Cyberactivism and Protest Movements The February 20th Movement The Forming of A New Generation in Morocco

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The Journal of North African Studies

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fnas20

Cyberactivism and protest movements: the


February 20th movement – the forming of a new
generation in Morocco

Nour-Eddine Laouni

To cite this article: Nour-Eddine Laouni (2022) Cyberactivism and protest movements: the
February 20th movement – the forming of a new generation in Morocco, The Journal of North
African Studies, 27:2, 296-325, DOI: 10.1080/13629387.2020.1810024

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2020.1810024

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https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fnas20
THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES
2022, VOL. 27, NO. 2, 296–325
https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2020.1810024

Cyberactivism and protest movements: the February


20th movement – the forming of a new generation in
Morocco
Nour-Eddine Laouni
Regional Training Center for The Professions of Education and Training, CRMEF, Meknes,
Morocco

ABSTRACT
The digital revolution has drastically transformed the conventional system of
political representation, participation and communication, bringing accordingly
many cultural changes in the public sphere where collective action is built and
new identity aspects are constructed. This article attempts to make sense of the
February 20th movement youth activists’ actions, understand their dynamics,
analyse their mobilisation process, examine their paradoxes and highlight their
promises from a social and political outlook. Youth activists in this movement
used the internet as a tool to strategise, organise and mobilise supporters across
the country to take the streets to demand for the democratisation of political
institutions, lifting the veil on the dysfunctional and seriously out of touch
political parties, more freedom of expression, more limits on the royal power
and an end to corruption, nepotism and favouritism. To address this concern, a
quantitative opinion survey was addressed to 100 activists in the February 20th
movement in 2011 in three major cities in Morocco: Rabat, Casablanca and
Meknes. The results obtained were significant with regard to gender
participation in the movement, level of education, political affiliation and the use
and manipulation of the Internet for political activism. Similarly, the manuscript
shows that activists in the February 20th Movement have managed to transform
the Moroccan society and changed the meaning of political participation and
social debate in Morocco, altering, thus, Morocco’s protest culture.

KEYWORDS Cyberactivism; social movements; public sphere; youth; the February 20th movement;
political change

Introduction
Youth political activism is not a new phenomenon. It has been challenging
forcefully the political systems of many countries in the Middle East and
North Africa over the last decade because youth in these places were often
presented as a synonym for the marginalised, the mistreated and repressed
part of society most suffering from authoritarian rules in authoritarian
regimes. However, with the spread and dissemination of technology, the

CONTACT Nour-Eddine Laouni [email protected]


© 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES 297

emergence of online protest, and the apparition of social movements pro-


vided greater implications on collective action, new identities and social
and political changes undertaken by cyberactivistic practices in the public
sphere (Della Porta 2009, 2013).
The generation of Moroccan youth who grew into political consciousness
in the early twenty-first century grew up in difficult political circumstances
characterised by highly restrictive political environment where the authoritar-
ian apparatus pervaded all facets of sociopolitical and economic life and
where human rights abuses were common and widely spread. In addition,
there was little tolerance for a democratic political participation, especially
with the dominance of a number of political dinosaurs as heads of major
archaic political parties. As a consequence, opportunities for participation in
formal politics were limited and freedom of expression was highly controlled
and restricted. Moreover, being founded on a tradition of patriarchal and
tribal obedience, Moroccan youth have always been forced to keep silent
and listen to the elders who have more experience. This attitude prevents
them from voicing their opinions or becoming part of a political elite or domi-
nant political parties. As a consequence, the level of participation of youth in
formal politics and decision-making is excessively low, hence Moroccan youth
are in constant search of new ways and forms of political involvement and
participation.
Faced with this situation, and feeling marginalised by economic downturns
and brutalised by repressive dictatorships, interest in and concern with free
open spaces in the virtual world become predominant. Moroccan youth occu-
pied new spaces outside the formally controlled sphere where they expressed
their views, opinions and positions freely and where they were framed as
impulsive revolutionaries inevitably bound to shake their societies. They par-
ticipated, hence, in long marches, organised sit-ins, post and shared their
ideas on blogs and Facebook pages. These acts and performances are impor-
tant to study, especially that policies and studies of youth in Morocco have
reduced this category of population to emotional and demographic stereo-
types. They have not paid attention to their worries, concerns and percep-
tions, particularly the way they perceive change, freedom, democracy,
dignity and social justice, a thing that led to many protests and demon-
strations in major cities of Morocco. According to a study by the sociologist
Abderrahmane Rachik (2014), Morocco witnessed many protest actions
between 2005 and 2012 because of the critical socio-economic situation of
youth, especially those graduated from different schools and universities
and couldn’t find a job. According to Kalpakian (2013), Morocco’s unemploy-
ment plight ‘ increaded with the level of education’. There is ‘one in eight uni-
versity graduates is unemployed which is difficult for a country where the
number of illiterate people exceeds forty percent of the population’ (Kalpa-
kian 2013). The number of protest actions rose from 700 in 2005, an
298 N.-E. LAOUNI

average of two sit-ins per day, to 5091 in 2008, 6438 in 2009 and to 8600 in
2010. With the Benkirane government, the number of protest actions has mul-
tiplied by 26 compared to 2005. In 2012, 17,000 protest actions took place, an
average of 52 actions per day.
According to Asef Bayat (2018), when talking about youth politics or youth
activism, we do not refer to youth involvement and participation in politics
only. Rather, we are talking about youthfulness as a lived experience that
intersects with other identities such as class, gender, occupation and tribe
to produce new ideas, actions and strategies to change the status quo.
Seen from this perspective, being young is being full of dynamism and posi-
tive change to attack perceived structures of injustice and oppression, ques-
tion the authority of older power-holders in different ways and deploy
particular strategies and incisive language that make sense only in their
context. They are all young, but hardly identical.
Who are really those youth who led ‘pressure from below’ to ask for policy
change, institutional reform and more transparency and accountability in gov-
ernment? How did they manage to prompt wide-ranging dialogue across the
country and urge the head of the state to call for a revision and reform of the
constitution in 2011? Does the Internet support or hinder youth movements
and online political activism? By addressing such questions, this article
attempts to explore the nature of youth activism in Morocco that brought
pressure to bear on the government for accountability and openness and
ask for more democracy, dignity, social justice and transparency.

Purpose of the study


The purpose of this study is to explain the possible existing relationship
between the use of the Internet for political activism and change in
Morocco by exploring the February 20th youth activists movement who
used the Internet for self -organization and mobilization to overthrow the
status-quo in a dominating and authoritarian regime. In a similar fashion,
this article sought to explain how the Internet supported youth participation
in social movements and online political activism in Morocco to establish laws
and set mechanisms and institutions that guarantees individuals’ social, econ-
omic and political rights, based on dignity, freedom, equity and social justice.
In other words, the purpose of this article was to find out if online activism
through the use of the Internet by Moroccan youth contributed to an increase
in political participation, political change and the democratisation of social
and political institutions. It attempted to investigate any relationship existing
between the use of the Internet and activism by exploring the essential factors
that lead to successful mobilisation and protest to create social and political
change in the country. The study hence strived to answer four research ques-
tions and test four corresponding hypotheses that were developed to guide
THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES 299

the study and provide a framework for examining results based on the pre-
dicted relationships among variables.

(1) What relationship exists between gender and the use of the Internet for
online political activism?
(2) What are the dominant age groups and political affiliations of youth in the
20th February Movement?
(3) To what extent does the Internet support or hinder youth participation in
social movements and political activism?
(4) What relationship exists between online and offline participation in social
movements?

