Rule 15-18 Conso Digest

Rule 15 – Motions
01. Green Asia Construction v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.

KEY TAKE-AWAY OR DOCTRINE TO REMEMBER
A certification on non-forum shopping is required only in a complaint or a petition which is an initiatory pleading—a petition,
or a motion, for the issuance of a writ of possession is not an initiatory pleading; An original action is not necessary to acquire
possession in favor of the purchaser at an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property; The purpose of a motion is not to initiate
litigation, but to bring up a matter arising in the progress of the case where the motion is filed.
FACTS
Green Asia Construction and Development Corporation (GACDC) represented by its president, Renato Legaspi, obtained a loan
from PCI Leasing and Finance (PCILFI). As security, GACDC executed a REM in favor of PCI covering 3 parcels of land. When
GACDC failed to pay the loan, the mortgage was foreclosed extrajudicially. Being the highest bidder, PCI was issued a certificate of
sale which was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of Angeles City. PCI filed a petition for issuance of a writ of possession
with RTC Angeles which was granted. GACDC filed an urgent omnibus motion and a supplement thereto praying for the setting
aside of the certificate of sale, cancellation and suspension of the implementation a writ of possession. RTC denied. GACDC filed
an MR, but it was denied. On appeal, CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.
GACDC contends that the petition for the issuance of writ of possession is not proper in form and substance because the verification
and certification on non-forum shopping was not signed by PCI or its duly authorized representative. Further, they argue that Sec.
8 of Act 3135 clearly provides that appeal in the proceedings in which possession was requested is the appropriate remedy. PCI
counters that there is no specific requirement in the Rules of Court to include the Secretary’s Certificate in the certification of non-
forum shopping. Also, RTC’s orders are not appealable since they are not in the nature of a judgment on the merits.
ISSUE/S STATUTES/ARTICLES INVOLVED
Whether or not the petition for issuance of a writ of possession Section 1. Motion defined. — A motion is an application for relief
is defective in form and substance considering that the other than by a pleading.
signatory of the verification and certification against forum
shopping, Florecita Gonzales, is not duly authorized as such by
PCILFI and/or there was failure to show proof of such authority
HELD: NO
A certification on non-forum shopping is required only in a complaint or a petition which is an initiatory pleading. In this case, the
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by PCI is not an initiatory pleading. Although PCI denominated its
pleading as a petition, it is more properly a motion. What distinguishes a motion from a petition or other
pleading is not its form or the title given by the party executing it, but its purpose. The purpose of a motion is not
to initiate litigation, but to bring up a matter arising in the progress of the case where the motion is filed. Indeed,
an original action is not necessary to acquire possession in favor of the purchaser at an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property.
The right to possession is based simply on the purchaser’s ownership of the property. Thus, the mere filing of an ex parte
motion for the issuance of a writ of possession would suffice. No verification and certification on non-forum
shopping need be attached to the motion at all. Hence, it is immaterial that the verification and certification on non-forum
shopping in PCI’s petition was signed by its lawyer. Such insignificant lapse does not render the said petition defective in form.
On the issue of whether appeal is an appropriate remedy in actions for the issuance of writ of possession
pursuant to Sec. 8, Act 3135:
The remedy of Green Asia was to file a petition to set aside the sale and cancel the writ of possession. Under Sec. 8 of Act 3135, the
aggrieved party may thereafter appeal from any disposition by the court on the matter. We note, however, that what Green Asia
filed were an urgent omnibus motion and a supplement to the urgent omnibus motion to set aside the sale and cancel the writ of
possession. In the said motions, Green Asia alleged there was no basis for the extrajudicial foreclosure because the mortgage was
void. Note that the nullity of the mortgage is not covered by the remedy outlined under Section 8 of Act No. 3135. The said provision
specifically lists the following exclusive grounds for a petition to set aside the sale and cancel the writ of possession: (1) that the
mortgage was not violated; and (2) that the sale was not made in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135. Any question
regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession.
Indeed, regardless of whether or not there is a pending suit for annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself, the purchaser
is entitled to a writ of possession. Green Asia should have filed a separate and independent action for annulment of the mortgage
or the foreclosure. The remedy under Section 8 of Act No. 3135 is inapplicable in this case. RTC thus correctly denied the motions
to set aside the sale and cancel the writ of possession on the ground of nullity of the mortgage.
Rule 15 – Motions 02. Heirs of Arania v. Intestate Estate of Sangalang, 2017 Rule 15
FACTS
Heirs of Arania filed an action for recovery of possession of several parcels of agricultural land (subject landholdings) before the
PARAD. As proof of their claim, the petitioners presented their Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs). They averred that sometime
in 1987, they were harassed by Magdalena and her cohorts and that through coercion, threats, and intimidation, they were forced
to leave their respective landholdings.
PARAD ruled that the subject landholdings were covered by Operation Land Transfer (OLT) and that CLTs were already issued in
favor of the petitioners. DARAB held that the receipts issued by respondent Romulo Jimenez proved that the respondents had
acknowledged the petitioners as their tenants who had religiously complied with their obligation to pay rentals, and that the
issuance of the CLTs substantiated the petitioners’ right to physical possession of the subject landholdings.
Resspondents filed a petition for review before the CA Seventh Division, to challenge the DARAB’s decision. They question the
petitioners’ failure to comply with the requisites of procedural due process.
A writ of execution pending appeal was issued by the DARAB. Thereafter, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the
CA Special Fifteenth Division, to assail the issuance of the said writ of execution pending appeal.
CA 7th division dismissed the appeal of the respondents. Meanwhile CA 15th division held that the DARAB and the PARAD did
not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents because they were not served with summons. Heir of Arania sought
to file a petition for review before this Court to assail the decision of the CA in the certiorari action.
Whether or not there was forum shopping in this case.
HELD:Yes.
Propriety of the remedy of annulment of judgment
From the foregoing, it can be easily discerned that the petition for annulment of judgment instituted by the petitioners before the
Court cannot prosper. First, an appropriate remedy to question the decision in the petition for certiorari was available. In fact,
the petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 150695, which, however, was
denied on the ground of lack of affidavit of service of copies of the motion for extension.
Further, neither extrinsic fraud nor lack of jurisdiction exists in this case. Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the
prevailing party in litigation committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party is prevented from fully
exhibiting his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, such as by keeping him away from court;
by giving him a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had the knowledge of the suit, being kept in
ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat. The
petitioners were able to properly and fully ventilate their claims before the PARAD and the DARAB. The two administrative
tribunals even ruled in their favor. When the respondents filed a petition for review as well as a petition for certiorari before the
CA, there is no showing that the petitioners were deprived of any opportunity to answer the petitions. Finally, a petition for
certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DARAB squarely falls within the jurisdiction of the CA. Hence, a
petition to annul the judgment of the appellate court in the certiorari action has no leg to stand on.
Notwithstanding the unavailability of the remedy of annulment of judgment, the Court resolves to give due course to this petition
in order to cure the grave injustice suffered by the petitioners brought about by the respondents’ blatant disrespect of the rules of
procedure, which they now invoke to defeat the petitioners’ claim.
Respondents are guilty of willful and deliberate forum shopping.

