Relati
ism: Cogniti
e

Latour B, Woolgar S 1986 Laboratory Life: The Construction of expressions such as ‘this,’ ‘here,’ ‘now,’ ‘I,’ etc., are
Scientific Facts. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ abbreviations of statements or sentences containing
Laudan H 1990 Science and Relati
ism. University of Chicago references to specific objects, dates, geographic loca-
Press, Chicago
tions, and named persons. The content of an indexical
Ross A 1992 Strange Weather: Culture, Science, and Technology
in the Age of Limits. Verso, London statement can be made explicit in such a way that its
Siegel H 1987 Relati
ism Refuted. Reidel, Dordrecht, Germany truth or falsity would arise from specifiable events
Sokal A, Bricmont J 1998 Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern occurring at a particular time, place, or context. For
Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science. Picador, New York instance, ‘It’s raining here today’ is equivalent to
Trigger B G 1998 Sociocultural E
olution: Calculation and ‘There is rain in Dublin on September 12, at 5:45 local
Contingency. Blackwell, Oxford time, 1999’ and that sentence is true or false ir-
respective of when or where or by whom it was uttered.
M. Bunge
2.2 Perspecti
alism
The perspectivalism of all our reports and experiences,
Relativism: Philosophical Aspects the impossibility of having a view from nowhere, has
been used to support relativism. All our judgements,
beliefs, or assertions, it is claimed, are made from a
1. Definition point of view, a perspective. A God’s eye view or a
Relativism is the view that cognitive, moral, or view from nowhere is not available to us. Perspec-
aesthetic norms are dependent on the social or tivalism goes beyond the mere indexicality of our
conceptual systems that underpin them and conse- judgements in that even a nonindexical judgement, for
quently a neutral standpoint is not available to us. instance, ‘there are nine planets in the Solar system,’ is
Relativists claim that standards of truth, rationality, a statement made from a human perspective as we
and ethical right and wrong vary greatly between cannot step out of our skin, so to speak, and experience
cultures and historical epochs and that there are no reality as it is. In addition, relativists assume, explicitly
universal criteria for adjudicating between them. or implicitly, that different perspectives could not
Relativism hence stands in opposition to universalism converge and therefore what is true or right from one
and absolutism. Although the first expression of perspective may not be so from a different one and
relativism as a philosophical thesis is found in ancient consequently the truth of a judgement is relative to a
Greece, it was only in the second half of the twentieth perspective or point of view we have or we adopt.
century that relativism became a prominent feature of
various intellectual fields, including philosophy, social 2.3 Cultural Di
ersity
sciences, and literary theory. In recent years, post-
modernism, in particular, has become identified with Increasing awareness of the extent of diversity of
relativism. beliefs, practices, and customs of different cultures and
different historical epochs has cast doubt on the
universality and objectivity of our judgements. Most
2. Moti
ations significantly, the reports by anthropologists about the
thinking habits of remote peoples have led to the
The appeal of relativism arises out of certain features suggestion that all normative judgements, whether
of our experiences of the world as well as a number of cognitive or ethical, may have only a local validity.
intellectual currents. Opponents of relativism argue that the extent and
scope of diversity between different cultures and
individuals is often exaggerated. Beyond the apparent
2.1 The Indexicality of our Judgements
dissimilarities, they argue, there are many core
Many of our judgements and assertions refer to events similarities which unify all human cultures and systems
that happen at a particular time, place, and are of beliefs. Relativists, on the other hand, believe that
experienced by a particular individual. Such asser- Western ethnocentrism and the intellectual legacy of
tions seem to be true only at the time, place, or the Enlightenment prevent us from appreciating or
context of their utterance. For instance, the sentence even seeing the uniqueness of different cultures and
‘It’s raining today’ is true at the time of writing it but modes of thought.
may be false when uttered at a different time or place.
This feature of our judgements has led some to argue
2.4 The Disappearance of Old Certainties
that the truth of all our judgements depends on, and in
that sense is relative to, their time and place, and The disappearance of old certainties, both in the
context. religious and scientific arena, has been instrumental in
This argument for relativism, despite its popularity, the popularity of relativism in recent years. The
is not very convincing. Sentences containing indexical collapse of a religiously motivated cosmology which

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fixed the position of individual human beings within a temporary hermeneutics and social theory through his
larger and immutable framework and provided firm argument that each nation can be seen as a self-
foundations for their ethical outlook helped to bolster contained unit with its own conception of reality and
a climate that was conducive to relativistic outlooks. system of values. Different historical periods, Dilthey
In science, the discovery of the possibility of non- maintains, produce different norms and values, each
Euclidean geometries followed by the scientific of which is taken to be unconditional or universal. We
developments at the beginning of the twentieth century cannot gain a correct understanding of social and
eroded the confidence placed in classical geometry and intellectual conditions if we do not understand or take
physics. Einstein’s theory of relativity cast doubt on into account the inevitable historicity of all thought.
