Moon Jae-In's Strategy Amid Covid-19 Pandemic: Reviving The Green in The Korean New Deal

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Collection of Essays on Korea’s Public Diplomacy:
Possibilities and Future Outlook
Collection of Essays on Korea’s Public Diplomacy:
Possibilities and Future Outlook
Publication Date December, 2020
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Tel. +82-2-2100-8104
Address 60, Sajik-ro 8-gil, Jongno-gu, Seoul 03172 Korea
Edited by
Global Public Diplomacy Center
Printed by
Seoul National University Press
Seoul, Korea
Copyright © 2020 by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea.

Collection of
Essays on Korea’s
Public Diplomacy:
Possibilities And
Future Outlook
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

4
CONTENTS
Notes on Contributors •7
1. ‌YouTube Diplomacy: A Sentiment Analysis of Global Reactions to

the 2018 Concert in Pyongyang • 15
Jenna Gibson
2. ‌To the Sea, to the World: Public Diplomacy and the Republic of
Korea Navy • 41
Alexander M. Hynd
3. ‌Korean Health Diplomacy Amidst COVID-19 and Its Impact on

Public Diplomacy • 67
Floortje Fontein
4. ‌Analysis of Rok Public Diplomacy on Social Media • 91

Abdou Chakour Arouna and Maissou Yacoubou
5. ‌Addressing Global Issues through Science Diplomacy: Towards a

South Korean Approach • 113
Thyene Ribas Moreira
6. ‌“Smart” Korea and COVID-19: Exploring the Potential of Smart

City as a Tool of Public Diplomacy • 139
Ayse Durakoglu
7. ‌Korean Anti-Corruption Public Diplomacy • 165

Azul van Marrewijk and Genaro Viesti
Contents
Contents 5
8. ‌Personalized Soft Power: An Innovative Model for South Korea’s

Public Diplomacy • 189
Bui Linh Nguyet Ha
9. ‌Korean Digital Public Diplomacy: A Case Study of the Embassy of

the Republic of Korea in Brazil’s Facebook Page • 215
Camila C S Carneiro
10. ‌The Performance of the Fourth Industrial Revolution in South

Korean Public Diplomacy: Focus on Korea-Vietnam Diplomatic
Relations • 239
Dong Thi Thu Hien
11. ‌Korean Public Diplomacy toward Africa: Scoping the Cooperation

and Humanitarian Aid in the Age of Covid-19 Crisis • 271
Iffat Tahira
12. ‌South Korean New Deal and the Role of Eco-Diplomacy • 297
Ingrid Rafaele Rodrigues Leiria
13. ‌Moon Jae-In’s Strategy Amid Covid-19 Pandemic: Reviving the

Green in the Korean New Deal • 315
14. ‌South Korea on the Forefront of Fifth Generation (5G) Technology:

Public Diplomacy 2.0 • 335
Mark Joseph V. Montera
15. ‌Role of Korean Public Diplomacy in Addressing Global Issues:

South Korea Middlemanship and Public Diplomacy • 357
Mathew Yeo Jie Sheng
16. ‌The Role of Korean Public Diplomacy in Addressing Global Issues

• 377
Pavlina Svobodova
6 Collection of Essays on Korea’s Public Diplomacy
17. ‌Democracy Promotion through ODA: The Future of Korean Public

Diplomacy? • 401
Simon Bruns
18. ‌Promoting New Southern Policy in Southeast Asia: Killing Two

Birds With One Stone • 427
Swe Yone Nanddy
19. ‌A Causality Analysis of the Impact of Korean Public Diplomacy

Strategies on Human Capital and National Capacity Development in
Nigeria • 443
Temitayo Shenkoya
20. ‌Humanitarian Aid and Public Diplomacy: How Helping Developing

Countries Combat COVID-19 is a Win-Win for South Korea and the
World • 469
Zachary Lavengood
7
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Jenna Gibson is a PhD student in the Department of Political Science at the

University of Chicago. Her research interests include: media effects,
political communication, public and cultural diplomacy, South Korean
politics and social issues, and U.S.-Korea relations. Jenna is a regular
contributor to the Korea column for The Diplomat and has also written
about Korean social issues for publications including Foreign Policy and
NPR. Before pursuing her doctorate, Jenna was Director of Communications
at the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI), a think tank in
Washington, DC. She previously lived for two years in Cheonan, South
Korea as a Fulbright English Teaching Assistant.
Alexander M. Hynd is a PhD candidate at the University of New South

Wales, Sydney, where his research focuses on middle power identity and
hierarchy formation among states in the Asia Pacific. Alexander received
his BA in Politics from SOAS, University of London, and his MA in
International Studies from Korea University. His previous research has
focused on the issues of arms control, South Korean foreign policy, and
maritime security. He can be reached at [email protected] or
[email protected].
Floortje Fontein is a third year Public Administration bachelor student at

Leiden University, with a Minor in Global Affairs. Fontein has ambitions to
continue her studies in the field of Public Administration with the Master
‘Public Management and Leadership’ at Leiden University. Her main
research interests include the management of public organizations,
representative bureaucracy, diversity management and leadership. She
aspires to aid public organizations in improving society and solving societal
challenges more effectively. Fontein is part of the research team at the
Dutch foundation ‘Stem op een Vrouw’ [Vote for a Woman] where she is
committed to improve the political representation of women and encourage

women’s empowerment. Fontein can be reached at f.fontein@umail.
leidenuniv.nl
Abdou Chakour Arouna is a Global Korea Scholarship (GKS) recipient

who is currently in the process of obtaining a master’s degree in economics
from Jeonbuk National University in Jeonju, South Korea. He completed his
BSc degree in Aviation management at The University of Turkish
Aeronautical Association. He has a special interest in digital marketing,
international economy, digital diplomacy, and economic diplomacy. Abdou
Chakour Arouna is a polyglot who speaks French, English, Turkish, and
Korean. Abdou can be reached at [email protected]
Maissou Yacoubou holds a double BSc degree in Aviation Management

and Logistics Management from the University of Turkish Aeronautical
Association. He is currently doing a master’s degree in International
Logistics at Chung-Ang University in Seoul, South Korea. Thanks to his
broader skills and experience in marketing, he is an active digital marketer
with a special interest in international business, marketing, and logistics.
Maissou Yacoubou is multilingual and speaks French, English, Turkish, and
basic Korean. Maissou can be reached at [email protected]
Thyene Ribas Moreira has a Bachelor’s in International Relations and is

an MBA in Finance and Controllership student at Centro Universitário
Ritter dos Reis - Uniritter. She is an associated researcher at the South
American Institute of Policy and Strategy - ISAPE. She attended the
Science and Diplomacy School of São Paulo University - InnScid SP/2020.
The focus of her research is the relations between Asia and Latin America,
Global South, Cooperation in Science, Technology, and Innovation and
Theories of International Relations. She believes that analyzing East Asia
from a Latin American perspective is a promising way to contribute to the
incorporation of other understandings of the world and to interpret its
complexities through different and original lenses. She can be reached at
[email protected]
Notes on Contributors 9
Ayse Durakoglu is a master’s student in Asian Studies at Middle East

Technical University, Turkey. She completed her bachelor’s and master’s
degrees in Political Science at Bilkent University. She was an exchange
student at Korea University in Seoul. Her research interests include cultural
politics, nationalism, modernity/modernization and political anthropology
of space and identity in Turkey and South Korea. Ayse is also a holder of a
Fulbright Foreign Student Ph.D. Scholarship. She can be reached at ayse.
[email protected] or [email protected].
Azul van Marrewijk is a graduate student of International Relations at

Austral University. She was awarded with the Erasmus+ Scholarship to do
an exchange program at Manchester Metropolitan University. Van
Marrewijk is currently doing internships in the Fuerza Solidaria trust and at
Universidad Austral, in the Master in Environmental Law, Management and
Policy. Her main research interests include global sustainable development
and international cooperation. She can be reached at [email protected]
Genaro Viesti is a graduate student in International Relations at Universidad

del Salvador (USAL) in Buenos Aires, Argentina. He is a content creator for
the international news portal “Síntesis Mundial,” which is part of the
Political and International Studies Centre (CEPI, in Spanish) of the Federal
Integration Foundation (FUNIF, in Spanish). His main duties include
research and outreach activities on international issues. His main research
interests include power, public diplomacy, culture, and political and social
processes. Viesti’s most recent articles are - “Latin America chooses: keys
to understand what is happening and what is to come” and - “Is it the end of
the truce? North Korea doesn’t see the point of waiting.” Viesti can be
reached at [email protected]
Bui Linh Nguyet Ha is an undergraduate student at Ewha Womans