In this jurisdiction, the rule against forum shopping has been ingrained in Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court
Expounding on the pernicious practice of forum shopping committed by a party who avails of several judicial remedies before
different courts to ensure a favorable ruling, the Court, in Yap v. Chua, held:
Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of action,
either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum
shopping may be resorted to by any party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an
attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by appeal or a special civil action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles
with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the administration of justice and congest court dockets. What is critical is the
vexation brought upon the courts and the litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes and
grant the same or substantially the same reliefs and in the process creates the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered
by the different fora upon the same issues. Willful and deliberate violation of the rule against forum shopping is a ground for
summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute direct contempt. To determine whether a party violated the rule against
forum shopping, the most important factor to ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another; otherwise stated, the test for determining forum shopping is whether
in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought.
Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between
the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. The underlying
principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same subject
matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy that the same subject matter should not be
the subject of controversy in courts more than once, in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake of
the stability of the rights and status of persons.
The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions;
(b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two
cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
The respondents undoubtedly committed forum shopping when they instituted a petition for certiorari before the CA in the guise
of challenging the validity of the writ of execution pending appeal, despite knowledge that a petition to review the DARAB’s
findings was pending in another division of the appellate court.
As regards the first requisite, in the petition for certiorari, the parties are the Intestate Estate of Magdalena R. Sangalang
represented by its administratrix, Solita Jimenez, Angelo Jimenez, Jr., Jayson Jimenez, Solita Jimenez, and John Hermogenes as
petitioners, and the petitioners herein as respondents. On the other hand, in the petition for review, Romulo S. Jimenez is the
sole petitioner while the petitioners herein are the respondents. It has been consistently held that absolute identity of parties is
not required. A substantial identity of parties is enough to qualify under the first
requisite.
Here, it is clear as daylight that the petitioners in both cases represent the same interest as they are all legal heirs of Magdalena
Sangalang. With respect to the second requisite, the respondents bewailed violation of procedural due process in the petition for
review by alleging lack of hearing, inadmissiblity of the petitioners’ position paper, and lack of directive from the PARAD to
submit position paper; whereas, in the petition for certiorari, they averred that the action for recovery of possession should have
been filed against the estate of Magdalena; that the PARAD and the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the estate or over the
persons of the respondents because no summons was served; that the CLTs did not make the petitioners owners of the subject
landholdings; that the subject landholdings had ceased to be agricultural lands; that the writ of execution pending appeal was
issued without hearing; and that the order for the issuance of the writ did not contain any good reason or impose any condition
therefor. Indeed, the respondents assigned different errors in the two petitions. However, the relief they sought from both
petitions is, without any doubt, the setting aside of the PARAD and DARAB’s decisions in favor of the petitioners.
In Pentacapital Investment Corporation v. Mahinay, the Court ruled that “forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) by
filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet
(where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the
same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) by filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for
dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).”
Both petitions in the appellate court are grounded on the same cause of action, i.e., the respondents’ claim of ownership over the
lands in question and the PARAD and DARAB’s violation of their rights as owners when the administrative bodies ruled in favor
of the petitioners. Certainly, the respondents may rightfully question the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal, the
same being the principal relief sought in the petition for certiorari. In evident bad faith, however, they assigned other errors that
already pertained to the merits of the case. It is worthy to note that the petition for review came first before the petition for
certiorari. What the respondents should have done was to file a supplemental petition to assail the issuance of the writ of
execution pending appeal. Moreover, it was the CA Seventh Division which has authority to rule on the propriety of the execution
pending appeal considering that Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that “after the trial court has lost jurisdiction,
the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate court.” As a corollary proposition, a challenge to a writ of
execution pending appeal issued by the trial court should be brought before the appellate court after the former has lost
jurisdiction over the case.
Finally, as to the third requisite, the judgment in the petition for review amounted to res judicata in the petition for certiorari.
There is res judicata or bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second
case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. As previously discussed, the
parties in the two petitions are identical. Further, the petitions involve the same subject matter, i.e., the landholdings covered by
the petitioners’ respective CLTs. “Identity of causes of action does not mean absolute identity. Otherwise, a party could easily
escape the operation of res judicata by changing the form of the action or the relief sought. The test to determine whether the
causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in
the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are
considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.” In this case, the same evidence will be
necessary to sustain the causes of action in the two cases which are unequivocally based on the same set of facts. While it may be
true that the respondents raised as an additional assignment of error in the petition for certiorari the DARAB’s issuance of the
writ of execution pending appeal, they nevertheless sought the nullification of the DARAB’s decision. Hence, in truth and in fact,
the two petitions are based on the same cause of action.
In sum, considering that all the elements of litis pendentia are present, the Court declares that the respondents are guilty of
forum shopping when they filed the petition for certiorari despite the pendency of the petition for review.
Rule 15 – Motions
03. Spouses Dico v. Vizcaya Management Corporation (G.R. No. 161211, 17 July 2013)
Defenses and objections not pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in an answer are deemed waived.
FACTS
Celso Dico was the registered owner of Lot 486 which was adjacent to Lot 29-B and 1412. The 3 lots were of the Cadiz Cadastre.
Celso and his wife Angeles resided in Lot 486 since 1958. Angeles and Celso filed free patent applications covering Lot 29-B and
1412, respectively. Vizcaya Management (VMC) claimed that it was the registered owner of the Lot 29-B and 1412 and that it derived
its title from Eduardo and Cesar Lopez, which in turn, derived their title from OCT in the name of Negros Philippines Lumber. (The
TCT in the name of the Lopezes was recorded on September 30, 1934 and the subsequent TCT in the name of VMC was recorded
on November 10, 1956). VMC sought to consolidate and subdivide Lot 29-B, 1412, 1426-B, and 1426-C. The consolidation-
subdivision plan was approved and VMC proceeded to develop and sell lots in its Don Eusebio Subdivision and Cristina Village
Subdivision.
In 1981, VMC filed against the Dicos a complaint for unlawful detainer in the City Court of Cadiz which was granted. The Dicos was
ordered to demolish the concrete water gate or sluice gate (“trampahan”) located inside Cristina Village. The decision attained
finality as the Dicos failed to appeal the same. Hence, the City Court issued a writ of execution and a second alias writ of execution.
On May 12, 1986, the Dicos commenced an action for the annulment and cancellation of VMC’s title alleging that VMC had land-
grabbed a portion of Lot 486 brought about by the expansion of Cristina Village. RTC ruled in favor of the Dicos and ordered VMC
to vacate and turn over a portion of Lot 486 to the Dicos. On appeal to CA, VMC contended that the Dicos’ complaint should have
been dismissed for being barred by prescription and/or laches and for lack of cause of action. CA agreed with VMC. Hence, this
petition.
The Dicos insisted that prescription could not be used by the CA to bar their claim for reconveyance by virtue of VMC’s failure to
aver them in a motion to dismiss or in the answer was unwarranted. The Dicos claimed that fraud intervened
Whether the complaint of the Dicos could be barred by Section 8. Omnibus motion. — Subject to the provisions of
prescription even if VMC failed to aver them in a motion to section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order,
dismiss or in the answer judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then
available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed
waived.
HELD: YES
Although defenses and objections not pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in an answer are deemed waived, it was really incorrect for
the Dicos to insist that prescription could not be appreciated against them for that reason. Their insistence was contrary to Section
1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, which provides that “Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss
the claim. Under the rule, the defenses of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription
of action may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal, except that the objection to the lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter may be barred by laches.
Verily, the reckoning point for purposes of the Dicos’ demand of reconveyance based on fraud was their discovery of the fraud. Such
discovery was properly pegged on the date of the registration of the transfer certificates of title in the adverse parties’ names,
because registration was a constructive notice to the whole world. The long period of 29 years that had meanwhile lapsed from the
issuance of the TCT on September 30, 1934 (the date of recording of TCT No. RT-9933 [16739] in the name of the Lopezes) or
on November 10, 1956 (the date of recording of TCT No. T-41835 in VMC’s name) was way beyond the prescriptive period of 10
years. (The complaint was filed only on May 12, 1986)
Rule 15 – Motions
04. Heirs of Dimaampao v. Alug, G.R. No. 198223, 18 February 2015.
An interlocutory order is always under the control of the court and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown
at any time before final judgment. This prescinds from a court’s inherent power to control its process and orders so as to make
them conformable to law and justice, and a motion for reconsideration thereof was not subject to the limiting fifteen-day period
of appeal prescribed for final judgments or orders.
FACTS
Heirs of Timbang Daromimbang Dimaampao represented by Cabib D. Alawi, filed with the RTC of Lanao del Sur, Marawi a
Complaint for declaration of deed of sale as a nullity, quieting of title and damages against respondents. Petitioners alleged that
they are the owners pro indiviso and lawful possessors of a parcel of land located at Madaya, Marawi City, and that they have
acquired ownership and possession of the subject land by way of inheritance from their deceased grandmother.
Respondent’s filed their answer denying petitioner’s claim of ownership and possession of the subject land as they owned and
possessed the same since 1978 and that the validity of the Deed of Sale involving the subject land was already upheld by the RTC
in Civil Case entitled “Cota Dimaampao v. Sheik Pangandaman Daromimbang, et al. and that the case had already attained
finality.
RTC set a schedule for pre-trial conference. Respondents filed a manifestation stating that they just received the RTC order and
moved for a motion for reconsideration and to defer the submission of pre-trial brief and the scheduled pre-trial conference. RTC
denied the motion.
Respondents filed with the CA, a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a preliminary injunction. CA granted the writ
of certiorari stating that RTC has unduly disregarded the decision in the civil case which had already attained finality.
Petitioners claim that respondents’ counsel received the RTC order denying their special and affirmative defenses on April 17,
2006, thus, they had until May 2, 2006 to file a motion for reconsideration. Respondents however, filed a Manifestation with
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration which is not allowed under the Rules of Court. Hence, the RTC
order had already become final and executory and could no longer be the subject of a petition for certiorari with the CA.
W/N the motion for extension filed by the respondents is a

