Lesson 2 Philippine Agriculture

Objectives:
This lesson aims to discuss the Philippine Agriculture with an expectation
that the students are able to:
1. Identify the History of Agriculture in the Philippine
2. Explain the different Philippine Agriculture.
3. Identify the Farmers list top issues impacting agriculture.

Welcome to Lesson 2, Module 1.

Introduction:

PHILIPPINE AGRICULTURE

Traces of modern Philippine agriculture became most visible to the Outside

World at the height of the Spanish regime when industries were encouraged and
developed and supplied the major needs of the colonizer Spain and other European
consumers for tobacco, sugar and abaca.

In the Lesson we will reviews the trends in the Philippine agricultural sector’s
performance, and relates these to the policy environment within which the sector has
operated through the years. The next section specifically examines the trends in
production and productivity of the sector. The evolution of the policy environment that
has influenced such performance is then reviewed in the following section. The last
section identifies the pitfalls that have hampered investments in the sector and stifled
growth in the agribusiness industry, and ends with a general indication of the needed
interventions to overcome the sector’s current hurdles.

Abstract

At the proclamation of Philippine Independence on June 12, 1898, which gave

birth to the First Philippine Republic under the stewardship of President Emilio
Aguinaldo, several offices and agencies were established. The then Department
of Agriculture and Manufacturing was created through a Presidential Proclamation
on June 23, 1898.

By 1901, a policy of diversification was adopted under the American Sovereignty,

which gave emphasis to the development of other agricultural products, like rice and
other basic commodities, and also fishing, forestry and mining. The Insular Bureau of
Agriculture was then created under the Department of Interior through Act 271.

Eventually, the Bureau of Agriculture grew rapidly until it was abolished by the
enactment of Act No. 2666 on November 18, 1916, which was implemented on January
1, 1917.

By virtue of this Act entitled "An Act to Re-organize the Executive Department of
the Government of the Philippine Islands" the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources took over the functions and activities of the Department of Interior, namely:
direct executive control, direction, and supervision of the Bureau of Agriculture, Bureau
of Forestry, Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Science, and the Weather Bureau and all
matters concerning hunting, fisheries, sponges and other sea products and such others
as may be hereafter assigned to it by law.

The Philippines is still primarily an agricultural country despite the plan to make it
an industrialized economy by 2000. Most citizens still live in rural areas and support
themselves through agriculture. The country's agriculture sector is made up of 4 sub-
sectors: farming, fisheries, livestock, and forestry (the latter 2 sectors are very small),
which together employ 39.8 percent of the labor force and contribute 20 percent of
GDP.
The country's main agricultural crops are rice, corn, coconut, sugarcane,
bananas, pineapple, coffee, mangoes, tobacco, and abaca (a banana-like plant).
Secondary crops include peanut, cassava, camote (a type of root crop), garlic, onion,
cabbage, eggplant, calamansi (a variety of lemon), rubber, and cotton. The year 1998
was a bad year for agriculture because of adverse weather conditions. Sector output
shrank by 8.3 percent, but it posted growth the following year. Yet, hog farming and
commercial fishing posted declines in their gross revenues in 1999. The sector is
burdened with low productivity for most of its crops.
The Philippines exports its agricultural products around the world, including the
United States, Japan, Europe, and ASEAN countries (members of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations). Major export products are coconut oil and other coconut
products, fruits and vegetables, bananas, and prawns (a type of shrimp). Other exports
include the Cavendish banana, Cayenne pineapple, tuna, seaweed, and carrageenan.
The value of coconut-product exports amounted to US$989 million in 1995 but declined
to US$569 million by 2000. Imported agricultural products include un-milled wheat and
meslin, oilcake and other soybean residues, malt and malt flour, urea, flour, meals and
pellets of fish, soybeans and whey.
One of the most pressing concerns of the agricultural sector is the rampant
conversion of agricultural land into golf courses, residential subdivisions, and industrial
parks or resorts. In 1993 the nation was losing irrigated rice lands at a rate of 2,300
hectares per year. Small land-holders find it more profitable to sell their land to
developers in exchange for cash, especially since they lack capital for seeds, fertilizers,
pesticides, and wages for hiring workers to plant and harvest the crops. Another
concern is farmers' continued reliance on chemical-based fertilizers or pesticides that
have destroyed soil productivity over time. In recent years however, farmers have been
slowly turning to organic fertilizer, or at least to a combination of chemical and organic
inputs.
Environmental damage is another major concern. Coral-reef destruction,
pollution of coastal and marine resources, mangrove forest destruction, and siltation
(the clogging of bodies of water with silt deposits) are significant problems.
The agriculture sector has not received adequate resources for the funding of
critical programs or projects, such as the construction of efficient irrigation systems.
According to the World Bank, the share of irrigated crop land in the Philippines
averaged only about 19.5 percent in the mid-1990s, compared with 37.5 percent for
China, 24.8 percent for Thailand, and 30.8 percent for Vietnam. In the late 1990s, the
government attempted to modernize the agriculture sector with the Medium Term
Agricultural Development Plan and the Agricultural Fisheries Modernization Act.
The fisheries sector is divided into 3 sub-sectors: commercial, municipal, and
aquaculture (cultivation of the natural produce of bodies of water). In 1995, the
Philippines contributed 2.2 million tons, or 2 percent of total world catch, ranking it
twelfth among the top 80 fish-producing countries. In the same year, the country also
earned the distinction of being the fourth biggest producer of seaweed and ninth biggest
producer of world aquaculture products.
In 1999 the fisheries sector contributed P80.4 billion at current prices, or 16
percent of gross value added in agriculture. Total production in 1999 reached 2.7
million tons. Aquaculture contributed the most, with 949,000 tons, followed closely by
commercial fishing with 948,000 tons, and municipal fisheries with 910,000 tons.
Domestic demand for fish is substantial, with average yearly fish consumption at 36kg
per person compared to a 12kg figure for consumption of meat and other food products.

Eight Paradigms

Translating the vision into reality, Dar employs a strategy built on the eight paradigms
that make up the “New Thinking for Agriculture”. These are:

1. Modernization of agriculture
2. Industrialization of agriculture
3. Promotion of exports
4. Farm consolidation
5. Infrastructure development
6. Roadmap development
7. Higher budget and investments for agriculture
8. Legislative support

Leading a government office with a rich and fruitful 121-year history, Dar is affirmative
that these imperatives will pave the way to developing, strengthening and nurturing the
country’s agri-fishery sector and elevate it to greater heights.

First Philippine Republic, American Regime

The Department of Agriculture and Manufacturing was formed 11 days after the
proclamation of the Philippine Independence on June 12, 1898. The Department was
one of the first agencies that President Emilio Aguinaldo formed.

The Department was then headed by three directors, Jose Alejandrino (1898-
1899), Graciano Gonzaga, and Leon Ma. Guerrero, during the latter part of 1899.

