argues that extension is n o t a simple unanalysable character

istic, and that i t could n o t possibly be an adequate account o f a n y t h i n g
THEORY OF CORPOREAL SUBSTANCES 55
to say that i t had such-and-such a shape, size, position, and m o t i o n .

His arguments are as follows.
(1) T h e n o t i o n ofspatial extension is analysable. I t has something i n
c o m m o n w i t h duration, viz. the factor o f continuous repetition or
diffusion. T a k i n g bodies as they appear t o the senses, their extension
seems t o consist i n the continuous diffusion o f some sensible quality,
e.g. whiteness i n the case o f m i l k , over an area or t h r o u g h o u t a v o l u m e ,
h i spatial extension w e have continuous diffusion o f w h a t is coexistent,
i n d u r a t i o n w e have continuous diffusion o f w h a t is successive. Thus
the n o t i o n o f an extended object essentially involves the n o t i o n o f
some non-geometrical quality w h i c h is diffused continuously and s i m u l
taneously. O f course Leibniz w o u l d n o t a d m i t that the quality c o u l d
really be a colour, such as whiteness i n m i l k , because he agrees w i t h
the Cartesians that colours are qualities w h i c h the observer projects i n t o
the things w h i c h he perceives. B u t there must be some real extensible
quality i n extended objects w h i c h really is continuously and s i m u l
taneously different, as whiteness appears t o be t o a person w h o looks
at a glass o f m i l k or a w h i t e cloud.
I t h i n k i t is plain that Leibniz is r i g h t here. T o talk o f anything being
merely extended, w i t h o u t any extensible quality w h i c h fills and marks
out its area or v o l u m e is to talk nonsense. I w o u l d add, however, that
there is something peculiar and unanalysable i n the n o t i o n o f extension,
v i z . the factor oispatial diffusion. This m a y be analogous to temporal
diffusion i n the case o f duration, and to the discontinuous simultaneous
repetition w h i c h is at the basis o f n u m b e r according t o Leibniz. B u t
it has its o w n unique character. I t w o u l d be misleading to say s i m p l y
that the n o t i o n ofextension can be analysed i n t o the notions o f p l u r a l -
i t y , c o n t i n u i t y , and simultaneity, and that the n o t i o n o f duration can
be analysed i n t o those o f plurality, c o n t i n u i t y , and succession. W h a t
is peculiar t o extension is the unique w a y i n w h i c h an extensible
quality constitutes a continuous diffused w h o l e o f coexistent adjoined
parts.
( 2 ) N o t o n l y is extension meaningless unless the n o t i o n ofextensible
qualities is introduced, t o talk o f motion i n a completely homogeneous
continuous fluid is also t o talk w i t h o u t t h i n k i n g . For just t r y t o c o n
sider w h a t w o u l d happen. A p o r t i o n o f t h e fluid w o u l d m o v e o u t o f a
certain region and w o u l d continuously be replaced b y other portions
o f the fluid. T h e m o t i o n w o u l d o f course be circulatory. N o w that
w h i c h flowed i n t o any region w o u l d be exactly l i k e that w h i c h
flowed out o f i t . There w o u l d have been a change o n l y i n name. W e
disguise f r o m ourselves the fact that w h a t w e are saying is meaningless
j6 LEIBNIZ: AN INTRODUCTION
b y i m a g i n i n g this p o r t i o n as somehow marked ofF f r o m the rest b y

being contained i n a k i n d o f infinitely t h i n flexible skin, distinguished
b y its colour or some other sensible quality f r o m its surroundings. B u t
this is t o deny tacitly w h a t w e are asserting explicitly, viz. that the
fluid is completely homogeneous and has n o t h i n g b u t geometrical
and kinematic properties. This argument w o u l d h o l d even i f m o t i o n
were something absolute; b u t w e shall see shortly that Leibniz h e l d i t
to be merely a change o f relationships, and therefore, o n his general
principles, at best a phenomenon benefundatum.
Leibniz concludes, quite r i g h t l y I t h i n k , f r o m these t w o arguments,
that w h a t Descartes calls 'extension', i.e. purely geometrical and k i n e
matic properties, is an essentially incomplete n o t i o n w h i c h c o u l d n o t
conceivably suffice b y itselfto constitute the w h o l e essence o f a n y t h i n g .
3 R e l a t i v i t y o f space, t i m e a n d m o t i o n
I t w i l l be as w e l l t o consider Leibniz's doctrine o f the r e l a t i v i t y o f

space, t i m e , and m o t i o n here. I t is most clearly stated i n the Letters to
Clarke. N e w t o n had definitely asserted i n the Principia that Dynamics
requires to postulate absolute space, t i m e , and m o t i o n ; and Clarke
represented N e w t o n i n this controversy.
h i order t o understand the controversy w e must begin b y stating
N e w t o n ' s v i e w , as i t emerged i n Clarke's letters. I t m a y be summarized
as follows, ( i ) Space is logically p r i o r to matter, apd T i m e is logically
p r i o r t o events and processes. (2) T h e v o l u m e o f a b o d y is a p r o p e r t y
o f i t , b u t the space w h i c h i t occupies is n o t . A l i m i t e d region o f space
w h i c h happens to be occupied b y a b o d y is a part o f t h e one u n l i m i t e d
Space. Even i f t h e w h o l e o f i n f i n i t e Space were occupied b y corporeal
substance, still Space w o u l d n o t be a p r o p e r t y o f that infinite body.
The infinite b o d y w o u l d still be merely in Space, as finite bodies are
i n various parts o f Space. T h e same remarks apply mutatis mutandis t o
T i m e and events or processes. (3) Strictly speaking, Space is indivisible.
I t is meaningless t o suggest that the regions o f Space w h i c h are ad
j o i n e d m i g h t be separated. I t is also meaningless t o suggest that there
m i g h t be holes i n Space. Similar remarks apply mutatis mutandis t o
T i m e . (4) Space is actually, and n o t just potentially, infinite i n every
direction. T i m e had no beginning and w i l l have n o end. (5) Since
T i m e is logically p r i o r to the events and process w h i c h happen t o
occupy i t , i t is intelligible t o suggest that the universe m i g h t have been
created at an earlier or later m o m e n t than that at w h i c h i t was i n fact
created. A g a i n , since Space is logically p r i o r t o the things and events
THEORY OF C O R P O R E A L SUBSTANCES 57
w h i c h happen t o occupy i t , b o t h the t w o f o l l o w i n g suggestions are

intelligible o n the supposition that the corporeal universe is o f fmite
extent, (a) That, w i t h o u t any difference i n its internal structure, i t
might have been created i n a different r e g i o n o f Space, (b) T h a t i t m i g h t
at any m o m e n t be moved as a w h o l e b y G o d f r o m one part o f Space t o
another, or be given an absolute r o t a t i o n about any direction i n
Space. I f this rectilinear m o t i o n were n o n - u n i f o r m , or i f the universe
were subjected t o an absolute r o t a t i o n , these absolute motions w o u l d
betray themselves b y observable forces w i t h i n the w o r l d . Otherwise,
they w o u l d remain unobservable. (6) Absolute m o t i o n involves ab
solute Space and absolute T i m e . Its distinction f r o m relative m o t i o n
is evidenced b y the existence o f centrifugal forces, b y the flattening o f
the earth at the poles, and so o n . (7) A region o f Space o r a stretch o f
T i m e has an absolute magnitude. Different regions can be compared
i n respect o f their absolute v o l u m e , and different stretches i n respect
o f their absolute duration. (8) G o d does n o t exist i n Space and T i m e
i n the sense i n w h i c h created things and events do so. B u t he is i m
mediately present to every part o f unbounded Space t h r o u g h o u t the
w h o l e o f unending T i m e . I n this w a y he is continually aware o f all
created things, and he acts upon t h e m , b u t they do n o t react u p o n
him.
Leibniz's argument against the absolute theory rests o n the Principle
o f Sufficient Reason and the I d e n t i t y o f Indiscernibles. I t m a y be
summarized as follows. Let us grant for the sake o f argument that the
Absolute T h e o r y is i n some sense an intelligible hypothesis and n o t
just meaningless verbiage. I f the t h e o r y were true, the created universe
could have occupied, w i t h o u t being i n any w a y different internally,
a different stretch "of t i m e or a different region o f space. N o w there
w o u l d have been n o possible reason for preferring t o p u t i t i n one
stretch o f t i m e or one region o f space rather than another. Therefore
God, w h o never makes a choice w i t h o u t a sufficient reason, w o u l d
not have created a universe at all. B u t , since there is a universe, w e
k n o w that he has created one. Therefore w e can be certain that the
Absolute T h e o r y is false, even i f i t is n o t meaningless. I f , o n the other
hand, the Relational T h e o r y were true, these so-called alternative
ways o f locating the w o r l d i n space or i n t i m e w o u l d n o t be genuine
alternative possibilities. O n the Relational T h e o r y there is n o actual
space or t i m e existing p r i o r t o the creation o f things and events. G o d
creates space i n and t h r o u g h creating bodies and arranging t h e m
spatially i n relation t o each other. A n d he creates t i m e i n and t h r o u g h
creating events i n temporal relations t o each other.
58 LEIBNIZ: AN INTKODUCTION
I t was n o t clear t o Clarke, and i t is n o t clear t o me, whether Leibniz

meant to go further and positively assert that the Absolute T h e o r y is
meaningless verbiage. I n the Fifth L e t t e r he says explicitly that the
1
supposition o f the universe as a w h o l e being m o v e d is meaningless,

because there could be n o space outside i t . I n the same Letter he says
that m o t i o n must be in principle observable. I t need n o t be actually
observed; b u t there is n o m o t i o n where there is n o change that could
be observed, and there is n o change where none could be observed.
These passages suggest that he held the m o r e radical v i e w that the
Absolute T h e o r y is meaningless verbiage. B u t I t h i n k that his state
ments are fairly susceptible o f either o f the t w o f o l l o w i n g inter
pretations, ( i ) T h e Absolute Theory, and the various questions w h i c h
arise i n connexion w i t h i t , are intrinsically meaningless. (2) Even t h o u g h
the Absolute T h e o r y and the questions w h i c h arise i n connexion w i t h
it be not intrinsically meaningless, yet w e can reject i t and accept the
Relational T h e o r y because o f the argument founded o n the Principle
o f Sufficient Reason. A n d i n terms of the Relational Theory these ques
tions are meaningless. I suspect that Leibniz h i m s e l f h e l d the first v i e w ,
but contented h i m s e l f w i t h the second for controversial purposes.
Is the argument based o n the Principle o f Sufficient Reason v a l i d
relatively to its o w n premisses? I t seems to me that, i f w e suppose that
G o d existed and had a series o f experiences before he created the
w o r l d , he m i g h t have perfectly g o o d reasons for creating i t w h e n the
series o f his o w n experiences had reached a certain stage o f develop
ment rather than before or afterwards. Suppose i t is intelligible t o
talk o f absolute t i m e . T h e n G o d m i g h t have a perfectly g o o d reason
for creating the w o r l d at a certain m o m e n t o f absolute t i m e . T h e rea
son could be, n o t i n anything special i n that m o m e n t itself, b u t i n the
stage o f development reached b y his o w n experiences at that m o m e n t .
I do n o t t h i n k that a similar argument could be used to show that G o d
m i g h t have a g o o d internal reason for creating the w o r l d i n one region
o f Absolute Space rather than another. A n d I a m p r e t t y sure that
Leibniz w o u l d have rejected the premiss o f m y argument about t i m e .
H e w o u l d have denied that G o d has successive experiences as created
minds do.
Leibniz's o w n account o f the Relational T h e o r y o f Space occurs i n
the Fifth Letter. I t m a y be summarized as follows. Suppose that
2
certain bodies X, Y, Z,... do n o t change their m u t u a l spatial relations

d u r i n g a certain interval. Suppose further that, i f there is a change
during this interval i n their spatial relations t o certain other bodies, the
1
[ G . , V I I , 389-420. Loemker, 696-717.] 2
[ibid.]
cause o f i t has n o t been i n themselves. T h e n w e can say that the bodies

o f X, Y, Z, . . . have constituted a ' r i g i d fixed system' d u r i n g the
interval i n question. Suppose that, at some m o m e n t w i t h i n this
interval, a certain b o d y A stood i n certain spatial relations t o the
bodies o f this system. Suppose that at a later m o m e n t w i t h i n the
interval A ceased t o stand i n these relations t o t h e m . A n d suppose, at
some later m o m e n t w i t h i n the interval, another b o d y B began t o
stand t o those bodies i n precisely similar relations t o those i n w h i c h A
had f o r m e r l y stood. T h e n w e can say that 'B has come t o occupy the
same place as A f o r m e r l y occupied.' I f and o n l y i f the causes o f these
changes o f relative position have been i n A and i n B respectively, w e
can say that A and B have 'been i n m o t i o n ' . Leibniz then defines 'a
place' i n terms o f t h e relation o f Occupying the same place'. Finally
he defines 'space' as the collection o f all simultaneous places.
Speaking i n contemporary t e r m i n o l o g y , w e may say that Leibniz
regards Space as a logical construction o u t o f places, and he regards a
place as a logical construction o u t offacts about the spatial relations o f
bodies. A n d he holds that the n o t i o n o f Absolute Space and absolute
places is a fallacy o f misplaced concreteness.
Leibniz sometimes argues i n the Letters to Clarke that the Relational
T h e o r y o f Space entails that there can be n o e m p t y spaces w i t h i n the
w o r l d , and that there cannot be e m p t y space outside the w o r l d . I n the
Fifth Letter, e.g., he says: 'Since space i n itselfis an ideal t h i n g . . . space
outside the w o r l d must needs be i m a g i n a r y . . . T h e case is the same w i t h
e m p t y space w i t h i n the w o r l d , w h i c h I take also to be i m a g i n a r y . '
1
Ffis m o r e usual v i e w , w h i c h also occurs i n the Letters to Clarke, is that

G o d could have l i m i t e d the quantity o f corporeal substance, b u t that
i t is v e r y unlikely that a perfectly wise and benevolent creator w o u l d
have done so.
T h e more radical v i e w is quite certainly mistaken. O f course, i f the
Absolute T h e o r y is false, space does n o t exist, i n the sense i n w h i c h the
Newtonians t h o u g h t i t d i d , either outside the w o r l d , i f that be finite,
or inside the receiver o f an a i r - p u m p i f that could be completely
exhausted. B u t i t is quite easy t o state, i n terms o f the Relational
T h e o r y , any o f the f o l l o w i n g hypotheses: ( i ) T h a t the w o r l d is o f
finite extent. (2) That, i f i t is o f finite extent, i t might have been bigger
or smaller at a given m o m e n t than i t i n fact was then. (3) T h a t i t m i g h t
become bigger or smaller i n future than i t n o w is. I w i l l n o w proceed
to show h o w this can be done.
Suppose y o u take as u n i t distance the distance at a given m o m e n t
1
[ G . , V I I , 396. L o e m k e r , 701.]
бО LEIBNIZ: AN INTRODUCTION
between t w o particles P and Q. T h e n to say that the universe is o f

finite extent is t o say that there is a fmite integer N such that the dis
tance between any t w o actual particles is less than N times the distance
between P and Q. T o say that i t m i g h t have been bigger or smaller
at a certain m o m e n t than i t i n fact was then, is to say that i t is logically
possible that N m i g h t have been bigger or smaller than i t i n fact was
then. T o say that there m i g h t be an e m p t y hole w i t h i n the w o r l d is to
say that there m i g h t be pairs ofparticles at a finite distance apart w h i c h
have n o particle between t h e m , and that the aggregate o f s u c h particles
m i g h t be so arranged as to f o r m a closed surface.
There is one other p o i n t o f some importance. I t is clear that the
controversy between Leibniz and Clarke is conducted at w h a t Leibniz
w o u l d regard as an intermediate level o f philosophical r i g o u r and
thoroughness. I t is indeed a philosophical, and n o t merely a scientific,
discussion. B u t Leibniz is granting for the sake o f argument certain
assumptions w h i c h he w o u l d claim to have refuted elsewhere. H e is
granting the reality o f relations; b u t , as w e k n o w , he holds that
relations between different substances are at best phenomena henefundata.
So the relational theory o f space, t i m e , and m o t i o n , t h o u g h far nearer
the t r u t h than N e w t o n ' s absolute theory, must itself be orJy an
approximation to the t r u t h . Suppose w e say that b o d y A is i n such-
and-such spatial relation to b o d y B and that these relations are changing
at such-and-such a rate. A n d suppose that this statement w o u l d , i n the
ordinary sense, be called true. I f Leibniz's general theory o f relations
is correct the t r u t h u n d e r l y i n g i t must be that A has a certain pure
quality, that B has a certain other pure quality, and that one or other
or b o t h ofthese qualities are changing at a certain rate.
W . E. Johnson pointed out that there are t w o different distinctions
i n v o l v e d i n the controversy between the absolute and the relative
theories o f space. (Similar remarks apply t o t i m e also, b u t w e w i l l
1
ignore i t . ) ( i ) Is spatial position a pure quality o r a relational property?

( 2 ) O n either alternative is i t a quality o f o r a relation between material
particles directly? O r does i t belong p r i m a r i l y t o particular existents o f a
peculiar k i n d , viz. points o r regions o f a peculiar e n t i t y called 'Space',
and o n l y i n a derivative sense to material particles i n v i r t u e o f their
occupying points o r regions o f Space? This question m i g h t be p u t i n
the f o r m : Is space substantival or adjectival i n character? N e w t o n held
b o t h that space is substantival and that spatial position is a pure quality.
Leibniz i n the Letters to Clarke argues that space is adjectival; that
spatial position is a relational property; and that the spatial relations
1
[ W . E. Johnson, Logic, Part U (Cambridge, 1 9 2 2 ) , 165ff.]
THEORY Of CORPOREAL SUBSTANCES 6l
between material particles are direct and n o t derived f r o m the facts

that they occupy points o f space and that these are spatially related i n
the p r i m a r y sense. B u t u l t i m a t e l y Leibniz must h o l d what Johnson
w o u l d call a f o r m o f the adjectival qualitative theory. The real basis
o f the phenomenon o f spatial position must be certain pure qualities
i n the substances w h i c h w e perceive as bodies. Later o n w e shall see
that these qualities are w h a t Leibniz calls the 'points o f v i e w ' o f
monads.
4 Dynamicalproperties ofbodies 1
I t still remains t o identify the objective non-geometrical extensible

quality, whose continuous simultaneous diffusion constitutes the ex
tension o f an extended object. Leibniz thinks that reflexion o n the
dynamical properties o f bodies enables us t o identify this quality, and
at the same t i m e t o reinforce the v i e w that the essence o f corporeal
substances cannot be extension.
4.1 I m p e n e t r a b i U t y
W e w a n t to f i n d an extensible q u a l i t y w h i c h , l i k e extension, is c o m
m o n t o all bodies under all conditions, e.g. whether they are solid,
l i q u i d or gaseous.Leibniz suggests that this characteristic is impenetra
bility. I n so far as a b o d y is considered as an extended object i t is c o n
ceived as characterized b y impenetrability diffused t h r o u g h o u t a
certain v o l u m e o r over a certain closed surface.
This p r o p e r t y o f impenetrability (or antitypia as Leibniz often calls
i t ) needs a little explanation. I t m a y be defined as the fact that t w o
bodies cannot at the same t i m e continuously occupy the same region.
Y o u m i g h t say that this is obvious enough w h e n b o t h are hard solids.
B u t w h a t about a solution ofsugar i n water, or a m i x t u r e o f w a t e r and
w i n e , o r a m i x t u r e o f air and ammonia? T h e answer w h i c h is always
given is the f o l l o w i n g .
T h e v o l u m e is n o t continuously occupied either b y water o r b y w i n e .
Each b o d y consists o f a vast n u m b e r o f v e r y small particles w i t h v e r y
small spaces between t h e m , and the particles o f t h e one b o d y are i n the
spaces between those o f the other body. N 0 particle o f water ever
occupies the same place as any particle o f w i n e . Y o u m i g h t compare
the sense i n w h i c h the m i x t u r e occupies the containing vessel t o that
i n w h i c h Trafalgar Square m i g h t be simultaneously occupied b y a
1
[ G . M . , V I , 2 3 4 - 5 4 . Loemker, 4 3 5 - 5 ° · ]
c r o w d composed o f w h i t e m e n and o f N e g r o e s interspersed. Even i f i t

were held that the vessel is continuously occupied b y the m i x t u r e as a
whole, i t w o u l d be o n l y discontinuously occupied b y each constituent
o f the m i x t u r e . This explanation shows that impenetrability has
n o t h i n g whatever t o do w i t h hardness or softness. I f the ultimate
particles o f liquids were themselves l i q u i d , i t w o u l d still be the case
that n o t w o o f t h e m could occupy the same place at the same t i m e .
W i t h this explanation w e can understand that what Leibniz means
is this. A necessary condition for saying that a certain v o l u m e is filled
w i t h corporeal substance at a certain m o m e n t is that n o other corporeal
substance can occupy any part o f that v o l u m e unless and u n t i l i t
probes before i t or thrusts aside the present contents o f that region.
4.2 b i e r t i a l quiescence
This condition, however, is n o t sufficient. A b o d y m i g h t be impene

trable, i.e. i t m i g h t be that n o other b o d y could occupy its place w i t h
out first slufting i t . B u t i t is logically possible that i t m i g h t offer n o
resistance to being shifted, i.e. i t m i g h t be that another b o d y could, w i t h
out losing any o f its o w n m o t i o n , push i t f o r w a r d or thrust i t aside.
I t is another essential property o f corporeal substance that this logical
possibility is never reaÜzed. N 0 b o d y can be set i n m o t i o n b y the
impact o f another b o d y w i t h o u t the latter losing some o f its o w n
m o t i o n i n the process. I a m g o i n g to call this property 'inertial quies
cence'.
4.3 b i e r t i a l seb>propagation
Extension, impenetrability, and inertial quiescence are still insufficient.

I t is logically possible that a b o d y should need an external force, n o t
o n l y t o set i t i n m o t i o n , b u t also t o keep i t m o v i n g . I t m i g h t be that i t
w o u l d at once cease t o m o v e i f the forces w h i c h had set i t i n m o t i o n
ceased t o act o n i t . O r , failing that, i t m i g h t be that the velocity w h i c h
it had acquired w o u l d gradually and automatically die away i f n o
external force acted to keep i t up. I t is another essential property o f
corporeal substance that this logical possibility is not realized. I f a b o d y
moves into a place w i t h a certain speed and i n a certain direction, i t
w i l l at the same instant m o v e out of that place w i t h the same speed and
i n the same direction, unless i t is then and there acted u p o n f r o m
outside. A n d any m o v i n g b o d y w h i c h causes a change i n the speed or
the direction o f m o t i o n o f another b o d y b y colliding w i t h i t w i l l
suffer a change i n its o w n m o t i o n b y d o i n g so. I a m g o i n g to call this

property 'inertial self-propagation.
Before g o i n g further I w i l l make the f o l l o w i n g comments, ( i )
Leibniz lumps together inertial quiescence and inertial self-propagation
under the c o m m o n name o f 'inertia'. I t seems t o me i m p o r t a n t t o
distinguish t h e m , since the f o r m e r does n o t logically entail the latter.
(2) Leibniz seems t o m e sometimes t o talk as i f i m p e n e t r a b i l i t y i m p l i e d
an infinite natural force o f resistance t o penetration. I t h i n k that this
is a mistake. T h e impossibility o f t h e same region being simultaneously
and continuously occupied b y t w o bodies seems t o m e t o be a logical
impossibility depending o n our criteria for j u d g i n g 'the same' and
'different' bodies. N o one objects, e.g., t o the same region being s i m
ultaneously and continuously occupied b y an electric and a magnetic
field. (3) Descartes was quite w e l l aware o f t h e facts o f i m p e n e t r a b i l i t y
and inertial quiescence and inertial self-propagation. B u t , since they
are essential properties o f bodies and they certainly are not logical
consequences o f their purely geometrical and kinematic properties,
Leibniz was quite r i g h t t o insist that they refute the doctrine that the
essence o f corporeal substance is extension.
4.4 Force
A . Passive. Leibniz classifies impenetrability and the t w o kinds o f

inertia together under the name of'passive f o r c e ' . For reasons already
1
given I do n o t t h i n k that impenetrability should be counted as force

at all. I t seems t o m e also that inertial self-propagation, as distinct f r o m
inertial quiescence, should be counted as something active and n o t as
something merely passive.
H e holds that the passive force i n any b o d y is everywhere the same,
and that the total a m o u n t o f i t i n a b o d y is p r o p o r t i o n a l to its v o l u m e .
H e admits, o f course, that there is a sense i n w h i c h one body, e.g. a
sphere o f lead, has greater mass and therefore greater inertia than
another o f the same size, e.g. an equal sphere o f w o o d . B u t he says
that this is because each ofthese bodies is porous, like a sponge, or is a
disconnected collection, like a cloud. The lead is m u c h less porous than
the w o o d , and so the quantity o f lead-material i n a sphere o f lead is
m u c h greater than the quantity o f wood-material i n an equal sphere o f
w o o d . B u t I understand h i m t o h o l d that, i f t w o equal volumes are
continuously occupied b y corporeal substance, the mass o f each w o u l d
be the same. I do n o t t h i n k that he produces any g o o d reason f o r this.
1
[ G . M . , V I , 236-7. Loemker, 437.]
в. Active. Besides the properties already mentioned bodies have

dynamic properties. A n y b o d y w h i c h is i n m o t i o n is capable o f p r o -
ducing effects o n other bodies. Its p o w e r o f d o i n g this is greater the
more massive i t is and the faster i t is m o v i n g . A g a i n , a b o d y w h i c h is
raised up, e.g. the w e i g h t o f a clock, can produce effects b y gradually
descending. Again, an elastic b o d y w h i c h is stretched or compressed,
e.g. a coiled spring or a bent b o w , is capable o f p r o d u c i n g m o t i o n b y
relaxing t o its n o r m a l state.
N o w , f r o m a purely geometrical p o i n t o f v i e w , a m o v i n g b o d y at
any instant is indistinguishable f r o m a resting b o d y i n the same position
at that instant. A n d , f r o m a purely kinematic p o i n t o f v i e w , the only
difference is the f o l l o w i n g . O f a m o v i n g b o d y w e can say, e.g., that
at immediately earlier moments i t occupied a continuous series o f
positions t o the left o f its present position, and that at immediately
later moments i t w i l l occupy a continuous series o f positions to the
r i g h t o f i t . O f a resting b o d y w e can say that i t occupied the same
position at immediately earlier moments and w i l l occupy the same
position at immediately later moments.
N o w i t seemed to Leibniz that, i f m o t i o n is to be real and to have
real effects, the state o f a m o v i n g b o d y at each instant must be different
f r o m the state o f a resting b o d y at an instant. There must be i n the
m o v i n g body, as he puts i t , something w h i c h is present b u t w h i c h
points towards a certain development i n the immediate future. T h e
difference at each instant between a m o v i n g b o d y and a resting one
consists i n the presence o f active force i n the f o r m e r and its absence i n
the latter. (This is a preliminary r o u g h statement w h i c h w i l l have t o
be made more accurate later.)
V e r y similar remarks apply to a compressed spring or a raised
weight. A l t h o u g h the spring is n o t d o i n g anything overtly so l o n g as
the catch is h o l d i n g i t , i t must be i n a different internal state f r o m a
geometrically similar b o d y w h i c h is n o t compressed b u t is o f its
natural length. For i t has the power t o produce or m o d i f y the motions
o f other bodies whenever i t is released. Leibniz gave the name 'active
force' to that factor w h i c h he t h o u g h t that w e must assume t o be
present at each m o m e n t i n a m o v i n g body, a compressed spring, o r
raised weight, and so o n , i n v i e w o f t h e fact that i t is ready t o produce
effects w h i c h w o u l d n o t be produced b y a resting body, a relaxed
spring, a weight resting o n the ground, and so o n . I must say that i t
seems t o me plain c o m m o n sense t o regard active force, i n this sense,
as an essential and independent factor i n the n o t i o n o f corporeal sub
stance.
T h e f o U o w i n g further points about active force should be n o t e d :

(1) Leibniz says that i t is n o t a mere passive potentiality, b u t an
active striving towards a certain process ofchange i n a certain direction.
I t requires n o t h i n g i n order to actualize i t except the removal o f c e r t a i n
hindrances, e.g. the release o f a catch, the c u t t i n g o f a string, etc.
(2) T h e process o f a c t i v e force i n bodies is sometimes obvious to the
senses. B u t reflexion shows that i t must be present everywhere i n
nature even w h e n i t is n o t obvious. Strictly speaking, however, i t is
something w h i c h is never perceived b y the senses and w h i c h cannot be
represented b y imagery. I t can o n l y be conceived b y the intellect o n the
occasion o f perceiving certain phenomena w i t h the senses. This seems
to m e t o be true.
(3) Leibniz draws a distinction between w h a t he calls 'primitive
active force' and w h a t he caUs 'derived active f o r c e ' . 1 do n o t w a n t t o
1
go i n t o a l o t o f physical detail, b u t I t h i n k that the essential p o i n t is

this. H e regards each genuine corporeal substance as h a v i n g a total
store o f w h a t w e should call 'energy', w h i c h is neither increased n o r
diminished b y any dynamical transactions i n w h i c h i t m a y take part.
A t any m o m e n t the w h o l e or part o f this w i l l be latent. B u t at m a n y
moments a part o f i t w i l l be overt. T h e part w h i c h is overt at any
m o m e n t m a y take various forms, e.g. i t m a y take the f o r m o f the
force due to the b o d y m o v i n g as a w h o l e (vis viva) o r the force due
to its being compressed o r raised, and so o n . T h e p r o p o r t i o n o f the
total energy w h i c h is overt at any m o m e n t , and the f o r m w h i c h that
manifestation w i l l t h e n take, depend u p o n the external conditions i n
w h i c h the b o d y is then placed. T h e p r i m i t i v e active force is the total
store o f energy, latent or overt, i n the b o d y . T h e derived active force
is the part o f t h i s w h i c h is overt at any m o m e n t . Interaction o f b o d y A
w i t h b o d y B merely furnishes the occasion o n w h i c h so m u c h o f A's
p r i m i t i v e active force takes such-and-such an overt f o r m , and so m u c h
o f B ' s p r i m i t i v e active force takes such-and-such an overt f o r m . There
is never any transference o f f o r c e f r o m one genuine corporeal substance
t o another.
(4) Leibniz also draws a distinction between w h a t he caUs ' l i v i n g
force' (vis viva) and 'dead force' (vis mortica). There is n o d o u b t at
2
all that w h a t he caUs vis viva is f o r all practical purposes w h a t w e should

nowadays call 'kinetic energy', and n o t w h a t w e should call 'force'.
I t is measured b y the product o f the mass o f a m o v i n g b o d y b y the
square o f its velocity. I t is n o t so clear t o me w h a t he meant b y vis
mortica, t h o u g h there is no doubt that he t h o u g h t that i t is illustrated
1
[ G . M . , V I , 236. L o e m k e r , 436.] 2
[ G . M . , V I , 238. L o e m k e r , 438.]
b y systems o f bodies w h i c h are at rest but i n tension or compression,

e.g. i n a pair ofsuspended weights connected b y a string over a pulley
w h i c h just balance each other. H e says that vis viva arises f r o m an
infmite series o f impressions o f vis mortica. I t is easy to see what he had
i n m i n d b y taking a simple example. Suppose that a compressed spring
lies o n a horizontal table w i t h a massive b o d y l y i n g i n contact w i t h the
free end o f i t . I f the spring is released, i t w i l l push the b o d y f o r w a r d
w i t h gradually increasing speed, thus i m p a r t i n g to i t more and m o r e
vis viva. As i t does so the tension i n i t w i l l be gradually relaxed. T h e
vis mortica o f the spring is certainly either the tension itself ( w h i c h is a
force i n the m o d e r n sense o f the w o r d ) or w h a t w e should nowadays
call the store o f potential energy connected w i t h the tension. I t is n o t
clear to me w h i c h o f the t w o Leibniz meant b y 'vis mortica'. Probably
he d i d n o t himself clearly distinguish the t w o .
(5) Leibniz supports his other arguments for postulating active force
i n bodies b y an argument d r a w n f r o m the relational theory o f space
and t i m e . T h a t theory naturally involves a purely relational v i e w o f
m o t i o n . This leads to t w o arguments at different philosophical levels.
T h e y m a y be stated as follows, (a) Suppose w e accept the reality o f
relations. Let A and B be t w o bodies and let the distance between t h e m
be increasing at a certain rate. Since distance is a symmetrical relation,
this k i n d o f change is perfectly symmetrical as between A and B.
B u t , i f the relational theory be correct, all m o t i o n consists s i m p l y o f
changes o f distance between bodies. I t w o u l d therefore appear t o be
meaningless t o say that A m o v e d and B stood still, or that A m o v e d
w i t h a certain velocity and B m o v e d w i t h a certain other velocity i n
the same or the opposite direction. Y e t c o m m o n sense w o u l d say that
a bullet moves and that the target remains at rest. A n d N e w t o n has
empirical arguments for absolute r o t a t i o n based o n the occurrence
o f centrifugal forces i n some cases and their absence i n other cases.
Leibniz's answer is that this shows that w e must postulate something
i n bodies beside m o t i o n . A l t h o u g h m o t i o n is n o t h i n g b u t a perfectly
symmetrical change o f relation between the bodies concerned, the
forces w h i c h are responsible for such changes o f relation are something
absolute. O n e o f t h e bodies m a y have all the force w h i c h is i n v o l v e d ;
or each m a y have some o f i t i n various proportions. T h a t is the real
basis o f t h e distinction w h i c h is misleadingly described as the difference
between 'the absolute true m o t i o n ' o f a b o d y and 'the mere relative
change o f i t s situation w i t h respect t o another body'.
The k i n d o f t h i n g w h i c h Leibniz has i n m i n d is quite obvious, m

m y example o f the bullet and the target the f o r m e r has the power to
break a w i n d o w o r k i l l a m a n or set an intervening object i n m o t i o n ,

whilst the latter has not. I t is the presence o f this p o w e r i n the bullet
and its absence i n the target w h i c h makes us say that the f o r m e r is
absolutely i n m o t i o n and the latter is not. B u t , according to Leibniz,
w h e n w e speak i n this w a y , w e are n o t adding anything intelligible
t o the fact that the bullet has these dynamical powers and that the tar
get has not.
(b) T h e second argument w o u l d r u n as follows. Since m o t i o n is
n o t h i n g b u t change o f spatial relations between bodies, and since
relations are at best phenomena bene fundata, m o t i o n itself is at best a
phenomenon benefundatum. Therefore there must be i n one or other o r
b o t h o f the substances concerned a non-relational attribute whose
changes are the foundation o f the phenomenon o f m o t i o n . Leibniz
concludes that this must be the active force characteristic ofeach b o d y .
4.5 M e t a p h y s i c a l impHcations o f L e i b n i z ' s d y n a m i c s
Leibniz's criticisms o n Descartes's doctrine that the essence o f cor

poreal substance is 'extension', i.e. simply geometrical and kinematic
properties, seem t o m e to be annihilating. His criticism o f N e w t o n ' s
doctrine o f substantival absolute space and t i m e seems t o m e t o be
w o r t h y o f v e r y serious consideration; and I suppose that, r i g h t l y o r
w r o n g l y , his conclusions o n this question w o u l d generally be accepted
b y scientists and philosophers at the present t i m e . Lastly, I a m inclined
to t h i n k that he is r i g h t i n h o l d i n g that the notions o f w h a t he caUs
'passive and active force' are an essential part o f w h a t w e understand
b y corporeal substance, and that they cannot be analysed away i n t o
anything else. B u t the question remains whether these facts have the
metaphysical implications w h i c h Leibniz thinks that they have.
T h e interpretation w h i c h he puts u p o n t h e m i n the Letters to Arnauld
and other w r i t i n g s o f a b o u t that period m a y be summarized as f o l l o w s .
(1) T h e n o t i o n o f materia prima i n physics is the n o t i o n o f a
continuous, boundless, perfectly homogeneous incompressible fluid,
possessing simply the t w o properties o f impenetrability and inertia,
i.e. passive force, and the potentiality o f m o v e m e n t i n the f o r m o f
circulatory currents w i t h i n i t . This n o t i o n is an abstraction f r o m the
complete n o t i o n o f a b o d i l y substance. As w e have seen, i t is also an
essential part o f the n o t i o n o f such a substance to have a store o f
p r i m i t i v e active forces. This is ready to manifest itselfat any m o m e n t i n
this, that, or the other f o r m o f derivative active force, according to the
external conditions prevailing i n the neighbourhood o f t h e b o d y then.
(2) This fits i n w i t h the general Scholastic doctrine that a created

substance is a composite i n w h i c h are the t w o factors o f s t u f f and f o r m .
The stuff-factor is those features w h i c h constitute materia prima, i.e.
extension, impenetrability, and inertia. T h e form-factor, w h i c h marks
out a particular p o r t i o n o f materia prima f r o m the rest as this or that
body, is the p r i m i t i v e active force w i t h w h i c h i t was endowed b y G o d .
A l l its subsequent history consists i n the various transformations o f
this p r i m i t i v e active force, o n the occasion o f its various encounters
w i t h other bodies, and subject to certain general laws w h i c h G o d has
impressed o n all bodies at their creation.
(3) W e must distinguish between a genuine corporeal substance,
w h i c h is a natural intrinsic unit, and a mere aggregate o f several such,
w h i c h is not. V e r y often w h a t w e take to be a single corporeal sub
stance is an aggregate o f m a n y . I t m i g h t be compared to a flock, whilst
a genuine b o d i l y substance m a y be compared to a single sheep. T h e
p r i m i t i v e active force i n a genuine b o d i l y substance is o f t h e nature o f
a soul, and the substance as a w h o l e is o f the nature o f a living creature.
T h e organism o f such a l i v i n g creature, taken apart f r o m its soul, is
not a single b o d i l y substance b u t is an aggregate o f m a n y such. B u t i t
is an aggregate o f a v e r y peculiar k i n d , w h i c h Leibniz caUs a 'natural
machine'. One peculiarity o f a natural machine is that, unlike an
artificial one, i t can never be generated or altogether destroyed i n the
course o f nature. I t can o n l y get larger or smaller, and there is always
present i n i t a certain degree o f vitality. Leibniz says explicitly that
this is true even o f organisms w h i c h w o u l d n o t c o m m o n l y be counted
as the bodies o f animals.
Thus every natural u n i t o f corporeal substance is an animated
natural machine. I t resembles the traditional a t o m i n being ingenerable
and indestructible. B u t the traditional a t o m was conceived either (a)
as unextended and p u n c t i f o r m , having n o properties except position,
m o t i o n , mass, and force, or (b) as a homogeneous, continuous,
indivisible little body, separated i n space f r o m other similar little
bodies except o n the occasions w h e n they happened t o h i t each other.
According t o Leibniz, a naturaii u n i t o f corporeal substance differs
f r o m the traditional a t o m i n having an extended organism differen
tiated i n t o various parts w h i c h are its organs. I t differs also i n being
animated b y something o f t h e nature o f a soul. This is indivisible, n o t
because i t is p u n c t i f o r m b u t because i t is non-spatial and has that k i n d
o f i n t e r n a l u n i t y w h i c h is characteristic o f a mental substance.
W h a t w e o r d i n a r i l y take t o be a single b o d i l y substance, e.g. a stone,
is o f course not one o f these natural units. I t is generally an aggregate
o f a large n u m b e r o f them, and is n o t a natural machine and is n o t

animated b y a substantial f o r m . I t m a y be compared to a s w a r m o f
fish. O n l y w e must remember that w h a t corresponds to the water
between the fish, i n this analogy, is also an aggregate o f natural units.
A n d the m e d i u m between t h e m is i n t u r n an aggregate o f natural
units. A n d so o n w i t h o u t end; f o r there are n o e m p t y spaces. Also
w e must remember that a natural u n i t need n o t be something v e r y
small. A h u m a n being, e.g., is a natural unit. I t is n o t a question
o f size b u t o f organization. T h e question is: 'Is i t a natural machine,
animated b y a substantial f o r m w h i c h stands t o the machine i n an
analogous relation t o that i n w h i c h a man's soul stands to his body?'
(4) A l t h o u g h w e must postulate a substantial f o r m , analogous t o the
soul, as an essential factor i n every natural u n i t o f c o r p o r e a l substance,
w e must n o t appeal t o those substantial forms i n explaining any
particular natural phenomenon. This was the mistake w h i c h the
Scholastics made, and f r o m w h i c h Galileo and Descartes delivered us.
Each particular phenomenon must be explained mechanically, i.e.
f r o m the general laws o f m o t i o n and the particular shapes, sizes,
masses, spatial relations, and derived active forces o f the bodies c o n
cerned. T h e shapes, sizes, and masses are determinate modifications o f
the stuff-factor or p r i m i t i v e passive force i n bodies. T h e derivative
active forces are determinate modifications o f the factor o f substantial
form, i.e. o f t h e p r i m i t i v e active force i n bodies. This provides Leibniz
w i t h an additional argument f o r postulating p r i m i t i v e active force.
T h e determinate force w h i c h a b o d y (e.g. a compressed spring) exerts
o n a particular occasion must be an occurrent m o d i f i c a t i o n o f some
persistent determinable p r o p e r t y i n i t , just as its determinate shape o r
size o n any occasion is an occurrent m o d i f i c a t i o n o f a certain persistent
determinable p r o p e r t y o f i t , viz. its extension. B u t an active occurrent
cannot be a m o d i f i c a t i o n o f a merely passive persistent determinable.
Therefore w e must postulate a p r i m i t i v e active force, as the persistent
determinable o f w h i c h the determinate active forces w h i c h a b o d y
manifests o n various occasions are the occurrent modifications.
(5) T h e laws o f m o t i o n , w h i c h are the universal premisses o r p r i n