Importance and contribution of the study


The existence of any relationship between the use of the Internet and political
activism could be useful for understanding activism and political change in
Morocco for several reasons. First, the majority of empirical studies on Moroc-
can youth focused on youth political attitudes, behaviours and perceptions of
the institutional framework. The present study looked at online activism
through the use of the Internet and the participation in political change
and the democratisation of social and political institutions. Second, many
studies on youth political participation revealed the low participation of Mor-
occan youth in political parties and trade unions (Bennani-Chraı ̈bi 1994). The
present study explained the disenchantment of youth with real participation
and talked, alternatively, about alternative modes of youth engagement,
agency and their transformative impact on the Moroccan society.
The contributions of the present study could be of some importance to pol-
itical and civic leaders in Morocco by providing them with objective infor-
mation on Moroccan youth overarching concerns, attitudes, worries and
overall characteristics that may help in profiling and setting up a strong iden-
tity through the use of the Internet, which according to the majority of the
democracy theorists like Habermas (1991) is a ‘functioning public sphere’
that allows the development of a public opinion through freedom of move-
ment, information and the confrontation of ideas between citizens. Similarly,
the present study goes beyond the sphere of communication studies to reach
other disciplines mainly political science, sociology and cultural studies. The
study hence provides valuable insight into Morocco’s new protest culture
and offers a frame of reference on how young Moroccans used digital technol-
ogy to help organise, strategise and expand their demands for change during
and before the 2011 uprisings to express discontent and exercise their citizen-
ship rights in innovative and creative ways to negotiate public space. Accord-
ing to Davison (2015), the Internet and social media played important roles in
300 N.-E. LAOUNI

many countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region by ‘mobi-
lizing people, giving them a space to express their dissatisfaction, to increase
solidarity around a common cause and to organize themselves’.

Literature review, theoretical frameworks and hypotheses


development
The impact of the Internet on politics and political participation has been a
debated issue in recent years. Some see it a real power that can alter and
shrivel a whole society and a real potential remedy for the decline in political
participation that had been noticed in so many places of the world. Others,
however, have grown increasingly skeptical about the positive impact of
the Internet on civic mobilisation and see that the Internet helps little in mobi-
lising citizens, and thus its role in political activism is very limited (Scheufele
and Nisbet 2002).
The act of utilising communication technologies as part of a strategy
used by activists to spread their message to a large audience, recruit
new individuals into their camps and galvanise individuals around a
specific cause or set of issues in an attempt to construct solidarity
towards meaningful collective action is what has become known and
referred to as cyberactivism. It is the act of bringing protests online or shift-
ing politics to an online environment where Internet communication tools
such as e-mails, blogs, forums and podcasts are used widely for a variety of
causes to enable faster communication. In this regard, cyberactivism can be
regarded as the integrated use of the Internet and networked digital tech-
nologies to further a cause. According to Howard (2011), cyberactivism is
‘the act of using the Internet to advance a political cause that is difficult
to advance offline’. Langman and his collaborators claim that cyberactivism
is ‘the extensive use of the Internet to provide counter hegemonic infor-
mation and inspire social mobilization’ (Langman 2005). Cyberactivism in
this sense is a purely sociopolitical activism assisted by and based on the
use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and the utilis-
ation of the Internet with all its varied spaces and communication tools
to demolish the hegemony and dominance of traditional political systems
and parties (Sierra-Caballero 2018).
According to Sandor Vegh (2003) who has created useful categories to
understand cyberactivism, there exist three general and progressive areas
as types of Internet activism: awareness/advocacy; organisation/mobilisation
and action/reaction.
Public awareness within the context of this study is only one element in a
wider continuum of a communication process that includes in addition to
awareness, advocacy, social mobilisation and programmed communication
(McKee 1992). Equally important, the creation of awareness in the public
THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES 301

sphere is based mainly on accessing information that is relevant to the cause


and serves to trigger people’s curiosity to know more information. Advocacy,
on the other hand, consists of the organisation of information into an argu-
ment to be communicated and distributed through various interpersonal
and media channels with a view to gain political and social leadership accep-
tance and prepare the society for a particular development upcoming event.
The main goal of advocacy is to make an issue a political or national priority in
which the Internet plays an important role in organising and mobilising
people to start a movement then carrying out action. Briefly, online advocacy
leads directly to social mobilisation.
Mobilisation is the process by which activists raise people’s awareness and
consciousness to protest for a cause. They use the Internet for this purpose in
three distinct ways. First the Internet can be used to call for offline action.
Second, activists can use the Internet for actions that have started offline
and prefer to follow its progress and effects online. Finally, activist may
start, follow and probably end up all their actions online. It is a choice,
which is based mainly on activists’ skill in manipulating the Internet technol-
ogy. Some of the possible actions include a massive spamming campaign or
hacking in a whole system by appropriating or disrupting technologies for
personal and political ends and reasons.
Activists use the Internet in so many ways and for so many purposes. Some
activists may show themselves as more proactive and aggressive in their use
of the Internet to achieve their goals and purposes. Others, however, see in
the Internet a democratic space that fosters freedom of expression and com-
munication and challenges authoritarian systems, censorship and control of
information. This new use of the Internet is what has become known by
and referred to in the literature as ‘hacktivism’ in which hackers usually appro-
priate or disrupt technologies for personal and political ends. On another
level, most people acknowledge that some citizens are really active through
the Internet, but this activity is pointless. It is a sort of showcasing that does
more to the activists to make them feel good about themselves or gratified
rather than to address urgent political matters and issues (Shulman 2005;
Hindman 2009). The recent creation of so many pages on Facebook and
other social networking sites is a solid proof that shows that the Internet
has transformed the meaning of in field political activism and furthered
what has recently been referred to as ‘micro- activism’. This derogatory use
of political activism is oftentimes referred to as ‘slacktivism’, which refers to
political activities that have no impact on real–life political outcomes, but
only serve to increase the feel-good factor of the participants (Morozov
2009). This aspect which has become dominating nowadays in many Internet
sites raises so many questions and worries over these activities which are
pointless and unable to achieve real political changes and goals. They may
even derail political participants away from the more effective forms of
302 N.-E. LAOUNI

participation in the activist repertoire that have traditionally been used


(Putnam 2000). This fact calls attention that not all political activities are
created equal. Some forms of political participation are suited for working
within the representative democratic institutions to influence the decisions
of the formal decision–makers. Other activities are more expressive
however, and although they display willingness to participate, the effective-
ness of these activities in achieving political aims especially democratisation
is still in dispute and debate among social movements specifically.
A social movement is not a political party with clear and well-defined pol-
itical vision, ideology, agenda and immediate access to power; nor is it an
unorganised mass without goals, strategy and objectives. Social movements
are in a position somewhere in between (Freeman and Johnson 1999). Yet,
they are described most often as informally organised groups of individuals
lacking political representation and affiliation but having clear objectives for
change.
Most often, there is no consensus over a unique definition of ‘social move-
ment’ within the existing literature. In this respect, de la Piscina (2007) claims
that ‘the wide-ranging typologies of social movements that currently exist
complicate the ability to offer one definition that results in a consensus’.
However, Snow and Cross (2012) assert that it is possible to organise the
wide range of the existing definitions of social movements around five
major axes, which complement each other and necessarily help in the con-
struction of a social movement. First, there should be a collective or joint
action; second, a change in the oriented goals or claims; third, non-insti-
tutional collective actions; fourth, a degree of organisation; and fifth a
degree of temporal continuity.
Diani (1992) defined a social movement as ‘networks of informal inter-
action between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations,
engaged in a political or cultural conflict on the basis of a shared collective
identity’. Social movements accordingly share the following characteristics:
they represent networks of informal interaction, individuals share beliefs
and solidarity and engage in collective action on conflictual issues and act
outside of the institutional sphere and routine aspects of social life. According
to De la Porta and Diani (2006), social movements concern their involvement
in ‘conflictual relations with clearly identified opponents; are linked by dense
informal networks; [and they] share a distinct collective identity’. Briefly, social
movements have emerged as advocacy networks that gather like-minded
people and organisations together to advocate and protest for a social or pol-
itical goal. They are in effect collective manifestations to express grievance
and reflect hard living conditions, political exclusion, authoritarianism and a
cultural or ideological conflict. They need a variety of resources and tools to
disseminate their message to encourage non-members, recruit new
THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES 303

