Luciano v. Estrella, G.R. No.

L-31622, 21 August 1970

Facts:

On 18 January 1969, Maximo Estrella, Teotimo Gealogo, Justino Ventura, Pedro

Ison, Ignacio Babasa, Bernardo Nonato, Eduardo S. Francisco, Cirilo Delmo, Jose
San Mateo, Lutgardo Ambrosio, Ciriaco Alano, Gualberto San Pedro, Jose Gutierrez,
Franco A. Gutierrez were charged with violation of Sections 3-G and 4-B of Republic
Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) in an information reading as
follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about July 26, 1967, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in
the Municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Maximo Estrella, then the
Municipal Mayor of Makati, Rizal; Teotimo Gealogo, Justino Ventura, Pedro Ison,
Ignacio Babasa, Bernardo Nonato, then Municipal Councilors of Makati, Rizal;
Eduardo Francisco, then Municipal Treasurer of Makati, Rizal; Cirilo Delmo, then
Assistant Municipal Treasurer of Makati, Rizal; Lutgardo Ambrosio, then Chief of
Traffic Control Bureau, Makati Police Department; Ciriaco Alano, then confidential
Private Secretary to the Municipal Mayor, Gualberto San Pedro, then Provincial
Auditor of the Province of Rizal; Jose Gutierrez and Franco A. Gutierrez, owner
and/or representatives of the JEP Enterprises, respectively, conspiring, and
confederating together, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, on
behalf of the Municipal Government of Makati, Rizal, enter into a contract or
transaction with the JEP Enterprises, represented by Jose Gutierrez and Franco A.
Gutierrez, for the delivery and installation by the JEP Enterprises to the Municipal
Government of Makati, Rizal of fifty-nine (59) units of traffic deflectors valued at
ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SIX PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(P1,426.60) each unit, that thirty-four (34) units were delivered, installed and paid
for by the Municipality of Makati in favor of the JEP Enterprises in the amount of
FORTY-EIGHT THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY ONE PESOS (P48,841.00), less
ten percent (10%) retention, which contract or transaction is manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the Municipal Government of Makati, Rizal, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter.

"That Jose Gutierrez and Franco C. Gutierrez, being the owner, manager and/or
representatives of the JEP Enterprises, being private persons, did knowingly induce
or cause the above-mentioned public officials and officers to enter into the
aforementioned contract or transaction." cralaw virtua1aw library

After due trial, during which the parties presented their respective documentary and
testimonial evidence, the court rendered judgment on 17 May 1969, finding that the
contract for the purchase of 59 units of traffic deflectors at P1,436.50 per unit, was
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the municipality of Makati, Rizal, and that
it was made possible through a sham bidding and a series of falsifications
participated in by most of the accused. Thus, Accused Mayor Maximo Estrella,
Councilors Teotimo Gealogo, Justino Ventura, Pedro Ison, Ignacio Babasa and
Bernardo Nonato, Municipal Treasurer Eduardo Francisco, Provincial Auditor
Gualberto San Pedro, Chief of Police Jose San Mateo, and Traffic Control Bureau
Chief Lutgardo Ambrosio were pronounced guilty as charged, and each was

1
sentenced to a prison term of 6 years, with perpetual disqualification to hold public
office. Thereupon, the Provincial Sheriff was ordered to remove said public officials
from office pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 3019. 1 Accused Franco A.
Gutierrez, Cirilo Delmo and Ciriaco Alano 2 were acquitted for insufficiency of
evidence. On the same day, 17 May 1961, Mayor Estrella and Councilors Gealogo,
Ventura, Ison, Babasa and Nonato perfected their appeal to the Court of Appeals,
where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 10250-CR.

Ruling:
Second, herein respondent municipal officials were charged with violation of Republic
Act 3019 under its Section 3(g), or specifically, for having entered, on behalf of the
government, into a contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous
to the government. It is not at all difficult to see that to determine the culpability of
the accused under such provision, it need only be established that the accused is a
public officer; that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government; and that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to that government. In other words, the act treated thereunder
partakes of the nature of a malum prohibitum; it is the commission of that act as
defined by the law, not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or
not the provision has been violated. And this construction would be in consonance
with the announced purpose for which Republic Act 3019 was enacted, which is the
repression of certain acts of Republic officers and private persons constituting graft
or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. 8 Note that the law does not merely
contemplate repression of acts that are unlawful or corrupt per se, but even of those
that may lead to or result in graft and corruption. Thus, to require for conviction
under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act that the validity of the contract or
transaction be first proved would be to enervate, if not defeat, the intention of the
Act. For what would prevent the officials from entering into those kinds of
transactions against which Republic Act 3019 is directed, and then deliberately omit
the observance of certain formalities just to provide a convenient leeway to avoid
the clutches of the law in the event of discovery and consequent prosecution? In the
present case, assuming arguendo that the absence of certification by the municipal
treasurer as to availability of covering funds would materially affect the validity of
the contract, that matter would be immaterial to the determination of respondents’
liability under Republic Act 3019; so that the discovery of such fact would not
constitute a proper ground to support a motion for the reopening and retrial of the
case.

With these violations of the Rules of Court thus made patent, we have no alternative
but to conclude that the grant of the motion for new trial by the Court of Appeals
was made, not only in error, but with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
of jurisdiction. We are left with no alternative but to disavow and set aside the
actuations of the Appeals Court.