Newtonian physics and deprived it from the un-
assailable status it had enjoyed. The new theories in the
area of quantum mechanics and particle physics, 3. Varieties of Relati
ism
Heisenberg’s Principle of Uncertainty in particular,
often misrepresented and misunderstood, added to the Relativism takes many shapes and forms. One way to
belief that universal, absolute laws are rarer than it distinguish between different types of relativism is to
was once imagined. consider the questions:
(a) What is it that is being relativized?
and
(b) What is it being relativized to?
2.5 Influence of Early Philosophers
A reply to the latter question allows us to distinguish
In addition to the above intellectual and socio- between subjective relativism (or subjectivism) on the
historical influences, contemporary relativism is heir one hand and social (or historical) relativism on the
to the legacies left by earlier philosophers. The other. Subjectivists or subjective relativists argue that
earliest documented source of relativism in the West- truth and falsity of all judgements and the right
ern intellectual tradition is Plato’s account of the and wrong of actions are relative to the beliefs and
Sophist philosopher Protagoras and his famous dic- opinions of the individual thinkers and actors. The
tum, ‘Man is the measure of all things; of the things view entails that the truth and falsity of our judgements
that are, that they are; and of the things that are not, come down only to what we believe or like. This type
that they are not’ (Plato 1961). As in twentieth century, of relativism, although quite popular, is too naive and
the relativistic tendencies in ancient Greece were fos- unsophisticated to be worthy of serious philosophical
tered by the increasing contact between the Greeks and consideration. Subjective relativism rules out the
other people; the realization that other societies may possibility of disagreement and the very distinction
arrange their social and ethical beliefs and customs in between correct and incorrect judgements, for it turns
radically different ways had a great impact on Greek all our judgements, as long as we believe in them, into
thinkers. Relativism was subsumed under scepticism correct or true ones.
by the Pyrrhonian sceptics who in turn influenced Social (historical) relativism is the claim that the
Michel De Montaigne (1533–92) one of the most truth and falsity of all judgements and the right or
important figures at the outset of modern philosophy. wrong of actions are relative to their social,
Giambattista Vico (1668–1744) and Johann Gottfried historical, and cultural contexts. According to this
von Herder (1744–1803) paved the way for historicism, view, we are indeed in a position to distinguish between
which in turn has shaped twentieth century relativism. true and false beliefs and right and wrong actions and
Contemporary relativists are influenced directly by the judgements, but only within the parameters of socially
perspectivism of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) and given norms and beliefs.
the historicism of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911). The most influential form of social relativism in
According to Nietzsche, all claims of knowledge are twentieth century is known as ‘cultural relativism.’
representations of reality only from a certain stand- Cultural relativism was inspired by the work of social
point. Reports of so-called ‘facts’ are statements of anthropologists who conducted their fieldwork among
interpretation which could always be supplemented or tribal people. Ethnographic evidence seems to suggest
replaced by other interpretations. Language is not a that various groups of people hold systems of belief
means of describing what there is, Nietzsche claims, which according to Western standards are false,
rather it imposes its own interpretation on our irrational, and even self-contradictory. The Nuer’s
thinking. Thus, the very idea of truth and reality is belief that twins are birds or the Azande belief in
called into question by Nietzsche. Whether Nietzsche’s witchcraft and oracles are some of the frequently cited
perspectivism should be equated with relativism is examples.
open to debate. However, his writings have become a Anthropologists distinguish between the methodo-
source of inspiration for postmodernist and relativist logical and the normative components of cultural
thinkers. relativism. The methodological principle enjoins the
Dilthey also has influenced a relativistic under- practicing anthropologist to refrain from taking
standing of social and historical conditions in con- judgmental positions on the people under study in

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order to attain a greater degree of objectivity. The cognitive relativism are relativism about truth, rela-
normative consequence of cultural relativism is respect tivism about rationality and logic, and conceptual
for other cultures and value systems—which can relativism.
