PROCESS SAFETY FUNDAMENTALS Safe Operational Principles to avoid incidents with hazardous chemicals EPSC THE PROCESS SAFETY NETWORK i aCONTEXT Process Safety is about: the avoidance of Loss of Containment: of hazardous chemicals. For this three areas are considered relevant: Operational Excellence, Mechanical Incegrity and Engineering Design. EPSC is doing a lange study of the causes of incidents that classify as process safety incidents (according to ICCA or APL-7S4 standard), among their industrial members. The result, shown in Figure 1, shows that most cases originate in how the installation is operated. Losses are typically caused by operator handling or maintenance of the installation. This has led to the understanding that operational excellence on process saPety is of great importance. One of the questions is, what type oF incidents are we talking about and how could operation better prepare themselves to avoid these. Here the process saFety Fundamentals are defined that can play a role in strengthening process safety operational excellence on hazardous sites. To obtain this, Leadership and Competency on the critical operational and maintenance tasks is also essential. FIGURE 1. EPSC BENCHMARK RESULTS OF 2019 INCIDENT ROOT CAUSES (ON CA 1000 CLASSIFIED PROCESS SAFETY CASES) PROCESS SAFETY INCIDENT CAUSES. DESIGN 14% OPERATIONAL 51% INTEGRITY 35% PAGEZ al &The ePPectiveness of the integrity assurance processes are highly depen on demonstrated leadership by management at different: levels of the organization, but also by collective commitment demonstrated by the entire workForce. ing To avoid chemical releases so called “barriers” ane identified. These barriers can be hardware, human or organizational as shown in Figure 2. The scope of this booklet is limited to preventive and mitigating human barriers, and more speciPically the operating discipline principles that need to be respected rigorously to avoid process safety incidents and accidents. This rule based layer Forms a solid Foundation, on which the risk based methods can bulld, which are used to prevent the more complex process causes of incidents. FIGURE 2. FOCUS ON HUMAN BARRIERS Hordeare Horas PAGES =]SCOPE OF EPSC PROCESS SAFETY FUNDAMENTALS EPSC Process SaPety Fundamentals are a set of basic principles intended to support Frontline workers, supervisors and operational management. They draw attention to situations that: could lead to a release of a hazardous chemical with potential Por severe consequences and emphasize existing good practices to prevent such events. The EPSC Process Safety Fundamentals mention a number OF typical critical aspects that are not easy to do well and that: have resulted multiple serious incidents. Not all chemical saPety hazards are addressed. They can be used very well at industrial sites dealing with hazardous chemicals, in addition to the existing process saety management systems. Therefore, the EPSC PSFs do not replace existing safety management systems (including policies, safe systems For work, safety training programs, change management, critical task analysis & procedures etc.) but provide a tool to increase understanding on the items that often go wrong in the Field on the basis of a detailed discussion of the slides provided The current collection of EPSC Process Safety Fundamentals addresses 18 typical hazardous operational situations. Not all of these will be relevant: Por your site, and even you might Find missing ones. It's suggested to select the most relevant ones For your site and start to work on those. The EPSC PSF do not include new safe operation principles. Instead, they address well known basic principles but presented and visualized in a way that they can be used as tool enabling Front line workers to get: a better understanding of process safety in their day to day activities. EPSC PROCESS SAFETY FUNDAMENTALS & LIFE SAVING RULES. The EPSC Process Safety Fundamentals are intended as a complement to the Life Saving Rules adopted in many companies. However the context of the use of the