members, and eventually exercise pressure on public policy makers, to act on


behalf of their issue (McCarthy and Zald 1977).
Herbert Blumer, one of the earliest scholars who studied social movement
processes, identified four stages of social movements’ lifecycles (Blumer
1995). The four stages he described are: ‘social ferment’, ‘popular excitement’,
‘formalisation,’ and ‘institutionalisation’ (De la Porta and Diani 2006, 150). The
names of these stages have undergone many changes in terms of naming and
renaming, but the core content of themes has remained the same. Today, the
four social movement stages are known as: Emergence – Coalescence –
Bureaucratisation and Decline.
The first stage of the social movement life cycle is known as the emer-
gence, or, as described by Blumer, the ‘social ferment’ stage (Della Porta
and Diani 2009). Social movements at this level are in their embryonic
stage and there is little to no organisation. What characterises this stage
also is a widespread of discontent and dissatisfaction among potential move-
ment participants. In this early stage, members of the movement are sup-
ported by social movement organisations that back up the movement to
be organised. Within every social movement organisation there are what
we call ‘agitators’ who have the role to raise consciousness around issues
and help to develop the sense of discontent among the general population.
The second stage is known as coalescence, sometimes referred to as the
‘popular stage’. It is characterised by clearly defining the sense or feeling of
discontent. People at this stage can know who and what is responsible for
the current unsatisfying situation. In other words, it is no longer just a
general sense of unease and grievance, but now a sense of what the
unease and grievance are about, and who or what holds responsibility. In
addition, at this stage ‘individuals participating in the mass behaviour
become aware of each other’ (Hopper 1950). Briefly, the movement at this
stage shows itself more organised and strategic in its outlook and perspec-
tives at this stage.
The third stage in the life cycle of a social movement is known as bureau-
cratisation or ‘formalisation’ as defined by Blumer’ (Della Porta and Diani
2009). There are higher levels of organisation and coalition-based strategies
at this stage since social movements have accumulated some success in
raising awareness and coordinating strategies that are necessary. Social move-
ments in this stage do not rely only on staff persons with specialised knowl-
edge or inspirational leaders and mass rallies to progress towards their
goals and build constituencies. Rather, they rely also on well-trained staff to
carry out the functions of organisations. Of course the political power of the
movement in this stage is greater than in the previous stages in that they
may have access to and relations to political elites. Bureaucratising social
movements is not always easy and a success. It might be unsuccessful, for
example, because mobilisation becomes too demanding for participants.
304 N.-E. LAOUNI

Decline or ‘institutionalisation’ is the last stage a movement can pass


through. Although the term decline may sound negative and may be under-
stood as failure of a social movement, it should not necessarily be understood
so. Scholars have noted that social movements may decline for several
reasons. Miller (1999) argue that there are four ways in which social move-
ments can decline: through repression, co-optation, success, failure and the
establishment with mainstream.
Understanding the four stages of development of social movement (life
cycle of a social movement) can help extensively in understanding how move-
ments form, grow and dissolve through different periods of times. They can
also be useful in understanding collective action and the effects they have
on individuals and institutions. Following this line of thought, one common
feature shared by the social movement theories is that they have been articu-
lated mostly to analyse forms of collective action that emerged in postmodern
and industrial societies.
Many research studies revealed that Internet usage increased the likeli-
hood of political protest for all individuals, but differentially enhances man’s
involvement in public protest more than women, especially in the Middle
East and North Africa where there are substantial gender gaps in terms of
Internet usage and political participation.
Howard and Hussain (2013) discussed the role of the Internet and digital
media in the Arab Spring and the role it played in women’s involvement in
online politics. They found that the Internet held an important position in
all Arab societies because it helped many societies to get rid of traditional
forms of activism and communication on Internet servers that were mostly
male dominated. Put differently, the Internet helped primarily in extending
the capacity of non-state political actors to awaken public sentiments, take
part in online political activism and specifically, motivated Arab women to
access the public sphere and overcome the gendered public-private divide
by establishing a presence in online social media sites and social movement
networks that were traditionally considered public and masculine spaces (Vic-
toria and Lara 2012).
However, although historical examples indicate that the Internet has been
an enabling tool and a source of information and empowerment, it has never
been a strong driving force that helped women’s increased influence in the
public sphere and in social movements across the MENA region (Saks 2002;
Skalli 2006). Moreover, as the Internet grows to become a tool for social
and political change, individuals, be they males or females, must understand
how both activism online and activism in physical spaces or places works in
order to use technology in a successful and efficient way to support social
movements. According to Skalli (2006), women in the MENA region need a
lot of training in technology use to access uncensored information, broaden
their horizons and take part in protests and demonstrations.
THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES 305

Theoretical framework
The debate over social movements in Western Europe gave rise to what is
now called the new social movement theory. Alain Touraine and Jürgen
Habermas are among the prominent European theorists who explained the
inadequacy of the Marxist analysis in explaining and analysing social move-
ments, which stress the importance of consciousness, ideology, social struggle
and solidarity. They were not also impressed at all by the American theories of
resource mobilisation and political process. Rather, they had their own convic-
tions that present-day collective action is not limited to just negotiations and
strategic calculations by social movements to gain political power. Rather, the
movements involve much broader issues of social norms and identity since
the real struggle is the one that takes place in the realm of civil society and
not in the realm of politics. In addition, and according to the same theorists,
new social movements (NSMs) approach explains the apparition of social
movements as an immediate result to the failure of the democratic system
in post-modern society in guaranteeing individual freedom, equality and
social justice.
For Habermas (1981), social movements are considered as ‘defensive
reactions’ to defend individuals in the public and the private sphere
against the hegemony of the state system and domination of market
economy. Touraine (1985), in his turn, considers participation in social
movements as the only way, which may allow individuals recover their
liberty and dignity. For both Habermas and Touraine, the main role of
social movements is to mobilise individuals so as they can raise self-aware-
ness and create human and social identities. Also to refer to and see other
individuals or human beings in general as full, free and creative citizens,
enjoying their full roles in pluralistic and democratic society, as opposed
to victims or objects of state manipulation and market domination. In
addition, they insisted on the ‘refusal of any centralized hierarchy, leaders
or spokespeople’ (Hardt and Negri 2011).
Though it was not a direct response to the previously mentioned theories,
new social movement theory did have a different political project of granting
agency to social movement actors (and theorists).
The dominant groups always tend to define movements as simple reactions to
crises, that is to a dysfunctional mechanism of the system. Admitting that they
are something else, would entail recognition of collective demands that chal-
lenge the legitimacy of power and the current deployment of social resources.
(Melucci 1996, 23)