In 1901 during the American colonial period, the Department was renamed
Insular Bureau of Agriculture under the Department of Interior and was headed by
Americans, Frank Lamson-Scribner (1902), W.C. Welborn (1904), and Dr. George
Nesom (1907).
 In 1910, the Bureau, under the supervision of the Department of Public
Instruction, was headed by Frederick Taylor (1911-1914) and Harry Edwards (1914-
1916).

In 1917, the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR) took over the
functions of the bureau and was led by Secretaries Galicano Apacible (1917-
1921), Rafael Corpuz (1921-1923), and Silvestre Apostol (1923-1928).

Galicano Apacible Rafael Corpuz Silvestre Apostol

(1917-1921) (1921-1923) (1923-1928)

During the administration of Secretary Rafael Alunan, Sr. (1928-1932), the DANR became the
Department of Agriculture and Commerce. The Bureau of Agriculture was split into two bureaus, the
Plant Industry and the Animal Industry.

The following year, the Fish and Game Administration and the Fiber Inspection Service were
established under the leadership of Secretary Vicente Singson Encarnacion (1933-1934).

From 1934-1938, Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr. was appointed Secretary who was replaced by Secretary
Benigno S. Aquino, Sr. until 1941. During Aquino’s term, the Fish and Game Administration was
restructured and the Division of Soil Survey was created.

With the outbreak of World War II in the Pacific, President Manuel Quezon re-appointed Secretary
Rafael Alunan, Sr. (1941-1942) as Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.

Rafael Alunan, Sr. Vicente Singson Encarnacion Eulogio Rodriquez

(1928-1932) (1933-1934) (1934-1938)
Postwar Period

Mariano Garchitorena
(1946-1948)

After the country’s Liberation from the Japanese on July 4, 1945, the government rebuilt the country
and reconstituted the agencies including the Department of Agriculture and Commerce (DAC). With
the resumption of the Commonwealth Government, President Sergio Osmeña reappointed Vicente
Singson Encarnacion as Secretary of the DAC. Thereafter, Mariano Garchitorena (1946-1948)
was appointed by President Manuel Roxas.

In 1947, the Department was named again as the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources
(DANR). In September 1948, President Elpidio Quirino
appointed Placido L. Mapa as its Secretary

Placido Mapa
(1948-1949)

Two years later (1950), Vice President Fernando Lopez served

concurrently as the DANR chief. During his term, the Bureau of
Agricultural Extension (now Agricultural Training Institute) was
established, along with the organization of the 4-H Clubs and Rural
Improvement Clubs (RICs) nationwide.

In 1953, President Quirino reappointed Placido L. Mapa to lead the

Department. Under his tenure, the Rice Economic Board was set up, making the rice industry the
first commodity to benefit from an integrated national planning.

Salvador Araneta (1953-1955) was later named as Secretary and three major agencies under the
DANR were created, namely: Agricultural Tenancy Commission, precursor of the Department of
Agrarian Reform; Philippine Tobacco Administration, forerunner of the National Tobacco
Administration; and Philippine Coconut Administration (now known
as Philippine Coconut Authority).

Salvador Araneta
(1953-1955)

During the latter part of his term, President Magsaysay

appointed Juan G. Rodriguez (1955-1960) as DANR chief, whose
term was highlighted by several milestones: the Philippines became
a member of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); launch of the National
Rice and Corn Production Program; and creation of the Rice and Corn Coordinating Council,
forerunner of the National Agricultural and Fishery Council (NAFC).

DA Moved to Quezon City

On September 14, 1959, the DANR offices moved from Manila (at Agrifina Circle) to Quezon City
(along Elliptical Road in Diliman).
When Cesar Fortich became the DANR chief in 1961, the Abaca Development Board (forerunner of
the Fiber Development Authority) was created. Jose Locsin, then concurrent Chairman of the
National Economic Council, succeeded Fortich from September to December 1961.

Benjamin Gozon
(1962-1963)

In 1962, President Diosdado Macapagal appointed Benjamin M. Gozon as Secretary. During his
term, two agencies were created: the Bureau of Agricultural
Economics (forerunner of the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics); and
the National Rice and Corn Administration or RCA (now known as the
National Food Authority).

The following year, President Macapagal appointed RCA

Administrator Jose Y. Feliciano as concurrent Secretary of
Agriculture. Feliciano launched the Agricultural Marketing News
Service that provided farmers and consumers prices of selected
commodities regularly.

Arturo Tanco, Jr.

(1974-1984)

In 1965, President Ferdinand Marcos named Vice Pres. Lopez as

Secretary, serving for the second time in a concurrent capacity.
Considered as the “rice czar,” he successfully implemented a
production program that enabled the Philippines to export rice for the
first time in 1968.

During the early years of Martial Law, in May 1974, President Marcos
reorganized and split the DANR into two agencies: Department of
Agriculture (DA); and Department of Natural Resources
(DNR). Arturo R. Tanco, Jr. was named DA Secretary.

DA Renamed as Ministry of Agriculture

Salvador Escudero III

(1984-1985)

Four years later, government departments were transformed into ministries with the country’s shift to
parliamentary form of government.

With Tanco remaining at the helm of the Ministry of Agriculture (MA),

the Masagana 99 rice production program was launched which
made the country self-sufficient and a rice exporter. A similar
program on corn also made the country self-sufficient in white
corn. In June 1978, the MA established 12 regional offices
nationwide.
Six years later, in June 1984, the agency was renamed Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF). The
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources was transferred from the
Ministry of Natural Resources.

In 1984, under a parliamentary government, Assemblyman Salvador

H. Escudero III — former Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry
and MAF Deputy Minister — served as MAF Minister. Escudero
implemented the Intensive Rice Production Program (IRPP), an
import-substitution program, expanded government’s animal dispersal
program, particularly the Bakahang Barangay (cattle raising the at
village level) and Pagbababuyan (swine raising).

People Power, Renamed to DA

Ramon Mitra Carlos Dominquez Senen Bacani

(1986-1987) (1987-1990) (1990-1991)

Roberto Sebastian
(1992-1996)

On February 1986, as a result of the ‘EDSA People Power Revolution,’ Corazon C. Aquino was
catapulted as President. She named Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. as MAF Minister who implemented policy
and institutional reforms that freed the agriculture markets, enabling farmers to enjoy higher
farmgate prices.

In 1987, MAF Deputy Minister Carlos G. Dominguez was appointed to replace Mitra who opted to
run for Representative of the second district of Palawan

On January 30, 1987, President Aquino signed and issued Executive Order No. 116, which renamed
and reorganized the MAF into the Department of Agriculture.

Under DA, Dominguez introduced reforms in the rural credit system and established the
Comprehensive Agricultural Loan Fund (CALF). In 1988, he also launched the Livelihood
Enhancement for Agricultural Development (LEAD) program to speed up farmers’ organizations
access to financing, management expertise, and marketing. Agriculture and Fishery Councils (AFCs)
were set up at the sectoral, regional, provincial and municipal levels to provide inputs on major
programs and policy decisions and help plan and monitor DA projects. Senen C. Bacani, appointed
in January 1990, implemented the Rice Action Program (RAP) and Corn Production Enhancement
Program (CPEP).