EPSC PSF is quite difPerent From the intent of Life Saving Rules. Therefore, combining them in a single list is not recommended. A comparison of the use oF LiPe Saving Rules and EPSC Process Safety Fundamentals is given in the table at the next: page. PAGE — &LIFE SAVING PROCESS SAFETY RULES FUNDAMENTALS OBJECTIVE | Reduce number oF ‘Avoid loss of containment: oP injuries/Pavalities chemicals with potentially serious consequences For people, environment and assets HSE DOMAIN } Behaviors in Behaviors in operations involving occupational saRety } hazardous chemicals TARGET POPULATION Operation teams on hazardous sites (process operators, supervisors, operational management, contractors, maintenance technicians) NATURE AND Simple rules that are } More complex principles that APPLICABILITY } easy tounderstand { cannot always be Fully applied (eg. and apply in all in case of design issues) circumstances IMPLMENTATION Non-negotiable set | The aimis to identify situations OF requirements (LiFe } that ane not in line with the Saving Rules /Golden ; Process Safety Fundamentals Rules) and to start a discussion on how to proceed, while avoiding uncontrolled initiatives "to get the job done” ‘The deployment of the Process Safety Fundamentals is very different From the way that companies have implemented their Life Saving Rules. Life Saving Rules are introduced and managed as a set of non-negotiable simple requirements PRES Epstlwhile the Process Safety Fundamentals address more complex situations, where design and the practical situation need to be taken into account, to decide how tthe work can be executed safely. Therefore the PSF allow more Flexibility, that is they have to rely mone on advanced understanding and competency The intent of the PSFs is to emphasize some critical Pront-line tasks and behaviors that need to be Pully understood and supported by all operational leaders to enable successful process safety performance. The deployment Of the PSFs must allow a renewed Pocus on existing, good operating practices that we must get right every time. However, in practice, Pull application of the PSFs may not be easy or even not possible. It is also the aim of the PSFs to give Visibility to these dilemmas that Frontline operators may Face and to engage them in a discussion with involved operational management: on how to deal with these situations. In this context, Process SoPety Fundamentals are not intended to be seen as “another set of rules’, but nabher as an opportunity For discussion between front-line operators and operational management when difFiculties arise in the execution of some critical tasks. Im this context, the Process Safety Fundamentals provide an excellent tool For leaders to instill an open culture driving process safety excellence. Leaders should: * Drive safety From a position of care. Be visible in the Field. Have a regular dialogue on the PSFs. Help Front line safe to comPortably + surface dilemmas, operational issues, and weak signals. Have a high understanding of the compromising Factors in practical * situations. Once dilemmas are brought Forward, work with the Front line to resolve the issues. Show curiosity. Seek to understand and comply with the PSFs before allowing deviations. Recognize risk normalization in many oF our daily activities and address it The list of 18 EPSC Process Safety Fundamentals is not a comprehensive or exclusive list of all possible challenges that operators may Face in the Field. Therefore, other Process Safety Fundamentals may be developed and adopted by companies depending on the local contexts and needs. GUIDANCE CARDS In this booklet, guidance cards can be Found For each oF the 18 EPSC Process PACES: eeSaPety Fundamentals. These guidance cards give supporting information For the implementation of the PSFs. They give a description of the operation principles to be Followed, with a Focus on hazards, possible challenges in the Field and options to get it right. DEPLOYMENT OF THE PROCESS SAFETY FUNDAMENTALS The success of the deployment of the EPSC Process