PCGG v.

Pena
G.R. No. 77663
April 12, 1988
FACTS

The Commission issued an order freezing the assets, effects, documents and records of two
export garment manufacturing firms – American Inter-fashion Corporation and De Soleil Apparel
Manufacturing Corporation. The Commission appointed Ms. Noemi L. Saludo as Officer-in-Charge (OIC)
of the said corporations with full authority to manage and operate the same. It also designated the OIC,
Saludo, and Mr.Yeung Chun Ho private respondent herein, as authorized signatories to effect deposits
and withdrawals of the funds of the two corporations.

The OIC withdrew the amount of P400,000.00, more or less, from the Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company against the accounts of the said corporations for payment of the salaries of the staff,
employees and laborers of the same.

Respondents Yeung Chun Kam Yeung Chun Ho and Archie Chan who are all in Hongkong,
instituted an action for damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the said bank, the
Commission, then Commissioner Mary Concepcion Bautista and the OIC, Saludo, of Branch 152 of the
Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro Manila, presided by respondent judge, and questioning the aforesaid
revocation of the authorization as signatory previously granted to Mr. Yim Kam Shing as private
respondents' representative.

The Commission filed a motion to dismiss with opposition to plaintiffs' (private respondents
herein) prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction over
the Commission or over the subject of the case

ISSUE

Whether Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over the Presidential Commission on Good
Government and properties sequestered and placed in its custodia legis in the exercise of its powers
under Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14, as amended.

Whether said Regional Trial Courts may interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and
actions of the Commission.

HELD

No. As can be readily seen from the foregoing discussion of the duties and functions and the
power and authority of the Commission, it exercises quasi-judicial functions. In the exercise of quasi-
judicial functions, the Commission is a co-equal body with regional trial courts and "co-equal bodies have
no power to control the other." The Solicitor General correctly submits that the lack of jurisdiction of
regional trial courts over quasi-judicial agencies is recognized in section 9, paragraph 3 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, which otherwise vests exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals over all
final judgment, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of regional trial courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions. But as already indicated hereinabove, the Court of
Appeals is not vested with appellate or supervisory jurisdiction over the Commission. Executive Order No.
14, which defines the jurisdiction over cases involving the ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his
wife, Imelda, members of their immediate family, close relatives, subordinates, close and/or business
associates, dummies, agents and nominees, specifically provides in section 2 that "The Presidential
Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the
Sandiganbayan which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof." Necessarily, those who wish
to question or challenge the Commission's acts or orders in such cases – must seek recourse in the same
court, the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan's
decisions and final orders are in turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively by this Court.
 THE UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC., ETC. vs. COMMISSION ON THE
SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS, ETC.
G.R. No. 135945
March 7, 2001
FACTS

Petitioner alleges that Commission entered the Dominican Hills property allocated to UNITED and
constructed houses thereon. Petitioner was able to secure a demolition order from the city mayor.

Unable to stop the demolition of their houses, the ASSOCIATION filed an action for injunction in
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and were able to obtain a TRO but their prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction was later denied.

While Civil Case No. 3316-R was pending, the ASSOCIATION, this time represented by the Land
Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc. (BENEFICIARIES, for brevity), filed Civil Case before Branch 61 of
the same court. The complaint prayed for damages, injunction and annulment of the said Memorandum of
Agreement between UNITED and HIGC. Upon motion of UNITED, the trial court in an Order, dismissed
Civil Case No. 3382-R. The said Order of dismissal is currently on appeal with the Court of Appeals.

To forestall the re-implementation of the demolition order, Commission filed a petition for

annulment of contracts with prayer for a TRO in the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP) against petitioner, HIGC, PMS, the City Engineer's Office, the City Mayor, as well as the
Register of Deeds of Baguio City. On the very same day, COSLAP issued the contested order requiring
the parties to maintain the status quo.

Without filing a motion for reconsideration from the aforesaid status quo order, petitioner filed the
instant petition questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP.

ISSUE

Whether COSLAP empowered to hear and try a petition for annulment of contracts with prayer for
a temporary restraining order and thus, arrogate unto itself the power to issue status quo order and
conduct a hearing thereof

Whether COSLAP is exempted from observing a clear case of forum shopping on the part of the
private respondents

HELD

No. Given the facts of the case, it is our view that the COSLAP is not justified in assuming
jurisdiction over the controversy. As matters stand, it is not the judiciary's place to question the wisdom
behind a law; our task is to interpret the law. We feel compelled to observe, though, that by reason of the
ambiguous terminology employed in Executive Order No. 561, the power to assume jurisdiction granted
to the COSLAP provides an ideal breeding ground for forum shopping, as we shall explain subsequently.
Suffice it to state at this stage that the COSLAP may not assume jurisdiction over cases which are
already pending in the regular courts.