University who majors in International Studies with a concentration in
International Law and Public Diplomacy. She is an Ewha Global
Partnership Program scholar. Her main research interests include political
psychology, public private partnership and applied microeconomics. Bui
can be reached at [email protected].
Camila Carneiro holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Journalism and is currently

studying Digital Marketing at the Metropolitan University of the State of
São Paulo. She is particularly interested in research topics related to the new
media environment, niche culture on social media and international affairs.
Carneiro can be reached at [email protected].
Dong Thi Thu Hien graduated from the University of Social Sciences and
Humanities, Vietnam National University. In 2019, Hien received a
Government Korea Scholarship (GKS) for her master’s degree which she
completed at Seoul National University. Although her major is Korean
language and Literature, she is interested in foreign affairs and international
relations. Her main research direction is related to novels written about the
period when the South Korean army participated in the war in South
Vietnam (1960-1970) during the Vietnam War (1954-1975). Hien can be
reached at [email protected].
Iffat Tahira is a graduate student in the Department of Political Science and

International Relations at Hanyang University. She has completed her
master’s at the Government College University Faisalabad, Pakistan. Her
main research interest is Korea’s public diplomacy towards developing
countries. She is co-author of the paper Korea’s Public Diplomacy towards
Africa: Strategies, Instruments and its Implications on Economic Linkages
with Africa (Journal of the Korean Economic Geographical Society). She is
working as a student intern at the Institute for Euro-African Studies,
Hanyang University. Tahira can be reached at [email protected]
Ingrid Rafaele Rodrigues Leiria is a Ph.D. Candidate in Economics at the

Graduate School of Economics and Statistics at Korea University, South
Korea. She holds a Master’s Degree and a Bachelor’s Degree in Economics
from Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos (UNISINOS), Brazil. She is
particularly interested in research topics related to microeconomic policy,
public policy, and regional development. Ingrid can be reached at
[email protected].
Karla Villalobos Cruz is an Undergraduate Student of International

Relations at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). She
won a scholarship to study a semester abroad at Korea University. She is a
member of the Binational Mexico-United States Relationship Observatory
at the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, UNAM. She has worked as
an Assistant Professor and at the Interdisciplinary Seminar of Juncture
Analysis and Social Prospect of the same university. Her main research
interests include Asia-Pacific (especially Northeast Asia), Global South
International Relations and International Political Economy. Karla can be
reached at [email protected] or [email protected]
Mark Joseph Montera is an undergraduate student of mechanical

engineering at Manuel S. Enverga University Foundation, Inc. located in
Lucena City, Quezon Province, Republic of the Philippines. He is a regular
participant in night pub and campus quiz bees and his fields of specialty are
geography, politics, history, and general knowledge. Starting from Hallyu,
he gained interest on the topic of Korean politics and diplomacy. Montera is
currently preparing to apply to the Korean Government Scholarship
Program and take up a master’s degree in international relations or
international affairs at a Korean university. Montera can be reached at
[email protected].
Mathew Yeo Jie Sheng is a graduate student pursuing a Masters’ Degree in

International Studies in the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul
National University. Mathew obtained his Bachelor’s Degree in Public
Policy & Global Affairs from the School of Social Sciences, Nanyang
Technological University in Singapore. His main interests include
International Relations theories, East Asian security, and US-China
relations. Mathew can be reached at [email protected]
Pavlina Svobodova is a Master’s student at Catholic University Leuven.

Pavlina completed her undergraduate studies at Aberdeen University. Her
main research interests are international security, peace-building, conflict
reconciliation, and EU. Pavlina’s current thesis looks into the normalisation
of relations between Israel and Bahrain and her previous thesis examined
negotiations with non-state violent actors as a conflict resolution strategy.

Pavlina can be reached at [email protected].
Simon Bruns is an undergraduate student at Franklin University Switzerland,

who is double majoring in History and International Economics with an
emphasis in Political Economy. His main research interests include aid
policies and development. His most recent publication is a book review of
Kan Kimura’s A Burden of the Past: Problems of Historical Perception in
Japan-Korea Relations (Carnival: Journal of the International Students of
History Association, Vol. 20). Simon can be reached at bruns.simon@
hotmail.com.
Swe Yone Nanddy is a recent graduate from the University of Yangon,

specializing in International Relations. She is currently a research intern at
the Myanmar Institute of Strategic and International Studies (MISIS). Her
main research interests include public diplomacy in the non-Western World,
political-security issues in the Asia-Pacific, and Sino-Myanmar relations.
She can be reached at [email protected].
Temitayo Shenkoya is a recent PhD. graduate from the Graduate School of

National Public Policy at Chungnam National University and majored in
Science and Technology Policy. He is currently a research professor
(교수연구원) at the Science & Technology Knowledge Research Institute -
Chungnam National University, Daejeon, South Korea. He has over 13
years’ experience in managing complex programmes for the United Nations,
international NGOs, public institutions, and grassroots organizations. His
research interest includes - National Innovation System, education,
innovation, FINTECH, entrepreneurship, knowledge management,
e-governance, and foreign diplomacy.
Zachary Lavengood is an Area Studies Ph.D. candidate at Charles

University’s Department of North American Studies in Prague, Czechia,
where he is completing his dissertation titled Arctic Partnerships: Geopolitics
of the Forming Power Blocs in the Far North. He graduated summa cum
laude from Charles University’s Area Studies Master’s program in 2019.
Zachary’s main research interests include Arctic and outer space geopolitics,
world-systems analysis, and international development. He can be reached
at [email protected]
15
YouTube Diplomacy: A Sentiment Analysis of

Global Reactions to the 2018 Concert in
Pyongyang
Jenna Gibson
Abstract | In early April 2018, a delegation of South Korean musical

artists performed in Pyongyang, North Korea as part of a prominent public
diplomacy initiative aimed to attract positive attention ahead of the first
summit meeting between President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim Jong-
Un later that month. By inviting Hallyu stars like Red Velvet and Baek Ji
Young, this event successfully tapped into global fan communities, smoothly
bringing political content into the consciousness of K-pop fans around the
globe. But how did those fans respond? In this paper, I scrape more than
4,000 comments left on official YouTube clips from the concert and conduct
a sentiment analysis to determine their emotional valence. Overall, I find
that fans responded positively to the concert footage, cheering on their
favorite singers and even empathizing with some of the songs’ emotional
lyrics. The only exception to the positive tone was when clips included
footage of the North Korean audience, creating a dissonance between fun
performances on stage and stoic viewers in the seats. This analysis thus
argues that integrating pop culture strategically into public diplomacy
campaigns can be highly successful, but cautions that these initiatives can
sometimes highlight cultural differences while attempting to bridge them.
국문초록 | 2018년 4월 말 문재인 대통령과 김정은 의장 사이에 있을 첫 정상

회담을 앞두고 긍정적인 관심을 이끌기 위한 중요한 공공 외교 계획의 일환으로
그 달 초 대한민국의 음악가 대표단이 북한 평양에서 공연을 했다. 이 행사는 레
드 벨벳과 백지영 같은 한류 스타를 초대함으로써 정치적 주제를 자연스럽게 전
세계 케이팝 팬들의 의식으로 끌어오면서 성공적으로 세계적 팬 커뮤니티에 다
가갔다. 하지만 팬들이 어떻게 반응했는가? 이 논문은 이 콘서트와 관련된 유투
브 동영상에 남겨진 4,000 개가 넘는 댓글을 가져와 그들의 감정적 값을 측정하
기 위해 감정 분석을 한다. 전반적으로 팬들은 그들이 좋아하는 가수를 응원하고
몇몇 노래의 감정적 가사에 공감하기까지 하며 콘서트 영상에 긍정적으로 반응