Moreover, it was argued that in order to recognise social movements, their


existence could not be taken for granted. ‘The empirical unity of a social
movement should be considered as a result rather than the starting point, a
fact to be explained rather than something that is already evident’ (Melucci
306 N.-E. LAOUNI

1996, 40). Thus, NSM theorists seek to explain how and why social movements
arise and how collective identity develops.
Social movements could also be analysed using collective action theory,
which can help in explaining how individuals from different communities
connect to the social movement group through a shared belief system.
According to Olson, if people share interests, then they will act collectively
to achieve them. Seen from this perspective, collective action can be con-
sidered as a social psychological concept that helps in explaining the link or
relationship an individual has to a group. It is an individual’s cognitive,
moral and emotional connection with a large community or institution. It is
in a way a perception of a shared status or relation, which may be imagined
rather than experienced directly within a group or groups. Tarrow (2011), ana-
lysed social movements by studying the interactions between institutions and
politics and found four properties that characterise a collective action: 1, col-
lective challenge; 2, common purpose; 3, social solidarity and 4, sustained
interaction.
Briefly, two theoretical frameworks were used in this study (social move-
ment and collective action theories) to predict the probable relationship
between independent and dependent variables and underpin the knowledge
base of the phenomenon investigated, guide the kind of data to be accrued
for this study and makes research findings more meaningful and generalisable
(Akintoye 2015).

Hypotheses development
The previously discussed empirical research in the review of literature and the
theoretical frameworks concerning the relationship between youth activists,
the use of the Internet for political activism for change form the basis of
the development of the hypotheses for this paper. They are discussed next.
H1: Males use the Internet for political activism more than females

H2: There is a difference between different age groups and political affiliation

H3: The Internet support more than hinder youth participation in political
activism

H4: There is a strong relationship between online and offline participation in


social movements

Methodology
This study is a quantitative correlational in nature. It relied on positivist knowl-
edge and utilised one pre-determined survey instrument to yield statistical
data. The basic advantage of utilising this method is that ‘it permits the
THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES 307

relationships [to be analyzed] among a large number of variables in a single


study’ (Gall, Borg, and Gall 2003, 414).

Context and participants


This study was undertaken in Morocco, an Islamic hereditary monarchy, which
gained its independence from France in 1956. Immediately after the indepen-
dence, the political situation was not quite stable and characterised by a
tension between a monarchy that wanted to dominate and extend its
power all over the country, and a political opposition desired to take part in
the ruling of Morocco. During the reign of Hassan II, many coups d’état
attempts were organised by military leaders to overthrow the king and lead
forcefully the country in his place. Faced with this critical situation, the mon-
archy decided to suppress and repress political dissidents and activists and
use coercive control over the ideological and repressive state apparatus.
During this period, King Hassan II’s reign featured large-scale human rights
abuses, torture, establishment of a semi-democracy and the enforced disap-
pearance of many political opponents. This state of the art led to the appari-
tion of a new era known in Morocco as the ‘Years of Lead’ with reference to
the period when lead bullets were fired at civilians during protests in the
streets. Three major areas were not allowed to discuss and were considered
as redlines not to trespass and transgress. It was not possible to criticise the
monarchy, question the integrity of the nation and not to believe in Islam
as the official religion of the nation. However, there were a number of achieve-
ments that King Hassan II realised to build a prosperous Morocco. He suc-
ceeded to recover all the southern cities from the hand of Spanish
colonialism after the launching of peaceful green march that helped in reco-
vering sovereignty over these territories. He initiated a referendum on the
Moroccan constitution in 1996 to pave the way to a harmonious coexistence
between the monarchy and opposition parties.
Since his enthronement on 23 July 1999, King Mohammed VI expanded the
process of political reform and the democratisation of institutions that started
in 1996 with his father, King Hassan II. He dismissed accordingly so many of
the old established habits inherited from his father’s oppressive regime by
allowing for example the return of exiled political dissidents, encouraged
official and honest investigations in human rights abuses from 1956 to
1999, visited and stayed even in many places that were neglected, ignored
and deprived of development during his father’s reign. From 2006 through
2010, the country’s progress towards democratic governance was very slow
and did not reach all political institutions. There was stagnation in the devel-
opment of the judicial independence and the fight against corruption in many
institutions. Meanwhile, there was a limited progress in political change, elec-
toral professionalism and transparency. However, there were many significant
308 N.-E. LAOUNI

and noticed advances in the area of media freedom and freedom of


expression in general, improvements in the country’s infrastructure and
advances in the fight against poverty and social exclusion.
Despite the Moroccan government’s efforts to present itself to the
outside world as reformist, the political system – having at its centre the
king – is far from the constitutional monarchy that it claims to be. The
king has strong executive powers and dominates all sides of political life
in the country. He names head of government and the cabinet and can
dismiss either at any time, can dissolve parliament, pass decrees or veto
laws approved by parliament, heads the armed forces and religious
affairs and presides over the Supreme Council of the Judiciary which
appoints all judges. Morocco has a multiparty system with more than 35
political parties. None of these parties challenges the supremacy and
decision of the king. The political structure in the country and its dynamics
are very elusive, hard to pinpoint because the personal becomes political
and the political becomes personal, and thus it is always hard to draw a
demarcation line between the two.
Having this situation, which did not satisfy the majority of Moroccans, and
in line with what took place in the neighbouring countries (Tunisia and Egypt)
because of structural imbalances, mainly at the socio-economic and political
level, the widespread of corruption and cronyism, inequality and social injus-
tice, a series of protests started in 2011 and became known as the Arab Spring.
At first, many analysts considered these events as small happenings with no
change effect to expect. Ironically enough, these apparently small and innoc-
uous events were the final straw that broke the camel’s back. Inspired by the
Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings, the February 20th Movement came into
existence and established itself as a movement that sought to change the
unsatisfying social and political circumstances in Morocco. They used digital
technology to interact, communicate, organise, strategise and expand their
demands for change across cities. By taking streets, the young protesters/acti-
vists in the movement called for social, economic and political rights. They
insisted specifically on dignity, freedom and social justice. Unlike their
counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt, youth activist in Morocco did not call for
radical change in the regime. They expressed their disenchantment with poli-
tics and political system, social and economic situation in a peaceful way,
through slogans, long larches and protest in public places. They never esca-
lated their protests into full confrontation with the regime concerned.
This study targeted youth who belong to different age categories (15–18,
18–24, 24–34 and more than 34). The sample of this study consisted of 32
females and 68 males. The majority of them have experience as activists,
but with no political affiliation. Because they were often obstructed by an
old-fashioned mind-set of traditional party members, these youth devel-
oped a negative attitude towards traditional and some newly emerged
THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES 309

pro-political system parties, institutions and leaders who have been dominat-
ing for so long, resisting change and keeping the status-quo. This fact led to
the discouragement of youth and women to participate actively in politics
and become members of political institutions. Most of them are university stu-
dents who are keen on using technology to communicate and disseminate
news and information. Some of them are bloggers, webmasters, ‘Facebookers’
and Youtubers as they like to refer to themselves. Others, however, are simple
users of the Internet. They conceive of it as a good public and democratic
space for political activism since it is interactional, secure and easy to
access. The sample was selected and recruited using a non-random snowball
sampling technique. This later was particularly used because the population is
large, geographically dispersed, hard to list or enumerate and most important
of all difficult to reach. This technique started with a convenience sample of
initial subjects that served as ‘seeds’ through which a subject recruited other
subjects and other subjects recruited others in their turn. It simply resembles
a snowball growing in size as it rolls down a hill (Heckathorn 2011).