Safety Fundamentals is highly depending on the way in which they are rolled out. A description of possible steps is given below: Engagement Workshop To introduce the Process Safety Fundamentals, a workshop may be organized with key people in the operational chain to ensure their commitment and involvement, These people include representatives From Operations, Maintenance, Process Safety, Asset Integrity, The participation and commitment of senior leadership is vital For successful implementation of the PSFs. In the workshop, @ presentation can be given about: the PSF program and a discussion can be organized with Front line operators on how to efPectively implement the PSFs in the Field. A Formal plan For implementation of the PSFs, endorsed by all people involved, may be one of the deliverables of the workshop. Analysis and Promotion To coordinate the implementation of the Process Safety Fundamentals, the company may choose to nominate one or more stewards or champions. The role OF the stewardsicoaches includes the organization of sessions to give Further clarification to enable Front line workers to understand the scope and objectives OF the PSF program. These sessions can also be used For discussions on possible Pront-line dilemmas in the application of the selected PSFs. The content of tthe EPSC PSF guidance sheets can be used as a tool in the discussions. In the discussion it helps if the people that work in the Field, can openly share all the cases, where one had deviated From best practices. The type and number of PSFs to be included in the program may vary. One or more of the EPSC Process Safety Fundamentals may be selected. However other PSFs may be included, based on specific local process safety challenges and supported by a thorough analysis of its internal incident and leading indicator data related to actual or potential high consequence process safety events. One option could be to initially select a minimum set of PSFs to be promoted during a pilot phase over a one-year program, allowing a better estimate of the a we EPSCrequired eFort in terms of budget and resources allocation For a Full-scale deployment over the Following years. Roll-Out Please Find in Table 2, some suggestions that can help you to role-out the process saPety Fundamentals within your company. PRACTICE PURPOSE ons 1.1 Individual, team or site gop analysis, with improvement action plan 1.2 360 degree Feedback Identify strengths and areas For improvement, using invernet survey, card-sort or paper- based questionnaire. For manager or supervisor behaviors in the ‘area oF Process Safety Fundamentals, inked to development. PI ren olka uen knead 21 Awareness campaigns 22 Setting behavioral expectations 23 Interactive exercises 2.4 HSE days Explain PSFs and why they are important, Ongoing sharing of the PSFs with the Front-line workforce, making rePenence to neal events that: have occurred at site level, but also taking into account lessons learned and other available material From the industry Emphasize behaviors expected in relation to tthe Process Safety Fundamentals. Fon simple ways of explaining the Process Safety Fundamentals in an interactive and engaging way. Communication of Process Safety Fundamentals to workForce during themed HSE days / events. PACES aw eePRACTICE 25 Toolbox talks 26 Posters 27 Videos 28 Booklets BUILDING INTO HR PRO 31 Employee selection (all levels) 32 Management: development: 3.3. Supervisor development PURPOSE, Communication of Process Safety Fundamentals to workFonce by supervisors. Posters can be a powerPul communication tool providing strong relevant images that can be displayed at strategic positions. A well-chosen image can often convey a meaning more powerfully than words alone. Meaningful videos can result in greater ‘attention to, and retention oF information. They increase audience understanding, trigger emotions and encourage participant questions. A short video could be developed For each of the PSFs, to explain the its importance and the roles played by employees in preventing