Prosecution Memorial

2ND AMITY NATIONAL TRIAL ADVOCACY MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022
TEAM CODE -
2ND AMITY NATIONAL TRIAL ADVOCACY

MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022
IN THE HON’BLE TRIAL COURT, NEW DELHI
C.C. NO.
STATE (NCT OF DELHI)

(PROSECUTION)
V.
MR. ABHINAV SINGH

(DEFENCE)
FOR OFFENCES CHARGED UNDER

SECTIONS 376,466, 420, 406
OF THE INDIANA PENAL CODE, 1860
IN THE COURT OF SESSIONS JUDGE AT TIZ HAZARI, NEW DELHI
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION
Page | 1
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PROSECUTION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Index of Authorities 3
• Table of Cases 3-4
• Books 4
• Websites 4
• Statutes 4
Statement of Jurisdiction 5
Statement of Facts 6-7
Statement of Issues 8
Summary of Arguments 9-10
Arguments Advanced 11-25
Issue-I: Whether Abhinav is liable for the rape of Soumya u/s 376 IPC? 11-16
Issue-II:WhetherAbhinav is liable for forgery u/s 420, 463, 464, 466 IPC? 17-22
Issue-III: WhetherMr. Abhinav has defrauded Miss Soumya under Section 406 of 23-25
IPC while getting the house registered in his own name?
Prayer 26
List of Witnesses 27
Page | 2
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Table of Cases:
1. Annu Gill v. State and another, 2001 V AD (Delhi) 411

2. Chelloor Mankkal Narayan v. State of Travancore, AIR 1953 SC 478
3. Daniel Hailey Walcot v. State, (1968) MLJ 229
4. Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 2071
5. Deelip Singh @ Dilip Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR 2005 SC 203
6. Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay, 1956 AIR 575
7. Kanumukkala Krishnamurthy v. State of A.P., AIR 1965 SC 333
8. Karthi@ Karthick v. State, AIR 2013 SC 2645
9. Mahedeo Prasad v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1954 SC 724
10. Mahmood Farooqui v. State, 2018 Cr LJ 3457 (Del)
11. Md. Ibrahim and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., (2009) 8 SCC 751
12. Ram Jas v. State of U.P., (1970)2 SCC 740
13. Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi, AIR 1999 SC 1216
14. Rao Harnarain Singh v. State, AIR 1958 Punjab 123
15. RK Dalmia v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1962 SC 1821
16. R. Venkatkrishnan v. CBI, (2009) 11 SCC 737
17. R.S. Nayak v.A.R.Antulay and Anr., (1986) 2 SCC 716
18. Salimbhai Hamidbhai Menon v. Nitesh Kumar Maganbhai Patel and Ors., AIR 2021 SC
4109
19. Sheila Sebastian v. R. Jawaharaj, AIR2018SC2434
20. State v. Parasram, AIR 1965 Raj 9
21. State of Gujarat v. Jaswantlal Nathalal, AIR 1968 SC 700
22. State of HP v. Karanvir, AIR 2006 SC 2211
23. State Of Rajasthan v. Kesar Singh, 1968 1968 WLN 3
24. State of Maharashtra v. Dnyndeo Sudam Waghmare, Criminal Appeal No. 72 of 1994
Bombay High Court
Page | 3
25. State of U.P. v. Naushad, 2014 Cr LJ 540

26. State of UP v. Chhteyal, AIR 2011 SC 69
27. State of UP v. Ranjit Singh, AIR 1999 SC 120
28. Sushil Suri v. Central Bureau of Investigation, AIR 2011 SC 1713
29. Uday Kumar v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1998 SC 3317
30. Vimla v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1963 SC 1572
31. Yedla Srinivasa Rao v. State of A.P.,(2006)11 SCC 615
STATUTES
1. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act 2 of 1973)

2. The Indiana Evidence Act, 1872 (Act 18 of 1872)
3. The Indiana Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860)
BOOKS
1. Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code, 33(2011)