ciples i n the mechanical explanation o f particular phenomena, are
themselves oi"metaphysical o r i g i n . T h e y cannot be derived f r o m m e r e l y
geometrical o r arithmetical considerations. Leibniz gives as examples
the principles that 'there is neither m o r e n o r less p o w e r i n the effect
than i n the cause'; that every change takes place gradually; and that
every action is accompanied b y an equal and opposite reaction. H e
caUs these 'systematic rules o f m o t i o n ' . I a m n o t sure w h a t he means
70 L E I B N I Z *. A N INTRODUCTION
b y this. Perhaps he means that the actual laws, w h i c h state, e.g., that
vis viva and m o m e n t u m are conserved, are n o t deducible from these
v e r y general principles; b u t that no l a w could be true vmless i t were
compatible w i t h t h e m and were i n fact a determinate specification o f
them. H e is no doubt r i g h t i n saying that these 'systematic rules' do
n o t f o l l o w f r o m the notions o f extension, impenetrability, and inertia.
H e concludes, rashly I t h i n k , that they must f o l l o w f r o m the n o t i o n
o f p r i m i t i v e active force, w h i c h is the other factor i n the complete
n o t i o n o f a b o d i l y substance.
(6) I n general w e ought n o t t o appeal t o final causes, i.e. t o the
supposed intentions o f God, i n physics. B u t Leibniz thinks that there
are cases i n w h i c h i t is useful to do so. I t is plain f r o m his examples
that he is t h i n k i n g o f the principle i n optics that l i g h t always travels
f r o m one p o i n t t o another b y the path w h i c h takes the least t i m e t o
traverse o f all the alternative paths open t o i t , n o matter h o w often
it m a y be reflected or refracted o n the w a y . H e says, t r u l y , that b y
appealing t o m i n i m a l principles, such as this, w e can often reach
correct results w h i c h i t w o u l d be difficult t o prove b y detailed mechan
ical theories as t o w h a t is happening at each intermediate place t o date.
H e evidently regards such principles as characteristic o f t h e w i s d o m o f
God, w h o ordains that an effect shall be produced w i t h the r n i n i m u m
expenditure o f t i m e or o f some other c o m m o d i t y w h i c h m e n deem
valuable.
As regards these alleged metaphysical implications o f Leibniz's
dynamics I w o u l d make the f o l l o w i n g comments.
( 1 ) I f the argument is n o t to be circular, w e must be sure that the
dynamical principles, w h i c h are supposed t o be the basis o f i t , were
reached w i t h o u t tacitly assuming the metaphysical conclusions. I
t h i n k that this is true i n the m a i n . T h e place where I feel d o u b t f u l
about i t is where Leibniz professes t o show that i n dynamical trans
actions between A and B each moves entirely b y its o w n p r i m i t i v e
active force, and that the o n l y f u n c t i o n o f B is t o furnish the occasion
f o r so m u c h o f the p r i m i t i v e active force o f A t o manifest itself i n
such-and-such a determinate overt f o r m . T h e physical arguments
seem to me v e r y t h i n indeed, and I suspect that the real g r o u n d is
the metaphysical principle o f the impossibility o f transeunt causa
tion.
( 2 ) I t is admitted that most o f the bodies w h i c h w e can observe i n
physical experiments are n o t individual corporeal substances, o n
Leibniz's v i e w , b u t are aggregates o f vast numbers o f t h e m . Therefore
the laws o f mechanics, as discovered b y observation and applied i n
THEORY OF CORPOREAL SUBSTANCES 7i
practice, must be the laws o f aggregates o f corporeal substances. This

fact seems to m e t o have the t w o f o l l o w i n g implications:
(a) I t makes one doubt whether i t can be safe to base metaphysical
theories about the nature o f i n d i v i d u a l corporeal substances o n the
laws and concepts o f empirical dynamics.
(b) I t makes one doubt whether Leibniz's dynamical theories are
supposed t o be true o f w h a t w e o r d i n a r i l y take t o be b o d i l y substances,
e.g. stones, billiard-balls, etc. A r e they n o t perhaps ideal principles
w h i c h w o u l d apply o n l y to the dynamical transactions o f genuine
individual substances i f w e were l u c k y enough t o have to do w i t h
them?
I n general I do n o t t h i n k i t could possibly be admitted that the
analysis o f dynamical facts w h i c h Leibniz has made i n criticizing
Descartes and N e w t o n w o u l d suffice b y itself to necessitate his meta
physical t h e o r y o f corporeal substances as animated natural machines.
I doubt whether i t suffices b y itself even t o suggest or support that
theory v e r y strongly. B u t , o f course, Leibniz had other and possibly
better reasons. I t m i g h t be claimed that, w h i l s t none o f t h e m separately
is conclusive, the dynamical arguments play their part i n conjunction
w i t h the others i n a single interlocking argument w h i c h , taken as a
w h o l e , is v e r y strong.
5 E n d l e s s divisibiHty
I t h i n k that the best statement o f Leibniz's argument f o r substantial

forms f r o m the endless divisibility o f corporeal substance is i n his
Letters to Arnauld and particularly i n his Fifth L e t t e r . B y this t i m e
1
A r n a u l d had raised a n u m b e r o f objections and a certain amount o f

m u t u a l misunderstanding had been cleared u p .
5.1 T h e a r g u m e n t for i n t r i n s i c units
Leibniz says that he takes i t as a fundamental principle that every

aggregate must i n the end be composed o f entities each o f w h i c h is a
genuine intrinsic unit. T h e reason w h i c h he gives is this. A n aggregate,
e.g. a flock ofsheep, derives any reality w h i c h i t has f r o m the elements
o f w h i c h i t is composed. For the essence o f an aggregate is t o be a
'mode o f being' o f the individuals o f w h i c h i t is composed. A n d ,
Leibniz says, anything whose nature is t o be a m o d e o f b e i n g o f s o m e -
t h i n g else presupposes the existence o f entities whose nature is not to
1
[ G . I I , 111-27. L o e m k e r , 338-48.]
be a mode o f b e i n g o f s o m e t h i n g else. I take this t o mean: ( i ) T h a t

every intelligible statement i n w h i c h the name or description o f an
aggregate occurs could be replaced b y a set ofstatements, w i t h appro
priately m o d i f i e d predicates, i n w h i c h that name o r description is
absent, b u t i n w h i c h names or descriptions o f its constituents occur.
(2) That i n any such analysis i t must be possible eventually to come t o
statements w h i c h do n o t i n v o l v e either explicit or disguised collective
names or descriptions, b u t o n l y names o r descriptions o f individuals.
Thus, y o u m i g h t at first analyse statements about an a r m y i n t o state
ments about its regiments, and statements about each regiment i n t o
statements about its battalions; and so o n . B u t eventually i t must be
possible t o have an analysis w h o l l y i n terms o f statements about
individual soldiers; and there the process w i l l stop.
Leibniz says that the same principle can be stated i n other ways.
One is to say that w h a t is n o t literally one entity is n o t strictly an
entity at all. A n o t h e r is to say that the plural presupposes the sing
ular, i.e. that, w h e n there is n o entity w h i c h naturally counts as one
so-and-so, there can be n o talk o f there being several so-and-so's.
A r n a u l d had suggested that the p o i n t is a merely verbal one and
that i t simply depends o n h o w y o u define 'substance'. Suppose y o u
define a 'substance' as an existent w h i c h is neither a quality of, n o r a
relation between, n o r a fact about, n o r an occurrent i n anything, b u t
w h i c h has qualities and occurrents, stands i n relations, and is a c o n
stituent i n facts. T h e n there is n o logical objection t o a mere aggregate
being called a substance. I f a n d o n l y i f y o u make i t part o f t h e definition
o f 'substance' that i t is t o be a natural intrinsic unit, y o u w i l l have t o
deny that a mechanical aggregate is a substance.
Leibniz w i l l n o t admit this. W e can leave o u t the w o r d 'substance',
and p u t the question i n the f o l l o w i n g w a y : ' C o u l d anything be an
aggregate o f aggregates o f aggregates . . . w i t h o u t end, where at every
stage i n this hierarchy the u n i t y ofeach aggregate is something w h o l l y
extrinsic, like the u n i t y o f t w o diamonds set side b y side i n a ring?'
This seems t o Leibniz t o be self^vidently absurd.
A r n a u l d had raised the question: ' M i g h t i t n o t be part o f t h e essence
o f a corporeal substance t o have n o intrinsic unity?' Leibniz answers
as follows. H"we admit this, then w e must admit that i t is o f t h e essence
o f a b o d y t o be an extrinsically unified aggregate o f parts, each o f
w h i c h is an extrinsically unified aggregate o f p a r t s , and so o n w i t h o u t
end. h i that case the r i g h t conclusion w o u l d be that there c o u l d be
n o t h i n g answering to the description o f a corporeal substance. F o r
this description is n o t the description o f a possible existent. W e should
therefore have to say that there are n o bodies, and that w h a t w e take
to be bodies are phenomena w h i c h are n o t even bene fundata. The
status o f the ostensibly physical w o r l d w o u l d be that o f a coherent
dream. I t w o u l d n o t even have that degree o f reality w h i c h science
ascribes t o a r a i n b o w . For science w o u l d say that, although w h a t w e
perceive as a r a i n b o w is n o t a continuous coloured solid arch, as i t
seems to be, yet i t is an aggregate o f w h a t science regards as genuine
substances, viz. drops o f water.
Leibniz sums up the situation as follows. A t the first m o v e i n the
analysis o f ostensibly corporeal substance w e are faced w i t h the
f o l l o w i n g alternatives. Either w h a t w e perceive as a b o d y has ultimate
constituents w h i c h are natural intrinsic units or i t has n o t . I f i t has n o t ,
it cannot really be w h a t w e take i t t o be; i t must be something o f a
different k i n d w h i c h w e partly misperceive and misconceive. W e
could express that alternative b y saying that ostensibly corporeal sub
stances are o n l y phenomena, t h o u g h they m a y be phenomena bene
fundata. I f , o n the other hand, w h a t w e perceive as a b o d y does have
ultimate constituents w h i c h are intrinsic natural units, then there are
prima facie three alternative possibilities about these ultimate c o n
stituents. (1) T h a t they are literally p u n c t i f o r m , having positive and
other qualitative characteristics, b u t literally no extension and n o shape.
(This type o f t h e o r y was w o r k e d o u t i n the eighteenth century b y
Boscovich.) (2) T h a t they are extended, continuous, homogeneous
little lumps w h i c h are intrinsically indivisible. (This was suggested
b y the Cartesian C o r d e m o y . ) (3) T h a t they are extended and divisible
b u t non-homogeneous, having an intrinsic natural u n i t y such as that
o f a l i v i n g animal. This u n i t y is due t o each being i n f o r m e d b y a
substantial f o r m i n somewhat the same w a y as a h u m a n organism is
animated b y a h u m a n soul.
5.2 T h e i n t r i n s i c units are o f t h e nature o f K v i n g o r g a n i s m s
Leibniz explicitly rejected the C o r d e m o y a t o m . I t is p l a i n l y v e r y

difficult t o see h o w any homogeneous continuous body, h o w e v e r
small, could be intrinsically indivisible. This, however, is n o t the
reason w h i c h Leibniz gives for rejecting i t . H e holds that every sub
stance must at every m o m e n t contain traces o f all its past and future
states, and that i t must m i r r o r the w h o l e universe f r o m its o w n special
p o i n t o f v i e w . A n d he does n o t see h o w a C o r d e m o y a t o m could f u l f i l
those t w o conditions. L*i the Letters to Arnauld he does n o t explicitly
consider the Boscovich theory o f p u n c t i f o r m atoms. His later theory
o f monads m i g h t almost be described as a k i n d o f c o m b i n a t i o n o f

something like this w i t h the doctrine that corporeal substance is a
phenomenon, but is a phenomenon bene fundatum. I n the Letters to Arnauld
he always leaves open the possibility that w h a t w e regard as inorganic
matter isjust a phenomenon bene fundatum. B u t plainly the theory w h i c h
he prefers is that o f animated natural units.
I w i l l n o w make some comments o n this argument o f Leibniz's.
( i ) Leibniz had n o t the least objection to infinity as such. H e d i d n o t
t h i n k that the n o t i o n o f a c t u a l i n f i n i t y involves any contradiction; and
he delighted to p o i n t o u t actual infinities wherever he could, as re
b o u n d i n g to the credit o f G o d ' s w i s d o m and power. W h a t he objected
t o was indefiniteness. I t seemed to h i m that anything that can exist i n
its o w n r i g h t must be a definite unit, having an intrinsic principle o f
u n i t y w i t h i n itself, w h i c h marks i t o f f f r o m other existents and m a i n
tains its identity t h r o u g h change. Plainly the most obvious examples
o f this o n the macroscopic scale are the bodies o f m e n , the higher
animals, and the higher plants, i.e. l i v i n g organisms. Equally plainly
a l u m p o f g o l d or a v o l u m e o f water, as i t appears to ordinary sense-
perception and reflexion based o n i t , does n o t answer to these c o n
ditions. I t seems to be a continuous expanse, divisible i n principle i n
any direction i n t o bits o f a n y size and shape. A n d its shapejs^a: w h o l e
seems to depend simply o n the external forces that have acted u p o n i t .
This is even more obvious w i t h such creations o f speculation as the
homogeneous continuous boundless fluid o f the Cartesians. I t is b y
definition devoid o f all natural 'grain', and that seemed to Leibniz t o
be fatal to its claims to be an actual existent.
I t is true that scientists, reflecting o n the nature o f bodies, have
come to the conclusion that w h a t seems to sense-perception to be a
homogeneous and continuous l u m p o f g o l d or v o l u m e o f w a t e r really
consists o f a vast number o f separate small particles. B u t that o n l y
pushes the question back. I f each particle o f g o l d is regarded as a little
homogeneous continuous l u m p , i t w i l l i n principle be divisible i n any
direction i n t o bits o f any size and shape. A n d so o n .
I t h i n k w e must agree w i t h Leibniz that the o n l y observable bodies
w h i c h seem to be natural intrinsic units are the l i v i n g organisms o f
m e n and animals and perhaps plants. The o n l y other bodies w h i c h
m i g h t possibly be suggested are crystals. B u t visible crystals are cer
tainly aggregates o f adjoined smaller crystals; and the g r o w t h and
self-repair o f a crystal has some resemblance to the g r o w t h and self-
repair o f a l i v i n g organism. I t is therefore n o t at all an unreasonable
suggestion that the genuine intrinsic units o f corporeal substance at
every level are o f the nature o f l i v i n g organisms, and that w h a t w e

regard as a continuous l u m p o f i n o r g a n i c material, e.g. a b i t o f g o l d ,
is a discontinuous aggregate o f t i n y organisms o f the same k i n d , like
a s w a r m o f bees.
(2) bi the Letters to de Voider Leibniz explains h o w he reconciles
his doctrine o f genuine intrinsic extended units w i t h his doctrine that
there are n o e m p t y holes i n the physical w o r l d . T h e gaps w i t h i n each
organism o f a given k i n d and the gaps between t w o or m o r e organisms
o f t h e same k i n d are occupied w i t h swarms ofsmaUer organisms. T h e
gaps w i t h i n each o f these smaller organisms and between t w o or m o r e
o f t h e m are occupied w i t h swarms o f s t i l l smaller organisms, and so o n
w i t h o u t end. M a t t e r is n o t continuous i n the sense i n w h i c h the space
o f t h e geometers is said t o be so. For that k i n d o f c o n t i n u i t y consists i n
having n o definite units, and being divisible i n innumerable possible
ways b u t n o t actually divided i n any. W e have just seen that n o real
t h i n g could have c o n t i n u i t y i n that sense. M a t t e r is continuous i n the
sense that i t is actually divided i n t o natural intrinsic extended units;
that there is no m i n i m a l u n i t ; and that the gaps w i t h i n and between
units o f any assigned order o f magnitude are occupied b y other units
o f a l o w e r order o f magnitude. Leibniz illustrates this i n an ingenious
w a y b y showing h o w a v o l u m e could be completely filled w i t h
spheres o f various sizes i n contact w i t h each other, i f the interstices
between spheres o f one order o f magnitude were occupied b y spheres
o f a l o w e r order, and the interstices between these b y spheres o f a
still l o w e r order, and so o n w i t h o u t end.
5.3 O r g a n i s m s a n d substantial f o r m s
I t m i g h t be admitted that i f c o r p o r e a l substance is t o be a real indepen

dent existent i t must have genuine units and that these must be o f the
nature o f l i v i n g organisms. B u t the question w o u l d still remain: 'Does
a l i v i n g animal necessarily consist o f a substantial f o r m i n f o r m i n g or
animating a b o d i l y machine?' Leibniz o f course held that i t does, and
therefore felt entitled t o postulate a substantial f o r m i n connexion w i t h
each genuine u n i t o f corporeal substance.
5.3.1 L e i b n i z ' s o w n v i e w o f s u b s t a n t i a l f o r m s
There is a great deal o f discussion o n this question i n the Letters to

Arnauld. I t h i n k that Leibniz's views at that p e r i o d m a y be summarized
as f o l l o w s .
(ι) W e start w i t h the one case o f t h e u n i o n o f a substantial f o r m and

stuff i n t o a single natural u n i t w h i c h w e k n o w f r o m inside, so t o speak.
This is the h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l , and i n that case the substantial f o r m is
the soul and the stuff is the body. Here there are three things t o c o n
sider, viz. (a) a person's b o d y apart f r o m the soul w h i c h animates
i t , (b) a person's soul apart f r o m the b o d y w h i c h i t animates, and
(c) the person or h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l composed o f a soul and a b o d y ,
w i t h the former animating the latter.
(2) There is n o doubt that Leibniz denied that a h u m a n b o d y apart
f r o m the soul w h i c h animates i t w o u l d be a genuine substance. I t h i n k
there is no doubt that, unlike the Thomists, he held that the soul apart
f r o m the b o d y w h i c h i t animates w o u l d be a genuine substance. As
regards the h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l , i t seems t o me that he regards i t as a
genuine substance i n this Correspondence. I f I a m r i g h t , then, he uses
the w o r d 'substance' here t o cover b o t h the h u m a n soul itself and
the h u m a n individual composed o f t h e soul and the b o d y w h i c h i t
animates.
(3) H e seems to assert i n this Correspondence that a h u m a n soul n o t
o n l y is a genuine substance and a natural unit, b u t also that i t confers
genuine substantiality and u n i t y u p o n the w h o l e composed o f itself
and the b o d y w h i c h i t animates, i.e. o n the h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l .
(4) h i answer to a question b y A r n a u l d , Leibniz explicitly denies that
the soul confers genuine u n i t y and substantiality o n the body w h i c h i t
animates. A h u m a n body, alive or dead, is n o t a genuine substance,
t h o u g h i t is composed o f genuine substances o f a n o n - h u m a n k i n d . 1
I n spite o f this denial, I cannot help t h i n k i n g that Leibniz often talks

as i f a l i v i n g organism were a genuine substance w h i c h derives its
u n i t y and substantiality f r o m the soul w h i c h animates i t .
(5) there are any genuine corporeal substances besides h u m a n
individuals, each o f t h e m must be constructed o n the same general
plan as a h u m a n individual. I t must consist o f something analogous t o a
h u m a n soul standing to something analogous to a h u m a n b o d y i n a
relation analogous t o that o f animating. W e must remember that
Leibniz held that the h u m a n soul is n o t concerned merely w i t h the
v o l u n t a r y movements o f t h e limbs, the tongue, etc. I t is also concerned
i n the biological functions o f the h u m a n b o d y as a l i v i n g organism,
e.g. its conversion o f f o o d and air i n t o parts ofitself, its self-regulation
and self-repair, and so o n .
(6) The question arises: ' H o w far do these analogies go and at w h a t
points do they break down?' Leibniz admits and asserts that h u m a n
1
[ G . , I I , 75. M a s o n , 9 3 . ]
souls have m a n y peculiarities. T h e most i m p o r t a n t o f these are the

process o f rational t h i n k i n g , o f self-consciousness, and o f personal
m e m o r y , w i t h all that these i m p l y . B u t he thinks that a characteristic
c o m m o n and peculiar t o every substantial f o r m f r o m the highest t o
the lowest is the p o w e r ofrepresenting simultaneously, f r o m its o w n
particular p o i n t o f v i e w , a n u m b e r o f other substances, i n fact every
other substance. I n h u m a n souls this representative f u n c t i o n takes the
f o r m o f sense-perception f r o m a particular perspective. B u t Leibniz
thinks that this is a v e r y special and h i g h grade o f i t . N o w , i n the
case o f a h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l , the b o d y is the centre f r o m w h i c h and
the organ b y w h i c h the soul perceives everything else f r o m a cer
tain particular p o i n t o f v i e w . I f there are any genuine corporeal
substances i n the w o r l d beside h u m a n individuals, the b o d y o f each
must be the centre f r o m w h i c h and the organ b y w h i c h the sub
stantial f o r m represents everything else f r o m a certain particular p o i n t
o f view.
(7) Leibniz takes the commonsense v i e w , as against the Cartesians,
that n o n - h u m a n animals have souls. I f that is granted, i t foUows at
once that there is a w h o l e range o f corporeal substances constructed
o n the same general plan as a h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l , i.e. psycho-physical
individuals composed o f a soul and an organism w h i c h i t animates. I n
that case there must be a w h o l e descending series o f souls, f r o m those
o f intelligent apes, w h i c h are almost h u m a n i n m a n y respects, d o w n
t o those o f oysters and tapeworms. Since there is n o clear l o w e r end or
l i m i t to this series, i t becomes m o r e or less plausible t o conceive the
possibility o f its extending further d o w n w a r d s and i n c l u d i n g , e.g.,
substantial forms o f i n d i v i d u a l cells. Finally, i t m a y extend stiLl further
t o include substantial forms o f molecules o r atoms, w h i c h w e c o m
m o n l y regard as inorganic.
(8) Leibniz explicitly says that a l i v i n g h u m a n b o d y is n o t itself a
corporeal substance, b u t a collection o f such. Let us suppose, e.g., 1
that i t is a collection o f l i v i n g cells. I f a cell is a genuine substance, i t

t o o must consist o f something analogous t o a soul and something
analogous t o a b o d y . T h e b o d y o f a single cell i n t u r n w i l l n o t be a
corporeal substance, b u t at best a collection o f l i v i n g organisms. Each
ofthese i n t u r n w i l l have something analogous t o a soul and something
analogous t o a b o d y . A n d so o n w i t h o u t end.
1
[ G . , II, 72. M a s o n , 8 8 . ]
5.3.2 W h y postulate a substantial f o r m for each l i v i n g

organism ?
A r n a u l d was n o t satisfied that i t is either necessary or useful t o postu

late a substantial f o r m i n connexion w i t h everything w h i c h has the
characteristics o f a l i v i n g organism. I t must be admitted, he says, that
n o b o d y has intrinsic u n i t y i n the sense i n w h i c h a soul has i t . B u t there
are various degrees o f t h a t imperfect k i n d o f u n i t y w h i c h is appropriate
t o bodies. E.g. a w a t c h has a higher degree o f such u n i t y than a heap
o f stones, and the b o d y o f a l i v i n g animal has a higher degree o f i t
than a watch. F r o m the nature o f the case such u n i t y must be o f the
extrinsic mechanical k i n d . B u t that is n o objection t o i t . 'The greatest
perfection w h i c h a b o d y can have is t o be a machine so perfect that
o n l y G o d could have made i t . ' That is the o n l y k i n d o f u n i t y w h i c h
even a l i v i n g h u m a n body, as such, can have. The fact that i t is animated
b y a soul m a y bestow a further u n i t y u p o n i t , b u t this cannot be o f the
k i n d w h i c h belongs to the soul itself.
h i a certain sense this argument is beside the p o i n t . Leibniz admits
that there is n o t h i n g i n the w o r l d o f corporeal substance except
machines, i f a 'machine' is defined as an aggregate o f spatially inter
related substances, whose characteristic modes o f behaviour are de
ducible f r o m the structure, arrangement, and inherent forces o f its
parts, and the laws o f mechanics. H e does indeed h o l d that every
natural, as distinct f r o m artificial, machine, must be animated b y a
substantial f o r m . B u t he does n o t h o l d that the substantial f o r m c o n
verts the machine which it animates i n t o a single substance instead o f an
aggregate o f substances; still less that i t gives to i t the k i n d o f u n i t y
w h i c h is characteristic o f a soul. W h a t he holds is that the substantial
f o r m makes the whole composed of itselfand the machine which it animates
i n t o a single natural psycho-physical unit. I n the case o f a man, e.g.,
this u n i t has the characteristic u n i t y o f a person or individual, n o t that
o f a soul and n o t that o f a machine.
Nevertheless i t seems t o m e that Leibniz's position is v e r y u n
satisfactory. I w i l l t r y to state i n m y o w n w a y the difficulties w h i c h I
feel. The real question at issue seems t o me t o be this. Is i t necessary
or useful t o postulate something analogous t o a soul i n connexion w i t h
everything that has the k i n d o f u n i t y w h i c h is characteristic o f a l i v i n g
organism? Let us grant, for the sake o f argument, that i t is necessary
and useful to postulate a soul, o n grounds ofintrospection i n one's o w n
case and o n grounds o f analogy i n the case o f other m e n and the
higher animals, i n order t o deal w i t h the psychological facts about t h e m .
Is i t necessary or useful to do so i n respect o f the purely biological and

physiological facts about them?
T h e facts are o f the f o l l o w i n g k i n d . A n animal develops f r o m a
small speck o f m a t e r i a l b y a regular process, u n t i l i t reaches the charac
teristic shape, size, and internal structure o f its species. I t does this b y
t a k i n g i n foreign matter, converting i t i n t o flesh, b l o o d , tissues, etc.
o f various kinds, and b u i l d i n g these up w i t h various organs, such as
heart, liver, lungs, etc. After this i t continues to take i n foreign material
and convert i t i n t o its o w n substance, replacing i n this w a y wastage;
so that i n the course o f a f e w years there m a y be hardly any material
i n its b o d y that has n o t been replaced. D u r i n g the w h o l e o f its life i t
adjusts itself most delicately t o changes i n the temperature, pressure,
etc. o f i t s surroundings, so as to maintain a practically constant internal
temperature, salinity o f the b l o o d , and so o n . I f i t is injured n o t t o o
seriously the injured parts heal. After a t i m e the organism performs its
self-maintaining and self-repairing functions less and less efEciently and
eventually i t n o longer performs t h e m at all. T h e n i t dies and breaks
P-
U
N o w all this looks as i f a m i n d , w h i c h desired that there should be

an animal ofsuch-and-such a k i n d , and w h i c h had a marvellous k n o w
ledge and c o n t r o l o f matter, continually directed certain physical p r o
cesses i n such a w a y as to carry o u t its plan. I t looks as i f i t were able
to succeed for a t i m e , often i n face o f considerable obstacles; b u t that
sooner or later i t always loses grip or interest i n the case o f each
individual o f a species. I t looks, however, as i f i t had foreseen and p r o
v i d e d f o r this also b y the device o f reproduction, whereby each
individual produces n e w individuals o f the same k i n d as itself w h i c h
w i l l replace i t . A n artificial machine is always the product o f a m i n d
w h i c h desires t o produce a certain result, and w h i c h makes use o f its
knowledge o f t h e laws and properties ofbodies and its p o w e r o f s h a p -
i n g and arranging t h e m , i n order to b r i n g about that result b y their
interactions. T h e more y o u insist o n the analogy o f a l i v i n g b o d y t o a
machine, the more strongly y o u suggest that there is a m i n d w h i c h
stands t o i t i n an analogous relation to that i n w h i c h a w o r k i n g en
gineer stands t o a machine w h i c h he has planned and b u i l t and m a i n
tained.
So m u c h for the admitted facts; n o w for philosophical speculation.
W h e n a person ascribes a substantial f o r m t o a l i v i n g organism he may
be intending one o f t w o things, ( i ) H e m a y merely be s u m m i n g u p
the facts i n a compendious f o r m , and saying that the development,
self-maintenance, self-repair, and reproduction o f l i v i n g organisms go
80 LEIBNIZ." AN INTRODUCTION
o n i n certain respects as if these processes were desired and planned and

controlled b y a m i n d . O r (2) he m a y be professing t o account for the
facts by actually postulating such a m i n d . I suspect that one and the same
person may sometimes mean to assert no more than (1) and sometimes
as m u c h as (2), and that he m a y hover between the t w o w i t h o u t
k n o w i n g i t . W e can confine our attention to the second alternative. I
shall t r y to show that i t is extremely difficult t o accept o n any v i e w ,
and especially so i n v i e w o f Leibniz's other principles.
(1) Plainly any m i n d w h i c h could do what is required o f i t b y
ordinary processes o f deliberate planning and construction w o u l d need
to have a supernatural knowledge o f the laws o f physics and the
details o f t h e physical environment at a given t i m e and place. I suppose
that i t m i g h t be very m u c h l i m i t e d i n its other interests, b u t i n its o w n
small department i t w o u l d have t o be divinely gifted. I t seems o d d t o
postulate one such m i n d for every cat, dog, flea, t a p e w o r m , etc.
(2) H o w w o u l d the m i n d w h i c h looks after the biological processes
o f an organism be related t o the m i n d w h i c h is the subject o f its
ordinary psychological processes? I n one's o w n case i t is perfectly
clear that the m i n d w h i c h is open to introspection, and w h i c h makes
and carries out ordinary plans, does n o t and could n o t consciously
design and carry o u t the development, maintenance, and repair o f
one's body. Either w e must postulate a different m i n d , or w e must
say that the biological functions and the introspectible psychological
functions are carried o u t b y different departments o f the same m i n d .
Neither alternative is v e r y attractive.
(3) W h e n a m a n designs and constructs a machine he carries o u t his
plan b y m a k i n g appropriate movements w i t h his fingers, etc., and
thus altering i n a planned w a y the m u t u a l relations o f foreign bodies.
Thus, for a m i n d t o carry o u t a plan i n the ordinary w a y i t must
already animate an organism and v o l u n t a r i l y c o n t r o l the m o v e
ments o f certain o f its organs. W h a t is the analogy t o this i n the
case o f a m i n d w h i c h is supposed t o construct and maintain its o w n
organism?
(4) The difficulties m a y be summed up i n the f o l l o w i n g dilemma.
Either y o u assume that the m i n d w h i c h looks after the biological p r o
cesses o f an organism forms its plans and carries t h e m o u t as w e do
w h e n w e design and b u i l d and maintain a machine, or y o u assume
that i t does so i n some w h o l l y different way. O n the first alternative
y o u r hypothesis is intelligible, but, w h e n one considers i t i n detail, i t
proves t o be quite incredible. O n the second alternative i t is n o t
intelligible i f i t is intended as an explanation o f the admitted facts. A t
THEORY ОГ CORPOREAL SUBSTANCES 8l
best i t is merely a summary ofthose facts masquerading as a hypothesis

to explain t h e m .
(5) I t seems to me that aU these difficulties w o u l d exist f o r Leibniz,
b u t that there w o u l d also be the f o l l o w i n g additional difficulty. There
is no p o i n t i n postulating a k i n d o f soul t o l o o k after the biological
processes o f each l i v i n g organism unless i t can directly or indirectly
influence the b o d y and foreign bodies w h i c h i t absorbs. B u t o n
Leibniz's general principles i t cannot possibly do this. I f everything i n
a l i v i n g organism w o u l d go o n exactly as i t does even i f i t were n o t
animated b y a soul, w h a t evidence can there be f o r postulating a soul
i n connexion w i t h every l i v i n g organism? I t is n o answer t o say that
each o f us has introspective evidence f o r a soul i n his o w n case, and
that i t is reasonable t o argue b y analogy t o the presence o f a soul i n
every k i n d o f l i v i n g organism. T h e soul f o r w h i c h each o f us has
introspective evidence is k n o w n as something w h i c h is responsible for
one's mental life and f o r one's rational speech and deliberate action. I t
is n o t k n o w n as something w h i c h is responsible f o r the g r o w t h , m a i n
tenance, self-repair, and reproduction o f one's b o d y .
I t seems t o me that w e m a y divide Leibniz's argument here i n t o the
f o l l o w i n g steps. (1) Corporeal substance must be composed ofbodies
each o f w h i c h is a natural intrinsic unit. (2) A n y such u n i t must be o f
the nature o f a l i v i n g creature. (3) T h e b o d y o f a l i v i n g creature is an
aggregate w h i c h is a natural machine; and the characteristic u n i t y o f a
l i v i n g creature arises f r o m the fact that there is something analogous
t o a soul standing t o this natural machine i n a relation analogous t o
that i n w h i c h a h u m a n soul stands to its b o d y . T h e first and the second
steps seem t o m e t o be plausible. B u t the t h i r d is logically independent
o f i t , and I do n o t find i t at all plausible. I t seems t o m e that there is
g r o u n d f o r postulating something analogous t o a soul where and o n l y
where there is g r o u n d f o r assuming some k i n d o f consciousness i n
connexion w i t h the processes i n and the behaviour o f a l i v i n g creature.
I cannot see that Leibniz has s h o w n that there need be any k i n d o f
consciousness i n connexion w i t h organisms and organic processes as
such, and therefore I cannot see any reason t o postulate something
analogous t o a soul i n the case o f everything w h i c h has the character
istics o f a l i v i n g creature.
6 A r g u m e n t f o r substantial f o r m s f r o m the P r e d i c a t e - i n - N o t i o n
Principle
Leibniz asserts that the Predicate-in-Notion Principle requires us t o

postulate a substantial f o r m i n any genuine substance. I do n o t f i n d

the argument v e r y clearly stated anywhere, b u t I t h i n k that i t must
be o f the f o l l o w i n g k i n d .
I said, w h e n discussing the Principle, that I t h i n k that Leibniz puts
the f o l l o w i n g interpretation o n i t . H e thinks o f every substance as
being created w i t h a stock o f innate dispositions w h i c h are, so t o
speak, the ontological correlate o f the various facts i n its complete
n o t i o n . N o w w e are familiar enough w i t h the n o t i o n o f a soul carrying
traces ofpast experiences w h i c h emerge f r o m t i m e t o t i m e as conscious
memory-experiences. I t is extremely difficult t o see h o w such dis
position could be carried b y the single homogeneous continuous fluid
o f Descartes, or the m a n y little continuous homogeneous separate
atoms o f C o r d e m o y , or indeed b y any purely corporeal substance. I
suspect therefore that Leibniz held that w e must postulate something
like a m i n d or soul i n connexion w i t h every genuine substance f o r the
f o l l o w i n g reason. I t is needed i n order t o retain, b y something ana
logous t o m e m o r y , the initial dispositions w h i c h G o d gave to i t at its
creation. These dispositions at the appropriate dates i n its subsequent his
t o r y give rise spontaneously to the states w h i c h i t is part o f its complete
n o t i o n to have at those dates. This m a y be compared to traces o f past
experiences g i v i n g rise to actual memory-experiences w h e n a suitable
cue is provided, e.g. b y the occurrence o f a n associated idea.
7 Substantial f o r m s a n d o r g a n i c bodies are ingenerable a n d

incorruptible
Leibniz held that every substantial f o r m is naturally ingenerable and

incorruptible. I t can come i n t o existence o n l y t h r o u g h a creative act o f
G o d and can cease t o exist o n l y i f G o d decides to annihilate i t b y a
miracle. The reason w h i c h he generally gives is that i t is n o t extended
and therefore cannot come into existence b y the c o m i n g together o f
previously separated components and cannot cease t o exist b y the
separation o f i t s component parts. I t is indeed obvious that n o t h i n g l i k e
a m i n d or soul could come i n t o existence b y composition or cease t o
exist b y decomposition. B u t i t is n o t clear that these are the o n l y c o n
ceivable natural ways o f beginning or ceasing t o exist.
This argument was accepted b y almost all Leibniz's contemporaries
as regards the h u m a n souI, and he simply applied i t , quite consistently,
to all substantial forms. H e claims also that the same proposition follows
f r o m the Predicate-in-Notion Principle. I cannot see that i t follows
that a substance could n o t cease t o exist i n the course o f nature. W h y
should i t n o t be part o f the n o t i o n o f a substance, implanted i n i t at

its creation, that i t should cease t o exist at a certain m o m e n t w h e n
other substances i n its neighbourhood had reached a certain stage i n
their o w n internal development?
N o w Leibniz held n o t o n l y that every l i v i n g organism must be
animated b y a k i n d o f soul but also that every k i n d o f soul must at
every m o m e n t o f its existence animate a l i v i n g organism. I cannot see
that he has any satisfactory argument f o r the latter proposition. I
t h i n k that one cause o f his belief m a y be the f o l l o w i n g confusion.
A c c o r d i n g to the Scholastics, the notions o f f o r m and stuff are cor
relative factors i n the n o t i o n ofsubstance. E v e n i n the case o f a h u m a n
being i t is the person, as a psycho-physical individual, w h i c h is a
substance. T h e soul, w h i c h is the substantial f o r m o f t h e body, is n o t b y
itself a substance. O n that k i n d o f v i e w i t is readily intelligible that
every soul requires an organism; the surprising t h i n g is that a h u m a n
soul should be able to exist, even t e m p o r a r i l y and abnormally, w i t h o u t
an organism, between the death o f a m a n and the resurrection o f his
b o d y at the Last Judgment. B u t Leibniz, t h o u g h keeping the names o f
'substantial f o r m ' and 'stuff', has made substantial forms i n t o complete
substances. I t is n o t clear w h y a soul, i f i t is a complete substance and
not merely a correlative factor to the stuff-factor i n a substance, should
need always t o animate a body.
I suspect that Leibniz's m a i n reason f o r this doctrine m i g h t be
stated as follows. I t is o f t h e essence o f a soul to represent the rest o f t h e
w o r l d f r o m a particular p o i n t o f v i e w . B u t a soul w i t h o u t a b o d y
w o u l d have n o particular p o i n t o f v i e w ; f o r i t o n l y occupies a par
ticular position i n the w o r l d indirectly t h r o u g h animating a b o d y
w h i c h occupies a particular position. I t h i n k that this argument m i g h t
be plausible o n the ordinary v i e w that the soul acts o n the external
w o r l d o n l y b y acting o n its body, and perceives the external w o r l d
o n l y t h r o u g h being acted upon b y its body. B u t i t is a good deal less
plausible w h e n combined w i t h Leibniz's v i e w that the soul neither
affects n o r is affected b y the body.
7.1 T h e o r y o f T r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f B o d i e s
T h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f the three propositions that every substantial f o r m

is ingenerable and indestructible, that every natural u n i t o f corporeal
substance has its o w n substantial f o r m , and that n o substantial f o r m
ever exists w i t h o u t animating a l i v i n g b o d y led Leibniz to his curious
theory o f Transformation.
A r n a u l d raised a great number ofdifficukies, o f w h i c h the f o U o w i n g