Data collection and analysis


The data collected for this study followed many systematic steps because of
the type of research undertaken and the nature of the sample targeted to
collect data. In meetings of committees in unions and some leftist political
parties, participant activists were informed about the research and its objec-
tives and were solicited to participate in disseminating the questionnaire
and encourage participation in other regions. This networking technique
made the distribution of the questionnaire more practical, effective and less
consuming in terms of time and efforts since it was based on cascading refer-
rals in which everybody who was requested to help in distributing the ques-
tionnaire encouraged in turn others to do likewise. In addition, this technique
which was basically informal and based on an indirect contact with many acti-
vists in the movement involved in the research, augmented the rate of partici-
pation and increased the response rate, especially if we consider that the
majority of participants received the questionnaire through activists who
have credibility in the movement as leaders.
Following this technique again, participating activists felt more compelled
to return questionnaires fully completed because of a sense of moral obli-
gation, moral duties and trust they have for referral leaders who contacted
them the first time. The survey gathered data on activists’ personal infor-
mation, interest in politics, the use of the Internet to empower citizens and
attitudes towards taking on leadership roles and lead demonstrations and
protests in streets. Items on the survey further targeted activists’ perceptions
of knowledge, skills and aptitudes towards activism activities and the use of
the Internet for sociopolitical change.
310 N.-E. LAOUNI

The survey was processed using SPSS 18.0. Descriptive statistics were used
first to describe and summarise the properties of the mass of data collected
from activists. Mean scores, standard deviations and percentages were calcu-
lated per each item in the questionnaire. Pearson correlation coefficients were
calculated as well to define different relationships.

Results
The findings gleaned from the study in response to research questions and
hypotheses revealed different relationships between different variables as
reported below.

(1) What relationship exists between gender and the use of the Internet for
online participation in social movements?

Research question 1 sought to explore the relationship that exists between


gender and the use of the Internet for online political activism. In a similar
fashion, the research hypothesis sought to outline the precise relationship
between gender and online political activism and predicted the nature of
the results of the study. According to the results obtained, there was a low
mean score attached to females in the use of the Internet for online activism
to make a political change as reported in Table 1.
The significance of the mean score in descriptive statistics reached signifi-
cance as well in inferential statistics. The results obtained indicated that there
was a strong negative correlation between gender and the use of the Internet
for political activism to make the change as shown in Table 2.
This finding was significant as well from the perspective of the hypothesis
that was formulated based on the research question in order to define the
existing relationship between gender and online political activism. According
to this finding, hypothesis 1 ‘male use the Internet for online political activism
more than females’ was strongly supported in his study.

(2) What are the dominant age groups and their political affiliations in the Feb-
ruary 20th Movement?

Knowing about the dominant age groups in and the political affiliations of the
February 20th Movement helped in profiling the activists according to results

Table 1. The mean scores related to sex category.


Type of variables N Minimum Maximum Mean
Sex category 100 1.00 2.00 1.3200
Use the net to make political change 100 1.00 2.00 1.2200
100
THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES 311

Table 2. Correlations between sex category and the use of the Internet for political
activism.
Type of correlation Sex category Use the net for change
Sex category Pearson correlation 1 −, 054
Sig. (2-tailed) – −, 595
N 100 100
The use of the net to make change Pearson correlation −, 054 1
Sig. (2-tailed) , 595 –
N 100 100

obtained from descriptive statistics first and inferential statistics second.


The results obtained from the descriptive analysis indicated difference in
mean scores between age and political affiliations. According to statistics
obtained 41% were aged between 18 and 24, making this the largest
group in the movement. The second largest group represented 36%
(aged between 24 and 36). Finally, 11% were aged between 15 and 18
(Tables 3 and 4).
Findings related to the relationship between age and political affiliation
showed that age and political affiliation correlated well in this study since acti-
vist in age category 1 (18–24) were not affiliated to any political party, and
thus they represented the greatest majority of non-affiliated in the move-
ment. Statistics obtained showed that 51% had no political affiliation, that
is to say they did not belong to any political party; 36% were involved in a
way or another in many leftist political parties mainly and 13% were simply
sympathisers. Table 3 shows youth political affiliations in frequencies and
percentages.
The significance of the percentage of non-affiliated in the February
20th Movement had relation with the trust youth in the movement had in
politics and politicians in general. According to results obtained, 82% of
youth in the movement did not trust politicians and the various existing
political parties; 18%, however, had some trust in some political parties,
especially leftist ones.
Other results forms in descriptive statistics showed important results as
well. The mean score in age groups looked high and indicated that the
majority of activists in the February 20th Movement were non-affiliated or
rather not affiliated to any political party as Table 5 shows.
This variance in mean scores reached significance in inferential statistics as
well and confirmed hypothesis 2 underpinning this study. According to the
results obtained, there was no relationship between age and political affilia-
tion as indicated in Table 6.

(3) To what extent does the Internet support or hinder youth movements and
political activism?
312 N.-E. LAOUNI

Table 3. Respondents’ age groups.


Age category Percentage
15–18 11
18–24 41
24–34 36
34+ 12
Total 100

Table 4. Youth political affiliation in the movement.


Political affiliation Frequency Valid per cent
Not affiliated 51 51
Affiliated 36 36
Sympathisers 13 13
Total 100 100

Table 5. Trust in politics and politicians.


Viewpoints Frequency Percentage
Yes 82 82
No 18 18
Total 100 100

Results obtained in relation to research question 3 revealed the importance of


the Internet in youth movements’ mobilisation, recruitment and staging pro-
tests. According to results obtained, 88% reported that the Internet became a
favourable and practical place for political activism, while only 12% had a
different view. Similarly, 82% believed that the Internet was the first media
tool that followed, shared and reported the activities of the movement
during protests in streets and squares, while only 16% considered that the
print media did some efforts to cover and report accounts on the protests.
The rate of coverage of the activities and protests of the February 20th Move-
ment by national TV channels and radio stations reached 2% only. In a similar
fashion, and according to results obtained regarding the reasons for using the
Internet for political activism, 37% stated because of its interactivity, 32%
accessibility, 30% security and only 01% for its global perspective (Table 7).
Similarly, results obtained concerning the tools used by the February 20th
Movement to mobilise individuals revealed that Facebook was the first online
social network used by the activists in the movement with a rate of 70%. E-

Table 6. Age category and political affiliation mean scores.


N Minimum Maximum Mean
Age category 100 2.00 5.00 3.49
Political affiliation 100 1.00 3.00 1.77
Valid N 100
THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES 313

Table 7. Correlations between age and political affiliation.


Type of correlation Age category Political affiliation
Resp. Age Pearson correlation 1 −, 103
Sig. (2-tailed) – , 308
N 100 100
Political affiliation Pearson correlation −, 103 1
Sig. (2-tailed) , 308 –
N 100 100

Table 8. Reasons for using the internet for political activism.


Reasons Frequency Per cent Valid per cent
Interactive 37 37 37
Easy to access 32 32 32
Secure 30 30 30
Intranational 1 01 01
Total 100 100.0 100.0

mail lists and newsgroups 16%, blogs 08%, Youtube video channels 04%,
finally Twitter with only 2% (Table 8). All things considered the Internet,
with all its varied tools and spaces, raised youth concern in politics during
the 2011 uprisings.

