3 April 2019

UTM – A Common Framework with Core Boundaries

for Global Harmonization
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Definitions

2. Abbreviations

3. Foreword

4. Scope

5. UTM Principles

6. Enabling/Complimentary Activities

7. List of Services

8. Gaps/Issues/Challenges

9. Summary of Conclusions

Appendices - Key Technical Areas

A. Registration, Identification and Tracking

B. Communications Systems

C. Geofencing-like Systems

D. Potential UTM Framework Diagrams

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Definitions

Note: The definitions contained herein are used in the context of this document. Except where
indicated, they have no official status within ICAO. Where a formally recognized ICAO definition is
included herein for convenience, this is noted with an *. Where a term is used differently from a formally
recognized ICAO definition, this is noted with an **.

Aeronautical information service (AIS)* – A service established within the defined area of coverage
responsible for the provision of aeronautical data and aeronautical information necessary for the safety,
regularity and efficiency of air navigation.

Aircraft* – Any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air other
than the reactions of the air against the earth’s surface.

Air traffic control service* – A service provided for the purpose of:

a) preventing collisions:

• between aircraft, and

• on the manoeuvring area between aircraft and obstructions.

b) expediting and maintaining an orderly flow of air traffic.

Air traffic management (ATM)* – The dynamic, integrated management of air traffic and airspace
including air traffic services, airspace management and air traffic flow management – safely,
economically and efficiently – through the provision of facilities and seamless services in collaboration
with all parties and involving airborne and ground-based functions.

Air traffic service* – A generic term meaning variously, flight information service, alerting service, air
traffic advisory service, air traffic control service (area control service, approach control service or
aerodrome control service) (and related services).

C2 Link** – The command and control data link between the remotely piloted aircraft and the remote
pilot station for the purpose of managing the flight.

Detect and avoid* – The capability to see, sense or detect conflicting traffic or other hazards and take
the appropriate action.

Geofence – A virtual 3-dimensional perimeter around a geographic point either fixed or moving,
which can be predefined or dynamically generated, that enables software to trigger a response when a
device approaches the perimeter. (also referred to as geoawareness or geocaging).

Identification** – The situation which exists when the position and identity of an aircraft is known.

Note. – The term aircraft includes unamend aircraft.

Lost C2 Link – The loss of C2 link contact with the unmanned aircraft such that the remote pilot can
no longer manage the aircraft’s flight.
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Operator* – A person, organization or enterprise engaged in or offering to engage in an aircraft

operation.
Note. – In the context of unmanned aircraft, an aircraft operation includes the unmanned aircraft
system.

Prohibited area* – An airspace of defined dimensions, above the land areas or territorial waters of a
State, within which the flight of no aircraft is prohibited.

Remotely piloted aircraft* – An unmanned aircraft which is piloted from a remote pilot station.

Remotely piloted aircraft system* – A remotely piloted aircraft, its associated remote pilot station(s),
the required command and control links and any other components as specified in the type design.

Restricted area* – An airspace of defined dimensions, above the land areas or territorial waters of a
State, within which the flight of no aircraft is restricted in accordance with certain specified conditions.

Segregated airspace* – Airspace of specified dimensions allocated for exclusive use to a specific
user(s).

UAS traffic management (UTM) – A specific aspect of air traffic management which manages
UAS operations safely, economically and efficiently through the provision of facilities and a seamless set
of services in collaboration with all parties and involving airborne and ground-based functions.

UAS traffic management (UTM) system – A system that provides UTM through the collaborative
integration of humans, information, technology, facilities and services, supported by air, ground and/or
space-based communications, navigation and surveillance.

Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) – An unmanned aircraft and its associated elements which are
operated with no pilot on board.

Visual Line-of-Sight (VLOS) operation* – An operation in which the remote pilot or remotely piloted
aircraft (RPA) observer maintains direct unaided visual contact with the remotely piloted aircraft.

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Abbreviations

AGL – Above Ground Level

AIP – Aeronautical Information Publication

AIS – Aeronautical Information Service

ANSP – Air Navigation Service Provider

API – Application Programming Interface

ATC – Air Traffic Control

ATM – Air Traffic Management

BVLOS – Beyond Visual Line-of-Sight

CAA – Civil Aviation Authority

E-ID – Electronic Identification

FIMS – Flight Information Management System

FSS – Fixed Satellite Service

GIS – Geographic Information Systems

GNSS – Global Navigation Satellite System

ICAO – International Civil Aviation Organization

ID – Identification

IFR – Instrument Flight Rules

ITU – International Telecommunication Union

NOTAM – Notice to Airmen

RPA – Remotely Piloted Aircraft

RPAS – Remotely Piloted Aircraft System

UA – Unmanned Aircraft

UAS – Unmanned Aircraft System

UTM – UAS Traffic Management

VFR – Visual Flight Rules

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VLOS – Visual Line-of-Sight

WRC – World Radio Conference

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Foreword

Over the last ten years, technological development in the unmanned aircraft (UA) industry has disrupted
aviation, introducing enhanced capabilities with unprecedented speed. As a result, States and/or regulators
have received an increasing number of applications for access to low-level airspace, where the operation
of manned aircraft are generally limited or restricted. At the current pace, civil unmanned aircraft system
(UAS) operations are expected to surpass the number of manned aircraft operations in the near future. Air
navigation service providers (ANSPs) anticipate that such operations will include those that are fully
contained in either controlled or uncontrolled airspace, and those that transit across their boundaries.

