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8  The Grenfell Tower fire

hot gases caused the uPVC jamb of the kitchen window to deform
and collapse. This provided an opening for the flames to pass into the
cladding façade system on the outside of the building. The cladding
consisted of aluminium composite material (ACM) rainscreen panels
bonded to a central polyethylene core which, being highly combusti-
ble, was the primary cause of the fire spread. It spread extremely rap-
idly around the outside of the building, both vertically up the tower
columns and laterally along the cladding above and below the window
lines.3 The fire moved across the eastern side of the building to the
north face of the tower and into the majority of the other apartments
in the tower block. The principal catalyst for the fire spreading hor-
izontally and downward was dripping polyethylene emanating from
the architectural crown of the building and from the spandrel and col-
umn panels. The polyisocyanurate (PIR) and phenolic foam insulation
boards, located behind the ACM panels, contributed to the speed of
the vertical flame spread.
Tragically, Grenfell Tower had a “stay put” fire policy in place
which means that the building had been designed to contain any out-
break of fire within the individual flat where the fire ignited until the
fire service arrived to extinguish the fire. However, in reality, there
proved to be little resistance to the spread of fire making it extremely
difficult to extinguish, which resulted in the death of 72 occupants.4
The death toll was exacerbated by the volumes of smoke produced
from the burning facade. The smoke appears to have entered the
building through unprotected openings even before the contents of
each affected flat were ignited and the high toxicity of the smoke from
the facade is an important factor in the scale of the tragedy. Smoke
inhalation is recognised as the most common form of death and injury
from fire in the UK.5 On exposure to the smoke, the victim becomes
unconscious, and unless they are rescued from the building, the effect
of the smoke is lethal.6

Public inquiry
The public inquiry was called by the Prime Minister, Theresa May,
on 15 June 2017. It was chaired by a retired judge, Sir Martin Moore-
Bick, and its primary purpose was to establish the facts of how the fire
had occurred to prevent a similar tragedy happening in the future.
Phase 1 of the inquiry considered what happened on the night of
the fire. It commenced on 14 September 2017 and concluded on 12
December 2018.
The Grenfell Tower fire  9
A number of expert witnesses gave evidence at the Public Inquiry
between 20 and 29 November 2018:

• Professor Luke Bisby spoke about the ignition of the facade materials
and the external spread of fire.
• Professor Jose Torreo addressed the fire spread throughout the
building.
• Dr Barbara Lane considered the fire protection measures within
the building.
• Professor Niamh Nic Daeid gave evidence around the cause and
spread of the fire in the flat of origin, Flat 16, and the spread of fire
within and from Flat 16.
• Professor David Purser provided evidence on the production of
toxic gases and the consequences of inhaling toxic gases in such
circumstances, which were the likely causes of incapacitation and
death at Grenfell Tower.

The Phase 1 inquiry report was published on 30 October 2019, and


Moore-Bick concluded that

there was compelling evidence that the external walls of the


building failed to comply with Requirement B4(1) of Sched-
ule 1 to the Building Regulations 2010, in that they did not
adequately resist the spread of fire having regard to the height,
use and position of the building. On the contrary, they actively
promoted it.7

The Phase 2 inquiry commenced in February 2020 with the overarch-


ing aim of examining the events that lead to the fire. These events in-
cluded the refurbishment of the tower, testing of the external cladding
system, compliance with the building regulations and the role of central
and local governments. The inquiry was suspended in March 2020 due
to COVID-19 lockdown restrictions and did not recommence until 7
September 2020.
In the following sections, the evidence provided in Phase 1 of the in-
quiry is used to explain in more detail how the design of the refurbishment
works, and the choice of materials used in those works contributed to the
spread of fire and smoke throughout Grenfell Tower. The final section
also reviews the “stay put policy” that was in place at the time of the fire
and how this contributed to the tragedy.

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