The COSLAP discharges quasi-judicial functions:

"Quasi-judicial function" is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc. of public
administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their
official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."
 However, it does not depart from its basic nature as an administrative agency, albeit one that
exercises quasi-judicial functions. Still, administrative agencies are not considered courts; they are neither
part of the judicial system nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. The doctrine of separation of powers
observed in our system of government reposes the three (3) great powers into its three (3) branches —
the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary — each department being co-equal and coordinate, and
supreme in its own sphere. Accordingly, the executive department may not, by its own fiat, impose the
judgment of one of its own agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, it is empowered "to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."

There is an equally persuasive reason to grant the petition. As an additional ground for the
annulment of the assailed status quo order of COSLAP, UNITED accuses Commission of engaging in
forum shopping. Forum shopping exists when a party "repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and
the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending
in, or already resolved adversely by some other court."
 CALIXTO SAÑADO v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SIMEON G. NEPOMUCENO
G.R. No. 108338
April 17, 2001
FACTS

Petitioner filed a complaint against private respondent and Edgar J. Chu with the regional trial
court docketed as Civil Case No. 2085 for recovery of possession and damages, wherein he alleged that
on February 19, 1975, private respondent had already recovered his investment in full; that as of said
date, the total earnings had amounted to P98,106.35 leaving an excess of P10,701.10 to be divided
between petitioner and private respondent at 35-65 sharing; that the 4-year period during which petitioner
and private respondent would share the net harvest commenced on February 19, 1975 and expired on
February 18, 1979; that after February 18, 1975, private respondent has not accounted for the income of
the fishpond and has failed and refused, in gross and evident bad faith despite renewed and repeated
demands, to deliver petitioner's share of the net harvest for four years which totaled P250,000.00 more or
less.

The petition before us hinges on the argument that the Court of Appeals entertained evidence
and/or other matters not duly covered or taken up in the trial of Civil Case No. 2085. Petitioner posits that
the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in doing so and in applying said matters in its
disposition of the case. Verily, petitioner's grumble and protest is confined to that portion of the June 19,
1989 decision of the Court of Appeals directing "defendants jointly to restore possession and control of
the fishpond area to the plaintiff."

Petitioner points out that the July 31, 1989 decision rendered by the Office of the President
through Deputy Executive Secretary – Magdangal B. Elma is a new matter which should not have been
treated by the appellate court with legal force and effect because "it was merely incidental to the propriety
or impropriety of the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction respecting the earlier Writ of
Execution granted by the trial court in favor of Calixto Sañado"

ISSUE

Whether there is an impact on the resolution of Civil Case No. 2085 by the July 31, 1989,
Malacañang decision.

HELD

Yes. The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying, or in suspending or revoking,

a license, permit, franchise, or certificate of public convenience and necessity is administrative or quasi-
judicial. The act is not purely administrative but quasi-judicial or adjudicatory since it is dependent upon
the ascertainment of facts by the administrative agency, upon which a decision is to be made and rights
and liabilities determined. As such, the July 31, 1989 decision of the Office of the President is explicitly an
official act of and an exercise of quasi-judicial power by the Executive Department headed by the highest
officer of the land. It thus squarely falls under matters relative to the executive department which courts
are mandatorily tasked to take judicial notice of under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. Judicial
notice must be taken of the organization of the Executive Department, its principal officers, elected or
appointed, such as the President, his powers and duties

The reasons given by the Office of the President in dismissing petitioner's appeal are quite clear.
Transferring or subletting the fishpond granted to a licensee without the consent or approval of the
administrative body concerned, as well as the failure to develop the area required by the fisheries rules,
are definitely solid and logical grounds for the cancellation of one's license. Withal, if petitioner disagrees
with the decision of the Office of the President, he should have elevated the matter by petition for review
before the Court of Appeals for the latter's exercise of judicial review. Nowhere in the record do we find
such action on petitioner's part.
 CARINO v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
G.R. No. 96681
December 2, 1991
FACTS

Some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers
Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as
"mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the
public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention.
According to them they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally
staged at the DECS premises without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the
granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions"
consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in
peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions
were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal,
and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against
those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass
actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed.

