Time Lag: Motifs for a Phenomenology of the Experience of Time
Author(s): BERNHARD WALDENFELS and Derrick Calandrella
Source: Research in Phenomenology , 2000, Vol. 30 (2000), pp. 107-119
Published by: Brill
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Time Lag: Motifs for a Phenomenology
of the Experience of Time
BERNHARD WALDENFELS
Ruhr-Universitat Bochum
The time lag in question here may be understood in two ways: as a shif
time itself, and as a corresponding shift in signification. The following con
erations begin with a general orientation as to the ordering of time; then t
cross over to specific phenomenal fields in which time unfolds its effect.1
1. Logos of Time
The logos of time is to be understood as the way we think time, talk about
represent it and present it, and all of this with reference to an experience
time that tike all phenomena is to be brought "to utter its own meaning."2
The oldest discourse on time is found in μΰθος. Chronos is known as a god
who devours his own children, a god older than Zeus. Here time is portraye
as a power that in coming to be and passing away, in aging, manifests itself
a deterioration and disintegration of forces. Some of this lives on in poetry
"Make haste Chronos! Out of the rattling trot!"—in Goethe Chronos is a
trophized as coachman and entreated in his distant proximity. In Virgi
Woolf's Mrs. Dalloway it is Big Ben's chime that scans the course of the
within the novel.3 Or finally Octavio Paz in his Piedra del Sol: "mientras el tiem
ciena su abanico [while time folds its fan shut]."4 The influences and
sequences of time are older than the logos, which responds to the work of tim
seeks to reclaim an order from this work.
107
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108 BERNHARD WALDENFELS
The classical ordering of time
turies develops particular co
Three fundamental aspects of
(1) In the first place there is
appears no longer as a who o
anonymous temporal power; r
Time débuts in something or i
the one hand Aristotle compo
from cosmic kinesis. On the o
chic time from the lived time
up to the present day. Time is
X?" or "Who am I?" does not e
emerges in time is not someth
identity does not mean in the
one is accustomed to speaking
very core.
(2) The mode of time is repeat
as outer and inner, φύσις and
(3) Time itself is thought as a
sitions are those of time and
versus standing out from on
(flowing vs. standing, tempor
time is tamed: one is at the me
ing being.
The classical ordering of time gradually gives way to a radical experience of time
the consequence of which is that the logos turns into a "logos of the aesthetic
world."5 This leads to a transformation of the classical representation of time.
(1) Time is henceforth more than an attribute of things or a way of experienc
ing the soul; it is also more than the form of intuition for a transcendental sub
ject. Time is no longer reduced to a mere modality, since it has a decisive part
in the formation, shaping, and realization of something (object), of someone
(subject), and of meaning (orderings). These three moments, still divided
between three worlds by Karl Popper, have their respective temporal ways of
being. Temporality turns out to be a generator of identity. (2) Time no longer falls
under binary schemata; it proves to be differing in the sense of a holding up, shift,
or postponement. (3) Time frees itself from the opposition to timeless instances;
it becomes entangled in itself in the form of a self-reference that leads to a self
doubling and self-duplication. Thus Husserl remarks at the beginning of his
time lectures,6 "that the perception of a temporal object has itself temporality,
that perception of duration presupposes duration of perception"; and Merleau
Ponty speaks in his late writings of a temporal "vortex."7 Here emerges with
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TIME LAG 109
increasing and
chiasmatically
consciousness
Heidegger; as f
the other and
narrated tim
authors such a
in whose work
sense the attem
a modern biolo
should point t
in many ways
itself undergon
done away wi
time, and dea
measuring of
on the interna
the "arrow of
In what follow
of time exper
tightly intert
entiality alrea
equally in phe
ordering of th
access required
which it is co
remembered,
cide; or the lat
"elle fait voir
mit of being d
nomenology.
literature (as w
this means. Ph
in colors, sou
(au/weist). Thi
considerable p
analyses of tim
one could ascribe to a kind of 'minimal art of time'.
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110 BERNHARD WALDENFELS
2. Time of Speech
Since in philosophy we are thus
speech may stand at the beginn
low the route of a 'linguistic t
things of importance. They ar
penetrating into language, and i
is more than mere language. As
place at different levels.
At the first level we are dealing
what is said. The tested means o
ulation. This begins with the te
says "co-indicates" time.11 It co
(now); today, this year; earlier,
formalized in a temporal logic. I
speech, then speech itself—toge
remain intact. The logic of time
poralization, strategies that in r
cal ideas of order.
These detemporalization strategies fail when we change over to the level of
saying, where time as spoken about swings back upon itself in the form of time
of speech. More precisely, what is going on here is a doubling of time that corre
sponds to the doubling of instances of speech in E. Benveniste.12 "I promise you
(now) that I will come tomorrow (on May 13)." Here two tenses appear: the now
of the promising, and the datable later of the promised. It is not at all the case
that the act of promising appears earlier than the announced keeping of the
promising—this would only hold for a report speaking about the promising.