are typical. W h a t happens t o the substantial f o r m o f a w o r m w h e n the
w o r m is cut i n t w o and each h a l f becomes a l i v i n g w o r m ? D o the
souls o f i n n u m e r a b l e flies, gnats, lice, etc. continue to exist indefinitely
after the death o f their bodies? D o animal souls exist, indivisible and
indestructible i n the semen o f every animal? r f so, w h a t happens t o
t h e m (a) i n cases where semen is emitted w i t h o u t leading t o c o n
ception, or (b) i n the case o f a male animal w h o dies w i t h o u t ever
having sexual intercourse w i t h a female? W h a t happens to the sub
stantial f o r m o f a creature w h e n its b o d y is b u r n t t o ashes, w h i c h are
purely inorganic material, e.g. the r a m w h i c h A b r a h a m sacrificed as a
burnt-offering i n place o f Isaac?
Leibniz's theory, i n answer to all such questions, is as follows. H e
draws a distinction between his o w n theory o f Transformation of Bodies
and the o l d Pythagorean theory o f Transmigration of Souls. T h e
Pythagorean theory is that, at the death o f a m a n or animal, the soul
w h i c h had animated its b o d y leaves the corpse altogether, j o i n s up
w i t h an e m b r y o ( o f t h e same or another species) w h i c h hasjust been
conceived, and begins t o animate i t . Leibniz naturally disapproved o f
this theory as i n v o l v i n g serious breaches o f the Principle o f C o n
t i n u i t y as applied t o changes. His o w n alternative is the f o l l o w i n g .
T h e soul o f any l i v i n g creature w h i c h w i U ever exist i n the course
o f history was created once for all at the beginning o f the w o r l d , and
w i l l persist (barring miracles) u n t i l the end o f the w o r l d . A t every
m o m e n t i t animates a l i v i n g b o d y oisome k i n d . W h e n a l i v i n g creature
A dies its soul continues to animate a v e r y small part o f i t s f o r m e r body.
T h e result is a microscopic or ultra-microscopic l i v i n g creature a,
w h i c h need bear n o more resemblance t o A than a tadpole does t o a
f r o g . After such a reduction i n scale the creature lives a v e r y restricted
life and its perception and activities are v e r y l i m i t e d , h i the same w a y ,
w h a t w e caU the generation o f a n e w l i v i n g creature B is really a r a p i d
transformation and g r o w t h o f a microscopic or ultra-microscopic
creature β w h i c h already existed and was animated b y the same soul.
W e can occasionally observe transformations o f this k i n d o n the
macroscopic scale, e.g. w h e n a tadpole becomes a f r o g or a maggot
becomes a m o t h . I f one w o u l d see b y means o f an ultra-microscope
the little animal to w h i c h Abraham's r a m was reduced w h e n its b o d y
was burned, there is n o reason w h y i t should l o o k like a little r a m . I t
m i g h t l o o k n o m o r e like a r a m than a maggot looks like a m o t h . Since
the microscope reveals swarms o f m i n u t e l i v i n g organisms i n every
d r o p o f apparently pure water, w e need have n o difficulty i n finding
r o o m at every m o m e n t for all the transformed macroscopic animals

w h i c h have l i v e d and died since the creation.
I t is an empirical question whether the ultra-microscopic residual
organism w h i c h is animated b y the soul o f a dead macroscopic animal
w i l l ever develop i n t o another macroscopic animal. I f i t should do so,
i t is another empirical question whether i t w i l l develop i n t o a macro
scopic animal o f the same k i n d as the one w h i c h died and w i t h w h i c h
i t was continuous. Leibniz does n o t profess to be able t o answer these
questions, b u t the fact that he cannot do so is n o objection t o his
general theory.
Leibniz does n o t maintain that there is any one p o r t i o n o f c o r p o r e a I
substance w h i c h is constantly attached t o a given substantial f o r m .
T h e stuff i n the organism o f any soul is continually changing, rather
s l o w l y at n o r m a l times, and v e r y q u i c k l y at certain critical periods;
and there is n o reason t o suppose that any part o f i t remains there f o r
ever, m the Letters to des Bosses Leibniz says definitely that the phrase
'same b o d y ' must be understood i n the sense o f 'same river', w h e n w e
say that a given substantial f o r m perpetually animates the same b o d y . 1
T h e b o d y o f any l i v i n g creature, great or small, is an aggregate and

not a substance. I t must be composed o f genuine intrinsic units. Each
such u n i t must be o f the nature o f an animal w i t h a soul and a b o d y .
Therefore the b o d y o f a n y l i v i n g creature, e.g. a cat, is an aggregate o f
other l i v i n g creatures. These are n o t l i t t l e cats, b u t are other kinds o f
l i v i n g creatures f o r w h i c h w e have n o names. B u t the soul w h i c h
animates a b o d y , w h i c h is an aggregate o f l i v i n g creatures, is n o t itself
composed o f the souls o f those l i v i n g creatures.
A corpse is w h a t remains o f a body, f o r m e r l y animated b y a certain
soul, w h e n that soul has ceased t o animate the w h o l e aggregate and
n o w animates o n l y an ultra-microscopic part o f i t . So a corpse is
neither a genuine substance, n o r is i t the stuff-factor i n a genuine sub
stance, as a l i v i n g b o d y is. I t is a mere aggregate. B u t i t is n o t merely
a delusive appearance; for i t is composed o f genuine substances, each
o f w h i c h has intrinsic u n i t y because i t is a l i v i n g b o d y animated b y a
substantial f o r m .
As regards an animal w h i c h is burned to ashes, Leibniz says that there
is n o reason w h y ashes, or any other composite mass o f m a t e r i a l w h i c h
is inorganic as a w h o l e , should n o t contain or even entirely consist o f
l i v i n g creatures, mdeed, i f Leibniz's general theory is true, i t must
do so unless i t is a mere phenomenon.
[·' As regards the w o r m w h i c h is cut i n t w o , Leibniz answers cautiously
[G., I I , 370. Loemker, 597.]
1
as follows. W e need n o t assume that b o t h halves are alive because b o t h

continue t o squirm about for a w h i l e . T h e soul w i l l certairdy n o t be
divided i n t o t w o , and, i f i t animates either half, i t w i l l certainly n o t
animate more than one o f the t w o .
As regards animals w h i c h are certainly reproduced sexually Leibniz
makes the f o l l o w i n g remarks. T h e microscopists Leeuwenhoek and
Swammerdam ( w h o first observed spermatozoa at about the t i m e o f
Leibniz's correspondence w i t h A r n a u l d ) are inclined t o t h i n k that a
macroscopic animal arises t h r o u g h the transformation o f a m i c r o
scopic animal, viz. a spermatozoon o f the male parent. (It should
be remembered that spermatozoa were observed l o n g before ova were
observed and identified. I t was thought that the function o f the
female i n reproduction was o n l y to provide the receptacle i n w h i c h the
spermatozoon undergoes its transformation, and the stimuli and
n u t r i m e n t needed for these transformations.) So far then Leibniz's
theory seemed t o have the support o f the best embryologists o f his
time. I t is indeed plain that Leibniz was m u c h impressed and i n
fluenced b y the revelations w h i c h the microscope was m a k i n g at this
period.
Leibniz admits that the microscopists have never given explicit
support t o his correlative v i e w , viz. that the death o f a macroscopic
animal is a process o f transformation to a microscopic one animated
b y the same soul. His explanation is as follows. T h e lack o f empirical
support is n o t surprising. T h e process o f i n e v o l u t i o n at death is m u c h
less easy to observe than the process o f e v o l u t i o n d u r i n g gestation. T h e
f o r m e r takes place suddenly and quickly, whilst the latter does so
gradually.
The last p o i n t to be noticed is that Leibniz thinks that spirits, i.e.
rational souls, such as those o f m e n and angels, are i n m a n y respects
peculiar, h i the Letters to Arnauld he suggests that G o d creates spirits
w h e n he thinks f i t i n the course o f t h e history o f t h e w o r l d . 1 take i t
1
that this w o u l d be at the conception o f each h u m a n e m b r y o . H e also

says that at the death o f a m a n G o d detaches the spirit f r o m the b o d y
'or at any rate f r o m thegross b o d y ' . This was n o t his final v i e w , and
2
w e w i l l defer his account o f rational souls t i l l later.

1
[ G . , I I , i o o . M a s o n , 125.] 2
[ibid.]
4
T H E O R Y OF M O N A D S
T h e theory o f corporeal substance w h i c h I have been describing

comes m a i n l y f r o m the Discours de metaphysique (1685) and the Corres
pondence with Arnauld (1686^90), supplemented b y Leibniz's w r i t i n g s
o n dynamics and the Correspondence with Clarke f o r the special points
w h i c h are treated there, m its m a i n outline he continued t o h o l d this
theory; b u t there were i m p o r t a n t changes o f detail and to some extent
o f principle i n his later w o r k s .
I t h i n k that Leibniz's doctrine at this stage m i g h t be described as
p r i m a r i l y panorganic and secondarily animistic. I t seems t o m e that
Leibniz held that there really are corporeal substances, b u t that every
such substance is a living organism. T h a t is w h y I call the theory ' p r i
m a r i l y panorganic'. I t is 'secondarily animistic' because he held that
each l i v i n g organism must have its o w n substantial f o r m , and that a
substantial f o r m is a substance o f the nature o f a soul. Even at this
stage Leibniz held that most o f the objects w h i c h w e take t o be cor
poreal substances are n o t really so, and he frequently mentions as a
possible v i e w that everything w h i c h w e take to be an inorganic b o d y
is o n l y a phenomenon benejundatum comparable to a r a i n b o w . B u t he
never asserts that theory, and I t h i n k his general position is that w h a t
w e take t o be an inorganic b o d y consists o f a collection o f substances
each o f w h i c h really is corporeal, t h o u g h i t is something more because
i t is animated b y a k i n d o f soul.
I t seems t o m e that the later development was f r o m a theory w h i c h
is panorganic and animistic t o a theory w h i c h is still panorganic and
animistic b u t is panpsychic. T h e o n l y genuine substances are n o w o f t h e
nature o f souls and there are really n o corporeal substances. Certain
aggregates o f souls appear t o certain other souls as extended massive
movable substances. W h a t w e take to be bodies, whether organic or
inorganic, are at best phenomena bene fundata. This theory is stated i n
terms o f 'monads', a w o r d w h i c h , so far as I can discover, does n o t
occur i n the Discours o r the Letters to Arnauld. This w o r d begins t o
occur i n the Letters to John Bernoulli (1698-9), and i t is regularly used
i n the Letters to de Voider (1699-1706).
88 LEIBNIZ.' A N INTRODUCTION
T h e T h e o r y ofMonads is one o f t h e mostelaborateandall-embracing

systems o f constructive metaphysics that exist, and the b r i e f statement
o f i t i n the Monadology (about 1712) is a t r i u m p h o f condensed ex
position. B u t i t is m u c h easier t o appreciate i t w h e n one sees i t i n
relation to the earlier theories out o f w h i c h i t developed.
I Monads a n d entelechies
So far as I k n o w the first place i n w h i c h the w o r d ' m o n a d ' occurs is i n

the Correspondence with John Bernoulli. A m o n a d is there defined as 'a
1
substance w h i c h is t r u l y one, i.e. n o t an aggregate o f substances'. 2
I do n o t t h i n k that the definition is ever altered. Thus i n the Letters to de

Voider a m o n a d is described as 'a complete simple substance'; i n the 3
Letters to des Bosses i t is described as 'a perfect substance'; and i n the 4
Monadology as 'a simple substance, i.e. one w i t h o u t p a r t s ' . This 5
undoubtedly means something w h i c h is a substance and is n o t c o m

posed o f other substances.
B u t I t h i n k that there is a p r o f o u n d change i n Leibniz's views o f the
nature o f the entities w h i c h answer t o this definition, h i the Letters to
Bernoulli Leibniz says: ' I call a m o n a d . . . n o t so m u c h the soul as
the animal itself or something analogous, provided w i t h a soul and
an organic b o d y . ' H e adds that every animal is a substance, and
8
that neither a m a n n o r a d o g is composed o f the parts o f its b o d y .

This seems t o be the doctrine w h i c h w e have already described
i n the Discours and the Letters to Arnauld. T h e name ' m o n a d ' seems
here simply to be used o f any l i v i n g creature consisting o f a soul
animating an organic body. B u t this is quite certainly n o t Leibniz's
later v i e w .
The change occurs i n the Letters to de Voider. These extend over the
seven years f r o m 1699 to 1706.1 do n o t feel sure that the doctrine o f
the later years is consistent w i t h that o f the earlier ones; b u t I t h i n k
that there is n o doubt that, as the correspondence goes o n , Leibniz
explicitly reaches a quite different v i e w w h i c h he retained thereafter.
I t involves a n e w technical t e r m , viz. entelechy. This is taken f r o m
Aristotle, and Leibniz has often used i t before, b u t he n o w makes the
meaning more definite. Unfortunately, as i t seems t o me, he does n o t
use i t consistently. W h e n he is being careful he distinguishes 'entelechy'
1
[ T h i s is n o t q u i t e c o r r e c t . C f . L o e m k e r , 508 n11.]
2
[ G . M . , I I I , 537-] 3
[ G . , I I , 252. L o e m k e r , 530.]
1
[ G . , I I , 306.] 5
[ G . , I I , 607. L o e m k e r , 643.]
• [ G . M . , III, 542.]
THEORY OF MONADS 89
f r o m 'monad', and regards an entelechy as an inseparable factor i n a

monad. B u t i t seems to me that he often uses i t carelessly as equivalent
to 'monad'.
I n a very i m p o r t a n t passage i n the Letters to de Voider Leibniz dis
tinguishes the f o l l o w i n g four kinds o f entity i n connexion w i t h any
l i v i n g b e i n g . ( i ) A p r i m i t i v e entelechy o r soul. (2) T h e materiaprima,
1
or p r i m i t i v e passive force, w h i c h is the stuff o f w h i c h the entelechy is

the f o r m . (3) T h e dominant m o n a d , w h i c h is composed ofthese t w o
factors. (4) The organic machine, w h i c h is an aggregate ofinnumerable
monads, each composed o f an entelechy and materia prima. T h e
dominant m o n a d stands t o the monads i n the organic machine i n a
peculiar relation w h i c h he expresses b y saying that i t is dominant i n
respect o f t h e m and they are subordinate i n respect o f i t . The l i v i n g
being or animal consists o f the dominant m o n a d together w i t h the
subordinate monads w h i c h together constitute the organic machine.
Leibniz here describes i t as 'the corporeal substance w h i c h is made one
b y the dominant m o n a d i n the organic machine'. I t is evident then that
w e have t w o entirely different relationships. One holds within each
monad between the entelechy and the materia prima. Neither o f these
is a substance, b u t they are t w o inseparable factors i n a substance
related as f o r m to stuff. T h e other relation holds between a certain
m o n a d and all the other monads i n a certain aggregate. This is the
relation w i t h i n a l i v i n g being between one monad, w h i c h is dominant,
and the rest w h i c h are subordinate to i t . A l t h o u g h the doctrine o f the
Letters to des Bosses differs i n i m p o r t a n t points o f detail, i t agrees c o m
pletely about the internal structure o f the m o n a d . Leibniz says there
that each entelechy has its o w n materia prima; that together they c o n
stitute a m o n a d ; and that, whilst G o d could deprive a dominant m o n a d
o f its subordinate monads, he could n o t deprive an entelechy o f its
materia prima or create an entelechy w i t h o u t materia prima. 2
I t is n o w easy t o understand w h y Leibniz, w h e n he is n o t being

specially careful, is liable t o taUc o f 'entelechies' w h e n he means
'monads'. H e has said that an entelechy is o f t h e nature o f a soul, and
this must be taken along w i t h the Aristotelian and Scholastic doctrine
that the relation o f a soul to the b o d y w h i c h i t animates is that o f a
substantial f o r m t o the stuff w h i c h i t informs. I n the l i g h t o f this w e
m i g h t say that an entelechy is the soul o f an i n d i v i d u a l monad, whilst
a dominant m o n a d is the soul o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l composed o f i t s e l f a n d
the subordinate monads w h i c h constitute its organism. B u t the phrase
'is the soul o f ' has different implications i n these t w o statements. W h e n
1
[G., I I , 2 5 2 . Loemker, 5 3 0 - i · ] 2
[G., П, 324-5·]
ι
w e say that an entelechy is the soul o f an i n d i v i d u a l monad, w e are

speaking i n terms o f t h e Aristotelian theory that soul and b o d y are n o t
t w o substances b u t are the form-factor and the stuff-factor i n a single
substance. W h e n w e say that a dominant monad is the soul o f a m a n
or a cat or any other l i v i n g creature w e are speaking i n terms o f the
Platonic and Cartesian theory that a soul is a substance and that the
b o d y w h i c h i t animates is another substance or collection ofsubstances.
b i the end Leibniz has accepted b o t h views, one for the internal struc
ture o f t h e individual monad, and the other for the relation o f s o u l and
b o d y i n a l i v i n g creature.
2 C o r p o r e a l substance is a p h e n o m e n o n bene f u n d a t u m
T h e next i m p o r t a n t change t o be noted is that Leibniz definitely comes

t o the conclusion that corporeal substance is o n l y a phenomenon bene
fundatum. I n the earlier w o r k s this v i e w has constantly been i n the
offmg as a possible alternative. B u t the line taken there was that cor
poreal substance w o u l d be something more than a phenomenon bene
fundatum i f and o n l y i f i t was admitted that every genuine corporeal
substance is an animated organism. H e assumed that such an organism
really w o u l d have the properties w h i c h scientists ascribe t o bodies, viz.
shape, size, position, m o t i o n , impenetrability, inertia, and various kinds
o f potential energy, t h o u g h i t w o u l d n o t have the secondary qualities
o f colour, temperature, etc. His n e w position m a y be stated as follows.
H e gives up n o t h i n g that he had asserted about the necessity o f h a v i n g
natural intrinsic units, and about such units being animated organisms.
B u t he n o w holds that even an organism cannot really have even those
properties w h i c h scientists ascribe t o bodies. Suppose that I a m i n a
situation i n w h i c h i t w o u l d be true t o say o f me i n ordinary speech
that I a m seeing and touching a cat, and where there is n o question o f
m y being asleep and dreaming or delirious or subject to an optical
delusion, etc. Leibniz w o u l d n o w say: Y o u certainly are perceiving a
collection o f substances w h i c h exist independently o f y o u . Those sub
stances certainly do have, independently o f y o u , certain properties
w h i c h are correlated respectively w i t h the shape, size, position, m o t i o n ,
etc. w h i c h y o u ostensibly perceive. B u t neither separately n o r collec
tively do they have shape, size, position, m o t i o n , etc. T h e y do not
have the properties w h i c h y o u perceive t h e m as having, or w h i c h a
physicist w o u l d ascribe t o t h e m o n the basis o f those w h i c h y o u per
ceive t h e m as having. A n d they do have other properties, viz. mental
ones, w h i c h y o u do n o t perceive t h e m as having and w h i c h they seem
I THEORY OF MONADS 01
to y o u not t o have. This is w h a t he means b y saying that bodies are

only phenomena, t h o u g h they are phenomena bene fundata. A m o r e
accurate w a y o f stating the case w o u l d be this. There are n o bodies.
B u t there are independent substances or collections ofsubstances w h i c h
human beings misperceive as bodies. A n d , w h e n a person's perceptions
answer to the ordinary tests for n o r m a l i t y , the various properties w h i c h
appear to him t o belong to the object w h i c h he misperceives as a b o d y are
correlated w i t h certain properties w h i c h really do belong t o that object.
This v i e w and the m a i n argument f o r i t are stated v e r y clearly i n the
Letters to de Voider. A n y t h i n g that can be subdivided is an aggregate
composed o f several constituents. A n y t h i n g that is an aggregate lacks
intrinsic u n i t y ; i t has u n i t y only f o r the m i n d o f an observer and
relatively t o his special interests and perceptual limitations. T h e reality
o f an aggregate is entirely b o r r o w e d f r o m that o f its constituents.
Therefore anything that can be subdivided has n o reality unless i t has
constituents w h i c h do n o t consist o f a plurality o f coexisting parts. 1
I w i l l complete the argument as follows.

Consider any ostensible b o d y , whether organic or inorganic. I t is
part o f the n o t i o n o f a b o d y t o be extended. Either this ostensible b o d y
is continuous or i t is discrete. I f it is discrete, i t w i l l consist o f a number
o f scattered smaller bodies, each o f w h i c h is extended and continuous;
and w e can apply the argument that follows to t h e m . So w e can c o n
fine our attention to ostensible bodies w h i c h are continuous. N o w any
v o l u m e , however small, consists o f smaller volumes w h i c h together
exactly make i t up w i t h o u t overlapping. Therefore, i f any v o l u m e ,
however small, be completely filled w i t h corporeal substance, the
substances w h i c h f i l l i t must be an aggregate composed o f the smaller
bits o f corporeal substance w h i c h respectively fill the smaller volumes
w h i c h together make up this v o l u m e w i t h o u t overlapping. B u t , f o r
precisely the same reason, each o f these smaller bits o f corporeal sub
stance w o u l d i n t u r n be an aggregate ofsmaller bits, and so o n w i t h o u t
end. Therefore a continuous extended substance w o u l d be an aggregate
o f aggregates o f aggregates . . . w i t h o u t end. This is an impossible
c o n d i t i o n and therefore there cannot be any extended substances.
Therefore, whenever w e perceive or conceive anything as extended
w e must be t o that extent mi'sperceiving i t or m/sconceiving i t .
This argument seems t o me t o be i m p o r t a n t f o r the f o l l o w i n g

reasons, ( i ) I t is a purely ontological argument against the reality o f
corporeal substance, and n o t a merely epistemological argument like
Berkeley's. ( 2 ) I t is quite independent o f whether the ostensibly
[G., П, 267. Cf. also 261.]
1
extended objects are animated organisms or n o t . Let t h e m be as ani

mated and as organic as they w i l l , i f their organisms are held t o be
extended, they are open t o this objection. (3) I f v a l i d , i t w o u l d be
fatal t o Cordemoy's extended homogeneous little atoms. T h e fact that
it is physically impossible t o separate the parts o f a C o r d e m o y a t o m is
irrelevant t o the argument.
Leibniz draws precisely the r i g h t conclusion f r o m his argument.
H e says that w e must postulate unextended entities as constitutive o f
ostensible bodies. B u t w e must n o t say that bodies are composed of these
constitutive entities. I t w o u l d obviously be self-contradictory t o say
that an extended object was composed of unextended parts; for the
w h o l e p o i n t o f t h e argument is that, if an object were extended, then,
however small i t m i g h t be, i t w o u l d consist o f parts w h i c h are also
extended. W h a t w e must say is that certain aggregates o f these u n
extended substances present to us the delusive appearance o f being
extended, movable, massive substances, i.e. bodies. T h e monads are
not parts ofbodies; f o r there can be n o such things as bodies f o r t h e m
to be parts of, and, i f there could be, they c o u l d n o t have unextended
parts. The monads are the real foundations o f the p a r d y delusive
experiences i n w h i c h w e seem t o ourselves t o perceive bodies.
3 P l u r a H t y o f substances
W h y d i d Leibniz h o l d that there is a p l u r a l i t y o f substances instead o f

h o l d i n g , l i k e Spinoza, that there is o n l y one genuine substance? H e
was, ofcourse, quite familiar w i t h Spinoza's doctrine and he occasion
ally refers t o i t i n his correspondence. Thus, e.g., de V o i d e r at one
stage t h r e w o u t the suggestion that perhaps o n l y the w h o l e universe is
a substance. T o this Leibniz answered (1) that this is contrary t o the
1
usual meaning o f the w o r d 'substance'; ( 2 ) that ' B . de S.' has p r o

duced n o shadow o f r e a s o n f o r this doctrine; and (3) that, i f a n y o n e
wants to use 'substance' i n this o d d w a y , w e can let h i m do so and say
that there are a n u m b e r o f 'things' or 'subjects' i n each o f w h i c h there
are 'modes' (i.e. occurrents).
I believe that Leibniz's m a i n reasons f o r Pluralism were the f o l l o w
ing.
( 1 ) H e understood b y the t e r m 'substance' a continuant w h i c h has
occurrents or states (i.e. w h a t he w o u l d call 'modes'), b u t is n o t itself
an occurrent i n o r a state o f anything. N o w i t seemed t o h i m obvious
that his o w n m i n d was a continuant, having various experiences as
1
[G., I I , 2 5 7 - 8 . L o e m k e r , 5 3 2 . ]
THEORY OF M O N A D S 93
occurrents i n i t . A n d he d i d n o t doubt that there are other finite minds

besides his o w n . h i the Letters to des Bosses he says that he can j u d g e
that he is n o t the o n l y created existent because he can see that there is
no reason w h y he should be i n the privileged position o f being the
o n l y substance actually created. N o w i t seemed to h i m meaningless t o
1
suggest, as Spinoza had i n effect done, that all finite minds are occur
rents i n a single M e n t a l Continuant, üf y o u suppose that this single
M e n t a l Continuant is a mind and that our minds are experiences i n i t ,
the suggestion is plainly nonsensical, f f y o u say, as Spinoza d i d , that
it is mental b u t is n o t a m i n d , i t is d o u b t f u l whether y o u have any
clear idea o f w h a t y o u are asserting. So I take i t that Leibniz t o o k a
pluralistic v i e w about ordinary minds, at any rate, o n plain c o m m o n -
sense grounds.
( 2 ) Passing to ostensibly material objects, w e have to account for
the fact that they appear t o be extended and endlessly divisible i n t o co
existing parts. Granted that n o t h i n g can really have this property, w e
have t o account for the appearances. I t is reasonable to do this i n such
a w a y as t o reduce the degree o f misperception t o a m i n i m u m . N o w
Leibniz has n o objection t o infinity as such. W h a t he objects to is a
c o m p o u n d whose components are themselves compounds, and so o n
w i t h o u t end. His solution is to suppose that any ostensibly extended
substance, n o matter h o w small i t may appear to be w h e n i t is mis-
perceived as extended, is i n fact an aggregate o f an infinite n u m b e r o f
simple unextended substances. His suggestion is that the harmless
i n f i n i t y o f an infinite aggregate o f simple unextended substances is
misperceived b y us as something w h i c h w o u l d have the objectionable
i n f i n i t y o f a c o m p o u n d composed o f c o m p o u n d s w h i c h are themselves
compounds w i t h o u t end. I f w e accept this argument Leibniz has given
g o o d reason for t h i n k i n g that there is an infinite n u m b e r ofsubstances,
each o f w h i c h is simple i n the sense that i t does n o t consist ofcoexisting
parts and therefore is n o t extended.
4 Characteristics o f m o n a d s
So far as the argument has gone the simple substances at the basis o f t h e
appearance o f e x t e n d e d objects m i g h t be spatially p u n c t i f o r m entities;
having spatial position, m o b i l i t y , inertia, and various inherent active
forces, b u t no spatial extension. A physical theory o n those lines was
w o r k e d o u t i n detail b y B o s c o v i c h and i n less detail b y K a n t i n his
2
1
[ G . , I I , 516.]
2
[Theoria Philosophiae Naturalis (Venice, 1763).]
Metaphysical Bases of Natural Science. B u t i t was n o t Leibniz's v i e w . H e

held that the simple substances are minds or souls. W e must n o w c o n
sider this part o f his doctrine.
4.1 M o n a d s a r e m i n d s
The f o l l o w i n g is a v e r y clear statement o f Leibniz's doctrine, taken

f r o m the Letters to de Voider. H e says that the simple substances w h i c h
are the foundation o f the phenomena o f matter and m o t i o n do n o t
differ essentially f r o m our o w n souls, w h i c h w e k n o w f r o m w i t h i n .
There is n o t h i n g i n the ostensibly external w o r l d except simple sub
stances, and n o t h i n g i n any simple substances except appetition and
perception. W e must n o w consider w h y Leibniz ascribes these t w o
1
properties to every monad, and what precisely he means b y doing so.
4.1.1 A p p e t i t i o n
Leibniz holds that i t is o f the essence o f a created substance t o be c o n

tinually i n process ofchange ofstate. There is a strong statement o f t h i s
v i e w i n the Letters to de Voider. ' N o t h i n g else i n a finite substance is
permanent, o n m y v i e w , except that l a w itself w h i c h involves c o n
tinual sequence... . ' N o w changes must be caused, and there can be n o
2
transeunt causation. Therefore each total state o f a m o n a d must be

completely determined b y its immediate predecessor and must c o m
pletely determine its immediate successor. The l a w or pattern o f all
its future changes was impressed o n the m o n a d b y G o d at its creation.
B u t that w o u l d n o t sufEce. H e must have endowed i t w i t h a per
manent active tendency to pass f r o m one total state t o another i n
accordance w i t h the innate l a w or pattern. Leibniz calls this active
tendency, w h i c h keeps up the series o f purely immanent changes,
Appetition. I t m i g h t be compared to w h a t Spinoza called Conatus. W e
must n o t t h i n k o f i t as a deliberate striving t o b r i n g about an imagined
and desired future state o f oneself. T h a t is a v e r y special f o r m o f
appetition w h i c h can occur o n l y i n the higher kinds o f m o n a d w h i c h
are capable o f m e m o r y and imagination.
4.1.2 P e r c e p t i o n
Leibniz explains i n Section 14 o f the Monadology that he is using the

w o r d 'perception' i n a v e r y extended and technical sense w h e n he
1
[G., I I , 2 7 0 . L o e m k e r , 5 3 7 . ] 2
[G., I I , 2 6 3 . L o e m k e r , 5 3 4 . ]
THEORY OF MONADS 95
ascribes perception to every simple substance. Perception, as i t occurs 1
i n h u m a n beings i n n o r m a l attentive w o r k i n g life, is a v e r y special

f o r m o f i t . H e says that the essential peculiarity o f perception is that
' m u l t i p l i c i t y is represented i n u n i t y ' . This n o t i o n o f representation o f
m u l t i p l i c i t y i n u n i t y goes r i g h t back to the Discourse on Metaphysics and
the Correspondence with Arnauld. I t h i n k that the meaning is as follows.
W h e n he ascribes perception t o a m o n a d he means that each total
state o f the m o n a d has a number o f different features w h i c h are n o t
separable or independent, and that each different feature corresponds
to, and so represents, the contemporary state o f a different one o f the
other monads. I t h i n k that the auditory field o f a person w h o is listening
to an orchestra composed o f m a n y different instruments playing s i m u l
taneously illustrates Leibniz's idea. B u t w e must remember that n o r m a l
h u m a n sense-perception is a v e r y advanced k i n d o f perception, w h i c h
can happen o n l y i n the higher monads, j u s t as deliberate conscious
striving f o r an end is a v e r y advanced k i n d o f appetition.
Leibniz's general t h e o r y o f representation m a y be expressed b y the
f o l l o w i n g symbolic scheme. Suppose that there was a set o f n monads
M lt M , . . ., M . Let M and M be t w o typical monads o f the set.
2 n f s
Let us denote the total state o f M at a certain m o m e n t t b y m', and

r
the total state o f M at the same m o m e n t b y m' . T h e n i n m\ there

s s
w i l l be a certain factor m' w h i c h corresponds to the contemporary

n
total state m[ o f M ^ There w i l l be a certain other feature m' w h i c h r2
corresponds to the contemporary total state m' o f M . A n d so o n for 2 2
the rest. T h e same remarks w i l l apply mutatis mutandis t o any other

m o n a d such as M . So w e can w r i t e
s
m
',=fr K> i»> · · ·. «> · · ·.
m m
O
K=fs « . "V • · ·· K< • • ·. o

w i t h similar equations f o r each o f the n monads. Here the letters f , r
f, etc. astride the bracket i n each case represent the characteristic mode
o f c o m b i n a t i o n i n each m o n a d o f t h e various factors i n t o a single total
state. T h e w h o l e history o f the m o n a d M w i l l be a continuous series
r
o f such total states as m' , p r o d u c i n g each other w i t h o u t any influence

r
f r o m outside i n accordance w i t h the l a w o f development w h i c h G o d

impressed o n the m o n a d at its creation, and i n consequence o f the
active force o f appetition w i t h w h i c h he endowed i t .
N o w Leibniz held that the n u m b e r o f monads must be infinite i n
order t o explain the apparent c o n t i n u i t y ofostensibly material objects.
1
[ G . , V I , 6 o 8 ^ . L o e m k e r , 644.]
Also he held that i n each m o n a d at any given m o m e n t the contempor

ary states oiall other monads are represented. As he puts i t : ' A t every
m o m e n t each m o n a d m i r r o r s the w h o l e universe f r o m its o w n special
p o i n t o f v i e w . ' Therefore our g r o u p o f n monads must include all the
1
monads that there are, and the number w i l l be infinite. So the t o t a l

state o f a n y m o n a d at any m o m e n t w i l l be infinitely complex. B u t the
complexity does n o t consist o f a n infinite n u m b e r ofparts, w h i c h could
conceivably be separated, l i k e the bits i n a jig-saw puzzle picture. I t
consists i n an infinite number ofinseparable superimp0sed^e0tores or
modifications. I f w e w a n t a physical analogy, the f o l l o w i n g m a y be
useful. W e can t h i n k o f the total state o f a monad at any m o m e n t as
like the pattern o f ripples o n a p o n d , produced b y the several ripples
emanating f r o m each o f a number o f stones dropped simultaneously
i n t o various parts o f the p o n d at some date i n the past.
I suspect that Leibniz's real reason for h o l d i n g that each m o n a d
mirrors the contemporary state o f all the others is the f o l l o w i n g .
E v e r y t h i n g i n the universe appears t o be influenced to some extent b y
everything else. E.g. every ostensible material particle is ostensibly
attracted gravitationally b y every other. N o w really there is n o matter
and no interaction. B u t w e have to account for the appearance o f u n i -
versal interaction between all the ostensible matter i n the universe. L e i b
niz's solution is to say that w h a t underlies the appearance ofuniversal and
m u t u a l interaction is thefact o f u n i v e r s a l and m u t u a l representation.
There is another complication t o be considered. Leibniz held, n o t
o n l y that each total state o f a m o n a d m i r r o r s the contemporary total
states o f a U the other monads, b u t also that i t m i r r o r s i n a very confused
w a y every one o f i t s own past andfuture states. H e seems to have t h o u g h t
that this f o l l o w e d f r o m the Predicate-in-Notion Principle and the fact
that all causation is purely immanent. A t every m o m e n t the m o n a d
must i n some sense bear traces o f a U its past and traces o f a U its future,
i f i t is t o develop spontaneously i n accordance w i t h the plan laid d o w n
f o r i t b y God at its creation. W e must therefore introduce i n t o our
formula a reflexive factor t o symbolize the monad's representation at
each m o m e n t o f its states at all other moments. I shall symbolize this
peculiar factor i n the state o f m o n a d M at m o m e n t ί b y μ/ . Thus o u r
r Γ
formulae finally become
K=fr (K'> n> U m m

<» · · ·)
»i=/j (K'> <> a> • • •> K m

)
1
[ G . , V I , 618. L o e m k e r , 6 4 9 . ]
THEORY OF MONADS 97
I f w e t h i n k o f Leibniz's theory i n terms o f m o d e r n physics w e n n d

that i t is oversimplified i n at least t w o respects, ( i ) I t presupposes that
heat, l i g h t , sound, etc. take no t i m e t o travel, i.e. that all the ostensible
effects w h i c h one remote ostensible b o d y has o n another foUow i n
stantaneously o n their ostensible causes. I f w e are to aUow f o r the facts
w e shall have t o say that the state o f a m o n a d at any m o m e n t t m i r r o r s
the states o f other monads at earlier instants. W e shall have to add that
the time-lag i n each case is correlated w i t h the ostensible distance
between the place where the one ostensible b o d y was w h e n i t osten
sibly sent o u t the influence and the place where the other ostensible
b o d y is w h e n i t ostensibly receives the influence. ( 2 ) Leibniz's theory
also seems to ignore the existence o f w h a t appears t o us as retarding
and disturbing media between ostensible bodies. I t is stated as i f w h a t
appears t o be the m e d i u m t h r o u g h w h i c h l i g h t , sound, etc. appear t o
travel f r o m one ostensible b o d y to another were always clear and
homogeneous. I f i t is n o t , something i n the state o f e a c h m o n a d must
be allowed for w h a t c o m m o n sense w o u l d describe as the effects o f t h e
transmitting m e d i u m . Leibniz w o u l d n o d o u b t say that w h a t w e take
to be a corporeal m e d i u m , e.g. glass, water, air, etc. must i n fact c o n
sist o f s w a r m s o f l i v i n g creatures each composed o f a dominant m o n a d
and an organism o f subordinate monads. B u t the fact w o u l d remain
that they are m i r r o r e d i n a v e r y different w a y f r o m other monads,
and that they appear t o influence i n a peculiar w a y the w a y i n w h i c h
other monads are m i r r o r e d .
4.2 C o n f u s i o n
Leibniz ascribes t o every m o n a d a certain determinable quality w h i c h

he caUs 'Confusion'. W e have seen that the total state o f any m o n a d
at any m o m e n t must i n fact be infinitely differentiated. For i t contains
a different modification corresponding t o the contemporary state o f
every other m o n a d , and the number o f other monads is infinite. I t also
contains a m o d i f i c a t i o n corresponding t o every one o f i t s o w n past and
future states, and the number o f these w U l be infinite, since t i m e is
continuous. N o w a m o n a d is confused i n so far as its total state at any
m o m e n t contains modifications w h i c h i t fails t o recognize and dis
tinguish. Leibniz used certain w e l l - k n o w n psychological facts t o show
that the total state o f any h u m a n m i n d , even at its most wakeful and
attentive moments, contains factors w h i c h i t fails to discriminate. I f s o ,
there is n o difficulty i n believing that monads b e l o w the level o f
h u m a n minds are habitually m u c h more confused than h u m a n m i n ds.
I t is not so obvious w h y he should have been sure that created minds

above the h u m a n level, e.g. those ofangels, must all have some degree
o f confusion. I t h i n k that he probably postulated this i n order that
every created m i n d , however exalted, should differ i n k i n d f r o m God's
m i n d . H o w e v e r that m a y be, i t is certain that he held that every monad
has some degree o f confusion at every stage o f its history. H e seems to
have held that n o t w o monads can have precisely the same degree
o f confusion at the same m o m e n t . B u t the degree o f confusion i n a
given monad m a y v a r y very m u c h f r o m t i m e t o t i m e . This is illustrated
b y the difference between a h u m a n m i n d w h e n f u l l y awake and
attentive, and the same k i n d w h e n drowsy or drugged. A g a i n I take i t
that the distribution ofconfusion w i t h i n a monad m i g h t vary even i f t h e
total degree o f i t remained the same. A t one m o m e n t a m a n is specially
attending, e.g., to certain items i n his usual field and at another he is
specially attending t o others. I f Leibniz is r i g h t he is i n some sense
aware at every m o m e n t o f e v e r y t h i n g i n the universe and o f h i s w h o l e
past and his whole future. This shift o f attention must mean that some
parts o f his total experiences w h i c h were clear have become confused,
and that others w h i c h were confused have become clear.
I t w i l l be remembered that Leibniz distinguishes i n every monad
t w o inseparable factors, viz. a substantial f o r m or entelechy and stuff
or materia prima. W e can n o w identify each o f these factors. T h e
entelechy-factor is the activity w h i c h is characteristic o f the monad,
i.e. its activity o f perceiving and striving. T h e stuff-factor is the
internal l i m i t a t i o n t o w h i c h this inherent and incessant activity is more
or less subjected at every m o m e n t i n every monad. I t is that w h i c h
gives rise t o confusion. W e must remember that all the mental l i m i t a
tions, such as drowsiness, laziness, etc., w h i c h w e c o m m o n l y ascribe
to the body, must, ifLeibniz's denial oftranseunt causation be accepted,
be ascribed t o something w i t h i n the m i n d itself. I t is this something
w i t h i n a monad, w h i c h limits and hampers its natural activities, that
constitutes its s t u f f o r materiaprima.
4.3 P o i n t o f V i e w
Leibniz holds that each monad at any m o m e n t has a certain peculiar

quality w h i c h he calls its Point of View. N 0 t w o monads at the same
m o m e n t have the same p o i n t o f v i e w . B u t the p o i n t o f v i e w o f a
monad may alter i n course o f t i m e , and so i t may happen that a certain
monad may acquire a certain p o i n t o f v i e w w h i c h f o r m e r l y belonged
t o another monad, m a certain sense i t m a y be said that the total exter-
THEORY OF MONADS 99
nal object perceived b y any m o n a d is the same as that perceived b y

any other monad, viz. the sum-total o f all the monads. B u t , apart
f r o m the fact, already noted, that n o t w o monads perceive this c o m
m o n object at any m o m e n t w i t h the same total degree o f confusion
or w i t h the same distribution o f confusion, there is the further difference
that they perceive i t f r o m different points o f view. This doctrine goes
right back to the Discourse on Metaphysics, and Leibniz never gave i t up.
• I t h i n k that this doctrine is designed t o f i t the f o l l o w i n g i m p o r t a n t
facts, ( i ) Ostensible bodies appear to stand i n various spatial relations
to each other. These ostensible spatial relations sometimes remain
constant f o r a w h i l e and sometimes change continuously. ( 2 ) The
influences w h i c h ostensible bodies appear to exert o n each other
t h r o u g h gravitation, heat, electricity, etc. v a r y w i t h their ostensible
spatial relations t o each other. (3) I f an observer views a certain set o f
ostensible bodies, their apparent shapes and sizes v a r y i n a systematic
w a y w i t h the ostensible spatial relations between t h e m and the obser
ver's ostensible body. This m a y be called the 'phenomenon ofperspec-
tive'. I t is illustrated also w h e n w e have an optical apparatus, such as a
camera or a system o f screens o n w h i c h shadows are cast, instead o f a
h u m a n observer. Leibniz had t o account f o r these systematically co
ordinated phenomena i n terms o f his o w n theory, w h i c h denies the
reality o f bodies and o f relations.
His solution is to ascribe to each m o n a d at every m o m e n t a certain