했다. 이러한 긍정적인 분위기에 유일한 예외는 무대의 밝은 퍼포먼스와 관중석
의 냉정한 관중 사이에 부조화를 만들어내는 북한 청중이 비춰졌을 때였다. 따라
서 이 글은 대중 문화를 공공 외교 캠페인에 전략적으로 통합시키는 것이 매우
성공적일 수 있음을 보여주면서도, 이러한 계획들이 문화적 차이를 좁히려는 동
시에 부각시킬 수도 있다는 점을 경고한다.
In early 2018, South Korean President Moon Jae-In and his administration
embarked on a policy of diplomatic engagement toward North Korea, often
bridging public diplomacy efforts, such as creating the inter-Korean soccer
team that competed in the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics, with more
traditional forms of governmental exchange and summit diplomacy. In
particular, the April 2018 Inter-Korean Summit between President Moon
and his counterpart, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, was a major
moment in traditional government-to-government diplomacy, but the event
also drew the attention of public audiences from around the world thanks in
part to an extensive public diplomacy campaign from the South Korean
government. Ahead of the meeting, South Korea employed a range of public
diplomacy tools designed to promote international interest and persuade
audiences of the prudence of the Moon administration’s North Korea policy.
In the run-up to the summit, the government launched an official website
that included information in 10 languages, hosted various messages of
support from world leaders and celebrities, graphics explaining Moon’s
policy goals, and even a live video feed of the main event. (Korea.net,
2018) On the social media front, the Korean government partnered with
Twitter to create a limited-edition emoji to pair with the summit’s official
hashtags, showing two small hands high fiving, representing the two Korean
leaders coming together for the first time in more than a decade.
One of the most prominent and visible events in the lead-up to the
summit itself was a two-day concert in Pyongyang that featured 11
prominent South Korean singers and bands, as well as a taekwondo
demonstration team. The delegation, led by South Korean Minister of
Culture, Sports, and Tourism Do Jong-Hwan, performed in Pyongyang on
April 1 and 3, 2018 under the hopeful theme of “Spring is Coming” (봄이
YouTube Diplomacy 17
온다). The event also involved high-level North Korean officials including
Kim Jong-Un himself, who attended the first night of the concert his wife.
(Kim, 2018) The performances ranged from pop hits from girl group Red
Velvet to tearful ballads from veteran crooners like Cho Yong-pil, and even
a chorus number with the full lineup singing a song entitled “Our Wish is
Unification” (우리의 소원은 통일). The full show was carried live in South
Korea by the country’s three main broadcasters, KBS, MBC, and SBS,
racking up combined ratings of 36.6%. (Yoon, 2018)
But while the concert drew significant domestic viewership, the
inclusion of internationally recognized stars also guaranteed the attention of
Korean pop culture fans from around the world. In recent years, the number
of people actively following Korean pop culture has exploded, bringing
even more depth to South Korea’s well of latent soft power. Through the
concert in Pyongyang, the Moon Administration was able to tap into that
interest, helping an enthusiastic and engaged audience learn about Korean
foreign policy between costume changes. And they did, indeed, grab the
attention of international fans, who trended hashtags like “#RedVelvet_our_
pride” on Twitter to show support for the group’s performance, and racked
up nearly 3 million views on official MBC YouTube clips of the show.
But just because the performance drew an international audience does
not necessarily mean that it was a public diplomacy success. Getting a large
number of people to view the performances or support specific singers on
social media does not necessarily mean they internalized or agreed with the
message of inter-Korean engagement that formed the basis of the show.
Therefore, in order to more accurately gauge audience responses to the
Pyongyang concert, I collected and analyzed more than 4,000 comments
that viewers left on 18 YouTube clips posted on YouTube by MBC. Through
a sentiment analysis and word frequency search, I was able to determine
that viewer comments were largely positive, with most focusing on the
singers involved. However, while much of the attention was on the
performances, there was indeed a significant number of comments that
explicitly discussed the political implications of the concert, remarked on
the emotional weight of the songs, and expressed hope for peace on the
peninsula. There were some negative comments that focused largely on one
aspect of the show – the North Korean audience, who remained stone-faced
during even the most upbeat of pop performances. The attention that
commenters paid to the North Korean audience is a perfect example of one
of the enduring difficulties of public diplomacy – the fact that cultural
exchange can often highlight cultural differences, at times distracting from
or even completely undermining the intended message.
Nevertheless, the amount of positive attention that the concert got from
international fans – attention that did not wane even as inter-Korean talks
stalled – shows the power of a public diplomacy event that smoothly
integrates non-governmental actors, in this case celebrities, into a cohesive
outreach strategy. The success of the Spring is Coming concert thus provides
three key lessons for future attempts to integrate South Korea’s incredibly
popular pop culture into public diplomacy initiatives. First, choosing the
right interlocutors is key to engaging a target audience. Second, finding a
subtle, relatable message that can be authentically communicated via those
interlocutors will retain more audience members than perfectly crafted
policy statements from government officials. Third, recognizing that
cultural differences can create awkward moments, especially when a public
diplomacy campaign is aimed at such a broad, global audience, but that
there may be ways to mitigate that awkwardness with careful planning and
learning.
This paper will proceed as follows: first, I will examine the extensive
literature on public diplomacy, particularly focusing on the practice of
public diplomacy in digital spaces. Then, I will introduce my dataset of
YouTube comments, explaining how I gathered, cleaned, and analyzed more
than 4,000 observations. Then, I further analyze some of the key themes that
emerged in the comments, showing how remarks about the singers, the
emotional resonance of the songs, and back-and-forth discussions among
commenters show that the international audience watching the Spring is
Coming concert online was highly engaged with both the musical and
political content of the show. Finally, I conclude with several key takeaways
for further integration of South Korea’s powerhouse pop culture into public
diplomacy campaigns.
LITERATURE
One of the major focuses of recent public diplomacy scholarship has been
exploring how the study and practice of public diplomacy has changed with
the expansion of the digital world. Scholars like Ilan Manor (2019) have
explored the ongoing and often non-linear process of the “digitization” of
public diplomacy, noting a shift from broadcasting to network-based
communications, from targeting messages at certain audiences to tailoring
content to actively engage those audiences, and from focusing on short-term
moments to creating policy narratives that build over time. Others have
pointed out that these different modes of communication, rather than being
an evolution in public diplomacy, are merely different tools that can be used
to further different goals - Zaharna (2010), for example, writes that network-
based communications build soft power, while mass communications wield
it.
Bringing public diplomacy to where the people are – online – creates
many new opportunities to reach foreign audiences, often at a fraction of the
price of traditional, offline public diplomacy programs. But it is also no
silver bullet – digitalized public diplomacy still comes with many of the
same challenges that plague all cross-cultural communication efforts.
Cultural contexts shape how individuals receive and interpret messages, so
any cross-cultural communication that hopes to be successful must take the
audience’s perspective into account. Min-Sun Kim (2002) points out that
many U.S. public diplomacy efforts have been met with backlash in part for
this reason – because American messengers assumed that their interpretation
of “the truth” as something universal and objective would be shared by their
audiences, when in fact many cultures regard truth as informed by social
contexts and norms.
Other scholars separate different cultures of communication itself –
communication can be used to transmit signals or messages, or it can be part
of a ritual of understanding where “nothing new is learned, but a particular
view of the world is portrayed.” (Carey, 1992, p. 20) Entertainment and pop
culture, which create groups of fans who find, connect, and communicate
with each other based on a shared love of a particular show, artist, or genre,
are examples of ritual communications, focused on building connections
amongst the group and affirming shared beliefs. (Giese, 2002) Public
diplomats must therefore take both the culture of the audience and its mode
of communication into account when choosing a messaging strategy, or risk
being seen as an outsider at best and an intruder at worst.
All of these problems still underlie the practice of public diplomacy in
its increasingly digitized forms. In fact, figuring out how to take into
account cultural context and identities has only become more difficult with
the expansion of digital life. Indeed, the digital world has developed to the
point where it has become its own society, with its own set of norms and
values (Manor, 2019). Any conception of culture must now contend with the
fact that the digital world now informs and morphs images of the self, one’s
relationships with others, and even societal institutions. (Lupton, 2015) On
top of that, the number of options to reach different target audiences has
expanded exponentially, and practitioners must make a myriad of choices
before even considering the message itself. Does the audience prefer print,
audio or video? Can they be found mostly on Twitter or Weibo? Are they
highly active or more passive in their content consumption? The expansion
of digital space keeps adding layers of complexity to public diplomacy.
Public diplomats who fail to understand the rules of digital society – or
even more specifically the norms of the particular social media platform or
media tool they are using for a given project – will either fail to get their
message picked up by the mighty algorithms that arbitrate what content gets
distributed and to whom (Manor, 2019), or, worse, will inevitably face scorn
from the audience. Take, for example, the State Department’s Digital
Outreach Team (DOT), which in 2009 stepped up its efforts to talk to
Muslim youth in the wake of President Barack Obama’s speech in Cairo in
which he called for the beginning of a more positive relationship between
the United States and the Muslim world. The DOT actively went to popular
Middle Eastern websites and attempted to converse with users about
Obama’s policies, hoping to create a more positive view of the United
States. However, because of bureaucratic protocol, it took diplomats almost
three days on average to respond to a single post, (Khatib, Dutton, &
Thelwall, 2012) a time frame which may as well be an eternity in the digital
world. Worse, they responded to emotional posts and even graphic
photographs of Muslim victims of violence with anodyne talking points or
by deflecting blame to terrorist groups. In this project, the DOT team failed
to understand the rules of digital society – that time is of the essence in
keeping a conversation flowing, and that, unlike at a negotiating table,
sticking only to formal policy points will not fly, especially when the topic
is a particularly emotional one. In the end, the DOT’s engagement on these
websites actually led to an overall more negative tone among participants
than before the U.S. government got involved. (Khatib, Dutton, & Thelwall,
2012)
The failed DOT outreach effort shows that cultural contexts matter not
just in the sense of religious, national, or ethnic background, but also in the
sense of shared norms for certain digital spaces. When Korean public
diplomacy efforts target fans of K-pop, for example, they are opening
engagement with an audience that brings identities from their own personal
identities, as well as their experiences within the culture of fandom. Both of
these bring a set of rules and norms, shared understandings, and even
vocabulary to the table (ask a K-pop fan who their “bias” is, for example, or
whether they’re a “multi”). This makes the Korean public diplomat’s job
harder, in the sense that they have to contend with both of these cultural
contexts when crafting a message. However, if done well, a message that
connects with that audience without pandering to them can be highly
successful – take, for example, a recent tweet by U.S. Ambassador to Korea
Harry Harris in which he asked fans to guess his favorite BTS song, which
garnered 17,500 Retweets and 71,100 Likes within just a few days. (Harris,
2020)
South Korea’s understanding of public diplomacy has been quickly
evolving, particularly in the last few years, and it is now taking a more
active stance in fostering dialogue with foreign audiences and tapping into
existing wells of soft power created by its powerhouse pop culture. Over the
last few years, the Korean government has shifted from a pure focus on
nation-branding to a more complex understanding of public diplomacy
(Ayhan, 2017), although there is still some confusion on terms and
limitations (Ayhan, 2020). This shift from nation-branding – promoting a
generally positive but potentially shallow and fleeting image of a country –
to active engagement with audiences may help make Korea’s soft power
more lasting and meaningful. (Pastreich, 2016; Ayhan, 2017) In this sense,
connecting audiences who already have an existing interest in the more