prohibited pleading.
HELD: No.
Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1. Subject of appeal.—An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final
order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from: (c) An interlocutory order;
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special
civil action under Rule 65.
In Denso (Phils.), Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,12 we expounded on the differences between a “final judgment” and an
“interlocutory order,” to wit:
x x x A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect
thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what
the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the
ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the
controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court
except to await the parties’ next move x x x and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes
“final” or, to use the established and more distinctive term, “final and executory.”
xxxx
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’
contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to
be done by the Court, is “interlocutory,” e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules x x x Unlike a
“final” judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an “interlocutory” order may not be questioned on appeal
except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case. Given the differences
between a final judgment and an interlocutory order, the RTC Order dated March 6, 2006 denying respondents’ special and
affirmative defenses contained in their answer is no doubt interlocutory since it did not finally dispose of the case but will proceed
for the reception of the parties’ respective evidence to determine the rights and obligations of each other. As such, the RTC Order
dated March 6, 2006 may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the
final judgment rendered in the case.
An interlocutory order is always under the control of the court and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown
at any time before final judgment. This prescinds from a court’s inherent power to control its process and orders so as to make
them conformable to law and justice, and a motion for reconsideration thereof was not subject to the limiting fifteen-day period
of appeal prescribed for final judgments or orders.
We, therefore, find no merit to petitioners’ claim that the Order dated March 6, 2006 had already become final and could not be
the subject of a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The petition for certiorari was timely filed with the CA. The RTC
Order dated February 29, 2008 denying respondents’ motion for reconsideration was received by the latter on April 9, 2008.
They had 60 days from receipt thereof to file the petition for certiorari with the CA. The last day to file the petition fell on June 8,
2008, a Sunday, while June 9 was declared a holiday, hence, the filing of the petition on the next working day which was June 10,
2008 was still on time.
Rule 15 – Motions
05. Biñan Rural Bank v. Carlos (G.R. No. 193919, 15 June 2015)
An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case; it is interlocutory as
it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. The denial of a motion to dismiss
generally cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari, as this remedy is designed to correct only errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal which is available
only after a judgment or order on the merits has been rendered. Only when the denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion can the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari be justified.
FACTS
Jose Carlos, Martina Rosa, and Maria Carlos-Tran filed a complaint for reconveyance, annulment of absolute sale, real estate
mortgage, certificate of sale, title, with damages against Biñan Rural Bank, and its co-defendants. Biñan moved to dismiss on the
ground that Biñan was not a real party-in-interest; the complaint failed to state a cause of action insofar as Biñan is concerned; and
the cause of action against it was barred by estoppel. RTC denied. Biñan’s MR was denied prompting it to file a petition for certiorari
before CA which was dismissed for lack of merit. CA also denied Biñan’s MR. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Whether it was proper for Biñan Rural Bank to file this present
special civil action for certiorari assailing RTC and CA’s denial
of its motion to dismiss.
HELD: NO
An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case; it is interlocutory as it
leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. The denial of a motion to dismiss
generally cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari, as this remedy is designed to correct only
errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an
appeal which is available only after a judgment or order on the merits has been rendered. Only when the denial
of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion can the grant of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari be justified.
Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that effectively brings the acting entity outside the
exercise of its proper jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse must be so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to
having acted without jurisdiction. We agree with the CA that using this standard, the RTC did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion when it acted as it did. No arbitrariness or despotism attended the issuance of the assailed
orders, as the RTC adequately provided and discussed the reasons and legal bases for denying the motion to
dismiss. Mere error of judgment by RTC, if any, is insufficient ground to reverse the CA’s dismissal of the certiorari petition.
A special civil action for certiorari is for the correction of errors of jurisdiction (where the act complained of was issued by the court
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion), and not errors of judgment; in the latter case, the court may
have been legally in error in its conclusion but was still acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
The issues that Biñan raised are more properly ventilated during the trial of the reconveyance case. Questions of whether the
complaint states a cause of action or is barred by estoppel, for instance, require the presentation and/or determination of facts, and
can best be resolved in the trial on the merits of the case.
Rule 15 – Motions
06. Spouses Soller v. Singson, G.R. No. 215547, 3 February 2020.
The prohibition applies only to TRO and preliminary injunction: All courts, except this Court, are proscribed from issuing TROs
and writs of preliminary injunction against the implementation or execution of specified government projects. The ambit of the
prohibition covers only temporary or preliminary restraining orders or writs but NOT decisions on the merits granting
permanent injunctions.
While courts below this Court are prohibited by these laws from issuing temporary or preliminary restraining orders pending the
adjudication of the case, said statutes however do not explicitly proscribe the issuance of a permanent injunction granted by a
court of law arising from an adjudication of a case on the merit
FACTS
Sps. Soller filed a petition for issuance of permanent injunction and damages with prayer for TRO/Preliminary Injunction against
herein respondents, alleging that as a result of the elevation project by King’s Builder and Development Corporation, their safety
was placed in imminent danger; and that the project block and retains floodwaters naturally coming from the nearby river and
submerging houses and lands including their properties. That the elevation project impaired their use and enjoyment of their
house and properties.
Respondents filed a Motion to dismiss, alleging that the issuance of injunctive writs is prohibited by PD 1818 (Prohibiting Courts
from Issuing Restraining Orders or Preliminary Injunctions in Cases Involving Infrastructure and Natural Resource Development
Projects of, and Public Utilities Operated by, the Government)
RTC Granted the motion to dismiss, finding that it has no jurisdiction over the case, as stated in RA 8975 (An act to Ensure the
Expeditious Implementation and Completion of Government Infrastructure Projects by Prohibiting Lower Courts from Issuing
Temporary Restraining Orders. Preliminary injunctions or Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions, providing penalties for violations
thereof, and for other purposes.
WON the lower court has jurisdiction over the case?
HELD: Yes
Section 3 of RA 8975 expressly vests jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court to issue any TRO, preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether
public or private acting under the government's direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel specified acts:
Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions – No court, except
the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction
against the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or private acting under the
government direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or location of any national government project;
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined under Section 2 hereof;
(c) Commencement prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of any such contract or project;
(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and
(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for such contract/project.
Philco Aero, Inc. v. Secretary Tugade: This Court recognized the remedy of resorting directly before this Court in cases covered
under RA No. 8975. Section 3 of R.A. No. 8975 was explicit in excluding other courts in the issuance of injunctive writs.
Bases Conversion and Development Authority v. Uy: This Court clarified that the prohibition applies only to TRO and preliminary
injunction: All courts, except this Court, are proscribed from issuing TROs and writs of preliminary injunction against the
implementation or execution of specified government projects. The ambit of the prohibition covers only temporary or preliminary
restraining orders or writs but NOT decisions on the merits granting permanent injunctions.
While courts below this Court are prohibited by these laws from issuing temporary or preliminary restraining orders pending the
adjudication of the case, said statutes however do not explicitly proscribe the issuance of a permanent injunction granted by a
court of law arising from an adjudication of a case on the merits.
As conferred by Section 19 of BP129, the RTC has jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject matter under litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. One of which, as established by jurisprudence, is a complaint for injunction.
The allegations and the reliefs prayed for in the complaint reveal that petitioner, as landowners of the surrounding estate of the
highway elevation project, sought to enjoin such construction; or if completed, to restore the affected portion, to their original
state. Clearly, the principal action is one for injunction, which is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
The principal action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction which cannot
exist except only as part or an incident of an independent action or proceeding. The complaint is one for injunction with a prayer
for issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary injunction. In determining the jurisdiction of the RTC, what is controlling is the
principal action, and not the ancilliary remedy which is merely an incident thereto.
Rule 17 – Dismissal of Actions
07. Go v. Cruz (G.R. No. L-58986, 17 April 1989)
Loss by plaintiff of the right to cause dismissal of the action by mere notice is not the filing of defendant’s answer with the court
but the service on the plaintiff of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment.
FACTS
On October 26, 1981, California Manufacturing brought an action in the CFI Manila against Dante Go accusing him of unfair
competition because Go was selling his products in the open market under the brand name “Great Italian”, in packages which were
colorable and deceitful imitation of California’s containers bearing its own brand “Royal”. 2 weeks later, however, or on Nov 12,
California filed a notice of dismissal. After 4 days or on Nov 16, California received by registered mail a copy of Go’s
Answer with counterclaim dated Nov 6, which has been filed with the Court on Nov 9. The record of the case filed by California
was destroyed when a fire broke out destroying Judge Tengco’s sala at the Manila City Hall.
California filed another complaint asserting the same cause of action against Go, this time with CFI Caloocan. Judge Cruz issued
an ex parte restraining order against Go. Hence, Go filed this petition for certiorari alleging that the case filed against him by
California in the Manila Court remained pending despite California’s notice of dismissal. According to him, since he had already
filed his Answer to the complaint before California sought dismissal of the action, such dismissal was no longer a matter of right
and could no longer be effected by mere notice, but only on plaintiff’s motion, and by order of the Court; hence, Caloocan Court
acted without jurisdiction over the second action based on the same cause.
Whether the first action before CFI Manila was still pending Section 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. — A complaint may
considering that Go had already filed his Answer to California’s be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any time
before service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Upon
complaint prior to its notice of dismissal such notice being filed, the court shall issue an order confirming the
dismissal. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without
prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the
merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent
court an action based on or including the same claim.
HELD: NO
Go is in error. What marks the loss by a plaintiff of the right to cause dismissal of the action by mere notice is not
the filing of the defendant’s answer with the Court (either personally or by mail) but the service on the plaintiff
of said answer or of a motion for summary judgment. This is the plain and explicit message of the Rules. “The filing of
pleadings, appearances, motions, notices, orders and other papers with the court,” according to Section 1, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court, means the delivery thereof to the clerk of the court either personally or by registered mail. Service, on the other hand,
signifies delivery of the pleading or other paper to the parties affected thereby through their counsel of record, unless
delivery to the party himself is ordered by the court, by any of the modes set forth in the Rules, i.e., by personal service, service by
mail, or substituted service.
Here, California filed its notice of dismissal of its action in the Manila Court after the filing of Go’s answer but
before service thereof. Thus, having acted well within the letter and contemplation of Section 1 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court,
its notice ipso facto brought about the dismissal of the action then pending in the Manila Court, without need of any order or other
action by the Presiding Judge. The dismissal was effected without regard to whatever reasons or motives California might have had
for bringing it about, and was, as the same Section 1, Rule 17 points out, “without prejudice,” the contrary not being otherwise
“stated in the notice” and it being the first time the action was being so dismissed.
There was therefore no legal obstacle to the institution of the second action in CFI Caloocan based on the same claim. The filing of
the complaint invested it with jurisdiction of the subject matter or nature of the action. In truth, and contrary to what Go obviously
believes, even if the first action were still pending in the Manila Court, this circumstance would not affect the jurisdiction of the
Caloocan Court over the second suit. The pendency of the first action would merely give the defendant the right to move to dismiss
the second action on the ground of auter action pendant, or litis pendentia.
The dismissal of civil actions is always addressed to the sound judgment and discretion of the court; this, whether the dismissal is
sought after a trial has been completed or otherwise, or whether it is prayed for by a defending party, or by a plaintiff or claimant.
There is one instance however where the dismissal of an action rests exclusively on the will of a plaintiff or claimant, to prevent
which the defending party and even the court itself is powerless, requiring in fact no action whatever on the part of the court except
the acceptance and recording of the causative document. This is dealt with in Section 1, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.
Ching v. Cheng, G.R. No. 175507, 8 October 2014.
As a general rule, dismissals under Section 1 of Rule 17 are without prejudice except when it is the second time that the plaintiff
caused its dismissal. Accordingly, for a dismissal to operate as an adjudication upon the merits, i.e, with prejudice to the re-filing
of the same claim, the following requisites must be present:
(1) There was a previous case that was dismissed by a competent court;
(2) Both cases were based on or include the same claim;
(3) Both notices for dismissal were filed by the plaintiff; and
(4) When the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff was consented to by the defendant on the ground that the latter paid and
satisfied all the claims of the former.
FACTS
Antonio Ching owned several businesses and properties, among which was Po Wing Properties Incorporated. His assets were
worth more than P380M. Ramong Ching said he was the only child of Antonio Ching through Lucina Santos. Lucina disputed
this. Joseph Cheng and Jaime Cheng claim to be Antonio’s illegitimate children through his maid, Mercedes Igne. Lucina said
Antonio entrusted her with the distribution of his estate to his heirs if something happened to him. Lucina handed all property
titles and business documents to Ramon Ching for safekeeping.
In 1996, Antonio was murdered. Ramon allegedly induced Mercedes, Joseph and Jaime to waive their claim for P22.5M. Joseph
and Jaime said Ramon never paid them. Ramon then executed an affidavit of settlement of estate naming himself as the sole heir
and adjudicating upon himself the entirety of Antonio’s estate. Ramon denied all this.
In 1998, Joseph, Jaime, and Mercedes (Chengs) filed a complaint of nullity of titles against Ramon before the Manila RTC. In
1999, complaint was amended, with leave of court, to include Po Wing Properties where Ramon was a primary stockholder. The
amended complaint was for “Annulment of Agreement, Waiver, Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estafa and the Certificates of Title
Issued by Virtue of Said Documents with Prayer for TRO and WPI. Lucina also intervened. Po Wing Properties filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter. In 2001, Manila RTC granted the dismissal. Chengs and Lucina
did not file the correct pleading within 15 days.
In 2002, Chengs and Lucina filed a second complaint for "Annulment of Agreement, Waiver, Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate
and the Certificates of Title Issued by Virtue of Said Documents with Prayer for TRO and WPI" against Ramon and Po Wing.
Chengs and Lucina filed a motion to dismiss their complaint without prejudice. Manila RTC granted the motion on the basis that
summons had not yet been served on Ramon and Po Wing and they had not yet filed any responsive pleading. In 2002, Case
dismissed without prejudice. Ching and Po Wing filed a MR on the 2002 decision.
The dismissal should have been with prejudice under the “two dismissal rule” of Rule 17, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. While this was going on, Chengs and Lucina filed ANOTHA one against Ramon and Po Wing for "Disinheritance and
Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra judicial Agreement, Deed of Absolute Sale, and Transfer
Certificates of Title with Prayer for TRO and WPI" Ramon and Po Wing opposed. They filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
res judicata, litis pendencia, forum-shopping, and failure of complaint to state a cause of action. In 2004, Manila RTC denied
Ramon and Po Wing’s motion for reconsideration and motion to dismiss. While their MR was pending, Ramon and Po Wing
appealed on certiorari the 2002 and 2004 decision. Manila RTC also denied the MR on the third case. Ramon and Po Wing filed
another certiorari case with the CA. CA dismissed the first certiorari case. Hence this petition.
W/N the RTC dismissal of the second case was a bar to the
filing of a third case as per the “two-dismissal rule”
HELD: No
The dismissal of the second case was without prejudice in view of the "two-dismissal rule". The "two-dismissal rule" vis-à-vis the
Rules of Civil Procedure Dismissals of actions are governed by Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The first section of
the rule contemplates a situation where a plaintiff requests the dismissal of the case before any responsive pleadings have been
filed by the defendant. It is done through notice by the plaintiff and confirmation by the court. The dismissal is without prejudice
unless otherwise declared by the court. The second section of the rule contemplates a situation where a counterclaim has been