determinable quality Q. This is called Point of View. Suppose that t w o
v e r y smaU ostensible bodies A and B appear to stand at a certain m o
ment i n a certain spatial relation t o each other. T h e monads w h i c h are
misperceived at t as the particle A then have values o f Q w h i c h all
cluster closely r o u n d a certain mean value <7.4. The monads w h i c h are
misperceived at t as the particle B then have values o f Q w h i c h cluster
closely r o u n d a certain other mean value ав- T h e real basis o f the
apparent spatial relation is the difference i n these t w o values q^ and qn-
m general the precise w a y i n w h i c h the state o f m o n a d M at a givenr
m o m e n t t is m i r r o r e d i n another m o n a d M depends j o i n t l y o n q' and

s r
q' , the points o f v i e w o f the t w o monads at that m o m e n t . T h a t is the

s
real basis o f the phenomena o f perspective and o f the appearance o f

effects w h i c h v a r y w i t h relative position.
5 Pre-estabHshed H a r m o n y
A c c o r d i n g to Leibniz the fact w h i c h underlies the appearance o f u n i

versal interaction between finite substances is that the total state ofeach
100 LEIBNIZ : AN INTRODUCTION
monad at each m o m e n t is infinitely complex, and each difTerent factor

i n i t represents the contemporary total state o f a different one o f the
remaining monads. N o w , i n consequence o f h i s denial o f t h e possibility
o f interaction between different substances, he has to h o l d that the
state o f each m o n a d at each m o m e n t is completely determined b y the
immediately preceding state o f that same m o n a d i n accordance w i t h a
purely immanent causal law. W h y then should there be any correspon
dence at aU between various monads, to say n o t h i n g o f a complete
one-to-one correlation between the state ofeach and the contemporary
states o f aU the rest?
Since they were aU created simultaneously b y God, i t is natural to
connect this constant correlation between their contemporary states
at aU later moments w i t h their c o m m o n o r i g i n . Leibniz rejects the
crude Occasioualist v i e w that G o d continually interferes i n the course
o f the w o r l d and directly produces a state β i n substance B w h e n he
notices that a state α has occurred i n substance A. This, he thinks,
w o u l d be quite inconsistent w i t h the w i s d o m and d i g n i t y o f God.
A n d , i n any case, science and philosophy ought n o t t o postulate a
special action o f G o d at every instant t o account for ordinary routine
natural phenomena.
Leibniz therefore puts f o r w a r d the f o l l o w i n g theory. A n y o n e w h o
admits the existence o f a creative G o d must a d m i t that he created each
m o n a d w i t h certain dispositional properties and i n a certain initial
occurrent state. Suppose one accepts Leibniz's general theories o f
causation and substance. T h e n one w i l l also have to admit that G o d
gave t o each m o n a d the p o w e r and the tendency t o develop spon
taneously all its future states i n succession according to the initial plan,
w i t h o u t any interaction w i t h other things and w i t h o u t any further
special action b y God. A U that w e need to suppose further is that G o d
created each m o n a d w i t h such dispositional properties and i n such an
initial occurrent state that the contemporary subsequent states o f aU
w o u l d correspond at each instant d o w n to the minutest detail. So w e
have the one miracle o f a co-ordinated creation w i t h o u t needing any
subsequent miracles o f interference. This is the doctrine o f the Pre-
established Harmony.
I f the denial o f transeunt causation were based u p o n the denial o f
relations i n general, or even o n the denial ofrelations between different
substances, i t w o u l d hardly be consistent to supplement i t w i t h the
Pre-established H a r m o n y . For the latter plainly presupposes temporal
relations between total states o f different monads, since i t talks o f the
correlation o f their contemporary states. I t also presupposes relations o f
THEORY OF MONADS IOI
p o i n t - t o - p o i n t correlation between the various distinguishable factors

i n the contemporary total states ofdifferent monads. B u t , as I have said,
I do n o t believe that Leibniz's g r o u n d for denying the possibility o f
transeunt causation was his general principle o f denying the reality o f
I relations.
6 T h e three k i n d s o f m o n a d
A l l monads have aU the properties w h i c h I have been describing, h i

addition, they all have the p r o p e r t y o f b e i n g ingenerable and indestruc
tible b y ordinary natural processes, because they are simple i n the
sense o f n o t being composed o f a p l u r a l i t y o f coexisting parts. B u t
Leibniz holds that they fall i n t o three great classes, w h i c h f o r m an
ascending hierarchy. H e caUs these Bare Monads, Animal Souls, and
Rational Souls or Spirits.
A Bare Monad is unable t o discriminate the various features i n its
total state at any m o m e n t . I t has n o conscious m e m o r y o f i t s past states
and n o conscious anticipation o f its future states. I t has therefore o n l y
completely unconscious perception and completely b l i n d appetition.
Ostensibly corporeal substances are certain aggregates o f b a r e monads.
A n Animal Soul has some degree o f discrimination. I t also has some
degree o f w h a t Leibniz here caUs ' m e m o r y ' . B u t he does n o t mean b y
this personal recollection o f particular events i n its past history. H e
means w h a t psychologists call 'retentiveness' and ' p o w e r o f f o r m i n g
associations', m consequence o f this the m o d e o f behaviour o f an
animal soul m a y be m o d i f i e d b y past experiences i n the sense that i t
m a y acquire 'conditioned responses'. Such monads are the souls ofcats
and dogs and oysters, and so o n .
A Rational Soul or Spirit has, i n addition t o the properties possessed
b y an animal soul and a bare monad, the f o l l o w i n g further properties,
w h i c h p u t i t i n a unique position i n the universe. I t has self-conscious
ness, and therefore can remember past events i n its life. I t can also
imagine possible future states o f affairs and strive deliberately t o b r i n g
t h e m about or t o prevent t h e m f r o m being actualized. I t has k n o w
ledge ofnecessary truths, such as the laws o f l o g i c and arithmetic, and
can make deductive and inductive inferences. I t also has knowledge o f
G o d and o f categories, like cause and substance. Lastly, i t is aware o f
the differences between r i g h t and w r o n g , g o o d and evil, and is m o r a l l y
responsible; and i t has the special desires and emotions w h i c h are b o u n d
u p w i t h m o r a l cognition. Such monads are h u m a n souls and the souls
o f angels.
W i t h i n each o f these classes there is a continuous series o f monads

differing i n degree o f confusion. O n certain occasions and f o r l i m i t e d
periods a rational soul m a y become as confused as an animal soul
n o r m a l l y is. This happens, e.g., to our souls w h e n w e faint or go to
sleep. I t almost certainly happens immediately after death. B u t that
abnormal degree o f confusion cannot last indefinitely, f o r a rational
soul has to be restored to a state o f c o m p a r a t i v e clearness at latest b y the
LastJudgment i n order to recognize thejustice o f t h e verdict u p o n its
past life and thereafter to enjoy its r e w a r d i n Heaven or suffer its
punishment i n H e l l .
N o monad could pass f r o m one ofthese classes to a higher one w i t h
out a miracle, for they differ i n k i n d . A bare m o n a d lacks certain
innate powers w h i c h an animal soul has, and an animal soul lacks
certain innate powers w h i c h a rational soul has.
7 T h e r e a l foundation o f t h e v a r i o u s b o d i l y p h e n o m e n a
A n ostensibly corporeal substance appears t o have properties w h i c h

fall i n t o four classes, viz. sensible, geometrical, kinematic, and d y n a m
ical. B y 'sensible qualities' I mean colour, heat and cold, taste, smell, etc.
B y 'geometrical qualities' I mean shape, size, and position. B y ' k i n e
matic properties' I mean m o t i o n ofvarious kinds and rest. B y 'dynamic
properties' I mean impenetrability, inertial quiescence, inertial self-
propagation, and forces or energies o f various kinds such as that
possessed b y a m o v i n g bullet or a compressed spring.
7.1 Sensible quatities
Leibniz, l i k e practically all the scientists and philosophers o f any

importance at that t i m e , held that, i f there are bodies, they are n o t
really coloured, h o t , etc., independently o f h u m a n or animal percipients.
A n d he held that, at the first m o v e at any rate, the real independent
basis o f the phenomena o f colour, temperature, etc. is the m i n u t e
structure o f bodies and the motions o f their m i n u t e particles. A t this
level Leibniz w o u l d say that, w h e n a person perceives something as
red, he is perceiving confusedly a very large number o f very similar
m i n u t e motions i n a very short period. T h e aggregate o f these is per
ceived confusedly because each separate m o t i o n is so small and lasts
for so short a t i m e and because they are aU so m u c h alike. Consequently,
t h o u g h each is perceived, one's perception o f each is unconscious, and
sothe p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e w h o l e a g g r e g a t e o f t h e m i s c o n f u s e d . Somehow
THEORY OF MONADS IO3
this makes one perceive the object as coloured, although n o t h i n g is i n

fact coloured. O f course this cannot be Leibniz's ultimate v i e w , since
according to h i m there are really n o motions to perceive whether
confusedly o r distinctly. B u t i t suffices to show that w e can confine
our attention to the geometrical, kinematic, and dynamical properties
o f ostensible bodies, i.e. t o those w h i c h scientists ascribe t o t h e m .
7.2 G e o m e t r i c a l properties
T h e real basis o f the appearance o f geometrical properties is the p r o

perty ofmonads w h i c h he callsPomi ofView. I t seems t o m e that Leibniz
makes statements i n different parts o f his w r i t i n g s w h i c h are difficult
t o reconcile w i t h each other. I n the Letters to de Voider he says i n one
place that a m o n a d has a 'certain ordered relation o f coexistence to
other things, i n consequence o f the machine w h i c h i t dominates, i.e.
a certain k i n d o f position w i t h i n extension, although i t is n o t possible
to assign i t t o a point.' h i his letter o f 21 July 1707 t o des Bosses he
1
says that a simple substance, t h o u g h i t has n o extension, has position

w h i c h is the foundation o f extension. B u t i n a later letter o f 26 M a y
2
1712 he definitely asserts that monads do n o t have real positions

relative t o each o t h e r . T h e g r o u n d given is that each is, as i t were, a
3
separate w o r l d , and that they are correlated w i t h each other o n l y

t h r o u g h the Pre-established H a r m o n y and b y n o other connexion.
T h e statement i n the letter t o de V o i d e r suggests that monads are
spatially interrelated o n l y indirectly t h r o u g h the organisms w h i c h they
dominate. B u t , since the organism o f a m o n a d itself consists entirely
ofsubordinate monads, this o n l y shifts the p r o b l e m f r o m the dominant
monads t o the subordinate monads. A n d i n any case, i n Leibniz's c o m
plete theory, each subordinate m o n a d is i n its t u r n a dominant monad
i n respect o f others w h i c h constitute its organism. I t h i n k that the
remark quoted m a y be concerned o n l y w i t h the rather special question
' I n w h a t sense can y o u say that a man's soul is located somewhere
w i t h i n his body?' and is n o t intended t o apply generally. T h e extreme
negative statement i n the letter 0 f 2 6 M a y 1712 t o des Bosses is c o n
sistent w i t h , and perhaps a necessary consequence of, Leibniz's denial
o f relations between different substances, ff there can be n o relations
there can be n o spatial relations; and, i f a l l position is relative, i t cannot
be literally true that one m o n a d has a position relatively t o anotber.
1
[G., I I , 2 5 3 . L o e m k e r , 531.]
2
[G., I I , 339·]
8
[G., I I , 4 4 4 . L o e m k e r , 6 0 2 . ]
I a m inclined to t h i n k that the consistent v i e w f o r Leibniz to take

m i g h t be summarized as f o l l o w s :
(1) W h a t appears t o a h u m a n being as a finite continuous b o d y is
really a set o f bare monads o f the f o l l o w i n g k i n d , (a) T h e points o f
v i e w o f all the monads i n the set faU w i t h i n certain limits. T h a t is w h y
the set is perceived as a finite b o d y w i t h a definite spatial boundary,
(b) Every possible p o i n t o f v i e w w i t h i n these limits belongs t o some
monad i n the set. I t is because o f t h i s , and because the possible points
o f v i e w constitute a continuous m a n i f o l d like the various possible
shades o f colour, e.g., that the set is perceived as a continuously ex
tended and endlessly divisible object.
( 2 ) Suppose that w h a t is perceived as b o d y A is perceived as standing
i n a certain spatial relation to w h a t is perceived as a separate b o d y B.
W h a t is perceived as b o d y A is really a certain set α o f monads such as
I have been describing; and w h a t is perceived as b o d y B is really a
certain other set β o f monads such as I have been describing. T h e basis
o f the fact that A is perceived as at a distance f r o m B is that the p o i n t
o f v i e w o f e v e r y monad i n set α differs b y a finite degree f r o m that o f
every monad i n set β. This m i g h t be compared w i t h the differences,
e.g., between a l i g h t shade o f b l u e and a dark shade o f b l u e . A c c o r d i n g
to the amount and k i n d o f difference between the points o f v i e w o f
monads i n α and the points o f v i e w o f monads i n β, A w i l l be per
ceived as m o r e or less distant f r o m B. Differences i n ostensible direction
could be dealt w i t h o n similar lines, b u t w e should have t o introduce
three or m o r e groups o f monads each o f w h i c h is misperceived as a
body.
I f this is the k i n d o f t h i n g that Leibniz had i n m i n d the f o l l o w i n g
points may be noted. (1) W h e n I discussed the controversy about
space and t i m e between Leibniz and Clarke I said that u l t i m a t e l y
Leibniz could n o t consistently h o l d a relational theory. H e must h o l d
that the real basis o f t h e phenomenon ofspatial position is certain pure
qualities i n the substance w h i c h appear t o stand i n spatial relations t o
each other. I t n o w appears that the pure qualities are the points o f v i e w
o f t h e monads i n those groups w h i c h are misperceived as extended and
spatially interrelated bodies.
( 2 ) T h e question remains: W h y should w e n o t take w h a t J o h n s o n
w o u l d call the adjectival f o r m o f t h e theory ofabsolute position, and
simply identify points o f v i e w w i t h perfectly determinate forms o f a
determinable quality o f absolute spatial position? I t seems t o m e that
i t is o n l y a question o f the usage o f words whether w e w i l l do this or
not.
THEORY OF M O N A D S IO5
7.3 K i n e m a t i c properties
Suppose that w h a t appears as a b o d y A is perceived t o m o v e relatively

to w h a t appears as b o d y B w i t h o u t any change i n the size or shape o f
either. W h a t appears as A w i l l be a group α o f monads such as I have
described, and w h a t appears as B w i l l be another such g r o u p β o f
monads. T h e real foundation o f the appearance o f relative m o t i o n is
that the points o f v i e w o f t h e monads i n «, or o f t h e monads i n β, or o f
b o t h , are changing i n a certain characteristic w a y . Let us confine our
attention t o a. T h e points o f v i e w o f a l l monads i n α must be changing
i n such a w a y that the difference i n p o i n t o f v i e w between any t w o o f
t h e m remains unaltered. Otherwise α w o u l d appear as a b o d y w h i c h is
changing i n size or i n shape or is disintegrating i n t o a n u m b e r o f
separate bodies. T h e situation m i g h t be compared to t w o sounds w h i c h
are b o t h changing i n absolute pitch, b u t keep the same relative pitch.
Similar remarks apply to the changes i n the points o f v i e w o f the m o n
ads i n set β. Lastly, there must be a difference i n the rate o f change o f
p o i n t o f v i e w between the monads o f g r o u p α and the monads o f group
β. Otherwise α and β w o u l d be perceived as t w o bodies A and B w h i c h
are at rest relatively t o each other.
Here again w e must remark that, although Leibniz has argued
against N e w t o n that all m o t i o n is relative, he must i n a sense deny this.
T h e appearance o f a change ofspatial relation between bodies must be
a phenomenon founded u p o n changes o f pure quality i n the monads
o f the groups w h i c h are misperceived as those bodies. W h e t h e r y o u
choose t o call these changes o f p o i n t o f v i e w 'absolute motions' or n o t
seems t o me to be largely a matter o f words. T h e y are n o t absolute
motions i n the sense i n w h i c h N e w t o n w o u l d have interpreted that
phrase. For N e w t o n ' s interpretation involves the substantival theory o f
Space w h i c h Leibniz has rejected. B u t there seems to be no g o o d reason
t o refuse to call t h e m absolute motions i n the Johnsonian sense, w h i c h
involves o n l y that position is a pure quality and n o t a relational
property.
I
7.4 D y n a m i c a l properties
I n dealing w i t h Leibniz's Dynamics w e saw that he argued successfully

against Descartes that the n o t i o n o f corporeal substance involves m u c h
beside geometrical and kinematic properties. I t involves i n addition
impenetrability and inertia, w h i c h Leibniz lumps together as primitive
passive force, and various kinds o f energy w h i c h he lumps together as
Юб LEIBNIZ : AN INTRODUCTION
primitive activeforce. The question n o w is: ' W h a t corresponds, i n the

monads o f a group α w h i c h is perceived as a b o d y A, to those various
dynamical properties w h i c h appear to belong t o the b o d y AT
Γη his letter o f 19 January 1706 to de V o i d e r Leibniz states quite
explicitly that force, i n so far as i t is t h o u g h t o f as a property o f ex
tended massive bodies, is n o t something that exists independently o f
an observer. I t is a phenomenon founded u p o n certain real properties
of monads,just as extension, m o t i o n , and mass themselves are. N o t h i n g
exists i n its o w n r i g h t except percipients and their perceptions and any
t h i n g that m a y be i n v o l v e d i n these.
1
Leibniz holds that the real factor i n monads w h i c h gives rise t o the
appearance o f impenetrability and inertia i n ostensible bodies is the
element o f c o n f u s i o n i n t h e m . Γη the individual monad this is the factor
w h i c h limits its powers o f perception and discrimination and explicit
m e m o r y and anticipation. W h e n a number o f monads constitute a
group o f such a k i n d as to appear as an extended object the element
o f c o n f u s i o n i n t h e m makes that object appear to be impenetrable and
inert.
T h e real factor i n monads w h i c h gives rise t o the appearance o f
active forces or energies i n ostensible bodies is the element o f a p p e t i t i o n
i n t h e m . Γη the letter to de V o i d e r w h i c h I quoted above he says that
force (in the individual monad) is simply the g r o u n d o f transition t o
new perceptions. W h e n a number o f monads constitute a group o f
such a k i n d as to appear as an extended object the element o f a p p e t i t i o n
i n t h e m makes that object appear to be possessed o f energy; either o f
the kinetic f o r m , as w h e n a massive b o d y is i n m o t i o n , or o f various
potential forms, as i n a suspended weight, a compressed spring, and so
on.
T h e f o l l o w i n g quotation f r o m Leibniz's Remarks on Bayles Article
Rorarius seems to me t o be interesting i n this connexion: 'Matter is
n o t capable o f maintaining itself i n circular m o t i o n , for this m o t i o n is
not simple enough for i t t o be able to remember. I t remembers o n l y
w h a t happens to i t at the last m o m e n t . . . i.e. i t remembers the direc
t i o n along the tangent' (i.e. t o the circular course w h i c h i t has been
travelling) ' w i t h o u t having the gift o f remembering the instruction
w h i c h w o u l d be given to i t t o t u r n aside f r o m that tangent. . . T h a t is
w h y an atom can o n l y learn to go s i m p l y i n a straight line, such is its
stupidity and imperfection. T h e case is quite different w i t h a soul or
m i n d . . . I t remembers (confusedly o f course) all its previous states and
is affected b y them. I t n o t o n l y holds its direction . . . b u t i t holds also
1
[G., I I , 2 8 r - 2 . Loemker, 5 3 9 . ]
I
THEORY OF MONADS IO7
the l a w o f the changes o f d i r e c t i o n . ' Γη this quotation one must

1
substitute f o r 'matter' and ' a t o m ' the bare monads w h i c h w h e n per

ceived i n suitable groupings appear as a b o d y or as an extended particle.
(Leibniz makes the same p o i n t i n his Second Answer to Bayle.) 2
T h e f o l l o w i n g comments m a y be made o n this part o f Leibniz's

theory o f m o n a d s :
(ι) I t h i n k i t is a mistake t o l u m p together impenetrability and
inertia. T h e y are so utterly different i n k i n d that i t seems implausible
t o ascribe the appearance o f b o t h o f t h e m t o a single factor i n the
individual monads, viz. their confusion.
(2) I t h i n k i t is a mistake t o l u m p together under the head o f 'inertia'
the t w o logically separable characteristics w h i c h I have distinguished
as inertial quiescence and inertial self-propagation. I t m a y be plausible t o
associate the reluctance o f a b o d y t o be set i n m o t i o n w i t h the passive
features o f confusion i n the monads. B u t surely its tendency t o m a i n
tain itself i n m o t i o n w i t h the same velocity and i n the same direction
should be associated w i t h the active factor o f a p p e t i t i o n i n the monads.
(3) Even i f these mistakes were avoided, the associations i n question
seem v e r y fanciful. N 0 doubt w e do talk o f 'mental inertia', o f 'force
and persistence o f w i l l i n g ' , and so o n . B u t the analogy o f these t o
inertia and energy respectively i n corporeal substances seems v e r y
slight.
( 4 ) I t w i l l be useful t o notice here that Leibniz uses each o f the
t w o technical terms materia prima and materia secunda i n t w o different
senses, w h i c h m i g h t be called a phenomenal and a metaphysical sense.
W h e n he is w r i t i n g p r i m a r i l y as a physicist he uses materia prima t o
mean corporeal substance considered simply as having extension, i m
penetrability, inertia, and m o b i l i t y . This is an abstraction, f o r aU
bodies have also inherent active forces or energies. I n the metaphysical
sense materia prima is that factor o f confusion w h i c h is present i n each
individual monad. I t is the correlate o f its entelechy, i.e. o f its positive
active powers o f perception and appetition. H e uses materia secunda
i n the phenomenal sense t o mean corporeal substances regarded, as
extended, mobile, impenetrable, inert, and the seat o f v a r i o u s active
forces. H e is particularly liable t o use i t o f the substances w h i c h make
up an animal b o d y considered s i m p l y as a physical object and w i t h o u t
reference t o the soul w h i c h animates i t . Γη the metaphysical sense
materia secunda means any collection o f bare monads w h i c h appear as a
b o d y . Γη particular i t means the collection o f subordinate monads
1
[ G . , I V , 543-4.]
2
[ G . , I V , 5 5 4 - 7 1 · L o e m k e r , 574-85·]
w h i c h appear as the b o d y o f an animal, considered i n abstraction f r o m

the dominant monad w h i c h is its soul.
( 5 ) I t is i m p o r t a n t to notice that, o n Leibniz's theory, the appearance
o f corporeal substance depends o n a double confusion, v i z . i n the
object and i n the subject, (a) A set o f m o n a d s w i l l n o t be perceived b y
any m i n d as a corporeal substance unless they are aU extremely c o n
fused, (b) A m i n d w i l l n o t perceive any set o f v e r y confused monads
as a corporeal substance unless it is itself somewhat confused. I f the
percipient were free f r o m confusion, he w o u l d perceive such a g r o u p
correctly, viz. as an infinite collection o f v e r y confused minds whose
points o f v i e w are aU confined w i t h i n certain limits. N 0 doubt, e.g.,
G o d perceives those sets o f monads w h i c h w e misperceive as bodies.
A n d n o doubt he k n o w s that w e misperceive t h e m as bodies. B u t he
certainly does n o t misperceive t h e m as bodies himself. H e perceives
t h e m correctly as groups o f confused monads.
8 T h e o r y o f organisms
I t w i l l be best to take Leibniz's doctrine o f organisms i n t w o stages.

W e w i l l first talk as i f organisms really were bodies, as they appear to
be. T h e n w e w i l l take account o f t h e fact that w h a t appear t o be bodies
are really certain collections o f l o w - g r a d e monads.
8.1 G e n e r a l a c c o u n t
( 1 ) A n organism is said to be a 'natural machine', Γη the Systeme

Nouveau i t is said that a natural machine differs f r o m an artificial one
i n at least the f o l l o w i n g three respects. (a) I t has an infinite n u m b e r o f
1
organs, (b) E v e r y part o f i t , however small, is itself a machine, (c) I t

always remains the same machine, being merely compressed or folded
w h e n i t seems t o be destroyed. H e adds that the presence o f a soul a n i
mating a natural machine gives a u n i t y (analogous t o that o f a h u m a n
individual) to w h i c h there is n o analogy i n the case o f an artificial
machine. Γη the Letters to de Voider i t is repeated that an organism has an
infinite number o f organs, and t w o reasons are given. One is that i t
requires t h e m i n order t o be able t o express i n its o w n w a y the w h o l e
universe. The other is i n order t o contain at every m o m e n t traces o f
aU its past and aU its future h i s t o r y . 2
A n organism neither begins n o r ceases i n the course o f nature. I t

1
[ G . , I V , 482. Loemker, 456.]
2
[ G . , I I , 251. L o e m k e r , 5 2 9 - 3 0 . ]
THEORY OF MONADS IOp
merely unfolds and takes up and organizes n e w material w h e n i t seems

to he generated; and i t merely closes up and sheds a great deal o f
material rather r a p i d l y w h e n i t seems t o die. W h e n w e say that the
same organism has persisted t h r o u g h o u t the w h o l e o f h i s t o r y , w e must
remember that the sameness o f an organism does n o t i m p l y that any
part o f i t , however small, has always been and w i l l always continue
to be a part o f i t . T h e characteristic feature o f an organism is that i t is
constantly taking i n material f r o m outside and organizing i t i n t o itself,
and constantly shedding material w h i c h f o r m e r l y was part o f i t .
Leibniz takes i t t o be certain that every organism is animated b y a
soul or something analogous t o a soul; and that every soul or substance
analogous t o a soul always animates an organism, h i the Letters to des
Bosses Leibniz says that i t is n o t necessary that every organism should be
animated, and conversely that i t is n o t necessary that a soul should a n i
mate an organism. B u t i t w o u l d be contrary t o God's w i s d o m to have
created an organism w i t h o u t a soul t o animate i t , and i t w o u l d be con
trary to the order o f t h i n g s for h i m t o create a soul w i t h o u t an organ
ism for i t t o animate. 1
T h o u g h the i d e n t i t y o f an organism t h r o u g h t i m e does n o t depend

o n its retaining any particular b i t o f material as a part t h r o u g h o u t its
w h o l e history, i t is v e r y closely connected w i t h being animated b y the
same soul t h r o u g h o u t its w h o l e history. A soul persists i n a quite
different w a y and for quite different reasons f r o m an organism. A soul
is simple, w h i l e an organism consists o f an infinite number o f s i m u l
taneous parts; and a soul is ingenerable and incorruptible because o f i t s
internal simplicity. Suppose that a l i v i n g organism is cut u p . T h e n that
part, and o n l y that part, w h i c h continues to be animated b y the soul
w h i c h f o r m e r l y animated the w h o l e , can be said t o be the same organ
ism as that w h o l e . T h e n , again, a soul w h i c h has been animating an
organism never begins t o animate another organism w h i c h is n o t
continuous w i t h the former. T h a t w o u l d i n v o l v e transmigration, w h i c h
Leibniz rejects, instead oftransformation, w h i c h he accepts.
Suppose w e start w i t h a l i v i n g creature o r animal, w h i c h w e w i l l
denote b y A. I t m i g h t , e.g., be a certain cat. I t w i l l consist o f a n organ
ism O together w i t h a soul S w h i c h animates i t . N o w , according to
Leibniz the organism O is itselfan aggregate o f m a n y l i v i n g creatures,
w h i c h w e w i l l denote b y A A , . . ., A , . . . Each o f these, e.g. A ,
lt 2 r r
consists o f an organism O together w i t h a soul S w h i c h animates i t .

r r
This goes o n indefinitely. E.g. O , the organism o f the second-order

r
l i v i n g creature A , is itselfan aggregate o f m a n y l i v i n g creatures, w h i c h

t
1
[ G . , I I , 378.]
w e can denote b y A , A , . . ., A , . . . Each o f these, e.g. A , c o n

n r2 fs n
sists o f an organism O together w i t h a soul S w h i c h animates i t .

rs rs
This hierarchy goes downwards w i t h o u t end. W e m i g h t t h i n k o f А ъ
A2 A , etc. as ceUular animals, p r o v i d e d w e t h i n k o f e a c h cell as

r
animated b y a soul. Each cell w o u l d then be the b o d y o f a ceUular

animal. W e must therefore regard i t as consisting o f ceUular animals
o f a l o w e r order, each w i t h a soul and a b o d y . A n d so o n . This hier
archy does n o t go upwards w i t h o u t end. There is, e.g., n o reason t o
believe that a cat is one o f the animals i n the organism o f some l i v i n g
creature w h i c h stands to i t i n the k i n d o f r e l a t i o n i n w h i c h i t stands to
one o f the cellular animals i n its o w n organism.
The soul w h i c h animates a b o d y perceives or represents primarily
w h a t happens i n that body. B u t the b o d y represents f r o m its o w n stand
p o i n t and i n its o w n w a y everything else i n the universe, and so the soul,
i n representing w h a t happens i n its o w n body, represents indirectly
w h a t is happening everywhere i n the universe. Conversely everything
that happens i n a soul is represented b y modifications o f t h e b o d y w h i c h
it animates. Even i n abstract reasoning the symbols are something
b o d i l y , and they, and our operations w i t h t h e m , represent processes
o f abstract t h i n k i n g i n our souls. T h e tendencies i n the soul towards
n e w thoughts correspond to the tendencies i n the b o d y t o n e w internal
modifications and motions.
As regards the question whether the soul can be said t o be located
i n the b o d y w h i c h i t animates, Leibniz's statements seem somewhat
ambiguous. I n the Letters to de Voider he says that a r u l i n g m o n a d has
'a certain ordered relation o f coexistence to other things, i.e. a certain
k i n d o f p o s i t i o n w i t h i n extension' in consequence of the organism w h i c h
it dominates. B u t he adds that i t is n o t possible t o assign i t t o a point. 1
I n the Letters to des Bosses he reiterates the statement that a soul cannot
be regarded as occupying a geometrical p o i n t . Yet, at another place 2
i n the same series o f letters, he says that, although a simple substance

has no extension, yet ' i t has position, w h i c h is the foundation o f
extension'. Nevertheless, he says i n another letter to des Bosses that
3
monads do n o t have real positions relatively to each other. H e gives

as his reason that 'each is, as i t were, a separate w o r l d ' , and they are
correlated w i t h each other o n l y t h r o u g h the correlation between their
contemporary total states. There is neither nearness n o r remoteness
between monads, and i t is equally meaningless to say o f a monad that
1
[ G . , I I , 253. L o e m k e r , 531.]
2
[ G . , II, 370. L o e m k e r , 598.]
3
[ G . , I I , 339·]
THEORY OF MONADS III
it is confined t o a p o i n t or that i t is spread out i n space. Lastly, I w i l l

1
quote a curious passage f r o m his letter o f 30 A p r i l 1709 to des Bosses:

' I do n o t deny that there is a certain real metaphysical u n i o n between
the soul and the organic b o d y , w h i c h justifies one i n saying that the
soul really is i n the body. B u t , since this cannot be explained f r o m the
phenomena and does n o t make any difference to t h e m , I cannot ex
plain m o r e distinctly i n w h a t i t consists. I t is enough to say that i t is
b o u n d up w i t h the correspondence.' ( I take this to mean the specially
2
intimate correspondence between w h a t goes o n i n a soul and w h a t goes

o n simultaneously i n the b o d y w h i c h i t animates.)
(2) I t h i n k that this is about aU that one can say o f Leibniz's views
about the nature o f organisms and the relation o f animation between
a certain soul and a certain organism, w h e n one talks as i f there really
were bodies. W e must n o w combine i t w i t h his doctrine that there
really are n o bodies, and that w h a t w e misperceive as a b o d y is reaUy a
collection o f v e r y confused minds. T h e complete theory is that there
really are organisms and that every monad reaUy animates an organism,
b u t that an organism is n o t reaUy a b o d y .
T h e theory m i g h t be p u t as follows. Each m o n a d m is associated at
any m o m e n t t w i t h a certain group o f l o w e r monads w h i c h w e can
denote b y g t- I f w e consider t w o moments t and t' i n the history o f
m
m the contents oig,,u and g t' are never exactly the same. I f t and t' are
m
remote f r o m each other g t and g t> m a y contain n o monads i n

m m
c o m m o n . B u t , i f t and t' are v e r y near together, the contents o f g t m
and gmt' w i l l as a rule v e r y considerably overlap. I f t is a m o m e n t

shortly before and t' a m o m e n t shortly after the death o f an ordinary
macroscopic animal, such as a cat, g t' w i l l consist o f a comparatively
m
small selection out oig t. W e call m the dominant or ruling m o n a d o f

m
gmt', w e call g t the organism o f m at i ; and w e say that the monads i n

m
g t are subordinate to m at t. T h e state o f m at t corresponds m o r e

m
closely t o the states o f the monads i n g t than t o the c o n t e m p o r a r y

m
states o f other monads. I t represents the states o f the monads i n g t m
directly. I t represents the contemporary states o f other monads o n l y

indirectly, i n consequence o f the fact that their contemporary states
are represented i n the monads ofgmt- There is some rather close c o n
n e x i o n between the p o i n t o f v i e w o f m at t and the points o f v i e w o f
the monads i n g t. Lastly, g t is a group o f such a k i n d that i t is per
m m
ceived b y m itself and other confused monads as a body. I t is perceived

b y m itself as its own body, p a r t l y ( i n the case o f m e n and the higher
animals) b y sight and t o u c h , b u t m o r e i n t i m a t e l y b y w h a t w e c a l l
1
[ G . , I I , 451. Loemker, 604.] [G., I I , 371. Loemker, 598.]
2
' b o d i l y feeling', 'kinaesthetic sensation', and so o n . I t is perceived

b y other monads only b y sight or touch or something analogous t o
these; so they perceive i t as &foreign b o d y . O w i n g to the special s i m i
larity between the p o i n t o f v i e w o f m and the points o f v i e w o f the
monads i n g t there is a sense i n saying that the soul is located w i t h i n
m
the b o d y w h i c h i t animates. B u t t o say this is at best o n l y phenomen

ally true; and even i n phenomenal terms i t w o u l d be incorrect to say
that the soul is located at a certain geometrical p o i n t i n its b o d y .
I t h i n k that Leibniz w o u l d h o l d that aU the monads i n g t are m o r e
m
confused than its r u l i n g m o n a d m. N o w each m o n a d i n g t also rules

m
an organism ofsubordinate monads, each ofthese rules an organism o f

subordinate monads, and so o n w i t h o u t end. I t w o u l d f o l l o w that there
is n o last t e r m i n the series o f more and more confused monads. I t
w o u l d also f o l l o w that the total number o f monads at each level o f
confusion increases as w e go d o w n the scale.
T h o u g h every m o n a d rules some organism, n o t every m o n a d is
a member o f the organism o f some higher monad. H u m a n souls,
e.g., are certainly n o t members o f the organisms o f higher monads;
eachhuman soul comes at thehead ofa descending hierarchy ofmonads.
So the universe as a w h o l e is n o t an organism. A n d ofcourse there are
m a n y ostensible bodies w h i c h are n o t the appearances o f a n organism.
The group ofmonads, e.g., w h i c h appears as a stone is n o t the organism
o f a n y monad. B u t i t is w h o l l y composed o f l i v i n g creatures, each w i t h
its r u l i n g monad and its organism o f subordinate monads. I t m i g h t
be compared to a swarm o f gnats misperceived as a cloud.
Supposing this, or something like i t , t o be Leibniz's theory, w e can
ask w h a t were his reasons for h o l d i n g i t . As usual he was, I t h i n k , t r y
i n g t o dojustice to a number o f e m p i r i c a l facts consistently w i t h certain
general metaphysical principles, such as the denial o f transeunt causa
tion.
(ι) I t h i n k that the panorganic theory was first introduced i n order
to save the reality o f corporeal substance b y finding intrinsic natural
units i n i t . This introduced, as a consequence, a w h o l e array o f minds
or souls b e l o w the level o f h u m a n or ordinary animal souls, because
Leibniz t h o u g h t that every l i v i n g organism must be animated b y some
t h i n g akin t o a soul.
( 2 ) A t that stage the number o f organisms w o u l d be infinite, and
they w o u l d f o r m a k i n d o f descending hierarchy, for the f o l l o w i n g
reason at any rate. Leibniz held that the existence o f e m p t y volumes
w i t h i n the w o r l d is incompatible w i t h the w i s d o m o f G o d . Therefore
the gaps w i t h i n and between organisms o f any given order must be
THEORY OF MONADS Ii3
occupied b y smaller organisms; the gaps w i t h i n and between these

must be occupied b y still smaller organisms, and so o n w i t h o u t end.
(Cf. Leibniz's illustration o f f i l l i n g spaces w i t h a hierarchy ofspheres.)
This, however, w o u l d n o t explain w h y every organism must itself
be composed of organisms and so o n w i t h o u t end. For i t is plainly one
thing to say that the holes w i t h i n and the gaps between organisms
must always be occupied b y other organisms, and another t h i n g to say
that each organism must itself be composed o f other organisms.
(3) A t a later stage Leibniz became persuaded b y the argument f r o m
endless divisibility that the reality o f corporeal substance could n o t be
saved. N o substance can reaUy be extended, whether i t is an animated
organism or n o t . T h e o n l y genuine substances are unextended and o f
the nature o f m i n d s or souls; and w h a t w e take to be a b o d y must be a
certain k i n d o f coUection o f souls.
(4) I f w e accept this, w e must interpret aU other substances b y ana
l o g y w i t h our o w n souls, for these are the o n l y simple substances w i t h
w h i c h w e are acquainted. N o w i t is an empirical fact that each different
human soul appears t o be uniquely associated w i t h a different h u m a n
body, and the same appears to h o l d for all the higher animals. A h u m a n
soul seems to affect and to be affected b y foreign bodies and other
souls o n l y t h r o u g h the m e d i u m o f its o w n body. A n d its perception
o f t h e rest o f t h e w o r l d seems t o be coloured b y the nature o f t h e p r o
cesses i n its o w n body, and t o be a k i n d o f perspective v i e w w i t h its
o w n b o d y as centre.
Leibniz generalized this to the principle that every different soul must
stand i n this unique k i n d o f relation t o a different l i v i n g body. Since
every simple substance is o f the nature o f a soul, i t follows that every
simple substance must animate something o f t h e nature o f a l i v i n g b o d y .
B u t w h a t w e take t o be a l i v i n g b o d y must itself consist entirely o f
simple substances, and therefore o f t h i n g s o f t h e nature ofsouls. There
fore every m o n a d i n the organism o f a given r u l i n g m o n a d must itself
rule an organism o f subordinate monads, and so o n w i t h o u t end.
(5) W h e n w e say that a h u m a n soul perceives and acts u p o n the
rest o f the w o r l d b y means o f the b o d y w h i c h i t animates, w e are
t h i n k i n g i n terms oftranseunt causation. W e t h i n k , e.g., o f a foreign
body e m i t t i n g l i g h t , o f the l i g h t travelling to a h u m a n b o d y aad
acting o n its retina; o f this setting up a disturbance i n the optic nerve
and eventually i n a part o f the brain; and o f this finally p r o d u c i n g a
colour-sensation i n the soul. B u t , o n Leibniz's general principles, aU
this is o n l y phenomenally true. ReaUy there is no interaction between
the group o f m o n a d s w h i c h I perceive as the sun, e.g., and the group o f
monads w h i c h I perceive as m y body. N o r is there any interaction

between the latter group and m y soul. T h e facts u n d e r l y i n g these
phenomenally true, b u t metaphysically misleading, statements are
facts about the correlation o f c o n t e m p o r a r y states ofmonads i n accord
ance w i t h the Pre-established H a r m o n y . B u t w e must t h i n k o f the
correlation between the state o f m y soul at any m o m e n t and the
contemporary states o f the monads i n m y organism as being v e r y
different i n principle f r o m the correlation o f the latter w i t h the c o n
temporary states o f the monads i n the group w h i c h I perceive as the
sun. For, empirically, there is an enormous difference between the
purely physical transaction w h i c h w e describe as the emission o f l i g h t
f r o m the sun t o m y eye and the consequent disturbance o f m y optic
nerve and brain, and the psycho-physiological transaction w h i c h w e
describe as the p r o d u c t i o n o f a sensation i n m y m i n d b y a disturbance
i n m y brain. This must correspond t o an i m p o r t a n t difference i n the
underlying facts; and that difference must be retained w h e n w e drop
the fiction o f causal transactions and substitute the reality o f repre
sentation i n accordance w i t h the Pre-established H a r m o n y .
8.2 D e a t h a n d b i r t h
W e m i g h t be inclined t o regard Leibniz's doctrine that n o organism