2. P.S.A. Pillai, Criminal Law 13 (2017)
3. K. D. Gaur, Criminal Law: Cases and Materials, 6 (2009)
4. Gupta and Dighe, Criminal Manual, 7 (2007)
5. R.V. Kelkar, Criminal Procedure, 5 (2011)
6. Harris, Criminal Law, 22 (2000)
7. I, III, IV Nelson R. A. Indian Penal Code, 10 (2008)
8. Hill, McGraw, Criminal Investigation, 4 (2004)
9. Lal, Batuk, The Law of Evidence, 18 (2010)
10. Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Law of Evidence, 22 (2006)
WEBSITES
1. http://www.scconline.com
2. http://www.manupatrafast.com
3. http://www.findlaw.com
Page | 4
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Hon’ble Court has the jurisdiction to try the instant matter under Section 177 r/w Section
209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731.
Section 177:
‘177.Ordinary place of inquiry and trial-
Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local
jurisdiction it was committed.’
r/w Section 209:
‘209.Commitment of case to Court of Session when offence is triable exclusively by it-
When, in a case instituted on a police report or otherwise, the accused appears or is brought
before the Magistrate and it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by
the Court of Session, he shall-
(a) Commit the case to the Court of Session;
(b) Subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail, remand the accused to custody during,
and until the conclusion of, the trial;
(c) Send to that Court the record of the case and the documents and articles, if any, which are to
be produced in evidence;
(d) Notify the Public Prosecutor of the commitment of the case to the Court of Session.’
The Counsels for the Prosecution most respectfully submit to this jurisdiction of the
Hon’ble Sessions Court.
1
The Code of Criminal Procedure, No. 2 of 1974
Page | 5
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Beginning
Mr. Abhinav Singh (Accused) aged 27 years, an Engineer in Delhi, and Ms. Soumya Garg
(Prosecutrix) aged 26 years, a Banker from Mumbai, met on a social media platform in the May
of 2020. They started chatting with each other, formed a romantic relationship, and even met a
few times.
The start of a live-in relationship
Till January 2021, Soumya transferred to Delhi. Even though initially reluctant for a live-in due
to hesitation of getting physical, Soumya decided to live with Abhinav on being assured of
marriage by the end of 2021 or start of 2022 as may be feasible for both of them considering
their job prospects and approval from family members. The two rented a 1-BHK flat in SS
Colony, Nangloi in New Delhi. To get an apartment Abhinav produced a marriage certificate that
presented the two as a couple, to satisfy the norms of the housing society of not renting the
apartments to bachelors.
The genesis of cracks in the foundation of the relationship
Soon after, the two started fighting over a variety of petty issues. The major reason for these
constant fights was that Soumya was unhappy with the kind of locality they were living in as
according to her it was not up to their standards and unsafe at night, along with Abhinav always
dogging the question of marriage. Soon, Abhinav bought a new flat in Aloft Residency, Punjabi
Bagh West, New Delhi from his own earnings, passive sources, and home loans in his name and
both shifted there in February 2022. Even then, their relationship did not improve and fights
continued. Despite repeated requests from Soumya, Abhinav refused to transfer the new
residence in her name despite Soumya emphasizing the fact that she too is repaying the home
loan. Soumya would constantly allege that Abhinav has fooled her into a live-in relationship and
had no intention of marrying her despite establishing a physical relationship on basis of the same.
Page | 6
The unfateful day
On the morning of April 30, 2022, Soumya, in a shabby condition (hit on the head, sleeves torn)
reached the Punjabi West Bagh police station to lodge a complaint against Abhinav under
Sections 376,420, 406, 464, and 466 of Indiana Penal Code. The police began an investigation on
the matter and records the statement of all possible witnesses.
Page | 7
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE 1
WHETHER ABHINAV IS LIABLE FOR THE RAPE OF SOUMYA UNDER SECTION
376 OF IPC?
ISSUE 2
WHETHER ABHINAV IS LIABLE FOR FORGERY UNDER SECTIONS 420, 463, 464,
AND 466 OF IPC?
ISSUE 3
WHETHER MR ABHINAV HAS DEFRAUDED MISS SOUMYA UNDER SECTION 406

OF IPC WHILE GETTING THE HOUSE REGISTERED IN HIS OWN NAME?
Page | 8
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE 1

376 OF IPC?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Mr. Abhinav is indeed guilty of the offence
of rape of prosecutrix as the consent given by the prosecutrix is consent procured by
misconception of fact and pursuant to a promisethat he is going to marry her at the end of 2021
or early 2022,which does not fall under the ambit of consent as per Section 90 of
IPC.Subsequently this absence of consent and presumption of this absence under Section 114A
of Indian Evidence Act goes on to fulfil all the essential elements of offence under Section 376
of IPC.
ISSUE 2
WHETHER ABHINAV IS LIABLE FOR FORGERY UNDER SECTIONS 420, 463, 464,
AND 466 OF IPC?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Mr. Abhinav is guilty of the offence of
forgery as he has forged a marriage certificate under section 466 of IPC. He forged the marriage
certificate to deceive the Housing Society, representing that he and the prosecutrix are married so
that he could easily rent the apartment as renting the apartment by mere bachelors was
prohibited. Making of such false document with a fraudulent intention committed by the accused
has fulfilled all the required essential to constitute offences under Section 420, 463, 464 and 466
of the Indiana Penal Code.
Page | 9
ISSUE 3
WHETHER MR ABHINAV HAS DEFRAUDED MISS SOUMYA UNDER SECTION 406

OF IPC WHILE GETTING THE HOUSE REGISTERED IN HIS OWN NAME?
It is humbly submitted that the prosecutrix entrusted the accused with her property i.e. money.
However, the accused has dishonestly misappropriated or converted the same to his own use the
property of the prosecutrix and ignored her questions to return back the property when the same
were demanded by the prosecutrix. Therefore, it would be justified to convict the accused under
Section 406 of IPC for criminal breach of trust.
Page | 10
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE 1
376 OF IPC?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Mr. Abhinav (hereinafter referred to as the
“accused”), is indeed guilty of the offence of rape of Ms. Soumya (hereinafter referred to as the
“prosecutrix") under Section 376 of Indiana Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as
“IPC”)[1.1]. Consequently, the consent given by the prosecutrix is consent procured by
misconception of facts provided under Section 90 of IPC [1.2]. Additionally, the Hon’ble Court
shall take the presumption that the prosecutrix did not consent in the instant case as provided
underSection114-A of the Indiana Evidence Act, 1872 [1.3].
[1.1]. THE ACCUSED HAS COMMITTED THE OFFENCE OF RAPE UNDER

