Chapter 10.

THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

1. Qualifications of the President and the Vice President, Election and Proclamation, Term of Office,
Oath of Office
Article VII, Section 1 “the Executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines” -> the
power to enforce and administer laws

Qualification
Article VII, Section 2
 Natural born citizen
 Registered voter
 Able to read and write
 At least 45 years old on the day of election
 Resident in the Philippines for at least 10 years

expressio unius est exclusio alterius - when one or more things of a class are expressly
mentioned others of the same class are excluded

Election and Proclamation

President and Vice President are elected by direct vote of the People. In case of equal vote, a majority
of vote by all the members of both the houses of the congress, shall be proclaimed winner.

Term of Office
Term of 6 years which shall begin on June 30 after following the election.

Oath of Office
The oath of office is merely intended to deepen the sense of responsibility of the President and ensure
a more conscientious discharge of his office.

Cases:
Tecson v. COMELEC G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004(424 SCRA 277)

FACTS
Before the court are consolidated cases, all of which questioning the issue of citizenship as
the qualification of presidential candidate Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Ferdinand
Poe Jr.

In the foregoing case, petitioners seek for the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ to
have the COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJ’s certificate of candidacy for alleged
misrepresentation of his citizenship and urging the Supreme Court to take cognizance of
the case. Petitioner invoked Section 4, paragraph 7, Section VII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING
The court has no jurisdiction and the case is hereby dismissed.

The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The term contest is referenced to a
post-election scenario. Rule 12, 13 and 14 of the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election,
returns and qualification of the President or Vice-President and not of candidates for
President or Vice President.

Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Section 4, paragraph 7, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the
qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are
held.

Pormento v. Estrada, G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010

FACTS
Private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President of the Republic of the
Philippines on May 11, 1998. He sought the presidency again in the general elections held
on May 10, 2010. Petitioner opposed private respondent’s candidacy and filed a petition
for disqualification. However, his petition was denied by the Second Division of COMELEC
and COMELEC en banc.

Petitioner filed an instant petition for certiorari.

ISSUE
Whether or not Estrada is banned for re-election.

RULING
The petition is denied due course and is hereby dismissed.

The petition was considered moot as it no longer presents a justiciable controversy. He did
not even pray for the issuance of a TRO or preliminary injunction to prohibit Estrada to
participate as a candidate for the position of President in the May 2010 elections. Thus, the
re-election issue does not equate to controversy for the court to resolve. As such, the
exercise of the court to judicial review is lacking in this case.

Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC. G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015

FACTS
During his incumbency as President of the Philippines on September 2007, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of plunder, defined in and
penalized by Republic Act No. 7080. Subsequently, former President Arroyo extended
executive clemency by way of pardon to former President Estrada.

Being restored his political and civil rights, former President Estrada ran for and filed a
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Mayor of the City of Manila. Petitioner Vidal
filed petition to disqualify former President Estrada before the COMELEC but was
subsequently dismissed for lack of merit. Estrada won the Mayoralty position.

A petition-in-intervention was filed by Alfredo Lim, for Mayor Estrada’s disqualification to

hold public office as the pardon granted to him failed to expressly remit his perpetual
disqualification.

ISSUE
Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in allowing former President Estrada to run for the Mayoral position as a
result of pardon granted by him by former President Arroyo.

RULING
The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolution.

The pardon granted to former President Estrada was absolute in the absence of a clear,
unequivocal and concrete factual basis upon which to anchor or support the Presidential
intent to grant a limited pardon.

Wherefore, the petition and petition-in-intervention are dismissed as they failed to

demonstrate factual or legal bases to prove that the assailed COMELEC resolutions
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, PE.T. Case No. 001, Feb. 13, 1996

FACTS
In the 1992 presidential election, Fidel Ramos defeated Miriam Santiago. Thereof,
Protestant Santiago prayed that the revision of ballots in the remaining precincts of the
pilot areas be dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot areas be deemed
completed.

During the pendency of her electoral protest, she filed a certificate of candidacy for senator
for the May 8, 1995 elections, won, took her oath, assumed office and discharged her
duties appertaining to the office of Senator.

ISSUE
Whether or not Protestant Santiago abandoned her electoral protest as Senator after
assuming office in the Senate.
RULING
Yes, the instant election protest is dismissed because it has been rendered moot and
academic by its abandonment or withdrawal by the Protestant as a consequence of her
election and assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of duties and functions
thereof. The Protestant’s abandonment of her protest rendered the protest moot to the
fact the she was not holding the office of President at the time she filed the certificate of
candidacy, assumed and performed the duties thereof and exercise the powers
appertaining thereto.

Legarda v. De Castro P.E.T. Case No. 003, January 18, 2008

FACTS
On June 24, 2004, Congress sitting as the national Board of Canvassers (NBC) proclaimed
Noli L. De Castro the duly elected Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Protestant Loren B. Legarda placed second. Subsequently, protestant filed this protest with
PET praying for the annulment of the protestee’s proclamation as the duly elected Vice-
President of the Republic of the Philippines.

During the pendency of electoral protest, Protestant filed a certificate of Candidacy for
Senator, won the election, and assumed office of Senator of the Philippines.