consumerist notion of Korean pop culture with deeper messages like the
pain of Korean separation and hope for reunification through the concerts in
Pyongyang is doing exactly what these scholars suggest.
DATA
On April 6, 2018, a YouTube Channel called MBCkpop posted 18 recorded

clips from the Spring is Coming concert in Pyongyang. The channel, run by
Korean broadcaster MBC, boasts 8.36 million subscribers, and updates
regularly with clips from MBC’s weekly K-pop music program and other
K-pop related shows on the network. (MBCkpop) For this analysis, I used
YouTube’s application program from this channel, including the number
and content of all comments left on the videos as of September 2020. These
18 videos have garnered a combined total of nearly 3 million views, with a
total of 4,768 comments, of which I was able to scrape 4,032. The
discrepancy in number of comments is due to limitations in the number of
replies that can be captured by my scraping tool – if a comment gets more
than five replies, the extraneous ones may not be captured in the dataset.
However, my dataset of more than 4,000 comments should still yield a good
picture of the overall tone of responses to these videos. The breakdown of
each video’s reach can be seen in Table 1 below.
Because the purpose of this analysis is to examine the efficacy of the
Pyongyang concert as a public diplomacy effort, I am specifically interested
in how international audiences viewed and interpreted the concert as seen
through these clips. While it is impossible to know exactly where each
viewer is located, several factors indicate that the MBCkpop clips were
aimed at, and primarily consumed by, non-Korean audiences. First, while
the MBCkpop channel does use Korean for the titles and descriptions of
most of its videos, its use of English across the channel indicates its aim to
draw in international audiences. The channel’s name and About section are
both written in English, unlike several of MBC’s other affiliated YouTube
channels, including MBC트로트 (a channel for Korean trot music popular
domestically) and MBC스포츠탐험대 (for Korean sports-related content). In
Table 1. Summary Statistics, 2018 Spring is Coming YouTube Clips