undesired process safety events. A pocket-sized booklet: covering the PSFs can be a helpful resource to maintain awareness of PSFs and also be used to prompt process saPety discussion, For example during toolbox talks, or during operational site visits by managers and supervisors. Use Process SaPety Fundamentals as criteria For selection. Develop manager engagement in application oF Process Safety Fundamentals. Develop supervisor engagement in application oF Process Safety Fundamentals. PAGES a &PRACTICE 34 Coaching 35 Enhancement of personal HSE action plans PURPOSE, Develop behaviors related to Process SaPety Fundamentals. ‘Add respect of Process Safety Fundamentals vo personal HSE action plans. 4. BUILDING INTO HSE PROCESSES & SYSTEMS 41 HSE improvement campaigns 42 During auditing 43 Reward and recognition 44 Post-incident review 45 Near-miss analysis Executive Safety Tools 46 Executive Saety Tools AT Contractor selection & management Linking Process Safety Fundamentals to specific campaigns (e.g. certain types of injury or incidents). Inclusion of Process SaPety Fundamentals during traditional HSE audits. Linking to demonstration of excellent: application of Process Safety Fundamentals. Following an incident, using the Process Safety Fundamentals to embed post-incident learning. Identieying trends in application of Process Safety Fundamentals in a series of nean-misses. Simple practices which senior executives can use to promote Process Safety Fundamentals. Engage contractors in demonstrating and reinPorcing the right behaviors related to Process Safety Fundamentals. PAGE 1 aw eePRACTICE 48 Integration in contractual agreements a oy 51 Risk assessment 52 Employee involvement 5.3 SaPety moments 54 Site visits and inspection program 55 Recognition and interventions PRACTICES PURPOSE The PSFs adopted inside the Company can be referenced in Tender documentation, not necessarily as a stand-alone document, but: identifying the most suitable way to ensure Contractors working on Company's sites are Fully aware that PSFs are part of Company policies/procedures. Encourage / maintain mindFulness. Get everyone involved in respecting Process ‘SoPety Fundamentals. Encourage / maintain mindfulness. Dedicated site visits can be conducted by supervisors and managers to support implementation of the PSFs; dilemmas raised by Front line workers can then be addressed to Facility continuous improvement in process ‘saPety performance. Inclusion of the PSFs in site hazard observation cards enabling dilemmas Paced by Frontline workers in trying to implement: PSFs, to be raised. And an award or recognition program For the best card of the month. Another ‘option is the inclusion of the PSFs in the pre- job Tool-Box-Talks materials, helping to increase understanding of the required controls to be ‘applied before starting work. PAGE 1 a &MONITORING AND FOLLOW-UP Management system activities include monitoring and Follow-up. In the case of Process Safety Fundamentals (as part of process management), some time be needed to measure the cutcome of the implementation of PSFs (in terms oF reduction of the number of Process Safety Events related to operating integrity). A more immediate step change will be more likely visible in terms of increased front-line awareness, competence and engagement in process safety FIGURE 1. INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT AREAS. orm ese 2 o oe EPSC18 TOPICS FOR PROCESS SAFETY EXCELLENCE 1, APPLY DOUBLE ISOLATION EMPTY AND DE-ENERGIZE BEFORE LINE-BREAKING 3. MONITOR AN OPEN DRAIN 4, MANAGE OVERRIDES OF SAFETY CRITICAL SYSTEMS LINE-BREAKING INCIDENTS 5. WALK THE LINE 6. VERIFY LEAK TIGHTNESS AFTER MAINTENANCE WORK 7. AVOID WORKING BEHIND A SINGLE VALVE 8. VERIFY THE CONDITION OF FLEXIBLE HOSES, 9, OPERATE WITHIN SAFE LIMITS 10. CONTROL UTILITY SYSTEMS CONNECTED TO A PROCESS: 11, REPORT DEFICIENCIES ON SAFETY CRITICAL EQUIPMENT 12. UNPLUGGING OF EQUIPMENT 13. STAY OUT OF THE LINE OF FIRE 14. CONTROL (UN)LOADING 15. CHECK ATMOSPHERE IN FIRE BOX BEFORE IGNITING THE BURNERS 16. AVOID