President Aquino appointed Senen Bacani as Secretary in

1990-1991. His leadership enabled the private sector to take the
lead in further developing fresh fruits business in the resource-
rich Mindanao.

In 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos named Roberto S.

Sebastian as DA chief who introduced the Key Production
Approach (KPA) which became the basis of the Medium-Term
Agricultural Development Plan (MTADP).

In 1996, President Ramos appointed Dr. Salvador H. Escudero

III as DA Secretary, for the second time. During his two-year
tenure, he launched the Gintong Ani food production and
security program.

Dar’s First Stint

William Dar
(1998-1999)

In July 1998, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada designated William D. Dar as Acting DA Secretary
who introduced the Estrada administration’s 10-point agenda in agriculture and fisheries under
the Agrikulturang Makamasa program.

In March 1999, President Estrada named former Senate President Edgardo J. Angara as DA
Secretary who authored the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act of 1997 or AFMA (Republic
Act No. 8435). He put into motion the law’s vision of modernizing the country’s agriculture and
fisheries sector.

Domingo F. Panganiban continued the implementation of AFMA as the government’s

comprehensive framework and platform for rural development when he assumed office in January
2001.

A month later, he was replaced by Leonardo Q. Montemayor who implemented the AFMA with
special emphasis on its social equity aspect. He launched the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani
Countrywide Assistance for Rural Employment and Services (GMA-CARES).

Secretary Luis P. Lorenzo Jr., took the helm at the Department in December 2002 and
spearheaded the launching of the Roll-On, Roll-Off (RORO) transport program. The hybridization
programs of the Department were intensified and interventions were focused on the Mindanao
regions.

Secretary Arthur C. Yap, appointed on August 23, 2004, continued to uphold the vision of
agricultural modernization. During his first term, he unveiled the GMA Goal 1 (develop two million
hectares of new lands for agribusiness to contribute two million to the 10 million jobs targeted by
2010) and GMA Goal 2 (make food plentiful while keeping the price of “wage goods” at low prices).

During Panganiban’s second term as Secretary, a total of 203,000 hectares of idle lands and
313,000 jobs were developed under Goal 1 and 10 Huwarang Palengke (outstanding markets) were
identified under Goal 2.

When Yap returned to the DA in October, 2006, he implemented various projects and policies
towards the attainment of food security and self-sufficiency. Upon Secretary Yap’s decision to run as
Representative of the 3rd District of Bohol, Secretary Bernie Fondevilla took over in March 2010.
Domingo Panganiban Leonardo Montemayor Luis Lorenzo

Arthur Yap Proceso Alcala

On June 30, 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed two-term congressman of Quezon and
civil engineer by profession Proceso J. Alcala as Secretary. One of the principal authors of
Republic Act 10068, or the Organic Agriculture Act of 2010, he also aimed to achieve self-sufficiency
in rice during his term.

Dar’s predecessor, Emmanuel F. Piñol was appointed by President

Rodrigo Duterte on July 1, 2016. He vowed to bring agriculture and
fisheries program to basic by addressing food production and poverty.
Under his watch, efforts were geared towards production and trade of
staple food commodities to ensure food sufficiency and security; and
high-value crops to generate jobs and foreign earnings.
Farmers list top issues impacting agriculture

Farmers are faced with new challenges and opportunities every day -
- from feeding an expanding global population while meeting strict new
emissions requirements, to producing more food on fewer acres while
minimizing their environmental footprint.
Case IH | Jan 18, 2011

Farmers are faced with issues impacting agriculture, including new

challenges and opportunities every day -- from feeding an expanding global
population while meeting strict new emissions requirements, to producing
more food on fewer acres while minimizing their environmental footprint.

As part of its commitment to help farmers meet their challenges,

Case IH issued a survey to gather farmers' perspectives on the leading
issues impacting their operations. Case IH offered the survey to a group of
farmer guests attending this year's Ag Connect Expo, as well as to farmers
visiting CaseIH.com.

"The survey results not only help define the challenges facing farmers
today, but also identify future opportunities," says Jim Walker, Case IH vice
president of North America. "Farmer input is crucial for Case IH to develop
equipment and technologies that fit farmers' diverse needs, and allow them
to farm the way they want to. Case IH's producer-driven innovations help
farmers solve their challenges so they can succeed."

Top issues impacting agriculture

Issues impacting agriculture identified in the survey include:

• Supplying the growing global demand for commodities arising from

developing economies and world population growth
• Availability and price of land for expansion
• New government mandates and regulations
• Stability, development and fluctuations in global financial markets
• Impact of global trade policies on food security and the supply and
demand for commodities
• Development and use of bio-based fuels

Government regulations a concern

Farmers were asked to rank the top issues impacting agriculture

business, both in the next year and five years out. The number one issue is
new government mandates and regulations, with nearly 30 percent of the
Ag Connect farmer group ranking it as having the most impact on their
business within the next year. Availability and price of land for expansion,
and stability, development and fluctuations in global financial markets are
tied, with 24 percent of respondents ranking them as the second most
impactful issue.

For the Ag Connect farmers' five-year impact projections, new

government mandates and regulations top the list again, with 33 percent
ranking it as the most impactful. Nearly 24 percent of respondents rank
availability and price of land for expansion as the second most impactful.
Other key findings from the Ag Connect survey:

• Nearly 25 percent of respondents indicate that equipment

dealers/experts will be one of the top advisors to influence their
decision making, along with their financial advisor and agronomist
advisors.

• 89 percent anticipate operation growth in the next five years

• Online farm audience shares similar, but not identical concerns

While the Ag Connect survey attracted primarily large farmers -- 65

percent report farming more than 5,000 acres, and all have a minimum of
1,000 tillable acres -- the CaseIH.com survey attracted more mid-size and
smaller-acreage farmers. More than 70 percent of online survey
respondents identify themselves as "predominantly cash grain producers" -
- of which nearly 54 percent farm 1,000 acres or less, and more than 41
percent farm between 1,000 and 5,000 acres.

About 25 percent of CaseIH.com survey respondents rank availability

and price of land for expansion as having the most impact on their business
within the next year, followed by stability, development and fluctuations in
global financial markets (21 percent). Other top issues include new
government mandates and regulations, and supplying the growing global
demand for commodities arising from developing economies and world
population growth.

Their five-year impact projections not only track closely to the

rankings for business impacts within the next year, but also emulate the Ag
Connect survey results. Online respondents rank availability and price of
land for expansion (26 percent) and new government mandates and
regulations (21 percent) as the top issues impacting their business in the
next five years.
Another key finding from the CaseIH.com survey: almost 82 percent
anticipate operation growth in the next five years

The Philippines is currently facing different problems especially in the sector of

agriculture. These are some of the problems we think that needs an urgent solution.

1. Small farm size; 78% farms are less than 3 hectares.

Most of our farms are have already shrunk in size due to the fast growth of our
population. Therefore, our country needs to build more houses, sacrificing the
agricultural sector of our country.