2
Villarosa v. People, G.R. Nos. 233155-63, 23 June 2020

Facts:

Sometime in August to September 2010, the Designated Area Supervisor of the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the Province of Occidental Mindoro
received several reports from their mining and quarry checkers that there are persons who are
conducting quarry operations within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of San Jose, in
the same province, without the required Extraction Permits issued by the Provincial Government.
Acting on these reports, the Designated Area Supervisor notified the quarry operators of their
alleged violation, but upon being confronted by the former, the said quarry operators presented
several documents, among which are Extraction Permits signed by herein petitioner who was
then the Mayor of San Jose. Noting that the documents shown were not issued by the Provincial
Governor's Office, Ruben P. Soledad (Soledad), the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Officer of Occidental Mindoro issued Cease-and-Desist Orders (CDOs) against these
quarry operators, notifying them that it is the Provincial Governor who has sole authority to issue
extraction permits and reminding them of the penalties that may be imposed upon them under
the applicable provisions of the governing Provincial Tax Ordinance.

After acquiring information of the issuance of the above CDOs, herein petitioner wrote a letter,
dated May 23, 2011, addressed to Soledad explaining his position on the matter and stating that
he [Soledad] is guilty of "mockery of the whole legislative process" in considering certain
provisions of the existing and applicable Provincial Tax Ordinance as repealed, and in
supposedly giving effect to a proposed amendment of the said Ordinance without the benefit of
public hearing and publication as required by law. As such, petitioner manifested that the
Municipality of San Jose "shall not recognize [the] cease-and-desist order until such time that a
proper legal process is adhered to by the Provincial Government." Petitioner also asked Soledad
to "properly respect the inherent powers vested upon the Local Government Unit which was
unmistakably and distinctly defined in the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 as a political
subdivision" which "has substantial control of local affairs."4

In a letter dated May 26, 2011, Soledad responded to petitioner by claiming that, pursuant to
Provincial Tax Ordinance No. 2005-004 of Occidental Mindoro, as well as the Local Government
Code of 1991, the authority to issue permits for the extraction of sand and gravel within the
Province of Occidental Mindoro resides exclusively with the Provincial Governor. Soledad
explained that the subject CDOs were issued for failure of the concerned quarry operators to
present the legal permits because the ones they presented were issued by herein petitioner in
his capacity as the Mayor of San Jose who is not authorized to do so. Soledad also insisted that
the CDOs it issued were based on the strength of the provisions of the existing Provincial Tax
Ordinance and not on the basis of any proposed amendments thereto.5

On August 23, 2011, petitioner wrote a letter addressed to the Members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Occidental Mindoro insisting that, under the LGC, the Municipal government is
authorized to organize its Municipal Environment and Natural Resources and to enforce its own
regulatory powers. Petitioner also manifested that he is not in conformity with the alleged
amendment of Provincial Tax Ordinance No. 2005-004, and that he will just honor the provisions
of the original version of the said Ordinance which supposedly authorizes the Municipal
Treasurer to receive payments from applicants of extraction permits.6

On October 4, 2011, Soledad filed, before the Office of the Ombudsman, a Complaint7 against
petitioner for Usurpation of Authority, Violation of Section 138 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA

3
7160), otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, Grave Abuse of Authority in
Office, Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and
Violation of Republic Act No. 6713 (RA 6713), otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. In his Complaint, Soledad alleged that
despite petitioner's knowledge that he lacks the requisite authority to issue extraction permits to
quarry operators, petitioner, nonetheless, proceeded to issue several permits to several
operators who were conducting quarry operations in San Jose.

The SB held that all the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are present in the
instant case.

Ruling:

In the present case, petitioner is charged with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 which
provides:

Section. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative
or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

In order to hold a person liable under this provision, the following elements must concur, to wit:

(1) the offender is a public officer;

(2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officer's official, administrative or
judicial functions;

(3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence; and

(4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.26

The presence of the first and second elements are not disputed in the present case. Petitioner
was the Mayor of the Municipality of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro at the time of the commission
of the alleged offense and the acts complained of were done in the discharge of his official
functions.

As to the third element, petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to prove that there was
evident bad faith on his part. First, petitioner contends that the applications for extraction permit
went through a legitimate process as these were filed with the Municipal Environment and
Natural Resources Office (MENRO), a body which was duly created by the Sangguniang
Bayan of San Jose and approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Occidental Mindoro.
Thereafter the applications were forwarded to the Municipal Administrator who, then,
recommended its approval to the Mayor. Upon approval by the Mayor, the applicant paid the
extraction fee to the Municipal Treasurer who issued Official Receipts. Second, petitioner argues

4
that the taxes and fees paid by the applicants for extraction permit were duly collected by the
Municipal Government of San Jose and were, in turn, remitted to the Provincial Government of
Occidental Mindoro. The taxes which were remitted formed part of the Province's general fund
and were duly appropriated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Petitioner avers that if he indeed
had no authority to issue the subject extraction permits, why did the Provincial Government
continue to accept the taxes which were generated from the issuance of these permits, and
which were remitted by the Municipal Government of San Jose and never bothered to question
them?