 In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to the Commission
on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly
learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons
completely unknown to them.

Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cariño sought and was granted leave to file
a motion to dismiss the case, alleging as grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action
and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case."

ISSUE

Whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the Constitution to do so
whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory
powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like
alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.

HELD

No. The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was
not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country or duplicate
much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication and cannot be likened to
the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the
end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to
such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law . This function, to repeat, the Commission
does not have.

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even
quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the
technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.
 MAGPALE v. CIVIL SERVICE COMISSION
G.R. No. 97381
November 5, 1992
FACTS

Petitioner started his career in government as an employee in the Presidential Assistance on

Community Development. Fifteen years later, he transferred to the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) as
Arrastre Superintendent and promoted to the position of Port Manager in 1977 of the Port Management
Unit (PMU), General Santos City. Then he was reassigned, in the same year to PPA-PMU, Tacloban City
where he likewise discharged the functions of Port Manager. The PPA General Manager designated Atty.
William A. Enriquez as officer-in-charge of PPA-PMU, Tacloban City. Petitioner then was ordered to
immediately report to the Assistant General Manager (AGM) for Operation, PPA, Manila, Petitioner
reported at PPA Manila on the same date and performed the duties and functions assigned to him.

In an Internal Control Department Report, the PMU-Tacloban Inventory Committee and the
Commission on Audit (COA) stated that petitioner failed to account for equipment of PPA value at
P65,542.25 and to liquidate cash advances amounting to P130,069.61. He was found also to have
incurred unauthorized absences from May 25, 1984 to July 23, 1984 which results for his preventive
suspension and has been out of service since then.

ISSUE

Whether CSC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action in this case

HELD

No. On the merit of the petition, petitioner claims that assuming even further that an appeal lies
from the MSBP decision, that respondent Dayan had the legal personality or standing to institute the
appeal that it was filed with the proper office, still CSC Resolution 90-962 was rendered with grave abuse
of discretion because petitioner cannot be suspended for alleged failure to account for pieces of
equipment and cash advances since this is not the neglect of duty contemplated by Section 36 of
Presidential Degree No. 807 or Section 46 of chapter in the Civil Service in Executive Order 292. At most,
petitioner can be held liable for the money value of the equipment and advances as mandated by Section
105 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines.

Under Section 47 of the same Code, the CSC shall decide on appeal all administrative
disciplinary cases involving the imposition of:

(a) a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or

(b) fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary; or

c) demotion in rank or salary or transfer; or

(d) removal or dismissal from office.

The February 5, 1990 decision of the MSPB did not involve dismissal or separation from office,
rather, the decision exonerated petitioner and ordered him reinstated to his former position.
Consequently, in the light of our pronouncements in the aforecited cases of Mendez v. Civil Service
Commission and Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission, the MSPB decision was not a proper subject of
appeal to the CSC.

Settled is the rule that a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions acts without
jurisdiction if no authority has been conferred by law to hear and decide the case.
 LASTIMOSA v. VASQUEZ
G.R. No. 116801
April 6, 1995
FACTS

Jessica Villacarlos Dayon filed a criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative
complaint for immoral acts, abuse of authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of
Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo. The cases were filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas.

The complaint was assigned to a graft investigation officer who, after an investigation, found
no prima facie evidence and accordingly recommended the dismissal of the complaint. However, the
Ombudsman, Hon. Conrado Vasquez, disapproved the recommendation and instead directed that Mayor
Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape.

Accordingly, the case has been referred to Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar for
the filing of appropriate information with the Regional Trial Court of Danao City.  The case was eventually
assigned to First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria G. Lastimosa.

Lastimosa conducted a preliminary investigation on the basis of which she found that only acts of
lasciviousness had been committed. With the approval of Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar, she filed on an
information for acts of lasciviousness against Mayor Ilustrisimo with the MCTC of Santa Fe.

As no case for attempted rape had been filed by the Prosecutor's Office, Deputy Ombudsman
Mojica ordered Kintanar and Lastimosa to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt for
"refusing and failing to obey the lawful directives" of the Office of the Ombudsman. Gloria G. Lastimosa
and Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar under preventive suspension for a period of six (6) months
for not charging Mayor Ilustrisimo with attempted rape.