Evidence:
To combat the lack of resources and lands the farmers had, the Philippine Government
issued several Land Reform Programs. Just like the Republic Act (RA) 6657 which was
implemented under Cory Aquino’s time with aims to redistribute lands both public and
privately while providing appropriate support services to help the beneficiaries become
independent small landowners.

2. Land is being encroached upon by the housing and industrial sectors

This is quite the same as the first one. Basically, this problem caused the first problem
to happen due to the same reasons.

3. Absence of critical programs on efficient irrigation systems

Irrigation is an important factor in agriculture. Irrigation helps farmers keep their crops
well-hydrated and moist, especially during the warm seasons. Without irrigation, the soil
would become dry and the crops will wilt.

4. Inadequate management programs on soil, pests and diseases

Pests and crop diseases have been a major problem in the agricultural sector of the
Philippines. It lacks funding from the government. If these pests and diseases were to
be left out of control, famine would crawl across our country.

5. Reduced farm labor

Due to the fast industrialization of our country, many people prefer to do industrialized
work instead of planting crops for the nation to eat. Our farmers have started to grow
old, and only few are replacing our old farmers.

6. Expensive and inappropriate farm equipment for small farmers

Since we do not have much money for spending in agricultural needs, machinery
needed for this has become a great expense for our pockets.

7. Climate change and natural disasters

Our country is known to be prone to natural disasters like typhoons and earthquakes.
What is not seen is that most of our crops cannot resist extreme weather conditions like
these. Encroaching climate change can also affect our agriculture due to its effects like
droughts.

Evidence:
Climate change and natural disasters are inevitable. The National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) is responsible for advising the Philippine President on
national development planning. This provides technical support in coordinating the
formulation of national plans and policies for agriculture, natural resources and agrarian
re-form sectors.

8. Inadequate technology transfer mechanisms

Our technology regarding agriculture is not given enough attention. Our country lacks
machinery and technology to improve our produce.
Solutions of the Mendelian Economists

1. Small farm size; 78% farms are less than 3 hectares.

2. Land is being encroached upon by the housing and industrial sectors

In order to solve these problems, it is good to consider the natural state of our farm
lands. Most farm lands are being replaced by buildings and houses dute to globalization
but maintaining these lands will help for the development in our agriculture.

3. Absence of critical programs on efficient irrigation system

4. Inadequate management programs on soil, pests and diseases.

To control and stop these problems, awareness is important as well as having a voice
and a stand in terms of this topic. Programs should be implemented by the government
and providing subsidies for the irrigation systems of the land. As a part of millennials,
we can share our thoughts using social media to campaign our advocacy to better
improve our economy especially in agriculture for we depend on it in terms of
production.

5. Reduced farm labor

To make the agricultural sector lively again, we can encourage citizens to farm again
through campaigning and education. Anything can be sparked using bare knowledge
and motivation.
Evidence:
The number of Filipino farmers lessens each year. The average age of a Filipino farmer
is 57. The government has thought of ways in the past to fight this issue. For example
the Republic Act No. 602 with a goal to establish a minimum wage law, to make it easier
for farmers to earn money.

6. Expensive and inappropriate farm equipment for small farmers

Science and technology is important. A project wherein it is agriculture-based would be
a great idea featuring different researches such as alternative and new machines,
prcoesses, etc. which may help for faster and better production of the country.

7. Climate change and natural disasters

This is one of the problems of our country though it is unexpected. Crops are damaged
due to strong typhoons considering our geography. A possible solution would be good
irrigation systems to prevent flood to damage crops.
Evidence:
Climate change and natural disasters are inevitable. The National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) is responsible for advising the Philippine President on
national development planning. This provides technical support in coordinating the
formulation of national plans and policies for agriculture, natural resources and agrarian
re-form sectors.
.
8. Inadequate technology transfer mechanisms
Our country does not invest that much in Technology considering it is important when it
comes to agriculture. In order to have progress, new mechanisms and processes are
important. Programs having exhibits on researches will be a great an dpromising idea
having Filipinos with great minds.
Philippine Agriculture over the Years: Performance, Policies and Pitfalls

Although many still think of the Philippines as an agricultural economy, strictly speaking,
it is not. Agriculture, fishery and forestry directly account for just one-fifth (20 percent)
of the economy’s aggregate domestic output (GDP). Ever since the 1960s, the direct
share of agriculture in the GDP had fallen below one-third, and by 1981, the sector’s
share had decreased to only 23 percent. Growth from this level was rather anemic,
averaging 1.7 percent per annum during the period 1981-2003, compared to the
average overall GDP growth of 2.6% over the same period. While agriculture output
was largely stagnant through the years, industry and especially services significantly
raised their output shares, particularly in the past two decades (Figure 1).

Agriculture’s importance looms larger when it comes to employment, with nearly two-
fifths (i.e. 37 percent) of jobs currently coming from the sector. Still, the services sector
accounts for close to half of both output and jobs in the economy. But if one considers
agroprocessing and agricultural inputs manufacturing and trading (i.e. agribusiness
sectors) along with basic agricultural production, about 40 percent of GDP and two-
thirds of jobs in the economy arise from agriculture (Tolentino et al. 2001).
Unfortunately, agriculture also displays the most erratic growth among the economy’s
major sectors, with growth rates tending to fluctuate widely from quarter to quarter
(Figure 2). The sector’s recent growth performance manifests the same volatility. While
the sector’s full year real GDP growth performance was well within the target for 2004
and exceeded the preceding year’s performance, the most recent quarters have seen
dramatic slowdowns from previous quarters, due mostly to unfavorable weather
conditions.
Notwithstanding these challenges, the critical role of the agriculture sector in a country’s
overall economic development as stylized in economic development literature is well
known. First, it provides food and vital raw materials for the rest of the economy.
Second, it provides a significant market for the products of the non-agricultural
economy, as buyer of farm inputs as well as consumer goods and services produced in
the non-agricultural economy. And third, as the sector grows and modernizes in the
face of limited supplies of agricultural land, it releases surplus labor to the industry and
services sectors.
With 70 percent of the country’s poor coming from the rural areas where agriculture is
the dominant source of livelihood and employment, the importance of agriculture to the
Philippine economy cannot be overemphasized. Thus, the Medium Term Philippine
Development Plans (MTPDPs) of successive administrations have consistently
recognized the critical importance of energizing and modernizing the agricultural sector
in the overall pursuit of a vigorous and broad-based economic growth and development.
But as we discuss below, success with this goal has continued to be elusive.