SPLASH LOADING 17, AVOID RUN-AWAYREACTION 18. REPORT PROCESS SAFETY INCIDENTS PAGE 1 a &EPSC PROCESS SAFETY FUNDAMENTALS €: Apply Double Isolation Empty and De-enengize Monitor an open drain before Line-breaking SYSTEM OVERRIDE = = 7: Manage Overrides of Walk the line Verify leak tightness Safety Critical Systems after maintenance work . w" Avoid working behind Verify the condition Operate within a single valve of Plexible hoses safe limits PAGE 14 aw eePICTOGRAMS D i ei - {_—_ 3 Control utility Report deficiencies Control unplugging oF systems ‘on Safety critical equipment: f 9? o— “ io # Lae ‘Stay out of Control (Un)loading Check atmosphere the Line of Fire. in Fire box before igniting the burners | aes Avoid Splash Loading Avoid run-away reaction Reports Process SaPety IncidentsGUIDANCE ON USING THE PROCESS SAFETY FUNDAMENTALS These are saPe operating principles related to hazardous chemicals to avoid spills, Fire, explosion, exposure, or business interruption. To establish Process SaPety Excellence on chemical sites by enhancing ‘awareness on typical hazardous operations and discussing the relevant details. Understanding the challenges in the Field and the good practices that help to get things right. Select: a limited number of PSF relevant For your operation to start; eventually expand in next: steps with additional more specific PSE Use the PSF slide to start the discussion. It is the discussion that provides the understanding of where you really are and what can be improved! Establish clear agreement: & procedures on the discussed PSF To get in the positive process safety mood, Feel Free to use this video made by Shell: https:/Mmwwyoubube.comiwatch?v=l9FudydckGgAPPLY DOUBLE ISOLATION Hazards Spill oF (hazardous) material can occur when a barrier (like a valve) Pails and no second barrier is in place. When important During routine and special operations: draining & sampling, (un-) loading activities, utility connections. Challenges in the Field © Older plant design often do not provide a double barrier © Blind Flanges not put back after maintenance work. © Blind Planges not installed with bolts & missing end-caps. © Importance of “primary containment" not understood © Valve handles that can be opened accidentally OPTIONS TO GET IT RIGHT eae nr ae ary Peete ious Tee az) k hat drains are ha an end-cap (blind Flange or eset Petes aes Eee R coe el Oe it EPSCHazards Uncontrolled release of energy or a hazardous material during the opening of piping or equipment. When important When unbolting, unscrewing, drilling or cutting of process equipment. While working on live equipment. Challenges in the Field Working at the wrong location Complexity of piping on break points arrangements. Double block and bleed not possible. Plugging of vents or drains / leaking valves. Installing blinds. Drains at the wrong location. OPTIONS TO GET IT RIGHT Oe Meer nsec) Peels Mca [ots numbered isolation points in Cine area Tene ened eee Reale Eid Pet enol ae Cee el) Teeth Empty and clean equipment leat Ce Rout ie Crear etter) Ce ees Cae ne ea) eRe ana eee aa ere el Renee eau ec ee Rea: eer] CSF etel ssc eeniere tis Pea au Rec aS Senet Ceouanes Crees ee Ma) Peds ce kee ro) errant aac CMe trees tent ea al Oa eect orcemeuclMONITOR AN OPEN DRAIN Hazards Unintended product release can occur during draining From a storage tank or other equipment to atmosphere, When important © When draining water Prom a tank that contains hydrocarbons to a sewer. © When removing liquid Prom process equipment. Challenges in the Field © Distracted by other things that need attention © Long draining time. © Bad weather, © Under estimation of the potential consequence of the product being released. © Drain valve does not Fully close. PAGE TB OPTIONS TO GET IT RIGHT rere eee ee) eee (hae Teen eee Tas (eel ry Cay Cruel Spring Lo« oder foun) Cel eee Reena R Seeks rete Seek el ere eet) Eola eeu Avoid doing something else while monitoring a draining mn handover EPSCSYSTEM OVERRIDE Hazards InsuPPicient saPeguards are in place when a safety critical