SECTION 376 OF IPC.
The offence of rape in its simplest form is ‘the ravishment of a woman, without her consent, by
force, fear or fraud, or as ‘the carnal knowledge of a woman by force against her will’. It is
humbly submitted that the accused is indeed liable for the offence of rape of prosecutrix. To
constitute the offence of rape, has been defined under Section 375 of IPC2, the following
conditions must necessarily be satisfied:
(i) There must besexual intercourse between the accused and the prosecutrix [A]; and
(ii) The intercourse must be without theconsent of the prosecutrix [B].
[A]. THERE WAS SEXUAL INTERCOURSE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND THE
PROSECUTRIX.
It is an acknowledged fact that is neither denied by the prosecution nor the defence in the present
case that the accused and prosecutrix had formed a physical relationship with each other since
2
Section 375 of Indiana Penal Code, 1860
Page | 11
2021 when they came into a live-in relationship. The prosecutrix was initially reluctant to form a
physical relationship with the accused and did not want to be used for mere sexual pleasure. It
can also be apprehended by the statements of the accused and the prosecutrix that the accused
assured the prosecutrix that he loved her and wanted to marry her by the end of 2021 or the
beginning of 2022 once he becomes more financially and emotionally stable, and through this
promise he acquired the consent of prosecutrix to engage in sexual activities with him.
Hence, the occurrence of sexual intercourse between the accused and the prosecutrix in the
present case has been established.
[B]. THE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WAS NON-CONSENSUAL AS IT WAS BASED ON

FALSE PROMISES.
It is humbly contended before the Hon’ble Court that in the present case, the accused is guilty of
the offence of rape as the consent for the sexual intercourses in question were under
misconception of facts [sub-issue (1.2)].
As aforementioned, the offence of rape has been defined under Section 375 of IPC which
enumerates six descriptions of the said offence. The second description of the Section 375
provides for rape "without her consent"3. In normal parlance, “consent” would mean voluntary
agreement to engage in sexual activity without being abused or exploited by coercion or threats.4
It must be engraved in mind that there is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex.5
Similarly, consent and submission are also very different concept as every consent involves a
submission but the converse does not follow and a mere act of submission does not involve
consent.6
In the instant case, the accused did not intend to marry the prosecutrixand made a false promise
to this effect only to allure her into having sexual intercourse with him which makes it
consentunder misconception of fact.7 Consequently, the consent obtained by the accused through
3
State of UP v. Chhteyal, AIR 2011 SC 697
4
Mahmood Farooqui v. State, 2018 Cr LJ 3457 (Del)
5
Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State Of Maharashtra,Criminal Appeal No. 1443 OF 2018(Arising out of Special
Leave Petition (Criminal) No.6532 of 2018)
6
Rao Harnarain Singh v. State, AIR 1958 Punjab 123
7
Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 2071
Page | 12
deceitful means is “no consent”8, thereby fulfilling the second essential ingredient of the
definition of rape as mentioned under Section 376 of IPC.
[1.2]. CONSENT OF THE PROSECUTRIX WAS GIVEN PURSUANT TO A FALSE

REPRESENTATION THAT THE ACCUSED INTENDED TO MARRY HER.
“Consent” means an active will in the mind of a person to permit the doing of the act complained
of, and knowledge of what is to be done, or of the nature of the act that is being done, is essential
to consent to an act.9 The concept and dimensions of 'consent' in the context of Section 375 of
IPC have been interpreted in the light of different angles. Though the IPC does not define
'consent' in positive terms, but what cannot be regarded as 'consent' under the Code is explained
by Section 90, which states that “consent is no consent if itis given: firstly, under fear of injury or
secondly, under a misconception of fact and the offender had the knowledge or reason to believe
that the consent was given by the prosecutrix under the fear of injury or misconception of fact.
However, when we delve into the provisions of Section 90, various landmark judgments laid
down by this Hon’ble Court and other Hon’ble High Courts, we conclude that a 3-part test
needs to be satisfied in order to bring the consent under misconception within the ambit of “no
consent” under Section 90 of IPC, which is as follows:
[A]. IS IT A CASE OF PASSIVE SUBMISSION IN THE FACE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL

PRESSURE EXERTED OR ALLUREMENTS MADE BY THE ACCUSED OR WAS IT A
CONSCIOUS DECISION ON THE PART OF THE PROSECUTRIXKNOWING FULLY
THE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACT SHE WAS ASKED TO INDULGE
IN?
In the present case, the consent of the prosecutrix was obtained through fraud, allurement, and
practicing deception upon her on the pretext that ultimately, she will be married, and under such
pretext she allowed the accused to have sexual intercourse with her10.
8
Karthi @ Karthick v. State, 2013 Cr.L.J. 3765 (SC)
9
Queen v. Lock , (1872) LR 2 CCR 10, 11.
10
Saleha Khatoon v. State of Bihar and another, 1989 Crl. L.J. 202
Page | 13
[B]. WHETHER THE TACIT CONSENT GIVEN BY THE PROSECUTRIX WAS THE RESULT
OF A MISCONCEPTION CREATED IN HER MIND AS TO THE INTENTION OF THE
ACCUSED TO MARRY HER?
Further contention raised by the prosecution is that the prosecutrix has given consent for sexual
intercourse with him only as a consequence of her belief, based on his promise, that they will get
married in due course.11 However, this tainted consent or consent of such nature which is based
on a misconception, cannot be termed, inter alia, to conclude that it was ’with consent.’12
[C]. WHETHER THE PROMISE TO MARRY, IF MADE BY THE ACCUSED, WAS FALSE TO
HIS KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF FROM THE VERY INCEPTION AND IT WAS NEVER
INTENDED TO BE ACTED UPON BY HIM?
This question is concretely answered from the conduct of the accused that he made a false
promise to marry with the fraudulent intention of inducing her into sexual intercourse and that
was the predominant reason for the prosecutrix to agree to the sexual intimacy with him. This
mala fide intention of the accused is de facto manifested through his conduct as he always
dogged the question of marriage and allured the prosecutrix into a live-in merely to satisfy his
lust13. The accused got promoted and an increment in the salary through which he bought the
house,and induced the prosecutrix into believing that the said house would be their marital home,
thereby, assuring their marriage by the end of 2021 or the beginning of 2022. However, when the
prosecutrix brought up questions regarding the marriage, he would not answer but rather ignore
her.
The accused was conscious of the fact, that if it was not the false promise14 the consent of the
prosecutrix would not have been given15 and the consent ostensibly given by the prosecutrix will
be of no avail to the accused to exculpate him from the ambit of Section 375. The Counsel would
like to draw the attention of the Court to the observation made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
case of Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana,16 which states that the accused can be convicted
11
State of U.P. v. Naushad, (2013) 16 SCC
12
Supra 10
13
Supra 7
14
Supra 8
15
Deelip Singh @ Dilip Kumar v. State Of Bihar, AIR 2005 SC 203
16
Supra, 10
Page | 14
ofrape if the court concludes that the intention of the accused was mala fide and that he had
clandestine motives.
However, it must be noted that even the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Uday17,
Deelip Singh,18and Shivashankar alias Shive v. State of Karnataka19 further support the
contentions raised by the Prosecution that if it is established and proved that the accused did not
have any intention to marry, then, the consent thus obtained can be said to be a consent obtained
on a misconception of fact as perSection 90 of IPC and would not excuse the offender of the
offence of rape.
Therefore, the Counsel humbly submits that the accused is indeed guilty of the offence of rape as
defined under Section 375 read with Section 90 of IPC and should be convicted under Section
376 of IPC.20
[1.3]. PRESUMPTION OF NO CONSENT UNDER SECTION 114-A OF THE INDIAN

EVIDENCE ACT
Section 114-A of the Indiana Evidence Act lays down that there will be a presumption of
absence of consent in certain instances of rape cases. Consensual sex on the false promise of
marriage to the prosecutrix amounts to consent obtained under misconception of facts under
Section 90 of IPC and gives rise to a presumption under Section 114-A of the Evidence Act.
Section 114-A states that in cases where21:
I. It is a proven fact that there has been intercourse;
II. The question is whether it was with or without consent; and
III. The woman states before the court in her evidence that she had not consented,
then the Hon’ble court shall take the presumption that she did not consent. Where the sexual
intercourse by the accused is proved and the question is whether it was without the consent of
women alleged to have been raped and she states in evidence before the court that she did not
17
Uday Kumar v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1998 SC 3317
18
Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 2005 SC 203
19
Shivashankar alias Shive v. State of Karnataka, Criminal Appeal (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.)
No.454 of 2017)
20
Supra 11
21
Yedla Srinivasa Rao v. State of A.P. (2006)11 SCC 615
Page | 15
consent, the court shall presume that she did not consent.22 The presumption has been introduced
by the legislature in the Indiana Evidence Act, 1872 looking at atrocities committed against
women and in the instant case as per the statement of prosecutrix, she resisted and did not give
consent to the accused readily, however, the accused continued to make such promises and
alluded the prosecutrix to give consent for a physical relationship and raped on her on such
pretext.
In her statement prosecutrix has stated that on 30th April accused clearly told her that he never
wanted to marry her and he didn’t know why he was stupid enough to invest so much on her.
Further, as per the statement of PW2 the prosecutrix and the accused always fought over the
topic of marriage and how he always ignored this topic, even when the friends of accused were
about to visit for house warming party he didn’t wanted to disclose it in front of them. PW3 also
stated that, he saw the prosecutrix in a shabby condition when she reached the police station,
indicating the miserable state of affairs the accused put her in.
Therefore, the Prosecution humbly submits that the Trial Court would be justified in convicting
the accused under Section 376 of IPC read with Section 90 of IPC, along with the assumptions
under Section 114-A of Indiana Evidence Act, 1872.
ISSUE 2
WHETHER ABHINAV IS LIABLE FOR FORGERY UNDER SECTION420, 463, 464