manifest itself as an adherence to multiculturalism and
avoidance of ‘ethnocentrism’ in contemporary West-
ern societies. 3.1.1 Relati
ism about truth. Relativism about
One important stimulus for the adoption of cultural truth is the claim that what is true for one individual,
relativism has come from the study of languages of or one social group, may not be true for another and
non-Western people. The work of Benjamin Whorf— that every effort to adjudicate between context-
known as ‘linguistic relativity’—is the locus classicus dependent standards of truth and falsity is bound to
of this approach. Whorf’s study of American Indian be futile. The truth of an assertion, so the claim goes,
languages, such as that of the Hopi, led him to claim is relative to the beliefs, attitudes, and other psycho-
that ‘we dissect nature along lines laid down by our logical idiosyncrasies of the individuals, or more
native languages. The categories and types that we generally and commonly to the conceptual, or
isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find cultural, background of the persons uttering them.
there because they stare every observer in the face; on Relativism about truth is the core of all relativistic
the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic positions since other subdivisions of cognitive rela-
flux of impressions which has to be organised by our tivism, and even moral relativism, are reducible to it.
minds—and this means largely by the linguistic For instance, relativism about rationality can be
systems in our minds. We cut nature up, organise it expressed in terms of whether there are true (universal)
into concepts, and ascribe significance as we do, largely standards of rationality. Relativism about logic may
because we are parties to an agreement to organise in be restated as the question whether logical truths are
this way—an agreement that holds throughout our relative to specific cultures or cognitive schemes or
speech community and is codified in the patterns of whether they are in any sense universal. Ethical
our language’ (Whorf 1956). According to Whorf, the relativism can be seen as the claim that the truth of
Hopi articulate and hence perceive the world in terms ethical judgements is relative to the context or the
of events rather than objects, and see time not in terms culture in which these particular judgements are being
of duration as English speakers do, but as relations made. In this sense relativism about truth is the most
between events. Whorf’s principle of relativity states general and strongest form of relativism and the target
that ‘all observers are not led by the same physical of most criticisms of relativism (see Sect. 5).
evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless
their linguistic backgrounds are similar, or can in some
way be calibrated’ (p. 214). We see and hear and 3.1.2 Relati
ism about rationality. The relativist
otherwise experience very largely as we do because the about rationality argues that various societies or
language habits of our community predispose certain cultures have different standards and criteria of
choices of interpretation. In this sense, the worlds in rationality and we are not in a position to evaluate,
which different societies live, he argues, are distinct or choose, between these divergent standards. For
worlds and not the same world with different labels instance, Peter Winch has argued that since stan-
attached to them. dards of rationality in different societies do not
Further ethnographic and linguistic studies have always coincide, we should use only contextually and
not supported Whorf’s hypothesis of linguistic rela- internally given criteria of rationality in our assess-
tivism. Nonetheless his views have had great impact ment of the systems of belief of an alien culture.
on the resurgence of interest in relativism in recent Winch, who based his arguments on Evans-
decades. Pritchard’s account of Azande’s beliefs in witchcraft
The attempt to answer the question ‘what is it that and magic and who was greatly influenced by the
is being relativized?’ gives us a different set of sub- work of the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, argues
divisions of relativism. Depending on whether cog- that we can only use contextually and internally
nitive or ethical norms are being relativized, phil- given criteria of reasoning and validity in our assess-
osophers distinguish between cognitive and moral ment of the systems of belief of other cultures, and
relativism. hence we cannot impute irrationality or illogicality to
the Azande. It does not make sense to speak of a
universal standard of tionality because rationality
means conforming to internal norms given by the
3.1 Cogniti
e Relati
ism
language and society, i.e., the form of life in which
Cognitive relativism is the view that what is true or the language is being used.
false, rational or valid can vary from society to society In more recent years, the discussion of the Azande
and culture to culture and we have no transcultural or material, coupled with a strongly relativistic interpret-
ahistorical criterion for adjudicating between con- ation of Wittgenstein’s views have led Barry Barnes
flicting cognitive norms. Some main subdivisions of and David Bloor to argue that not only standards of

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rationality but also laws of logic, often seen as the relativism. Putnam, for instance, has denied that there
necessary conditions for rational thought, are defined is a fact of the matter as to even what counts as an
by and hence are relative to their social context. object outside the standards set by a conceptual
According to them the very distinction between valid scheme. One and the same situation, according to
and invalid modes of argument is relative to the Putnam can be described ‘as involving entirely
practices prevalent in a given linguistic community or different numbers and kinds of objects’ (1992, p.120).
society and cannot in any sense be seen as universal. Different conceptual schemes will contain bits that are
Bloor argues that there are no culture-transcendent ‘true’ (or ‘right’) and bits that will turn out to be
rules of validity and inference. Different societies may ‘wrong’ by the standards appropriate to the scheme
have incompatible, but internally coherent, systems of itself—but we do not have an account of truth which
logic and the norms of logical reasoning are relative to would be external to, and independent of, all con-
a background of cultural conditioning. According to ceptual schemes.