pleaded by the defendant before the service on him or her of the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss. It requires leave of court, and the
dismissal is generally without prejudice unless otherwise declared by the court. The third section contemplates dismissals due to
the fault of the plaintiff such as the failure to prosecute. The case is dismissed either upon motion of the defendant or by the court
motu propio. Generally, the dismissal is with prejudice unless otherwise declared by the court. In all instances, Rule 17 governs
dismissals at the instance of the plaintiff, not of the defendant. Dismissals upon the instance of the defendant are generally
governed by Rule 16, which covers motions to dismiss. The purpose of the "two-dismissal rule" is "to avoid vexatious litigation."
When a complaint is dismissed a second time, the plaintiff is now barred from seeking relief on the same claim. Here, the first
case was filed as an ordinary civil action. It was later amended to include not only new defendants but new causes of action that
should have been adjudicated in a special proceeding. A motion to dismiss was inevitably filed by the defendants on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction.
Under Rule 17, Section 3, a defendant may move to dismiss the case if the plaintiff defaults; it does not contemplate a situation
where the dismissal was due to lack of jurisdiction. Since there was already a dismissal prior to plaintiff’s default, the trial court’s
instruction to file the appropriate pleading will not reverse the dismissal. If the plaintiff fails to file the appropriate pleading, the trial
court does not dismiss the case anew; the order dismissing the case still stands. The dismissal of the first case was done at the
instance of the defendant under Rule 16, Section 1(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Section 5 of the same rule, a party
may re-file the same action or claim subject to certain exceptions. Thus, when respondents filed the second case, they were
merely refiling the same claim that had been previously dismissed on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. When they moved to
dismiss the second case, the motion to dismiss can be considered as the first dismissal at the plaintiff’s instance.
In Gomez v. Alcantara: The general rule is that dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is to be regarded as an adjudication on
the merits and with prejudice to the filing of another action, and the only exception is when the order of dismissal expressly
contains a qualification that the dismissal is without prejudice. In granting the dismissal of the second case, the trial court
specifically orders the dismissal to be without prejudice. It is only when the trial court’s order either is silent on the matter, or
states otherwise, that the dismissal will be considered an adjudication on the merits. However, while the dismissal of the second
case was without prejudice, Cheng's act of filing the third case while petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was still pending
constituted forum shopping.
09. Blay vs. Baña (G.R. No. 232189, 7 March 2018)
However, as stated in the third sentence of Section 2, Rule 17, if the defendant desires to prosecute his counterclaim in the same
action, he is required to file a manifestation within 15 days from notice of the motion. Otherwise, his counterclaim may be
prosecuted in a separate action.
FACTS
Alex Raul Blay filed before RTC a petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, seeking that his marriage with Cynthia Baña be
declared null and void on account of psychological incapacity. Subsequently, Baña filed her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim.
However, Blay lost interest over the case and thus, filed a Motion to Withdraw his petition. In her comment/opposition thereto,
Baña invoked Section 2, Rule 17, and prayed that her counterclaims be declared as remaining for the court’s independent
adjudication. In turn, Blay averred that Baña’s counterclaims are barred from being prosecuted in the same action due to her failure
to file a manifestation within 15 days from notice of the Motion to Withdraw. Blay alleged that Baña filed the required manifestation
only on March 30, 2015. However, Baña’s counsel received a copy of the motion on March 11; hence, Baña only had until March 26
to manifest before RTC her desire to prosecute her counterclaims in the same action.
RTC granted Blay’s motion to withdraw and declared Baña’s counterclaim as remaining for independent adjudication. Blay filed an
MR but it was denied, hence filed a petition for certiorari before CA praying that RTC’s order be set aside to the extent that they
allowed the counterclaim to remain for independent adjudication before the same trial court. CA dismissed the petition and held
that the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. Hence, this petition.
Whether Baña’s counterclaim may be allowed to remain for Section 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. — Except as
independent adjudication in the same action, despite the provided in the preceding section, a complaint shall not be dismissed at
the plaintiff's instance save upon approval of the court and upon such
manifestation having been filed only on March 30 or 19 days terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has
after notice of Blay’s motion to withdraw. been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of
the plaintiffs’ motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be
limited to the complaint. The dismissal shall be without
prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in a separate action unless within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the motion he manifests his preference to
have his counterclaim resolved in the same action. Unless
otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall
be without prejudice. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court.
HELD: NO
Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court provides for the procedure relative to counterclaims in the event that a complaint is
dismissed by the court at the plaintiff’s instance. As per the second sentence of the provision, if a counterclaim has been pleaded by
the defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff’s motion for the dismissal — as in this case — the rule is that the dismissal
shall be limited to the complaint. Instead of an ‘action’ shall not be dismissed, the present rule uses the term ‘complaint.’ A dismissal
of an action is different from a mere dismissal of the complaint. For this reason, since only the complaint and not the action is
dismissed, the defendant inspite of said dismissal may still prosecute his counterclaim in the same action. However, as stated in
the third sentence of Section 2, Rule 17, if the defendant desires to prosecute his counterclaim in the same action, he is required
to file a manifestation within 15 days from notice of the motion. Otherwise, his counterclaim may be prosecuted in a separate action.
It is hornbook doctrine in statutory construction that the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. In this case, the CA confined the application of Section 2,
Rule 17 to that portion of its second sentence which states that the “dismissal shall be limited to the complaint.” Evidently, the CA
ignored the third sentence, which provides for the alternatives available to the defendant who interposes a counterclaim prior to
the service upon him of the plaintiff’s motion for dismissal.
The rationale behind this rule is not difficult to discern: the passing of the 15-day period triggers the finality of the court’s dismissal
of the complaint and hence, bars the conduct of further proceedings, i.e., the prosecution of respondent’s counterclaim, in the same
action. Thus, in order to obviate this finality, the defendant is required to file the required manifestation within the aforesaid period;
otherwise, the counterclaim may be prosecuted only in a separate action.
CA erroneously sustained the assailed RTC Orders declaring Baña’s counterclaim “as remaining for independent adjudication”
despite the latter’s failure to file the required manifestation within the prescribed 15-day period.
Shimizu Philippines v. Magsalin, G.R. No. 170026, 20 June 2012.
“Dismissals of actions (under Section 3) which do not expressly state whether they are with or without prejudice are held to be
with prejudice[.]” As a prejudicial dismissal, the December 16, 2003 dismissal order is also deemed to be a judgment on the
merits so that the petitioner’s complaint in Civil Case No. 02-488 can no longer be refiled on the principle of res judicata.
Procedurally, when a complaint is dismissed for failure to prosecute and the dismissal is unqualified, the dismissal has the effect
of an adjudication on the merits.
FACTS
Leticia Magsalin, doing business as “Karen’s Trading,” had breached their subcontract agreement for the supply, delivery,
installation, and finishing of parquet tiles for certain floors in the Shmizu’s Makati City condominium project called “The Regency
at Salcedo.”
When Magsalin also refused to return the petitioner’s unliquidated advance payment and to account for other monetary liabilities
despite demand, the petitioner sent a notice to FGU Insurance demanding damages pursuant to the surety and performance
bonds the former had issued for the subcontract.
Shimizu filed a complaint against both Magsalin and FGU Insurance. FGU Insurance filed a motion for leave of court to file a
third-party complaint. Attached to the motion was the subject complaint, with Reynaldo Baetiong, Godofredo Garcia and
Concordia Garcia named as third-party defendants. The RTC admitted the third-party complaint and denied the motion to serve
summons by publication on the ground that the action against respondent Magsalin was in personam.
RTC issued a notice setting the case for hearing . FGU Insurance filed a motion to cancel the hearing on the ground that the third-
party defendants had not yet filed their answer. The motion was granted. RTC ordered the dismissal of the case for failure to
prosecute. The CA agreed with FGU Insurance and dismissed the appeal, and denied as well the subsequent motion for
reconsideration. The Shimizu thus filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
W/N the RTC dismissal of the case was proper
HELD: No.
After due consideration, we resolve to grant the petition on the ground that the December 16, 2003 dismissal order is null and
void for violation of due process.
The nullity of the dismissal order is patent on its face. It simply states its conclusion that the case should be dismissed for non
prosequitur, a legal conclusion, but does not state the facts on which this conclusion is based. Dismissals of actions for failure of
the plaintiff to prosecute is authorized under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.
A plain examination of the December 16, 2003 dismissal order shows that it is an unqualified order and, as such, is deemed to be
a dismissal with prejudice. “Dismissals of actions (under Section 3) which do not expressly state whether they are with or without
prejudice are held to be with prejudice[.]” As a prejudicial dismissal, the December 16, 2003 dismissal order is also deemed to be
a judgment on the merits so that the petitioner’s complaint in Civil Case No. 02-488 can no longer be refiled on the principle of
res judicata. Procedurally, when a complaint is dismissed for failure to prosecute and the dismissal is unqualified, the dismissal
has the effect of an adjudication on the merits.
As an adjudication on the merits, it is imperative that the dismissal order conform with Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court on
the writing of valid judgments and final orders. The rule states:
RULE 36 Judgments, Final Orders and Entry Thereof - “Section 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders.—A
judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge,
stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of the court.”
The December 16, 2003 dismissal order clearly violates this rule for its failure to disclose how and why the petitioner failed to
prosecute its complaint. Thus, neither the petitioner nor the reviewing court is able to know the particular facts that had
prompted the prejudicial dismissal. Had the petitioner perhaps failed to appear at a scheduled trial date? Had it failed to take
appropriate actions for the active prosecution of its complaint for an unreasonable length of time? Had it failed to comply with
the rules or any order of the trial court? The December 16, 2003 dismissal order does not say.n We have in the past admonished
trial courts against issuing dismissal orders similar to that appealed in CA- G.R. CV No. 83096. A trial court should always specify
the reasons for a complaint’s dismissal so that on appeal, the reviewing court can readily determine the prima facie justification
for the dismissal.
A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark and is
especially prejudicial to the losing party who is unable to point the assigned error in seeking a review by a higher tribunal. We
thus agree with the petitioner that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 constituted a denial of due process. Elementary due
process demands that the parties to a litigation be given information on how the case was decided, as well as an explanation of the
factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court.23 Where the reasons are absent, a decision (such as the
December 16, 2003 dismissal order) has absolutely nothing to support it and is thus a nullity.
11. Martinez v. Buen (G.R. No. 187342, 5 April 2017)
A dismissal based on any of the grounds in Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court has the effect of an adjudication on the merits. Unless
otherwise qualified by the court, a dismissal under said rule is considered with prejudice, which bars the refiling of the case.
FACTS
Noel Buen filed in the MeTC Manila an Action for Recovery of Personal Property (Toyota Tamaraw) against Robert Martinez. After
Buen posted the required bond, MeTC awarded the possession to him. During the pendency of the civil case, Martinez filed a
Complaint for Qualified Theft against Buen before RTC Manila. Buen went into hiding after a warrant of arrest was issued against
him. Trial ensued in civil case. On the scheduled date of hearing, Buen’s counsel manifested in open court that Buen cannot attend
his cross-examination and prayed that the case be archived which was granted. Claiming that he had no idea of the Order granting
temporary archiving of the case, Martinez filed a Comment/Opposition and prayed that the motion filed by Buen be denied. MeTC
treated Martinez’s comment/opposition as a motion for reconsideration and dismissed the case pursuant to the provisions of Sec.
3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.
Buen filed a Petition for Certiorari before RTC and took issue with MeTC’s dismissal of the case pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 17. He
alleged that unless a party’s conduct is so negligent or dilatory, courts should consider ordering lesser sanctions other than the
dismissal of the case. He maintained that the delay brought about by his nonavailability to appear during the trial is “unexpected,
unavoidable and justified” and beyond his will. RTC ruled in favor of Buen. Hence, Martinez filed a petition for certiorari before
CA. He argued that a petition for certiorari in the RTC is not the proper remedy to challenge the MeTC’s order. Also, he argued that
the MeTC, on its own, may dismiss the case on the ground of failure to prosecute. He argued that the dismissal was proper because
Buen was a fugitive from justice as admitted by the latter’s counsel in open court and in his written motion to archive. He stated
that the MeTC cannot speculate on when Buen would appear to continue the trial of the case and maintained that the pending
case/should not be held hostage by Buen’s illegal and capricious act. CA denied. Hence, this petition. Martinez submits that Buen
availed of the wrong remedy when Buen filed a petition for certiorari instead of an appeal from the MeTC Order of Dismissal.
Whether Buen’s petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable
assail the MeTC’s order dismissing the case pursuant to Sec. 3, cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his
evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an
Rule 17 unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order
of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the
defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right
of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a
separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication
upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.
HELD: YES. Certiorari will lie because MeTC judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment when
he dismissed the case without stating the specific ground on which the dismissal was based.
A dismissal based on any of the grounds in Section 3, Rule 17 has the effect of an adjudication on the merits. Unless otherwise
qualified by the court, a dismissal under said rule is considered with prejudice, which bars the refiling of the case. When
an order completely disposes of the case and leaves nothing to be done by the court, it is a final order properly subject of an appeal.
MeTC’s order dismissing the case pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 17 was silent as to whether the dismissal of the case was with prejudice.
Thus, the general rule would apply, that is, the same would be considered to be one with prejudice. Under the circumstances,
Buen’s remedy would have been to file an ordinary appeal in the RTC pursuant to Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.
Here, Buen filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Since a special civil action for certiorari can only be entertained when there
is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the RTC could have dismissed Buen’s petition
outright. The rule that certiorari will not lie as a substitute for appeal, however, admits of exceptions. One of which is where the
trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment. This is present in this case. The MeTC judge capriciously and
whimsically exercised his judgment when he treated Martinez’s (belated) Comment/Opposition as a motion for reconsideration
and dismissed the case without stating the specific ground on which the dismissal was based.
Section 3, Rule 17 provides four grounds for dismissal of a case due to the fault of the plaintiff. These are: a. Failure to appear on
the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief; b. Failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time; c. Failure to comply
with the Rules of Court; and d. Failure to comply with the order of the court. Here, while the Order indicated that the dismissal was
made pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17, it did not provide for the specific ground upon which the dismissal was made, leaving Buen
(and the appellate courts) to speculate as to the same.
Rule 18 – Pre Trial
12. Daaco v. Yu, G.R. No. 183398, 22 June 2015.
Section 3 of Rule 18 requires that notice of pre-trial conference be served on counsel. The counsel served with notice is charged
with the duty of notifying the party he represents. However, when a party has no counsel, as in this case, the notice of pre-trial is
required to be served personally on him. In view of the fact that petitioner was, and still is, not represented by counsel, and that
as petitioner herself admitted, notice of the pre-trial conference was served on her, the mandate of the law was sufficiently
complied with. Thus, the fact that the trial court mistakenly referred to her counsel when no such counsel exists is immaterial. For
as long as notice was duly served on the petitioner, in accordance with the rules, the trial court's order of dismissal cannot be
invalidated due to statements referring to her counsel, for the same have no bearing on the validity of the notice of pre-trial.
FACTS
This is a petition assailing the Order of the RTC in dismissing the case of Daaco on the ground of an alleged irregularity in the
notice of pre-trial conference, which she received only 15 hours before the scheduled conference.
Daaco filed a case against Yu for Annulment of Title, Recovery of Property and Damages. On September 5, 2007, after the
answer had been filed and preliminary matters disposed of, the RTC set the pre-trial conference on October 4, 2007. However,
when Daaco failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial, the trial court dismissed the case upon Yu’s motion. Daaco filed a Motion
for Reconsideration alleging that the order of dismissal was invalid because she was not properly notified of the pre-trial
conference. The 15-hour notice is deemed no notice at all, resulting in the invalidity of the trial court’s dismissal of the case.
Whether or not the petitioner’s failure to appear at the pre-trial Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides:
is a valid ground to dismiss the case.
Section 4. Appearance of parties. — It shall be the duty of the
parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The
non-appearance of a party may be excused only if a valid cause
is shown therefor or if a representative shall appear in his behalf
fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to
submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter
into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents, (n)
Section 5. Effect of failure to appear. — The failure of the

plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next
preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The
dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by
the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be
cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and
the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. (2a, R20)
HELD: Yes.
In this case, the petitioner harps on the fact that the notice of pre-trial was sent to her 15 hours before the scheduled conference.
She maintained that it was impossible for her to appear since she had yet to secure counsel to represent her as well as prepare
the documents necessary for the case. The Court held that while it cannot be denied that every party to a case must be given the
chance to come to court prepared, the parties must do so within the parameters set by the rules. The records show that petitioner
had more than a year from the filing of the respondent’s answer to prepare for the pre-trial conference. Furthermore, the
petitioner’s active participation in the proceedings contradicts her defense of unpreparedness.
The petitioner further alleged that the RTC’s order is patently void because the RTC erroneously included the absence of her
counsel despite due notice as reason to dismiss the case when records reveal that she is not actually represented by any
counsel. Section 3 of Rule 18 requires that notice of pre-trial conference be served on counsel. The counsel served with notice is
charged with the duty of notifying the party he represents. However, when a party has no counsel, as in this case, the notice of
pre-trial is required to be served personally on him. In view of the fact that petitioner was, and still is, not represented by counsel,
and that as petitioner herself admitted, notice of the pre-trial conference was served on her, the mandate of the law was
sufficiently complied with. Thus, the fact that the trial court mistakenly referred to her counsel when no such counsel exists is
immaterial. For as long as notice was duly served on the petitioner, in accordance with the rules, the trial court's order of
dismissal cannot be invalidated due to statements referring to her counsel, for the same have no bearing on the validity of the
notice of pre-trial.
Hence, the instant petition is Denied. RTC’s decision is affirmed.