The pace and off-the-shelf emphasis of technological advancement poses a significant challenge to the
timely development of standards. In particular, the lack of stability in aircraft design and equipage as well
as the use of non-traditional aviation-related communications and navigation technologies which renders
any attempt to use traditional methods of certification and operational approval impractical. To meet
demand, States and regulators are encouraged to be innovative in approving such proposals; however, this
leads to a lack of harmonization that may impact safety, security, the environment, system reliability and
economic efficiency.

The UAS traffic management (UTM) concept was first proposed in 2016 by members of State research
organizations and industry to support the real-time or near-real-time organization, coordination, and
management of UA operations, including the potential for multiple beyond visual line-of-sight (BVLOS)
operations.

Through UTM, it is envisaged that civil aviation authorities (CAAs) and ANSPs, to the extent they are
involved, will be able to make real-time information regarding airspace constraints and flight intents
available to UAS operators directly or through a UTM service provider. The UAS operator would then be
responsible for managing their operations safely within these constraints without receiving positive air
traffic control services from the ANSP. The primary means of communication and coordination between
the ANSP(s), UTM services providers, operators and other stakeholders may be through a distributed
network of highly automated systems via application programming interfaces (API), and not between
pilots and air traffic controllers via voice.

Although some UAS are unable to comply with the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Doc
7300), signed at Chicago on 7 December 1944 and amended by the ICAO Assembly, the 39th Session of
the ICAO Assembly requested that ICAO address, as a matter of urgency, the increasing numbers of UA
operating in low-level airspace that may conflict with manned aviation, and develop a global baseline of
provisions and guidance material for the proper harmonization of UAS regulations that remained outside
the international instrument flight rules (IFR) framework. As UTM, while a concept, is already under
development, a common agreement on its framework and principles is essential to ensuring global
harmonization and interoperability. Accordingly, ICAO is supporting States, UAS industry leaders,
academic and aviation professionals, in the development of a common agreement on the framework for
UTM that will remain consistent with the principles of the Convention.

With potentially disparate rules and regulations, lack of guidance material, or limited consensus on best
practices or standards, the Preamble to the Chicago Convention, 1944 remains valid:

“WHEREAS the future development of international civil aviation can greatly help to create and
preserve friendship and understanding among the nations and peoples of the world, yet its abuse
can become a threat to the general security; and WHEREAS it is desirable to avoid friction and to
promote that cooperation between nations and peoples upon which the peace of the world
depends; THEREFORE, the undersigned governments having agreed on certain principles and
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arrangements in order that international civil aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly
manner and that international air transport services may be established on the basis of equality of
opportunity and operated soundly and economically; Have accordingly concluded this
Convention to that end.”

Note. — In this guidance material, the term “unmanned aircraft” or “UA” is intended to refer to
those that will primarily operate within the UTM framework. However, it does not include those UA or
remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) operating within the traditional air traffic management (ATM) system.

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Scope

This document is intended to provide States that are considering the implementation of a UTM system
with a framework and core capabilities of a “typical” UTM system. A common framework is needed to
facilitate harmonization between UTM systems globally and to enable industry, including manufacturers,
service providers and end users to grow safely and efficiently without disrupting the existing manned
aviation system. Specifically, this document may be used by States to develop a UTM system that
provides the following benefits:

• Continued safety of all air traffic, manned and unmanned

• Safety of persons on the ground

• Complex low-level UA operations

• Ongoing support of technological advancements

• Evaluation of security and environmental risks

• Provision for a global, harmonized framework for low-level UTM

This framework is not intended to propose or endorse any specific UTM system design or technical
solutions to the UTM challenge but instead to provide an overarching framework for such a system.
Accordingly, the following sections propose a common set of guiding principles and enabling actions.

Initial assessment parameters include: overall effectiveness, safety and efficiency of the UTM system;
registration and identification systems; communications compatibility between UTM, air traffic control
(ATC) and potentially manned aircraft; detect and avoid (DAA) capabilities; geofencing-like systems
(benefits, constraints, restraints, etc.); interoperability (with other systems and other States); adaptability
of the architecture; infrastructure performance requirements (including reliance on existing
infrastructure); radio spectrum (availability, suitability, security, etc.); and cybersecurity. As with the
technology, this document will be updated as developments occur and system capabilities have been
demonstrated.

Although it is understood that interoperability with certain elements of UTM with ATM and ATC is a
critical aspect, this issue will be addressed in future editions of this framework. There are also several
components of a safe and effective UTM system that may not be addressed in this version of the
framework, such as transitions between UTM and ATM, design and certification standards of the UA and
potentially high-altitude airspace UTM systems; it should be noted however that future editions of this
framework may address these issues, building on the foundation established herein.