AND 466 OF IPC?
The Counsel on behalf of the prosecutrix humbly submits before the Hon’ble Court that the
accused is indeed guilty of the offence of forgery under Section 466 of IPC [2.1].
Simultaneously, the accused is guilty of the offence of cheating under Section 420 of IPC as well
[2.2].
[2.1]. THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OFFORGERY U/S 466 OF IPC.
22
Bipul Medhi v. State of Assam, 2008 Cri LJ 1099
Page | 16
The offence of “Forgery” as provided under Section 466 of IPC is the more aggravated form of
forgery, which has been defined under Section 463 of IPC. As per Section 466 of IPC, the
following three essential elements of forgery need to be fulfilled to constitute the offence:
[A]. The forgery committed must be in respect of one of the documents prescribed under
Section 466 of IPC.
[B]. It must be the forgery as defined under Section 463 of IPC.
[C]. It must be made in such a fraudulent or dishonest manner as defined under Section 464 of
IPC.
As per the statement of PW 3, when he initiated the investigation, he discovered an alleged fake
marriage certificate that Abhinav had forged and produced to defraud the Housing Society and
made his way through the norms of Society. Simultaneously, the Counsel on behalf of the
prosecutrix pleads that the findings of PW 3 are accurate and apt in the instant case, through the
hereinafter raised arguments.
[A]. THE FORGERY COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED WAS IN RESPECT OF ONE OF THE
DOCUMENTS PRESCRIBED UNDER THE SECTION 466 OF IPC.
As aforementioned, the offence of “Forgery” under Section 466 of IPC is the more aggravated
form of forgery, however, forgery in this Section is limited to certain documents provided in the
Section itself, namely:
• A register of birth, baptism, marriage, or burial, or a register kept by a public servant as
such;or
• A certificate or document purporting to be made by a public servant in his official capacity;
or
• An authority to institute or defend a suit, or to take any proceedings therein, or to
confessjudgment;or
• A power of attorney.
In the instant case, the Accused forged a marriage certificate, which falls under the category of
documents mentioned under Section 466 of IPC. He forged the marriage certificate to deceive
the Housing Society, representing that he and the prosecutrix are married so that they could
easily rent the apartment as renting the apartment by mere bachelors was prohibited.
Page | 17
[B]. THE FORGERY COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED WAS INDEED THE FORGERY
DEFINED UNDER THE SECTION 463 OF IPC
The making of a “false document” with any of the criminal intents23 as specified in Section 463
of IPC is what constitutes the offence of “forgery”. According to Section 463 of IPC, whoever
makes a false document or electronic record or part of them, with a criminal intention to use it
as genuine so as to24-
• cause damage or harm to:(i) the public, (ii) any person, (iii) to support any claim or title, or
• or to cause any person to part with property, or
• entering a contract, or
• to commit fraud,
commits the offence of forgery under this Section.

In the instant case, the accused forged a marriage certificate,knowing it to be false in fact,
representing him and the prosecutrix to be married, dishonestly and fraudulently with the
criminal intent to commit fraud25.
[C]. THE FORGED MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE WAS MADE IN SUCH A FRAUDULENT OR

DISHONEST MANNER AS PRESCRIBED UNDER THE SECTION 464 OF IPC.
When a document is prepared with the intention to deceive an individual and employing deceit,
an unfair advantage is obtained by one person or an unfair loss is caused to the other person, i.e.,
benefit or advantage to the deceiver, but no corresponding loss to the deceived,26 then it is said to
be a fraud.27Section 464 of IPCstates how the forgery of the documents occurs and provides
exclusively that the individual who makes a false document solely can be held liable under this
provision28.
23
State v. Parasram, AIR 1965 Raj 9
24
Sushil Suri v. Central Bureau of Investigation, AIR 2011 SC 1713; State of UP v. Ranjit Singh, AIR 1999 SC 1201
25
Sadanand M. Dhand v. State, 1977 Cri LJ (NOC) 103 (Goa); Muhammad Sirdar v. Emperor, AIR 1914 Lah 586:
16 Cri LJ 19
26
Vimla v. Delhi Administration, AIR1963SC1572
27
State of UP v. Ranjit Singh, AIR 1999 SC 1201
28
Sheila Sebastian v. R. Jawaharaj, Appeal (Crl.), 359-360 of 2010
Page | 18
Section 464 of IPC precisely provides that to constitute forgery, the false document must either
be legally capable of attaining the fraud thus intended or it must appear as a true document,
possessing some legal validity29. Under this Section, what is essential is that the accused person
must make a document with the intention of making it to be believed that it was signed by or by
the authority of someone else, while he knows that it was not so made or authorized by that
person.30
The Hon’ble Apex Court held in the case of Md. Ibrahim & Ors v. State of Bihar &Anr31 that
in order to constitute the offence of forgeryunder this Section, the document must be-
a) false in fact;
b) it must have been made fraudulently and dishonestly; i.e.
(i) it is made or executed by the accused, claiming to be someone else or authorized` by
someone else; or
(ii) it is altered or tampered; or
(iii) it is obtained by practicing deception, or from a person not in control of his senses.
c) the forged document must be made with one of the intents specified in Section 463 of IPC32.
In the present case also, the accused made a false marriage certificate with his and the
prosecutrix’s signature knowing it to be false, with a view to making it appear that it was made
by the appropriate authority with the intent to defraud the Housing Community.33Intending to
defraud means, of course, something more than deceiving.34Here, the expression "defraud"
involves two elements, namely, deceit and injury to the person deceived.35 The accused in the
instant case fulfilled both the elements:
(i). He deceived36 the Housing Community, making them believe that the marriage certificate
was legal and that he and the prosecutrix were a married couple.
29
Badan Singh, (1922) 3 Lah. 373
30
Re, Venkatasuryanarasimha Rao, AIR 1955 Andhra 82
31
Md. Ibrahim and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., (2009) 8 SCC 751
32
Daniel Hailey Walcot v. State, (1968) MLJ 229.
33
Re, Venkatasuryanarasimha Rao, AIR 1955 Andhra 82; Kotamraju Venkatrayadu v. Emperor, I.L.R. (1905) Mad.
99
34
Kotamraju Venkatrayadu v. Emperor, I.L.R. (1905) Mad. 99
35
Vimla v. Delhi Administration, AIR1963SC1572
36
Ashwinbhai Hirabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 18419 of 2018
Page | 19
(ii). The accused caused injury to the society of SS Colony, Nangloi because as per the norms
of the housing society apartments could not be rented to bachelors. In the case of State of
Maharashtra v. Dnyndeo Sudam Waghmare37, Bombay High Court held that if
ultimately monetary benefit was not obtained by the accused, still the trial Court had
rightly convicted him for committing the offence of cheating forgery due to the use of
forged documents.
Therefore, the Prosecution humbly submits that the Trial Court would be justified in convicting
the accused if it is shown by the evidence on record that the accused has committed the offence
of forgery as defined under Section 466 of IPC.
[2.2]. THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF CHEATING U/S 420 OF IPC AS WELL.