can begin o r cease t o exist i n the course o f nature as an extravagant
fantasy. I do n o t t h i n k that this w o u l d be fair. W e have t o consider i t
i n relation t o the f o l l o w i n g four propositions, ( i ) E v e r y l i v i n g organ
ism is animated b y something o f the nature o f a soul. (2) E v e r y soul
is a simple substance. (3) N 0 simple substance can begin o r cease t o
exist except b y a miracle. (4) Except b y a miracle a soul cannot exist
w i t h o u t an organism.
Take any animal w h i c h n o w exists, e.g. the present T r i n i t y C o m
bination R o o m cat. Since its ostensible b o d y is a l i v i n g organism i t
must be animated b y a soul. Since that soul is a simple substance i t
cannot be destroyed b y any natural process, and therefore n o t b y the
death o f the cat. Г£ then, w e d o n o t assume that G o d miraculously
annihilates i t , i t must persist after the death o f t h e cat. B u t , i f i t persists,
i t must continue t o animate some appropriate organism. Either this is
continuous w i t h the organism o f the cat j u s t before death or i t is n o t .
The latter supposition, w h i c h w o u l d be i n v o l v e d i n the doctrine o f
transmigration, is contrary t o the Principle o f C o n t i n u i t y . So, unless
w e are w i l h n g t o postulate miracles o f one k i n d o r another at the death
o f every animal, w e are practically c o m m i t t e d b y Leibniz's various
THEORY OF MONADS I i 5
premisses to the doctrine that an organism, continuous w i t h the

organism w h i c h existed at the m o m e n t ofdeath, persists after death and
is animated b y the same soul.
Similar remarks apply to the b i r t h o f the cat. Either its soul was
miraculously created at the m o m e n t o f c o n c e p t i o n or i t existed before
hand. I f i t existed beforehand, i t must have animated some k i n d o f
organism beforehand. I f the Principle o f C o n t i n u i t y is t o be observed
this organism must be continuous w i t h that o f the embryonic cat as i t
was just after conception. The empirical fact, at that t i m e recently
observed b y microscopists, that spermatozoa are t i n y l i v i n g creatures,
seemed t o give detailed empirical support t o Leibniz's theory o f c o n
ception and gestation. W e n o w k n o w that, whatever the facts may be,
they must be more complex than Leibniz supposed, since the e m b r y o
arises f r o m the combination o f an o v u m f r o m the female parent and a
spermatozoon f r o m the male parent. I t appears therefore that a n e w
organism arises f r o m the blending o f the t w o pre-existing organisms.
O n Leibniz's principles each o f these w o u l d be animated b y its o w n
soul, and the n e w organism w o u l d be animated b y its o w n soul. I n
theory, I suppose, one m i g h t h o l d either that the soul o f the sperma
tozoon becomes that o f t h e embryo, and that the soul o f t h e o v u m be
comes a subordinate m o n a d i n the organism; or vice versa; or that the
souls o f b o t h become subordinate t o a t h i r d soul. T h e t h i r d alternative
m i g h t lead to difficulties about the Principle o f C o n t i n u i t y . Perhaps an
other possibility w o u l d be to h o l d that o n l y the spermatozoon is an
animated organism, and that the o v u m is just an aggregate o f monads
which,is n o t subordinate to any one r u l i n g monad, m that case the soul
o f t h e e m b r y o w o u l d , as o n Leibniz's theory, be the soul o f t h e sperma
tozoon. Either Leibniz's original theory or this amendment o f i t w o u l d
have difficulty i n accounting for the fact, w h i c h must have been as
obvious to Leibniz as i t is to us, that a child m a y take after its mother
rather than its father i n its mental characteristics.
8.2.1 T h e case o f r a t i o n a l souls
Leibniz remarks i n the Letters to John Bernoulli that his general doctrine
about the souls and the organisms o f l i v i n g creatures b e l o w the h u m a n
level is meant t o leave open the question o f the o r i g i n and destiny o f
rational souls. T h e y differ i n several i m p o r t a n t respects f r o m other
1
monads. Γη particular the fact that they are self-conscious and have
personal m e m o r y and a knowledge o f g o o d and evil and r i g h t and
1
[G. bA.;m, 55!M5i.]
Il6 LEIBNIZ: AN INTRODUCTION
w r o n g makes i t possible for t h e m to be treatedjHSf/y or unjustly. That

question cannot arise i n regard t o animal souls and bare monads. I n the
Systeme nouveau Leibniz says explicitly that no change c o u l d happen
to a spirit w h i c h w o u l d deprive i t o f i t s moral qualities. 1
W e must therefore consider specially w h a t happens at the conception

and the death o f a h u m a n being, m the Letters to Arnauld Leibniz says
that G o d creates rational souls i n the course o f history whenever he
thinks fit. I take this to mean that he creates a rational soul and sub
2
ordinates the embryonic organism to i t whenever a h u m a n being is

conceived. I n the Letters to des Bosses, w h i c h are m u c h later, he wavers
between this and another v i e w . The other alternative is that the souls
o f h u m a n spermatozoa are, b y nature, animal and n o t rational monads.
A t the conception o f a h u m a n being G o d miraculously raises the
one spermatozoon concerned t o the rational level, and leaves the others
as they were. I n his letter o f 30 A p r i l 1709 to des Bosses he mentions
this t h e o r y . H e says that he prefers the theory that G o d creates a
3
rational soul, although he thinks i t u n l i k e l y that G o d creates n e w non-

rational monads i n the course o f h i s t o r y . B u t i n his letter o f 3 1 J u l y 1709
he says that i t seems m o r e f i t t i n g t o suppose that, w h e n a m a n is c o n
ceived, a certain animal soul is miraculously raised t o the level o f a
rational soul than that aU the souls o f h u m a n spermatozoa are r a t i o n a l . 4
For the vastly greater p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e m w i l l never develop i n t o

h u m a n beings.
Thus i t w o u l d seem that the alternatives contemplated b y Leibniz
m a y be classified as follows. (1) T h a t the souls o f h u m a n spermatozoa
are rational, and that the development o f a m a n at conception is
exactly parallel to that o f an animal at conception, the o n l y difference
being that the soul is rational i n one case and merely animal i n the
other. (2) That the souls o f h u m a n spermatozoa are n o t rational b u t are
merely animal. This gives rise t o t w o alternatives, (a) That, at the c o n
ception o f a h u m a n being, G o d miraculously creates a rational soul and
makes i t dominant over the monads w h i c h have been the organism o f
one o f the spermatozoa o f the father, (b) That, at the conception o f a
h u m a n b e i n g , G o d miraculously raises the soul o f t h e one spermatozoon
concerned f r o m the merely animal t o the rational level. Thus b o t h
forms o f the second alternative require a miracle at the conception o f
each human being, t h o u g h i t is a different k i n d o f m i r a c l e i n each o f the
t w o forms.
T h e disadvantage o f alternative (1) is the waste and apparent i n -
1
[ G . , I V , 481. L o e m k e r , 455.] 2
[ G . , I I , 100. M a s o n , 125.]
3
[ G . , I I , 371. L o e m k e r , 598·] . 4
[ G . , I I , 378.]
THEORY OF MONADS I i 7
justice i n v o l v e d i n the existence o f myriads o f rational souls w h i c h

never get a chance to exercise their powers b y d o m i n a t i n g a m a c r o
scopic h u m a n organism. Its advantage is that i t avoids miracles. O n
alternative (2a) there w o u l d seem t o be the f o l l o w i n g difficulty. W h a t
becomes o f t h e animal soul w h i c h dominated the spermatozoon w h i c h
develops i n t o a h u m a n body? Does i t remain and continue to dominate?
I f so, the h u m a n being has t w o souls, one animal w h i c h i t t o o k over
f r o m the spermatozoon, and the other rational and specially created
b y G o d at conception. This is certainly n o t Leibniz's usual v i e w , and i t
w o u l d lead to various a w k w a r d questions about the relations between
the t w o souls. Alternative (2b) avoids this difficulty o f t w o souls. I t
seems o n the w h o l e the best that Leibniz could adopt.
Leibniz says explicitly that the theory k n o w n as Traducianism, i.e.
that the soul o f the child is i n some sense produced b y and f r o m the
souls o f b o t h its parents, is nonsense.
The f o l l o w i n g remarks, aU f r o m the Letters to des Bosses, about the
possibility o f G o d creating monads i n the course o f h i s t o r y , are w o r t h
n o t i n g here. (1) G o d c o u l d at any t i m e create a n e w m o n a d w i t h o u t
having to create a w h o l e l o t ofsubordinate monads t o be its organism. 1
For he could make i t the dominant monad o f some group o f pre

existing monads w h i c h were n o t the organism o f any pre-existing
monad. H e could, e.g., make i t the dominant m o n a d o f a group o f
monads w h i c h had previously appeared as an inorganic body, e.g. a
stone. T h e stone w o u l d then become an animal. I assume that G o d
w o u l d have to rearrange these pre-existing monads v e r y considerably.
A n d one w o u l d have, I suppose, i n addition to the miracle o f a n e w
simple substance being created i n the course o f h i s t o r y , the miracle o f a
new organism being constructed i n the course o f history. (2) T h e cre
ation o f a n e w monad (or indeed o f a n y fmite number o f t h e m ) w o u l d
not, empirically speaking, increase the quantity o f corporeal substance
i n the w o r l d . I t w o u l d , Leibniz says, be 'like adding a p o i n t t o a
l i n e ' . This is obviously correct. A c c o r d i n g to Leibniz, an ostensible
2
body, however small i t m a y appear to be, must be the appearance

o f an infinitely numerous group o f monads. For, otherwise, i t w o u l d
not appear t o be endlessly divisible i n t o smaller adjoined extended parts.
I cannot find any v e r y clear account i n Leibniz o f w h a t happens t o a

h u m a n soul between the death o f its ordinary b o d y and the D a y o f
Judgment. N 0 doubt i t continues t o dominate a small selection o f
monads f r o m the larger group w h i c h constituted its organism just
before death. I suppose that i t remains i n a v e r y confused state u n t i l the
[G., I I , 368.]
1
[ibid.]
2
Il8 LEIBNIZ: AN INTRODUCTION
D a y o f J u d g m e n t ; that its organism then takes i n numbers o f other

monads and w o u l d appear as a h u m a n b o d y o f n o r m a l size; and that
it wakes up, regains its memories, and receives its appropriate r e w a r d
or punishment w h i c h w i l l go o n thenceforth for ever.
There is one fmal remark t o be made about the theory o f the ani
mated organism i n general. I t is almost impossible t o state i t or c o n
ceive i t w i t h o u t assuming the reality o f relations. A n organism seems
to be a group o f monads interrelated i n a v e r y special way. A n d a
r u l i n g monad seems t o be related to the monads i n its organism i n a
very special way. Leibniz w o u l d have t o say that aU these relational
statements are reducible to statements about pure qualities o f the
several monads concerned. B u t I find this v e r y h a r d to accept.
9 A p p a r e n t interaction o f b o d y a n d m i n d
I t w i l l be as w e l l t o consider this p r o b l e m i n its historical setting. As

far as I a m aware, i t d i d n o t exist for the Greeks or for the Scholastics.
I t begins w i t h Descartes.
9.1 ffistorical background ofthe problem
(1) T h e question f o r Descartes m a y be p u t as f o l l o w s : 'Granted that a

h u m a n m i n d and the b o d y w h i c h i t animates are substances o f different
kinds interrelated i n a peculiarly intimate w a y , h o w can events i n the
one produce or m o d i f y events i n the other?' Descartes t h o u g h t that the
occurrence o f r a t i o n a l speech and intelligent action proves conclusively
that certain events i n a person's m i n d do affect the movements o f his
b o d i l y organs, and that the occurrence o f o r g a n i c sensations, emotions,
and images proves conclusively that certain events i n a person's b o d y
do affect the experiences o f his m i n d .
The difficulty for h i m was t w o - f o l d , (a) I t was difficult to see h o w
an unextended mental substance, w h i c h had n o fundamental property
except cognition, and an u n t h i n k i n g material substance, w h i c h had
n o fundamental property b u t extension, could ever come to grips
w i t h each other, (b) I f the m i n d affected the movements o f the
b o d y i t w o u l d add to the amount o f m o t i o n i n the w o r l d . B u t
Descartes thought he could prove f r o m the perfection o f G o d that
i n aU the changes o f bodies the same aggregate quantity o f m o t i o n is
conserved.
Descartes's solution was to say that interaction between m i n d and
b o d y takes place only i n h u m a n beings; that i n t h e m i t takes place o n l y
I
THEORY OF MONADS IIO
at one p o i n t , viz. the pineal gland; and that even there i t produces o n l y
a change i n the direction o f pre-existing m o t i o n w i t h o u t changing its
total quantity. I t acts as the points o n a r a i l w a y influence the direction
o f a train b y deflecting i t f r o m one line to another.
( 2 ) This solution gave little satisfaction. T h e next attempt was made
b y the Occasionalists, w h o were nearly all i n the m a i n disciples o f
Descartes, (a) T h e crudest f o r m o f Occasionalism is as follows. A
person's m i n d and his b o d y are t w o substances, b u t they cannot act
o n each other. God, being omnipotent, can act o n b o t h ; and, being
omniscient, he is aware o f a n y event that takes place i n either. Suppose
that at a certain m o m e n t a v o l i t i o n to m o v e his a r m i n a certain w a y
arises i n a certain man's m i n d . G o d notices this. A n d , i n general, o n
such occasions he deliberately causes that man's a r m to m o v e i n accord
ance w i t h his v o l i t i o n . T h e apparent causation o f a painful sensation
i n a man's m i n d b y a p i n p u n c t u r i n g his skin w o u l d be explained i n a
similar w a y . G o d notices that the p i n is entering the skin, and as a rule
he thereupon produces a painful sensation i n the man's m i n d , (b) A
m u c h less crude f o r m o f Occasionalism was reached b y Malebranche,
t h r o u g h developing certain aspects o f Descartes's theory o f created
substance. Descartes held that any fmite substance needs, n o t o n i y t o
be created i n the first instance b y God, b u t also to be continually re
created i n order t o keep i t going f r o m m o m e n t t o m o m e n t . Malebranche
t h o u g h t that this makes each finite substance i n t o a mere series o f
occurrents, each o f w h i c h is directly and w h o l l y due to God, and none
o f w h i c h is a state o f any continuant. W e say that a certain finite sub
stance has persisted unchanged, or has altered i n a certain way, or has
ceased t o exist, according t o h o w G o d chooses t o act f r o m m o m e n t t o
m o m e n t i n creating n e w occurrents. O n this v i e w there is n o real
interaction between any finite substance and any other. There is n o t
even immanent causation between the successive states o f the same
finite substance. These are merely rules w h i c h G o d generally follows.
I f h e continues a certain series i n a certain w a y , he generally continues
adjacent series i n certain other correlated ways. So w e say that a certain
event i n one substance causes certain other events i n adjacent sub
stances i n accordance w i t h a certain l a w .
(3) I t w i l l be seen that w i t h Malebranche the p r o b l e m has widened

o u t f r o m being a departmental p r o b l e m o f h o w a m i n d interacts w i t h
the b o d y w h i c h i t animates t o being a general p r o b l e m o f h o w any
finite substance interacts w i t h any other. T h e next attempt at solution
comes f r o m Spinoza. H e accepted Malebranche's conclusion that
the soKalled 'finite substances' o f c o m m o n sense are n o t genuine
continuants. According to h i m there can be one and o n l y one genuine

continuant. H e applied this reasoning equally to minds and to bodies.
B u t (a) he objected altogether to ascribing v o l i t i o n and deliberate
action to God. (b) H e thought i t self-evident that every occurrent
must inhere i n some continuant, (c) He d i d n o t t h i n k that there is any
incompatibility between an event or process being mental and its being
material. O n the contrary, he seems to have held that anything w h i c h
had either o f these properties w o u l d necessarily have both.
H e therefore t o o k the f o l l o w i n g v i e w . There is one and o n l y one
continuant, viz. God. This is b o t h mental and material; but i t is neither
a m i n d n o r a body. Every so-called 'finite substance' is a more or less
continuous and coherent series o f occurrents i n the one continuant. Its
u n i t y and persistence and self-identity are like those o f a wave or a
shadow. A p a r t f r o m these differences, Spinoza's theory o f t h e causation
o f o n e finite mode b y another is n o t unlike Malebranche's occasional
ism, except that i t aU happens necessarily and automatically and is n o t
the result o f v o l i t i o n o n God's part. W h e n one fmite substance seems
to produce or m o d i f y or destroy another b y its o w n power, that is an
illusion. The fact is that so m u c h o f the total energy o f God ceases t o
be manifested i n a certain w a y at a certain place and t i m e , and i t begins
to be manifested i n a certain other w a y or i t becomes f o r a t i m e latent.
The sort o f occasions o n w h i c h this happens can be b r o u g h t under
rules, and these are the causal laws o f nature.
As t o the particular p r o b l e m o f the apparent interaction between a
m i n d and the b o d y w h i c h i t animates, this has entirely altered for
Spinoza. The m i n d and the b o d y o f a m a n or an animal are n o t t w o
substances, for they are n o t substances at aU and they are n o t even two
occurrents. The m a n or animal is a mode or occurrent i n the one sub
stance God, and every mode necessarily has b o t h b o d i l y and mental
characteristics exactly correlated w i t h each other. For any b o d i l y fact
about the m o d e J o h n S m i t h there is a corresponding mental fact about
h i m , and vice versa. W h a t w e call 'John Smith's m i n d ' is simply J o h n
Smith, considered as the subject o f mental facts, w i t h o u t reference t o
the correlated b o d i l y facts. W h a t w e call 'John Smith's b o d y ' is simply
John Smith, considered as the subject o f b o d i l y facts, w i t h o u t reference
t o the correlated mental facts. I t becomes nonsensical to talk o f i n t e r
action here, for interaction implies t w o terms; and here there is o n l y a
single t e r m , considered under t w o different, b u t precisely correlated,
abstract headings.
There is one other characteristic doctrine o f Spinoza's t o be m e n
tioned. Suppose that at a certain m o m e n t an individual A has an
THEORY OF M O N A D S 121
experience w h i c h w e w i l l denote b y εψ, and that the b o d i l y correlate

o f t h i s is an event i n his b r a i n w h i c h w e w i l l denote b y еф. Then, as w e
have said, еф and еф are just one and the same psycho-physical event
еуф, considered respectively i n its purely mental and its purely b o d i l y
aspects. B u t w e must n o w add that Spinoza holds a v e r y peculiar v i e w
as to the nature o f t h e correlation between the t w o aspects o f t h e single
event е^ф. H e holds that ецф, considered i n its purely mental aspect
ίψ, is a state o f confused b u t direct acquaintance w i t h itself considered
i n its purely b o d i l y aspect еф. Thus e.g., t o have a colour-sensation is t o
be acquainted i n a confused w a y w i t h that event i n one's brain w h i c h
is the b o d i l y correlate o f the experience.
9.2 L e i b n i z ' s s o l u t i o n
W e come n o w t o Leibniz. H e was ofcourse fuUy aware o f t h e develop

ments i n the controversy since Descartes's t i m e , and he p u t f o r w a r d his
o w n theories i n v i e w o f t h e suggestions ofDescartes, Malebranche, and
Spinoza.
As regards Descartes he points o u t that the suggestion that the soul
can change the direction o f p r e e x i s t i n g motions i n the body, b u t can
n o t add to the quantity o f m o t i o n i n the w o r l d , does n o t meet the real
difficulty. B y 'quantity o f m o t i o n ' Descartes meant the product o f t h e
mass o f a b o d y b y its velocity taken w i t h o u t regard t o direction or
sign. H e was mistaken i n t h i n k i n g that the sum-total o f this is con
served i n all dynamical transactions. B u t Leibniz substituted for the
false principle o f the Conservation of Motion the true principle o f Con
servation of Momentum. T h e m o m e n t u m o f a b o d y i n a given direction
i n a given straight line is defined as the product o f i t s mass b y the c o m
ponent o f its velocity i n that direction along that line. Thus m o m e n
t u m m a y be positive or negative according to the angle w h i c h the
direction o f a body's m o t i o n makes w i t h the assigned direction.
Leibniz recognized the fact that the total m o m e n t u m o f all the bodies
i n the w o r l d i n any direction (when account is taken o f sign) is c o n
stant. N o w , i f the soul were t o alter the direction o f the p r e e x i s t i n g
motions even w i t h o u t altering the magnitude o f the velocities, w e
should have a conflict w i t h the Conservation o f M o m e n t u m .
As regards Malebranche and the other Occasionalists Leibniz t o o k
the f o l l o w i n g line. T h e y are r i g h t i n saying that finite substances do
n o t interact, and that every created substance is, i n a sense, continually
produced b y God. B u t w e ought n o t to be content w i t h this. Occasion
alism w o u l d involve continual miracles o n the most t r i v i a l occasions,
because i t requires a special action o f G o d o n each particular occasion,

instead o f a general reference t o the natures w h i c h G o d gave t o created
things at the beginning and w h i c h he has maintained ever since i n
them. G o d acts i n general o n l y b y natural means. H e puts i n t o each
t h i n g that he creates the principle o f its subsequent changes and the
activity or energy required to carry out those changes i n accordance
w i t h the principle.
As regards Spinoza, Leibniz held, for reasons w h i c h w e have already
considered, that there is a p l u r a l i t y o f finite substances, and that there
is no reason t o h o l d that w h a t w e take t o be finite substances are all
occurrents i n a single continuant. A g a i n , he could n o t p u t the b o d i l y
and the mental aspects o f the w o r l d o n a level. N o t h i n g could have
certain o f the features, e.g. endless divisibility, w h i c h bodies appear t o
have and w h i c h are part o f the n o t i o n o f a body. W h a t w e take to be
bodies are really certain collections o f l o w - g r a d e minds w h i c h w e mis
perceive as bodies because w e are ourselves rather confused.
The difficulty w h i c h Descartes felt about the interaction o f soul and
body, viz. that they are so u t t e r l y unlike i n nature, does n o t exist for
Leibniz. N o r does the difficulty w h i c h Spinoza felt, viz. that soul and
b o d y are n o t t w o terms b u t are one and the same t e r m considered
under t w o different abstract headings. For Leibniz the r u l i n g m o n a d
is one substance, and the monads w h i c h together constitute its organ
ism are different substances o f the same general character as itself (viz.
minds), t h o u g h o f a l o w e r order ofclearness and intelligence. N e v e r
theless, Leibniz d i d i n fact deny the possibility o f interaction between
any t w o finite substances, and he explained the appearance o f such
interaction b y the hypothesis o f Pre-established Harmony. W e have
already dealt w i t h his views o n these general questions, and i t remains
o n l y to see h o w he applied the general principles to the particular case
o f a r u l i n g monad and its organism.
A l l that remains o f t h e o l d p r o b l e m is this: ' W h a t is reaUy happening
i n the r u l i n g m o n a d and i n the monads o f its organism w h e n w e say
that a person's m i n d v o l u n t a r i l y produces a certain movement o f his
b o d y or that an event i n his b o d y produces a certain sensation i n his
mind?' Suppose, e.g., that I w i l l to move m y a r m i n a certain w a y and
that i t thereupon moves as I wish. M y present v o l i t i o n must be caused
entirely b y something i n the previous state o f m y soul. Its effects must
consist entirely i n certain later changes i n m y soul. E.g. the cause m i g h t
be a feeling o f discomfort and a belief that i t w o u l d be advantageous
to me to have m y a r m i n the proposed n e w position. N o w consider
the same incident f r o m the standpoint o f m y a r m . W h a t I perceive as
I
THEORY OF MONADS 123
my a r m is i n fact a certain set o f confused monads h a v i n g a certain

range o f points o f v i e w . W h a t I perceive as a m o t i o n o f m y a r m is a
change i n the points o f v i e w o f aU these monads. N o w the change i n
the p o i n t o f v i e w o f each o f the arm-monads must i n fact be caused
b y some previous change i n i t . T h e process d o f deliberation i n m y
m i n d corresponds t o contemporary change S 1( S , · • · h i each o f the
2
subordinate monads m lt m , • • • o f m y organism. T h e change S, i n

2
mx causes its point o f v i e w t o change f r o m π ton[; 1 the change δ i n

2
m 2 causes its point o f v i e w t o change & о т т с 2 ί ο π ; and so o n f o r the

2
rest. M e a n w h i l e the process d i n m y m i n d causes m y perception o f

t h e m as m y a r m at position p t o change t o m y perception o f t h e m as
m y a r m at p o s i t i o n p ' . Thus, in my mindUit conative process d leads b y
purely i m m a n e n t causation t o this change i n m y perceptions.
Ln the arm-monads the corresponding simultaneous processes S l5
S ,. . . lead t o the changes i n their points o f v i e w w h i c h I perceive. A n d

2
b y the Pre-established H a r m o n y δ 1 ; δ , . . . correspond to d; and the

2
changes7Tj^7ri,Tt2^>4r2, etc., correspond t o the change f r o m m y per

1
ceiving the monads as m y a r m at position p t o m y perceiving t h e m

as m y a r m at position p'. T h e opposite case o f a p i n - p r i c k seeming
to produce a painful sensation w o u l d be dealt w i t h i n a similar
way.
Sometimes w e say that a person is 'active' i n a certain transaction,
e.g. w h e n a m a n t h r o w s a stone. Sometimes w e say that he is passive,
e.g. w h e n a stone hits a m a n and hurts h i m . Leibniz has t o give an
account o f the facts u n d e r l y i n g such statements w h i c h shall be con
sistent w i t h his v i e w that i n neither case is there any interaction between
one substance and another. H i s solution is as follows. Suppose that a
stone hits m e and that this event is i m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w e d b y m y
h a v i n g a painful sensation. T h e occurrence o f that sensation at that
t i m e must be w h o l l y due t o something i n the previous state o f m y o w n
m i n d . B u t I certainly cannot detect this past event i n m y m i n d either
b y introspection or retrospection. Therefore i t must have been a v e r y
confused perception i n me. Leibniz suggests that I a m said t o be 'pas
sive' i n any change w h e n a distinct and noticeable change i n m y m i n d
is caused b y some factor i n its previous state w h i c h was t o o faint or
confused f o r m e t o be able t o detect and discriminate b y m e m o r y
or introspection. Suppose, o n the other hand, that I deliberately t h r o w
a stone. A l l that I reaUy accomplish b y m y v o l u n t a r y effort is t o p r o
duce a change i n m y o w n perceptions; the changes i n the monads w h i c h
I perceive as the stone are caused b y their o w n past states. B u t i n this
1
[I.e. the changes f r o m π t o π'
χ ν from π 2 to π^, etc.]
case the cause o f t h e change i n m y o w n perceptions is something w h i c h

I can introspect and discriminate, viz. m y v o l u n t a r y effort. I n such
cases I a m said to be 'active'.
The f o l l o w i n g quotations w i l l make Leibniz's position clear. ' A t
the m o m e n t w h e n the soul wills a b o d i l y movement the organized
mass w h i c h i t animates is ready t o act accordingly o f itself i n notice o f
the laws o f mechanics' (Systeme nouveau). ' B o d y and soul are so
1
adapted that a resolution i n the soul is accompanied b y an appropriate

movement i n the body. . . E v e r y t h i n g that goes o n i n the b o d y is as i f
Hobbes and the Epicureans were r i g h t i n h o l d i n g that the soul is
material or that there is no soul and a m a n is merely an automatic
machine.' B u t philosophical considerations, such as the arguments
about endless divisibility, the arguments f r o m the nature o f force i n
mechanics, the Predicate-in-Notion Principle, the denial o f causal
interaction, etc., show that materialism is neither adequate nor defen
sible i f t a k e n literally as a complete philosophical theory (Second Answer
to Bayle). 'The tendencies o f t h e soul towards new thoughts correspond
2
to the tendencies o f t h e b o d y towards n e w shapes and motions. As these

new motions are capable o f causing the b o d y t o pass f r o m order to dis
order, so their representations i n the soul are capable o f causing i t t o
pass itompleasure topain (Comments on the article Rorarius). 'Whatevei s
happens i n the b o d y i n accordance w i t h the laws o f mechanics is

expressed i n the soul according t o its o w n laws' (Letters to de Voider). 4,
i o T h e V i n c u l u m Substantiale
Before leaving Leibniz's theory o f monads w e must say something

about a suggestion w h i c h he t h r o w s o u t i n the Letters to des Bosses
(1706-16). Γη estimating the w e i g h t to be attached to this suggestion
i t is i m p o r t a n t to remember the context i n w h i c h Leibniz p u t i t f o r
w a r d . Des Bosses was a Jesuit theologian, and Leibniz was anxious t o
show that the theory o f monads could be reconciled w i t h the R o m a n
Catholic doctrine o f transubstantiation. I t is i n this connexion that
Leibniz puts f o r w a r d the theory o f the Vinculum Substantiale. So far
as I can see, he never says that he himself holds this theory. H e says
that i t w o u l d be consistent w i t h the theory o f monads and that i t
w o u l d give the R o m a n Catholics aU that they could possibly demand
i n c o n n e x i o n w i t h transubstantiation. I t appears t o m e thatLeibniz h i m -
selfholds that the theory that ostensibly material things are phenomena
1
[G., I V , 4 8 4 . L o e m k e r , 4 5 8 . ] 2
[G., I V , 559. L o e m k e r , 5 7 7 . ]
« [G., I V , 545-1 4
[G., I I , 2 0 5 - 6 . ]
bene fundata gives all that the R o m a n Catholics ought to demand.

I t w i l l he w e l l to begin b y stating the R o m a n Catholic doctrine o f
transubstantiation. So far as I can understand i t , i t is as follows. W h e n
the priest consecrates the bread and w i n e b o t h the stuff and the f o r m
o f those substances are abolished and they are replaced respectively b y
the s t u f f a n d the f o r m o f t h e b o d y and the b l o o d o f Christ. B u t b o t h
the sensible and the dispositional properties o f the bread and the w i n e
continue to exist. E.g. the colour and smell o f t h e w i n e and its chemical
and physical properties remain. I t is n o t a mere delusive appearance,
b u t a fact independent o f the observer, that these qualities and dis
positional properties are still locally present. B u t , o n the other hand,
these accidents exist, after the consecration, i n a quite peculiar w a y
t h r o u g h the miraculous action o f God. T h e y n o longer qualify any
substance. St Thomas holds that the region f o r m e r l y occupied b y the
bread and w i n e receives f r o m G o d the p o w e r t o act as the quasi-
subject o f the qualities and dispositions w h i c h f o r m e r l y inhered i n the
substance o f the bread and the w i n e .
N o w Leibniz gives the f o l l o w i n g account o f transubstantiation i n
terms o f his o w n theory that w h a t w e perceive as a b o d y is i n fact an
aggregate o f unextended mental substances. Suppose that a certain
aggregate o f monads appears as a red body. Consider the scientific
statement that the appearance o f redness i n o r d i n a r y l i g h t depends
u p o n a certain k i n d o f m i n u t e structure s i n the surface o f the body.
Really the aggregate o f monads w h i c h appears as a red b o d y n o more
has this m i n u t e structure s than i t has a red colour. For i t is n o t really
extended, and so i t has n o spatial structure. Y e t i n some sense the
scientific statement is true. Leibniz's solution is as follows. W e con
sciously perceive this aggregate o f monads as a red body, and at the
same t i m e w e unconsciously perceive i t as having the m i n u t e structure
s. B o t h this conscious perception and these unconscious perceptions
are i n part delusive. B u t i t is a fact that our conscious misperception
o f this aggregate o f monads as a red b o d y depends causally u p o n our
unconscious misperceptions o f i t as a b o d y h a v i n g the minute structure s.
I f w e unconsciously misperceived a certain aggregate o f monads as a
b o d y w i t h a certain other m i n u t e structure 5' w e should consciously
misperceive i t as a blue body. A n d so o n . Consider n o w the statement
' G o d has made this red b o d y blue, b u t has preserved the accident o f
redness.' The phenomenalist interpretation o f t h i s w o u l d be as follows.
' G o d has so changed this aggregate o f monads that anyone w h o per
ceives i t w i l l unconsciously misperceive i t as a b o d y w i t h the minute
structure 5' instead o f a b o d y w i t h the m i n u t e structure s. B u t he has
miraculously arranged that everyone shall continue consciously to

misperceive i t as red, although n o r m a l l y an aggregate w h i c h is u n
consciously misperceived as a b o d y o f the structure s' is consciously
misperceived as a blue body.' N o w apply this to the bread w h i c h has
been consecrated. The monads are so changed that everyone u n
consciously misperceives t h e m i n the w a y w h i c h w o u l d n o r m a l l y give
rise to a conscious misperception o f t h e m as a l u m p o f Christ's flesh.
B u t , o w i n g to God's further miraculous intervention, w e all continue
to misperceive t h e m consciously as a wafer o f bread.
N o w this solution was n o t satisfactory t o the R o m a n Catholics.
T h e y wanted something less phenomenalistic. I t was i n order to meet
this requirement and yet keep the theory o f m o n a d s that Leibniz t h r e w
out the suggestion o f the Vinculum Substantiale.
I do n o t pretend to understand the doctrine o f the Vinculum Sub
stantiale i n detail, b u t the f o l l o w i n g is pretty certainly a correct account,
so far as i t goes, o f Leibniz's various statements.
( 1 ) Leibniz's n o r m a l v i e w , apart f r o m the Vinculum Substantiale
theory, is that the o n l y genuine substances are simple substances, i.e.
monads. There are n o such things as composite substances. There are
aggregates o f simple substances, and w e perceive some o f these as
bodies, i.e. as composite substances; b u t this is a misperception. H e
even goes further than this i n the letter t o des Bosses 0 f 2 9 M a y 1716.
H e says there that an aggregate is a mere phenomenon. A n d he gives
as his reason that everything i n i t except the monads is added b y the
m i n d o f t h e percipient w h o perceives t h e m t o g e t h e r . 1 t h i n k that this
1
is a more extreme v i e w than he generally takes. I t h i n k that he usually

talks as i f a n organism really were an aggregate ofmonads, interrelated
i n a certain characteristic w a y , and as i f our misperception consisted
o n l y i n perceiving such an aggregate as a body. B u t , i f w e take the
denial ofrelations seriously, w e should n o doubt be forced t o the more
extreme v i e w that there are n o genuine aggregates.
(2) The Vinculum Substantiale theory is intended t o a l l o w f o r the
existence o f genuine composite substances, independent o f an observer
and his perceptions. H e says repeatedly that the Vinculum Substantiale
is something w h i c h 'reifies' or 'substantializes' phenomena; w h i c h
'allows us to assign reality t o phenomena outside perception'. W h e t h e r
there is a Vinculum Substantiale or n o t , certain aggregates o f monads
appear to us as extended, massive, movable, composite substances. I f
there is no Vinculum Substantiale, they only appear to be such to minds
like ours. I f there is a Vinculum Substantiale, there is something c o n -
1 [ G . , U , 517.]
nected w i t h such an aggregate o f monads, w h i c h reaUy is extended,

massive, movable, etc., whether w e perceive i t o r n o t .
(3) Leibniz says that the o n l y ostensibly corporeal substances i n
connexion w i t h w h i c h i t is plausible t o postulate a Vinculum Substantiale
are the bodies o f l i v i n g men o r animals. I n terms o f his general t h e o r y
o f organisms this implies that i t is o n l y where y o u have a dominant
m o n a d and an organism o f subordinate monads tha\ i t is plausible t o
suppose that there is a Vinculum Substantiale, w h i c h combines these
subordinate monads into a genuine corporeal substance independent
o f the observer and his perceptions. H o w he reconciles this w i t h his
application o f the theory t o the bread and w i n e i n the eucharist I do
n o t understand.
( 4 ) H e says that the Vinculum Substantiale unifies the materiae primae
o f t h e various monads i n an organism, and thus gives rise t o the materia
prima o f a l i v i n g b o d y . I t also unifies the entelechies o f the various
monads, and thus gives rise t o the entelechy o f that l i v i n g b o d y . This
entelechy must be distinguished f r o m the soul o f the m a n o r animal.
T h e soul is the dominant monad, and is a simple immaterial substance.
T h e entelechy o f the body, w h i c h arises f r o m the unification b y the
Vinculum Substantiale o f the entelechies o f the various monads i n the
organism, is i n perpetual flux. For monads are constantly entering
and leaving the organism. T h e soul o r dominant monad, and the
entelechy o f t h e b o d y w h i c h that soul animates, together constitute the
substantial form o f the i n d i v i d u a l m a n o r animal.
(5) Leibniz, as w e k n o w , held that every l i v i n g organism is, i n a
sense, ingenerable and incorruptible i n the ordinary course o f nature.
For every organism is animated b y a soul; every soul exists t h r o u g h o u t
the w h o l e course o f h i s t o r y and at every m o m e n t animates an organ
ism; and, although the organism animated b y a soul is never identical
i n content at any t w o moments, yet there is never complete dis
c o n t i n u i t y i n its content even at crises such as conception and death. H e
concluded f r o m this that, i f t h e r e is a Vinculum Substantiale w h i c h u n i
fies the monads i n an organism, i t t o o must be ingenerable and i n
corruptible i n the ordinary course o f nature.
(6) Leibniz makes the f o l l o w i n g statements about the relation be
tween a Vinculum Substantiale and the monads w h i c h i t unifies, (a) H e
insists that, w h e n a set o f monads is unified b y a Vinculum Substantiale
i n t o a genuine composite substance, the monads are n o t ingredients i n
the Vinculum o r i n the composite substance thus f o r m e d . T h e monads
are physically, b u t n o t metaphysically, requisite t o the Vinculum Sub
stantiale w h i c h unifies t h e m . I t could exist w i t h o u t u n i f y i n g them, and
they could exist w i t h o u t being unified b y i t . (b) H e means something

m u c h more radical b y this than the tame proposition that the same
Vinculum Substantiale need not u n i f y precisely the same monads at aU
moments. I n his letter to des Bosses o f 29 M a y 1716 he says that a
Vinculum Substantiale is 'naturally, but not essentially' a unifier o f
monads. I t can exist w i t h o u t u n i f y i n g monads. I n the ordinary course
1
o f nature G o d does n o t create a Vinculum Substantiale apart f r o m a set

o f monads for i t to u n i f y ; but there is n o logical or metaphysical
necessity for i t to be actually u n i f y i n g a set o f monads. Γη the letter o f
20 September 1712 he says that a Vinculum Substantiale w h i c h has been
u n i f y i n g certain monads can be transferred b y G o d t o others, thus
unifying the latter w i t h a genuine composite substance and leaving the
former ununified and o n l y apparently a substance. Another possibility 2
is that a certain Vinculum Substantiale, w h i c h already unifies a certain

set o f m o n a d s i n the ordinary course o f n a t u r e , m a y continue to do so
but may also begin miraculously t o u n i f y a certain other set ofmonads.
(c) W h e n a composite substance is constituted out o f a n aggregate o f
monads b y means o f a Vinculum Substantiale, the Vinculum is neither a
modification o f these monads severally n o r a relation between t h e m
collectively. Conversely, the monads w h i c h are unified b y a Vinculum
Substantiale are not accidents o f that Vinculum. B u t i t is an accident o f
the Vinculum that i t unifies those particular monads at that m o m e n t
(letter o f 5 February 1712). (d) A l l the modifications w h i c h occur
3
naturally i n a composite substance result f r o m the modifications i n the

monads w h i c h are unified b y a Vinculum Substantiale to f o r m that sub
stance. B u t G o d can b y a miracle give to a Vinculum Substantiale, and
to the composite substance w h i c h i t produces, certain modifications
w h i c h do not arise f r o m and correspond to modifications i n the monads.
He can also miraculously deprive a Vinculum Substantiale, and the
composite substances w h i c h i t generates, ofcertain modifications w h i c h
w o u l d naturally arise f r o m the modifications o f the monads (letter o f
29 A p r i l 1715).4
These are the m a i n points i n Leibniz's doctrine o f the Vinculum