Production and Productivity Trends

Labor productivity. Up until the 1970s, the Philippines’ agricultural
performance, in terms of both agricultural Gross Value Added (GVA) and agricultural
exports, compared well with its neighbors and other Asian countries (Figure 3a). But by
the 1980s and 1990s, the country had lagged behind most of the countries in the region
(Figures 3b and 3c). This came as agricultural output growth had slowed down
dramatically through the decades (Figure 4). Moreover, the sector’s growth had been
rather erratic in the 1990s, especially with the periodic occurrence of the El Niño
phenomenon that had appreciable impact on weather patterns and, consequently,
agricultural performance.
Table 1 shows the average annual growth in GVA of major agricultural
commodities since 1960. What is clear from the table is that growth rates of all
commodities, except for livestock and poultry, have been slowing down over time.
Furthermore, growth rates have been below the population growth rate, implying that
production has not been able to keep up with increasing population.
Erratic and decelerating growth over the past two decades is a major concern, as
agriculture continues to employ a large bulk of the country’s poor. Balisacan (2003)
estimates that in 2000, the poverty incidence in agriculture was 46 percent, the highest
among the major sectors (with the exception of mining). It also contributed 61.3 percent
to population poverty, far exceeding the next biggest sectors (construction, at 7.7
percent, and the unemployed, at 7.3 percent).
Employment in agriculture has been stagnant, even as overall employment
continues to grow at a rate of about 2.4 percent per year from the 1990s onward
(Figure 5). Hence, while agriculture employed 36.4 percent of the labor force in 2003,
this is now much lower than the 44 percent employed a decade earlier. This exit of
employment out of agriculture has helped keep labor productivity in agriculture growing
at modest rates, roughly on par with the growth rate in total employment (Figure 6). In
common with other countries in Southeast Asia, such as Thailand and Indonesia,
migration from the agriculture to nonagriculture sectors has been driven by wage
differentials across sectors, although weakness in employment absorption in the other
sectors has constrained the convergence of labor incomes (Butzer, Mundlak and Larson
2003).
Despite the mediocre growth of labor productivity, the 1990s actually was a
period of mild recovery for the sector, after sharply declining in the 1980s. Closer
examination reveals that within agriculture, labor productivity has stagnated in the crops
subsector. The observed growth was therefore probably due to increasing productivity
in livestock and poultry, where use of improved technologies and increasing scale of
production considerably improved production efficiency (David 2003).
Nevertheless, labor productivity in Philippine agriculture compares favorably with
other developing countries (Figure 7). The Philippines’ labor productivity remains far
ahead those of large, populous countries such as China and India; it is also greater than
the neighboring Southeast Asian countries of Vietnam, Indonesia, and even Thailand.
However labor productivity lags behind countries with higher per capita incomes, such
as Malaysia, Brazil, and Chile. Moreover, some of the low productivity countries (China,
India, and Vietnam) have experienced a more rapid labor productivity growth in the
1990s. It may be noted that the low growth rate of labor productivity reckoned in US$ in
the 1990s is probably due to the depreciation of the exchange rate, as the Philippines
was one of those hit by the currency crisis of the late 1990s.

Land productivity. It is not very meaningful to discuss land productivity by

highly aggregated agricultural categories. To maintain focus given the large number of
agricultural commodities, data is presented here only for the top five major crops in
terms of production and area, namely rice, corn, coconut, sugarcane, and banana.
Coconut and sugarcane are traditional exports, while banana is a nontraditional export.
 The yield performance of these major crops follows a checkered history starting
from the 1960s (Table 2). The growth rate of rice yield was fastest in the 1960s, and
slowed down in the 1970s as the Green Revolution technology diffused and neared 100
percent adoption. However, contrary impressions notwithstanding, rice productivity
growth picked up again in the 1980s before its recent slowdown. Corn follows a similar
pattern: rapid growth in the 1960s, a slowdown in the 1970s, before picking up again
subsequently. Unlike rice, however, corn has kept its yield growth fairly steady, with the
spread of hybrid yellow corn, the concentration of corn in productive areas, and the
withdrawal of marginal land from the subsistence farming of white corn (David 2003).
A more detailed look at production, area, and yield trends for the 1990s is
provided in Table 3. Only corn and sugarcane have witnessed production declines from
1992-2003; the rest have grown at a decent pace. For example, rice production rose
from 9.5 million metric tons (MT) to 14 million MT. Part of this production growth is due
to growth in area planted: for each crop, hectarage has increased over the last decade.
The marked exception is corn, whose area has fallen quite rapidly over the period.
In the 1990s, the growth in area was, however, mostly outpaced by the output
growth, due to yield increases. The significant exception is sugarcane; even corn,
whose output and area fell, saw a respectable increase in yield over the period.
Interestingly, coconut experienced yield growth quite late relative to the others, i.e. in
the 1980s. This, however, coincided with an area decline, combined with overall
production growth, signifying withdrawal from marginal lands and increased yields from
productive areas. Sugarcane followed suit, with yield growth happening in the 1990s,
although this was quickly reversed by the following decade. In the case of bananas, the
period of rapid yield growth occurred in the 1970s, followed by a marked downturn, and
a robust recovery in recent years. David (2003) points out that yield growth has also
been observed in other nontraditional exports such as pineapple and mango. Such
growth in yield may also be due to the adoption and spread of agricultural innovations
(e.g. introduction of chemical spraying in mango), which may have started off in the
larger commercial operations, then diffused among smallholders (e.g. in the case of
pineapple).
It should be pointed out that agricultural modernization is not confined to cereals,
despite the popular association between modernization and the Green Revolution
technologies. Balisacan (1993) pointed out that production growth did not primarily
originate from rice; over the period 1960-1980, rice contributed only 16 percent of the
growth in agricultural GVA. It was the fruits and vegetables sector, particularly export
crops such as banana, pineapple, and coffee, which contributed over one-half of
agricultural GVA growth.
Comparisons with international experience suggest that the country is an
average performer in terms of land productivity. According to Rosegrant and Hazell
(2000), from 1967 to 1995, yield growth in developing Asia averaged 3.3 percent per
year, with the highest growth experienced by China, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Vietnam.
The lowest growth performance occurred in Nepal; the Philippines is somewhat in the
middle. As in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, yield growth in the
Philippines coincided with the period of the Green Revolution. In the South Asian
countries, yield growth accelerated in the 1980s. The same is true for Vietnam, when
the country initiated a regime of agricultural liberalization.

Marginal productivity. All the foregoing are average measures of productivity. A

more accurate picture of productivity change is found at the margin: in fact, average
productivity is useful only as a crude approximation of marginal productivity. Measuring
marginal productivity, however, requires more sophisticated statistical methods.

A common application of marginal productivity analysis is growth accounting.