(4) What relationship exists between online and offline participation in social
movements?

Results obtained in response to research question 4 revealed that most


respondents who participated in street demonstrations also utilised the Inter-
net and social media for organising, strategising and protesting. In other
words, computer-mediated communication increased and encouraged the
number of people mobilised to participate in real local areas protests.
Table 9 sheds light on this complementarity between online and offline acti-
vism and active participation in social movements.
The results obtained addressed and answered the research questions and
confirmed the hypotheses underpinning the study. Results obtained from the
field indicated that 07% strongly agree, 69% agree, 05% neutral and only 01%
strongly disagree over the assumption that those who are active virtually are
also active physically (Table 10).

Discussion
The results obtained regarding research questions 1 revealed that male
respondents represent 68% and females 32%, which is significant enough
to claim that males use the Internet for political activism more than their
female counterparts. This imbalance in gender representation in the study
314 N.-E. LAOUNI

Table 9. Social networks used for political activism.


Networks used Frequency Per cent Valid per cent
Facebook 70 70 70
E mails and Newsgroups 16 16 16
Blogs 08 08 08
Youtube 04 04 04
Twitter 02 02 02
Total 100% 100 100

Table 10. The mean: those who are active online are also active offline.
Mean score N Minimum Maximum Mean
Those who are active online are also active offline 100 1.00 5.00 2.37

reveals that females using the Internet for political activism are still lagging
behind the percentage of men who are highly represented and active in
the movement and online and offline activities. This finding is consistent
with the dominant vision that technology in general and ICT and social
media in particular are male dominated and that structural, psychological
and cultural factors rooted in patriarchy are all working forces to prevent
women from gaining access to technology, either as producers or users.
Liberal feminists defined this problem in terms of the ways in which men
dominated the design and use of technologies. They went even further to
claim that in the wider world, inventors or engineers are oftentimes portrayed
as male so there are few role models for women. Put differently, technologies
are gendered because they embody the patriarchal values of domination and
control of both women and nature. The solution then is to reject and ward off
technology.
After having conducted a Pearson Correlation analysis comparing sex cat-
egory and the use of the Internet for political activism to make change, there
seems to be no evidence that may indicate the existence of positive correlation
between the two variables under focus. This reveals that there is a negative cor-
relation between gender (male or female) and the use of the Internet for politi-
cal activism to make change. The more male sex dominates the less online
activism females experience and use, which might be considered as another
phenomenon worth investigating in future studies within the realm of
gender participation and representation in the Internet. Does gender inequality
in online activism mirror the same cultural factors as technology access in
general or is it a result of other social dynamics? Are females under more
pressure to avoid political persecution? Are they discouraged from taking on
the public roles often associated with online activism? Are they less comfortable
with the technology in general and Internet use for political activism in particu-
lar? We look forward to seeing more research on the link between feminism and
technology in general and online political activism in particular.
THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES 315

However, other findings are in sharp contrast with what this study found
regarding the assumption that males use the Internet for political activism
more than females, especially in cases where sociocultural barriers are
present and may prevent women from participating publicly in social move-
ments. According to the Arab Social Media Report (2011), the incorporation of
the Internet with all its tools and platforms into the recent protests move-
ments provided ample opportunities for female participation. Moreover,
during the Arab Spring, women succeeded to establish a real presence in
social media platforms and social movement networks that were traditionally
dominated and considered as masculine spaces (Victoria and Lara 2012). Fol-
lowing the literature review of social movements, the inclusion of women in
online activism and social movements can boost the potential for diversity
within movements, which is an essential factor in mass mobilisation. Similarly,
several studies show that nonviolent protests movements are the movement
in which a big number of females are involved. Generally, women have a pre-
ference of nonviolence if compared to men, which may have positive effect
on the movement to follow a nonviolent or peaceful direction and orientation.
In her study on how women used the Internet and participated in social move-
ments during the Arab Spring in many countries of the Middle East, Radsch
(2012) indicates that women who used the Internet and social media in
support of social movements were eager to participate actively in the move-
ment, shared a sense of connection to others in the movement and worked
hard to inform others about the movement’s goals, actions and directions
to follow in a peaceful way.
In Morocco as well as in a number of countries in the Arab world, gender
segregation represents a strong challenge to female’s participation in collec-
tive actions and social movements. Encouraging women’s participation in
online activism and in social movements may provide them with ample
opportunities to voice their opinions in protest movements, contribute to
social movements, collective action and ultimately participate in the construc-
tion of change process. According to Radsch (2012), encouraging equality in
the Internet, cyberactivism may be more socially acceptable than physical
mobilisation into the public sphere.
To better analyse age as a determinant variable in cyberactivism, respon-
dents were grouped into four-year ranges, beginning with 15–18 and
ending with more than 34. Among the respondents involved in the study,
18–24 year-olds age are by far the largest group, making up 41% of the
total subjects. However, many other age groups are well represented as
well. The second-largest group, the 24–34-year-olds, made up 36% of the
total sample which is made up of 100 participants. The other groups from
age 15–18 constitute only 11%. The youth in this age category are very
much politically disengaged – but very creative and active online. Not surpris-
ingly, after age 34 or more than 34 responses decrease and constitute 12%
316 N.-E. LAOUNI

only. Does this mean that activists aged between, 18 and 24 are more active
online than the other age groups? Our sample is not large enough to say yes
for sure especially that the one-way analysis of variance and post-hoc tests
were not used to compare groups and know if age really affects online acti-
vism or not.
So what are the magic ingredients that make of this age category, 18–24,
real and active online activists? These respondents are in their full student life
and experience to a large extent youthful idealism and new political ideas that
they absorbed in university campuses where they socialise and build new pol-
itical identities. Moreover, activists in this age category are in their first years of
adulthood. They are in a sweet spot of technical expertise and political ideal-
ism. They are technologically immersed because they are digital natives and
concern themselves to a large extent with new styles of music, fashion,
democracy and human rights. They showed high consciousness of the
social and political situation dominating the country and the neighbouring
countries during the Arab Spring. The majority of them are university students
(62%), and thus they are in a well-suited position to absorb the role of the
movement and their role as activists in it; 21% are unemployed graduate
degree holders; 11% are still students in junior and high schools; and finally
06% are employed in different private and public sectors. This shows that
the number of students is very high and represents the greatest bulk of par-
ticipants in the movement.
Being a university student means a lot to Moroccan youth. The university
represents a free and open space where they can learn and achieve academi-
cally and meanwhile develop and grow emotionally, intellectually and politi-
cally. Debates among youth political parties (radical leftist, Islamists and
Amazigh) on campuses provided these students with a unique opportunity
to know and learn a great deal about politics, political parties and political par-
ticipation and vision and ideologies of each group. In addition, and although
the majority of students in Moroccan universities are not affiliated to any pol-
itical party, they show great concern in politics when there is an open debate
or discussion on campuses which are considered real and dynamic learning
circles. It is not surprising then to find that 51% of the respondents from
the February 20th Movement have no political affiliation; 36% were
affiliated to different political parties, which outnumber 33 political parties
in Morocco. However, only 13% of the respondents sympathised with
different political parties but not involved officially or practically speaking in
any.
Political affiliation does not mean a lot to the movement since activists
believe in non-political affiliation and non-attachment to the existing old
ideologies and archaic political parties. It is true that many participants from
the movement recognise the important role of political parties and political
participation in establishing democracy and change in society. Yet, their
THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES 317