Cheating as an offence is also made punishable under Section 420 of IPC, which is the
aggravated form of Section 417 that provides the punishment for simple cheating. Under Section
420 of IPC, the following essentials are required to be fulfilled:
Firstly, there must be cheating.
Secondly, the accused must:
a) dishonestly induce the person deceived to deliver any property to any person; or
b) make, alter, or destroy any valuable security; or
c) or anything which is signed or sealed and capable of being converted into valuable security;
in whole or in part.
The Prosecution humbly submits that the accused is indeed guilty of the offence of cheating as
all the prerequisites of the offence of cheating as per Section 415 of IPC are fulfilled by the act
committed [A]. Additionally, the accused dishonestly induced the Housing Society to deliver the
property i.e., conferring the apartment on rent as well [B] going on to fulfil both the essentials of
Section 420 of IPC.
A. THE PREREQUISITES OF CHEATING AS PER SECTION 415 OF IPC ARE

FULFILLED.
37
State of Maharashtra v. Dnyndeo Sudam Waghmare, Criminal Appeal No. 72 of 1994 Bombay High Court
Page | 20
The first essential ingredient of Section 420 of IPC i.e., the offence of “cheating” has been
defined in Section 415 of IPC. It is committed in order to gain profit or an advantage from
another person by using some deceitful means. The person who deceives another knows for a
fact that it would place the other person in an unfair situation.
Under Section 415 of IPC, cheating can be committed in either of the two ways:
• Where, by practicing deception the accused fraudulently or dishonestly induces that

person to deliver any property to any person or to consent that any person shall retain
any property; or
• Where, by deception practiced upon a person the accused intentionally induces a
person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so
deceived, and this act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that
person in body, mind, reputation, or property38.
It is also essential to examine one of the most essential ingredients of the offence of cheating i.e.,
guilty intention or 'mens rea' on the part of that person who deceives another, to secure the
conviction of a person39. It must also be established that the intention to deceive was in existence
at the time when the inducement was offered.40
In the instant case, the accused deceived the Housing Society from the time he occupied the
apartment by providing a false marriage certificate with the intention to rent the apartment as the
apartment was not to be engaged by mere bachelors. The accused induced the Housing Society
dishonestly, with the criminal intent to commit fraud,41 thereby, constituting the offence of
“cheating.”
B. THE ACCUSED DISHONESTLY INDUCED THE HOUSING SOCIETY TO CONFER THE