Abstracting from measurement errors and random shocks, total output growth can be
decomposed into the growth of factors of production, and the growth of total factor
productivity (TFP). Depending on the framework, the last term can be broken down into
technological change and improvements in production efficiency. Mundlak et al. (2004)
present a disaggregated breakdown of productivity growth (Table 4). For the
Philippines, growth in agricultural output was fairly steady up to the 1970s, then
declined sharply, partly due to the deceleration in input growth. However the decline in
TFP growth is also a critical part of the story behind agricultural stagnation. The share
of TFP growth was fairly significant (over a quarter of output growth) up to the 1970s,
but then subsequently fell to less than 10 percent.
Meanwhile, for Thailand and Indonesia, overall growth was fairly robust, and
seems to have been driven to a great extent by large and consistent growth of total
factor productivity. For Thailand, TFP accounts for about a third of growth, with the
greatest contribution happening in the 1970s. In Indonesia, TFP accounts for over 40
percent of growth, and in fact reaches near parity with factor growth by 1998.
FAO (2004) made a cross-country comparison of TFP growth, based on the
Malmquist index. The growth rate of TFP can be decomposed into an efficiency
component, and a technological change component. For most of the countries, the bulk
of growth owes to technological change; only India registered negative growth in
efficiency, pulling down TFP growth to negative levels. From 1981–2000, TFP growth
has been fastest for China and Chile; on similar clip are Bangladesh, Thailand, Vietnam,
and Brazil. The computation for the Philippines is fairly similar to the figure from
Mundlak et al, and is quite low relative to other Asian economies.
Cost competitiveness. Cross-country comparisons of farmgate prices of
various key agricultural commodities reveal the poor state of Philippine agriculture’s
competitiveness. Figures 8 to 12 show how Philippine farmgate prices for rice, fresh
fruits, beef, pork and chicken meat compare with those of selected Asian countries.
With the exception of chicken meat, wherein India has much higher prices, the
Philippines consistently has the highest farmgate prices for the above agricultural
commodities, indicating lack of price competitiveness in the international trading arena.
While higher farmgate prices may at first glance appear to be favorable to Filipino
farmers, this ultimately redounds to lower welfare for Filipino consumers. And because
lack of international competitiveness constrains the potential for growth in the domestic
agricultural enterprise sector, the Filipino farmers – who are also consumers themselves
– must ultimately bear the adverse consequences of our inferior agricultural productivity
and lack of cost competitiveness.

The Policy Environment

Based on the above discussions, productivity growth in the Philippines by

whatever measure comes out to be mediocre, in comparison to both past performance,
as well as to contemporaneous performance of other major developing economies.
It is a common observation that the poor performance of the Philippine
agricultural sector in recent decades traces not so much to weaknesses in the
production sector itself, but to failures and shortcomings in the policy and institutional
environment within which the sector operates. This environment has been shaped by
price intervention policies (including trade policies), public expenditure allocations, and
institutional and governance weaknesses in the sector.
David (2003) argues that the policy regime has not established an appropriate
incentive structure for the rapid development of agriculture. With the reversion of price
policies towards agricultural protection in the 1990s, the protection favored
importcompeting rather than export-oriented sectors, thus continuing the regime of
distortions, while further eroding the competitiveness of labor-intensive industries (i.e.
because of artificially high food prices that raises the cost of wage goods).
The country has also failed to provide adequate quantity and quality of
investments in several key areas. Irrigation investments have declined from the 1980s
through the early 1990s. Similarly, investments in rural roads and ports have
plummeted, significantly raising costs of rural access. Research & development (R&D)
is badly underfunded, resulting in research intensity ratios3 far lower than those in other
countries. Moreover, much of the research resources are inordinately focused on rice,
several times out of proportion to that commodity’s GVA contribution. Agricultural
support policies should specialize in expanding credit access and providing extension;
instead, scarce resources have funded highcost activities such as provision of post-
harvest facilities, marketing, and credit subsidies, which are probably better off left to
the market (Tolentino et al. 2001). A case in point is the tremendous fiscal and
deadweight burden imposed by the National Food Authority’s activities on rice trade
(Roumasset 2000). Another policy with adverse unintended consequences for
agricultural investments is land reform. Due to its slow pace of implementation,
landowners yet to be subject to CARP have scaled back their investments significantly
(Habito et al 2003; Briones 2002), thereby contributing to the overall slowdown in
investments in the sector.
Price intervention and trade policies. Prior to and until the early 1980s, analysts
argued that overall incentive structures in the Philippine economy had been biased
against agriculture (David 1983; Bautista 1987; Intal and Power 1991). The bias was
manifested in the overvaluation of the peso arising from the industrial protection
structure and macroeconomic policies designed to defend an unsustainable deficit in
the balance of payments (David 2003).
Policies undertaken in the mid-1980s began to address the bias, through moves
to eliminate quantitative restrictions (QRs) on trade and reduce the level and dispersion
of import tariffs. Nonetheless, the overvaluation of the peso persisted and worsened
through the early 1990s as the real effective exchange rate appreciated sharply
between 1992 and 1996. The result had been to lower the domestic relative prices of
tradable agricultural products and raise their relative prices to foreigners, thereby
providing a disincentive to exports. It was not until the rapid depreciation of regional
currencies with the Asian financial crisis of 19971998 that the real effective exchange
rate reversed its decline (i.e. appreciation of the peso), and underwent a depreciation
that began to benefit the tradable goods sector.

Trade liberalization policies in the 1990s consciously aimed at improving the

competitiveness of Philippine production sectors, especially the industrial sector, by
reducing trade protection and fostering greater competition. In particular, the traditional
bias of stronger protection in favor of industry relative to agriculture declined, even as
overall trade protection was consciously reduced. Philippine ratification of the WTO
Agreement in 1995 set in motion the replacement of all QRs with tariffs, while imposing
a ceiling on tariff rates and reducing these over time. In practice, however, effective
protection on traded farm products actually increased as the government resorted to
“dirty tariffication,” that is, having applied tariffs significantly higher than the nominal
protection rates implied by the previous QRs. Because of this, the relative rates of
protection enjoyed by the agricultural and industrial sectors underwent a reversal. The
turning point occurred in 1995, when the EPR for agriculture exceeded that for industry
for the first time.
Table 5 shows the evolution of the trade protection structure among the various
Philippine economic sectors. Bautista, Power and Associates (1979) came up with the
first widely published estimates of sectoral effective rates of protection in the country, for
the year 1974. They estimated the EPR for agriculture and the primary resource
sectors at an average of 9 percent, only about one-fifth of the estimated 44 percent
protection enjoyed by manufacturing. Major agricultural commodities actually had
significantly negative EPRs, indicating a penalty rather than protection on the sector.
These included rice milling (-49 percent), corn milling (-46 percent), coconut including
copra (-6 percent), dessicated coconut products (-10 percent), bananas (-6 percent),
pineapple (-3 percent), tobacco (-8 percent), and sugar milling and refining (-12
percent). In contrast, manufacturing subsectors enjoyed extremely high rates of
protection in 1974, topped by cigarettes (18,758 percent), bakery products (3,371
percent), cocoa and chocolate products (1,750 percent), flour milling (1,148 percent),
and household electrical appliances (204 percent), to name but a few.
By 1998, the EPR on manufacturing as a whole had declined to 20 percent
based on estimates by Manasan and Pineda (1999). Of the manufacturing subsectors,
food processing (including rice, corn, coconut and sugar milling) was the most highly
protected, with an EPR of 37 percent, and non-metallic mineral products was the least
protected, with an EPR of 4 percent. On the other hand, effective protection of the
agriculture sector had risen to 25 percent. By 2000, agriculture was estimated have
received 24 percent effective protection, while that for manufacturing had further
declined to 15 percent.
Another relevant element in the price intervention policy environment has been
government-sanctioned monopolies in the trade of key farm products. Until recently,
the government, through the NFA, exercised a monopoly over the international trade in
rice and corn while undertaking domestic market interventions aimed at stabilizing
prices and narrowing geographic divergences in prices. Similar monopoly powers had
been exercised on the international trade of coconut oil, soybean meal, wheat and
sugar until 1986. While efforts to liberalize the trade environment have been
undertaken since the late 1980s, the passage of the Magna Carta for Small Farmers
(R.A. 7606) in 1991 provided blanket authority for restricting the import of agricultural
products that might compete with domestic production. Similarly, the Seed Law (R.A.
7308) regulated the importation of seeds and planting materials.