For the purposes of this material, UTM is considered a separate, but may be a complementary, system to
the ANSP-supplied ATM system.

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UTM Principles

UTM is envisioned as a subset of ATM intended to manage UAS operations safely, economically and
efficiently through the provision of facilities and a seamless set of services in collaboration with all
parties and involving airborne and ground-based functions. Such a system would provide UTM
through the collaborative integration of humans, information, technology, facilities and services,
supported by air, ground and/or space-based communications, navigation and surveillance.

ATM is a longstanding and well understood system for the safe and efficient management of airspace and
operation of aircraft based on principles of airspace design and cooperative systems between pilots and air
traffic controllers with clear roles and responsibilities. The emerging UAS sector offers many
opportunities, but to be fully integrated, UA will need to coexist with manned aircraft, and the existing
aviation systems, within finite airspace resources. In doing so, safety must be paramount while allowing
both of these sectors to co-operate for mutual gain and to prevent unduly impacting existing airspace
users or capabilities. Additionally, privacy, security, reliability and the environment are also significant
public interests. UAS operations must be seen by the public to be compliant and accountable if routine
operations are to be accepted. Each depends on the harmonization of risk and performance-based
regulations and oversight, including with emerging technological solutions.

UTM systems are therefore envisaged to be interoperable and consistent with existing ATM systems in
order to facilitate safe and efficient operations. Although systems-level requirements for UTM systems
have not yet been developed, core principles can be established that will guide their development. There
are also numerous principles that exist in the current ATM structure that remain applicable when
considering UTM services. The following principles should be considered:

1. Oversight of the service provision, either UTM or ATM, remains the responsibility of the
regulator.
2. Existing policies for aircraft prioritization, such as aircraft emergencies and support to public
safety operations, should remain applicable and practices unique to UTM should be compatible
with these policies.
3. Access to the airspace should remain equitable, provided each aircraft is capable of meeting the
appropriate conditions, regulations, equipage, and processes defined for the specific airspace in
which operations are proposed.
4. The UAS operator should be appropriately qualified to meet the established normal and
contingency operating procedures defined for the specific class of airspace in which operations
are proposed.
5. To meet their security and safety oversight obligations, States should have unrestricted, on-
demand, access to UAS operators and the position, velocity, planned trajectory and performance
capabilities of each UA in the airspace through the UTM system.

Where a State is considering the issuance of an operational approval for a UTM system, there are
numerous factors which should be assessed, to include safety-significant factors such as: types of UA and
their performance characteristics (including navigation capabilities and performance); adequacy and
complexity of the existing airspace structure; nature of the operation; type and density of existing and
anticipated traffic; regulatory structure; environmental considerations; requirement for all UA in the UTM
airspace volume to be cooperative; detection/separation of non-cooperative UA, management of
aeronautical information service (AIS) data as well as geographic information systems (GIS) data
applicable to the UTM airspace; etc.

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Enabling/Complimentary Activities

In addition to the key enablers of registration and identification, communications and geo-awareness/geo-
fencing discussed later in this framework, the safe operation of UAS – and BVLOS operations in
particular – in a UTM system will depend on a range of supportive and enabling capabilities. UTM
systems are envisaged to provide some of these, but they will require enabling policy and regulatory
frameworks including emerging technological solutions. These include, but are not limited to:

• An approach to regulation that is performance and risk-based. This implies that appropriate
standards are put in place. The UTM regulatory framework should be consistent with the rules for
UAS operations and the technical requirements for UAS. Responsibilities of the various actors
should be clearly spelled out. Additionally, the risk-based approach should be supported by
appropriate risk assessment methodologies, for both the operations and the airspace.

• A requirement for the development and/or compliance with standards that address UTM related
data management to ensure the UTM system meets an acceptable level of reliability, redundancy,
fault alerting/monitoring and a guaranteed quality of service.

• The UTM system should be able to accommodate UAS with varied capabilities, performance and
operational requirements, based on assessment for the need of UTM, which could include a
variety of systems from remotely piloted UA, to fully automated UA and potentially for aircraft
intended for urban mobility.

• CAAs optimize the use of common and shared airspace and radio-frequency spectrum.

• CAAs or regional safety oversight organizations invoke, where required, appropriate assurance
standards (e.g. cyber security, software assurance level, etc.)

• CAAs or regional safety oversight organizations prescribe and promote, where required,
appropriate education, guidance and usage standards for UAS operators and UTM service
providers.

• Consistency should be emphasized between national and international developments and

deployments of UTM systems, in order to ensure interoperability and harmonization. For
instance, depending on the type and location of UTM operation, a system might allow operators
to submit information about a proposed flight, for it to be assessed based on existing traffic
demands and airspace restrictions prior to an approval or rejection being given.

• When AIS and/or GIS data is utilized in a UTM system, such information must be trusted,
accurate and timely.