system is not working properly or is bypassed. When important Failure of or unreliable safety systems. Testing of interlocks. Turnaround or maintenance work. Commissioning, start-up & shutdown Challenges in the Field Consequences are unknown. Safety systems that prevent start-up. Lack of knowledge of procedure. Absence oF authorizers. PACE 20 OPTIONS TO GET IT RIGHT OMe React Ceti k ect Cereal antec aa ne id Coren au Nat Cel) Deantoni Rc Pecans col ae er renee rane rN ake eee Mie Me Pee ctu tg Recent Ree eed cy registered in a bypass log ena Deer a) Ceca Limits bypass duration, initiate Cie oed zo ue cor ane ac Me aa e bypassing in the Ges Poe tere ae Cent see Maen Maan) meeting). bypassedWALK THE LINE Hazards Spills or inadvertent mixing might occur when the transfer line is not ready For operation due to open ended lines or drains, wrong valve or tank line-up. When important APter each change in set-up of a transfer line, eg. start-up after shut-down, isolating equipment, change of equipment, maintenance work, draining Challenges in the Field © Transfers occurring around shift change-over © Long transfer lines, not Fully accessible. © Distracted by other things. © Bad weather low visibility at night. © Pipelines or valve position that are not easy to see. PRE OPTIONS TO GET IT RIGHT Oe Rea at tcl RM oe ay Reena icr i acini ean ae Ts aed Dae eeuecaes aie Tachi Label equipment: in the Field, like valves, pipelines and pumps to help with the Field check eee eee ener Meee an aes Peete endure i sat Cee ened I acd Pe Ne se eRe oy eee EPSCVERIFY LEAK TIGHTNESS AFTER MAINTENANCE WORK Hazards When a Plange or other equipment: is closed, it can still leak, when hazardous chemicals are introduced. When important © APter work where equipment and Flanges have been opened. © Temperature change can influence bolt tension and create leakages. Challenges in the Field © Competent people when bolting © Verification competency or procedures are missing. ace 22 OPTIONS TO GET IT RIGHT Cees ace aa Eanes Meera} Cree] Wee ae ean Te) * by introducing a less Pe ene] eee ed Tea) ee ee ed on results, Pee Ree est) eat eae te) leak test) na ae cuore Meee Rn Raced tension after heabing-up the Cem acc ie aaa EPSC >Hazards Single valves can leak because they are not Pully closed, are Fouled or just leak. During working behind a single valve the valve might be accidentally opened or start leaking, releasing chemicals. When important During and after line breaking due to @ repair or maintenance activity When the plant is not Fully de- energized. Challenges in the Field Older plant design often might not provide a second barrier or Pull block and bleed option to isolate equipment. Placing a blind, turning a spectacle Flange. OPTIONS TO GET IT RIGHT Oe Man tact ey Meena Rect a Eola Su art cee rene ec eae era ane aE earl Tae Ree RN eam Rete. See ane) Dee Re ey Pen Ree nec isolation, on by a pressure eerers SNe ors Sc Teresa aes aa ‘void accidental knocking ‘open during the task. oer ata oes MeN Teac Creare Ran Nae) Peo Mount a spade or blind Ciera ee Nr Cieec eae cna races Peace cual Pee eae ee a Peet: Mae uel ae ata Pee ees eter Pec) Mee ne ae ol protective equipment (PPE) Cen rs Cee Mean eT Cal Ctry Hazards Hazardous Fluid release due to hoses Failures. Wildly moving hoses at pressure release when coupling gets loose. When important When using Flexible hoses. When disconnecting hoses that still contain pressure or toxic material Challenges in the Field Connections ane not properly made, requiring bended or stretched hoses. No good storage location available. PACE OPTIONS TO GET IT RIGHT OO eta te toy Code Rena fect Re keeus etary Ce oe ae i Per Regen Rent Ceaser eae ae Comes ec ute CNet! eee en Rene ein: ot Me nae a Recto ie axe) Dee Re Kecnaia a aio reece is Hoses should be tagged and ate ener reli Peri OTs Cera a ere ae Rad hanging straight down, or pelea fied: ratecarors mag) Try Groves: Mauna) Tea oa Creech ines facet das le Tea Cee Peete eucrccatesOPERATE WITHIN SAFE LIMITS Hazards Hozardous reactions and releases or equipment: damage can be caused when safe operating limits are exceeded. When important © Deviations From normal operation Transient operations, batch process, start-up / shut-down. © At design changes. Challenges in the Field © Limits not well known or identified © MOC process not Followed. ‘© Pushing production OPTIONS TO GET IT RIGHT eee eet each cy oe leh Cele cn ate enc Snore any Cec Nelle tae a Sea ae y Preaek ieee tay Pee eee eta Peet are ae ucklatecy renee Uae Oa Cereals Dera eRetec urd tec eee Nes ee Cee ean at Demet ete Reel cere Ta eRe uel eres React] eae ete ca) Cieaee Recaro nrelaa eters EPSCCONTROL UTILITY SYSTEMS CONNECTED TO A PROCESS Hazards When ubility systems are temporarily connected with a Plexible hose to a process, hazardous substances can Flow back into the utility system. When important © During inertiing, cleaning and unplugging operational equipment using utilities. © When taking a sample a utility is needed to purge a system. Challenges in the Field © Lack of knowledge. © Easy availability of ul & hoses. © Hazard studies did not identify the hazard. y stations Pace 26 OPTIONS TO GET IT RIGHT One eee nets Meee ee teu nt) Oe nee es ieee ney et) Creede ame arc Sie ated enolate cn Tee) eae oer) eae) Peek cre Pee Rea crea Feeley Ciel v4 Ceneereneeotie Meal int Cicero) EPSC >REPORT DEFICIENCIES ON SAFETY CRITICAL EQUIPMENT Hazards Safety Critical Equipment provides a barrier to prevent or limits the eFPect of a major incident. When important When Safety Critical Equipment is not working properly, Challenges in the Field © A shutdown might be needed to repair the broken equipment. © Not aware of the criticality, © Unawareness of the Pailure — no testing. © Unreadable equipment, like a Fouled sight glass. PAezT OPTIONS TO GET IT RIGHT Oe aes) Peefea cl einen ct ead Pen aay Cece aera nd ety Critical Equipment must have a testing protoc ieee as Eee Lee cee eee e teen Pele Mie terre) Cree ae Rca] > the operation Tuna ae) m Cereal veer aes) Cee Cele highest priority, Ne Be ene] ee Koen cl EPSCUNPLUGGING OF EQUIPMENT Hazards Unplugging might require opening of installations that can unexpectedly result in a release of hazardous substances When important When process equipment is blocked, eg by Fouling, polymer corrosion, objects ater maintenance ete. Challenges in the Field © Unexpected severe Flow restrictions. © No unplugging procedure or good options. © Not wanting to stop production. PACE 28 OPTIONS TO GET IT RIGHT See ae eal Cine) Priam leatay ellie Protease h eu) Rem eie Ui eaecent Reaetitriaer Temes eRe ret) a mitigati cise ely ecu cera) eect eae act Meek Ren eee Coa} equipment can still have Cerent een Red Pat Apply eee as reece aera De T Na es er ixe Sereda eee nas olation and First EPSC >STAY OUT OF THE LINE OF FIRE Hazards Exposure in case of unexpected release of energy or chemicals or unexpected movement of objects like a manhole, also vacuum can Form a hazard. When important When being in processing units that do not work at. ambient: pressure. Challenges in the Field © Release points not designed well: 4g. PSV release points that end in a pathway, ‘© Manholes (or manway) that are sbuck. ‘© Heat releases From Flare. Pace2a OPTIONS TO GET IT RIGHT eer ese oy Crt see eet Pee einces Reset ane CS Dea Pern eaee Pe ee eon elena ee i ae Cert Eo rotat| eee) Tat) Deven Cresent aa Dee Re cei ere et een ee Tercera eer Maer eu ied ore tanta Cea EPSCmn ~7 be CONTROL (UN)LOADING Hazards Unexpected run away reaction. Formation of toxic chemicals. Over filling on loss of containment. When important © Receiving of chemicals at your site. © Loading chemicals to a tank or reactor © Waste handling operation. Challenges in the Field © Lack of knowledge & guidance OF the contractor or operator involved. @ Line up. © Chemical identiPication. Pace 30 OPTIONS TO GET IT RIGHT Tee eiae as Cee chai Pes euaiateeltent Coretta! Cree um ie) Merny Diss} Pires aay Ceol cte) Tae cy Use colour codes (or bar eee ea Ese i) Poa oee eR) Ceo rac OTK P transporting the chemicals Crea EAI) Cem aono} Mie Reenter tO are involved