ISSUE

Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to
assist it in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo.

HELD

Yes. It does not matter that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor had already conducted the
preliminary investigation and all that remained to be done was for the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
to file the corresponding case in court. Even if the preliminary investigation had been given over to the
Provincial Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the nature of the offense to be charged would still
be subject to the approval of the Office of the Ombudsman. This is because under Sec. 31 of the
Ombudsman's Act, when a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the "supervision and control" of the
Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve,
reverse or modify his (prosecutor's) decision. Petitioner cannot legally act on her own and refuse to
prepare and file the information as directed by the Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the power to "punish for contempt, in
accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided
therein." There is no merit in the argument that petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar cannot be
held liable for contempt because their refusal arose out of an administrative, rather than judicial,
proceeding before the Office of the Ombudsman. As petitioner herself says in another context, the
preliminary investigation of a case, of which the filing of an information is a part, is quasi judicial in
character.
 SYQUIA v. BOARD OF POWER AND WATER WORKS
G.R. No. L-42783-85
November 29, 1976
FACTS

Private respondents filed three separate complaints with Board of Power and Waterworks
charging petitioner as administrator of the South Syquia Apartments at Malate, Manila with the offense of
selling electricity without permit or franchise issued by respondent board, in that petitioner billed
respondents-complainants various specified amounts for their electricity consumption at their respective
apartments for the months of May to September, 1974 in excess of the Meralco rates authorized by
respondent board.

Petitioner's motion to dismiss the complaints asserting that they involved contractual obligations
of respondents as apartment tenants and were beyond respondent board's jurisdiction was denied by the
latter.

Petitioner thereupon filed her answer, wherein she again questioned the complaints as beyond
the jurisdiction of respondent as a regulatory board, since she is not engaged in the sale of electric power
but merely passes to the apartment tenants as the end-users their legitimate electric current bills in
accordance with their lease contracts, and their relationship is contractual in nature.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent exceeded its jurisdiction in taking the case as mentioned

HELD

Yes. The board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner's contractual relations with respondents-
complainants as her tenants since petitioner is not engaged in a public service nor in the sale of electricity
without permit or franchise.

Respondents' complaints against being charged the additional cost of electricity for common
facilities used by the tenants (in addition to those registered in their respective apartment meters) give
rise to a question that is purely civil in character that is to be adjudged under the applicable provisions of
the Civil Code (not the Public Service Act) and not by the respondent regulatory board which has no
jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general jurisdiction.

Respondent board in resolving the complaints against petitioner and requiring her to absorb the
additional rising costs of electricity consumed for the common areas and elevator service even at a
resultant loss of P15,000.00 a year arrogated the judicial function. Its orders were beyond its jurisdiction
and must be set aside as null and void.
 GLOBE WIRELESS LTD. v. PUBLIC SEREVICE COMISSION AND ANTONIO B. ARNAIZ
G.R. No. L-27520
January 21, 1987
FACTS

A message addressed to Maria Diaz, Monte Esquina, Madrid, Spain, filed by Antonio B. Arnaiz
with the telegraph office of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Dumaguete City was transmitted to the
Bureau of Telecommunications in Manila. It was forwarded to Globe Wireless Ltd. for transmission to
Madrid. Globe sent the message to the American Cable and Radio Corporation in New York, which, in
turn, transmitted the same to the Empresa Nacional de Telecommunicaciones in Madrid. The latter,
however, mislaid said message, resulting in its non-delivery to the addressee.

Petitioner, in its answer, questioned PSC's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the letter-
complaint, even as it denied liability for the non-delivery of the message to the addressee.

Hearing ensued, after which the PSC issued an order finding petitioner "responsible for the
inadequate and unsatisfactory service complained of, in violation of the Public Service Act" and ordering it
"to pay a fine of TWO HUNDRED [P200.00] PESOS under Sec. 21 of Com. Act 146, as amended."
petitioner was likewise required to refund the sum of P19.14 to the remitter of the undelivered message.

ISSUE

Whether the Commission acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of non-delivery of the
message?

HELD

No. Section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended otherwise known as the Public
Service Act, vested in the Public Service Commission jurisdiction, supervision and control over all Public
services and their franchises, equipment and other properties. However, Section 5 of Republic Act No.
4630, the legislative franchise under which petitioner was operating, limited respondent Commission's
jurisdiction over petitioner only to the rate which petitioner may charge the Public.