Substantiale. So far as I can understand, the application t o the doctrine
o f transubstantiation is as follows. Before the priest has consecrated the
bread i t is a genuine substance consisting o f a certain aggregate o f
monads unified b y a certain Vinculum Substantiale. ( I do not see h o w
1
[ G . , I I , 516.]
2
[ G . , I I , 458. L o e m k e r , 606.]
3
[G., II, 435-6. Loemker, 600-1.]
4
[G., II, 495-6. Loemker, 6 i o - n . ]
this can be reconciled w i t h his statement that o n l y l i v i n g organisms are

genuine composite substances.) A t the m o m e n t o f consecration this
Vinculum Substantiale is miraculously destroyed, and the Vinculum
w h i c h unifies the monads o f Christ's b o d y is substituted f o r i t . B u t
the monads, w h i c h were f o r m e r l y unified b y the Vinculum w h i c h has
n o w been destroyed, remain otherwise unchanged. So w e continue t o
perceive t h e m , b o t h consciously and unconsciously, as a corporeal sub
stance having aU the characteristic sensible and structural and disposi
tional properties o f a b i t o f bread.
So m u c h f o r the doctrine o f the Vinculum Substantiale. I have tried
to state i t as clearly as I can; b u t I must confess that the various state
ments call up n o clear positive idea i n my m i n d o f w h a t Leibniz m a y
have had i n his m i n d .
I
5
PSYCHOLOGY A N D THEORY
OF K N O W L E D G E
Leibniz brings out his o w n views o n the nature o f the m i n d and its
activities largely i n the course o f criticizing Descartes and L o c k e . 1
Probably his most i m p o r t a n t and characteristic psychological doctrine

is his assertion that there are 'unconscious perceptions' and his dis
tinction between 'perception' and 'apperception'. H e based his criticism
on Locke and Descartes and his o w n positive psychological theories
v e r y largely o n this. So w e w i l l begin w i t h i t .
I C o n s c i o u s a n d unconscious experiences
Leibniz used the w o r d 'perception' i n a very w i d e sense. I t w i l l do n o

h a r m i f f o r the present w e substitute the w o r d 'experience' f o r i t .
Instances o f experiences are feeling toothache, feeling frightened o f a
snake, feeling a desire f o r one's dinner, seeing a chair, ostensibly seeing
a ghost, dreaming o f falling o f f a roof, and so o n .
i . i A r e unconscious experiences possible?
N o w I t h i n k that the question about the possibility and the actuality o f

unconscious experiences m a y best be approached as follows. Some
times, i f y o u ask a person whether he is having an experience o f a
certain k i n d w h i c h y o u describe, he w i l l answer 'Yes' w i t h o u t any pre
l i m i n a r y effort o f introspective attention and w i t h complete c o n
viction. T h a t w o u l d be the case, e.g., i f y o u were to ask me: ' A r e y o u
n o w seeing a b i t o f paper w i t h w r i t i n g i n y o u r o w n hand u p o n it?'
Sometimes, i f y o u p u t a similar question to a person, he w i l l answer
' N o ' w i t h o u t any preliminary effort ofintrospective attention and w i t h
complete conviction. T h a t w o u l d be the case, e.g., i f y o u were n o w
to ask me: ' A r e y o u n o w hearing a bugle-call?' Sometimes a person
hesitates about saying 'Yes' or ' N o ' , and returns a qualified answer;
1
[See especiaUy t h e New Essays, Preface a n d B o o k s I a n d I I . G . , V , 3 9 - 2 5 0 .
Langley, 41-284.]
PSYCHOLOGY AND THEORY OF K N O W L E D G E i3i
but some such hesitations and qualifications are irrelevant t o the

question o f unconscious experiences. E.g. y o u m i g h t say to a person:
' D o y o u see a m a n over there?' and he m i g h t hesitate to say either
'Yes' or ' N o ' because he was n o t sure whether w h a t he saw was a m a n
or a scarecrow. H e m i g h t still say w i t h o u t hesitation: ' I see something
that looks like a man, b u t I may be mistaken i n t h i n k i n g i t to be a m a n . '
A g a i n , suppose that a person were i n a feverish state w i t h periods o f
d e l i r i u m and periods o f n o r m a l consciousness, and that he was aware
o f t h e fact. I f y o u said t o h i m : ' D o y o u see a m a n over there?', he m i g h t
hesitate to say 'Yes' or ' N o ' , simply because he was n o t sure whether
the w o r d 'see' is appropriate to describe his visual or quasi-visual
experience. He m i g h t still say w i t h o u t hesitation: ' I seem to see a man,
but this m a y be an hallucinatory visual experience, and I may n o t
really be seeing a m a n or any other physical object.'
N o w there are other cases where a person, w h e n asked such a ques
t i o n , w o u l d hesitate and begin t o p e r f o r m a process o f introspective
attention before attempting t o say 'Yes' or ' N o ' . Suppose I were
sitting i n a r o o m w i t h another person and he suddenly said to me: ' D o
y o u smell gas?' I should probably n o t be prepared t o answer either
'Yes' or ' N o ' offhand. I f I k n e w h i m to be a n o r m a l sensible person I
should assume that there was a m o t i v e f o r his question and that he at
any rate was having an olfactory experience w h i c h suggested t o h i m
that there was an escape o f gas. I m i g h t have been attending t o other
matters, and I should n o w start sniffing and attending specially t o m y
sensations o f smell. After d o i n g so I m i g h t either say 'Yes' w i t h c o n
v i c t i o n or ' N o ' w i t h conviction or ' I a m n o t quite sure whether I do
or do n o t . ' A n d here the doubt w o u l d be, n o t as t o whether an ex
perience o f s m e l l w h i c h I certainly have is really due t o the presence o f
gas, b u t as to whether I a m or a m n o t having an experience w h i c h
m i g h t be described as 'smelling a gas-like smell'. Suppose that, w h e n I
do start sniffing and specially attending t o m y sensations o f smell, I a m
able to say w i t h o u t hesitation: 'Yes, I a m smelling a gas-like smell',
this does n o t i n itself settle the question whether I was having such an
experience at the t i m e w h e n the question was asked, i.e. just before I
began to sniff and t o attend selectively. I t is obviously possible that
these processes may have been necessary conditions for p r o d u c i n g i n
m e an experience w h i c h I was n o t having before.
I t h i u k that the question o f t h e possibility ofunconscious experiences

may n o w be p u t as follows. Is i t intelligible to say o f a person: ' C is
having an experience o f such-and-such a k i n d at the m o m e n t i ' , i f
aU the f o l l o w i n g conditions are fulfilled? ( i ) The phrase 'having an
experience o f such-and-such a k i n d ' is used i n precisely the same sense

i n w h i c h i t is used w h e n a person w h o is asked whether he is having an
experience o f t h a t k i n d unhesitatingly answers 'Yes'. (2) I f t h e question
had been p u t t o X at t and he had answered honestly, he w o u l d either
(a) have at once unhesitatingly answered ' N o ' , or (b) could have
unhesitatingly answered ' N o ' i f h e had then started a process o f i n t r o -
spective attention directed towards settling the question. As this is
rather abstract, I w i l l take a concrete example. Is i t intelligible t o say
' M r Jones is n o w having a sensory or quasi-sensory experience o f a
ticking noise' i f all the f o l l o w i n g conditions are fulfilled? (1) The
phrase is used i n precisely the same sense i n w h i c h i t is used w h e n one
says t o a person: ' A r e y o u aware o f a t i c k i n g noise?' and he unhesi
tatingly answers 'Yes', even t h o u g h he m a y admit that the experience
may be hallucinatory or an auditory illusion. (2) I f the question were
put to M r Jones n o w and he were t o answer honestly, he w o u l d either
(a) unhesitatingly answer ' N o ' , at once, or (b) w o u l d do so at the end
o f a process ofintrospective attention devoted to settling the question.
I f and o n l y i f it is intelligible, w h e n all these conditions are fulfilled, t o
say that M r Jones is having a sensory or quasi-sensory experience o f a
ticking noise, i t is intelligible to say that M r Jones is h a v i n g an un
conscious perception or quasi-perception o f a t i c k i n g noise, i n a per
fectly literal non-dispositional sense. There may be, and n o doubt are,
other senses o f the phrase 'unconscious experiences' i n w h i c h t o say
that a person is having an unconscious experience o f such-and-such a
k i n d w o u l d merely be saying something about his dispositions, i.e.
about w h a t experiences he would have or would have had, i f certain
conditions should be or had been fulfilled. These m a y be called 'meta
phorical and dispositional' senses o f the phrase 'unconscious ex
periences'. I t h i n k there is no d o u b t that Leibniz held i t t o be intelligible
to say that a person m a y have unconscious experiences i n the literal
non-dispositional sense w h i c h I have explained. A n d there is n o
doubt that he held that this possibility is i n fact realized, and that every
person does have unconscious experiences i n the literal non-dis
positional sense.
I f a man alleges that i t is unintelligible t o say that there m a y be

unconscious experiences i n the literal non-dispositional sense, he must,
I think, accept the f o l l o w i n g t w o propositions. (1) T h a t i t is part o f
w h a t w e mean b y calling an event an 'experience' that w e could say
o f i t : 'Some one person X has that experience.' (2) T h a t i t is part o f
w h a t w e mean b y saying that X has the experience e that, i f e were
described t o X at the time w h e n i t is occurring, X could, i f asked
PSYCHOLOGY AND THEORY OF K N O W L E D G E i33
whether he was having i t , answer, either at once or after a process o f

introspective attention, w i t h complete confidence that he was. I
suppose that Leibniz w o u l d have accepted the first and rejected the
second o f these t w o propositions. H e w o u l d n o t have t h o u g h t i t
intelligible t o say that there m i g h t be experiences w h i c h were n o t the
experiences o f anyone. B u t he d i d t h i n k i t intelligible to say that a
person m i g h t be having an experience o f a certain k i n d , although, i f
y o u had asked h i m at the t i m e whether he was d o i n g so and he had
answered honestly, he w o u l d have answered, either at once or after a
process o f introspective attention, w i t h complete confidence i n the
negative.
So far as I a m aware Leibniz assumes this w i t h o u t any discussion, and
concerns himself s i m p l y w i t h arguments t o prove that the assumed
possibility o f unconscious experiences is i n fact realized.
1.2 L e i b n i z ' s a r g u m e n t s for unconscious experiences
I shall n o t go i n t o Leibniz's empirical arguments i n detail, because I

have discussed such arguments pretty f u l l y i n The Mind and its Place in
Nature (Chapter 9 ) . B u t there are some general remarks w h i c h i t m a y
1
be w o r t h w h i l e to make about t h e m .
I f w e l o o k i n t o these arguments, I t h i n k w e find that they all rest o n
one or other o f t h e f o l l o w i n g three tacit assumptions. ( 1 ) I f I perceive
a w h o l e w h i c h i n fact has several parts or several characteristics, then I
must ipsofacto perceive all the parts and all the characteristics o f t h a t
perceived w h o l e . ( 2 ) I f the physical stimulus w h i c h gives rise to a
perception is complex, then every part o f that complex stimulus must
give rise t o a different perception. Leibniz evidently uses this as a pre
miss i n his favourite argument that our hearing o f the roaring o f the
sea at a distance must be composed o f innumerable unconscious
auditory perceptions ofeach wave r o l l i n g o n each stone. O u r conscious
perception o f t h e noise o f t h e s u r f o n the shore is composed of, or b u i l t
upon, our unconscious perceptions o f the noises due to the r o l l i n g o f
each wave o n each stone. (3) W h a t is called the 'persistent innate or
acquired power' t o cognize a certain object x is reaUy the process o f
cognizing χ continually. W h a t is called 'stimulating the disposition
i n t o action' is reaUy the raising o f this continuous cognitive process
f r o m the unconscious to the conscious level f r o m t i m e t o t i m e .
( 1 ) As regards the first ofthese premisses i t is perhaps plausible about
parts, b u t i t is n o t so as regards characteristics. I t is plausible to say that, i f
1
[C. D. Broad, The Mind and Its Place in Nature (London, 1 9 2 5 ) . ]
I literally sce the whole o f t h e t o p surface o f a penny, then there must

be a sense i n w h i c h I literally see every part o f that surface. I t is surely
not plausible to say that I must perceive all its qualities.
( 2 ) I do n o t t h i n k that Leibniz has any r i g h t t o use the second pre
miss, and, even i f h e had, i t is n o t particularly plausible. I t is plain that
he ought n o t t o use, w i t h o u t some k i n d o f elaborate reinterpretation
i n terms o f his o w n theory o f monads, a premiss w h i c h presupposes
the commonsense v i e w that our sensations are occasioned b y the action
o f foreign bodies o n our o w n bodies. For he has rejected the reality
b o t h o f matter and o f transeunt causation.
(3) The t h i r d premiss needs some further discussion. I t is plain that
some o f the empirical arguments w h i c h Leibniz uses to probe the
existence o f unconscious perceptions w o u l d directly prove o n l y the
existence o f c e r t a i n cognitive dispositions. N o w these are n o t perceptions
or any other k i n d o f actual experiences. M a n y philosophers, e.g.
Descartes and Locke, w h o reject the n o t i o n ofunconscious experiences
as meaningless, have n o objection t o cognitive dispositions. I suspect
that Leibniz may have argued as follows.
Suppose, e.g., that I have learned something and can actually re
member i t w h e n I choose t o or w h e n I a m suitably reminded. A t other
times I a m certainly n o t consciously t h i n k i n g o f i t , and there seems
primafacie n o need to postulate anything relevant to i t i n m y m i n d
during these intervals except a certain persistent cognitive disposition.
B u t , after aU, a disposition is merely a disguised conditional p r o
position. M o s t o f us feel obliged to suppose that there is some actual
state or modification w h i c h was set up b y the original process o f
learning, w h i c h persists thereafter, and w h i c h cooperates w i t h any
subsequent reminder to produce an actual experience o f r e m e m b e r i n g .
B u t h o w is this persistent state or modification t o be conceived? M a n y
people w o u l d t h i n k o f i t as a structural modification i n the b r a i n or
nervous system. B u t Leibniz could n o t take that v i e w . For according
to h i m w h a t is called the 'brain' is reaUy a set o f confused monads
partly misperceived, and none o f these can act o n the m i n d , w h i c h is
the dominant m o n a d o f this set. So the persistent modification must
for h i m be something purely mental. N o w i t is n o t at all easy t o c o n
ceive o f a persistent mental modification, since i t cannot be t h o u g h t
o f as a modification i n spatial arrangement or m o t i o n o f particles. I t
seems to me that the v i e w w h i c h Leibniz t o o k was that the m o d i
fication simply is a persistent b u t unconscious experience. E.g. d u r i n g
intervals w h e n I should ordinarily be said n o t to be t h i n k i n g o f the
fact that 2 X 2 = 4 and n o t to be remembering the late Master o f
I
T r i n i t y , I a m really continuously t h i n k i n g o f the f o r m e r and r e m e m

bering the latter i n a perfectly literal non-dispositional sense. B u t at
such times these experiences are unconscious. A t times w h e n i t w o u l d
ordinarily be said that the mere cognitive disposition gives rise t o an
actual experience w h a t really happens is that the cognitive process
w h i c h has been going o n aU the time becomes conscious. Thus f o r
Leibniz any evidence for cognitive dispositions w o u l d ipso facto be
evidence f o r unconscious cognitive experiences.
1.3 ' M i n u t e ' a n d 'confused' perceptions
Leibniz has a great deal to say about w h a t he calls ' m i n u t e perceptions'

and w h a t he caUs 'confused perceptions'; and he thinks that there is a
close connexion between minuteness and confusion, o n the one hand,
and unconscious perception, o n the other.
B y a ' m i n u t e perception' he meant one o f v e r y faint intensity. H e
does n o t distinguish very sharply between act and object i n the case o f
sensations. B u t i t is evident that a sensation o f a very faint or v e r y
inextensive sensibile w o u l d ipso facto be a perception o f very faint
intensity. Thus the sensation o f a just audible squeak, or o f a colour
expanse so small as to be o n l y just visible, w o u l d be a m i n u t e per
ception. N o w Leibniz t h o u g h t that minuteness tends to make a per
ception unconscious, and that i f i t be feeble enough i t w i l l inevitably
be unconscious under n o r m a l conditions.
W e come n o w to the n o t i o n o f 'confusion'. Leibniz distinguishes
carefully between 'confusion' and 'obscurity'. The opposite o f con
fusion is distinctness, and the opposite o f obscurity is clearness. H e defmes
these terms e x p l i c i t l y w i t h reference to ideas ofspecies, b u t I t h i n k that
his definition can be applied w i t h o u t m u c h difficulty t o perceptions o f
particulars.
Y o u have a clear idea o f a species, e.g. ofsheep, i f i t w o u l d enable
y o u to recognize an instance i f y o u were t o perceive one under n o r m a l
conditions. I f i t w o u l d n o t enable y o u t o do this, the idea is obscure.
N o w , w h e n y o u have a clear idea o f a species, and are thus enabled t o
recognize an instance o f i t , this must i n fact be due to a certain set o f
characteristics w h i c h taken together are c o m m o n and peculiar to m e m
bers o f t h e species. B u t y o u m a y n o t have analysed this set i n t o its c o m
ponents and discriminated t h e m . I f y o u have done so y o u r idea is
distinct as w e l l as clear. I f y o u have n o t , i t is confused, t h o u g h clear.
Thus the ordinary person has a clear idea o f t h e species m a n ; but, i n so
far as the feature b y w h i c h he recognizes that something is a man is a
i36 LEIBNIZ: AN INTRODUCTION
h i g h l y complex and unanalysed shape, size, posture, colour, etc., the

idea is confused. A n anatomist or physiologist w o u l d have a m u c h more
distinct, t h o u g h n o t necessarily a clearer, idea o f man.
Let us n o w apply this to the perception o f a particular. A n y t h i n g
that w e perceive w i l l have m a n y characteristics and i t m a y have m a n y
parts. Some o f these characteristics and some o f these parts m a y be
discriminated b y the percipient and others m a y not. T h e perception o f
an object is said to be 'confused' w h e n the object has i n fact parts o r
characteristics w h i c h the percipient does n o t discriminate. As I have
said, Leibniz seems to have regarded i t as axiomatic that, i f I a m ac
quainted w i t h a w h o l e W, w h i c h i n fact consists o f the parts P lt
P , . . . and w h i c h i n fact has the characteristics C

2 C , . . ., then I
l s 2
must ipso facto be acquainted w i t h aU these parts and aU these charac

teristics. I f I fail t o discriminate some o f these parts or characteristics,
that can mean o n l y that m y perceptions o f t h e m are unconscious.
T h e y m a y be unconscious either because o f their minuteness or because
they are all extremely alike and are all happening at the same t i m e .
Ofcourse b o t h these causes m a y cooperate to make t h e m unconscious.
Thus the connexion between unconsciousness, minuteness, and con
fusion m a y be summarized as follows. A perception tends to be u n
conscious i f e i t h e r (a) its immediate object is v e r y feeble i n intensity or
very inextensive, or (b) i t is one o f a n u m b e r o f v e r y similar per
ceptions w h i c h are aU happening at the same t i m e i n the same m i n d .
A confused perception is a perception o f an object w h i c h has certain
parts or certain characteristics w h i c h the percipient does n o t consciously
perceive. Since he must be perceiving t h e m aU, he must be perceiving
unconsciously those w h i c h he does n o t perceive consciously. A n d the
perceptions o f these parts or characteristics w i l l be unconscious either
because o f their minuteness or because o f their likeness to each other
or for b o t h reasons.
1.4 L e i b n i z ' s uses o f t h e doctrine o f u n c o n s c i o u s

experiences
W e come n o w to the uses w h i c h Leibniz made o f the doctrine o f

unconscious experiences i n his o w n philosophy. The doctrine was
absolutely essential for some purposes and v e r y useful for others.
Leibniz enumerates t h e m i n the New Essays. (1) I f the Pre-established
H a r m o n y is to be a substitute for the generalized physical principle
that everything acts o n everything else, w e must suppose that every
m o n a d perceives every other monad. N o w i t is certain that I do n o t
I
consciously perceive everything else i n the universe. Therefore i t is

o n l y b y a d m i t t i n g that I perceive a great deal unconsciously that i t
could be admitted that I perceive everything else i n the universe.
(2) B y means o f unconscious experiences w e can explain h o w i t seems
that some o f our choices are n o t completely determined, although
reaUy they are completely determined. (3) There is plainly more i n a
self than its conscious sensations, and thoughts, and memories at any
m o m e n t . The latter are v e r y fragmentary and superficial. The back
g r o u n d and foundation o f personality is unconscious, minute, and
confused perceptions. (4) The doctrine o f unconscious mental states
explains h o w death can be merely a sleep, and h o w the soul can have
existed before b i r t h . (5) I t enables us t o explain the relations between
p r i m a r y and secondary qualities i n a more satisfactory w a y than
Descartes and Locke had been able to do. (6) I t explains h o w desire
can m o v e us to action and yet often be a pleasant rather than a painful
experience. I w i l l explain the last t w o statements later.
1.4.1 Is a m i n d a l w a y s t h i n k i n g ?
W e can n o w explain h o w Leibniz used his doctrine o f unconscious

perceptions i n connexion w i t h t w o controversies between Locke and
Descartes. Descartes held that the m i n d must always t h i n k , i.e. always
be p e r f o r m i n g some actual cognitive process. Locke said that there was
n o reason w h y i t must, and that i n aU p r o b a b i l i t y i t does n o t d u r i n g
dreamless sleep. Again Descartes accepted innate ideas and innate
principles w h i l s t Locke rejected b o t h . T h e position w h i c h Leibniz
takes is this. I t is c o m m o n g r o u n d to Locke and Descartes that a per
son cannot have an experience w i t h o u t ipso facto k n o w i n g s i m u l
taneously that he has i t . O n this c o m m o n basis Locke's arguments
against Descartes are conclusive. A n d yet Descartes was i n fact r i g h t
i n h o l d i n g that the m i n d must t h i n k always and that there are innate
ideas and principles. W h a t is needed is to distinguish between conscious
and unconscious experiences and to admit that a person can have
experiences w h i c h he is n o t automatically aware o f h a v i n g at the t i m e .
I n that case i t can be maintained that the m i n d cognizes even d u r i n g
periods o f dreamless sleep. For w e have o n l y to suppose that i t cannot
n o w , and perhaps d i d n o t then, cognize its o w n cognitive acts w h i c h i t
performed d u r i n g sleep. I t is clear that, i f w e accept this doctrine o f
Leibniz's aU Locke's arguments against the principle that the m i n d is
always actually cognizing fall to the ground. B u t is there any positive
g r o u n d for accepting the principle? A c c o r d i n g t o Leibniz there is.
I n the first place, he accepts Descartes's premiss that c o g n i t i o n is the

essential attribute o f t h e m i n d , and merely insists against Descartes that
cognition need n o t be conscious. H e agrees w i t h Descartes that the
fact that c o g n i t i o n is the essential attribute entails that the m i n d must
be continually cognizing. B u t , apart f r o m this, he has, o n his o w n
premisses, perfectly conclusive empirical arguments. For everyone
must admit that d u r i n g dreamless sleep, fainting, etc., the m i n d must
have persistent cognitive dispositions. Otherwise the l i n k i n g up o f t h i s
morning's experiences w i t h last night's w o u l d be inexplicable. A n d ,
as w e have seen, Leibniz holds that w h a t is called a persistent cognitive
disposition must really be a continuous non-introspectible cognitive
process.
2 T h e innate a n d the a p r i o r i
Leibniz's theory o f innate and a priori principles and concepts needs

separate discussion. O f course his doctrine o f unconscious c o g n i t i o n
enables h i m at once to answer aU the objections to innate concepts and
beliefs w h i c h Locke based o n babies, idiots, and savages. W e are at aU
times t h i n k i n g o f a n d believing the laws o f l o g i c , arithmetic, etc. B u t
at most times i n aU o f us and at all times i n some o f us this c o g n i t i o n
remains unnoticed and indiscriminated. I t m a y nevertheless affect our
action and our conscious t h i n k i n g , so that w e tend to obey these
principles and feel uncomfortable w h e n w e disobey t h e m , even w h e n
w e do n o t explicitly recognize t h e m . I t m a y need a great deal o f atten
t i o n , and even special instruction, t o enable us to become aware o f our
knowledge o f these principles; and i t is quite l i k e l y that children and
savages whose interests are m a i n l y practical w i l l n o t take the trouble
to do this.
Leibniz admits that, o n his v i e w , aU ideas are i n a certain sense innate.
This seems t o me t o be the case b o t h i n a negative and i n a positive
sense. The negative sense is that none o f m y ideas can have been p u t
i n t o me b y the action o f anything outside m y m i n d . I f they have
originated at aU i n the course o f m y history they must have been c o m
pletely caused b y earlier events i n m y m i n d . This, however, w o u l d
still make i t possible t o d r a w a distinction between ideas and beliefs
w h i c h had always existed i n m y m i n d , consciously or unconsciously,
and others w h i c h d i d n o t exist even unconsciously i n m y m i n d u n t i l a
certain date i n m y history. T h e f o r m e r m i g h t be called innate i n the
positive sense; the latter w o u l d be innate o n l y i n the negative sense
o f internally generated. B u t , w h e n w e remember Leibniz's v i e w o f
I
change, I t h i n k w e shall have to say that all m y ideas and beliefs are
innate i n the positive sense. For he holds that the o n l y changes are
changes i n the distribution o f confusion and distinctness over the
same field o f consciousness. I f so, G o d created me w i t h all the ideas
that I shall ever have; and all that has happened since is that some have
become conscious w h i l s t others have become unconscious. H o w this
doctrine could be reconciled w i t h the fact that I sometimes change m y
o p i n i o n about the same subject, e.g. start b y believing p, go o n t o
doubt i t , and end up b y disbelieving i t , I do n o t k n o w .
T h e distinction between innate and acquired thus ceases to be v e r y
i m p o r t a n t for Leibniz. B u t he says that he can use the distinction i n a
certain special sense, and that i n this sense i t is important. H e can dis
tinguish between those concepts w h i c h are derived b y abstraction f r o m
sense-perception, or w h i c h are constructed f r o m concepts thus derived,
and those w h i c h are n o t . T h a t is, he can distinguish between w h a t I
should call 'empirical' and 'a priori' concepts as w e l l as anyone else.
A g a i n , he can distinguish between those universal judgments w h i c h
are merely empirical generalizations, and those w h i c h can be seen to be
necessary. That is, he can distinguish between w h a t I should call
'empirical' and 'a priori' judgments as weU as anyone else.
N o w among a priori concepts, i n the sense defined, he counts the
concepts o f God, o f the self, o f substance, cause, and the other cate
gories. A n d he holds a rather special v i e w o f the w a y i n w h i c h w e
acquire explicit ideas o f the categories. W e acquire t h e m b y reflecting
o n ourselves as agents, substances, etc. I t h i n k his position m a y be
summed up as foUows. T h e concepts o f G o d , the self, and the cate
gories, are, like all concepts, innate. A l l that is needed is to make con
scious the unconscious ideas o f t h e m , w h i c h w e all have. T h e y are
a priori i n the sense that they are n o t made explicit b y a process o f
abstraction f r o m sense-experiences. B u t some special k i n d o f experi
ence is needed t o start the process w h i c h wih* render t h e m explicit.
A n d i n the case o f the categories o f cause, substance, etc., there is
n o t h i n g i n our senseexperiences to start the process. W h a t starts i t is
reflexion o n ourselves as active agents and as the u n i t a r y owners o f a
series o f i n f i n i t e l y complex total states. T h e concepts o f p u r e geometry
are equally innate and equally a priori. B u t there the special k i n d o f
experience w h i c h is needed to start the process o f m a k i n g t h e m con
scious and explicit does come f r o m sense-perception, t h o u g h the
process is n o t one o f mere abstraction f r o m sense-experience. Leibniz
objects t o Locke's comparison o f the m i n d t o a tabula rasa. H e says that
i t is more l i k e a b l o c k o f w h i t e marble w i t h black veins i n i t w l d c h
mark out a statue. W e have o n l y t o chip away the w h i t e surroundings

and the statue w i l l stand out. I t h i n k he means b y this that, among its
other ideas, every rational soul contains the idea o f itself as a nucleus,
and that reflexion o n itself and its nature suffices t o make explicit the
categories ofcause, substance, etc.
3 Sensation a n d sense-perception
Leibniz's views o n sensation and sense-perception are n o t v e r y easy t o

make out. I t is certain that he held that sensation is h i g h l y confused,
that i t is b y means o f sensation that w e learn o f the existence and
qualities o f substances other than ourselves, and that w e are i n some
w a y passive i n sensation as compared w i t h t h i n k i n g . K a n t often accuses
Leibniz o f h o l d i n g that sensation is merely confused thought, and he
r i g h t l y insists that such a doctrine is quite impossible. B u t I very m u c h
doubt whether Leibniz ever held i t i n the sense i n w h i c h K a n t denied
i t . I f w e contrast sensation, as intuitive acquaintance w i t h particulars,
and thought, as discursive c o g n i t i o n b y means o f j u d g m e n t s about the
qualities and relations o f subjects, i t seems to me most u n l i k e l y that
Leibniz ever held that sensation is confused thought. W e must n o w t r y
to make o u t what he m a y have meant.
3.1 P r i m a r y a n d secondary qualities
(1) I n the first place, he distinguishes between the sensible qualities

w h i c h w e sense b y the special senses, e.g. colour, temperature, etc., and
those w h i c h w e become acquainted w i t h b y what he caUs 'the common
sense'. A m o n g the latter are included aU such qualities as shape, size,
number, duration, etc., w h i c h Locke held to be derived f r o m several
senses, such as sight and touch, or f r o m b o t h sensation and reflexion.
Leibniz places our ideas o f these latter qualities o n a higher intellectual
level than our ideas o f t h e former. His reason seems to be that the latter
give rise to the a priori concepts and judgments o f pure geometry,
whilst n o a priori concepts or judgments are suggested b y the special
sensations o f colour, temperature, smell, etc. ( 2 ) H e says that the ideas
w h i c h come f r o m the special senses are clear b u t n o t distinct. T h e
idea o f r e d , e.g., is a clear idea; for w e have no difficulty i n recognizing
a red t h i n g w h e n w e see i t . B u t i t is n o t distinct for the f o l l o w i n g rea
son, l f w e accept the o r t h o d o x physical v i e w , what is perceived as red
is certain vibrations w h i c h have i n fact n o colour b u t have a certain
vibration-number. Leibniz, w h e n talking as a physicist, seems to h o l d
I
PSYCHOLOGY AND THEORY OF K N O W L E D G E i4i
that t o perceive something as red simply is to perceive confusedly a large

n u m b e r o f v e r y similar disturbances i n a very short period. The w h o l e
is perceived confusedly because each disturbance is so m i n u t e and lasts
f o r so short a t i m e ; and because they are all so m u c h alike. Conse
quently, t h o u g h each is perceived, the perception o f each is unconscious.
A n d so the perception o f the w h o l e composed o f t h e m is confused. I
suppose that the o r d i n a r y v i e w is that we do n o t perceive the vibrations
at aU, b u t that they produce an effect i n us w h i c h is a sensation o f a red
colour-expanse. Leibniz's v i e w , at the level at w h i c h w e are at present
m o v i n g , seems to be that w e actually perceive the vibrations and n o t
an effect o f t h e m ; and that w e misperceive a set o f similar vibrations,
w h i c h aU occur i n a v e r y short period, as red, because our perception
o f each is unconscious and so our perception o f the w h o l e set is con
fused. O f course this cannot be his ultimate v i e w ; for, according to
h i m there are reaUy n o vibrations and no extended surfaces. B u t his
theory o f our perception o f extended surfaces is similar. W h a t I
actually perceive is a set o f v e r y numerous and v e r y similar monads.
O w i n g t o their n u m b e r and their likeness m y perception o f each o f
t h e m is unconscious, and so m y perception o f the set as a w h o l e is
confused. A n d t o perceive the set as extended just is to perceive i t i n
this confused w a y . (3) Thus Leibniz can a l l o w a relative, b u t o n l y a
relative, v a l i d i t y to Locke's distinction between p r i m a r y and secondary
qualities. T h e p r i m a r y qualities are w h a t w e become acquainted w i t h
b y the c o m m o n sense. O u r sensations o f t h e m stimulate us t o become
conscious o f certain a priori concepts and judgments (viz. the concepts
and axioms o f pure geometry and mechanics) w h i c h make t h e m
susceptible ofscientific treatment. T h e secondary qualities are w h a t w e
become acquainted w i t h b y the special senses. T h e y are correlated w i t h
certain p r i m a r y qualities, and become capable o f scientific treatment
o n l y t h r o u g h this correlation. A t the half-scientific and h a l f - p h i l o
sophic level o f Locke's Essay w e can say that t o perceive something
as a red surface just is to perceive confusedly a set o f vibrations o f
a certain frequency, and so o n . B u t , w h e n w e speak w i t h strict p h i l o
sophical correctness, w e must add that t o perceive something as having
extension and shape and m o t i o n is t o perceive confusedly an infinitely
numerous set o f u n e x t e n d e d monads o f v e r y similar points o f v i e w .
I t h i n k that w e must here distinguish t w o alternative possible views,

b o t h about secondary qualities and about p r i m a r y qualities. One v i e w
about our awareness o f secondary qualities w o u l d be that a conscious
perception o f something as red just consists o f a vast number o f u n
conscious perceptions o f v i b r a t i o n s o f a certain frequency w i t h i n a very
short period. The other v i e w w o u l d be that to have a vast number o f

unconscious perceptions o f vibrations o f a certain frequency w i t h i n a
very short period is a causally necessary condition for having a conscious
perception o f s o m e t h i n g as red, b u t that the latter conscious experience
is not composed of the f o r m e r unconscious experiences. Similarly one
v i e w about our perception o f something as a surface o f a certain shape
and size w o u l d be that i t is a conscious perception composed of a vast
number o f simultaneous unconscious perceptions o f monads whose
points o f v i e w are very m u c h alike. The other v i e w w o u l d be that to
have a vast number ofsimultaneous unconscious perceptions o f monads
whose points o f v i e w are v e r y m u c h alike is a causally necessary con
dition for having a conscious perception o f something as a surface o f a
certain shape and size, b u t that the latter conscious experience is not
composed of the former unconscious experiences. O n the first alternative,
the property o f being a conscious perception o f something as red or
being a conscious perception o f something as extended and shaped
w o u l d be a k i n d ofcollective or pattern-quality. T h a t is to say, i t w o u l d
belong t o a certain collection o f simultaneous or closely successive
perceptions taken as a whole. B u t i t w o u l d n o t belong to any o f t h e m
individually. N o n e o f t h e m w o u l d be a conscious perception or a per
ception o f anything as red or a perception o f anything as extended and
shaped. O n the second alternative, the p r o p e r t y o f being a conscious
perception o f something as red or o f something as extended and
shaped w o u l d belong neither t o the i n d i v i d u a l unconscious percep
tions nor to the collection o f t h e m taken as a whole. I t w o u l d belong
t o another perception, w h i c h arises as an effect o f t h e i r simultaneous or
closely successive occurrences. I t seems t o me that Leibniz ought t o
h o l d the second alternative. For t o a d m i t the possibility o f collective
or pattern-qualities w o u l d be t o admit the possibility o f attributes
w h i c h have as m a n y 'legs' as a centipede, and he has rejected relations
o n the g r o u n d that there could n o t be an attribute ' w i t h one leg i n one
t e r m and another leg i n another t e r m ' .
3.2 D i r e c t versus representative p e r c e p t i o n
There is one question w h i c h i t is w o r t h w h i l e t o raise before leaving

Leibniz's theory o f sense-perception. Does his theory necessarily i n
volve the doctrine o f 'representative perception'? O r w o u l d i t be
compatible w i t h his general principles that one m o n a d should be
directly acquainted w i t h other monads?
I understand b y the theory o f representative perception the t w o
PSYCHOLOGY AND THEORY OF K N O W L E D G E I43
f o l l o w i n g propositions, ( i ) The o n l y objects w i t h w h i c h a person can

possibly be acquainted are internal objects, i.e. states o f h i s o w n m i n d .
(2) Some ofthese internal objects are specially related to certain things
or events other than his o w n m i n d and its states, and i n v i r t u e o f this
are 'representative' t o h i m ofthese foreign things and events, rn being
acquainted w i t h such a representative internal object a person auto
matically b u t indirectly perceives the foreign t h i n g or event w h i c h
this internal object represents. I understand b y the theory o f d i r e c t per
ception that a person m a y be and sometimes is acquainted w i t h a
foreign t h i n g or event.
N o w i t is c o m m o n l y assumed that Leibniz held the theory o f
representative perception. I t h i n k that m a n y people w o u l d be inclined
to say that his statement that 'monads have n o w i n d o w s ' is c o n 1
clusive evidence for this. I a m inclined to agree that he d i d h o l d the

theory, b u t I do n o t t h i n k that this quotation is conclusive. W i n d o w s
can be considered f r o m t w o different points o f v i e w , viz. as holes
t h r o u g h w h i c h one can l o o k o u t at the rest o f the w o r l d , or as holes
t h r o u g h w h i c h causal influences f r o m the rest o f the w o r l d m a y b l o w
i n . W h e n Leibniz says that monads have n o w i n d o w s he is t h i n k i n g o f
the latter analogy and n o t the former.
I t seems t o me that he could consistently have held that one monad
is directly acquainted w i t h other monads, t h o u g h I do n o t suggest that
he actually d i d h o l d this. I n each m o n a d a series ofacts ofacquaintance
w o u l d arise f r o m purely internal causes. B u t the immediate object
ofeach such act w o u l d be another m o n a d i n the state w h i c h i t had then
reached i n the course o f its o w n internal development. O n this v i e w ,
w h e n I a m said t o be perceiving a b i t o f matter, I a m directly b u t
unconsciously acquainted w i t h every one o f a certain v e r y numerous
set o f monads, w i t h v e r y similar points o f v i e w , i n the state w h i c h
they have then reached. I n some w a y , n o t satisfactorily explained, the
coexistence o f aU these unconscious acts o f acquaintance w i t h these
numerous i n d i v i d u a l monads either constitutes or causes i n me a c o n
fused perception o f t h e group as a w h o l e . This is a misperception o f t h a t
group as a single, continuously extended coloured massive material
t h i n g . T h a t Leibniz d i d n o t i n fact h o l d the theory o f direct perception
is, I t h i n k , clear f r o m the fact that he says that the perceptions o f each
m o n a d w o u l d have been unaltered even i f aU the others had been
annihilated.
1
[ G . , V I , 607. L o e m k e r , 643.]
4 C o n a t i v e a n d affective experiences
Conation is just as essential a feature o f every m o n a d as cognition.