Under the third element, the crime may be committed through "manifest partiality," "evident bad
faith," or "gross inexcusable negligence." As already held by this Court, Section 3(e) of RA 3019
may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest
partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence.27 There is
"manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor
one side or person rather than another.28 "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment
but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or
conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.29 "Evident bad faith" contemplates a
state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill
will or for ulterior purposes.30 "Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized
by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty
to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.31

In the instant case, the prosecution alleges that petitioner is guilty of evident bad faith. However,
the Court agrees with petitioner and finds that there is no sufficient evidence to prove that he is
guilty of evident bad faith.

First, since he was not furnished copies of the CDOs nor was he previously notified of their
issuance, petitioner was the one who took initiative in clarifying the validity of the said CDOs by
writing a letter to Soledad and informing him of his position on the issue and the legal bases of
such position.

Second, from the tenor of his letter to Soledad and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Occidental
Mindoro, petitioner was very emphatic in his belief and reasoning, albeit mistakenly, that, under
the Local Government Code, he wields authority, as Municipal Mayor, to issue the questioned
permits. In fact, he even raised a legitimate question on the validity of the Provincial Tax
Ordinance of Occidental Mindoro which governs, among others, the issuance of permits to
extract and dispose of resources of the province. In other words, his claim and argument are not
without any legal basis. However, he was mistaken in his reliance on the provisions of the Local
Government Code as to his authority to issue the subject extraction permits. Such mistake,
nonetheless, is not tantamount to evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable
negligence as contemplated under the law as to make him liable under Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

Third, there is no showing that petitioner personally gained anything by his issuance of the
questioned extraction permits. In fact, it was not disputed that all the pertinent taxes and fees in
the issuance of the said permits were collected and the respective shares of the Provincial
Government and the barangay were properly remitted and appropriated by them.

Fourth, there could have been no furtive design to issue the questioned permits because it is
likewise undisputed that the application, the processing and the approval of the said permits went
through the regular process. The applications were filed with the MENRO, which were then
forwarded to the Municipal Administrator who, then, recommended its approval to the Mayor.
Upon approval by the Mayor, the applicant paid the extraction fee to the Municipal Treasurer who
issued Official Receipts. There was no evidence to show that there were favored applicants
whose permits were surreptitiously issued for any ulterior motive or purpose.

5
Hence, the foregoing instances cast doubt on the culpability of petitioner for the crime charged.
The prosecution was unable to present sufficient evidence to prove that in issuing the questioned
extraction permits, petitioner was moved by a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection
to favor one side or person rather than another or of a palpably and patently fraudulent and
dishonest purpose operating with furtive design to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing.

Anent the last element, in order to hold a person liable for violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019, it is
required that the act constituting the offense consists of either (1) causing undue injury to any
party, including the government, or (2) giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge by the accused of his official, administrative or judicial
functions.32 Petitioner is charged under the second mode.

For one to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the accused has given
unjustified favor or benefit to another in the exercise of his official, administrative or judicial
functions.33 The word "unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified;
unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason.34 "Advantage" means a more favorable
or improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of
action.35 "Preference" signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation
above another.36

In the instant case, the Court finds no sufficient evidence to prove that the persons in whose
favor herein petitioner issued the subject extraction permits received unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference. At the time of issuing the subject permits, petitioner was justified by his
honest belief that he is authorized by law to issue the said permits. Moreover, as mentioned
above, there is no dispute that the recipients of the permits went through the regular process in
applying for the said permits and that they paid the taxes and fees imposed by the Municipal
Government of San Jose. Neither was there any showing that they were given preference over
other applicants.

Moreover, it bears to reiterate that an accused has in his/her favor the presumption of innocence
which the Bill of Rights guarantees. Unless his/her guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt,
he/she must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process
clause of the Constitution, which protects the accused from conviction except upon proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. The
burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the accused need not
even offer evidence in his/her behalf, and he/she would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of proof as, excluding the possibility of
error, produce absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the accused
is responsible for the offense charged.37

6
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965, 26 February 2002

Facts:

In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito

Estrada, then President of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal complaints against the
former President and members of his family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed
with the respondent Office of the Ombudsman.

On April 4, 2001, the respondent Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause
1 

warranting the filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations against the former
President and the other respondents therein. One of the Informations was for the crime of
plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 and among the respondents was herein petitioner Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.

The Information was amended and filed on April 18, 2001. Docketed as Criminal Case No.
26558, the case was assigned to respondent Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. The
arraignment of the accused was set on July 10, 2001 and no bail for petitioner’s provisional
liberty was fixed.

On April 24, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash or Suspend" the Amended Information on
the ground that the Anti-Plunder Law, R.A. No. 7080, is unconstitutional and that it charged more
than one offense. Respondent Ombudsman opposed the motion.

On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner and his co-
accused. On its basis, petitioner and his co-accused were placed in custody of the law.

On April 30, 2001, petitioner filed a "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion" alleging that: (1) no probable
2 

cause exists to put him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only
allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not in a "series or combination of overt or criminal acts"
as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail as a matter of right. Petitioner prayed
that he be excluded from the Amended Information and be discharged from custody. In the
alternative, petitioner also prayed that he be allowed to post bail in an amount to be fixed by
respondent court. 3

Issue:
"1) not declaring that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and, as applied to petitioner,
and denying him the equal protection of the laws;

Ruling:

7
Petitioner’s contention that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional as applied to him is principally
perched on the premise that the Amended Information charged him with only one act or one
offense which cannot constitute plunder. He then assails the denial of his right to bail.