The act complained of consisted in petitioner having allegedly failed to deliver the telegraphic
message of private respondent to the addressee in Madrid, Spain. Obviously, such imputed negligence
had nothing whatsoever to do with the subject matter of the very limited jurisdiction of the Commission
over petitioner.

Moreover, under Section 21 of C.A. No. 146, as amended, the Commission was empowered to
impose an administrative fine in cases of violation of or failure by a Public service to comply with the
terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission.
Petitioner operated under a legislative franchise, so there were no terms nor conditions of any certificate
issued by the Commission to violate. Neither was there any order, decision or regulation from the
Commission applicable to petitioner that the latter had allegedly violated, disobeyed, defied or
disregarded.

Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that the jurisdiction
and powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly
granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order
without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective. The order under consideration belonged to this
category.
 PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. v. BATARIO, JR.
G.R. No. 92285
March 28, 1994
FACTS

Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of
the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8
aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the
National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified.

ISSUE

Whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or beyond its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of this case.

HELD

No. That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers
and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of
the other two departments of the governments.

The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the
performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although
it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting
within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department
than to any other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the Electoral Commission under
Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its compositions is also
significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But it is a body separate
from and independent of the legislature.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the
Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And
this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution. If
we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the
proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period
within which protests should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective. The
Electoral Commission in such case would be invested with the power to determine contested cases
involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at
all times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of
our Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual
authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle
would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of
cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority effective whenever
and whenever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be
remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly
in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings
of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is
obvious that this result should not be permitted.
 PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. v. BATARIO, JR.
G.R. No. 92285
March 28, 1994
FACTS

PETITIONER PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI), is a Philippine corporation engaged in

industrial tree planting. It grows gubas trees in its plantations in Agusan and Mindoro which it supplies to
a local match manufacturer solely for production of matches. In consonance with the state policy to
encourage qualified persons to engage in industrial tree plantation, Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised
Forestry Code confers on entities like PTFI a set of incentives among which is a qualified ban against
importation of wood and "wood-derivated" products.

A. J. International Corporation (AJIC) imported four (4) containers of matches from Indonesia,
which the Bureau of Customs released, and two (2) more containers of matches from Singapore. The
records do not disclose when the second shipment was released.

Upon request of PTFI, Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., of the Department of Natural
Resources and Environment issued a certification that "there are enough available softwood supply in the
Philippines for the match industry at reasonable price."

PTFI filed with the Regional Court of Manila a complaint for injunction and damages with prayer
for a temporary restraining order against respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to enjoin the
latter from importing matches and "wood-derivated" products, and the Collector of Customs from allowing
and releasing the importations.

ISSUE

Whether the Commissioner of Customs under Sec. 1207 of the Tariff and Customs Code has
"exclusive jurisdiction to determine the legality of an importation or ascertain whether the conditions
prescribed by law for an importation have been complied with seizure, detention or release of property
affected.”

HELD

Yes. The enforcement of the importation ban under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry
Code is within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the
Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to enforce the ban is devoid of any legal
basis. To allow the regular court to direct the Commissioner to impound the imported matches, as
petitioner would, is clearly an interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over
seizure and forfeiture cases.

An order of a judge to impound, seize or forfeit must inevitably be based on his determination and
declaration of the invalidity of the importation, hence, an usurpation of the prerogative and an
encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In other words, the reliefs directed against the
Bureau of Customs as well as the prayer for injunction against importation of matches by private
respondent AJIC may not be granted without the court arrogating upon itself the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Customs.
 PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION v. AGRAVA
G.R. No. L-12426
February 16, 1959
FACTS

It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the
bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in
good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the
cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass
an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice
before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for
patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.

In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution
of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of
scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the
prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other persons
with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the
Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body
from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the
Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of scientific
and technical knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the
respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the
Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the United States
Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as that prescribed by respondent.

ISSUE

Whether the Director may require, under the law, an examination for qualification of those
aspiring to work before the Philippines Patent Office.

HELD

No. The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is

reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be
allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of course,
the Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar
practicing before him enlist the assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers and
documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine sought to be
patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application for the registration of a parcel of land on
behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and technical description of said land, prepared by a
licensed surveyor.

Were court to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law
giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it
before they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no reason why other
bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area are
more or less complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc.,
assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the
classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of
Customs, may not also require that any lawyer practicing before them or otherwise transacting business
with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.