APARTMENT ON RENT TO HIM.
38
R.S. Nayak v. A. R. Antulay and anr., (1986) 2 SCC 716; Kanumukkala Krishnamurthy v. State of A.P., AIR 1965
SC 333; Ram Jas v. State of U.P., (1970)2 SCC 740; Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi, AIR 1999 SC 1216
39
Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay, 1956 AIR 575
40
Mahedeo Prasad v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1954 SC 724
41
Sadanand M. Dhand v. State, 1977 Cri LJ (NOC) 103 (Goa); Muhammad Sirdar v. Emperor, AIR 1914 Lah 586
Page | 21
The Counsel humbly proffers that, in the present case, the accused prima faciecheated42 the
housing society (as established earlier), representing himself and the prosecutrix to be married
throughsuch forged document and took advantage of the same.43 He would not have gotten the
apartment on rent as he was not eligible to get one because of his status of being unmarried.
The accused, therefore, by practicing deception dishonestly induced the Housing Society to
deliver him the property i.e., rent the apartment to him, and thereby, defrauded them.
The Prosecution humbly submits that in the light of the aforementioned, the accused is indeed
guilty of the offence of cheating, fulfilling all the prerequisites of the offence under Section 420
of IPC.
Further, it is not a matter of concern for the Court to scrutinize who might have forged the
marriage certificate, on which reliance was placed by the accused. However, it is of utmost
importance to bring the attention of the Court to the fact that the accused hasmade use of the
such document with requisite mens rea, knowing it to be a forged document, for the purpose of
getting the apartment on rent.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sheila Sebastian v. R.Jawaharaj44 has held that a
penal statute cannot be expanded by using implications and Section 464 of the IPC makes it
clear that the one who makes a false document can be held liable under the aforesaid
provision.Therefore, if for instance accused pleads that he was not the one who made the
documents but still he can’t escape his liability under Section 471 of IPC.
Therefore, the Counsel humbly submits that the Trial Court would be justified in convicting the
accused for the offence under Section466 and 420 of IPC as the act committed by the accused
has fulfilled all the required conditions to constitute these offences and the same has been duly
justified by the prosecution in this issue.
ISSUE 3
WHETHER MR. ABHINAV HAS DEFRAUDED MISS SOUMYA UNDER SECTION 406
OF IPC WHILE GETTING HOUSE REGISTERED IN HIS OWN NAME?
42
Salimbhai Hamidbhai Menon v. Nitesh Kumar Maganbhai Patel and Ors., AIR 2021 SC 4109
43
Ashwinbhai Hirabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 18419/2018
44
Sheila Sebastian v. R. Jawaharaj, AIR 2018 SC 2434
Page | 22
The Counsel on behalf of the Prosecutrix humbly submits before the Hon’ble Court that the
accused is indeed guilty of the offence of criminal breach of trust under the Section 406 of IPC.
Section 406 of IPC provides punishment for the offence of criminal breach of trust while Section
405 of IPC defines the said offence45. Section 405 of IPC states that the term “criminal breach of
trust” would, inter alia, mean using or disposing of the property by a person who is entrusted
with or has otherwise dominion over the property and closely corresponds to the offence of
embezzlement under the English law. The ownership or beneficial interest in the property in
respect of which criminal breach of trust is committed must be in some person other than the
accused and the latter must hold it on account of some person or in some way for his benefit.46
This offence consists of any one of four positive acts, namely, misappropriation, conversion, use
or disposal of property.47 Sufferance of any loss by the victim is not necessary for leading to a
conviction under the Section.48
In the instant case, the prosecutrix entrusted the accused with her property (money) [3.1], and the
accused dishonestly converted to his own use that property [3.2], thereby, fulfilling both the
essential prerequisites of the offence of criminal breach of trust.
[3.1]. THE PROSECUTRIX ENTRUSTED THE ACCUSED WITH HER PROPERTY

(MONEY).
For the application of Section 405 of IPC, there must be entrustment of property. The term
“entrustment” in its most general significance carries with it the implication that the person
handing over any property or on whose behalf that property is handed over to another, continues
to be its owner and does not imply the conferring of any proprietary right at all49. Further, the
person handing over property must have confidence in the person taking the property so as to
create a fiduciary relationship.50
45
Annu Gill v. State and another, 2001 V AD(Delhi) 411
46
Chelloor Mankkal Narayan v. State of Travancore, AIR 1953 SC 478
47
Supra 47
48
R. Venkatkrishnan v. CBI, (2009) 11 SCC 737
49
Lake v. Simmons, (1927) AC 487
50
State of Gujarat v. Jaswantlal Nathalal, AIR 1968 SC 700
Page | 23
Once entrustment is proved, the prosecution has not to prove any misappropriation as notit is for
the accused to prove in his defence that there was no misappropriation. The offence becomes
proved when it is shown that the property has not been applied to the purpose for which it was
entrusted.51 Additionally, the word “property” is not restricted to movable property in this
Section of IPC.52
The Counsel humbly proffer that the accused is liable for the offence of criminal breach of trust
in the instant case. The prosecutrix de facto used to support the accused financially and bore the
entire household expenditure by herself under the misconception of fact that the accused will
marry her as per his promise (as established under Issue 1). The prosecutrix, therefore, entrusted
the accused with her property i.e., her hard-earned money and believed that they will share
everything together through the holy matrimony of marriage. The accused over time bought a
new apartment under his name on loan in the Aloft Residency and the prosecutrix still continued
to pay the household expenditure.
Also, the Counsel humbly seeks to draw the attention of the Court to the statement of PW1 began
to pay even the EMI of the newly bought apartment as the accused had enormous excuses
asserting that he could not pay them.
[3.2]. THE ACCUSED DISHONESTLY CONVERTED TO HIS OWN USE THE