Petitioner’s premise is patently false. A careful examination of the Amended Information will
show that it is divided into three (3) parts: (1) the first paragraph charges former President
Joseph E. Estrada with the crime of plunder together with petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada,
Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda Ricaforte and others; (2) the second paragraph
spells out in general terms how the accused conspired in committing the crime of plunder; and
(3) the following four sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts constitutive of
the crime of plunder pursuant to items (1) to (6) of R.A. No. 7080, and state the names of the
accused who committed each act.

Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the
Amended Information which is of "receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several
instances, money in the aggregate amount of ₱545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the form
of gift, share, percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary benefit x x x." In this sub-paragraph
(a), petitioner, in conspiracy with former President Estrada, is charged with the act of receiving
or collecting money from illegal gambling amounting to ₱545 million. Contrary to petitioner’s
posture, the allegation is that he received or collected money from illegal gambling "on several
instances." The phrase "on several instances" means the petitioner committed the
predicate act in series. To insist that the Amended Information charged the petitioner with the
commission of only one act or offense despite the phrase "several instances" is to indulge in a
twisted, nay, "pretzel" interpretation.

It matters little that sub-paragraph (a) did not utilize the exact words "combination" or "series" as
they appear in R.A. No. 7080. For in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, we held that where these two
13 

terms are to be taken in their popular, not technical, meaning, the word "series" is synonymous
with the clause "on several instances." "Series" refers to a repetition of the same predicate act in
any of the items in Section 1 (d) of the law. The word "combination" contemplates the
commission of at least any two different predicate acts in any of said items. Plainly, sub-
paragraph (a) of the Amended Information charges petitioner with plunder committed by a
series of the same predicate act under Section 1 (d) (2) of the law.

Similarly misleading is petitioner’s stand that in the Ombudsman Resolution of April 4, 2001
finding probable cause to charge him with plunder together with the other accused, he was
alleged to have received only the sum of P2 million, which amount is way below the minimum of
P50 million required under R.A. No. 7080. The submission is not borne out by the April 4, 2001
Resolution of the Ombudsman, recommending the filing of charges against petitioner and his co-
accused, which in pertinent part reads:

Respondent Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, the present Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, appears to
have also surreptitious collection of protection money from jueteng operations in Bulacan. This is
gleaned from the statements of Gov. Singson himself and the fact that Mayor Estrada, on at
least two occasions, turned over to a certain Emma Lim, an emissary of the respondent
governor, jueteng haul totalling P2 million, i.e., P1 million in January, 2000 and another P1 million
in February, 2000. An alleged "listahan" of jueteng recipients listed him as one "Jingle Bell," as
affirmed by Singson [TSN 8 & Dec. 2000 SICt/17 Oct. 2000 SBRC/SCI]." 14

Hence, contrary to the representations of the petitioner, the Ombudsman made the finding that
P2 million was delivered to petitioner as "jueteng haul" on "at least two occasions." The P2
million is, therefore, not the entire sum with which petitioner is specifically charged. This is
further confirmed by the conclusion of the Ombudsman that:

8
"x x x           x x x          x x x

It is clear that Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in confabulation with Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Atty. Edward
Serapio and Yolanda Ricaforte, demanded and received, as bribe money, the aggregate sum of
P545 million from jueteng collections of the operators thereof, channeled thru Gov. Luis ‘Chavit’
Singson, in exchange for protection from arrest or interference by law enforcers; x x x." 15

To be sure, it is too late in the day for the petitioner to argue that the Ombudsman failed to
establish any probable cause against him for plunder. The respondent Sandiganbayan itself has
found probable cause against the petitioner for which reason it issued a warrant of arrest against
him. Petitioner then underwent arraignment and is now on trial. The time to assail the finding of
probable cause by the Ombudsman has long passed. The issue cannot be resurrected in this
petition.

Petitioner raises these hypothetical questions for he labors hard under the impression that: (1) he
is charged with only one act or offense and (2) he has not conspired with the other accused
named in sub-paragraphs (b) to (d) of the Amended Information, ergo, the penalty imposable on
him ought to be different from reclusion perpetua to death. R.A. No. 7080, he bewails, is cloudy
on the imposable penalty on an accused similarly situated as he is. Petitioner, however,
overlooks that the second paragraph of the Amended Information charges him to have conspired
with former President Estrada in committing the crime of plunder. His alleged participation
consists in the commission of the predicate acts specified in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information. If these allegations are proven, the penalty of petitioner cannot be unclear. It will be
no different from that of the former President for in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of the
other. The imposable penalty is provided in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, viz:

"Section 2. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with the members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at
least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public
officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be
punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal
Code, shall be considered by the court."

From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the accused named
in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired with former President
Estrada to enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount of P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended Information is worded, however, it is not certain
whether the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each other to enable the
former President to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of clarity, petitioner
cannot be penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other accused with the former
President as related in the second paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-
paragraphs (b) to (d). We hold that petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate acts
he allegedly committed as related in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which were
allegedly done in conspiracy with the former President whose design was to amass ill-gotten
wealth amounting to more than P4 billion.