Rule 18 – Pre-Trial
13. Aguilar v. Lightbringers Credit Cooperative (G.R. No. 209605, 12 January 2015)
Failure to attend the pretrial does not result in the “default” of the defendant. Instead, the failure of the defendant to attend shall be
cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.
FACTS
Lightbringers Credit Cooperative filed 3 complaints for sum of money against Aguilar, Calimbas, and Tantiangco which were
consolidated before MCTC Bataan. On the scheduled pretrial conference, only Lightbringers appeard. MCTC then issued the Order
dated August 25, 2009 allowing it to present evidence ex parte. Lightbringers presented its General Manager as its sole witness.
Aguilar and Calimbas insisted that they should have the right to cross-examine the witness of Lightbringers, notwithstanding the
fact that these cases were being heard ex parte. MCTC held that the petitioners who had been declared “in default” had no right to
participate therein and to cross-examine the witnesses. Thereafter, Lightbringers filed its formal offer of evidence. MCTC held
Aguilar and Calimbas liable for their respective debts to Lightbringers and dismissed the complaint against Tantiangco.
Whether the defendant shall be declared in default for failure Section 5. Effect of failure to appear. — The failure of the plaintiff
to appear in the scheduled pretrial conference despite due to appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall
be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice,
notice. unless other-wise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part
of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present
his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the
basis thereof.
HELD: NO
The rule is that a court can only consider the evidence presented by respondent in the MCTC because the petitioners failed to attend
the pretrial conference on August 25, 2009 pursuant to Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. The Court, however, clarifies that
failure to attend the pretrial does not result in the “default” of the defendant. Instead, the failure of the defendant to attend shall be
cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.
The case of Philippine American Life & General Insurance v. Joseph Enario discussed the difference between nonappearance of a
defendant in a pretrial conference and the declaration of a defendant in default in the present Rules of Civil Procedure. Prior to the
1997 Rules of Procedure, the phrase “as in default” was initially included in Rule 20 of the old rules. The rationale for the deletion
of such phrase was that while the procedure actually remains the same, the purpose is one of semantical propriety or terminological
accuracy as there were criticisms on the use of the word “default” in the former provision since that term is
identified with the failure to file a required answer, not appearance in court.
If the absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is
allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof. Thus, the plaintiff is given the
privilege to present his evidence without objection from the defendant, the likelihood being that the court will decide in favor of the
plaintiff, the defendant having forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present his own evidence.
The pretrial cannot be taken for granted. It is not a mere technicality in court proceedings for it serves a vital objective: the
simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation. More significantly, the pretrial has been
institutionalized as the answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Hailed as the most important procedural
innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the nineteenth century, it paved the way for a less cluttered trial and resolution of the case. It
is, thus, mandatory for the trial court to conduct pretrial in civil cases in order to realize the paramount objective of simplifying,
abbreviating and expediting trial.
In the case at bench, the petitioners failed to attend the pretrial conference set on August 25, 2009. They did not even give any
excuse for their nonappearance, manifestly ignoring the importance of the pretrial stage. Thus, the MCTC properly issued the
August 25, 2009 Order, allowing Lightbringers to present evidence ex parte. MCTC even showed leniency when it directed the
counsels of the parties to submit their respective position papers on whether or not Aguilar and Calimbas could still participate in
the trial of the case despite their absence in the pretrial conference. This gave Aguilar and Calimbas a second chance to explain their
nonattendance and, yet, only respondent complied with the directive to file a position paper. MCTC properly held that since the
proceedings were being heard ex parte, Aguilar and Calimbas had no right to participate therein and to cross-examine the witness.
Thus, as it stands, the Court can only consider the evidence on record offered by respondent. The petitioners lost
their right to present their evidence during the trial and, a fortiori, on appeal due to their disregard of the
mandatory attendance in the pretrial conference.
Rule 18 – Pre-Trial 14. Re: Anonymous Complaints against Hon. Dinah Evangeline Bandong, A.M. No.
RTJ-17-2507, 9 October 2017.
To decongest court dockets and enhance access to justice, the Court through A.M. No. 01-10-05-SC- PHILJA approved the
institutionalization of mediation in the Philippines through court-annexed mediation. Along with this, structures and guidelines for the
implementation of court-annexed mediation were put in place.
FACTS
The OCA received two letters-complaints, one from an anonymous sender and the other under the pseudonym “Shirley Gomez, both
narrating the difficulties encountered by the employees of, and litigants appearing before the RTC of Lucena City, Branch 59 concerning
then Presiding Judge Dinah Evangeline B. Bandong.
First letter of complaint alleged:

(1) Judge Bandong relied on the legal researcher to resolve the cases
(2) She would not acquaint herself with the case and would ask the counsels about the same
(3) She would admit in open court that she can’t resolve the case for failing to understand it
(4) She would spend most of her time watching television inside her chambers
(5) She would unreasonably demand that all checks covering her salaries be immediately delivered to her upon release.
(6) She unduly favors the criminal case clerk in charge, Febrer.
Second letter-complaint:
(1) Was of similar import.
(2) She would repeatedly postpone the hearing until such time the parties would just opt to settle
(3) In one instance, Judge Bandong even pursued the settlement of a rape case notwithstanding that it was already submitted
for decision prior to her assumption as Presiding Judge of the branch. She ordered the accused to plead guilty to a lesser
offense, and when the PAO lawyer refused to assist the accused, she appointed another lawyer to the prejudice of the
private complainant whose efforts to obtain justice was put to naught
(4) She would refrain from reading voluminous case records and would instead order her staff to make a digest or orally
narrate to her the circumstances of the case.
Judge Bandong denied the charges against her.

OCA: After conducting investigations it found, among others:
With respect to Judge Bandong’s practice of delegating to her court staff the mediation of cases, this was confirmed by the sworn
statements of some from her staff which revealed that per instruction of Judge Bandong, Stenographer Parfan caused the parties in a
criminal case to enter into monetary settlement in order to terminate the case.
Per A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA, cases where amicable settlement is possible should be referred to the Philippine Mediation Center
(PMC) which shall assist the parties in selecting a duly accredited mediator. Judge Bandong therefore erred in not referring mediatable
cases to the PMC and in letting her staff, who were not accredited mediators, handle the mediation of cases. This, according to the OCA,
constituted grave misconduct.
Whether or not the findings of the OCA is proper.
HELD: YES
Both the affidavits of the court staff confirmed that it was Stenographer Pargan who mediated between them in the criminal case. This
was supported by the handwritten receipt signed by Parfan. Also, Judge Bandong was silent about the matter. She failed to deny or
proffer any explaination for the same. To decongest court dockets and enhance access to justice, the Court through A.M. No.
01-10-05-SC- PHILJA approved the institutionalization of mediation in the Philippines through court-annexed mediation. Along with
this, structures and guidelines for the implementation of court-annexed mediation were put in place.
Trial courts, therefore, cannot just indiscriminately refer for mediation any case to just anybody. For one, there are cases which shall
and shall not be referred to court-annexed mediation. For another, mediatable cases where amicable settlement is possible must be
referred by the trial courts to the PMC, who in turn, shall assist the parties in selecting a mutually acceptable mediator from its list of
duly accredited mediators. In the assailed criminal case involving frustrated homicide is apparently not a mediatable case. Clearly Judge
Bandong had violated said law, worse, she entrusted the settlement of the case to a court stenpgrapher who obviously was not a
qualified, trained, or accredited mediator.
It must be emphasized that while courts and their personnel are enjoined to assist in the successful implementation of mediation, A.M.
No. 01-10- 05-SC-PHILJA does not authorize them to conduct the mediation themselves. Mediation of cases can only be done by
individuals who possess the basic qualifications for the position, have undergone relevant trainings, seminars-workshops, and
internship programs and were duly accredited by the court as mediators. These are to ensure that the mediators have the ability to
discharge their responsibility of seeing to it that the parties to a case consider and understand the terms of a settlement agreement.
Unlike therefore when the mediation is facilitated by an accredited mediator, there is great danger that legal rights or obligations of
parties may be adversely affected by an improper settlement if mediation is handled by an ordinary court employee.
Rule 18 – Pre-Trial 14.
15. Senarlo v. Paderanga, A.M. No. RTJ-0602025, 5 April 2010.
Since mediation is part of Pre-Trial, the trial court shall impose the appropriate sanction including but not limited to censure,
reprimand, contempt, and such sanctions as are provided under the Rules of Court for failure to appear for pre-trial, in case any
or both of the parties absent himself/themselves, or for abusive conduct during mediation proceedings.
Under Rule 18, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, failure of the plaintiff to appear at pre-trial shall be cause for dismissal of the
action.
FACTS
The case at bar is an administrative Complaint filed by complainant Cecilia Senarlo against Judge Maximo G.W. Paderanga, Presiding
Judge of the Cagayan de Oro RTC, for gross ignorance of the law, knowingly rendering unjust judgment, and grave abuse of authority,
relative to Civil Case No. 2005-160 where the complainant is a plaintiff.
The said civil case, is an action for reconveyance and quieting of title, instituted by Lorna Bacalzo) against the Archbishop of the Roman
Catholic Church of CDO before the RTC, presided over by respondent Judge. Bacalzo was seeking to recover a parcel of land, donated to
the Roman Catholic Church. Considering that Bacalzo was already residing in the US, she was represented by her granddaughter,
Senarlo,
In an Order dated October 7, 2005, Judge Paderanga referred the civil case for mediation to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC),
directing the parties to proceed and personally appear for mediation proceedings on November 4, 2005 which was later declared a
holiday.
In view of the foregoing development, Bacalzo, who arrived from the US., went to the PMC on November 7, 2005, instead of November
4, 2005. Bacalzo and her counsel signed a Request for Resetting of Mediation Conference to November 15 and later to November 29,
2005. Both requests were approved by the mediator.
Regardless of the resetting of the PMC mediation proceedings, Judge Paderanga issued on November 9, 2005 an Order, which dismissed
the civil case on the ground of the failure of both parties to appear at the PMC on November 4, 2005. Consequently, the complainant
filed the case at bar for such order. In his Comment, Judge Paderanga denied the allegations in the Complaint. He claimed to have been
misled by the Mediator’s Report into believing that both parties failed to appear during the mediation conference as ordered. OCA found
the respondent judge guilty of grave abuse of authority.
Whether or not Judge Paderanga is liable for grave abuse of