Number of
Title Views Likes Dislikes
Comments
1 Red Velvet - ‘Red Flavor’ 1,293,536 34,425 432 3,216
2 Baek Ji Young - ‘Please, Don’t forget me’ 496,336 7,869 72 229
3 Seohyun - ‘Blue Willow’ 475,108 13,409 70 678
4 Baek ji Young - ‘Like being hit by a bullet’ 159,643 2,550 8 96
5 Jung-in - ‘Uphill road’ 134,715 1,676 25 128
6 YB - ‘I am a Butterfly’ 88,663 2,033 12 109
7 Lee Sun Hee - ‘Beautiful Scenery’ 70,449 1,309 8 92
8 Chorus - ‘My friend’ 61,387 1,053 7 46
9 ALi - ‘PUNGPUNG’ 45,124 585 7 27
10 Chorus - ‘Until We Meet Again’ 41,850 749 6 54
11 Kang San-ae - ‘Raguyo’ 37,597 763 3 41
12 YB - ‘Man is ship Woman is harbor’ 24,533 376 4 13
13 Jung-in and ALi - ‘Face’ 18,200 228 2 8
14 YB - ‘1178’ 15,835 356 6 15
15 Cho Yong-pil - ‘Dream’ 11,256 127 0 4
16 Choi Jin-hee - ‘Labyrinth of love’ 8,876 122 2 3
17 Cho Yong-pil - ‘The Winter Teahouse’ 6,977 103 2 7
18 Choi Jin-hee - ‘A belated regrets’ 3,363 48 2 2
19 Total 2,993,448 67,781 668 4,768
addition, unlike many of the other K-pop videos posted on the MBCkpop
channel, the Spring is Coming clips all had titles and descriptions entirely in
English, indicating that these clips in particular aimed to attract a non-
Korean-speaking audience. The language preference followed through in
the comment section as well - while there were indeed some Korean
comments on the Spring is Coming videos, they were few and far between.
Instead, there were comments in Japanese, French, Russian, Arabic, and
more, with the vast majority written in English.
Contrast this with other versions of the concert, which have been posted
to both YouTube and the Korean-language platform Naver TV. The choice
of YouTube rather than (or, in this case, in addition to) Naver indicates a
desire to broaden the audience beyond domestic Korean viewers. But even
YouTube can capture an exclusively Korean audience if the video’s title and
description are written in Korean. For example, the full two-hour version of
the concert was posted on YouTube by Yonhap News, with the title “무삭제
풀버전] ‘우리는 하나’...남북평화협력기원 평양공연” and a description written
entirely in Korean. (YonhapNewsTV, 2018) The comments followed suit –
the vast majority were in Korean with only a handful in other languages.1
The use of English for both the channel, title, and descriptions of the
MBCkpop clips of the Spring is Coming concert indicates an intention to
appeal to an international, non-Korean-speaking audience. And the
prevalence of languages other than Korean, mainly English, in the comment
sections for all of these clips lends credence to the assertion that an analysis
of the comment sections from these videos will provide a window into how
international publics viewed and responded to this soft power-laden event.
With that in mind, I ran a sentiment analysis on 4,032 comments for
these 18 videos using the SentimentR package and dictionary. While all
sentiment analyses are fraught with the complexities of quantifying language,
the SentimentR algorithm is generally believed to be the best option for
R-based sentiment analysis, in part because it can capture both negation and
amplification. (Naldi, 2019) For example, most dictionaries would rate the
sentences “It was good,” “It was very good,” and “It was not good” with the
same sentiment score based on the appearance of the word “good.” However,
SentimentR explicitly searches for negation words like “not” and “never,”
and would know to attach a negative score despite the appearance of the
word “good.” Similarly, with amplifiers like “very” or “more,” which the
algorithm would rate as more positive than just the word “good” on its own.
This method improves, but does not eliminate, issues that can arise with
sentiment analysis. One of the remaining issues is context, which is all but
1 While outside the scope of this analysis, the gap between how audiences responded in
English to the MBCkpop videos versus how audiences responded in Korean to the same
clips posted on Naver TV is striking and could provide interesting insight into how foreign
and domestic audiences can interpret the same content differently. Many of the
international comments on YouTube focused on the performers themselves, praising the
singers and at times commenting generally on the political context or hoping for
unification. This was also the case for Korean comments to an extent, but these comments
also discussed the political context more and with more detail, often expressing emotional
reactions to the songs themselves and their meaning.
impossible for an algorithm to account for. Take a comment like “Song was
beautiful but why i feel sad and crying . that means she’s a good
singer and i feel her ❣,” which was left on a video of Baek Ji Young
singing an emotional ballad at the concert. Within the context of the show,
the song, and the political landscape surrounding it, this comment clearly
conveys an emotional connection with the video which, while not necessarily
positive in the same way as joyful praise, is certainly not as negative as the
sentiment dictionary assessed. This need for additional context is one of the
reasons I conducted an additional qualitative analysis on the results. And
while the analysis may not capture the nuance in more complex comments
like the one above, the use of a more robust algorithm, plus the large
number of observations in the dataset, lends confidence to the results.
In addition to calculating an overall sentiment score for the words in
each comment, I also used an emoji dictionary to capture the positive or
negative valence of any emojis that commenters included in their post.
(Novak et al., 2015) Emojis have become an important part of online
communication and can significantly increase or decrease the sentiment
score of a comment. In my dataset, 785 comments included emojis, about
20 percent of the total. The additional positive or negative score from any
emojis included in a comment was thus added onto the original sentiment
score to create a total sentiment score for each comment.
Finally, I believe it is important to capture not just the comment itself,
but how much it resonated with other viewers. This can be proxied through
the like count on each comment. Essentially, if another viewer agreed with
the sentiment expressed in a comment, they may choose to simply like the
comment rather than writing a similar one themselves. In fact, likes appear
to be an important way that people interact in the comment section of these
videos; while most comments have fewer than 10 likes, some have
thousands – the most-liked comment has 10,802 likes, more than the total
number of comments on all the videos combined. Therefore, I duplicated
each observation based on the number of likes that the comment received.
So a slightly positive comment with zero additional likes will appear once
in my dataset, to represent the one time that someone posted it without
anyone agreeing with its sentiment. However, a slightly positive comment
with 1,000 likes will appear 1,001 times in the dataset, because 1,000
people in addition to the original poster agreed with the sentiment that
comment expressed. This method essentially created the equivalent of
153,525 “comments” that I can use to analyze the overall valence of
audience reactions to each video.
Finally, I removed any remaining comments that had a total sentiment
score of exactly 0, as well as outliers. The sentiment algorithms I used are
extremely precise, with scores going into the 8th decimal place. That means
a comment can only have a score of exactly 0 for two reasons: it was either
a comment entirely in a non-English language, with no emojis that could
indicate an emotional valence whatsoever, or it was an English comment
with absolutely no emotional information whatsoever. An example of a truly
neutral comment in the dataset was one that merely read “Google.” This
comment, while in English, does not give us any information about how this
person perceived the video. Thus, no information is lost by dropping this
type of observation. For outliers, I used the standard rule of thumb of
dropping any observations outside 1.5 times the interquartile range. This
method removes any extreme observations – including, in this case, several
comments with more than a dozen repeated emojis, including one with more
than 200 emojis. The final total number of observations in my dataset after
dropping non-English, true neutral, and outlier comments is 131,855. Figure
1 below shows the comments for each video, including the 95% confidence
interval.
As Figure 1 shows, out of the 18 videos, 16 videos had average sentiment
score above 0 – indicating commenters viewed the clip positively. One
video – Jung-in and ALi’s “Face” – had a neutral average score. Only one,
Baek Ji Young’s “Please Don’t Forget Me,” had a negative average score.
However, as I will discuss further in the analysis below, this may be due to
the emotional nature of the song, which is about separation and loss.
In addition to examining the overall spread of comments left on these
videos, I also wondered whether the tenor of the comments was at all tied to
the political context of the inter-Korean talks that inspired the concert in the
first place. While early 2018, when the videos were first posted, was full of
hope for the inter-Korean summit that was to come, enthusiasm waned over
time as the talks reached a stalemate. However, interestingly, the emotional
valence of comments left over time, as seen in Figure 2, did not drop off
despite this changing context.

The consistency of this positive tone throughout the period from 2018 to
2020 says one of two things. Either the positive comments are largely tied
to feelings about the performers in the video – which would not wane over
time no matter the political context – or the hopeful tone of the videos is
still convincing to the audience regardless of the less than positive turn that
the peace talks took. Regardless of which – or both – explanations are true,
the durability of positive sentiments expressed on the Spring is Coming
videos shows its success as a lasting generator of positive sentiment among
a foreign audience. This implies that, much like digital diplomacy hopes,
the concert is a step toward building a network of interest that is not
Figure 1.
Figure 2.
necessarily tied only to the success or failure of one specific foreign policy
event or goal, but can continue to have legs and engender positive
interaction over time.
ANALYSIS
As the results above show, viewers expressed overall positive thoughts in

their comments after watching clips from the Spring is Coming concert,
with some rare exceptions. In addition to the general sentiment analysis
above, I further delved into a qualitative examination of the comments to
learn more about what, exactly, the audience was saying in response to these
videos. The broad themes that appeared in these comments broke down into
four, non-mutually exclusive categories: comments praising the performers,
comments indicating an emotional response to the clips, comments
educating other viewers about the concert and its political/social context,
and comments about the North Korean audience in attendance. Each of
these types of comments has implications for the concert’s efficacy as a
South Korean public diplomacy tool.
First, many comments were very straightforward, praising the performer
in any given clip for their singing, dancing, or even just their appearance.
These were among the most common types of comments in the dataset – in
fact, the two most common words in the entire corpus of comments were
“Joy” (a member of Red Velvet who was not able to attend the show because
of a prior commitment), and “Seohyun.” Examples of this type of comment
include “She is so amazing. A beautiful legend,” left on Lee Sun Hee’s
performance of “Beautiful Scenery,” or “Seohyun is so graceful and
beautiful ,” left of Seohyun’s cover of the North Korean song “Blue
Willow.”
On first glance, these comments mean very little for the overall message
of the concert – to promote inter-Korean exchange and detente. However,
recalling the literature on public diplomacy – particularly digital public
diplomacy – the picture may be a bit rosier. The abundance of comments
that mention the singers directly shows that these concert clips have
successfully tapped into the network of K-pop fans on YouTube – a network
that, once properly accessed, can become a built-in audience for other
messages. And while some, or even most, of the fans who just wanted to see
their favorite singer may not have come away with an entirely new opinion
on inter-Korean reconciliation, that does not at all mean that the messaging
was useless. After all, as Carey (1992) noted, a message does not have to
directly state a new fact or directly change someone’s mind to be a powerful
form of communication. Just shaping the context of a message and
re-forming the audience’s worldview can also be an important form of
communication and persuasion.
In this case, fans who watched the concert may not have learned about
inter-Korean politics in a deep way from the videos, but they did learn at the
very least that their favorite singer, who they admire, is supportive of
cultural exchange and reconciliation. Take, for example, this comment from
Seohyun’s video: “For me it’s really not about how well she sang. It’s about
her sincerity in wanting to be part of this cultural exchange occasion. The
way she handled everything from relations with the sk and nk performers
[sic], the interviews etc, really showed her maturity and good heart. She’s
really beautiful inside out.” While praising their favorite singer, the
commenter clearly acknowledged Seohyun’s role in the broader political
context. This kind of subtle paradigm-shifting communication, while
difficult to show concretely and even harder to sell to oversight agencies
demanding metrics for public diplomacy campaigns, should nevertheless be
considered an important part of the overall success of the concert as a
messaging tool.
The second type of comment, which is perhaps more promising as an
indication of deeper positive responses to the concert, were those that
indicated an emotional resonance with what the person was viewing on the
screen. Many commenters expressed hope for reunification: “Both Koreas
want the reunification of their countries. This is a step towards it.” (Red
Velvet, “Red Flavor”); “I got goosebumps from her performance. Hoping
one day the two countries will unite once more!!” (Seohyun, “Blue Willow”).
Others expressed how the themes in the songs resonated with them on a
personal level, like this commenter from Germany indicated:
“I can relate so much to this as Germany once was also separated,

