Problem of Unity and Multiplicity Theory of Ideas

ONE OF THE FIRST PROBLEMS that early Greek It is in the context of this general problem of reconciling
thinkers were preoccupied with was the unity and multiplicity of unity and multiplicity that we might understand Plato's theory of
things. On the one hand, it seemed obvious that the world is in ideas or forms. For Plato, human knowledge is possible only
constant flux, always changing, thus ever different from what it Insofar as man is able to grasp some stable structures or
was the moment before. Furthermore, it would seem that this relations in the midst of all the changing sensible world. As had
ever changing world also consists of many different things, each already been pointed out by Parmenides, there must be some
having its own particular characteristics and properties. On the stable being as the foundation and object of true knowledge. It
other hand, it seemed just as evident to these Greek thinkers was also clear to Plato that true or valid knowledge does exist,
that these diverse things, diverse across time and space. could as exhibited by the sciences of the time, such as arithmetic,
not be so distinct from one another as to constitute completely geometry, grammar, and Pythagorean numbers governing
different worlds. For that would make things completely chaotic musical harmony. and astronomy as well as geometrical figures.
and incomprehensible. Yet it seems just as obvious that there is Thus, Plato theorized that there must be a world or permanent
but one ordered rational world, subsisting through all the and immutable forms which are the proper object of human
changes, one world underlying all those seemingly different knowledge. This alone could explain the fact that,
things. This was a fundamental belief or assumption of the notwithstanding the flux of things, man is able to know. The fact
Greek mind, that there is a Logos or Reason, a kind of all- of human knowledge, therefore, would seem to argue for the
encompassing, self-instituting, self-governing order prevailing existence of another world aside from the ever changing
over all of reality. One manifest effect of Logos is the kosmos, sensible world, a world of spiritual and Immutable ideal forms.
the ordered universe of earth, planets, and stars governed by
eternal, immutable laws. The problem, then, was how to Moreover, this world of ideal forms is the source and
reconcile this unity and multiplicity of things, how to understand foundation of the sensible or material world. This sensible world
the reason behind the seeming contradiction between unity and exhibits gradients of greater or lesser degree, such as the more
the diversity across time and space. Heraclitus emphasized the or less good, the more or less beautiful. But it never presents
transience and oppositeness of things, yet at the same time that which is the good itself or the beautiful itself, the par ousta.
pointing out that such diversities are constantly under the same Hence, Plato argued, the sensible world by metaphysical
lawful order and reason. Parmenides, on the other hand, participation is the pale copy or reflection of the ideal world.
emphasized the permanence and unity of all beings while Thus the sensible world proceeds from the ideal world as its
allowing for the secondary changes and differences. source of being an exemplary model. Within the world of ideal
forms itself, there is an ascending order of more and more
Inclusive, more and more fundamental ideas. All these ideas are
eventually subsumed under the ideas of Movement and
Stillness, which in turn are subsumed under the ideas of Being
and Nonbeing (Nonbeing is relative nonbeing or potential truth and wisdom. Its corresponding desire is the will boulel,
being). All of these ideas ultimately fail under the paramount which is the soul's tendency toward the Good.
idea of the Good, insofar as all beings and potential beings are
unfoldings of the Good. The Good therefore is the idea of ideas, Given this composition of man. Plato explains by way of
Source of all ideas and of all things, the Absolute itself, a parabole or myth that there was a time when the soul, living in
excluding all limitations and all potentiality. the Light and the spiritual world of ideal forms, was not bonded to the body.