• The UTM system and the UA operated within the system should utilize common horizontal,
vertical and temporal reference sources compatible with the accuracy and tolerances needed for
UA navigation through the airspace.
Note. As it is anticipated that UTM and ATM systems will at some point coincide or overlap, the
common reference sources used for UTM will need to be compatible with those used in ATM
systems.
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The evolution of the UTM architecture should meet the UAS community demand, while maintaining
emphasis on the criticality of safety for all airspace users (manned and unmanned) and third parties on the
ground, by enabling the timely introduction of the appropriate traffic density management capability to fit
planned operations. Such an architecture would likely be predicated on the interaction and integration of
these operations through information exchange processes avoiding direct communication with ATC,
except when specifically required.

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List of Services

The UTM architecture could be considered as a collection of services, among other features, intended to
ensure safe and efficient operations of UA within the UTM-authorized volume of airspace and in
compliance with regulatory requirements. UAS operations may occur in uncontrolled and controlled
airspace, with each type of airspace potentially requiring specific services. When UAS operations occur in
controlled airspace, UAS operators would be required to follow the procedures and requirements for the
airspace, unless an exemption or alternate procedures have been established relieving those operating in
the UTM system from the established airspace rules.

While this document does not specify technologies associated with these services, it intends to provide
suggested types of services. These services will be based on what is required in a given geographic
volume of airspace and on the risk of operations and level of resiliency needed. Operational concepts
have shown that these services may be provided by third-party suppliers, ANSPs, or State organizations.
As applicable to UAS operations in a UTM environment, these services may include, but are not limited
to:

• Activity Reporting Service – A service which provides on-demand, periodic, or event driven
information on UTM operations occurring within the subscribed airspace volume and time (e.g.
density reports, intent information, status and monitoring information, etc.). Additional filtering
may be performed as part of the service.

• Aeronautical Information Service – A service which provides for the flow of aeronautical
information/data necessary for safety, efficiency, economy and regularity of, in this case, UAS
operations.

• Airspace Authorization Service – A service which provides airspace authorization from the
Airspace Authority or ANSP to a UAS operator.

• Discovery Service – A service which provides users of the UTM system with information on
relevant services of varying levels of capability in a specific geographical volume of airspace
(e.g. suppliers of meteorological information).

• Mapping Service – A service which provides terrain and/or obstacle data (e.g. GIS) appropriate
and necessary to meet the safety and mission needs of individual UAS operations or to support
UTM system needs for provision of separation or flight planning services.

• Registration Service – A service which provides the ability for UAS operators to register their
UA including the provision of any required data related to their UAS. The system should also
provide a query function which permits authorized stakeholders (e.g. regulator, police services,
etc.) to request registration data. See Appendix A for additional information.

• Restriction Management Service - A service which manages and disseminates directives (e.g.
safety bulletins), operational and airspace restrictions from the CAA or ANSP to UAS operators,
including in the form of Notices to Airmen (NOTAM).

• Flight Planning Service – A service which, prior to flight, arranges and optimizes intended
operational volumes, routes and trajectories for safety, dynamic airspace management, airspace
restrictions, and mission needs. Note – this is not intended to refer to the existing manned aircraft
flight planning services.

• Separation Service
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a. Strategic Deconfliction Service – A service which arranges, negotiates, and prioritizes

intended operational volumes, routes or trajectories of UAS operations with the intention
of minimizing the likelihood of airborne conflicts between operations.

b. Tactical Separation with Manned Aircraft Service – A service that provides real-time
situational awareness information about manned aircraft so that UA operators remain
well clear of manned aircraft.

c. Conflict Advisory and Alert Service – A service which provides real-time alerting
through suggestive or directive information to UAS operators, of UA proximity to other
airspace users (manned and/or unmanned).

d. Conformance Monitoring Service – A service which provides real-time monitoring and

alerting of non-conformance to intended operational volumes, routes or trajectories for a
UAS operator.

e. Dynamic Reroute Service – A real-time service which provides modifications to intended

operational volumes, routes or trajectories to minimize the likelihood of airborne
conflicts and maximize the likelihood of conforming to airspace restrictions while
permitting completion of the planned flight. This service would arrange, negotiate, and
prioritize inflight operational volumes, routes, or trajectories of UA operations while the
UA is airborne.

• Tracking and Location Service – A service that provides information to the UAS operator and the
UTM system about the exact location of UA, in real time. See Appendix A for additional
information.

• Weather Services – A service which provides forecast and/or real-time meteorological

information to support operational decisions of individual UAS operators and/or services.

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Gaps/Issues/Challenges

ANSPs anticipate that UAS operations will encompass everything from those that are fully contained in
uncontrolled airspace, to those that require transit across the boundary between controlled and
uncontrolled airspace, and finally to those that originate and operate within controlled airspace. The safe
and efficient integration of UAS, particularly small UA, into existing controlled and uncontrolled airspace
presents a variety of issues and novel challenges. Recent studies forecast significant growth of UAS
operations, leading to a shift of focus to operations in the low-level environment and over populated
areas, with various types of operations and UA. This will likely include:

• Operations at altitudes in the very low-level structure (e.g. below 150 meters or 500 feet above
ground level (AGL)).

• Systems with high levels of automation and connectivity.