in (un)loading, eet eet uae asad an Cees Has Cetera Rs a CMe eee accu) esol es EPSC >Hazards When the Firebox of a Furnace or boiler has an explosive mixture by accumulation of lange amounts of Flammable gases, this will explode when igniting the burners. When important Upon start and restart. Cold start. Acer a Furnace trip. Challenges in the Field Reliability of instruments. No good procedure / practices. Fast restart required to avoid shut down. OPTIONS TO GET IT RIGHT Oeil eee ec Rea ud eee merck explosive atmosphere, before emer Cee clea Ceres atte available and up-to-date. font es ue Cty Cede tee ues Cree cu eueter ke Cement ene pee eM eit ea eee cy Pen ae ea Cil Pease Cau Crea) pune eda Re Perens ae eel Mere eee ia Gilet soa T aur n Ceo Reet secs Peete aoc iecuc as at ree kaa Mercado Nee ha ue corn Cee Me RT RC Ceo] EPSC aAVOID SPLASH LOADING Hazards When loading non conductive Flammable liquids, an explosive atmosphere will be created the tank, that can ignite when electrically charged droplets generate a spark. When important © When transFenring Flammable liguids. © When liquids Pall down and Form droplets. Challenges in the Field © Lack of knowledge. © Design issues, eg. on pump or loading dip-pipe. © Communication (ship - shore). ace 32 OPTIONS TO GET IT RIGHT @ Assure that the loading speed Cnt elon vessel is below 1 mi Pee eet plets are only little loaded Crane RN ee ome ees) Cae aa} Ce reer} MMe ae hc Aten ee menor tcl reir eee i Cannas eau a eed eee Cee can b eeree ens aay reenter sa Understand which chemicals Cita ue ea Meo cy Cer isomer ete Rea Meee ec cic} Roce oar) EPSC >AVOID RUN-AWAY REACTION Hazards Bhopal & Seveso incidents occurred aPter an exothermic exponential runaway reaction started. When important © Exothermic batch reactions. © Storage of reactive chemicals. © Unexpected Polymerization or Decomposition. Challenges in the Field © Chemistry at increased temperature can be diferent on unknown to operators. © Cooling can malfunction on might not be able to cope with tthe exponential increase of the reaction rate. OPTIONS TO GET IT RIGHT MU een ea aoa) Ee ial abnormal conditions like Bevery feces sien ata) Peet eee eae ry Dteratave) iene rela teeonieReorais neato aac Cie seem Se eer ers avoid. peony pele have back-up cooling available. falidate inhibitors are Peete tally Deca itera’ like Interlocks, Breaker plats Coes Pane nat fone eee Eee tec EPSC 2Hazards ‘Acceptance of small leakages, near misses or substandard practices. When important When related to SaPety Critical Equipment. Small leakages & Activation of barriers. Challenges in the Field No open learning culture that. stimulates intervention by all on sarety. Production pressure. Bad Follow-up and Feedback on reported items DiFFicult reporting tools OPTIONS TO GET IT RIGHT eee eke Beau n al Cone rae Reel tae ed Pe ean ca) eM eas Gosek uke Clean aete Follow-up on reported items cere Cece Ton) a REE Cec eae eet toe ie} elect Meee et Small leakages. Cel Rega eeu Pee une gh ea ay Coane as is Fires; liquid hammering; vibrations; con ign: like Auto- rears Tete Peecieel eB not in the right position. Pennetta Cases Devt eeao|THANKS TO: This work has been made possible by the efPorts of the Following companies and EPSC work group participants: COMPANY NAME BakerRisk Robert: Magraw BASF Thomas Miller Thomas Wolf Bayer Andreas Seidel Covestro Jorn Buhn| Dow Osvaldo Fuente DuPont Pilar Eira Eni Antonio Mangini SteFano Pellino EPsc Tijs Koerts Linde Marianna KuepFer Liana Marin Lyondellsasell Martin de Zeeuw MOL Group Vojtech Merva Nouryon Johan Rood OMY Petrom Saadallah Harzalli lulian Marin Sabic Marco van Pinxteren Total Dirk Roosendans Vynova Andreas Scholz Disclaimer “The Information provided in this brochure has been collected by EPSC ond is avallable Free of charge. kr Is meant to stimulave dscussion and create awareness on eritical operational and mahcenanee tasks in operations with hazardous mavervals. EPSC can not be hold ldble Por the use of this information by Users and the eventual consequences. © EPSC- march 2021