Ultimate principle of explanation. Everything is a participation of Due, however, to some Fall of man, consequent upon some evil
the Good. deed, the soul was exiled to the material world and thus
imprisoned in the body. The story itself of the Fall and the
If human knowledge is the “grasping” of the ideal form consequent imprisonment of the soul in the body was not
which is a world other than the sensible world; how then does original with Plato. It had been propounded previously by
man come upon these ideal forms amidst the ever fleeting Pythagoras and Empedocles. It was a popular belief that was
sensible world? How is knowledge possible under the part of the whole religious tradition of the Greek culture at the
circumstances? Here we come to a second feature of Plato's time. What was original in Plato was the way he integrated this
philosophy, namely, his theory of Reminiscence. Fall of mari with his theory of ideas. In this fallen state man is
forgetful of the world of ideas of his previous existence.
Theory of Reminiscence However, insofar as the material world is a shadowy reflection
or participation of the ideal world, the sojourn of the soul in the
Man, for Plato, is a reflection of the duality of the material world serves as occasion for it to reminisce, to recall
sensible and ideal worlds. Man himself is composed of a body the ideal forms of its previous state. The encounter with the
and soul The body is made up of the four traditional elements material world serves as an occasion for the soul to remember
carth, water, air and fire. The soul consists of three distinct what in a sense it had always known from the beginning
faculties. three levels of knowledge and desire. There is at the
lowest level, sensation (aisthesis), ordered to the cloudy The myths of the soul's preexistence and the Fall allows
reflections of the ideal forms in sensible things. On the level of Plato to explain the moral dimension of man. In the fallen state,
sensation there is the corresponding sense desire (epithumia), man is torn between two tendencies. On the one hand, by virtue
seeking satisfaction in the ever changing and thus formless, of its imprisonment in the body, the soul finds itself dragged
endlessly frustrating material things. There is secondly, opinion down, as if by some leaden weight, toward a life of mere sense
Idol. which in itself is not free from error but is sufficient for and physical pleasure. On the other hand, the soul is marked by
ordinary practical matters such as the hypothetical sciences and a certain deep disquietude, a fundamental yearning for that
the government of communal life. The corresponding desire is which is beyond, for that which is ideal. This tendency of the
spirit (thumos), a kind of spontaneous tendency toward soul is for Plato the expression of the soul's connaturality with
everything beautiful and good. Thirdly, there is the mind or the Good and its preexistence in the world of ideas
intellect Inous, the immortal part of the soul, the capacity for
 Due to the Fall and the consequent imprisonment in the Good. With that end in view, they must see to the maintenance
body, man must now die unto himself bit by bit, by a method of of the basic moral virtues in communal life temperance over
purification, gradually restraining his passions and gaining sense pleasures, courage to overcome fear and face danger
control of himself and thereby liberating himself, that is to say, and defend the city-state when necessary. Justice which
liberating the soul from the hold of the world and of the body renders each one his due and thus unifies the community, and
and reuniting it with the Good. The life of man is, therefore, a finally wisdom, the contemplation of and discerning familiarity
spiritual voyage that is really a return to one's roots and with the Good. The whole purpose of the polis or the city-state,
beginnings, a kind of quest or pilgrimage in fidelity to this natural therefore, is to make it possible to enable man to lead the life of
orientation of man to that which is the Good. moral virtue and wisdom.

This spiritual voyage eventually leads man on a dialectic On the other hand, he who at the end of his life has
or ascending path. It starts from eros, the desire of the failed to attain the goal of life by not going beyond mere physical
physically beautiful and the desire to procreate the physically desires and the pleasures of the sensible world will be led to
beautiful It then moves on to the higher desire for the more judgment. After a period of expiation, he will be reincarnated,
spiritually beautiful, and the desire to procreate spiritual either as an animal or as a man, depending upon the misdeeds
offspring, such as poetic works, the sciences, social and legal of his past life. He is destined to remain reincarnated and tied to
institutions. It finally arrives at the last stage, which is the union the body, until his soul has learned its way through the proper
with the Ideal Beauty and Good Itsell, which eros was path of purification and ascension. If necessary, there will be
unconsciously searching for all along. This highest, ultimate several repeated reincarnations. (Here we see perhaps a trace
stage signifies not mere knowledge, but a kind of mystical touch of Hindu Influence in Plato's thought.)
of something that is really beyond and transcendent to man.