they unified the same year I was born. It makes me really sad to see
Korea divided. Same fate, but different outcome as my country... so
we understand you. I hope one day, Korea becomes one country as
we did. That day I will celebrate ;) Stay strong dear koreans[sic].”
(Baek Ji Young, “Please Don’t Forget”).
Some commenters even explicitly expressed how music can tear down walls
between people: “This song always makes me feel emotional. A beautiful
concert demonstrating the power of music and how it touches the hearts of
people. Best wishes Korea.” (Chorus, “My Friend”), or contextualized the
songs in light of North Korean policies: “Take note that the song that is
about following your dreams and flying away from all your troubles and
worries is the song that they loved the most and cheered the loudest for then
any other song. This performance was like a big eff you to the regime and I
love it” (YB, “Butterfly”).
Many commenters also expressed empathy both with the tone and
lyrical content of the songs, connecting them with the enduring separation
of the Korean Peninsula: “For me this is the best performance of the
concert! The meaning of this song hits a very true and sad topic about
people wishing for the day when the two nations are finally at peace, but it’s
been a long wait and for some the time has run out...” (Kang San-ae,
“Raguyo”); “’We used to love each other, Now we’re breaking up. Even if
we’re in different places. I hope you don’t forget me’ The emotional lyrics
fit the situation between South & North Korea” (Baek Ji Young, “Please
Don’t Forget”); “Hooked on this song. The delivery is sorrowful yet
delightful. His voice is art itself tears keep falling down effortlessly. I wish
the reunification happens soon” (Kang San-ae, “Raguyo”).
The fact that so many people found parts of the concert that deeply
resonated with them, whether because of their own personal experience (as
in the case of the German commenter) or just through empathy with the
Korean people, shows that music can be a powerful way to connect with a
broad audience regardless of their level of knowledge about inter-Korean
politics. One doesn’t need to understand the intricacies of the negotiations
to hear the sorrow in Kang San-ae’s voice when he sings about separation.
This is another way in which the choice of a concert was a smart one for
Korean public diplomacy – the themes and emotional resonance are self-
evident to the audience, and do not require extensive background knowledge
or explanation.
That does not mean that there was no learning going on amongst the
audience, however. Some expressed that they had qualms about their
favorite singer going to North Korea, but ended up enjoying the results.
Further, many commenters took it upon themselves to teach others about
inter-Korean relations, the songs themselves, and North Korea more
generally. For example, under Kang San-ae’s performance of his song
“Raguyo,” one commenter explained the song’s context in detail:
“The song is so so intimate since his parents were North Korean

refugees who escaped on a US battleship during the Korean war at
Hungnam. So the lyrics say for the first chorus that his dad’s
repertory was that he always used to say ‘... I wish, if only just once
before I die, that I could go back home’; and for the second chorus
his mom says the same thing. So he’s appealing to the audience that
he is North Korean descent, and in his next song called Myungtae (a
fish caught near his parents’; hometown) he appeals to them that he
knows the stories of the North.” (Kang San-ae, “Raguyo”)
Another commented on how the concert itself fit in with the ongoing peace
talks, albeit with a slightly oversimplified view of the agreements reached:
“Now the USB of red velvet’s performance going viral all the way in NK.
Also today, the president Moon had a meeting with the NK leader Kim
declaring the permanent peace. NK removed their nuclears too. I think that
this spring Performance affected to this meeting[sic].” (Red Velvet, “Red
Flavor”) And, under a comment about how North Koreans don’t know
about anything outside their own country, several commenters replied
correcting that stereotype, writing things like: “The majority of North
Koreans these days (especially the younger generations) regularly watch
Korean dramas and listen to Korean music in secret - well, honestly these
days it’s not even really a secret, you just can’t get caught doing it. Like,
everyone does it and everyone knows everyone does it, but it’s still
‘secret.’” (Red Velvet, “Red Flavor”)
Not all of this education had a positive tone, however. Some took the
opportunity to point out the flaws of the North Korean system and criticize
the brutality of its leader, Kim Jong Un. Others pointed out that only elites
loyal to the regime would have been allowed to attend the concert:
“These north korean elites are chosen ones by the party. There is no
such freedom like you and i to buy concert tickets as we like. These
people are carefully selected for their hardcore royalty[sic] to the
communist party and they know too well that their mouth will be
shut after watching the south korean performance.” (Baek Ji Young,
“Like Being Hit by a Bullet.”)
But even these negative takes got some pushback at times. In one response
to a commenter who criticized the concert as “propaganda” while saying
that North Korea was poor and corrupt with a “murderous” leader, another
responded forcefully:
“How do you help the people of the country when you cant get in to
that country? Do you realize what you are saying has no possibility
of happening in reality? At least this way, some north koreans will be
exposed to new ideas and maybe some will start to be more open. Its
time to stop demonizing and use excuses to not talk to the other side.
You have to talk first before you can do anything. After peace is
finalized, then maybe we can do the things you are talking about…”
(Red Velvet, “Red Flavor”)
Regardless of the tone, the fact that some in the audience took the time
to discuss not only the concert itself but its deeper political implications
shows how engaged they were with the content. This type of conversation
among audience members also shows some of the pros and cons of good,
network-based public diplomacy. This event allowed the audience to
educate themselves and each other further on the topic, rather than relying
on a public diplomat or blatant policy messaging campaign. Not only does
an approach that leverages the community in this way save time and energy
on the part of diplomats, it also creates a more organic, trustworthy
conversation among the audience members. Having a diplomat spend time
engaging with the audience directly to continue to push the message of
reconciliation could easily run into the same problems that the State
Department faced when messaging to Arab audiences – it could invite more
dissent, and any direct messaging by a diplomat would likely be dismissed
as mere policy talking points at best or propaganda at worst. However, the
main downside to allowing these conversations to play out on their own is
that misinformation can easily spread unchecked – like with the comment
above that suggested North Korea had agreed to give up its nuclear weapons
program.
The final topic that came up throughout the comments, but particularly
underneath the clip of Red Velvet’s performance, is related to the North
Korean audience in attendance at the concert. In the clip, the Red Velvet
girls smiled wide while dancing to their smash-hit single “Red Flavor,” an
upbeat summer-themed song with energetic choreography. Every once in a
while, the camera would cut away from the exciting spectacle on the stage
to show the completely stone-faced North Koreans in the audience. The
contrast between the two halves of the auditorium could not be more stark –
and the commenters definitely noticed. In the entire weighted corpus of
comments across all videos, “audience” was the third most common word,
and the words that appeared most often alongside “audience” were
“disgust,” “disinterest,” and “stone.” On the Red Velvet clip alone, 12
percent of the comments explicitly mentioned the word “audience” (279 out
of 2,285 comments).
Many of the comments joked about the juxtaposition visible on the
screen, often using emojis like or to imitate the audience members’
blank stares. Others mentioned being scared or anxious because of the
audience, or expressed sympathy for the group having to perform in front of
such an unresponsive crowd. Some took it as a sign of North Korean
repression, commenting that the audience may be jailed or killed if they
even show a smile, while others empathized with their plight:
“Imagine being in the audience and coming home crying over the
fact that you would have been a lot happier being born in South
Korea, and how much of life you haven’t fully explored. It’s weird
watching and knowing that a lot of the people there aren’t even sure
how to act during this and just sit to be polite. Must be hard on
people to not be happy with the way their life has turned out because
of dictatorship and higher power in the country and knowing there’s
nothing they can do about it.” (Red Velvet, “Red Flavor”)
On the one hand, the fixation on the North Korean audience and their
reactions shows some of the pitfalls of public diplomacy. As with all cross-
cultural communication, sometimes exchange can expose cultural gaps
rather than bridge them. In this case, in a concert meant to represent hope
for a more unified future in Korea, the juxtaposition between the South
Korean performers and the North Korean audience may have just made the
division between the two countries more stark.