• Greater numbers of operations that raise questions about the sustainability and the scalability of a
UTM system and the ability of ATM infrastructure to accommodate these new users.

• Flights not conducted in accordance with IFR or visual flight rules (VFR) with the potential of
establishing UAS specific flight rules.

• Reliance on data links (either non-traditional ground-based links, in air C2 links or data links with
UTM systems) raising new challenges linked to spectrum, resilience and cybersecurity.

Gaps

This section includes a short description of the gaps that must be addressed to enable safe UAS operations
within the UTM system.
• Airspace classification – The current airspace classification scheme as developed for manned
aviation may not effectively support visual line-of-sight (VLOS) or BVLOS operations. This gap
encompasses the potential modification of current classes of airspace to include new flight rules
applicable to UAS flying VLOS and BVLOS or potentially creating new classes of airspaces to
accommodate the range of needs brought by the UAS operations.

• Airspace Access - The policies, rules and priorities required to support equitable access to
airspace (e.g. European Union is investigating “Fair access to airspace” policies) must be
developed.

• ICAO Annex 2 Rules of the Air - the rules of the air specify right-of-way, altitude above people
and obstructions, distance from obstacles and types of flight rules all of which, as written, are
incompatible with the intended operations within UTM systems.

• Operational Procedures - UTM system specific procedures, to include normal, emergency and
contingency scenarios are needed.

• Liability - Liability and insurance implications for UTM service providers in relation to UAS
operators must be determined.
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• Certification – Certification of the UTM system, particularly when interacting with an ATM
system, and, for UA, meeting the principles of airworthiness, scaled to an appropriate level based
on risk(s).

• Data Standards - Appropriate standards for data required to support UTM service safety related
services, including security and cyber-security are needed.

• Positional References - Common altitude, navigation and temporal references for manned and
unmanned operations are needed. There are gaps in the use of reference points and of equipment
providing different levels of accuracy and performance for the measurement of the altitude,
navigation or time.

• Interface between UTM and ATM - There is a need to develop procedures and adequate tools to
ensure the sharing of information and the interoperability of the two (2) systems as well as to
identify roles, responsibilities and limitations.

• Data Recording - Data recording policies and capabilities, similar to ATC data retention, to
support incident/accident investigative requirements, are needed.

• Communications - Remote pilot interfaces and/or communications capabilities with the UTM
system must be developed. This includes the ability to interface/communicate with ATC and
pilots of manned aircraft.

• Alerting Systems - Safety and integrity of the UTM system, failure alerting and failure
management must be addressed. Policies, guidance and procedures will need to be developed to
address the degradation or failure of the various UTM components and/or the entire UTM system.

Issues

The issue of modification, adaptation or applicability of requirements for airspace and procedure design
when considering issues such as navigation performance, has yet to be addressed.

To ensure system reliability and safety, spectrum availability and supportability need to be determined,
based on the UTM system architecture.

The establishment of a UTM service within a volume of airspace may affect the classification of that
airspace (e.g. changes from Class G to D).

ATM and UTM interface, to include responsibilities and procedural development, must be addressed to
ensure compatibility between manned and unmanned operations.

Challenges

Aircraft participating in the UTM system need to be separated from each other and from other hazards
(e.g. buildings, weather, etc.). This separation management would include guidance and responsibilities
complemented by other tools and procedures to properly address scalability. To support separation
management, additional standards, policies, capabilities or tools may be required, such as:
• A DAA capability to identify/detect and avoid conflicting aircraft and any other hazards (e.g.
buildings, weather, etc.).
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• Methodologies to allow improved/enhanced detectability and conspicuity of UA, by manned

aviation.

• Assignment of responsibility for separation provision, particularly in low-level airspace, which

may include unique solutions such as separation provision being delegated to the UA or the UTM
system.

• Development of UA separation standards within the UTM system, which may include the need
for safety margins based on issues such as airspeed, weight, UA equipment, etc.

• Determination of relevant surveillance capability for the UTM system to support integration of
new or novel aircraft and operations.

• Development of policies to address means of compliance or system approval for UTM systems.

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Summary of Conclusions

As discussed in the Objectives portion of this document, UTM, as a concept or capability, is still under
development. ICAO continues its tasking as a global aviation forum, to support States, UAS industry
leaders, academic and aviation professionals, exploring the current state-of-the-art for UTM and using
that information to develop the framework and core principles of UTM.

This framework is not intended to endorse or propose any specific UTM system design or technical
solutions to the UTM challenge but instead to provide an overarching framework for such a system. The
intent is for this to be a living document, and as new or additional information is gained, the UTM
framework will be updated.

The developmental nature of UTM makes it difficult to predict how a follow-on framework would be
organized, validated, and certificated. More participation from industry and/or future business advocates
will be necessary to explore the minimal set of safety issues in product deployment/development that will
have the potential to achieve global interoperability.

Three (3) Appendices are included as part of this framework document which synthesize the information
gathered from the submissions to ICAO’s Request for Information and the material provided during
DRONE ENABLE 1.