Such a state is really ineffable and incommunicable, capable of In brief, Plato's philosophy views man and the world as
expression only in terms of the Good's attributes such as Truth, having proceeded from the Good, metaphysically participating in
Proportion and Beauty. In this final state of union, the soul is the Good, and seeking ultimately to return to the Good.
liberated from all change and all tribulations and thus attains
true immortality, which was really the point and goal of all the Aristotle (384-323 B.C.)
desire for physical and spiritual procreation
ARISTOTLE WAS A STUDENT of Plato. Thus, in the
He, who in his life attains wisdom and finds the way to early period of his teaching and writing. he was a faithful
the Good, owes it as his duty to the Good to enlighten others Platonist. He eventually developed, however, his own system of
along the true path. It is in this regard that Plato sees the thought quite different from that of his former master.
relation between morality and politics. The philosophers, those
men of wisdom who have found the path to the Good, must lead Aristotle believed that ethics is not a science lepisteme),
the community toward the one goal of life, the attainment of the dealing with absolute and eternal truths, but an art (techne). the
art of living well. As art, therefore, ethics does not proceed by is to the artisan, or the slave to the master. The soul has two
deduction from first principles, nor does it lead by induction to main parts, the rational and the irrational.. The rational soul,
first principles. Rather, Aristotle viewed ethics as a comparative completely independent of the body, is further subdivided into
method, a dialectic as he would say, comparing different the speculative intellect. pure thought or intellection (theoretike
opinions regarding good and bad, and arriving at a set of dianola), and the practical intellect (to praktikon dianoetikon).
prudential directives of limited generality. It is for this reason, The practical intellect is ordained toward action and determines
perhaps, that Aristotle's ethics stand independently of his appropriate means to attain the end. The Irrational soul, closely
metaphysics. Besides, he developed his metaphysics after his united with the body is subdivided into the vegetable part which
ethics, much later in his career. is manifested by the activities of nutrition growth and
reproduction, and the desiring part, which is further subdivided
Sifting through the prevailing moral opinions of his Greek into three progressive levels. They are unruly and irrational
tradition, Aristotle set about inquiring about man, about his sense desires and covetousness (epithumia), spontaneous
purposes and ends in life, and the conditions needed for the impulses (thumos), desires and tendencies which may partially
attainment of these ends. coincide with the dictates of reason, and wishes and desires
(boulesis). completely subordinated to the dictates of reason.
What then is the good? The good is that which is the end Wishes and desire in contrast with the first two have as object
of any being, that which a being tends toward. But for man, something stable, namely, that which is perceived as good. In
there seems to be a whole variety of ends. Men all seek for the end, as we shall see later, the task of morality is to effect a
happiness, but some men seek happiness in pleasure, others in harmonious combination between the rational commands of the
wealth, others still in power. The point, however, is not simply practical Intellect and the docile wishes and desires boulesis.
what man seeks for, but what is his true end? Does man seek
some kind of ultimate end for which all these other ends are We see in Aristotle's ethics the strong influence of
sought, the end beyond which there is no other, insofar as it Plato's dualism of body and soul, which Aristotle was to
constitutes his proper fulfillment and thus, his true happiness. overcome only later with the development of his metaphysics.