representation in the governing structures of political parties remains


insignificant. The majority believe that the majority of dominating political
parties such as the Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Independence
Party (PI), the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) and the Authenticity
and Modernity Party (PAM) are not fulfilling their obligations toward citizens
and do not communicate to people regularly except in times of votes. Alter-
natively, they consider themselves part of a ‘free and independent move-
ment’. This claim is significantly important for the study because in their
first speech in 16 February 2011, activists in the movement declared and pre-
sented themselves as a youth movement independent of all political organis-
ations and parties. Its taking of the streets for protests and demonstrations
emanates from the great love they have for their country – a love that has
driven them to demand change in order to bring about more freedom of
speech, democracy, dignity and social justice to all Moroccans.
In brief, the results accumulated from variables in demographics as pre-
sented earlier show that activists in the February 20th youth movement
and the movement itself as an organising body have some special character-
istics which sometimes they share, and on many other occasions they differ
from the characteristics of youth and their movements in other Arab countries
where the Arab Spring was buoyant like Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen and
Libya. Age is probably the same according to so many studies, but political
problems, political affiliation, educational level, consciousness about social
and political issues and the use of the Internet for political activism are all dis-
similar since they depend on the nature of the country’s regime first, the
nature of the social and political problems that affect the country, second;
the characteristics of the Internet infrastructure, third … etc. That is why
there is no way to compare the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt to the dem-
onstrations of the February 20th youth movement in Morocco. Recent
research studies especially the ones done in Egypt after the revolution, for
example, suggest that Internet use is increasingly more prevalent among
younger age groups within the Arab world, especially the 20- to 30-year-old
age group, which uses the net more avidly compared to the rest of the popu-
lation (Abdulla 2007, 50). This explains clearly why and how new media were
effectively deployed by young people in the Arab world to trigger political
reform and change. In Egypt, for example, the 15–17% of the population
who are active Internet users are mostly youth, who were the driving force
behind and catalysts of the Egyptian revolution. In Morocco, the rate is
much higher and statistics done by the movement itself reveal that 82% of
the total populations of activists in the movement are aged between 18
and 24 which support the study done in Egypt by Abdulla (2007, 50) and
support as well official statistics done on youth in Morocco, which reports
that youth represent 30% of the whole total population – a fact that has
318 N.-E. LAOUNI

never been in the history of Morocco according to a study done by L’ECONO-


MISTE on June 2011.
The importance of the Internet, and the potentials it has in supporting
youth movements and political activism in general was apparent in the
results obtained. In total, 88% of participants reported that the Internet
becomes a good place for political activism, while only 12% have an opposing
view. This shows clearly the role of the Internet as an open and virtual space or
cyberspace for political debate, mobilisation and activism. The Internet as a
consequence is like Jürgen Haberamas’ public sphere that involved before
open discussions of all issues of general concern to the public. Now, this
public sphere is a technologically mediated space where communication, col-
laboration and co-operation take place. It is also a sphere of production, repro-
duction and circulation of human knowledge. It is inherently a networked,
decentralised and dynamic space where political interaction takes place
easily. Some people, however, may reject this view that the Internet can be
thought of as a public sphere in it; yet and in all cases, we might come to
regard it as a supporting foundation upon which real public sphere can
be built.
Online activism, and from the experience of the February 20th movement
and the Arab revolutions would not have been successful, had it not been
translated into real demonstrations in streets and squares. There are lots of
controversies regarding this issue of online or cyberspace activism vis-à-vis
real-life or physical activism. Some claim that there are some activists who
are active both online and on the ground and, thus they contribute both vir-
tually and also in ‘reality’. Others, however, claim that some activists are
limited to the cyberspace or the virtual world only. Theorists and analysts of
social movements regard online activism and ‘Facebooking’ demands for
reform or change as an efficient tool to mobilise people, but this act alone
does not bring a revolution or a demonstration to successful conclusions.
Whether these views and assumptions are right or wrong, they constitute a
controversial issue. They, however, raise an important question again here:
‘Are cyber campaigns comparable to the real world action?’ The answer is
no of course since there is no way to compare the virtual with the real
world. It is easy for anyone to sit in front of a computer in his or her room,
wearing a pyjama and type away long petitions, criticising and expressing
feelings of resentments towards the system or the regime (Activism in
pyjama), while others are toiling in the real world and facing lots of violent
persecutions attacks and risks.
There is no need thus to glamorise all and every cyberactivist and give
credit where it is due. Recognising the sacrifice of in-the field heroes will
add to the validity of online activism as a real force and help online campaigns
be more effective and successful. So findings on technology and advocacy
skills acquisition challenge the assumption that those who have a facility
THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES 319

with technology are more likely to become online activists. But to what extent
do they combine both online and in flesh activism? That is what can be
explored further in this discussion.
Without the Internet, online activism is impossible to use and practice. The
Internet provides its users among activists with ample opportunities to disse-
minate a huge cultural content, which is, transmitted through the use of social
media, such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Whatsapp, text messaging and
others. These media enable peer-to-peer communication between users
and facilitate the establishment of different relations with each other, allowing
users to transmit their ideas, opinions and images to large numbers of people.
Consequently, many individuals consider the Internet as the most important
avenues through which public opinions can pass and circulate. It defies
boundaries, challenges governmental media censorship and control and pro-
vides an alternative voice to traditional media outlets, which echo always the
same official and governmental policies and views. Results from the field indi-
cate, and on the basis of the five-point Likert scale rating, 07% strongly dis-
agree, 69% disagree, 05% neutral, 18% agree and only 01% that strongly
agree over the assumption that those who are active online are also active
offline. For the February 20th youth movement and since it was born and nur-
tured in the Internet and grew up in the streets and squares of major Moroc-
can cities, there is no doubt to claim that the movement used the Internet
abundantly to plan, strategise and mobilise people to take the streets for pro-
tests. The type of activism the movement resorted to can be defined as Inter-
net-based or mediated activism which uses the Internet as means rather than
an end for political activism and political change. This new digital media has
triggered ‘a revival of the watchdog of the media and paved the way for it to
act as a fourth estate in monitoring political abuses by the regime’ (Zaid and
Mohamed 2011). Yet, not everything is permitted for publication and sharing
over the Internet in Morocco because regulations are restrictive, manipulated
and controlled by the state. On many occasions, the government blocked
many sites, blogs and personal web pages that it considers overtly critical
to the system.
The massive implication of the youth in protest movements called for by
the February 20th Movement is very much revealing of the limits of a pre-
viously held belief which argued that youth in Morocco are depoliticised,
uninvolved and apathetic (Bourqia, Harras, and Bensaid 1995). Rather than a
loss of interest in politics, results obtained from this study showed a revival
of interest in politics through the use of technology among this generation.
According to Zerhouni (2009), youth in Morocco ‘do politics in a different
way’, not specifically through the formal modes of political participation;
51% from the movement reported that youth in Morocco are highly con-
cerned in politics and political change while 49% think the opposite and con-
sider that youth use the Internet to satisfy various gratifications other than
320 N.-E. LAOUNI