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KEY TECHNICAL AREAS

APPENDIX A

REGISTRATION, IDENTIFICATION AND TRACKING

Presentation Review

Registration, identification and tracking are separate features that provide specific capabilities for quite
different purposes.

Registration provides for the ability to identify an individual aircraft and the State in which it is
registered. The registration consists of a unique alphanumeric system affixed to the aircraft. Ownership
details can be obtained through the State which has registered the aircraft.

It is also possible to identify individual aircraft from one or more other unique ‘signatures’, e.g. encoded
information transmitted via radio or digitally. Hence, identification is the feature that can be made via
registration (usually visually) but can also be achieved using a wide range of other techniques, many of
which can make use of technology to facilitate this at distance.

Tracking may therefore be considered as the ability to locate and trace individual aircraft through the
airspace over time. In order to do this, specific unique information is needed to identify the particular
aircraft along with techniques to determine its location. These location aspects can be independent of the
aircraft (e.g. surveillance systems).

In the context of UAS and UTM, at a minimum, it is necessary to be able to identify and track each
aircraft in order to assure safety and the efficient management of the airspace. The registration details
provide the CAA of the State in which the operation is occurring to identify; nationality of the aircraft, the
operator and what person or machine is controlling it. Registration may also assist non-aviation related
agencies concerned with issues such as security, law enforcement, privacy, etc.

It will therefore be necessary to determine and harmonize common national, regional or international
approaches that will define and assign suitable unique registration identities for all UA that will
potentially operate in the UTM system. These will need to be structured and formatted to address visual
markings wherever practical, and technical solutions that will support the UTM systems as these evolve.
It is envisaged that, in a cooperative communications based UTM framework, greater use of electronically
defined/transmitted identification techniques will be necessary along with a range of tools to decode and
share this information, whilst respecting the need for security and personal data protections.

During DRONE ENABLE 1, there were several very focused views from organizations, with specific
attention on their product offerings. Most focused on the methods of sharing identification data using
available technology/standards and/or proprietary systems so as to aid use, acceptability and/or
enforcement. Secondary elements considered the use of current security/cyber aspects but did not address
safety implications related to system failures or security compromises.

Overall, ICAO received limited information on solutions to address the systemic topics and how to do this
in an open and interoperable manner.

The ICAO UAS Advisory Group used the knowledge/input from the presentations and DRONE
ENABLE 1 RFI submissions to develop the information provided below.
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Registration

Registration proposals varied from simple identification of the aircraft and pilot/operator alone, to having
systems that registered everything about the aircraft, the UA control station, the operator, the pilot,
certificates, and any pre-approved flight authorizations. The overarching needs that drove these proposals
were the need for accountability and enforcement, which have a direct impact on safety and security.
With the anonymous nature (no one on board and operator not clearly visible) of UAS operations, this
issue has become critical and could warrant an international minimum standard similar to manned
aviation. States would determine who has local access to the registration information and how that
information is safeguarded. This registration system may be an integral part of the UTM system or simply
a plugin module with the CAA holding the registration system.

Identification (ID)/Electronic ID (E-ID)

Similar to the registration proposals, the ID /E-ID had similar large variations of the proposed solutions
with regards to the needed information. A common element identified was a requirement for the
transmission of the UA ID and the UA control station location to provide for the rapid identification of a
specific UAS. This was primarily for the direct functioning of the UTM system and additionally for the
safety, security and accountability with regards to the integration of UAS within the existing aviation
community. Without this capability, it will be difficult, at best, to garner public acceptance of routine
UAS operations. Again, a minimum international standard was recommended with States developing
local variations. Additionally, there were many technical and procedural issues identified that, depending
on the system architecture, may need to be addressed at both the international and State levels. These
include but are not limited to:

• Cyber/security
• Communications/spectrum availability
• Cost/financing
• Compatibility vs interoperability
• Real time use/updates
• Required performance standards

Tracking

Regarding the tracking proposals, it was evident from the presentations and submissions that for a UTM
system to function on a basic level, it would need to be able to track all UA, participating or not, using a
minimum of 4D geospatial data. This again was required for safety, security and accountability within the
UTM and aviation systems. The secondary need addressed the collection of data to aid in airspace design
and management. The ability to track UA within the UTM system is considered a critical service that has
implications for system reliability, resilience and redundancy at the manufacturing and operational levels.
Other considerations such as system accuracy, real-time, delay-refresh rates, flight data records and
storage/access of data were all items that would need to be resolved for a UTM system to function
effectively. The last remaining issue that was identified related to “ghost operations”, which would entail
UA that needed to be managed by the UTM system while masking the identification and position (e.g.
police operations).

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KEY TECHNICAL AREAS

APPENDIX B

COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

Presentation Review

Integration of UAS operations into controlled and uncontrolled airspace presents a variety of issues and
novel challenges for the information systems.

The primary means of information dissemination and coordination between those entities providing UTM
services may be through a distributed network of highly automated systems via API.

The same architecture may also support multiple service providers, if operational volume and complexity
require. A common protocol must be established in order to ensure that information systems are safe,
secure, reliable and interoperable, whilst adhering to a performance-based regulatory framework.