W h e n the striving o f a monad is accompanied and directed b y a c o n
scious belief that such-and-such a future state ofaffairs w o u l d satisfy i t ,
it is called desire. W h e n i t is n o t thus accompanied and directed i t is
called instinct. I n the case o f desire the accompanying belief m a y be
mistaken i n detail or completely. Leibniz holds that i n the actual w o r l d
every monad strives for its o w n good. This is supposed t o be a c o n
tingent fact. I t is n o t very easy to see w h a t i t can mean. I t is obvious
that conscious beings often desire w h a t w i l l i n fact be bad for t h e m ,
o w i n g t o mistaken beliefs. So one w o u l d be tempted to substitute for
Leibniz's contingent principle the principle that every m o n a d strives
for w h a t i t believes at the time to be its o w n good. B u t , even i f this be
admitted for self-conscious rational monads acting deliberately, i t is
difficult to see w h a t i t can mean for animal souls and bare monads, i n
w h i c h striving takes the f o r m o f instinct. Perhaps Leibniz w o u l d say
that i n instinctive action the striving is accompanied and directed b y
an unconscious b e l i e f t h a t such-and-such a future state w o u l d be g o o d
for the agent.
Leibniz holds that pleasure and pain are indefinable, i n the sense that
n o analysis can be given o f the n o t i o n o f pleasant and painful. B u t he
thinks i t is a true synthetic proposition that a perception is pleasant i f
and o n l y i f i t noticeably helps our activity. Similarly a perception is
painful i f and o n l y i f i t noticeably hinders our activity. I t is probable
that every perception has one or other ofthese effects to some degree;
but w h e n the effect is so slight as n o t t o be noticed the experience is
counted as hedonically neutral. H e also expresses his beliefthat pleasure
is a noticeable feeling o f perfection and pain a noticeable feeling o f
imperfection. N o w , like Spinoza, he always identifies increase o f per
fection w i t h increase o f cognitive distinctness and decrease o f perfec
t i o n w i t h increase o f c o g n i t i v e confusion. So i t looks as i f h i s doctrine
amounted t o this, that pleasure is the sign o f any change i n us that
makes us noticeably less confused, and that pain is the sign o f any
change i n us that makes us noticeably more confused. H e defines
'happiness' as lasting pleasure, and says that i t can be realized o n l y b y
continually passing f r o m one pleasant experience to another. ' H a p p i
ness,' he says, 'is a road t h r o u g h pleasures.' Reason shows us the best
1
road. Instinct and passion t r y to take short-cuts, and thus often lead us
astray.
1
[ G . , V , i 8 o . Langley, 201.]
PSYCHOLOGY AND THEORY OF K N O W L E D G E I45
Leibniz's v i e w o f the nature o f the experience o f desiring is as

follows. I t is n o t itselfpainful. B u t i t is a confused state made up o f a
n u m b e r o f undiscriminated minute experiences, each o f w h i c h w o u l d
be painful i f i t were magnified and separately noticed. As w e satisfy
a desire these m i n u t e undiscriminated quasi-v>ams are replaced b y
m i n u t e undiscriminated gtws!-pleasures. A t the end o f the process the
latter are integrated i n t o an appreciable pleasure. I t is difficult t o see
w h y the coexistence o f a n u m b e r o f minute gtwsi-pleasures should be
an actually pleasant experience, w h e n the coexistence o f a n u m b e r o f
minute ^wasi-pains is n o t an actually painful experience.
Leibniz, like most philosophers o f his t i m e , was a psychological
hedonist. H e held that the o n l y ultimate m o t i v e is the desire f o r our
o w n happiness. N o w pleasure is a noticeable feeling o f p e r f e c t i o n , and
presumably the degree o f the pleasure is proportional t o the degree o f
perfection; so one's o w n greatest happiness w o u l d be one's o w n greatest
perfection t h r o u g h o u t the w h o l e o f one's life here and hereafter.
Thus a person w h o desired his o w n greatest happiness, and k n e w i n
w h a t this reaUy consisted, w o u l d desire his o w n greatest perfection,
i.e. w o u l d desire the m a x i m u m clearness o f perception t h r o u g h o u t
life. B u t , whilst everyone desires his o w n greatest happiness, most
people do n o t recognize that their o w n greatest happiness consists i n
their o w n greatest perfection, or that this consists i n m a x i m u m clear
ness o f knowledge. So m e n can and do desire other things, b u t they
always do so under the misapprehension that these other things w i l l
make t h e m as happy as possible.
I
6
ETHICS
Leibniz was a universalistic ethical hedonist. That is he held that

n o t h m g is intrinsically g o o d b u t happiness or intrinsically bad b u t
unhappiness, and that the m o r e happiness there is the better n o
matter whether i t is i n A or B or C. N o w , as he was also an egoistic
psychological hedonist, the question arises: ' H o w can i t be m y d u t y t o
promote the happiness o f other people, since i t is psychologically i m
possible f o r me to desire anything b u t m y o w n happiness as an end?'
The w a y i n w h i c h Leibniz attempts t o answer this question seems t o
be as follows. W h e n I clearly understand w h a t m y o w n happiness
consists i n I see that i t consists i n being intellectually as clear and as
little confused as possible. I shall therefore a i m at m a k i n g myself as
completely reasonable a being as possible, simply because I shall see
that m y greatest happiness consists i n this. O f course m y approach t o
this state w i l l presumably be i n some respects a self-accelerating p r o
cess. The m o r e reasonable I become the m o r e clearly I shall see that
m y greatest happiness consists i n being as completely reasonable as
possible. A n d the m o r e clearly I see that m y greatest happiness consists
i n being as reasonable as possible the m o r e intensely and single-mind-
edly I shall a i m at m a k i n g myself reasonable. So far his doctrine is
intelligible enough. H e then claims that the more reasonable I become
the more I shall a i m at increasing the general happiness. I cannot see
that the last step is valid. I f L e i b n i z had said: 'The m o r e reasonable y o u
become the m o r e clearly y o u w i l l see that the best w a y to make y o u r
self happy is to a i m at m a k i n g other people happy', i t w o u l d have
f o l l o w e d that an enlightened psychological hedonist ought t o a i m at the
general happiness as a means t h o u g h n o t as an end. B u t he does n o t
say this, and I do n o t see h o w he consistently could have said i t . I f m y
greatest happiness consists i n clear rational knowledge, I ought, as an
enlightened psychological hedonist, to a i m at m a k i n g others happy
o n l y i n so far as I can see that this is the best w a y to increase and clarify
m y o w n knowledge. A n d I cannot see any reason t o suppose that this
always or often could be the best means to this end.
I have little doubt that Leibniz's real v i e w is that w h e n w e really

k n o w w h a t w e are about w e see that the greatest happiness o f each o f
ETHICS i47
us is best secured b y practising w h a t are ordinarily counted as virtues

and w i t h o u t regard to their efFects o n our o w n happiness. O f course,
even i f this be accepted, the m o t i v e f o r w h a t is called 'virtuous action'
remains purely egoistic. W e p e r f o r m virtuous acts, n o t because they
are virtuous, b u t because they are seen t o be the best means t o o u r o w n
happiness. Still, this is a considerably m o r e elevated f o r m o f egoism
than Locke's o r Paley's. A c c o r d i n g t o t h e m v i r t u e can be chosen o n l y
because there is an external payment i n this w o r l d or the next f o r
virtuous action. O n Leibniz's v i e w ' v i r t u e is its o w n reward', i n the
sense that the performance o f w h a t are ordinarily called 'virtuous
actions' is itself pleasant and the most intense k i n d o f pleasure to a
rational being. Y e t i t must be admitted that Leibniz has failed to show,
that, e.g., the practice ofbenevolence is so pleasant i n itself to the agent
that a really enlightened egoistic psychological hedonist w o u l d always
practise benevolence. A n d i t seems most u n l i k e l y that this could be
p r o v e d or that i t is i n fact true.
I t w i l l be noticed that o n Leibniz's v i e w all w r o n g - d o i n g is due t o
intellectual confusion. I necessarily do w h a t I t h i n k at the m o m e n t w i l l
give me most happiness o n the w h o l e ; and, unless I make a mistake
about w h a t w i l l make me most happy, this line o f conduct is also the
one w h i c h w i l l produce the greatest happiness o n the w h o l e , and is
therefore the r i g h t line o f c o n d u c t . Leibniz does n o t a l l o w f o r weakness
or perversity o f w i l l , i.e. seeing the better and failing to pursue i t or
deliberately rejecting i t f o r the worse. This v i e w that all w r o n g - d o i n g
is completely explicable b y intellectual mistakes about certain matters
o f f a c t has, ofcourse, been h e l d b y m a n y other i m p o r t a n t philosophers
beside Leibniz. I t seems to m e to be plainly false. There is a desire to do
w h a t is believed to be r i g h t as such; b u t there are other desires, w h i c h
conflict w i t h i t , and w h i c h m a y and do overcome i t at times w i t h o u t
first clouding the intellect. A n d the doctrine is peculiarly inconvenient
for Leibniz, w h o believes i n eternal punishment. For even the most
enthusiastic supporter o f eternal punishment m i g h t hesitate to t h i n k
that i t isjust f o r a spirit to be t o r t u r e d eternally because its intellect had
been at certain times t o o confused t o see clearly w h a t kinds o f action
w o u l d be most conducive t o its happiness.
7
THEOLOGY
I t is plain that G o d plays a very i m p o r t a n t part i n Leibniz's system.

H e w r o t e one large b o o k - the Theodicy - especially to deal w i t h
Bayle's doctrine that revealed religion is n o t merely supplementary,
but positively contrary, t o h u m a n reason. B u t the Theodicy contains
m u c h beside this, e.g. a justification o f God's character, and the
exposition o f Leibniz's o p t i m i s m . W e w i l l begin b y stating Leibniz's
v i e w o f t h e nature o f G o d and his relation to the monads.
ι G o d ' s nature a n d relations to the w o r l d
Leibniz developed his v i e w o f G o d i n contrast t o those o f Descartes

and Spinoza. His o w n special theory o f the nature o f fmite substances
at once introduced a sharp difference between his v i e w o f the nature
o f G o d and their views. I f Leibniz is r i g h t , there are genuine finite
substances w h i c h o w e their o r i g i n to G o d ; b u t , once created, they
continue to exist and develop f r o m the active force w h i c h G o d has
given them. T h e y do n o t need t o be recreated f r o m m o m e n t t o
m o m e n t , as Descartes held. T h e y are n o t mere occurrents i n G o d as
continuant, as Spinoza held. A n d they genuinely act and change f r o m
their o w n resources, instead o f being perpetually pushed and pulled
about b y God, as the Occasionalists held. O f c o u r s e Leibniz w o u l d n o t
have been prepared to say that they are n o w w h o l l y independent o f
G o d . h i the first place, G o d could at any m o m e n t annihilate any o f
t h e m b y a miracle. Secondly, they require the perpetual concurrence
o f G o d as a necessary background c o n d i t i o n f o r their continued exis
tence and development, h i the Discours, Section 14, e.g., Leibniz says
that G o d continually keeps each substance i n existence b y a k i n d o f
emanation, and that this m a y be compared t o the w a y i n w h i c h w e p r o
duce our o w n t h o u g h t s . 1 t h i n k that aU o r t h o d o x theologians w o u l d
1
insist u p o n this amount o f continual dependence o f created substances

u p o n God. B u t this leaves t h e m m u c h less dependent than they w o u l d
i f the views o f Descartes or Spinoza or the Occasionalists were true.
N o w this v i e w makes the n o t i o n o f creation fundamental i n Leibniz's
1
[G., I V , 439. Loemker, 311.]
I
THEOLOGY i49
system. For 'to create', w h e n used literally, just means t o b r i n g i n t o

being a genuine n e w substance, w h i c h can then continue and develop
o n its o w n w i t h o u t further special interference f r o m its creator. This
is quite a different n o t i o n f r o m that o f producing a n e w occurrent i n a
pre-existing continuant. A n d i t is quite different f r o m b r i n g i n g cer
tain pre-existing continuants i n t o more intimate and relatively stable
m u t u a l relations, so that a n e w complex continuant is f o r m e d w h i c h
then persists. W e do the f o r m e r i f w e set u p a ripple w h i c h continues i n
a p o n d o f w a t e r . W e do the latter w h e n w e b u i l d a bridge or an engine.
B u t w e cannot genuinely create a n e w simple continuant, and w e can
not conceive w h a t such a process as genuine creation w o u l d be. N o w
Leibniz's G o d has to be creative, because Leibniz's monads are genuine
simple continuants, and because Leibniz held that the monads had a
beginning and that God started t h e m . There is n o pretence that Spin
oza's G o d is creative. A n d , w h e n Descartes's doctrine that persistence
i n perpetual recreation is t h o u g h t out, one sees that i t amounts to the
denial o f genuine fmite substances and therefore t o the denial o f
genuine creation.
N o w i t m i g h t be argued that the fact that Leibniz's G o d has to be
creative is a serious defect i n his system as compared, e.g., w i t h Spin
oza's. W e k n o w w h a t w e mean b y the occurrent-continuant relation,
at any rate i n the sense that w e t h i n k w e can produce plenty ofinstances
o f i t w i t h i n the universe. A n d Spinoza uses o n l y this relation. B u t w e
certainly do n o t k n o w , even i n this sense, w h a t w e mean b y the
relation o f creator and created substance; since there are n o instances
o f i t w i t h i n the universe. A n d Leibniz has t o make use o f t h i s relation.
There are t w o things t o be said about this contention. (1) I t must be
said for Leibniz and against Spinoza that Spinoza can make the occur
rent-continuant relation adequate only b y counting as occurrents certain
things w h i c h prima facie are n o t occurrents i n any k n o w n continuant,
viz. finite minds. (2) I t m i g h t be possible t o keep this advantage
o f Leibniz over Spinoza and yet avoid the n o t i o n o f creation a l
together. For i t m i g h t be possible t o h o l d that the ultimate simple
continuant o f w h i c h the universe is composed never originated and
w i l l never end. Γη that case w e m i g h t either have n o God, or a G o d
w h o is one supremely i m p o r t a n t simple continuant b u t n o t a creator o f
other simple continuants. W e should then get a system something
l i k e McTaggart's. Leibniz o f course t h o u g h t that there were con
clusive reasons against such a v i e w , and w e shall have to consider t h e m
w h e n w e deal w i t h his arguments f o r the existence o f God.
Closely connected w i t h the p r o p e r t y o f creativeness w h i c h Leibniz

assigned to G o d is another difFerence between h i m and Descartes and

Spinoza. H e agreed w i t h Spinoza i n rejecting Descartes's v i e w that
b o t h the difFerence between r i g h t and w r o n g and the difFerence
between t r u t h and falsehood depend o n the arbitrary decrees o f G o d .
B u t Spinoza, i n rejecting this, also rejected the v i e w that G o d c o n
templates genuine possibilities, weighs up the g o o d and bad points i n
each, and then decides to actualize a certain one o f these possibilities
because he sees that this is the best o n the whole. This n o t i o n o f G o d
choosing sub ratione boni seems t o Spinoza ridiculously anthropo
morphic. B u t i t plays an essential part i n Leibniz's philosophy, and i n
his defence o f God's character. N o w , o f course, i n Spinoza's v i e w o f
God, the n o t i o n is ridiculous, because the w h o l e n o t i o n o f w i l l and
choice is as inapplicable t o G o d as the n o t i o n o f circularity o r t r i
angularity is t o Space as a coUective w h o l e . B u t i t does seem to m e t o
be rather ridiculously a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c o n any v i e w o f G o d . H o w
ever, i t is an essential feature i n Leibniz's theology.
Passing n o w to the negative aspects o f G o d ' s nature, w e m a y r e m i n d
ourselves o f the f o U o w i n g facts. G o d is n o t a m o n a d . H e has n o c o n
fusion and therefore n o materia prima. His m i n d perceives everything
past, present, and future i n the actual w o r l d , and perceives i t w i t h
complete clearness. T o this extent the content o f G o d ' s cognition c o i n
cides w i t h that o f the humblest monad, and the o n l y difference is that
i n G o d there is n o confusion. B u t there is m u c h content besides this i n
God's m i n d . I n the first place, he is aware o f aU the details o f aU the
possible worlds. Secondly, he is aware o f all the eternal truths, w h i c h
h o l d f o r aU possible worlds. T h i r d l y , he is aware o f aU the facts about
his o w n nature. N o w Leibniz holds that monads b e l o w the level o f
rational souls cognize n o t h i n g about merely possible w o r l d s ; they also
cognize n o eternal truths and k n o w n o t h i n g o f God's nature. T h e
rational souls do indeed k n o w something o f God's nature, o f eternal
truths, and o f possible w o r l d s . For they t o some extent m i r r o r G o d i n
addition t o m i r r o r i n g the rest o f the created w o r l d . B u t presumably
there is a great deal i n this department w h i c h no created m i n d perceives
even confusedly. A n d i t is certain, i n Leibniz's v i e w , that m u c h o f t h e
knowledge o f these facts w h i c h does exist i n any created m i n d is, and
w i l l remain i n this life, confused and unconscious.
Since there is never any confusion i n God's m i n d , and since aU

change is ultimately change i n the distribution o f c o n f u s i o n t h r o u g h o u t
a total field o f consciousness, there can be n o change i n G o d . H o w
Leibniz w o u l d reconcile this w i t h the fact that Godfirst contemplated
aU the possible worlds and then created the best o f t h e m , I do n o t k n o w .
THEOLOGY i5i
A g a i n , I do n o t k n o w h o w G o d could perceive the changes w h i c h take

place i n us, as he must do since they are real, w i t h o u t any change t a k i n g
place i n himself. B u t difficulties o f t h i s k i n d are c o m m o n t o aU systems
w h i c h make G o d changeless and then profess t o b r i n g h i m i n t o creative
and cognitive relations t o a w o r l d w h i c h he originated and w h i c h has
been changing ever since.
Beside having n o confusion G o d has n o p o i n t o f v i e w . A c c o r d i n g t o
Leibniz there is some v e r y intimate connexion between confusion and
p o i n t o f v i e w . I t h i n k he holds that any change i n the distribution o f
confusion involves a change i n p o i n t o f v i e w , and conversely. I do
n o t t h i n k that he w o u l d deny that the total amount ofconfusion m i g h t
vary w h i l s t the p o i n t o f v i e w remained the same. B u t , however this
m a y be, i t is certain that G o d has n o p o i n t o f v i e w . H e also has n o
organism. This is obvious. For he perceives everything w i t h complete
clearness. N o w the organism o f a m o n a d is a certain set o f monads
whose changes that m o n a d perceives w i t h special clearness. Thus G o d
must either have n o organism or must have all the created w o r l d for
his organism. A n d Leibniz definitely rejects the n o t i o n o f a W o r l d -
Soul.
I t is w o r t h n o t i n g that Leibniz says i n Section 14 o f t h e Discours that
G o d is aware o f t h e actual w o r l d i n t w o quite different w a y s . (1) H e 1
k n o w s i t i n t h o u g h t as i t w o u l d appear f r o m every possible p o i n t o f

v i e w , i.e. as every possible m o n a d i n i t w o u l d perceive i t . A n d ( 2 ) he
k n o w s i t i n a w a y peculiar t o himself. I t is this double knowledge w h i c h
enables h i m to conceive and then create a system subject to the Pre-
established h a r m o n y .
2 Existence o f G o d
Leibniz based his b e l i e f i n the existence o f G o d o n four m a i n arguments,

viz. the Ontological, the Cosmological, an argument f r o m the Pre-
established H a r m o n y , and an argument about Eternal Truths. I w i l l
say something about each o f these i n t u r n .
2.1 O n t o l o g i c a l A r g u m e n t
Leibniz discussed this rather carefully. H e accepts the m a i n step i n i t

w i t h o u t question, b u t he considers that a preliminary investigation is
needed t o decide whether the Ens Realissimum is a possible existent.
A c c o r d i n g to h i m , the argument, as given b y St Anselm and Descartes,
1
[ G . , I V , 4 3 9 . Loemker, 3 1 1 - 1 2 . ]
w o u l d establish o n l y the hypothetical proposition ' I f a being answering

to the description o f the Ens Realissimum w o u l d be a possible existent
then there necessarily is a being answering to the description o f the
Ens Realissimum', i.e. ' i f there can be anything answering t o this
description, then there must be something answering t o i t ' . N o w the
Ens Realissimum is described as being all positive perfections to the
highest degree. The p r e l i m i n a r y question then is whether this descrip
t i o n m a y n o t i n v o l v e some internal inconsistency. I f so, n o t h i n g could
answer to i t . B u t , i f n o t , then something must answer t o i t , for the
reasons w h i c h St Anselm and Descartes gave. Leibniz therefore sets
out t o prove that there can be n o i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y between any t w o
purely positive characteristics. This he easily does to his o w n satis
faction f r o m his doctrine that aU opposition is contradictory opposition,
i.e. the k i n d o f opposition w h i c h there is between p and non-p. This
doctrine seems very d o u b t f u l . One does n o t see, e.g., h o w the o p p o
sition between characteristics w h i c h seem entirely positive, e.g. t w o
colours or t w o different shades o f the same colour, can be b r o u g h t
under i t . B u t , even i f i t could be accepted t w o difficulties w o u l d
remain, ( i ) O f t w o opposed qualities, say g o o d and evil, o f w h i c h b o t h
seem to be positive, h o w could y o u tell w h i c h is reaUy the purely
positive one? Leibniz and most theologians w h o take this p o i n t o f
v i e w have generally regarded the most desirable o f such a pair as the
positive one and the less desirable as the negative one. B u t , i f anyone
had chosen to say that evil is purely positive and good p a r t l y negative,
and consequently that the Ontological A r g u m e n t proves the existence
o f a perfectly evil being, I do n o t see w h a t answer they could have
given. (2) Even i f t h e description o f t h e Ens Realissimum involves n o
internal inconsistency Leibniz has done n o t h i n g t o remove the f u n
damental objection t o the Ontological A r g u m e n t , viz. that i t treats
the existential proposition: 'The so and so exists (or is real)' as i f i t
could be analysed i n precisely the same w a y as the characterizing
proposition 'The so and so flies (or is y e l l o w ) . ' I n fact i t seems to me
that Leibniz's doctrine o f the choice and creation o f the best o f the
possible worlds rests o n this fallacy. H e thinks o f the possible monads
as already i n being, and already having aU their other predicates and
then a certain set o f t h e m is launched o n its career b y being given the
one remaining predicate ofexistence. Since creation is an unintelligible
n o t i o n to us, no doubt any attempt t o state w h a t happened at creation
w i l l be nonsense. B u t this does seem particularly palpablenonsense.
THEOLOGY i53
2.2 Cosmological A r g u m e n t
This is one ofLeibniz's favourite arguments. E v e r y state o f t h e universe

no doubt follows necessarily i n accordance w i t h a l a w f r o m the p r e
vious state. B u t this previous state has as little intrinsic necessity as the
one w h i c h i t determines. A n d so o n w i t h o u t end. So there must be
one or m o r e intrinsically necessary beings, altogether outside the course
o f n a t u r e ; and the system o f n a t u r e as a w h o l e must depend o n i t or o n
them.
Russell makes an interesting objection t o the Cosmological A r g u
m e n t . H e says that i t must be f o r m a l l y invalid because i t professes t o
1
deduce a necessary proposition (viz. 'There is a being w h o exists o f

necessity') f r o m premisses w h i c h are n o t all necessary (e.g. ' I exist
here and n o w ' ) . Is there anything i n this objection?
I t h i n k i t is impossible t o discuss i t unless one states the argument
f o r m a l l y . I t h i n k i t w o u l d often be stated as follows: ' A n y t h i n g w h i c h
exists and whose existence is not necessary derives its existence f r o m
something whose existence is necessary. I exist and m y existence is n o t
necessary. Therefore I derive m y existence f r o m something whose
existence is necessary. Therefore there is something whose existence is
necessary.'
N o w I do not agree that the conclusion, as stated, is a necessary
proposition. I t is a n o n - m o d a l proposition. T h e conclusion is n o t
'There is necessarily something whose existence is necessary', but is
simply 'There is something whose existence is necessary.' N o t h i n g is
asserted or i m p l i e d about the m o d a l i t y o f t h i s proposition. So i t seems
t o me that RusseU's objection is invalid.
B u t there are other logical questions w h i c h could be raised about
the argument. There are at least t w o phrases i n i t w h i c h are ambiguous,
viz. 'necessary' and 'derives its existence f r o m ' . T h e y m i g h t be inter
preted i n a purely logical sense o r i n a non-logical sense. I suppose that
the purely logical interpretation o f the statement 'The instance o f φ
necessarily exists' w o u l d be ' I t is a necessary proposition that there is
one and o n l y one instance ο ί φ . ' I suppose that the purely logical inter
pretation o f t h e statement 'The instance ο ί ψ derives its existence f r o m
the instance o f φ' w o u l d be 'The proposition that there is one and
o n l y one instance o f ψ is entailed b y the proposition that there is one
and o n l y one instance o f φ.'
I f w e take these purely logical interpretations the major premiss is
transformed i n t o the f o l l o w i n g proposition: ' f f i t is true, but n o t
1
necessary, that there is one and o n l y one instance o f any characteristic

ψ, then i t follows that there is a characteristic φ such that ( i ) i t is
necessary that there is one and o n l y one instance o f φ, and (2) the
proposition that there is one and o n l y one instance o f φ entails that
there is one and o n l y one instance o f
N o w i t is easy t o see that, i f t h e major premiss be interpreted i n this
way, i t is self-contradictory. For i n the antecedent i t is supposed that
the proposition that there is one and o n l y once instance o f <b is not
necessary. B u t i n the consequent i t is said that the proposition that
there is one and o n l y one instance o f ψ w o u l d be entailed b y a p r o
position w h i c h (5 necessary, viz. the proposition that there is one and
only one instance o f φ. B u t a proposition w h i c h was entailed b y a
necessary proposition w o u l d itself be necessary. Thus the consequent
in the major premiss entails the contradictory o f what is supposed i n
the antecedent. A n d so the major premiss is s e l f 4 x m t r a d i c t 0 r y ,
W e could, however, easily keep the purely logical interpretation
and avoid the contradiction, i f w e were t o alter the major premiss as
foUows. W e m i g h t distinguish between being intrinsically necessary
and being o n l y derivately necessary. A n intrinsically necessary p r o
position w o u l d be one whose necessity arose simply f r o m its o w n
terms. A derivately necessary proposition w o u l d be one whose neces
sity arose, n o t simply f r o m its o w n terms, b u t f r o m the fact that i t is
entailed b y other propositions aU o f w h i c h are necessary. T h e major
premiss w o u l d n o w take the f o l l o w i n g f o r m : ' I f i t is true b u t not
intrinsically necessary that there is one and o n l y one instance o f a charac
teristic <b, then i t follows that there is a characteristic φ such that (1) i t
is intrinsically necessary that there is one and o n l y one instance o f φ,
and (2) the proposition that there is one and o n l y one instance o f φ
entails the proposition that there is one and o n l y one instance o f y.'
There is n o contradiction here. B u t this premiss w o u l d make all
existential facts necessary. Those w h i c h were not intrinsically necessary
w o u l d aU be derivately necessary. So this interpretation m i g h t suit
Spinoza, b u t i t w o u l d certainly n o t suit Leibniz or the ordinary Christ
ian theologian. I a m quite sure that they never d i d interpret 'deriving
its existence f r o m ' i n purely logical terms. T h e y were t h i n k i n g , n o t o f
logical entailment, b u t something analogous to the sense i n w h i c h a
person derives his existence f r o m his parents, or a mental image
derives its existence f r o m a person w h o deliberately calls i t u p and
keeps i t before his mind's eye. T h e argument w o u l d then r u n as
follows: ' A n y t h i n g whose existence is causally derivative must u l
timately derive i t f r o m something whose existence is n o t causally
THEOLOGY i55
derivative. I exist and m y existence is causally derivative. Therefore

I ultimately derive m y existence f r o m something whose existence is
not causally derivative. Therefore there is something whose existence
is n o t causally derivative.'
h i this argument there is n o question o f m o d a l i t y i n the logical sense,
and therefore n o t even the appearance o f a modal fallacy, such as
Russell suggests. Supposing that w e interpret the argument i n this
way, there still remains the f o l l o w i n g question. Can w e get beyond the
partly negative conclusion that there is something whose existence is
not causally derivative to the more positive conclusion that there is
something whose existence is intrinsically necessary? I t is certain that
Leibniz and most Christian theologians have claimed t o do so.
N o w I t h i n k that the more positive interpretation o f the conclusion
could take t w o different forms, one purely logical and the other
causal. T h e purely logical interpretation w o u l d be that the existence o f
anything whose existence is n o t causally derived is logically necessary.
This w o u l d amount t o saying that anything whose existence is n o t
causally derived has a characteristic φ such that the proposition 'There
is one and o n l y one instance o f φ' is logically necessary. N o w Leibniz
certainly held that the o n l y entity whose existence is n o t causally
derived has the property o f possessing all positive perfections t o the
highest possible degree. A n d he held that the proposition 'There is one
and onby one entity w h i c h has all positive perfections t o the highest
possible degree' is logically necessary. N o w the converse o f the p r o
position under discussion does seem obvious. T h e existence o f a n y t h i n g
whose existence was logically necessary w o u l d presumably be causally
underived. B u t I can see n o t h i n g obvious about the proposition itself.
W h y should there n o t be existents whose existence is n o t causally
derived and also n o t logically necessary?
The causal w a y o f p u t t i n g a more positive interpretation o n the
conclusion is to pass f r o m ' n o t causally deriving its existence f r o m
anything else' to 'causally deriving its existence f r o m i t s e l f . T h e o
logians have often described G o d as causa sui. N 0 doubt they often
meant n o m o r e b y this than that G o d does n o t causally derive his
existence f r o m anything else. B u t I suspect that they sometimes meant
that he causally derives his existence f r o m himself. As regards this
interpretation I have t w o comments to make. (1) I d o u b t whether any
clear positive idea corresponds t o the phrase ' d e r i v i n g one's existence
f r o m oneself. (2) I f this phrase has a clear positive meaning, I still do
not see w h a t justification there is f o r passing f r o m the negative p r o
position 'This does n o t causally derive its existence f r o m anything else'
to 'This causally derives its existence f r o m itself.' One w o u l d need the

premiss 'Everything that exists causally derives its existence either f r o m
itselfor f r o m something else.' B u t , even i f t h i s is intelligible, is i t i n the
least self-evident?
2.3 A r g u m e n t f r o m Pre-estabHshed H a r m o n y
W e m i g h t regard this as Leibniz's special f o r m o f the argument f r o m

ostensible teleology w i t h i n nature t o an architect or designer o f
nature. As Leibniz insists, i t w o u l d be m u c h stronger than the ordinary
f o r m o f t h i s argument, h i the first place, i t does n o t need as its premiss
questionable propositions about the inner teleology oforganisms or the
adaptation o f the rest o f nature t o the existence and progressive
development o f life and m i n d . T h e o n l y premiss that i t needs is that
everything appears t o interact w i t h everything else. This seems h i g h l y
plausible even o n purely physical grounds, w h e n w e consider the
pervasiveness o f gravitation, radiation, and other physical influences.
Secondly, i t avoids the objection w h i c h m i g h t be made t o the Cosmo
logical A r g u m e n t and the usual f o r m o f the A r g u m e n t f r o m Design,
viz. that, so far as these arguments go, there m i g h t be a number o f
Gods. For the Pre-established h a r m o n y between causally independent
substances, w h i c h is necessary t o account f o r the appearance o f u n i
versal interaction, could hardly have been arranged except b y a single
m i n d w h i c h could contemplate t h e m all and compare aU their states.
T h i r d l y , i t is often objected t o the ordinary f o r m o f the A r g u m e n t
f r o m Design that at best i t w o u l d suggest the existence o f an Architect
o f N a t u r e o f great, b u t n o t necessarily infinite, w i s d o m and power.
N o w i t is plain that, i f t h e doctrine ofPre-establisbed H a r m o n y be the
only w a y t o account f o r the appearance o f universal interaction, G o d
w i l l have t o be s o m e t h i n g m u c h m o r e than this. I n v i e w o f t h e infinite
number o f m o n a d s i n every b i t ofapparent matter, and i n v i e w o f t h e
fact that each m o n a d has an organism o f monads each o f w h i c h has i n
t u r n an organism o f monads, and so o n w i t h o u t end, G o d w i l l need
infinite cognitive powers t o keep his head. A n d i n v i e w o f Leibniz's
theory o f substance G o d w i l l have t o be a creator w h o creates the
monads at the start w i t h such natures that they w i l l aU u n f o l d indepen
dently and automatically i n accordance w i t h the Pre-established har
m o n y . Ofcourse i t seems t o me m u c h m o r e reasonable t o h o l d that the
ultimate substances i n the w o r l d never have begun t o exist and always
have interacted w i t h each other. B u t , i f y o u deny this, Leibniz's
argument for the existence o f G o d becomes v e r y strong. T h e alter-
THEOLOGY i57
native is an infinitely improbable chance correlation between the

histories o f an infinite number o f completely independent substances.
2.4 T h e A r g u m e n t about E t e r n a l T r u t h s
Leibniz's real meaning o n this p o i n t is not easy to grasp. The argument

w i l l be f o u n d i n Sections 43^5 inclusive o f the Monadology. 1
I will
collect his chief remarks and then t r y t o interpret them. ' G o d is the
source n o t o n l y o f existences but also o f essences, so far as they are
real.' H e is the source ' o f t h a t w h i c h is real i n the possible'. W i t h o u t
G o d 'there w o u l d be n o t h i n g real i n the possible'. There w o u l d be ' n o t
o n l y n o t h i n g existing but also n o t h i n g possible'. T h e reason w h i c h
Leibniz gives for these statements is that the reality o f essences or
possibilities or eternal truths 'must be founded o n something existing
and actual'. A n d he concludes that their reality must be founded o n the
existence o f a being whose essence involves his existence. H e then
adds, b y w a y o f w a r n i n g , that w e must n o t suppose, as Descartes and
others have done, that because the eternal truths are dependent o n
G o d , they are arbitrary and depend o n his w i l l . Necessary truths
'depend solely o n God's understanding, and are its internal object'.
Contingent truths do indeed depend o n his w i l l ; but even they are
n o t arbitrary, since the principle o f God's choice is that o f fit
ness.
These are the essential points o f Leibniz's doctrine. I t remains t o t r y
t o interpret i t . I n the first place I a m pretty sure that i t is completely
misunderstood b y Russell. Russell takes i t to mean that the eternal
2
truths are made true b y the fact that G o d k n o w s them. H e has n o

difficulty i n m a k i n g nonsense o f this; i t is i n fact plainly absurd that
the t r u t h o f a n y proposition should consist i n the fact that G o d or any
one else k n o w s or believes i t to be true. B u t , i n the first place, Leibniz
is hardly l i k e l y t o have made such a silly mistake. A n d , secondly,
Russell's interpretation w o u l d have n o application to essences, possi
bilities, etc. Y e t Leibniz is plainly referring just as m u c h to t h e m as t o
eternal truths. For he says that G o d is the source o f essence as w e l l as
existence, that he is the source o f the reality o f the possible, and so
on.
This suggests t o me that w h a t Leibniz had i n m i n d was somewhat
as follows. Possibilities that do n o t actually exist, essences that do not
have any actual instances, and propositions w h i c h apply n o t o n l y to
the actual but also t o the merely possible, are i n some sense real. T h e y
1
[G., V I , 614. Loemker, 647.] 2
i58 LEIBNIZ : AN INTRODUCTION
have some k i n d o f being; since they are the subjects o f true p r o

positions, and can be the objects o f acts o f contemplation, j u d g m e n t ,
etc. i n existent fmite minds. W h a t k i n d o f being can they have?
Plainly they cannot depend for their reality o n either characterizing
or being contemplated b y any ordinary created existent being. For, b y
hypothesis, they do n o t characterize anything that actually exists, and
they need n o t be contemplated b y any finite existent. Y e t i t seemed t o
Leibniz that they could n o t j u s t hang unsupported i n the air; that the
being o f possibilities, unexemplified characteristics, hypothetical facts,
etc., must depend i n some w a y o n something actually existent. A n d
his argument is that, since they must depend o n some actual existent
and cannot depend o n any finite, created, contingent existent, they
must depend o n an existent whose existence is entailed b y its essence.
Thus his doctrine comes to this: There must be an essence w h i c h
entails the existence o f an actual instance o f itself. Let us call this ' T h e
Supreme Essence' and let us call its instance 'The Intrinsically Neces
sary Existent'. T h e being o f a U other essences depends o n the existence
o f the Intrinsically Necessary Existent. The fact that certain o f these
other essences are exemplified i n finite created existents, and that the
rest o f t h e m are not, depends o n the will o f t h e mtrinsically Necessary
Existent. Leibniz is c o m m o n l y said to have held that the possible is
logically p r i o r t o the actually existent; and he has often been criticized
o n this ground. I f m y interpretation o f his A r g u m e n t about Eternal
Truths be r i g h t , his doctrine about the relations o f t h e possible and the
actually existent is n o t nearly so simple as this. T h e actually existent
must first be divided i n t o the created and the uncreated. These divisions
areexhaustive and exclusive. T h e possible is l o g i c a l l y p r i o r to the created
existent, i n the sense that the latter is the actualization o f one out o f a
number ofalternative possibilities aU o f w h i c h are equally real. B u t the
possible is n o t logically p r i o r to the «wcreöfeJexistent; for the being o f
aU these unactualized possibilities depends o n the existence o f t h e latter.
I f this be Leibniz's doctrine i t is at least n o t open t o the charge o f

being simply siUy, as i t w o u l d be o n Russell's interpretation o f i t . T h e
question o f w h a t k i n d o f b e i n g should be ascribed t o mere possibilities
and to purely hypothetical facts is a real p r o b l e m , and Leibniz's theory
o f God as the existent f r o m w h i c h aU possibilities derive their being is
one attempt t o solve i t . B u t , w h e n he goes i n t o details, he does lay
himself open to the k i n d o f charge that Russell makes. T h e possible
worlds and the eternal truths may, i n some w a y w h i c h w e cannot
understand, depend o n God's existence f o r their being. A n d they
w o u l d , n o doubt, also be contents o f God's intellect, i n the sense that
THEOLOGY i59
he w o u W contemplate the possibilities and w o u l d k n o w the etemal

truths. B u t the f o r m e r fact cannot possibly be reduced t o , or explained
i n terms of, the latter.
3 D e f e n c e o f G o d ' s character
Leibniz w r o t e the Theodicy m a i n l y t o show that the evil i n the w o r l d

is compatible w i t h its h a v i n g been created b y a perfectly g o o d and
wise being. W e had better begin w i t h Leibniz's doctrine o f evil. H e
distinguishes three kinds o f evil, w h i c h he caUs metaphysical, moral, and
physical. M o r a l evil is sin, and physical evil is pain. Metaphysical evil is
l i m i t a t i o n . Every m o n a d necessarily has i t , f o r i t is identical w i t h
materia prima. God, having every positive characteristic to the highest
possible degree, has n o metaphysical evil i n h i m . N o w Leibniz always
maintained that metaphysical evil is purely negative or p r i m i t i v e ; i t is
s i m p l y the extent t o w h i c h each m o n a d falls short o f God. One con
sequence o f this should be that every fmite m i n d is infinitely e v i l ; b u t
perhaps a g o o d m a n y theologians w o u l d n o t object t o this. N o w
metaphysical e v i l is supposed t o be fundamental, and physical and
m o r a l e v i l are supposed t o be dependent o n i t . Leibniz concluded that
sin and pain must be purely negative, since they are due to meta
physical evil, and this is purely negative.
W e m a y as w e l l criticize this theory at once. (1) There is a certain
a m b i g u i t y i n the w o r d ' e v i l ' , since i t m a y be used as a substantive, as
w h e n w e say that toothache is an evil, or as an adjective, viz. the ethical
characteristic c o m m o n and peculiar t o evils. N o w the doctrine o f the
negativity o f evil m i g h t mean that the characteristic 'evilness' is purely
negative, like blindness, i.e. that i t is just non-goodness. O r i t m i g h t
mean that, whilst 'evilness' is a positive characteristic, i t attaches t o
things o n l y i n v i r t u e o f w h a t they, lack and n o t i n v i r t u e o f anything
positive i n t h e m . Thus 'hungriness' is a positive characteristic, b u t i t
attaches to a person simply because he lacks f o o d . O f these t w o alter
natives I should say that b o t h are false, and that the first is ridiculous.
B u t Leibniz is forced t o take the first and m o r e ridiculous f o r m o f the
theory f o r the f o l l o w i n g reason. Goodness and evilness are opposites,
and o n his v i e w aU opposition reduces t o contradictory opposition.
N o w he wants t o h o l d that G o d is perfectly g o o d and n o t perfectly evil,
and that aU God's attributes are purely positive. B u t , i f goodness be
purely positive, and all opposition is to be contradictory opposition,
evilness must s i m p l y be non-goodness. (2) I t is plainly false that pain-
fulness is negative or that all pains are s i m p l y the absence ofsomething
positive. A n d i t is very a w k w a r d f o r a Christian to maintain that sin

fulness or sins are purely negative. Indeed a g o o d m a n y theologians
have been i n the unhappy position o f w a n t i n g sin to be negative i n
order that G o d m a y n o t be blamed f o r creating sinners, and w a n t i n g
i t to be positive i n order that he m a y be justified i n d a m n i n g t h e m .
(3) Even ifmetaphysical evil be purely negative, and i f i t be a necessary
condition o f physical and m o r a l evil, i t does n o t f o l l o w that these
consequences o f i t w i l l be purely negative. (4) Leibniz does n o t explain
i n detail h o w mere internal l i m i t a t i o n gives rise to sin, and still less does
he explain h o w i t gives rise t o pain. (5) I t is quite clear that materia
prima must be m o r e than mere lack o f s o m e t h i n g positive i f i t is to do
all the w o r k w h i c h Leibniz demands o f i t i n his physics, metaphysics,
and theory o f knowledge.
N o w i t is metaphysically necessary that any created universe should
contain some metaphysical evil. For any possible created universe must
consist o f monads, and any monad must have some degree o f con
fusion, i.e. some amount o f materia prima, and therefore some amount
ofmetaphysical evil. I t w o u l d also be necessary that any universe w h i c h
contained m o r e than one m o n a d should have the total metaphysical
evil i n i t unequally distributed. For t w o monads i n the same universe
must necessarily differ i n degree o f confusion and therefore i n amount
o f metaphysical evil. Leibniz seems to t h i n k i t obvious that, since
every possible w o r l d must contain some metaphysical evil, every
possible w o r l d must contain some sin and some pain. This, however,
does n o t seem t o f o l l o w f r o m the mere fact that sin and pain are due
to metaphysical evil. For i t seems possible that there should be a great
deal ofmetaphysical e v i l and n o m o r a l o r physical evil. Suppose, e.g.,
that the w o r l d had consisted o n l y o f bare monads, and had contained
n o animal souls and n o rational souls. T h e n there w o u l d have been a
great deal ofmetaphysical evil, since all these monads w o u l d have been
h i g h l y confused and bursting w i t h materia prima. B u t there w o u l d
certainly have been n o sin. A n d I do n o t t h i n k that Leibniz could h o l d
that there w o u l d have been any pain. For he distinctly says that pleasure
and pain are due t o noticeable furtherings or checkings o f appetition.
A n d this implies that they c o u l d n o t exist i n a being w h i c h had n o
clear consciousness. So i t seems t o m e that G o d w o u l d n o t have the
simple choice o f deciding t o create the w o r l d w i t h the least possible
amount ofmetaphysical evil. H e m i g h t have to balance the three kinds
o f evil against each other, even t h o u g h the other t w o w o u l d n o t be
there unless there were metaphysical evil. H o w e v e r , Leibniz does n o t
consider these complications.
THEOLOGY l6l
T h e situation before G o d is therefore the f o l l o w i n g . I t is logically

impossible f o r h i m t o create a w o r l d w i t h o u t metaphysical evil i n i t .
A n d he cannot do w h a t is logicaUy impossible. N o w G o d is perfectly
good. For Leibniz has assumed that, o f the t w o opposites g o o d and
evil, g o o d is the positive one; and G o d is the being w h o has aU posi
tive characteristics to the highest degree. A g a i n , G o d cannot choose
capriciously. I t is a necessary t r u t h that there must be a sufficient reason
for anything that actually takes place; and so there must be a sufficient
reason f o r God's decision to create rather than to abstain f r o m creating,
and there must be a sufficient reason f o r God's decision t o create this
w o r l d rather than any o f the other possible worlds. N o w , for a per
fectly g o o d and wise being w h o has t w o alternatives A and B open to
h i m the o n l y possible sufficient reason f o r preferring A to B w o u l d be
the superior goodness on the w h o l e o f A to B. This consideration is
necessary and sufficient t o determine the choice o f such a being. T h e
doctrine o f the purely negative nature o f evil comes i n over the
question W h y d i d G o d decide t o create rather than n o t t o create,
seeing that there is necessarily some evil i n every possible universe?
I f evil be something positive w e should have t o show that i n one at
least o f the possible universes there is a balance o f g o o d over evU. I t is
very difficult t o see h o w this could be shown. B u t w i t h Leibniz's v i e w
o f evil i t is n o t necessary t o show this. A n y universe w o u l d be better
than none. For i t w o u l d have something positive i n i t and this w o u l d
be g o o d , whilst the evil i n i t w o u l d o n l y be w h a t i t lacked. There can
be n o question o f a balance between something positive and a mere
negation. T h e fact that w e aU do consider that g o o d and evil balance
against each other, and that the mere absence o f any universe w o u l d
not be a positive evil b u t merely an absence oibothgood and evil, shows
that Leibniz's doctrine is at variance w i t h the facts. A n d o f course he
does n o t consistently keep to anything so absurd. B u t i t is his o n l y
g r o u n d f o r showing that God, w h o could have abstained f r o m creat
i n g , acted r i g h t l y i n creating rather than abstaining.
Granted that any universe is better than none at aU, G o d has n o w

o n l y t o decide which one he w i l l create. A n d here his decision is deter
m i n e d simply b y the relative amounts o f metaphysical perfection i n
each. I t is plain that the doctrine comes i n the end to this, that G o d w i l l
create as m u c h as is logically possible f o r h i m t o create. I n this, I
suppose, intensity and degree w i l l have to be counted as w e l l as mere
n u m b e r o f substances and states. E v e r y t h i n g positive is w h o l l y g o o d ;
and the m o r e there is o f i t , and the greater the intensity o f anything
that has intensive magnitude, the m o r e goodness there w i l l be. N o w ,
i f o n e tries to t h i n k this out, i t becomes v e r y difficult t o see h o w G o d is

l i m i t e d at aU. W e are explicitly t o l d that he is l i m i t e d o n l y b y the
laws o f logic and pure mathematics. H e is n o t subject to physical
necessity, i.e. he is n o t faced w i t h an alien and independent material
w i t h laws and properties o f its o w n . N o r is there any question o f h a v i n g
a l i m i t e d space or d u r a t i o n or amount o f material at his disposal.
Lastly, w e are explicitly t o l d that, i n the end, all opposition is purely
contradictory opposition, i.e. the sort o f opposition w h i c h there is
between the presence and the absence o f something. I f so, surely aU
that is positive i n each o f the possible w o r l d s must be compossible.
T h e incompossibility between t w o possible w o r l d s W and W can ± 2
consist o n l y i n the fact that some positive factor F is present i n W x
and absent i n W or present i n W and absent i n W Since there can