But similar to the examples of discussion and education described
above, many commenters took it upon themselves to explain more about
why the audience might be behaving this way. Some comments pointed out
that North Koreans – especially the generally older, more elite people who
would have been invited to this type of event – might not be used to the
pop-y performance that Red Velvet was showing. Others claimed it was just
a cultural difference, assuring other fans that the audience was just being
polite according to North Korean standards and not trying to snub the
performers. Several comments also deliberately tried to bridge the cultural
gap directly – “Some comments are just overreaction. North Korea is just
another country on earth. Some comments made me feel they are aliens,
which is ridiculous. Just enjoy RV’s comeback PLZ.” (Red Velvet, “Red
Flavor”) One commenter even acknowledged that their opinion changed
after reading the discussion going on underneath the video:
“I was going to comment and make an acceptable joke about how

unimpressed and judging the audience is until I read the comments
and realised this is their performance in North Korea.This whole
performance must have been so new and strange for North Koreans
to watch, and I really wonder what they were thinking, if they liked
it or not. I don’t know much about the rules in North Korea but I
wouldn’t be surprised if they weren’t allowed to show any emotions
while Red Velvet performed…” (Red Velvet, “Red Flavor”)
The somewhat mixed, although still overall positive, reaction to the Red
Velvet performance could serve as a good lesson on the difficult balancing
act of public diplomacy programs. Red Velvet brought a lot of extra
attention from an audience that may not have tuned in otherwise. However,
the culture gap they revealed between the South Korean performers and the
North Korean audience, as well as between the North Koreans and the
international viewers, may have undermined the concert’s intended message
of unity. In contrast, some of the other performances were more in line with
the theme and tone of the event. Seohyun, for example, sang a North
Korean ballad that the audience visibly resonated with, and commenters
took notice: “in my opinion this type of k-music is more fitting to be

exhibited in pyeongyang[sic]. you see the north korean audience reacted so
well and enjoyed it better. it was a right decision to bring seohyun there.”
(Seohyun, “Blue Willow”) As this example shows, by working to balance
the appeal of including big performers who can draw a larger audience
while still trying to match the theme and tone of the event and its message,
Korean public diplomacy efforts can become even more effective.
IMPLICATIONS FOR KOREAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
While the incredible popularity of Korean pop culture around the world has
drawn admiration and interest as a potential source of Korean soft power, it
is still unclear if, and how, that soft power reserve could be mobilized by
Korean public diplomacy efforts. Fans of Korean pop culture are a ready-
made audience for related messaging – but can they actually be activated?
And, if so, how?
The overwhelmingly positive response that the Spring is Coming clips
received from international viewers via the MBC YouTube channel is a
good sign for Korean public diplomacy efforts that tap into the popularity of
Korean culture abroad. Even when expressing negative emotions such as
sadness, the fact that international audiences were connecting with the
videos and finding emotional resonance with its content and with the
Korean separation should be seen as a sign of success for this public
diplomacy campaign. Future campaigns can, and should, learn from this
model, including its relatively minor shortcomings. Based on this analysis
of international viewer responses to the Spring is Coming concert clips, I
offer three key takeaways for public diplomacy efforts that want to take
advantage of hallyu’s popularity.
First, choosing the right people to participate in the event based on the
target audience that the government hopes to reach is key. The Spring is
Coming concert aimed to reach both a domestic audience through territorial
broadcasters and Korean-langugage videos online, and aimed to reach an
international audience through the MBC channel’s English-language clips
posted on YouTube. The inclusion of a variety of singers in the concert,
some of whom would only be known to the Korean audience and some of
whom would be more internationally popular, helped make this event a
success on both counts. In fact, internationally known acts like Red Velvet,
Seohyun and Baek Ji Young racked up by far the most views and of
comments on YouTube, showing that the inclusion celebrities in public
diplomacy efforts can, indeed, get the attention of fans online.
Second, the concert succeeded in part because it let these popular figures
create authentic connections with the audience through their performances
rather than nakedly trying to push a political message. In these clips, the
singers and their music came first, and the political context served as an
important but not necessarily overt backdrop. The message – support for
inter-Korean peace efforts – was consistently present throughout the videos
but not belabored fits perfectly with the type of ritual-based communication
that works particularly well with fandom communities. The fact that this
was a concert was taking place in North Korea and that it was part of a
larger peace effort was not explicitly mentioned in English anywhere except
in the descriptions of the videos (the full name of the concert in Korean,
“남북평화협력기원 평양공연, 봄이 온다,” was in the top corner throughout all
the clips but it was not translated for a non-Korean speaking audience).
Nevertheless, as the analysis above shows, the audience clearly understood
the fact that this concert was special because of its location, and even took
time to discuss and educate each other about the songs, the artists, and their
place in inter-Korean peace efforts. This public diplomacy effort shows that
a message does not have to be overt in order to get its point across. By
centering the stars and their music, the audience responded more organically
to the content and its implicit political message.
Third, one cautionary point. As discussed above, cultural exchange often
runs the risk of exposing differences rather than bridging them. In this case,
the visible gap between some of the performers and their audience was
distracting to international viewers, and caused many of them to focus on
the awkward audience and their inability to enjoy the performances – hardly
the message South Korea wanted to be the takeaway from the show. It’s
important to be genuine, and show the event as it was, awkward audience
and all. But these sorts of gaps could also be rectified through the event
planning process – perhaps asking Red Velvet to perform one of their many
ballads, or cover a song like Seohyun did, would have fit with the theme of
the other stages better, and may have caused less of a dissonance for
viewers watching the clips later on.
This analysis has used the example of the 2018 Spring is Coming
concert in Pyongyang to illustrate some of the key ways that South Korean
public diplomacy efforts can, and indeed have, connected well with
audiences around the world. By following this type of campaign in the
future, using internationally beloved Hallyu stars to deliver authentic,
relatable messages, South Korea can more effectively activate its latent soft
power to attract attention and support from a broad, engaged audience.
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South Korean K-pop stars perform in Pyongyang. Retrieved from https://www.
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41
To the Sea, to the World: Public Diplomacy

and the Republic of Korea Navy
Alexander M. Hynd
Abstract | Navies in Northeast Asia are increasingly taking on non-

combat, public diplomacy roles in the pursuit of soft power at a regional and
global level. This chapter examines the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN)’s
use of public naval diplomacy to build soft power in the Asia Pacific
maritime theatre and as far as the Gulf of Aden, motivated by interwoven
functional and status logics. It identifies three main pillars of the ROKN’s
public naval diplomacy: (i) anti-piracy operations and evacuation efforts, (ii)
naval cooperation, and (iii) humanitarian assistance and disaster response. It
highlights three advantages the ROKN faces when conducting public naval
diplomacy compared to other Northeast Asian states: (i) it is not seen as a
potential threat, (ii) it is not expected to contribute as many public goods as
Great Powers, and (iii) South Korea enjoys solid soft power foundations as a
liberal democratic capitalist state that has undergone rapid economic and
political development through sea-based trade. Finally, this chapter engages
with contemporary policy debate within South Korea’s maritime strategy
community, considering adjustments to ROKN’s acquisitions of new naval
platforms, and the creative retirement of old platforms, in pursuit of public
diplomacy leadership in maritime environmental conservation.
국문초록 | 동북 아시아 해군들이 지역적, 세계적 차원에서 소프트 파워를 추

구하며 점점 더 비전투적인 공공 외교의 역할을 맡고 있다. 이 글에서는 실용적
이면서도 높은 위상을 뒷받침하기 위해 아시아 태평양 해역에서 아덴만(Gulf of
Aden)까지를 무대로 소프트 파워를 확립하고자하는 대한민국 해군의 공공 외교
를 살펴본다. 대한민국 해군의 공공 해군 외교는 (i) 반(反)해적 작전과 대피 노
력, (ii) 해군 협력, 그리고 (iii) 인도주의적 지원과 재난 대응 등 세 개의 주요 부
분으로 이루어져 있다. 이 글에서는 다른 동북아시아 국가들과 비교해 대한민국
해군이 공공 외교를 실행할 때 마주하는 이점들을 강조한다. (i) 잠재적인 위협으
로 여겨지지 않고, (ii) 강대국만큼 공공의 이익에 기여할 것을 요구받지 않으며,
(iii) 해상 무역을 통해 경제적, 정치적으로 급격히 발전한 한국은 자유민주 자본
주의 국가로서 견고한 소프트 파워 기반을 누리고 있다. 마지막으로 이 글은 해

