Crisanta Hosoya v. Atty. Allan Contado, A.C. No.

10731 (October 5, 2021)

Facts:

Cristanta filed a complaint for disbarment before the Office of the Bar Confidant on February 15, 2015.
In her complaint, Crisanta claimed that she met Atty. Contado in 2003. She alleged that he immediately
courted her and represented that he was already separated-in-fact from his wife. Atty. Contado also
mentioned that he was already working out the dissolution of his marriage through a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage or through annulment.

In 2010, Crisanta agreed with Atty. Contado's proposal to live together as husband and wife. During that
time, however, Crisanta discovered that Atty. Contado was also cohabiting with and impregnated other
women (apart from her). Despite knowledge of these, Crisanta admitted that she continued living with
him. Their cohabitation resulted in two children that were born in 2011 and 2013.

Crisanta claimed that they were having financial problems, and that Atty. Contado left her alone in
settling the obligations. At this point, the parties had already terminated their relationship. Crisanta and
her children were constrained to move to another place.

Crisanta claimed that she and her children no longer received support from Atty. Contado. Thus, she
sent him a demand letter asking him to provide support. In the letter though, Crisanta stated that Atty.
Contado was providing support albeit not sufficient for their needs. She claimed that he did not respond
to the demand as of the time of the filing of the instant complaint.

In response, Atty. Contado denied the allegations in the Complaint. He posited that Crisanta's allegations
were not supported by evidence and were meant to exact revenge for a relationship that had gone sour.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) recommended that Atty. Contado be suspended from the
practice of law for one year. The IBP Board of Governors (BOG) adopted the findings of fact and
recommendation of the CBD, but resolved to increase the penalty to disbarment.

Issue:

Should the penalty of disbarment be imposed upon Atty. Contado?

Held:

Yes. The SC adopted the findings of the IBP BOG.

Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the CPR state:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit or the legal
profession.

For the imposition of the penalty of disbarment on the ground of immortality, the conduct complained
of must not only be immoral, but must be grossly immoral. Panagsagan v. Panagsagan (Panagsagan)
defines grossly immoral conduct as "one that is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency."

It is well-settled that married person's abandonment of his or her spouse to live with and cohabit with
another constitutes gross immorality as it amounts to either adultery or concubinage.

In the instant case, Atty. Contado likewise admitted the fact of his relationship with Crisanta, while being
married to his wife. In so admitting, he effectively admitted to living a life of deceit and immorality. He
also admitted that their relationship resulted in two daughters.

These admissions strongly support and corroborate Crisanta's statements that they cohabited. Instead
of disputing Crisanta's allegations, he affirmed them in giving these statements; he did not present any
denial on these specifics. Atty. Contados statements, therefore, made it clear to the Court that he
abandoned his legal wife and family to cohabit with Crisanta that resulted in two children. Applying
Chan, Atty. Contado's admissions can serve as basis to find him guilty of violating the CPR for committing
grossly immoral acts.

Resultantly, and again based on Chan, the penalty of disbarment is proper.

Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634 and 161824

Facts:

On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter
"FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines
under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his
certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated
his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his
place of birth to be Manila.

Victorino X. Fornier initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed as SPA No. 04-003 before the
Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was
a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated,
that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the
latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate
birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita
Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed,
Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.

COMELEC denied the petition and the subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Issue:

Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition?
Held:

No. SC affirmed the COMELEC’s resolution denying the petition.

In ascertaining whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary
to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn,
depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino
citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from
taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of
Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old,
Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish
rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of
any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou
would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902.
That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of
respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to
hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner
has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given
to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been
material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be
material, but also deliberate and willful.