2 2 v
be no i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y between the positive features i n W and W

x 2
G o d can create at once aU that is positive i n b o t h . H e ought t o do so, i f

aU that is positive is w h o l l y good. A n d , as a perfectly g o o d being w h o
is m o r a l l y necessitated to do the best that is open to h i m , he is m o r a l l y
necessitated to do this. Thus, i n the end, Leibniz ought to come to the
same conclusion as Spinoza, viz. that aU that is possible is actual. M o r e
over, there can be n o possible reason w h y G o d should have p u t o f f
creating the best possible w o r l d ; f o r any delay i n creating i t means so
m u c h less positive existence, and therefore o n Leibniz's v i e w , so m u c h
less goodness and m o r e evil. I t w o u l d therefore seem that G o d cannot
have existed before he created the w o r l d , and so the w o r l d must be
co-eternal w i t h h i m . So i t seems to me that, i f L e i b n i z had consistently
developed this side o f h i s system, he w o u l d have reached a result w h i c h
w o u l d h a r d l y differ f r o m Spinozism so far as concerns the relations o f
G o d and the w o r l d .
I t w i l l be noticed that Leibniz's O p t i m i s m , o f w h i c h so m u c h f u n

has been made b y Voltaire and others, comes t o very little. N o doubt
Leibniz said that this is the best o f a U possible worlds, and n o d o u b t this
sounds fatuously optimistic i n v i e w o f t h e enormous amount o f m o r a l
and physical evil w h i c h i t contains. B u t , quite apart f r o m the doctrine
o f the negativity o f evil, i t is compatible w i t h this w o r l d being ex
tremely bad and even containing a balance o f evil. For i t merely
asserts that any other possible w o r l d w o u l d have contained a greater
balance o f evil. T h e fact is that Leibniz was m u c h m o r e concerned t o
save God's character than t o take an optimistic v i e w o f the actual
w o r l d . So l o n g as the actual w o r l d contained the slightest positive
balance o f good over evil, and so l o n g as i t c o u l d be s h o w n t o be
logicaUy impossible that any alternative w o r l d w o u l d have contained a
THEOLOGY l63
greater balance, God's character is saved. A n d this was all that Leibniz
cared about.
Can anything be made o f s u c h a theory as Leibniz's? (1) h i the first
place, w e should have to drop the doctrine that the characteristic o f
evilness is negative, that i t is merely the absence o f goodness. W e
m i g h t , however, t r y t o keep the doctrine that, although evihiess is a
positive characteristic, yet evils are aU negative. T h e o n l y f o r m i n
w h i c h this could possibly be maintained is, I t h i n k , the f o l l o w i n g . I t
w o u l d have to mean that a t h i n g or event has the positive ethical
characteristic o f evUness o n l y i n v i r t u e o f its negative non-ethical
characteristics, i.e. because o f w h a t i t is n o t and n o t because o f a n y t h i n g
that i t is. Even this is plainly unsatisfactory. B o t h a stone and a selfish
m a n lack love o f t h e i r neighbours. W e call the m a n evil i n v i r t u e o f t h i s
negative characteristic, b u t w e do n o t call the stone evil. Thus, even
i f a negative non-ethical characteristic be necessary, i t is never sufficient,
to give a t h i n g the ethical characteristic o f evilness. A t the very most
w e can say that a t h i n g is never evil o n account o f its positive n o n -
ethical qualities alone; i t is always the combination o f c e r t a i n negative
non-ethical characteristics w i t h certain positive ones w h i c h makes i t
evil. Thus the o n l y f o r m o f t h e doctrine o f t h e negativity o f e v i l w h i c h
could possibly be maintained is this: 'Evilness is as positive an ethical
characteristic as goodness; and a t h i n g must exist, and have certain
positive non-ethical characteristics, i n order to be evil, just as m u c h as
i n order to be good. B u t i t is never evil merely i n respect o f i t s positive
n o n e t h i c a l characteristics. Its evilness is always due to the c o m
bination o f certain negative non-ethical characteristics w i t h its positive
non-ethical characteristics. O n the other hand, i f a t h i n g is good, i t is
so i n v i r t u e o f its purely positive non-ethical characteristics. I t is never
good i n v i r t u e o f what i t lacks.' I t must be noted that, o n this v i e w ,
a universe m i g h t quite w e l l contain a balance o f evil. For i t m i g h t n o t
be particularly g o o d i n v i r t u e o f i t s purely positive non-ethical charac
teristics, and i t m i g h t be very evil i n v i r t u e o f t h e combination o f w h a t
i t lacks w i t h w h a t i t has. Thus a sane interpretation o f the negativity
o f evil gives n o countenance to the v i e w that any universe is better
than n o universe at aU. N 0 universe at all means n o value and n o dis-
value. A n d , as w e have j u s t seen, a universe m a y have a balance o f
evil.
(2) C o u l d Leibniz have dropped the negativity o f evil and still have
defended God's character? Leibniz's defence o f G o d ' s w i s d o m and g o o d
ness is t o l i m i t his power. B u t he wants to l i m i t i t only t o the extent
that G o d cannot p e r f o r m logical and metaphysical impossibilities.
A n d he wants G o d t o be a creator and n o t a mere architect, and t o

have created o f deliberate choice and n o t f r o m metaphysical necessity.
N o w i t is o f course easy t o save God's goodness and w i s d o m , w i t h o u t
assuming that evil is i n any sense negative, provided y o u are w i U -
i n g t o l i m i t his p o w e r enough. I f y o u w i l l admit that he d i d n o t
create his materials, b u t was faced w i t h independent materials w i t h
laws and properties o f their o w n , y o u can always say that he d i d his
best and that Gods can do n o more. B u t this o f course makes G o d a
mere architect, and makes h i m l i m i t e d b y physical as w e l l aslogical
or metaphysical necessity. A g a i n , i f y o u suppose that G o d could n o t
help creating w h a t he d i d create, y o u can save his w i s d o m and goodness
w i t h o u t l i m i t i n g his p o w e r further and w i t h o u t needing t o assume
that evil is i n any sense negative. B u t this w o u l d have removed almost
the last trace o f difference between Leibniz's G o d and Spinoza's. I a m
inclined t o t h i n k that the doctrine o f t h e negativity o f e v i l was essential
i f Leibniz was t o defend the character o f a deliberately creative G o d
whose p o w e r is l i m i t e d o n l y b y logical and metaphysical necessity.
For he had t o show that any created universe was better than none at
aU, and that i t is logicaUy impossible that any created universe should
have been better than the actual one. A n d I do n o t see h o w he could
hope to have p r o v e d either proposition w i t h o u t his o w n special f o r m
o f t h e doctrine o f t h e negativity o f e v i l . Since the doctrine, i n the f o r m
i n w h i c h he has t o h o l d i t , is plainly ridiculous, he succeeds neither
i n defending God's character n o r i n showing that the actual universe
does n o t contain a balance o f evil.
( 3 ) Before leaving the subject there is one other p o i n t w o r t h m e n

t i o n i n g . I n comparing possible worlds i t w o u l d be necessary t o d i s -
tinguish the total value in a w o r l d and the total value of a w o r l d . T h e
former w o u l d consist i n the virtuee, happiness, etc. o f e a c h individual.
The latter w o u l d consist i n the value o f the society f o r m e d b y these
individuals. T h e value o f a society w o u l d o f course depend i n part o n
the values i n i t ; b u t i t w o u l d also depend t o a large extent o n the
relations o f the individuals t o each other and t o G o d . Since Leibniz
denies the reality o f relations he m i g h t have argued that there is n o
value of a universe as distinct f r o m the value in i t . B u t , w h e n he is
discussing ethics and theology, he forgets about the denial o f relations.
A n d there are passages i n w h i c h he does take the line that a w h o l e m a y
be perfect t h o u g h the parts are n o t . This plainly does introduce the
n o t i o n o f the value of a w h o l e as distinct f r o m the value in i t . A n d ,
however inconsistent i t m a y be w i t h his denial o f relations, he ex
p l i c i t l y says that the rational souls i n the universe f o r m a spiritual
THEOLOGY l65
c o m m u n i t y w i t h G o d as their k i n g . This is the o r i g i n o f Kant's c o n

ception o f t h e K i n g d o m o f E n d s . I w i l l conclude b y saying something
about this.
4 The Kingdom ofEnds
Leibniz always made i t a great merit o f h i s philosophy that i t reconciled

teleology and final causation, o n the one hand, w i t h mechanism and
efficient causation, o n the other. T h e situation o n this subject at his
t i m e was r o u g h l y as follows. T h e Scholastics had made great use o f the
concepts o f end and o f final causation. W i t h Descartes they have been
almost completely pushed out o f the created w o r l d . W i t h i n the w o r l d
they have n o place except i n the v o l u n t a r y action o f h u m a n beings.
E v e r y t h i n g else is to be explained mechanically, and i t remains ex
tremely paradoxical that h u m a n minds can interfere w i t h this u n i
versal mechanism even to the extent o f i n i t i a t i n g b o d i l y movements b y
their volitions. B u t G o d does act f r o m final causes. H e creates and
arranges matter and the laws o f matter i n such a w a y that his designs
shall be carried o u t b y purely mechanical processes. Spinoza eliminated
final causation b o t h f r o m the finite i n d i v i d u a l and f r o m G o d . T h e
finite modes have w i l l , b u t they are n o t really m o v e d b y desires f o r
ends. T h e y are simply pushed b y impulses, w h i c h create the illusion
that ends are being desired. A n d t o ascribe w i l l and designs t o G o d is
as absurd as to ascribe figure and m o t i o n t o h i m . N o w Leibniz saw
clearly that scientific explanation o f natural phenomena had t o be b y
mechanism and efficient causation, and that there was n o hope o f g o i n g
back t o Scholasticism o n this point. O n the other hand, i t seemed clear
t o h i m that there was final causation b o t h within the universe and of
the universe. A n d he claimed that his theory o f monads d i d justice t o
b o t h these facts.
A c c o r d i n g to Leibniz there are t w o harmonies w i t h i n the w o r l d ,

viz. a h a r m o n y between efficient and final causation, and a h a r m o n y
between the k i n g d o m o f nature and the k i n g d o m o f grace. B o t h these
harmonies are u l t i m a t e l y due to the fundamental Pre-established har
m o n y between aU the monads and t o God's choice o f the best o f aU
possible w o r l d s .
4.1 Efficient a n d final causation
T h e h a r m o n y between efficient and final causation is most f u l l y stated

i n the Monadology, sections 7 8 - 8 1 . The empirical facts w i t h w h i c h

1
Leibniz is here concerned are those w h i c h have led people t o deny the
possibility o f i n t e r a c t i o n between the h u m a n soul and the h u m a n body.
The facts are that the h u m a n b o d y seems to be a physical system sub
ject to the general principles ofmechanics such as the conservation o f
energy and m o m e n t u m . Descartes had held that this excludes all action
o f t h e m i n d o n the b o d y except that i t can change the direction o f t h e
f l o w o f animal spirits i n the brain b y m o v i n g the pineal gland i n
various directions. Leibniz argued that even this w o u l d be impossible
because, although such action w o u l d be compatible w i t h the c o n
servation o£vis viva, i t w o u l d n o t be compatible w i t h the conservation
o f angular momentum. Y e t o f course the soul seems t o m o v e certain
parts o f the b o d y at w i l l . Leibniz sums up the situation b y saying that
'bodies act as i f ( w h i c h is impossible) there were n o souls, souls act as i f
there were n o bodies, and b o t h act as i f they influenced each other'.
H e also says that 'souls act according t o the laws o f final causes, b y
appetitions, ends, and means. Bodies act i n accordance w i t h the laws
o f efficient causes or o f m o t i o n . A n d the t w o realms, that o f efficient
causes and that o f f i n a l causes, are i n h a r m o n y w i t h each other.'
N o w I t h i n k that his reconciliation o f efficient and final causation
may be stated as follows. Strictly speaking, aU causation is final, i.e.
aU causes are o f the nature o f desire or impulse and aU effects are p r o
cesses w h i c h are started b y desire or impulse and w h i c h tend t o b r i n g
about its satisfaction. W h a t appears as a b i t o f matter, whether i t be a
h u m a n b o d y or anything else, is a set o f v e r y confused minds. A n d w h a t
appear as changes i n a b i t o f matter are changes w h i c h these minds
produce i n themselves b y impulses and desires. N o w all these changes
i n the l o w e r monads are subject to certain general l i m i t i n g conditions.
Since the changes are reaUy psychical these general l i m i t i n g conditions
must reaUy be psychological laws about the mental processes w h i c h are
initiated b y unsatisfied desire and w h i c h lead t o satisfy the desire. B u t ,
since the changes are misperceived as motions o f matter under the
action o f external forces, these psychological laws w i l l appear t o us
as the general laws o f m o t i o n . N o w these laws are contingent. T h e y
h o l d i n the actual w o r l d , b u t different laws m i g h t have held. A n d at
this point the n o t i o n o f final cause enters again i n another way. Since
the laws m i g h t have been different, their actual f o r m must be due to the
fact that G o d saw that a w o r l d i n w h i c h these laws held w o u l d be o n
the w h o l e better than a w o r l d i n w h i c h any other laws had held.
Leibniz thought that the fact that the actual laws can be expressed i n
1
[ G . , V I , 6 2 0 - 1 . L o e m k e r , 651.]
THEOLOGY l67
terms ofprinciples ofconservationand o f m i n i m u m p r i n c i p l e s w a s asign

that they result f r o m the volitions o f a g o o d and wise being and are n o t
metaphysically necessary. Leibniz never tells us w h a t the psychological
laws are w h i c h appear t o us as such principles as the conservation o f
energy and o f m o m e n t u m . A n d , granted that a g o o d and wise being
w o u l d choose laws w h i c h take the f o r m o f conservation-principles
and minimum-principles, i t is n o t obvious w h y he should decide that
momentum and energy should be conserved rather than the other
physical magnitudes w h i c h are n o t conserved.
T h e position then is this. Strictly speaking, all action is b y final
causes, and the laws w h i c h govern i t are psychological laws. B u t o n l y
the higher monads, viz. animal souls and rational spirits, appear to us
to act f r o m final causes. T h e l o w e r monads, or rather certain groups
o f t h e m , appear as matter; their changes appear as the movements o f
matter determined b y efficient causation; and the laws w h i c h govern
these changes appear as the laws o f m o t i o n . Yet, even w h e n w e see the
laws i n this partly distorted f o r m w e can see that they are the results
of final causation b y God, t h o u g h w e cannot see that they are laws
about final causation i n created substances. For their f o r m irresistibly
suggests that they are n o t metaphysically necessary, b u t result f r o m
the deliberate choice o f a wise and g o o d being. N o w this being, w h e n
he created the monads, adjusted the states o f a U o f t h e m to each other.
W h e n the soul o f a given organism explicitly desires an end and takes
means to attain i t , the w h o l e causal process is really i n itself. B u t the
monads i n its organism w i l l meanwhile go t h r o u g h a parallel series
ofchanges, w h i c h w i l l appear as the appropriate movements o f l i m b s ,
etc. A n d all these changes w i l l be subject to those general laws w h i c h ,
w h e n stated i n phenomenal terms, are the laws o f m o t i o n . T o us i t
appears that the process starts w i t h a desire i n the soul, that this affects
the b o d y and sets up changes i n the outer w o r l d , and that finally these
affect the soul and produce changes w h i c h satisfy the desire. (Cf., e.g.,
the case o f a m a n designing a house and getting i t built.) B u t this is a
delusion. There is one process o f c h a n g e w h i c h is w h o l l y i n the soul,
and w h i c h starts w i t h the desire and ends w i t h the satisfaction. Parallel
w i t h this there is a process o f change i n the monads o f the organism,
and i n other monads. A n d this appears as appropriate movements o f t h e
organism and o f foreign bodies, subject to the laws o f m o t i c n . T h a t
these t w o independent series agree i n the w a y i n w h i c h they do is due
to the particular arrangements w h i c h G o d made w h e n he originally
established the h a r m o n y between aU the monads at creation. The
theory m a y . b e illustrated b y the f o l l o w i n g diagram, where crosses
represent events i n a r u l i n g m o n a d , and noughts represent events i n

those monads w h i c h are misperceived as its b o d y and as foreign
matter. The full arrows represent the real causal relation, and the dotted
arrows represent the apparent causal relation. Leibniz's doctrine, that
w h a t appears t o us as mechanical and physical laws are really psycho-
Desire Fulfilment
X » X
ι
ι ι
ι ι
ι ι
0 o—•^—0 »-0 • 0
logical laws o f m i n d s o f a very l o w order w h i c h are slaves o f h a b i t and
association, is taken u p and w o r k e d out m o r e f u l l y b y W a r d , i n his
Pluralism and Theism.
1
W a r d makes i t m o r e plausible b y the f o l l o w i n g
consideration. E v e n i f w e take the ordinary scientific v i e w o f atoms
and molecules as being entirely non-mental, w e must admit that the
laws ofphysics and mechanics are n o t laws about individual atoms and
molecules. T h e smallest b i t o f matter that we could possibly perceive
and experiment w i t h is a collection o f many millions o f atoms and
molecules. Consequently the laws o f physics and mechanics must, o n
any v i e w , be regarded as statements about statistical averages. If, then,
the atoms and molecules be really mental substances, the laws o f
physics and mechanics must be compared, n o t w i t h the psychological
laws w h i c h govern individual minds, b u t w i t h statisticd laws about
large collections o f minds. The conservation o f energy, e.g., is c o m
parable t o the fact that the p r o p o r t i o n o f the inhabitants o f England
w h o m a r r y or c o m m i t suicide i n each year is practically constant. W e
k n o w that individuals have the most varied motives f o r m a r r y i n g and
c o m m i t t i n g suicide, and yet this fact is compatible w i t h the p r o p o r t i o n
ofmarriages and suicides f o r any large c o m m u n i t y keeping practically
constant. I f this be so w i t h communities o f minds at the h u m a n level,
i t is afortiori likely that collections o f minds at the level o f b a r e monads
w o u l d exhibit statistical uniformities. There is n o t h i n g i n this argument
w h i c h Leibniz could n o t have accepted, and i t certainly very m u c h
strengthens his case. M o n i s m about differentiating attributes, i f i t can
be made t o w o r k , is certainly m o r e satisfactory t o the intellect than
1
rjames Ward, The Realm qfEnds: orPluralism and Theism (Cambridge, 1911).]
THEOLOGY l69
dualism or pluralism. A n d a mentalistic type o f m o n i s m about differen

tiating attributes is certainly m o r e satisfactory than a materialistic type,
provided i t w i l l give a plausible explanation o f the laws o f mechanics
and physics. For i t seems quite impossible to explain the higher types
o f mental fact materialistically, whilst i t does n o t seem impossible t o
regard physical and chemical laws as statistical uniformities about v e r y
large collections o f v e r y stupid minds. N o w i t does seem impossible
to regard minds as mere occurrents i n a single continuant; and so, i f
w e adopt mentalistic m o n i s m about differentiating attributes, w e are
almost forced t o adopt substantial pluralism. Thus a combination o f a
mentalistic m o n i s m about attributes w i t h pluralism about substances
is perhaps the most plausible f o r m f o r a system o f speculative p h i l o
sophy to take, i f i t is t o be intelligible and to do justice to all k n o w n
aspects o f the universe. I t does n o t o f course f o l l o w , nor is i t very
likely, that i t is the w h o l e t r u t h and n o t h i n g b u t the t r u t h ; b u t i t m a y
w e l l be the best a p p r o x i m a t i o n to the t r u t h that h u m a n beings i n their
present life can reach. W e must remember the extremely n a r r o w basis
f r o m w h i c h all attempts at speculative philosophy b y human beings
must start. W e can describe and interpret the w o r l d intelligibly t o o u r
selves o n l y i n terms o f w h a t w e are directly acquainted w i t h . N o w
each o f us is directly acquainted w i t h t w o and o n l y t w o things, viz.
(1) his sense-fields and the relations and changes o f r e l a t i o n among the
sensa i n these fields, and (2) his o w n m i n d , its experiences and activities,
and the relations and changes o f relation between these. A n y theory
o f the universe w h i c h w e can either make or understand must describe
the universe b y analogy w i t h one or other or a m i x t u r e o f these t w o
objects o f d i r e c t acquaintance. This is a beggarly equipment f o r so vast
an undertaking, and this fact makes i t unreasonable t o attach m u c h
w e i g h t to any system o f speculative philosophy. B u t no h u m a n being
can step outside these limitations, and the desire t o f o r m a coherent
theory o f the universe seems to be innate i n h u m a n beings. W e must
thereforejudge systems ofspeculative philosophy b y w h a t they accom
plish w i t h the available materials, and n o t b y some super-human
standard w h i c h is n o m o r e attainable b y the critics than b y the author.
A n d , w i t h i n these limits, a system like Leibniz's must be given a very
h i g h place.
4.2 N a t u r e a n d grace
W e come n o w t o the second h a r m o n y w i t h i n the universe, viz. the

h a r m o n y between the realm o f nature and the realm o f grace. The
realm o f nature consists o f the non-rational monads, i.e. the bare

monads w h i c h appear t o us as matter and the animal souls. T h e realm
o f grace consists o f rational monads and God. I t thus includes h u m a n
spirits and any rational created beings above the h u m a n level, e.g.
angels and devils. O w i n g t o the fact that the rational spirits t o some
extent m i r r o r G o d and have conscious desires and can act o n principles,
they f o r m a society, whilst the other monads do n o t . God stands i n the
relation o f creator and architect t o the w h o l e created w o r l d , b u t he
stands i n an additional relation t o the realm o f rational spirits, viz.
that o f a governor. The spirits can to some extent understand the
nature and purposes o f God. T h e y k n o w that he exists, that he is
perfectly good and wise, and that they ought to obey h i m . A n d they
can either deliberately t r y t o obey h i m and carry out his designs or
they can deliberately set themselves i n opposition t o h i m . T h e y can
therefore be j u s t l y rewarded or punished b y h i m . N o w Leibniz holds
that the rewarding o f g o o d spirits and the punishment o f b a d spirits is
not accomplished b y special miraculous interventions w h i c h G o d
makes f r o m t i m e t o t i m e . G o d foresaw all the g o o d actions and all the
bad actions w h i c h spirits w o u l d p e r f o r m i n the w h o l e course o f h i s t o r y
w h e n he created t h e m . A n d he so arranged the monads w h i c h appear
as matter that the spirits w o u l d automatically be punished or rewarded
at the r i g h t t i m e b y the ordinary laws o f n a t u r e . E.g. the monads w h i c h
appear as matter were so designed and arranged b y G o d at their
creation that their o w n internal development w o u l d have reached the
stage w h i c h appeared as the Flood b y the t i m e that h u m a n spirits had
reached the degree o f wickedness that justified a universal deluge as a
punishment. This is what Leibniz means b y the h a r m o n y between the
realm o f n a t u r e and the realm ofgrace.
T h e f o l l o w i n g comments may be made o n this theory, ( i ) T h e

conception o f a c o m m u n i t y o f spirits w i t h G o d as their k i n g seems
meaningless unless there be real relations b o t h between one spirit and
another and between the spirits and God. (2) Since there are n o causal
relations between different substances the reward o f the g o o d and the
punishment o f the w i c k e d b y events i n the material w o r l d must be an
illusion. N 0 one can really have been d r o w n e d b y the Flood. T h e
w i c k e d at that t i m e had a characteristic k i n d o f painful experience
w h i c h they mistakenly attributed t o the action o f w a t e r o n their bodies.
B u t really i n each o f t h e m the painful experience must have been
completely caused b y his o w n previous mental states, conscious and
unconscious. T h e fact that the monads w h i c h appear as matter had
then reached the stage o f development w h i c h appeared as the Flood
THEOLOGY i7i
was causaUy quite irrelevant. (3) This raises the general question: W h y
d i d G o d create non-rational monads at aU? T h e ordinary theist can say
that, although matter has no intrinsic value, yet i t has an instrumental
value. I t supplies rational spirits w i t h pleasures and pains, and w i t h a
field for their inventive, constructive, and artistic activities. A n d these
have intrinsic value. B u t Leibniz cannot consistently take this v i e w .
For the monads w h i c h , w h e n suitably grouped together, appear t o
rational souls as matter can neither act u p o n n o r be acted u p o n b y
rational souls. T h e y have therefore neither intrinsic n o r instrumental
value, and i t is difficult t o see w h y G o d should have created t h e m . T o
this Leibniz w o u l d certainly have answered that mere quantity o f
existence is a metaphysical good. A n d he w o u l d have said that the
infinite c o m p l e x i t y o f the realm o f nature is valuable as manifesting
the infinite power and w i s d o m o f G o d even t h o u g h i t does n o t other
wise affect created spirits for g o o d or i l l .
C o u l d he have gone further than this? N o t , I t h i n k , so l o n g as he
held the theory ofrepresentative perception. A c c o r d i n g to that theory
G o d could have given t o any m o n a d all those perceptions w h i c h i n
fact correspond t o other monads and their states, even t h o u g h he had
created n o other m o n a d b u t i t . So whatever value m a y accrue t o a
m o n a d t h r o u g h the internal c o m p l e x i t y and arrangement o f its ex
periences could have arisen even t h o u g h i t had been the o n l y monad
that was ever created. B u t I have said earlier that i t seems t o m e that
Leibniz could consistently have held a theory o f direct perception,
t h o u g h I a m practically certain that he d i d n o t i n fact do so. N o w , o n
that v i e w o f perception, there w o u l d have been an additional reason
for creating those monads w h i c h , w h e n suitably grouped, are mis
perceived b y us as bits o f m a t t e r . For, i f t h e theory o f d i r e c t perception
were true, each m o n a d w o u l d be directly, b u t confusedly and i n many
cases unconsciously, acquainted w i t h every other monad. Its sense-
field at any m o m e n t w o u l d actually consist of aU the other monads; i t
w o u l d n o t consist o f states o f itself representative o f all the other
monads. Therefore, o n this v i e w , i t w o u l d be impossible f o r the
experience o f a m o n a d t o have the c o m p l e x i t y and richness w h i c h i t
does have unless the other monads, w h i c h are the immediate objects o f
its perceptions, existed for i t t o perceive. O n this v i e w i t w o u l d still be
the case that the monads w h i c h , w h e n grouped i n certain ways are 3
perceived as matter do n o t affect spirits causally for g o o d or i l l . B u t ,

unless they had existed for spirits to perceive, the experiences ofspirits
w o u l d have been infinitely poorer i n content and complexity. O n these
lines I t h i n k that Leibniz could have explained, consistently w i t h his
doctrine that n o m o n a d can causally influence any other, w h y G o d

should have created the monads w h i c h appear as matter. A n d I cannot
t h i n k o f any other w a y i n w h i c h he could have done so. B u t i n fact
that line o f explanation is n o t open t o h i m , because i t seems quite
certain that he held the theory ofrepresentative perception and n o t the
theory o f direct acquaintance o f one m o n a d w i t h others.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ΝΟΤΕ
I n his list o f Leibniz's principal philosophical w o r k s B r o a d refers t o

editions w h i c h are n o t easily accessible. T h e reader m a y therefore find
it helpful t o have a list o f those w o r k s i n the m o r e w i d e l y available
C. I . Gerhardt's Die Philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz, vols.
I - V I I (Berlin, 1 8 7 5 ^ 0 ) .
I n the f o l l o w i n g list I also give, i n each case, a currently available
English translation. W i t h the exception o f Theodicy I always refer t o
L . E. Loemker's G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters (2nd ed.,
Dordrecht, 1969); b u t i n a f e w cases I also m e n t i o n other translations.
1 Discours de metaphysique. G., I V , 427-63. Loemker, 303-30.
M e n t i o n shouldalsobe made ofthe f o l l o w i n g i m p o r t a n t e d i t i o n .
Leibniz: Discours de metaphysique, edition coUationnee avec le texte
autographe presentee et annotee par H e n r i Lestienne (Paris, 1907;
reprinted 1 9 2 9 ) . A n Englishtranslation based m a i n l y o n this edition
is Leibniz: Discourse on Metaphysics, trans, b y Peter G. Lucas and
Leslie G r i n t (Manchester, 1953). Loemker's translation is based
m a i n l y o n Gerhardt, b u t takes account o f t h e edition b y Lestienne.
2 Correspondence with Arnauld. G., I I , 11-138.
The Leibniz-Arnuald Correspondence, ed. and trans, b y H . T .
Mason (Manchester, 1967). Selections i n Loemker, 331-50, 359¬
62.
3 The New System. G., I V , 477-87. Loemker, 4 5 3 ^ .
Loemker's translation is o f the original text as printed i n the
Journal des Savants, 27 June 1695, and reproduced i n G. W.
Leibniz: Ausgewählte Philosophische Schriften im Originaltext, her
ausgegeben v o n H e r m a n Schmalenbach, v o l . I (Leipzig, 1914),
119-31. Gerhardt gives a later version.
4 Controversy with Pierre Bayle. G., I V , 517-71.
Selections i n Loemker, 492-7, 574-85.
5 Letters to John Bernoulli. These are lacking i n G., but are included
i n G. M . , I I I , 113-973.
Selections i n Loemker, 515-41.
6 Letters to de Voider. G., I I , 153-283.
Selections i n Loemker, 515-41.
7 Letters to des Bosses. G., I I , 291-521.

Selections i n Loemker, 596^617.
8 Theodicy. G., V I , 21-463.
Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and
the Origin of Evil by G. W. Leibniz, trans, b y E. M . H u g g a r d
(London, 1952).
9 Principles of Nature and of Grace. G., V I , 598-606.
Loemker, 636-42.
10 Monadology. G., V I , 607-23.
Loemker, 643-53.
11 Correspondence with Clarke. G., V I I , 352-440.
The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, ed. b y H . G. Alexander
(Manchester, 1956). Loemker, 675-721. Loemker omits Clarke's
Fifth Reply.
I N D E X OF PROPER N A M E S
A n s e l m , St, 151 J o h n s o n , W . E . , 6 0 - 1 , 104

Aquinas, St T h o m a s , 125
A r c h i m e d e s , 28 K a n t , 5, 9 3 , 140, 165
A r i s t o t l e , 2 - 3 , 88
A r n a u l d , 2, 4, 7 - 8 , 1 3 - 1 5 . 7 1 - 2 , 7 6 . 78, L e e u w e n h o e k , 86
84 L o b a c h e v s k i , 17
L o c k e , 3, 130, 134, 1 3 7 - 4 1 . 147
B a c o n , I , 3, 4 9 Lotze, 5
Bayle, 4,148
B e r k e l e y , 91 M a l e b r a n c h e , 2 - 3 , 53, 1 1 9 - 2 1
BernouUi, John, 2 , 4 M c T a g g a r t , 5, 39, 149
B o s c o v i c h , 73, 93 M i U , 18
Boyle, 2
N e w t o n , 3, 56, 6 0 , 6 6 - 7 , 71, 105
C l a r k e , S a m u e l , 2 - 3 , 5 , 4 0 - 1 , 56, 5 8 , 6 0 ,
r04 Paley, r47
C o r d e m o y , 73, 82, 92 Pascal, 2
C o u t u r a t , 2 8 , 30 Plato, 2-3
des Bosses, 2, 4, 124 Rorarius, 4

Descartes, 3 , 4 4 , 4 9 , 52-4, 5 6 , 6 3 , 6 7 , 6 9 ,
R u s s e U , 4 3 , 153, 1 5 5 , 1 5 7 - 8
71, 82, 105, r 1 8 - 1 9 , 1 2 1 - 2 , 130, 134,
1 3 7 - 8 , 1 4 8 - 5 1 , 165
Schuller, 2
des M a i s e a u x , 4
S p i n o z a , 2 - 3 , 2 9 , 53, 9 2 - 4 , 1 1 9 - 2 2 , 1 4 4 ,
E u d i d , 17, 33 1 4 8 - 5 0 , 154, 162, 164-5

S w a m m e r d a m , 86
G a h l e o , 52, 6 9 Tschirnhausen, 2
Grassmann, 3
V o i d e r , de, 2, 4, 9 2
Herbart, 5 V o l t a i r e , 5, 162
Hessen-Rheinfels, v o n , 4
H o b b e s , 2 - 3 , 4 9 , 124 W a r d , 5, 168
Hume, 5 W u s o n , J o h n , 18
Huygens, 2 WohT, 5

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LEIBNIZ

Cambridge University Press

Library ofCongress Catalogue C a r d N u m b e r : 74-31784

First pubHshed 1975

Printed i n Great Britain b y

Editor's preface page i x

,CHAPTER ι Life and works

CHAPTER 2 General principles used b y Leibniz 6

5.1 Contingent facts and God's choice o f t h e best 32

y ι Monads and entelechies 88

;ΗA ρ τ E R 5 Psychology and theory o f knowledge 13 0

Conscious and unconscious experiences 130

CHAPTER 6 Ethics 146

CHAPTER 7 Theology 148

1 God's nature and relations t o the w o r l d 148

Bibliographical note 173

C. D . B r o a d expressed a w i s h that after his death I should go t h r o u g h

R o u n d brackets are Broad's; m y o w n insertions are enclosed i n

Trinity College, Cambridge

G. Die Philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried

Leibniz was b o r n o n 21 January 1646 at Leipzig, where his father

w i t h Malebranche o n philosophy, and w i t h Huyghens o n physics and

academies. A n d Leibniz lost t w o v e r y g o o d friends at the deaths o f

tainly d i d n o t deserve. H e also elaborately criticized N e w t o n ' s theories

the principle o f a universal language o f ideograms. H e was also a v e r y

Leibniz w r o t e copiously, b u t v e r y little was published i n his lifetime

(1) Discours de metaphysique (written 1685, published 1846 by

stances, v i z . the theory o f the Vinculum Substantiale, w h i c h does n o t

I t appears f r o m the above list that m a n y o f Leibniz's most careful

There are certain general principles o f w h i c h Leibniz makes constant

This plays a very i m p o r t a n t part i n the Discours de metaphysique and the

for reasons w h i c h he had developed i n his Letters to Arnauld. A g a i n , i n

T h e principle m a y be stated r o u g h l y as follows. E v e r y substance

1.1 Complete notion o f an individual

I n his letter o f 1 4 J u l y 1686 to A r n a u l d , Leibniz tries to explain w h a t

w i t h 'the knowledge w h i c h G o d had o f A d a m w h e n he determined

Leibniz then points o u t that w e must carefully distinguish between

Leibniz often talks o f alternative possible individuals w i t h the same

i t should be equally intelligible t o say that there were t w o alternative

i t should be intelligible t o say that G o d deliberately actualized the first

that the phrase 'several alternative possible Adams' is meaningless i f

to any actual substance. Y o u start w i t h any finite set o f properties P , s

w h i c h together suffice t o distinguish the actual substance S f r o m all

i n innumerable different alternative ways. Y o u w o u l d thus conceive

Leibniz formulates the Predicate-in-Notion Principle i n various places.

T h e essential points w h i c h he makes there are the f o l l o w i n g . T h e

proposition is analytical. I f i t is contained o n l y i m p l i c i t l y , the p r o ­

possible a priori reason f o r such statements is that the n o t i o n o f that

ciple emerges f r o m , and isjustified b y , reflecting o n w h a t is meant b y a

W h a t Leibniz calls the Principle of Sufficient Reason is so closely b o u n d

connexion o f t h e subject and the predicate i n the fact is founded o n the

foundation for the connexion o f the terms o f a proposition w h i c h is

that such reasons 'often incline w i t h o u t necessitating'. T h e latter is

a rather mysterious phrase w h i c h he often uses. W e may n o w consider

Principle ofSufficient Reason seems t o be an immediate application o f

W e must distinguish between absolutely and hypothetically necessary

decisions to read the books and attend the lectures, he is behaving i n a

between A d a m and his predicates intrinsic and necessary, like the

connexion between the defming properties o f a circle and any other

proposition is analytical. I f i t is contained o n l y i m p l i c i t l y , the p r o

species o f geometrical figures and a natural k i n d . A l l the other p r o

This question reduces t o the f o l l o w i n g . Does the phrase 'every pre

Leibniz thinks that m a n y i m p o r t a n t and surprising ontological c o n

consequence o f God's w i l l that A d a m was disobedient. These para

about i t w h i c h are n o t explicitly or i m p l i c i t l y contained i n the descrip

state o f В' I do n o t w i s h t o assert positively that this sentence is sig