Bloor, ‘The Azande have the same psychology as us It is important to note that most conceptual
but radically different institutions. If we relate logic to relativists, Quine and Putnam in particular, wish to
the psychology of reasoning we shall be inclined to say distance themselves from cultural relativism which
that they have the same logic; if we relate logic more they think is fundamentally incoherent (see Sect. 5).
closely to the institutional framework of thought then Their brand of relativism is based on their theories of
we shall incline to the view that the two cultures have meaning and truth rather than the purported dif-
different logics’ (Bloor 1976, pp. 129–130). ferences between cultural traditions.
Conceptual relativism has also influenced the phil-
osophers of science, Thomas Kuhn and Paul
3.1.3 Conceptual relati
ism. Conceptual relativism Feyerabend, who have emphasized the role of different
is motivated by philosophical considerations about modes of reasoning at various periods in the history of
the relationship between human thought and the science and have argued that scientific theories be-
world rather than mere observation of cultural and longing to these divergent styles of reasoning are
historical differences, and for that reason it is both incommensurable. Kuhn has claimed that scientists
quite distinct from and much more sophisticated than working with different paradigms live in different
other varieties of cognitive relativism. The roots of worlds, Feyerabend has argued that a change of
conceptual relativism rest with Immanuel Kant’s universal principles brings about a change of the entire
(1724–1804) distinction between the data of our sense world. Speaking in this manner we no longer assume
experiences and the principles of organization or that there is an objective world that remains unaffected
categories we use to organize them. Kant believed by our epistemic activities, except when moving within
that all thinkers necessarily apply the same categories the confines of a particular point of view. Kuhn’s
or conceptual schemes to the undifferentiated flow of thesis of incommensurability rested on his assumption
their experiences. However, once the distinction be- that scientific theories cannot be compared or assessed
tween a conceptual scheme and the content of that independently of the paradigms in which they are
scheme was introduced, then it was easy to accept embedded. For Kuhn, each paradigm acts as a unique
that there may be more than one system or scheme and untranslatable language or conceptual framework
of organization and the idea of conceptual relativism and since rival paradigms do not have access to a
was born. common criterion for adjudication, they cannot be
One of the most influential versions of conceptual compared and hence remain self-contained and
relativism in twentieth century was proposed by W. V. beyond the critical reach of other paradigms. Ac-
O. Quine (1908–2000). According to Quine, to be able cording to this understanding, incommensurability
to talk about the world and to cope with our stream of implies that evaluation of different conceptual
sensory experience, we must impose upon the world a schemes, cultures, or ways of life is impossible.
conceptual or linguistic scheme or theory. However, it Subsequent to the first publication of The Structure
is possible to envisage a plurality of conceptual or of Scientific Re
olutions in 1962, Kuhn, unlike
theoretical frameworks all of which explain and Feyerabend, attempted to distance himself from rela-
predict our experiences of the world equally well. tivism but his views remain an important source of in-
There are no determinate facts to enable us to choose spiration for relativistically inclined thinkers in many
between these different frameworks, hence what Quine fields.
has called ‘ontological relativity’ ensues.
The influence of Quine’s views is widespread.
Philosophers working in differing areas have explicitly,
3.2 Moral Relati
ism
or implicitly, made use of his arguments to support
their relativistic positions. We can see the impact of Moral inquiry is concerned with how life should be
Quine’s ontological relativism on the writings of lived and how human beings should behave towards
Nelson Goodman and Hilary Putnam who have each other and their world. Moral relativism is the
proposed very sophisticated forms of conceptual claim that there exist diverse, incompatible moral

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systems and there are no overarching criteria to decide Ethical relativism is often associated with tolerance
between them. Moral relativists start from the premise and open-mindedness. It is sometimes argued that
that moral values are grounded on societal con- ethical relativism is itself a normative doctrine insofar
ventions, historical conditions, metaphysical beliefs, as it prohibits interference with the ways of life and
etc., which vary from one society or social grouping to moral practices of other cultures. But this degree of
another and argue that there are no neutral standards tolerance can also lead to moral indifference and even
available to us for adjudicating between such com- nihilism. A relativist does not have the certitude to
peting claims. The truth or falsity, the appropriateness condemn genocide, torture, child abuse, etc., so long
or inappropriateness of ethical beliefs, are relative to as it is argued that such actions are part of the fabric of
their sociohistorical backgrounds and moral beliefs the social life of some cultures and peoples. Fur-
cannot be assessed independently of their social thermore, if ethical relativism is true then even
framework. tolerance and noninterference could not be seen as a
Moral relativism is usually subdivided into de- universal ethical value and could not be recommended
scriptive and ethical (or meta-ethical) relativism. to those who do not already embrace it.