It is often asserted that the Philippine manufacturing sector grew complacent,

became inward-looking and perpetuated inefficiencies and consequent
uncompetitiveness due to the relatively high levels of protection it enjoyed in the past.
On the other hand, agriculture failed to modernize and achieve significant productivity
improvements because it had traditionally been penalized by macroeconomic policies,
including the trade protection – or more accurately, “disprotection” – structure described
above. In both cases, large deviations in either direction from a “level playing field” kept
Philippine producers from attaining international competitiveness, at the time when the
country's immediate neighbors had already attained dynamic rates of growth and
improvements in productivity.
 With agriculture protection having risen significantly in the 1990s even as
industrial protection declined, will these trends now lead agriculture into the same pitfall
previously experienced by Philippine industry? Will this further perpetuate long-
standing weaknesses and inefficiencies in the sector? In the particular case of sugar
and sugar milling, now the most highly protected agricultural sub-sector, will this not
only spell the final demise of the industry as a major export sector, especially with the
loss of the US sugar quota system in 2004 and the eventual need to fully contend with
global competition in this commodity?
While it is tempting to answer these questions in the affirmative, the answer can
be a qualified ‘no’. The difference between the past era of high rates of protection on
manufacturing and the current period of relatively high levels of protection on agriculture
is that the latter situation is clearly time-bound. This is because multilateral and regional
trading arrangements (i.e. WTO, APEC and AFTA) are constantly providing the
pressure to reduce trade protection, including and especially on agriculture. The
country is likely to need to commit to certain deadlines for bringing down trade
protection for agriculture, just as all countries are being asked to do so under the WTO.
In the case of the Philippines, it is well acknowledged that the country is now simply
“buying time” to be able to put in place meaningful and lasting support needed by the
farm sector to be inherently competitive and modernized. This support includes rural
farm-to-market roads, irrigation facilities and postharvest facilities, all of which continue
to be highly inadequate to support an internationally competitive agricultural sector.
Unfortunately, with the government’s current fiscal difficulties, budgetary allocations for
these key public investments are unlikely to improve appreciably in the near term.
Public investments in agriculture. The Department of Agriculture (DA)
received appropriations totaling P61 billion from 1995 to 1998, 43 percent more than
originally projected because Congress consciously supplemented the agency’s budget
precisely to improve the capability of Government to meet its commitment under the
WTO. However, actual allotment only came up to P48.2 billion, while actual utilization
reached only P40.4 billion. Meanwhile, the expected contributions from the Asset
Privatization Trust, minimum access proceeds, Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
and Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) did not materialize. In
essence, only about 55 percent of the total requirement envisioned in the Action Plan
was realized.
There are several reasons for the seemingly low compliance to committed
budgetary support to agriculture. On the demand side, it was apparent that the over-all
requirement was on the high side. At the time the Action Plan was formulated, some
projects or expenditure items were still in the conceptual stage such that their budgetary
requirements were overstated. Others were eventually deemed of low priority and
shelved. On the supply side, the DA and other contributing agencies encountered a
number of project development and implementation bottlenecks such as long project
preparation process, delays in fund releases and complicated bidding systems. These
bottlenecks substantially lowered the absorptive capacity of the sector such that
accomplishment would have remained low even if the full requirements of the Action
Plan were met.
The following are the areas for which the proposed budget was to have been spent:
1. Irrigation. The National Irrigation Authority (NIA) needed some P27 billion for
the construction and repair of regular rice irrigation projects as well as pump projects for
diversified cropping. Only about half of this requirement was actually allocated, of which
some 85 percent was utilized. This resulted in the rehabilitation of existing facilities that
cover some 1.34 million hectares or about three times the target. Newly constructed
irrigation facilities for rice, on the other hand, were able to cover some 39 thousand
hectares or about 47 percent of target. Also, newly established and rehabilitated pump
projects for diversified cropping covered some 2.6 thousand hectares or 30 percent of
target.
On the other hand, the Bureau of Soils and Water Management (BSWM) needed
P772 million for small water impounding projects (SWIPS) and shallow tube wells
(STWs). It received about P2.1 billion or three times its indicated requirements. This
amount was fully utilized for SWIPs and STWs, resulting in the coverage of about 108
thousand hectares, also three times the target.
2. Farm-To-Market Roads. The Action Plan indicated that some P8 billion was
needed for the construction of about 8,000 kilometers of farm-to-market roads during
the three-year period. Total allotment came up to only about P1.5 billion, of which only
P380 million or about 26 percent was utilized. Actual roads constructed only reached
381 kilometers or 10 percent of target.
The NIA also received some P570 million for the construction of roads in existing
National Irrigation Systems (NIS). It was able to utilize 96 percent of the amount, and
construct/repair some 2,706 kilometers of roads.
3. Post-Harvest Facilities. Some P762 million worth of grains drying facilities
for farmers' cooperatives were included in the Action Plan. About P489 million was
actually allocated for mechanical dryers and multi-purpose drying pavements. This
amount was fully utilized for some 446 mechanical dryers and 8,103 multipurpose
drying pavements.

The Plan also indicated the need for some P27 million for the construction of 18
bulk storage bins and P820 million for 4 bulk handling systems. These projects
apparently received low implementation priority as these were not pursued.

4. Grains Centers. About 799 farm level grains centers (FLGCs), amounting to
some P64 million, were considered necessary but only 104 were actually installed. The
NFA also planned to build about 260 municipal level grains centers but eventually only
built 21 farm-level and 32 municipal level grains centers. There were post-harvest
facilities, not included in the December 1994 plan, that were also funded during the
period 1995 to 1998. These included a total of 200 outdoor storage, 12 in-store dryers,
and 1,000 moisture meters.