The reason why the act of promising does not appear earlier is that the act as
such does not at all happen in time. Rather it opens up a time in which the
speaker is obligated to something or other. One might think of inaugural
events, when legal contracts are closed or constitutions given. The inaugural
event takes place at a zero point, as Husserl calls it,13 that is not to be found
like just any given point within a system of coordinates. A promise could not
be repeated, a vow not be renewed, if it had passed away like a datable event
occupying a place in a field of time or on a time line. Certain anniversaries lose
their significance when all they keep alive is a historical reminiscence. In short,
promising is not part of the promised but rather signifies a surplus of saying in
what is said, a surplus said along with what is said without coming up in this.
Of course all this goes not only for acts of promising but also for threats, con
gratulations, and even for assertions. These too commit the speaker in such a
way that taking them back means more than just a contrary assertion.
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ΉME LAG 111
We touch upon
saying. This le
change over fr
watch; and at s
in speech says m
not exactly coin
we arrive upon
like an echo of
there were a fi
could the word
Is there a first
chapter of whi
feeling he had
up snow." Is th
before the narr
Buchenwald. S
atthe fork in
wards. A first
to a terror, not
And a last wor
words with a f
sation because
beautiful, appr
something ab
Giraudoux.... I
Sunday, which
be one that per
that no one cou
In the aporia o
the level of "pr
zonless atom o
"ideal limit,'"5
as such, thus in
ist keinmal). Th
remains as limi
ing; it at most
falling silent.
Accordingly,
realm of a pre-
points to a thr
ence untouched
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112 BEMHARD WALDENFELS
would have us think; but this
It is rather because it precede
it has itself a flesh and does
3. Time of the Sens
Should there have been an ex
referred to the senses, thus t
waits for our response. Yet h
Can we assume a perceived ti
least see, hear, touch along w
tion of what we understand b
perception itself. If we restric
then we only have to deal wit
are actually present in percep
tualness of the temporal mom
time. The transition to psych
able to represent what is not
by arranging its own lived ex
another in succession or ho
opposed to the standing out f
sition to a distentio animi, to
tended durée in Augustine,
already mentioned, where inn
sense and space. This privilege
By collecting itself in itself a
approaches an omnipresence
This privileging of the inner
ditional hierarchic ordering of
arts through the art of ton
entails a corresponding despat
A revision that leaves behind the internalization as well as the externaliza
tion of time takes shape as soon as we proceed from the fleshliness of the senses.
Here the alternatives 'passive givenness' and 'active positing' lose their power.
Perception, anchored in a fleshly here and now, is carried out as self move
ment, as kinasthesis. This traditional expression that Husserl takes up does not
mean sensation of movement, but rather sensing that moves itself.16 In looking,
listening, feeling, tasting, or sniffing, my flesh responds to that which comes to
the fore, occurs to me, surprises me and affects me in the flesh. In perception
the world is staged and not simply registered in its details. Time is involved in
this in many ways, already, for example, in the time of the look (des Blicksj, in
the glimpse of a moment (.Augen-blick), which approximates the time of speech
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TIME LAG 113
already ment
where else, pr
aheadand back
Merleau-Ponty
For us the per
the level of p
us to leave to
eyes on to m
fused reflecti
spreads out, t
is not a specta
which is not y
no depth, my
and so dispose
re-assign to it
me, because I c
the world's fir
minate object
prospective, si
retrospective,
the 'stimulus',
ning. The spat
unfolding of ti
The temporalit
namely by pro
nal etymologic
movement (τά
This continues
of movement
presupposes cou
articulation of
measured out
another; if no
be no rhythm
this sameness
rhythm takes
particular atte
processes, and
as far as the so
ment to all th
chical; the fo
reaches beyond
of color vision.
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114 BERNHARD WALDENFELS
He illustrates this claim in an
rhythm. Impossible. I knew so
kept the beat with his eyelids. O
But it goes beyond this straigh
sents itself at the same time as re
sive in this is that as articulation
and alters it. If we attend to th
selves in an already completed o
something that repeats itself"; it
that it repeats itself." This is ho
hende) behind the existing (best
becomes identical; it becomes id
ally comes back to something as
same. In this sense repetition me
of what is not the same."23 In co
to a pure eurythmy, but is inst
arrhythmia.
Modern music, which—like mo
along the limits of order, operat
but also with counter-rhythms
erophony. The rhythm of the s
in fact at the level of a prelan
ing threshold although it alway
to return as something, there m
Accordingly, language acquisitio
phonic forms and written ima
extends into speaking and writi
claims. The rhythmic at work h
of self that goes through the sen
a temporal aspect.