PROPERTY OF PROSECUTRIX.
Section 405 of IPC is very broad in its approach and dishonest intention is the essence of this
offence. It provides that a person commits criminal breach of trust if he dishonestly
misappropriates or converts to his own use the property entrusted to him 53. The person will be
convicted only when it is shown that he misappropriated it or converted the same to his own use
or was a party to criminal breach of trust committed in respect of that property by any other
person.54The dishonest intention is one of the essential ingredients of the offence of criminal
misappropriation and also of the offence of the criminal breach of trust. The crucial word used in
51
State of HP v. Karanvir, AIR 2006 SC 2211
52
RK Dalmia v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1962 SC 1821
53
Supra 49
54
State Of Rajasthan v. Kesar Singh, 1968 WLN 35
Page | 24
Section 405 IPC is dishonestly and therefore, it implies the existence of mens rea, that is to say a
guilty mind.
As per the statement of the prosecutrix, a promise by the accused at the time of buying house
reiterated her trust in him but when the time of paying EMI(s) came, it was her who was paying
the same most of the time as he had excuses like brother’s education, etc. Also, at the time of
their fight on 30th April she specified that it was practically her who was repaying the loan.
It has been established in the abovementioned point that the prosecutrix entrusted the accused
with her property and through all these aforementioned statements, it can be deduced that the
accused had criminal intention to misappropriate the property (money) of the prosecutrix.The
accused has dishonestly misappropriated or converted the same to his own use the property
(money) of the prosecutrix and ignored her questions to return back the property when the same
were demanded by the prosecutrix.55 Hence, the elements constituting offence punishable under
Section 406 IPC have been established beyond reasonable doubt in the instant case.
Therefore, in the light of above arguments, evidence presented and statement of witnesses
annexed herein the Hon’ble Trial Court would be justified in convicting the accused under
Section 406 of IPC for such a criminal breach of trust.
55
Annu Gill v. State and another, 2001 V AD (Delhi) 411
Page | 25
PRAYER
Wherefore, in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, may this
Hon‘ble Court be pleased to:
1. Convict Mr. Abhinav Singh of the offence of rape under Section 376, cheating under
Section 420, forgery under Section 466, and criminal breach of trust under Section 406 of
Indiana Penal Code, 1860.
2. Declare sentence rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to imprisonment
for life and shall also be liable to fine.
AND/OR
Pass any other order it may deem fit, in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience.
All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.
Place : New Delhi S/d ____________________
Date: COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION
Page | 26
LIST OF WITNESSES
1. Soumya Garg(Complainant) – Prosecution Witness 1 (PW1)

2. Rajni(House Help) – Prosecution Witness 2 (PW2)
3. Harjot Singh (Investigation Officer) – Prosecution Witness 3 (PW3)
Page | 27

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2ND AMITY NATIONAL TRIAL ADVOCACY MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022

2ND AMITY NATIONAL TRIAL ADVOCACY

IN THE HON’BLE TRIAL COURT, NEW DELHI

STATE (NCT OF DELHI)

MR. ABHINAV SINGH

FOR OFFENCES CHARGED UNDER

IN THE COURT OF SESSIONS JUDGE AT TIZ HAZARI, NEW DELHI

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION

1. Annu Gill v. State and another, 2001 V AD (Delhi) 411

25. State of U.P. v. Naushad, 2014 Cr LJ 540

1. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act 2 of 1973)

1. Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code, 33(2011)

The start of a live-in relationship

The genesis of cracks in the foundation of the relationship

The unfateful day

WHETHER MR ABHINAV HAS DEFRAUDED MISS SOUMYA UNDER SECTION 406

WHETHER ABHINAV IS LIABLE FOR THE RAPE OF SOUMYA UNDER SECTION

WHETHER MR ABHINAV HAS DEFRAUDED MISS SOUMYA UNDER SECTION 406

[1.1]. THE ACCUSED HAS COMMITTED THE OFFENCE OF RAPE UNDER

[B]. THE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WAS NON-CONSENSUAL AS IT WAS BASED ON

[1.2]. CONSENT OF THE PROSECUTRIX WAS GIVEN PURSUANT TO A FALSE

[A]. IS IT A CASE OF PASSIVE SUBMISSION IN THE FACE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL

[1.3]. PRESUMPTION OF NO CONSENT UNDER SECTION 114-A OF THE INDIAN

WHETHER ABHINAV IS LIABLE FOR FORGERY UNDER SECTION420, 463, 464

[2.1]. THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OFFORGERY U/S 466 OF IPC.

commits the offence of forgery under this Section.

[C]. THE FORGED MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE WAS MADE IN SUCH A FRAUDULENT OR

[2.2]. THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF CHEATING U/S 420 OF IPC AS WELL.

A. THE PREREQUISITES OF CHEATING AS PER SECTION 415 OF IPC ARE

• Where, by practicing deception the accused fraudulently or dishonestly induces that

B. THE ACCUSED DISHONESTLY INDUCED THE HOUSING SOCIETY TO CONFER THE

[3.1]. THE PROSECUTRIX ENTRUSTED THE ACCUSED WITH HER PROPERTY

[3.2]. THE ACCUSED DISHONESTLY CONVERTED TO HIS OWN USE THE

All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.

Place : New Delhi S/d ____________________

Date: COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION

1. Soumya Garg(Complainant) – Prosecution Witness 1 (PW1)

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