We hasten to add, however, that the respondent Ombudsman cannot be faulted for
including the predicate acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended
Information in one, and not in four, separate Informations. A study of the history of R.A. No.
7080 will show that the law was crafted to avoid the mischief and folly of filing multiple

9
informations. The Anti-Plunder Law was enacted in the aftermath of the Marcos regime where
charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed against former President Marcos and his alleged
cronies. Government prosecutors found no appropriate law to deal with the multitude and
magnitude of the acts allegedly committed by the former President to acquire illegal
wealth. They also found that under the then existing laws such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
20 

Practices Act, the Revised Penal Code and other special laws, the acts involved different
transactions, different time and different personalities. Every transaction constituted a
separate crime and required a separate case and the over-all conspiracy had to be broken
down into several criminal and graft charges. The preparation of multiple Informations was a
legal nightmare but eventually, thirty-nine (39) separate and independent cases were filed
against practically the same accused before the Sandiganbayan. R.A. No. 7080 or the Anti-
21 

Plunder Law was enacted precisely to address this procedural problem. This is pellucid in the
22 

Explanatory Note to Senate Bill No. 733, viz:

"Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic
treason, punishes the use of high office for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts
done not in the public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of time, that may involve so
many persons, here and abroad, and which touch so many states and territorial units. The acts
and/or omissions sought to be penalized do not involve simple cases of malversation of
public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft but constitute plunder of an entire nation
resulting in material damage to the national economy. The above-described crime does not
yet exist in Philippine statute books. Thus, the need to come up with a legislation as a safeguard
against the possible recurrence of the depravities of the previous regime and as a deterrent to
those with similar inclination to succumb to the corrupting influence of power."

There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to
the national economy" is made up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of
plunder, therefore, different parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at
bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts have a commonality—to help the
former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the
Amended Information alleged the different participation of each accused in the conspiracy.
The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive
protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco
excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle
Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself
from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts,
agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition
of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.

In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused in multiple conspiracies

commonly involves two structures: (1) the so-called "wheel" or "circle" conspiracy, in which there
is a single person or group (the "hub") dealing individually with two or more other persons or
groups (the "spokes"); and (2) the "chain" conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of
narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive communication and cooperation in
much the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and
wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer. 23

From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar appears similar to a "wheel"
conspiracy. The hub is former President Estrada while the spokes are all the accused, and the
rim that encloses the spokes is the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing,
accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.

10
Macapagal-Arroyo v. People, G.R. No. 220598, 19 July 201

Facts:

On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA); Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and Accounts
Officer Benigno Aguas; PCSO General Manager and Vice Chairman Rosario C. Uriarte; PCSO
Chairman of the Board of Directors Sergio 0. Valencia; Members of the PCSO Board of
Directors, namely: Manuel L. Morato, Jose R. Taruc V, Raymundo T. Roquero, and Ma. Fatima
A.S. Valdes; Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman Reynaldo A. Villar; and COA Head of
Intelligence/Confidential Fund Fraud Audit Unit Nilda B. Plaras with plunder. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-O 174 and assigned to the First Division of
the Sandiganbayan.

The information  reads:

3

The undersigned Assistant Ombudsman and Gratl Investigation and Prosecution Officer III,
Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuse GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ROSARIO C.
URIARTE, SERGIO O. VALENCIA, MANUEL L. MORA TO, JOSE R. TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T.
ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA A.S. V ALOES, BENIGNO B. AGUAS, REYNALDO A. VILLAR and
NILDA B. PLARAS, of the crime of PLUNDER, as defined by, and penalized under Section 2 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, committed, as follows:

That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto,
in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused GLORIA
MA CAP A GAL-ARROYO, then the President of the Philippines, ROSARIO C. URIARTE, then
General Manager and Vice Chairman, SERGIO O. VALENCIA, then Chairman of the Board of
Directors, MANUEL L. MORA TO, JOSE R. TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, MA.
FATIMA A.S. V ALOES, then members of the Board of Directors, BENIGNO B. AGUAS, then
Budget and Accounts Manager, all of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO),
REYNALDO A. VILLAR, then Chairman, and NILDA B. PLARAS, then Head of
Intelligence/Confidential Fund Fraud Audit Unit, both of the Commission on Audit, all public
officers committing the offense in relation to their respective offices and taking undue advantage
of their respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence, conniving,
conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally amass, accumulate and/or acquire. Directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or total value of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE MILLION NINE HUNDRED
NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTEEN PESOS (PHP365,997,915.00), more
or less, through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or
means, described as follows:

11
 (a) diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget of PCSO to its
Confidential/Intelligence Fund that could be accessed and withdrawn at any time with
minimal restrictions, and converting, misusing, and/or illegally conveying or transferring
the proceeds drawn from said fund in the aforementioned sum, also in several instances,
to themselves, in the guise of fictitious expenditures, for their personal gain and benefit;

(b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several instances, the
above-mentioned amount from the Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts,
and or unlawfully transferring or conveying the same into their possession and control
through irregularly issued disbursement vouchers and fictitious expenditures; and

(c) taking advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships,

connections or influence, in several instances, to unjustly enrich themselves in the
aforementioned sum, at the expense of, and the damage and prejudice of the Filipino
people and the Republic of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

By the end of October 2012, the Sandiganbayan already acquired jurisdiction over GMA,

Valencia, Morato and Aguas. Plaras, on the other hand, was able to secure a temporary
restraining order (TRO) from this Court in Plaras v. Sandiganbayan docketed as G.R. Nos.
203693-94. Insofar as Roquero is concerned, the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction as to him
by the early part of 2013. Uriarte and Valdes remained at large.