authority and gross ignorance of the law in issuing the assailed
Order.
HELD: No.
The Court, although finding that Judge Paderanga is administratively liable for issuing the assailed Order, does not fully agree
with the findings and conclusions of the OCA.
A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA dated 16 October 2001, otherwise known as the Second Revised Guidelines for the
Implementation of Mediation Proceedings and Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court grant judges the discretion to dismiss an
action for failure of the plaintiff to appear at mediation proceedings.
Since mediation is part of Pre-Trial, the trial court shall impose the appropriate sanction including but not limited to censure,
reprimand, contempt, and such sanctions as are provided under the Rules of Court for failure to appear for pre-trial, in case any
or both of the parties absent himself/themselves, or for abusive conduct during mediation proceedings.
Under Rule 18, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, failure of the plaintiff to appear at pre-trial shall be cause for dismissal of the
action.
[Ratio on why he was found guilty of simple misconduct]
As may be gleaned from above, there was ostensible legal basis for Judge Paderanga to dismiss an action for failure of the
plaintiff to attend the mediation conference. However, Judge Paderanga’s Order dated November 9, 2005, dismissing Civil Case
No. 2005-160, was improperly and prematurely issued. Judge Paderanga failed to take into consideration that Bacalzo, the
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2005-160, could not have attended the mediation conference scheduled on November 4, 2005 because
the said date had been declared a regular holiday, such declaration was a development totally outside Bacalzo’s control for
which she should not be sanctioned with the dismissal of Civil Case No. 2005-160.
Judge Paderanga cannot entirely put the blame on the supposedly misleading Mediator’s Report. As the Court notes, the RTC
had already received on November 8, 2005 the Mediator’s Report, which stated that the parties failed to attend the November 4,
2005 mediation conference. Judge Paderanga issued the assailed Order the following day, on November 9, 2005, a mere five
days after November 4, 2005. Judge Paderanga could not have forgotten so soon that November 4, 2005 was a holiday.
Moreover, the same Mediator’s Report requested for the resetting of the mediation conference to November 21, 2005. Judge
Paderanga could have easily inquired with the PMC or required them to explain the reason for the resetting. Yet, Judge
Paderanga no longer bothered to look into the reason for the non-appearance of the parties or the basis for the request of the
mediator for resetting.
Evidently, Judge Paderanga failed to exercise the necessary diligence before issuing the Order dated November 9, 2005
dismissing Civil Case No. 2005-160, to the prejudice of Bacalzo. This, however, makes Judge Paderanga liable for simple
negligence, and not gross ignorance of the law, and is found guilty of simple misconduct.

Rule 15-18 Conso Digest

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Rule 15 – Motions

01. Green Asia Construction v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.

ISSUE/S STATUTES/ARTICLES INVOLVED

ISSUE/S STATUTES/ARTICLES INVOLVED

Whether or not there was forum shopping in this case.

Propriety of the remedy of annulment of judgment

Respondents are guilty of willful and deliberate forum shopping​.

ISSUE/S STATUTES/ARTICLES INVOLVED

ISSUE/S STATUTES/ARTICLES INVOLVED

W/N the motion for extension filed by the respondents is a

ISSUE/S STATUTES/ARTICLES INVOLVED

ISSUE/S STATUTES/ARTICLES INVOLVED

WON the lower court has jurisdiction over the case?

ISSUE/S STATUTES/ARTICLES INVOLVED

ISSUE/S STATUTES/ARTICLES INVOLVED

ISSUE/S STATUTES/ARTICLES INVOLVED

ISSUE/S STATUTES/ARTICLES INVOLVED

W/N the RTC dismissal of the case was proper

ISSUE/S STATUTES/ARTICLES INVOLVED

ISSUE/S STATUTES/ARTICLES INVOLVED

Section 5. Effect of failure to appear. — The failure of the

Hence, the instant petition is Denied. RTC’s decision is affirmed.

ISSUE/S STATUTES/ARTICLES INVOLVED

First letter of complaint alleged:

Judge Bandong denied the charges against her.

ISSUE/S STATUTES/ARTICLES INVOLVED

Whether or not the findings of the OCA is proper.

ISSUE/S STATUTES/ARTICLES INVOLVED

Whether or not Judge Paderanga is liable for grave abuse of

[Ratio on why he was found guilty of simple misconduct]

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Respondents are guilty of willful and deliberate forum shopping.