Descriptive relativism purports to be an empirical
doctrine based on observation of diversity in moral
judgements and moral values in different societies and
at different times. There is widespread disagreement 4. New De
elopments
among individuals and cultures on issues ranging from Relativism has gained support from two recent philo-
capital punishment to abortion, from human rights to sophical developments. A new variety of relativism
animal rights, and so on. Descriptive relativists go so has been introduced through the work of the
far as accepting that there may be broad similarities in neo-pragmatist philosophers, the most prominent
the core beliefs of different societies, for instance, among whom is Richard Rorty. Although Rorty
injunctions against the killing of innocents, but argue denies the charge of relativism he does believe that
that such shared values are given very different truth, rationality, and objectivity are all defined only
and even incompatible interpretations by different in terms of the practices of a community. Furthermore,
cultures. he argues that no external questions can be asked
Ethical relativists claim that descriptive relativism about the relationship between the practices of a
entails that all ethical judgements are relative to the community and a reality that exists independently of
culture or context in which they are made and that it. ‘Objective truth,’ then, for Rorty, is simply the best
there is no unique criterion for adjudicating between idea we currently have about how to explain things.
them. Of course moral diversity is compatible with the The argument supports relativism insofar as it
possibility that there are right and wrong answers to identifies truth with (best) views current in a society at
ethical questions. But this would depend on having a a given time.
dependable path towards the discovery of ethical The work of postmodernist cultural and literary
truths or the establishment of a universal framework theorists has been hugely influential in establishing
for arbitrating between incompatible moral claims. relativism as one of the strongest intellectual
Ethical relativists deny this possibility because they currencies of recent times. Jacques Derrida’s pro-
claim that any rational decision making procedure will posed deconstruction of Western ideas of logic, truth,
have deeply seated normative historical and cultural and rationality has been seen as a harbinger of a new
presuppositions embedded in it. Reason and ration- intellectual era free of the logocentrism and phallo-
ality are themselves evaluative concepts, constrained centrism of Western rational intellectual traditions.
in turn by cultural and historical influences and hence Derrida, like Rorty, has denied that he is a relativist
are incapable of leading us to a set of neutral but his own and his fellow postmodernists’ writings
universally applicable standards of evaluation. Thus, lend themselves easily to relativistic interpretations.
ethical relativists deny the possibility of convergence
between conflicting ethical frameworks.
Ethical relativism can be embraced independently
of cognitive relativism. Ethical relativists may agree 5. Arguments Against Relati
ism
that convergence between diverse world views and
theoretical frameworks is possible in the natural Relativism has been challenged on several grounds.
sciences but deny that this is the case in the realm of
ethics. According to this view, moral precepts and
judgements are not part of and do not pertain to the
5.1 The Self-refutation Argument
natural furniture of the universe. They are man-made
and would not exist independently of human actions, The most common criticism leveled against relativism
beliefs, and customs, hence, there exists a fundamental is the charge of inconsistency. The argument goes back
difference between scientific investigations and moral to Plato and the main claim is that relativism, at least
enquiry. in its stronger form of relativism about truth, is either

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inconsistent or incoherent because of the dubious Relativism has survived 2,000 years of attempts to
status of the claim that ‘truth is relative.’ It is suggested bury it. Its perennial appeal and periodic fashion-
that if ‘truth is relative’ is itself true unconditionally, ability are due to its ability to capture and express an
then there is at least one truth which is not relative, essential insight, be it in an exaggerated fashion, about
and hence relativism is not true. If, on the other hand, the human condition. The insight that we live in a
‘truth is relative’ is true only relative to the relativist’s world of pluralities and do not have access to univocal
framework, then the claim is devoid of significance. To answers to our diverse problems.