4. Time of Forgetting and
In forgetting and rememberin
effectivity of time and not only
without forgetting, no remembe
does not fit into the current sc
cerns us, but it will not be unde
portment. It has neither a mean
to a rule that is ours to follow; a
that merely prevents any effec
that runs into us like an acciden
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TIME LAG 115
is forgotten
Forgetting is
described as lo
ening, withdr
not there; it c
Yet not every
of forgetting
getting of wh
learning is un
ter. To be disti
was never con
one's own chil
in memory th
fully extricate
(Urvergessen)
case of birth
Expressed less
sent."25 This
form of delay
the temporal
in all decisive
tion of them,
the belated ef
There is the f
experience, fo
an accident,
occur to us, t
that it happen
giving and tak
would not esp
closed present
erects a bulwa
hand, we assu
retention, thi
looking for a
does not begi
onto in memor
grasp'.27 Bec
sciousness fro
case of faintin
ting presents
again, forgett
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116 BERNHARD WALDENFELS
not fully 'in' consciousness ca
self-withdrawal that makes u
changes us, why we undergo
the fleshly members are onl
lings under order to carry ou
Remembering, just as little a
instance, an act of observatio
to me again in the same way
is awakened, not made. In thi
stem from our own initiativ
summoned under order, does
as intentionally directed act o
as taking up again, as putting
called in the Platonic texts on
old storage model of memory
pure observer's category29 mi
the 'building contractor' is n
that come from the past but
signifies no more or less tha
ing. Reservations equ emerge
a not being able to rememb
ing competence and limited c
not even allow for the questi
ing, whether it could validat
time has as consequence that
of remembering largely run
a mixture of storage capacity
renders the penetration of
totally harmless.31
5. Time of the Oth
The temporal shifting we ha
stronger when we consider h
another. Here temporality ga
time comes to the fore, that
tors and descendants. The com
this new dimension. It is in t
of meaning a dia-chrony that l
logos.32 Even in classical dialo
Plato to Gadamer, there is de
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77ME LAG 117
the word alter
within a cont
and synchroni
reveals itself in
to validity cla
spectives, accor
to Jean Piaget
look, forfeit t
continues in th
ates the proper
net yield. A un
fact that the f
As opposed to
response, betw
rupts the com
response from
demand signifi
present, where
quality not to
begins somew
inscribed with
ing bloom. The
suffering from
maieutic is co
means more th
method of tria
of an enduring
Synchrony, w
the exchange o
thetic power w
to expression in
thing unexpect
fall apart into
enable and req
even give what
already on stab
All in all we
timeless or fl
spersed with
differentiates
in it. This inne
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118 BEMHARD WALDENFELS
and now and at the same time somewhere else and at some other time. This
is where the split continually opens up for other times: not a nunc stans, but a
nunc distans.
Translated by Derrick Calandrella
The Pennsylvania State University
NOTES
1. The following text goes back to a lecture I held on December 17, 1998, at the Univ
Frankfurt/Main in the context of the graduate college "Experience of Time and Aesth
Perception." I would like to thank the organizers Hans-Thies Lehmann and Burkh
Lindner.
2. Edmund Husserl, Husserliana (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950 ffi), vol. 1, §16, 77. He
cited as Hua.
3. Here compare the interpretation of the time novel in the second volume of Paul Ricoeur's Time
and Narrative, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1988).
4. Octavio Paz, "Sunstone," The Collected Poems of Octavio Paz 1957-1987, trans. Eliot Weinberger
(New York: New Directions, 1987), 11.
5. Hua 17: 297.
6. Hua 10: 22.
7. On Merleau-Ponty's conception of time compare my "Wirbel der Zeit," written with Régula
Giuliani (forthcoming).
8. Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue with Nature, 1st ed.
(Boulder: New Science Library, 1984).
9. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1968), 266.
10. For more on this theme see chap. 3 of my Vielstimmigkeit der Rede. Studien zur Phànomenologie des
Fremden, vol. 4 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1999).
11. Cf. On Interpretation 3: ρήμα δέ έστιν το προσσημαΐνον χρόνον.
12. Emile Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics, trans. Mary Elizabeth Meek (Coral Gables:
University of Miami Press, 1971), 219.
13. Hua 4: 158.
14. Jorge Semprun, What a Beautiful Sunday! trans. Alan Sheridan (San Diego: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1982).
15. Hua 10: 40.
16. Erwin Straus, The Primary World of Senses: A Vindication of Sensoiy Experience, trans. Jacob
Needleman (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).
17. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (New York: Humanities
Press, 1962), 239.
18. For more on this, see chap. 3 of my work Sinnesschwellen. Studien zur Phànomenologie des Fremden,
vol. 3 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1999).
19. Cf. Laws 664e-665a.
20. Cf. Kurt Goldstein, The Organism. A Holistic Approach to Biology Derived from Pathological Data in Man
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1963).
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TIME LAG 119
21. Paul Valéry,
22. Hua 1: §18.
23. On this form
in the Twilight,
24. Republic 400
25. Merleau-Ponty,
26. Martin Heide
27. Hua 3: §122.
28. Merleau-Ponty
29. Foreward to G
30. Ibid., 34.
31. On the respon
proves extremely
Ill, 5.
32. Cf. Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Duquesne:
Duquesne University Press, 1998), passim.
33. Husserl already spoke of retention and perception as being "differently timed [verschiedenzeitig]"
(Hua 10: 205).
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