GMA pleads that the denial of her demurrer to evidence was in patent and flagrant violation of
Republic Act No. 7080, the law on plunder, and was consequently arbitrary and oppressive, not
only in grave abuse of discretion but rendered without jurisdiction because:

First Ground

On the basis of the above Resolutions, the Sandiganbayan has denied petitioner Arroyo's
Demurrer to Evidence and considering the reasons for doing so, would find petitioner
Arroyo guilty of the offense of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 as charged in the
Information notwithstanding the following:

a. While the gravamen, indeed corpus delicti of the offense of plunder under R.A. No.
7080, and as charged in the Information, is that the public officer ... "amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts as described in Section l(d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of
at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00)", the Sandiganbayan Resolutions extirpate
this vital element of the offense of plunder;

b. In point of fact, not a single exhibit of the 637 exhibits offered by the prosecution nor a
single testimony of the 21 witnesses of the prosecution was offered by the prosecution to
prove that petitioner amassed, accumulated or acquired even a single peso of the alleged
ill-gotten wealth amounting to P365,997,915.00 or any part of that amount alleged in the
Information;

c. Implicitly confirming the above, and aggravating its error, on the basis solely of
petitioner Arroyo's authorization of the release of the Confidential/Intelligence Fund from
PCSO's accounts, the Sandiganbayan ruled that she has committed the offense of plunder
under R.A. No. 7080 for the reason that her release of CIF funds to the PCSO amount to a
violation of Sec. l(d) [11 of R.A. No. 7080 which reads, as follows:

12
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids
on the public treasury;

which, "did not associate or require the concept of personal gain/benefit or un.just
enrichment with respect to raids on the public treasury", thereby disregarding the
gravamen or the corpus delicti of the offense of plunder under R.A. No. 7080.

Ruling:

n its present version, under which the petitioners were charged, Section 2 of Republic Act No.
7080 (Plunder Law) states:

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. – Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of
the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who
participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime
of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree
of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by
the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-
gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and
shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State. [As
Amended by Section 12, Republic Act No. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law)]

Section l(d) of Republic Act No. 7080 provides:

Section 1. Definition of terms. - As used in this Act, the term:

xxxx

d. "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of

any person within the purview of Section two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly
through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the

public treasury;

2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or

any/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public officer concerned;

3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National

Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking;

13
5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests;
or

6. By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence

to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must be identified as the one who
amassed, acquired or accumulated ill-gotten wealth because it plainly states that plunder is
committed by any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at
least P50,000,000.00 through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in
Section l(d) hereof. Surely, the law requires in the criminal charge for plunder against several
individuals that there must be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be members
of her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons. In other words, the allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the
information was appropriate because the main plunderer would then be identified in either
manner. Of course, implied conspiracy could also identify the main plunderer, but that fact must
be properly alleged and duly proven by the Prosecution.

This interpretation is supported by Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, where the Court explained the
40

nature of the conspiracy charge and the necessity for the main plunderer for whose benefit the
amassment, accumulation and acquisition was made, thus:

There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to
the national economy" is made up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of
plunder, therefore, different parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the
different accused and their different criminal acts have a commonality - to help the former
President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the
Amended Information alleged the different participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The
gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive
protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco
excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle
Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself
from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts,
agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition
of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada. [bold underscoring supplied for
emphasis]

Here, considering that 10 persons have been accused of amassing, accumulating and/or
acquiring ill-gotten wealth aggregating P365,997,915.00, it would be improbable that the crime
charged was plunder if none of them was alleged to be the main plunderer. As such, each of the
10 accused would account for the aliquot amount of only P36,599,791.50, or exactly 1/10 of the
alleged aggregate ill-gotten wealth, which is far below the threshold value of ill-gotten wealth
required for plunder.

We are not unmindful of the holding in Estrada v. Sandiganabayan  to the effect that an
41

information alleging conspiracy is sufficient if the information alleges conspiracy either: (1) with
the use of the word conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive,
collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of the basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a
person of common understanding would know what is being conveyed, and with such precision
as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on
the same facts. We are not talking about the sufficiency of the information as to the allegation of
conspiracy, however, but rather the identification of the main plunderer sought to be prosecuted

14
under R.A. No. 7080 as an element of the crime of plunder. Such identification of the main
plunderer was not only necessary because the law required such identification, but also because
it was essential in safeguarding the rights of all of the accused to be properly informed of the
charges they were being made answerable for. The main purpose of requiring the various
elements of the crime charged to be set out in the information is to enable all the accused to
suitably prepare their defense because they are presumed to have no independent knowledge of
the facts that constituted the offense charged.42

For sure, even the Sandiganbayan was at a loss in this respect. Despite the silence of the
information on who the main plunderer or the mastermind was, the Sandiganbayan readily
condemned GMA in its resolution dated September 10, 2015 as the mastermind despite the
absence of the specific allegation in the information to that effect. Even worse, there was no
evidence that substantiated such sweeping generalization.

In fine, the Prosecution's failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be fatal to the
cause of the State against the petitioners for violating the rights of each accused to be informed
of the charges against each of them.