Thus, the real man is seen to be his soul, and the fundamental
The Purpose of Man activity of the soul is reason. Reason, as we have seen
previously, is a fundamental concept in the ancient Greek
In quest of such an ultimate end, Aristotle introduced a tradition which in general is an all-encompassing, self-instituting,
new concept, more objective than the concept of happiness, self-governing order prevailing over all reality. That man is
namely. the proper function (ergon) or purpose of man, by which rational would mean, therefore for Aristotle, that man in some
man attains the fulfillment of his being. What then is man? special way participates in this all-encompassing Logos, not
Concretely, man is a being composed of soul and body. The merely in the sense of being governed by reason which the
soul is that part of the composite which animates and whole world is but in the sense that man has within him a
commands, the body is the part which is subordinate, as the tool capacity for permanent activity of self-instituting, self-governing
order. Man unlike the lower beings, whose specific activities are face of danger, thereby manifesting the nobility and excellence
all transitive activities. Transitive activities are activities initiated of man and of the human spirit. Subjectively, virtue is an activity
from without and terminated in a purpose or end outside of the which proceeds from certain proper dispositions. A virtuous act
Individual being. Thus, mineral, plant, and animal activities are is one which proceeds from a habitual state or disposition
determined by the external environment and terminate in some acquired by constant practice, where the doing of the virtuous
end or purpose external to the individual, such as for example act has become a kind of second nature, the action being posed
the enrichment and perpetuation of the species. Man, however, firmly and surely. without fail and without any doubt or
as rational being is capable of activity starting from within and hesitation. For Aristotle, an action done after going through
terminating in a purpose which remains within man, within the agonizing doubts and temptations is a sign that man has not
activity itself, thus trumanent, like in the act of intellection acquired mastery over his unruly desires and passions.

If reason or immanent activity is that which is specific to Furthermore, a virtuous act is one which proceeds from
man or to his soul, then the end or function (ergon) of man must the right intention. This means that the action is desired for its
have something to do with this specific activity of man. From the own sake and not for some ulterior motive beyond the action
very nature of immanent activity, as we have seen, the end itself. For example, in the virtue of friendship, the intended goal
could not very well be something external to the activity Itself. of the friendship should be the human relationship itself, the
Hence, for Aristotle, the end or function of man could only be mutual good will binding two or more people, each loving the
the Immanent activity of reason itself brought to its fullest extent, other for his own sake, rather than for some extraneous purpose
namely, the moral virtues within the framework of the communal such as to curry favor, to acquire some advantage or pleasure
life of the polls and the act of contemplation. from the other.

Aristotle takes the moral virtues of his teacher Plato, but From what we have seen thus far, we might, therefore,
Instead of considering them as mere means toward eventual say that for Aristotle a moral virtue is a rational measured
union with the Good, Aristotle makes them the very ends of activity following the rule of the "Just middle," motivated by the
man, or at least one level of the ends of man. right intention and proceeding from a permanent disposition
acquired through repeated exercise of the act. It will be seen,
A Morally Virtuous Act however, that in such a definition the concept of moral virtue is
not yet complete. It implies a relation to some norm we have not
Objectively, a morally virtuous action for Aristotle seen so far. For example, what is the norm or rule for "Just
consists of a measured activity, following the rule of the "Just middle"? In the absence of some further norm, the "Just middle"
middle" (mesotes), neither deficient nor excessive, with reason could very well be mere expediency and calculation. Right
ordering the desires and passions into a harmonious whole. intention is needed but what is the norm or rule of right
Thus, for example, the virtue of courage consists of an activity intention? Would any action desired for its own sake then be
which is neither pusillanimous nor reckless, but steadfast in the good? Similarly, a permanent disposition is needed but a
permanent disposition to perform what kind of activity finally? A seems to view the organized life of the polis itself as one
permanent disposition without a rule or norm could be either a immanent activity whereby man precisely achieves his humanity
virtue or a vice. as a rational being.