UTM system information protocols and interfaces will play a key role in ensuring that the system will
enable the safe integration of UAS into shared airspace. Development of minimum performance and
interoperability standards for the communication protocols should be taken into consideration including
where relevant those for:

• C2 Link between the UA control station and UA

• Aircraft-to-aircraft communications between UA
• Communications link between UA and other airspace users (e.g. manned aircraft), as necessary
• Communications between remote pilot and the respective UTM/ATM systems

Communication Solutions

Given the rapid advancement of technology, there will be a variety of possible technological solutions
that could support a framework for communications systems. As work progresses, different concepts of
UAS communications service provision through entities such as ANSP, governmental organizations and
private third-party suppliers will evolve, similar to those being utilized for ATM systems. They could
play a key role in centralizing all communications between UAS and stakeholders (ATC, law
enforcement etc.), as well as assisting with strategic de-confliction, situational awareness, flight
planning/authorization of UAS operations in the respective airspaces, and collaboration between UAS
operators and flight information management systems (FIMS).

With the introduction of future UTM, it is envisaged that a key emphasis will be placed on aircraft-to-
aircraft operations. Direct aircraft-to-aircraft communications allow UAS operators or remote pilots to
communicate their flight plan and other relevant information with each other. Various technologies
including Dedicated Short-Range Communications 1 (DSRC) developed for the automobile industry are
being considered to support those aircraft-to-aircraft operations.

1
DSRC is a two-way, short-to-medium-range wireless communications capability that permits very high data transmission for
vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure automobile communications in the intelligent transportation system (ITS) -
https://www.its.dot.gov/factsheets/dsrc_factsheet.htm
 -21-

Spectrum Requirements

The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) plays a decisive role in allocating protected spectrum
for UAS operations, which may be a necessity for enabling safety-critical functions. A loss or
compromise of the communications link between remote pilots and aircraft could result in serious safety-
related consequences. As an example, the C2 link between the UA and the UA control station is required
for the safe operations of UA under VLOS and BVLOS conditions.

A number of frequency bands in the fixed satellite service (FSS) are being considered for the provision of
the C2 Link for UAS, albeit with specific conditions pertaining to the governance and usage of those
bands imposed by the ITU and ICAO. This might be an option to consider for some UTM operations.

Standards for communications systems will need to consider the relevant safety implications due to ‘lost
C2 Link’ events, as well as metrics pertaining to data transmission latency, integrity, availability and
redundancy.

The anticipated operational needs for spectrum usage revolve around four main elements:
• Aircraft-to-aircraft communications between UA
• Communications between UA/UAS operators, remote pilots and the respective UTM/ATM
systems
• Communications for C2 Link
• Communications for application of DAA

In this regard, spectrum sharing will be especially vital for urban areas where operations will be
significantly more congested as compared to rural/remote areas. As an example, the current required
spectrum capacity for remotely piloted aircraft system (RPAS) as defined by ITU designations at World
Radio Conference (WRC)-12 were:
• 34 MHz for terrestrial systems,
• 56 MHz for satellite systems.
There are concerns on frequency availability and suitability, as well as challenges relating to protection of
airspace and space-ground frequencies that will need to be addressed and closely coordinated with the
ITU.

Cyber Security

There are significant cyber security risks and vulnerabilities that need to be taken into consideration. A
robust security framework must be established to address potentially malicious attacks to communications
systems ranging from C2 Link disruptions, Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)
jamming/spoofing attacks and even manipulation of information exchanged between UAS and between
UAS and UTM systems which result in erroneous advisories, unwanted changes in flight path and
increased risk of collision.

Additional Considerations

The DRONE ENABLE presentations and submissions provided some indications of the type of
communications technology that might support a UTM system as well as some of the questions that
would need to be answered before deciding on the way forward. Subject to validating that the required
performance and security requirements can be met, technologies such as LTE, 3GPP or a combination of
terrestrial and satellite-based communications were mentioned. To select any of these technologies,
questions regarding suitability for urban or rural areas, sufficient bandwidth or capacity availability,
spectrum availability or resilience to interference will need to be addressed.
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KEY TECHNICAL AREAS

APPENDIX C

GEOFENCING-LIKE SYSTEMS

Presentation Review

States may wish to restrict the operation of UA in certain areas due to many and varied reasons. These
reasons include but are not limited to: sensitive or safety critical infrastructure; military activity; accident
and law enforcement activities; public and social gatherings; aircraft landing areas; and VIP protection.

When imposed by State or local governments, these areas may be published by States or ANSPs in
Aeronautical Information Publications (AIPs), dedicated websites, various mobile applications or
activated by NOTAM. The data related to these areas must be valid/accurate and issued by a
competent/approved agency which is clearly identified. This data may be of a different nature than
existing aeronautical information, however there will be a need to harmonize it with applicable
aeronautical information standards. Additionally, issues such as the shape of the specific areas may
require standardization due to impacts on the embedded system’s performance.

A geofencing function includes an airborne piece of equipment (hardware and/or software) that can be
found on some small UA today; however no associated performance requirements/standards currently
exist for the development or approval of such systems at all times.