Nevertheless, the Prosecution insists that GMA, Uriarte and Aguas committed acts showing the
existence of an implied conspiracy among themselves, thereby making all of them the main
plunderers. On this score, the Prosecution points out that the sole overt act of GMA to become a
part of the conspiracy was her approval via the marginal note of "OK" of all the requests made by
Uriarte for the use of additional intelligence fund. The Prosecution stresses that by approving
Uriaiie's requests in that manner, GMA violated the following:

a. Letter of Instruction 1282, which required requests for additional confidential and intelligence
funds (CIFs) to be accompanied with detailed, specific project proposals and specifications; and

b. COA Circular No. 92-385, which allowed the President to approve the release of additional
CIFs only if there was an existing budget to cover the request.

The insistence of the Prosecution is unwarranted. GMA's approval of Uriarte's requests for
additional CIFs did not make her part of any design to raid the public treasury as the means to
amass, accumulate and acquire ill-gotten wealth. Absent the specific allegation in the information
to that effect, and competent proof thereon, GMA' s approval of Uriarte' s requests, even if
unqualified, could not make her part of any criminal conspiracy to commit plunder or any other
crime considering that her approval was not by any means irregular or illegal.

The Prosecution takes GMA to task for approving Uriarte's request despite the requests failing to
provide "the full detail [ ofJ the specific purposes for which said funds shall be spent and shall
explain the circumstances giving rise to the necessity for the expenditure and the particular aims
to be accomplished." It posits that the requests were not specific enough, contrary to what is
required by LOI 1282.

However, an examination of Uriarte' s several requests indicates their compliance with LOI No.
1282. The requests, similarly worded, furnished: (a) the full details of the specific purposes for
which the funds would be spent; (b) the explanations of the circumstances giving rise to the
necessity of the expenditure; and (c) the particular aims to be accomplished.

A reading of the requests also reveals that the additional CIFs requested were to be used to
protect PCSO's image and the integrity of its operations. The Court thus cannot share the
Prosecution's dismissiveness of the requests for not being compliant with LOI No. 1282.
According to its terms, LOI No. 1282 did not detail any qualification as to how specific the
requests should be made. Hence, we should not make any other pronouncement than to rule
that Uriarte's requests were compliant with LOI No. 1282.

15
COA Circular No. 92-385 required that additional request for CIFs would be approved only when
there was available budget. In this regard, the Prosecution suggests that there was no longer any
budget when GMA approved Uriarte's requests because the budget had earmarked intelligence
funds that had already been maxed out and used. The suggestion is not acceptable, however,
considering that the funds of the PCSO were comingled into one account as early as 2007.
Consequently, although only 15% of PCSO's revenues was appropriated to an operation fund
from which the CIF could be sourced, the remaining 85% of PCSO's revenues, already co-
mingled with the operating fund, could still sustain the additional requests. In short, there was
available budget from which to draw the additional requests for CIFs.

It is notable that the COA, although frowning upon PCSO's co-mingling of funds, did not rule
such co-mingling as illegal. As such, sourcing the requested additional CIFs from one account
was far from illegal.

Lastly, the Prosecution's effort to show irregularities as badges of bad faith has led it to claim that
GMA had known that Uriarte would raid the public treasury, and would misuse the amounts
disbursed. This knowledge was imputed to GMA by virtue of her power of control over PCSO.

The Prosecution seems to be relying on the doctrine of command responsibility to impute the
actions of subordinate officers to GMA as the superior officer. The reliance is misplaced, for
incriminating GMA under those terms was legally unacceptable and incomprehensible. The
application of the doctrine of command responsibility is limited, and cannot be true for all
litigations. The Court ruled in Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo that command responsibility
44

pertains to the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of

the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
conflict. The doctrine has also found application in civil actions for human rights abuses. But this
case involves neither a probe of GMA' s actions as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, nor of a human rights issue. As such, it is legally improper to impute
the actions of Uriarte to GMA in the absence of any conspiracy between them.

III.
No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring
ill-gotten wealth of at least P50 Million
was adduced against GMA and Aguas

The Sandiganbayan sustained the sufficiency of the evidence to convict the petitioners for

plunder on the basis that the Prosecution established all the elements of plunder.

After a review of the records, we find and rule that the Prosecution had no case for plunder
against the petitioners.

To successfully mount a criminal prosecution for plunder, the State must allege and establish the
following elements, namely:

1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by herself or in connivance with members of her
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;

2. That the offender amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or
series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly,
any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from
any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of
the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition
of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by
obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other

16
form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or
other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular
persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the
damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,

3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or
acquired is at least P50,000,000.00. 46

The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth

valued at not less than P50,000,000.00. The failure to establish the corpus delicti should lead to
the dismissal of the criminal prosecution.

As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-
gotten wealth worth at least P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution adduced no evidence showing that
either GMA or Aguas or even Uriarte, for that matter, had amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-
gotten wealth of any amount. There was also no evidence, testimonial or otherwise, presented by
the Prosecution showing even the remotest possibility that the CIFs of the PCSO had been
diverted to either GMA or Aguas, or Uriarte.