Practical Reason Through organized economic activity, typified by the

virtue of temperance (discipline, hard work and the judicious
Presumably, the inevitable answer to all these queries is husbanding of means) man in community provides for his
reason. Just so. But reason then will have to be made more material needs and thus attains self-sufficiency in his physical
precise. Thus, Aristotle proposes, apart from the moral virtues, a life. The shared life of the community constitutes essentially the
kind of master virtue, a virtue of virtues so to speak, namely, companionship and the communion of the virtue of friendship
practical wisdom (phronesis). Practical wisdom for Aristotle whereby fellowmen reciprocally bear good will and love toward
means knowledge on one hand, which participates in the act of each other. Furthermore, the shared life and tradition of the
contemplation which we shall see later, and action, on the other community make possible the education of the succeeding
hand, which is akin to the moral virtues. As knowledge, practical generations. This assures the continuance of the life of moral
wisdom provides the insight to the truth, regarding the intrinsic virtue as a self-maintaining immanent activity. The courage of
worth and excellence and beauty (kalon) of the action to be the military organization assures the defense of the community
done. As action, practical wisdom is the practical intellect which against external threat, thus guaranteeing the survival of the
properly decides to act. It takes the appropriate means community. The practical wisdom, sense of Justice (to dikaion),
(prohatrests) in the situation in view of the intended goal and equity (epieikeia), and good common sense (gnome) of the
takes command of one's desires and passions. It thus results statesmen assure the overall government, distribution of goods,
not only in knowledge and wishful thinking, but in efficacious reward and punishment, and harmony and peace of the
action. Practical wisdom, then, is the proper activity and virtue of community as the immanent, communal, rational, moral life of
the practical intellect, by which man as the source of action is man continually establishing, governing, and perpetuating itself.
the union of desire and thought. Viewed in this light, the moral In this sense, Aristotle holds that man is a social or political
virtues are merely particular aspects of the one master active being. Outside of the pale of communal life, man will have to be
virtue which is practical wisdom. a demigod, or he will lose his humanity and descend to the level
of the beast.
Like Plato, Aristotle views the communal life of the polis
as the proper place for the exercise of moral virtue. However, To say that man is a political being is not, however, to
unlike Plato, Aristotle does not consider the life of the polis as say that the end of man is external to the individual man, as in
merely a means for the attainment of moral virtues and the the lower beings, where the end of the individual is the
Good. Rather, the communal life of the polis is seen in its perpetuation of the species, usually at the expense of the
essence to be the very life of moral virtues and thus the polis individual. Precisely because man is rational, the individual man
constitutes one of the ends of man. In other words, Aristotle is a species by himself, according to Aristotle. His proper end
remains immanent within him. Thus, the communal life of moral world and of man. He is seen by Aristotle as First Motor, but
virtue of the polis is not external to the individual. Since it is more in the sense of being the most sublime of beings. He
essentially a spiritual activity, the shared communal life is constitutes a point toward which all other beings aspire.
imminent to the individual, and has the good of the individual, as
a rational activity, as its proper end Thus, in contemplation, the most immanent, the most
self sufficient activity man is capable of, man attains the apex of
The Act of Contemplation his possibilities. He becomes like God. In other words, for
Aristotle, contemplation does not mean an encounter with
The other end of man is the proper activity and virtue of something or someone beyond man, for that would break the
the speculative Intellect. This is the act of contemplation, which circle of immanence. Rather, contemplation for him is to engage
Aristotle calls the best and most perfect virtue. The speculative in the highest, most perfect type of reflection, the way it is in
intellect is capable of science (episteme) which is the God as noesis noeseos. Contemplation for Aristotle remains a
demonstration and derivation of conclusions from first principles. purely immanent activity, the most immanent man is capable of,
On the other hand, it is also capable of intuition of the which constitutes man's sovereign end and happiness.
fundamental principles (nous). But the highest capability of the
speculative intellect is a perfect science. This is the possession Nevertheless, for man to be capable of such an activity,
of the most fundamental principles and their elaborations and which s really no longer a mere human activity like the moral
derivations, which Aristotle calls philosophy (philosophia or at virtues, Aristotle theorized that over and above man's ordinary
times sophia signifying its fulfilled state). Such a perfect science human powers and possibilities, and over and above the
in the concrete consists of contemplating what Aristotle calls the Composition of body and soul, there must be something divine
most sublime beings, which would include the eternal heavenly In man which alone is immortal in him, the nous. Aristotle.
bodies which were considered divine by Greek tradition, but however, left unresolved the question of whether this divine part
most especially, contemplating the most perfect, most sublime in man proves individual immortality, or whether it means a kind
being which is God Himself. of ray or participation of the divine in men which is reintegrated
in the Godhead at the moment of man's death.