It is envisioned that a geofencing/geoawareness-like system will either prevent UA from entering airspace
in which they are not permitted to operate or, alternatively, they may be used to prevent a UA from
leaving a specific area. The system would likely have to be associated with an approved “service” that
provides accurate information on airspace availability/restrictions, providing benefits in terms of safety
and security, and enabling reduced requirements concerning competencies of those operating the UAS.
However, consideration must also be given to potential unintended consequences of UA being prevented
from entering airspace when there may be a requirement to do so in order to prevent a mid-air collision or
other safety of flight related reason.

Draft UTM concepts include two components of geofencing functions:

• Static: when the data provided to support the geofencing/geoawareness function relies on
published stable data (AIP, list of restricted airspace); and

• Dynamic: when the restricted areas are temporary and may be issued with little or no notice (e.g.
emergency scene, public event). There should be the capability to permit accredited authorities to
create temporary restricted areas on short notice, for example, to protect an area of public safety
concern. In such a situation, there would need to be a capability that transmits these restrictions to
UA already in flight.

As currently exists with manned aviation, a common set of standards/processes for airspace restrictions
should be developed to address: how to integrate temporary restrictions; approval of accredited
authorities; common requirements for who can establish and/or validate such areas; and the conditions
under which these areas may be established. Processes or policies should also be established to avoid
having too many restricted areas that could create congestion or safety issues for manned aircraft or UA
in flight.
 -23-

A geofencing capability is envisaged as a service providing the data (static and dynamic) and information
on UA position required to alert the remote pilot when the UA is approaching or crossing a geofenced
area or to allow the UA to avoid and/or deny access into prohibited areas. A geofencing/geoawareness
system could include different layers or buffer zones around the geofenced area that would trigger
different types of alerts (e.g. inner, intermediate and outer).

Some considerations for geofencing/geoawareness functions include:

• Data integrity – AIS and GIS data and information must be valid, current and supplied by a
recognized/accredited source.

• Accuracy of the UA position – the positional information must be accurate enough to ensure the
UA does not enter the geofenced area (could be coupled with the use of buffer zones). The
current GNSS positioning technology may not provide a sufficient level of accuracy, reliability
or redundancy, particularly in limited reception areas such as urban canyons. The UAS operator
or remote pilot may be required to validate the UA position accuracy prior to flight operations.

• Assessment of whether the UA is about to enter, or has entered, a geofenced area and alert the
remote pilot and/or alert the UA which may be able to react automatically.

Geofencing might need to be removed for some operations in some areas (e.g. UA authorized to operate
at airports, UA performing inspections in a power plant, UA used by public safety agencies, etc.). A
geofencing service provided in UTM could deal with a certain number of these exceptions in an
automated way, facilitating the authorization process for specific UAS operators.

Other considerations that were raised regarding geofencing include:

• Contingencies: how to mitigate fly-aways, lost C2 Link, UA emergency recoveries, etc.

• Geofencing should not replace the need for sufficient knowledge, on the part of the remote pilot,
of airspace structure, airspace constraints and regulations.

• Methods to address or enforce intentional non-compliance with geofencing must be developed.

• Prior to deciding if geofencing/geoawareness should be compulsory equipment for a UTM

system, other factors should be assessed:

a. Availability of alternative methods of ensuring UA do not violate airspace boundaries,

such as: active monitoring of UA flight trajectories, accurate navigation equipment
performance and properly trained remote pilots.
b. Establishment of performance requirements for UA operating within the UTM system to
address issues such as navigation, position and use of common altitude references.
c. Availability and quality of airspace data within UTM systems, particularly across States.

• It was recognized that geofencing could provide risk mitigation for the lack of situational
awareness and airspace appreciation often found with recreational users of these aircraft, and as
such, geofencing could be a separate requirement outside of a UTM system.

Even if geofencing/geoawareness may not be considered a mandatory requirement for a UTM system, it
may provide some mitigation measures and could be used by UAS operators/remote pilots operating in
 -24-

areas where they are not familiar with the airspace (i.e. in a foreign country). As such, it was identified
during DRONE ENABLE 1 that international standards would likely be needed to address the following
issues:

• AIS and GIS data that could be uploaded in a given State (e.g. ATM related formats such as
AIXM5 could be utilized).

• Data exchange protocols for provision of dynamic information on real-time airspace availability
or airspace restrictions should be established.

• Process and procedures must be established to provide special authorizations for approved UAS
operators (or UA) to override geofencing restrictions and enter specific geofenced areas.

• Anticipated behaviors of a UA when approaching a geofenced area (e.g. land, hover, wait for
remote pilot instructions, return to home, circumnavigate, etc.) must be identified and system
responses developed.

• UA actions under contingency operations (e.g. lost C2 Link, fly-aways, emergencies, etc.) and
system responses developed.

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APPENDIX D

POTENTIAL UTM ARCHITECTURES

The following are examples of two potential UTM architectures; however, it should be noted the UTM
architecture it not fixed and may differ from what is shown below.
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— END —