Domingo v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 176127, 30 January 2009

Facts:

A complaint-affidavit was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman by Sangguniang

Kabataan (SK) officials Kathryn Joy Paguio, Allan Jay Esguerra and Neil Patrick Celis
(respondents) against petitioner as Barangay Chairman and Barangay Treasurer Fe
T. Lao (Lao), both of Barangay 686, Zone 75, District V, Manila, for malversation,
falsification of public document, dishonesty and grave misconduct. 5

Respondents alleged that petitioner and Lao misappropriated the cash advance
taken by respondents from the SK funds amounting to P16,784.00 in the year 2002.
They added that petitioner gave a false statement in his Justification supporting the
2003 Barangay Budget and Expenditures by declaring that his barangay had no
incumbent SK officials at that time contrary to the fact that respondents are duly
elected and incumbent SK officials of the barangay.6

In support of their claims, respondents presented as evidence: (1) the Audit

Observation Memorandum dated 9 February 2004 issued by the Office of the City
Auditor of Manila;7 (2) the photocopy of the certified true copy of the allegedly
falsified Justification;8 (3) the certificate of canvass of voters and proclamation of the
winning candidates for SK Chairman and Council members during the SK election on
15 July 2002;9 and (4) the affidavit of Esguerra, Danilo Baldivia and Paolo Tagabe
attesting to the fact that their services were hired by respondent Paguio to paint
the barangay sidewalk.10

17
Petitioner denied the allegations in his counter-affidavit and asserted that all
financial transactions of the barangay, particularly the expenditures, were supported
by pertinent documents and properly liquidated. He explained that the check
covering the sum of P16,784.00, the object of the alleged misappropriation, had
been properly liquidated with the submission of pertinent documents as of 26 June
2003.

Issue:

With respect to the penalty imposed, the graft office defends its propriety stressing
that it is in accordance with R.A. No. 6713.19

Respondents merely echo the stance of the OMB with the argument that by
submitting the falsified Justification in connection with the 2003 barangay budget,
petitioner failed the mark of professionalism required of a Barangay Chairman.

Ruling:

On the merits, the Court is also unconvinced that there is substantial evidence
establishing petitioner's culpability. Petitioner had a hand in the preparation and
submission of the documents in support of the budget, such as the 2003 barangay
budget,23 budget proposal,24 barangay development plan for 2003,25 and statement
of income and expenditures for 2003.26 In all these documents, the existence of the
SK was recognized and corresponding allocations were made for it. With these
attestations on petitioner's part, there is absolutely no rhyme or reason for him to
issue the questioned Justification and attest to the non-existence of these SK
officials, more so in light of respondents' assertion that he did so in connection with
the process for the approval of this barangay's 2003 budget. ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

The sole evidence relied upon by the OMB in holding petitioner liable is the undated
Justification. The handwritten entry "Copy Budget 2004" 27 as certified by the Chief of
the MBB appears to be a clerical error because the Justification was ostensibly made
in connection with the 2003 budget. The OMB stated that "the fact of whether or not
the same (Justification) was intended for 2003 or 2004 budget is immaterial as the
irregularity of its entry in the records of the barangay bureau was the issue."
However, its entry into the barangay records was in itself questionable. In both
cases, the submission of the Justification cannot be logically pinpointed to petitioner.
If the Justification was intended for 2003, there would have been a gross
inconsistency between the Justification and the documents relating to the 2003
budget submitted by petitioner. Likewise, if the Justification was intended for 2004,
respondents should have presented the 2004 budget since the burden is on them to
prove the charges against petitioner. But respondents failed to do so.

The Justification, if indeed it was officially submitted, was denominated as such and
so submitted to justify the non-inclusion of the SK in the barangay budget. But the
2003 budget contained an appropriation item for the SK. Thus, if at all, the
Justification is a stray and aberrant document which could not have emanated from
petitioner.

18
The charge of violation of Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 deserves further comment.
The provision commands that "public officials and employees shall perform and
discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism,
intelligence and skill." Said provision merely enunciates "professionalism as an ideal
norm of conduct to be observed by public servants, in addition to commitment to
public interest, justness and sincerity, political neutrality, responsiveness to the
public, nationalism and patriotism, commitment to democracy and simple living.
Following this perspective, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 6713
adopted by the Civil Service Commission mandates the grant of incentives and
rewards to officials and employees who demonstrate exemplary service and conduct
based on their observance of the norms of conduct laid down in Section 4. In other
words, under the mandated incentives and rewards system, officials and employees
who comply with the high standard set by law would be rewarded. Those who fail to
do so cannot expect the same favorable treatment. However, the Implementing
Rules does not provide that they will have to be sanctioned for failure to observe
these norms of conduct. Indeed, Rule X of the Implementing Rules affirms as
grounds for administrative disciplinary action only acts "declared unlawful or
prohibited by the Code." Rule X specifically mentions at least twenty-three (23) acts
or omissions as grounds for administrative disciplinary action. Failure to abide by the
norms of conduct under Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 is not one of them.

Furthermore, there is obviously a denial of due process in this case. The due process
requirement mandates that every accused or respondent be apprised of the nature
and cause of the charge against him, and the evidence in support thereof be shown
or made available to him so that he can meet the charge with traversing or
exculpatory evidence.28 A cursory reading of the complaint-affidavit does not reveal
that petitioner was charged with violation of Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713. Likewise,
in the OMB's Evaluation Report, the charges indicated were for malversation,
falsification, dishonesty and grave misconduct.

19