5. The Agricultural Competitiveness Enhancement Fund. RA 8178 provides

that the tariff proceeds of the minimum access volume importation shall accrue to the
Agricultural Competitiveness Enhancement Fund (ACEF) and shall be used to finance
projects that increase the competitiveness of the sector. However, the relevant
revenues for 1995, 1996, and 1997 never accrued to the Fund, basically due to the
absence of clear procedures, pre-agreed among the DA, the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM), the Bureau of Treasury (BTr), and the Bureau of Customs (BOC),
on the documentation and release of these revenues. The guidelines have since been
formulated, but no releases had been made even as late as 1999 (Habito et al. 1999).
Meanwhile the DA had only been able to recommend five projects, worth a total
of P101.6 million, for assistance through the Fund. A total of 101 project proposals
have been received since 1997. The recommendations were made following DA AO 9
(series 1997), which provided guidelines on what and how projects can avail of the
Fund. These guidelines came under scrutiny of the Senate and House Committees on
Agriculture and Food in 1998, further delaying processing of other project proposals.
6. Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization. Congress passed the Agriculture
and Fisheries Modernization Act (AFMA) in January 1998, spelling out the policies and
measures to be implemented from 1999 to 2004 to prepare agriculture and fisheries for
the challenges posed by globalization. The Act provided programs on the following:
• irrigation
• post-harvest facilities
• other infrastructure
• credit and financing
• information and marketing assistance
• product standardization and consumer safety
• human resource development
• research and development
• extension services
• rural non-farm employment
• trade and fiscal incentives

The Act also provided for the identification of Strategic Agricultural and Fisheries
Development Zones (SAFDZs) that shall serve as centers of agriculture and
fisheries development, and the formulation of a medium- and long-term
comprehensive Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Plan (AFMP). Both
these provisions had not been completed as of late 1999. The identification of
the SAFDZs had been delayed by political considerations, i.e. politicians
competing for inclusion of their respective areas. This, in turn, held back the
formulation of the AFMP, which was additionally hampered by inadequate
capability to draft plans at the local levels.

The Act moreover provided that DA shall propose a budget of P37 billion for
1999. This shall consist of P20 billion for the implementation of AFMA on top of
DA’s regular appropriation that is equal to its 1998 appropriation. However, DA’s
actual appropriation in 1999 was only P14.7 billion, limited by overall budget
constraints.

David (2003) observed that a large proportion of public expenditure in agriculture

through the years has been redistributive in nature, financing what are essentially
private goods and services, including foreign and domestic grain trading, provision of
seeds and planting materials, animals, agro-processing factories, tubewell irrigation,
credit, and so on. These procurements have been fraught with overpricing,
underutilization, poor quality, and late delivery especially of seeds and planting
materials. Credit programs have proved unsustainable due to low repayment rates and
high transaction costs.
Meanwhile, less than half of public spending on agriculture have gone to
productivity-enhancing, public good-type expenditures. Public R&D expenditures, apart
from being inordinately allocated to rice at the expense of commodities with great
potential for raising sector output, represent only 0.4 percent of GVA in agriculture. This
contrasts with the average of 1 percent among developing countries and 2-3 percent
among developed countries (Pardey, Roseboom and Anderson 1991).
All told, the level of public investments in agriculture has been well below the actual
requirements of the sector, and worse, these have been far from optimally allocated and
utilized.

Institutional and governance weaknesses. One of the biggest stumbling blocks to

significant progress in the Philippine agricultural sector has been the general weakness
and ineffectiveness of the bureaucracy that is tasked with implementing agricultural
development initiatives. Analysts have constantly pointed to the following difficulties:
1. Over centralization
2. Politicization of the bureaucracy
3. Lack of clear organizational framework
4. Fragmentation/weak coordination
5. Weak technical and managerial capability
6. Unclear communication lines
7. Unstable budget
8. Corruption

It is often remarked that the Philippine government has no shortage of good

plans and programs to address various sectoral concerns, like those of the agricultural
sector. It is, however, in the implementation of such plans and programs where the
failures lie. Thus, governance and bureaucratic reforms, especially in the agriculture
bureaucracy and in the local governments, lie at the heart of addressing the age-old
constraints to stronger performance of Philippine agriculture.

Challenges and Constraints to Agribusiness

The lackluster performance of the Philippine agriculture sector is not surprising in

light of the policy environment and public expenditure situation described above.
Relative to neighboring countries, the unconducive domestic policy and institutional
environment has hampered investments in the sector, whether at the small farm level or
at the commercial farm level. Policies specifically concerned with the agricultural
sector, as well as those addressing the larger economy and society, have all conspired
to dampen investments in improved agricultural productivity, both from the private and
public sectors.

Table 6 summarizes commonly-cited impediments to stronger investments in the

sector, both by large-scale enterprises and small and medium enterprises (SMEs).4
The various impediments identified may be categorized as originating from
inappropriate policies (P), weaknesses in policy implementation including inadequate
budgetary allocations (I), weak capacities on the part of either government or private
enterprises concerned (C), weaknesses in governance, including graft and corruption
(G), unfavorable market realities (M), and external factors beyond our control (E), e.g.
policies of trading partners. Thus, the desirable interventions to address lack of
investments in agriculture may take the form of any of the following: policy reforms via
legislation or executive mandates, improved implementation/enforcement of existing
policies and programs, capacity-building for the appropriate government or private
sector entities, improved governance and control of corruption, appropriate market
incentives, or bilateral/ multilateral negotiations.

Specifying the strategy and specific measures to address the above is beyond
the scope of this paper. A separate paper by Rolando Dy deals with a strategic
framework for addressing the above challenges, with a view towards invigorating the
agribusiness sector out of its current lethargy.
 One important trend of strategic significance in crafting the strategy for
invigorating the agribusiness sector is worth mentioning here, and that is the rapid
increase in demand for horticultural products overseas. Along with an observed shift in
East Asia’s diet pattern, there has been a rise in the per capita consumption in many
East Asian countries of fruits, vegetables, fish, milk, alcoholic beverages, and nuts and
oilseeds (Table 7). Data also indicate growing importance of horticulture crops (fruits
and vegetables) and processed agricultural products in the agricultural trade of OECD
countries. Although OECD countries are net exporters of cereals and dairy products,
they are net importers of fresh fruits and nuts, processed fruits, fresh and processed
vegetables, as well as meat and meat preparations (Table 8). Notably, the OECD
countries’ imports of these products have been growing rapidly, with fruits and nuts
being their largest and fastest growing imported agricultural products.5 Bananas, fresh
and dried fruits (including pineapple) and edible nuts comprise the key imported fresh
fruits and nuts while fruit juice accounts for half of imported processed fruit. Similarly,
OECD imports of fresh and processed vegetables have also grown fast, especially
frozen vegetables, dried vegetables and vegetables preserved other than by vinegar.

All these developments point to the strategic significance of efforts to further

strengthen the country’s existing comparative advantage in horticultural products,
especially fruits, vegetables and nuts, or the the so-called “high value crops”.

Summary and Conclusions

Data over the past 20 years show an unmistakable trend of deterioration in the
performance of the Philippine agricultural sector, which becomes starker when taken
against the performance of its neighboring countries in the region. While the picture is
not devoid of some bright spots, the general picture remains disturbing, and implies the
urgent need for determined corrective action. The required interventions to reverse the
sector’s decline comprise a mix of policy reforms, improved implementation of existing
policies and programs, capacity-building, market reforms, improved governance and
strong negotiation with trading partners. These are daunting tasks that government
alone cannot undertake.

It is imperative, then, that all concerned sectors – government at the national

down to the local levels, the private sector, and civil society – work together to bring
about the conditions needed to modernize Philippine agriculture. The crying need is to
make Philippine farms efficient and competitive as global competition intensifies into the
next century and millennium, and ensuring that such efficiency and competitiveness
translates to the broadest benefits for the Filipino population.
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