ISSUE
Whether or not Protestant abandoned her electoral protest after assuming office of
Senator.

RULING
Yes, the protestant’s candidacy for, election to and assumption of the office of Senator of
the Philippines is ground for abandonment or withdrawal of her electoral protest.

The precedent case of Defensor-Santiago vs Ramos was upheld. In the case at bar,
protestant’s tenure in the Senate coincide with the term of the Vice-Presidency 2004-2010,
that is the subject of her protest. Thus, her assumption of the office of the Senator clearly
abandoned her electoral protest against the Protestee as her tenure in the Senate
coincides with the term of Vice-Presidency she was vying for.

Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697-700, March 8, 2016

FACTS
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was the adopted daughter of Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe. On October 18, 2001, Poe became a naturalized American
citizen. However, her father’s demise caused her family to move back to the Philippines
and re-acquired her Philippine citizenship.

On October 15, 2015, she filed her Certificate for Candidacy for the Presidency for the May
2016 Election. In her COC, she declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her
residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 9, 2016 would be ten years and
eleven months counted from May 24, 2005. She attached to her COC an “Affidavit Affirming
Renunciation of USA Citizenship”.

Her filing of her COC triggered several COMELEC cases against her alleging that she lacks
the requisite residency and citizenship to qualify for the Presidency. COMELEC First and
Second Division resolved to cancel her COC.

Hence, the petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not the COC of petitioner should be denied due course or cancelled on the
ground she made in the certificate a false material representation.

RULING
No, petitioner is declared qualified to be a candidate for Presidency and COMELEC
undertake grave abuse of discretion.

The cancellation qualification of the petitioner resorted to erroneous discretion of

COMELEC. She was a natural born citizen which automatically acquired Philippine
 citizenship and is lost when she acquired her American citizenship. Thus, in re-acquiring her
Philippine citizenship, she is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, she possessed all the
necessary qualification to be elected as President of the Philippines.

2. Perquisites and Inhibitions

Article VII, Section 6 – Prerequisite
The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the President and Vice-President shall be
determined by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in said compensation
shall take effect until after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during which such increase was
approved. They shall not receive during their tenure any other emolument from the Government or
any other source.

Article VII, Section 13 – Inhibition

The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President
shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office
of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices,
including government-owned or controlled corporation and their subsidiaries.

Cases:
Funa v. Ermita, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010
FACTS
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Baustista as
Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC). She was
designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of the DOTC under Special Order No.
2006-171.

Following the resignation of then Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) Administrator

Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the
Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.

Petitioner, herein Dennis A. B. Funa filed an instant petition challenging the

constitutionality of Batutista’s appointment/designation, which proscribe by the
prohibition laid under Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution.

ISSUE
Whether or not the concurrent designation of respondent as OIC of MARINA and DOTC
Undersecretary violates the constitutional proscription against multiple offices.

RULING
Yes, the designation of respondent Bautista is declared unconstitutional for being violative
of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

The nature of the appointment or designation was not found in Section 13, Article VII nor
Section 7, paragraph 2 Article IX-B but to hold an office means to possess or occupy the
same or to be in possession and administration, which implies nothing less than the actual
discharge of the functions and duties of the office, where it to be a designation nor an
appointment.

Funa v. Agra, G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013

FACTS
President Gloria M. Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Alberto C. Agra as the Acting
Secretary of Justice following the resignation of Secretary Agnes VST Devandanera.
Subsequently, the President designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent
capacity.

Petitinoner Dennis A.B. Funa, commence a suit to challenge the constitutionality of Agra’s
 concurrent appointments or designations, claiming it to be prohibited under Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 constitution.

Hence, a petition for certiorari and prohibition commenced.

ISSUE
Whether or not the concurrent designation of Respondent Agra violates the constitutional
prohibition against dual or multiple offices.

RULING
Yes, the designation is void for being unconstitutional and violative of Section 13, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution. Respondent Agra was declared de facto officer during his tenure
as Acting Secretary of Justice.

The court held that to hold multiple or dual offices by appointment or designation means to
possess or to occupy the office, or to be in possession and administration of the office,
which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the
office, prohibitive to the mandate of the constitution.

3. Executive Privilege
The right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from
Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public.
 Informer’s privilege
 Privilege accorded to presidential communications
 Deliberative process privilege
 Diplomatic negotiations privilege

Cases:
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002
FACTS
On February 4, 1977, President Marcos issued P.D. No. 1084 creating Public Estates
Authority, and PD No. 1085 transferring to PEA the lands reclaimed in the foreshore and
offshore of the Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project
(MCCRRP)

Then, portions of Manila Bay were being reclaimed until the time of former President
Estrada.

In 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private
corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an
additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding the islands to complete the
configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Reclamation Project. The JVA was
approved by the President Ramos. Consequently, Senate President Maceda denounce the
JVA as “grandmother of all scams” when he delivered his privilege speech.

As an action to address the issue after the legislative investigation, then President Ramos
issued PD No. 365 creating a legal task force to conduct a study on the matter.