avoid inconsistency a relativist should accept that
See also: Ethics and Values; Evans-Pritchard, Sir
‘truth is relative’ is itself only relatively true, i.e. true
only for people who suggest it, but then she or he Edward E (1902–73); Fieldwork in Social and Cul-
would not be in a position to try and convince a non- tural Anthropology; Intentionality and Rationality:
relativist of the veracity of the claim. The relativist is An Analytic Perspective; Irrationality: Philosophi-
condemned to silence. cal Aspects; Kant, Immanuel (1724–1804); Kuhn,
Thomas S (1922–96); Nietzsche, Friedrich (1844–
1900); Paradigms in the Social Sciences; Pluralism;
Realisms and their Opponents: Philosophical Aspects;
5.2 Argument from Translation Truth, Verification, Verisimilitude, and Evidence:
Philosophical Aspects; Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1889–
A new type of criticism of relativism has surfaced in
1951)
recent years directed at the intelligibility of the claim
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Siegel H 1987 Relati
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Epistemological Relati
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M. Baghramian relativists, have viewed the world:
Copyright # 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd.
All rights reserved. Nature is mindless, objective, and visible. It is empty of such
unseen, unobservable, meta-physical things as god, sin,
obligation, value, morality, and so on. If such things exist at
Relativism, Pluralism, and Skepticism all, they exist only as reality-posits in the mind. And if they
(Philosophical Perspective): Cultural exist only in the mind, they are not objective and thus ought
not be (sic) allowed to be constraining. If human beings feel
Concerns constrained by such things, it is only because, not yet realizing
their essential nature (self-determination), they do not dis-
Few terms in our critical language are as ambiguous tinguish between truth and poetry, confusing, quite irra-
as pluralism and relativism. Under diverse definitions, tionally, external reality with what exists nowhere else but in
their relationship could be said to range all the way their minds (Shweder 1989, p. 121).
from twins to deadly enemies. Both have been accused
by some monists as furthering rank skepticism or Even when we follow Shweder and rightly reject
nihilism. Meanwhile, defenders have vigorously de- such extremes and decide that truths do exist, though
nied that either term necessarily entails utter skepti- in multiple forms, we are still faced with the complex
cism, or Pyrrhonism, or what Bernard Williams has problem of how to deal with that multiplicity. For
called vulgar relativism. This article pursues pluralism cultural pluralists who refuse to dodge the problem,
as the best escape route from naive dogmatism and the best possible method is to search for common
naive (hyperskeptical) relativism. (For a useful, ground that underlies surface differences. (Sometimes
though somewhat superficial, history of skepticism, they—we—stumble upon another route, after the
especially in the Renaissance, see Popkin 1979.) probing: ‘By studying my opponent carefully I have
Almost every serious critic would agree that some learned that I was wrong and he\she was right; now my
extreme forms of either term can lapse into the kind of pluralism includes memory of my previous error.’)
skepticism or nihilism that threatens genuine intel- When for example we discover that every culture,
lectual inquiry or achievement. Genuine inquiry is including the most rationalistic versions of our own,
doomed if no claim to ‘truth’ has any validity except exhibits some form of embrace of an unprovable
for the claimer, and no one thus has any real reason to ‘transcendent’ ‘world’ or ‘reality’ or God, we no longer
listen to the arguments of anyone else. Fortunately, have good reason to consider religious commitments
more and more postmodernists, some of whom for a absurd: they are shared by all cultures. Again to quote
while edged towards such utter skepticism, have Shweder 1989:
attended to diverse cogent attacks on the ‘vulgar’ or
‘total’ forms of doubt. They have acknowledged that In that (our) post-Nietzschian world God is not dead; only
all arguments for total nihilism are paradoxically self- positivism and monotheism are dead. Polytheism is alive and
destructive; no one can offer a coherent defense of well. Its doctrine is the relativistic idea of multiple objective
utter skepticism without violating that defense by worlds [including the world of scientific rationalists], and its
claiming to offer, unskeptically, this one coherent commandment is participation in the never-ending process of
defense. What is more, the would-be utter skeptics overcoming partial views (pp. 132–3).
usually reveal many other deep commitments that
contradict their skeptical claims. Meanwhile, many
have argued that the term relativism need not be 1. Plurality of Thought-modes
identified with nihilism (Pepper 1942, Williams 1972,
Shweder 1989, Goodman 1978, Rorty 1989, Krausz Once we embrace that form of cultural pluralism,
1989. value-terms like ‘dead’ and ‘partial’ turn our problem
Cultural relativism—‘though truths exist, they are in the direction of philosophical inquiry: how to deal
always relative to some cultural placement’—has been with plurality not just of culture systems but of

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International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences ISBN: 0-08-043076-7