Insofar as God is the most perfect being, there is no
potentiality left in Him. He is Pure Act, thus per-fect. For Owing, however, to the frailty of this composite of body,
Aristotle, He could only be Pure Reason, Pure Thought thinking soul and nous that is man, the "high's" of contemplation come
Itself (Noesis noeseos), for any other object outside of the Pure only as rare brief moments in man's life. Even for the best of
Thought would leave Pure Thought in further potency for it. men, such moments are not to be expected as everyday
which then would signify incompleteness or imperfection. Since happenings. In the concrete, the end of man is mixed. On one
He is the most pure immanent activity. God does not know hand, there are the rare intense moments of intellectual activity
anything or anyone besides Himself. He is not a providential that is divine contemplation, and more commonly, there is the
God, nor is He seen as Creator or source of the being of the
active life of moral virtues and practical wisdom within the One fundamental characteristic of Aristotle's ethics,
context of the communal life of the polis. which perhaps is shared more or less by the whole ancient
Greek tradition, is that man is seen mainly as being his intellect,
Morality is Human Reasonableness apart from which there are only blind irrational desires and
passions Consequently, the main problem of morality is
We see then that, unlike Plato for whom morality is invariably seen to be how to discipline the lower desires and
essentially the soul ordained toward and in quest of the absolute passions, and how to educate and cultivate the intellectual part
Good transcendent to man, Aristotle sees morality more as an in order to attain man's fulfillment. Without this discipline of the
affair of human reasonableness. It is being true to the intrinsic lower desires and the cultivation of the intellectual part, or
nobility and excellence of one's rational soul. Immorality without the necessary conditions which allow for such discipline
therefore consists in an activity which is inordinate, excessive. and cultivation, the moral end is not attained, whether through
disorderly, unreasonable. And the fault is ultimately traceable to the Individual's own fault or not. It is this element which gives
ignorance and error in judgment which make man miss his both Plato's and Aristotle's ethics a certain elitist or aristocratie
proper end in life. Such ignorance, of course, may be quality. It is only later with the coming of Christianity that man
attributable to man himself for failure to exercise discipline over comes to view himself essentially as will, which is a capacity for
his lower passions and desires, thereby letting his intellect and freedom, for free choice and for self-determination. This gives
judgment be clouded over. Or this ignorance may be due to morality a deeper dimension and makes it a matter of
external factors, such as the lack of necessary natural, social or conscience and good will
material conditions.
Another point that might be made of Aristotle's ethics is
Having delineated the proper ends and fulfillment of that whereas the Good for Plato signifies a transcendent, other
man. Aristotle in the end felt constrained to admit that such worldly end of man, for Aristotle the moral end is seen as
noble ends are accessible only to relatively few men. Such ends something immanent in human activity and achievable in life.
require necessary conditions which are not given to all. They The twin ends of moral virtues and contemplation signify for
require a certain natural endowment-normal desires, tendencies Aristotle the achievement of that which is best in man. The
and passions which do not unduly distort the higher Intellectual moral virtues constitute the fulfillment of the nobility and
part of man, except by the Individual's own sufferance and excellence of the human spirit. Contemplation means not so
social background that affords man from early childhood training much the encounter or union with that which is other than man,
and education and orientation to his proper ends. They also but rather the fulfillment of the highest potential of man which is
require a level of material ease and leisure which gives man the his capacity for immanent, self-sufficient activity."
opportunity to develop his powers and possibilities. Here we see
why Aristotle's ethics eventually turns out to be quite exclusive
and aristocratie.