A case was filed, on April 13, 1998, by Antionio M. Zulueta for Prohibition with Application
for the Issuance of TRO and preliminary injunction. However, the Supreme Court dismissed
the petition for unwarranted disregard of judicial hierarchy.

On April 27, 1998, Francisco Chavez filed before the Supreme Court a petition for
mandamus with the prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and TRO. He
contended that the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the
reclaimed islands to AMARI. He further asserted that such sale violated section 3, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution and that any renegotiation must be disclosed by invoking Section
28, article II and Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Joint Venture Agreement violated the Constitution.

RULING
Yes, under the public land act, as amended, reclaimed islands are classified as inalienable
and disposable islands of the public domain, however, limited to agricultural lands under
Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution.

The amended JVA clearly violated glaringly Section 2 and Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose objects or purpose is
contrary to law, outside the commerce of men, are inexistent and void from the beginning.

The Supreme Court declared the JVA null and void ab anitio.

Chavez v. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998

FACTS
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, invoking his constitutional right to information and the
correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly its transactions involving the national
interest, demands that respondents make public any and all negotiation and agreements
pertaining to the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)’s task of
recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of
any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses.

RULING
Yes, respondent PCGG, its officers and all government officials are directed to disclose to
the public the terms of any proposed compromise settlements, as well as the final
agreement, relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth.

Section 7, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern shall be recognized. The court emphasized that the ill-gotten
wealth of that Marcoses assumes a matter of public concern and imbued with public
interest.

Thus, the public has a right to respondent’s disclosure of any agreement that may be
arrived at concerning the Marcoses’ purported ill-gotten wealth.

Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate issued invitation to various
officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public
hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China
National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project)

On September 28, 2005, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order 464, “
Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on
Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative
Inquiries in aid of legislation under the Constitution, and for other purposes,” which,
pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately.

Consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition was filed to tender the President’s
abuse of power by issuing EO 464. Petitioners also prayed for its declaration as null and
void for being unconstitutional.

ISSUE
Whether or not EO 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.

RULING
Yes, Section 2(a) and 2(b) of E.O. 464 is void and unconstitutional because it allows the
President to invoke executive privilege based on the classifications or categories of persons,
when in fact such categorization should only apply to information.

The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as
a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The
enumeration of public officials to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing
before either house of Congress is unconstitutional as it invokes executive privilege without
 asserting why.

4. Presidential Immunity
Unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State, and the officer who acts illegally is not acting
as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser. Presidential immunity from suit exists
only in concurrence with the president’s incumbency.
Cases:
Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988
FACTS
Luis D. Beltran, together with others, was charged by former President Corazon Aquino.
Then President Cory herself filed a complaint affidavit against him and the others. Hence,
together with other two principal issues, Beltran argued that the reasons which necessitate
immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit. Further, he contended that if
criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of President’s filing of her complaint affidavit, she may
subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution and she may be exposing herself to
possible contempt of court or perjury.

ISSUE
Whether or not the President may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners

RULING
Yes, the privilege of immunity from suit pertains to the President by virtue of the office and
may be invoked only by the holder of the office. Hence, reliance of Beltran on such was
misplaced. There is nothing in our laws which would prevent the President from waiving
the privilege. Thus, if so, minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the
privilege and submit to the court’s jurisdiction.

The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive is solely upon the President’s
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person. As
such, the petition was dismissed.

Gloria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119903, August 15, 2000

FACTS
Dr. Bienvenido A. Icasiano was appointed as Schools Division Superintendent in Quezon
City by the then President Corazon Aquino on June 29, 1989.

On October 10, 1994, Ricardo Gloria, Secretary of DECS, recommended to President Cory
that Icasiano be reassigned as Superintendent of MIST. Such recommendation was
approved. Subsequently, Director Nilo L. Rosas of DECS informed Icasiano of his
reassignment effective October 17, 1994.

Icasiano requested Secretary Gloria to reconsider but to no avail. Hence, on October 19,
1994, Icasiano filed a petition before the Court of Appeals praying for issuance of TRO.
However, it was set aside. However, in the decision issued on March 28, 1995, the Court of
Appeals declared the re-assignment as violative of Icasiano’s right to security of tenure.

ISSUE
Whether or not Icasiano’s reassignment was violative of his security of tenure.

RULING
Yes, petitioner’s contention that prohibition is improper as it attacks the President, in
violation of the doctrine of Presidential immunity, was held to be untenable as the petition
was directed against the Secretary and Director of DECS, and not to the President. As the
transfer appears to be indefinite, the transfer was held to be permanent. Hence, it was held
violative.

Cases:
1. Tecson v. COMELEC 424 SCRA 277
2. Pormento v. Estrada, G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010
3. Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC. G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015
4. Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, PE.T. Case No. 001, Feb. 13, 1996
5. Legarda v. De Castro P.E.T. Case No. 003, January 18, 2008
6. Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697-221700, March 8, 2016
7. Funa v. Ermita, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010
8. Funa v. Agra, G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013
9. Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002
10. Chavez v. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998
11. Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006
12. Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988
13. Gloria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119903, August 15, 2000