politics and political change, which is also significant statistically speaking and
need further research. Accordingly, and on the basis of the findings discussed
previously, youth in the February 20 youth movement proved to be great poli-
ticians and well in the know of ‘the mechanism of the political game’. They
have succeeded to form, and in a very short lapse of time, a counterforce
to challenge the regime and archaic politicians and political parties. Similarly,
the February 20 youth movement managed to a large extent to materialise
the calls for change that have preoccupied so many political groups for so
many decades in Morocco; but it has always remained limited to activities
in clubs and university campuses, and occasionally taking action on the
street to express solidarity with Arab and Islamic issues. This fact highlights
the significance of the February 20th movement that called on Moroccans
to take to the streets and ask for political change and more concrete and posi-
tive reforms. This great and courageous political initiative, which is according
to so many politicians, experts and analysts, is a conclusive evidence that Mor-
occan youth are highly conscious of their role as important initiators and
dynamo of change. They proved to be continuously and actively in search
of new means and ways to make their voice heard and reach the mass of
the public.
‘L’ECONOMISTE’ on June 2011, published the results of a very big opinion
survey entitled ‘Youth of 2011’ which reports that 04% are affiliated in politics,
while 96% are not affiliated from a total number of 1.046 respondents who
participated in this opinion survey from all over Morocco. This in turn supports
the findings of the present study that the February 20 youth movement acti-
vists do not come from political parties and unions only. They represent a
mixture of ideologies that are fused in one main goal: to activate the wheel
of change and bring freedom, democracy and dignity to all Moroccans
from all walks of life. Some of them are bloggers. Some others are just keen
users of social networking websites such as Facebook and twitter. Others,
however, are just simple users of the Internet. Being inspired by the revolu-
tions in the neighbouring Arab countries, a group of youth, and through
the Internet, decided to call for a day of action and demonstration to ask
for political change and some institutional reforms. The first street protest
took place on Sunday, 20 February 2011 and was an occasion to show that
youth in Morocco are highly involved in politics and the use of the Internet
for political activism as their counterparts in other countries. The first street
protest was associated with a list of initial demands that appealed to the
majority of Moroccans such as the call for a democratic Constitution that
expresses popular sovereignty, the dissolution of the actual parliament and
the dismissal of the government, and a better quality of, and access to
social welfare services (health, education and housing), especially for the
poorest individuals.
THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES 321

The date of 20 February 2011 marked the founding of the movement


officially. On that day, and through an announcement made by the Minister
of Interior, he admitted officially that demonstrations took place in 53 cities
and towns across Morocco and more than 200,000 took the streets to ask
for more liberty and political reform. However, and according to reports of
the movement, more than 800,000 took the streets that day to ask for
freedom, democracy, dignity and social justice. The February 20th youth
movement hence proved a lot to Moroccans and urged as a consequence
the government under the strict guidelines of the king to revise so many of
its strategies and political discourses they address to the rest of the public.

Conclusion
The February 20th Movement is one of the new oppositional groups that saw
light with the wave of protests and uprisings that swept over and engulfed the
MENA since 2011. Its emergence is associated with the development and
rapid diffusion of the Internet and many social media forms; in addition to
the deteriorated socioeconomic and political situations. The movement or
rather actors in the movement passed through difficult times ranging from
repression and co-optation to jail and corporal punishment, though the move-
ment called only for reforms of major institution and not the overthrow of the
regime or the questioning of the monarchy as a such. The movement asked
for a democratic constitution, the independence of the judiciary and the
media, as well as the separation of wealth and the monopolisation of
resources and political power. These demands reflect the political potentials
that members of the 20th Movement have as a group of youth with a
common identity, different ideologies and a set of common and shared
goals and objectives. In addition, they have the mobilisation potentials
which refer to the willingness to become engaged in unconventional forms
of political behaviour (Barnes and Kaase 1979).
Personal characteristics, coupled with the wide range of potentials (political
and mobilisation potentials) of the oppositionists, the February 20th Move-
ment, remain insufficiently examined and need deeper studies in the future
to historically contextualise and profile it. Through an understanding of the
characteristics and potentials of Moroccan youth online activists and by con-
textualising cyberactivism historically and politically speaking, there is a
chance to better understand this socio-political phenomenon that altered suc-
cessfully Morocco’s protest culture and annoyed the regime and the follower
institutions or state apparatus.
The findings of the present study are promising and can travel beyond the
context of Morocco because of their relevance, significance and relatedness to
a global wave of mobilisation and protests that swept over many countries as
a result of ‘economic failure, the rise of the Internet and the level of repression
322 N.-E. LAOUNI

by the government’ (Kalpakian 2013). In the Arab World region, there are
many shared socioeconomic and political plights that determined the
spread and multiplication of protests. Yet, this does not mean that the Arab
Spring can be seen or understood as one similar phenomenon throughout
the region. There are some specificities and regional character that distinguish
one region from the other, though the February 20th Movement, and accord-
ing to the literature examined earlier, came about within the scope of global
mobilisations and collective action commonly referred to as the Arab Spring.
According to finding obtained, the February 20th Movement is composed
of a complex assortments of protesters with contrasting ideological, political
and religious beliefs, maintaining thus the diverse populations that are one of
the best hallmarks of this phenomenon. Protesters in the movement came
from different sociocultural backgrounds, educational levels and experience
in activism in order to realise change and redefine the country’s political
future. This issue of diversity among youth activists and protesters in the
movement helped in reaching many identity categories elsewhere. Like
other protests in other places of the world, this oppositionist movement
brought together a diverse collection of Moroccan youth from all walks of
life (liberals, Islamists, Leftists and Constitutionalists). These youth generally
have the same dreams and worries. With easy access to education and tech-
nology, they became better educated and well informed due to the amount of
information that is spread and disseminated in the Internet and other media
outlets. The findings obtained showed that youth are less acquiescent to auth-
ority and therefore in a better position to judge when a system is not working
well and when the status-quo should be abolished. A finding that can travel
beyond the context of the Moroccan society.
Similarly, the findings of this study revealed the importance of technology
in mobilising public opinion, spreading protesters’ dissident ideas and mess-
ages, and disseminating grievances among the rest of the population. On the
basis of these findings, cyberactivism will continue to grow, develop and exist,
but it will be always faced with new tactics from the other side (repressive
government forces). The more youth activists develop their protest tactics
and strategies online and offline, the more, the state also develops its
tactics of silencing voices and breaking protests and demonstrations
through sowing divisions within the movement, launching smear online
media complains against its members and/or by resorting to repression, co-
optation and even violence and persecutions. This fact can also reach other
borders and be an example to take when dealing with oppressive systems.
Briefly, the February 20th Movement represents Morocco’s 2011 cultural
revolution that was built around rallying Moroccans to their cause through
the use of the Internet for political activism. It paved the way for new ways
to establish participatory democracy, encourage freedom of speech and
launch big political reforms. After the Arab Spring, Morocco becomes
THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES 323

known as a country of evolution far more than revolution (Ben Moussa 2016) if
compared to many countries in the MENA region where civil wars and deep
political and sectarian divisions have been dominating till the present
moment. According to Kriesberg (2012) ‘a powerful expression of outrage
and a cry for change, particularly if it is effective, gives hope to other
people who feel some of the same grievance’, which indicates that the experi-
ence of the February 20th Movement can be a real model to follow because it
was the only social and oppositional movement that successful managed to
transgress antagonism towards agonism in a peaceful way.

Acknowledgement
The would like to express my deepest appreciation and gratitude to the anonymous
reviewer(s) from The Journal of North African Studies for the time and effort they
spent in reviewing this article. Without their guidance and persistent help, this
paper would not have been possible and would not see light.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

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