양 환경 보존 분야의 공공 외교 선두주자가 되기 위해 대한민국 해군의 새로운
해군함 인수 및 독창적인 방식의 해군함 퇴역을 고찰하며 오늘날 대한민국 해양
전략 커뮤니티 내에 존재하는 정책 토론을 다룬다.
Introduction
Navies in Northeast Asia are increasingly taking on non-combat, public

diplomacy roles in the pursuit of soft power at a regional and global level
(Bukh 2017; Erickson & Strange 2015; Forster 2015; Mizokami 2011). In
part, this is symptomatic of a broader rivalry between Great Powers for
influence in the Asia Pacific (Sohn 2011). However, these activities are not
confined to the forces of China, Japan, Russia and the US. The Republic of
Korea (hereafter ‘South Korea’), too, has used its navy to engage with
international publics, protecting its interests while exercising leadership on
major maritime issues, self-consciously reaching for increased status through
its naval activities (Bowers 2019).
Sealed off from continental Asia along the inter-Korean border since
becoming a republic in 1948, South Korea has frequently been referred to as
a geostrategic ‘island’ (e.g. Hynd 2019; Roehrig 2019) in recognition of its
economic and political dependency on global sea lines of communication
(SLOC). Despite this, investment in South Korea’s military forces has
traditionally prioritized the army and air force over the navy, the latter being
given a limited role in defending peninsula waters for much of the second
half of the twentieth century (Bowers 2019, 110). This was partially as a
consequence of the South’s role within its military alliance with Washington,
in which US naval dominance required Seoul instead to counter North
Korea’s numerical advantage on land until reinforcements arrived; and was
also influenced by the institutional dominance of the army, whose
involvement in pre-democratic era domestic politics was substantial (Bowers
2019, 110; Park S.Y. 2012, 148).
The Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) has undergone steady transfor-
mation in both blue-water ambitions and capabilities since the end of the
Cold War, with a changing strategic environment leading to greater awareness
To the Sea, to the World 43
of China and Japan’s own naval forces (Park S.Y. 2012, 149). It has
employed the slogan ‘to the sea, to the world’ since 1992, underlining how
the maritime domain has come to be seen as a means with which Seoul is
able to engage with wider international society (Bowers 2019, 153). Debate
remains, however, around the extent to which the ROKN should prioritise
its local, regional and global interests. Delivering a keynote speech to a
maritime conference in Seoul in 2013, Geoffrey Till asked his audience to
consider whether South Korea is ‘aiming to be seen as a global naval power,
a regional one or should it focus primarily on responding to the threat from
the North?’ (Till 2014).
The challenges Seoul faces in peninsula waters are as varied as they are
severe. In 2010 alone, the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan by a North Korean
submarine led to the deaths of 46 crew, and the North’s shelling of
Yeonpyeong island resulted in four further South Korean fatalities (Lee J.H.
2020). At the same time as it guards against unexpected attack, the ROKN
is responsible for preventing infiltration via sea by North Korean crafts that
are sometimes small enough to escape detection (Choe 2019). Elsewhere, in
the East Sea the ROKN is tasked with maintaining South Korea’s control
over the islets of Dokdo, which is disputed by Japan, and in the West Sea
the submerged rocks known as Ieodo, disputed by China (Harold 2012).
Additionally, illegal fishing remains a major issue, with more work needed
to achieve agreement on and enforcement of maritime boundaries between
South Korea and neighbouring states (Harold 2012, 288-289). There are
strong reasons to argue that the ROKN should limit its operational focus to
these local issues. Why, then, has the ROKN also developed the capability
to engage in public diplomacy as part of its blue-water strategy? What form
has this public diplomacy taken, and how is the ROKN able to compete for
soft power influence with the better resourced Great Power navies of
Northeast Asia?
I argue that South Korea’s behaviour is informed by a mixture of
functional and status-seeking logics, with the country recognising its
interests in protecting vital SLOC, as well as the opportunities it has to
promote its image through ‘nation branding’ as a middle power (Ayhan
2019). The analysis presented in this paper is informed by a review of South
Korea’s diplomatic and defense white papers, together with domestic and
international media, think tank reports and academic literature.

The remainder of this paper consists of four main parts. It first outlines
the concepts of soft power and public diplomacy, and how they relate to
military activities, introducing the term ‘public naval diplomacy’ as a way
of understanding soft power naval activities. Second, it provides an
overview of three pillars of ROKN public naval diplomacy: (i) anti-piracy
and evacuation activities (ii) naval cooperation through port visits and joint
naval exercises, and (iii) humanitarian assistance and disaster response
(HADR). Third, it makes a case for the comparative strengths of the ROKN
in pursuing public naval diplomacy when compared to larger neighbouring
naval forces. Finally, it engages with contemporary policy debate within
South Korea’s maritime strategy community, considering adjustments to the
ROKN’s acquisitions of new naval platforms, and the retirement of old
platforms. Building upon South Korea’s existing successes in public naval
diplomacy, it calls for policymakers to consider the ROKN’s potential role
as a leader in regional maritime environmental conservation.
Soft Power, Public Diplomacy and Naval Diplomacy
Soft power has been defined as the ‘ability to get what you want through
attraction rather than coercion or payments’ (Nye 2004, x). Following
Vuving (2009, 8-12), this attraction can be generated by three complementary
power currencies: benignity, brilliance, and beauty. By engaging positively
in good faith with foreign publics, an actor’s benignity ‘generates soft
power through the production of gratitude and sympathy’ (Vuving 2009, 8).
In being seen to perform functions well, brilliance ‘generates soft power
through the production of admiration’ (8). Finally, by following a persuasive
value-driven agenda, beauty ‘generates soft power through the production
of inspiration’ (9).
Soft power has a symbiotic relationship with public diplomacy—the
work done by governments, and increasingly non-government actors, to
nurture, build, and ultimately wield soft power currencies. In the South
Korean context, public diplomacy is officially viewed as ‘diplomacy
activities through which the State enhances foreign nationals’ understanding
of and confidence in the Republic of Korea directly or in cooperation with

local governments or the private sector through culture, knowledge,
policies, etc.’ (MOFA 2016, 1). In practise, discussions of South Korea’s
public diplomacy have typically focused on Korean cultural exports and
exchanges, its hosting of sporting and diplomatic events, and its demonstrated
leadership in areas such as official development assistance and environmental
concerns. Among Seoul’s environmental initiatives have been its push for a
‘me first’ approach to tackling emissions and its involvement in green
growth governance, including its decision to provide a physical home for
international organisations such as the Global Green Growth Institute and
the Green Climate Fund (Blaxekjaer 2016; Lee J. 2016). Away from the
peninsula, existing works on South Korea’s maritime public diplomacy
focus on local issues such as the Dokdo island dispute (Ordaniel 2016),
without considering the country’s broader regional and global maritime
theatres.
According to Hall and Smith, ‘(t)here are two arms races happening in
Asia today: one for military capabilities and another for the weapons of
“soft power”’ (2013, 1). While for Hall and Smith ‘traditional and new
media, as well as cultural events and academic exchange programs’ are the
main ‘weapons’ of soft power (1), this binary distinction between hard and
soft power resources is, in reality, not so clear-cut (Capie 2015, 329). As
Nye himself acknowledges, ‘Military… resources can sometimes be used to
attract as well as coerce’ (2009). However, not all military resources are
equally well-suited to this role. Naval platforms have increasingly been
used in non-warfighting capacities due to a combination of instrumental and
normative influences. They have been praised for their versatility and
manoeuvrability, with Capie noting that ‘(a)mphibious warfare vessels,
often equipped with helicopters, have proved to be ideal vehicles for the
provision of humanitarian aid’ (2015, 314). Furthermore, in comparison to
other military components, naval vessels are in some circumstances more
easily perceived as non-threatening by foreign publics. As Till notes of port
visits by navy warships, ‘It [is] certainly quite hard to conceive of an equiv-
alent courtesy visit by a division of main battle tanks’ (Till 2009, 256).1
1 This point was demonstrated forcefully in March 2018, when a US aircraft carrier arrived
Traditional naval diplomacy consists of a variety of peacetime maritime

activities, including coercion and collaboration (Le Mière 2014, 27);
reflecting diverse mission sets that can ‘entail both “hard” and “soft” power
dimensions’ (Strating 2019). Classic accounts of naval diplomacy have
tended to focus upon the more coercive ‘gun boat diplomacy’ (Widen 2011).
More recent studies have instead emphasized soft power activities, such as
anti-piracy missions and evacuations, naval cooperation projects and HADR
(Jevsejevas 2020; Patalano 2015). These activities can provide opportunities
to demonstrate a country’s benignity, brilliance, and beauty—and may
therefore be considered forms of what I call ‘public naval diplomacy’. The
following section examines South Korea’s record in each of these areas,
contributing to a growing literature on the soft power utilization of
resources previously seen as inseparable from hard power.
Public Naval Diplomacy and the ROKN: Mixing Sea

Power with Soft Power
South Korea’s public naval diplomacy efforts can be divided into three
pillars: (i) anti-piracy operations and evacuation efforts off the coast of
Africa since 2009, (ii) cooperation projects, including joint naval exercises
and regular port visits, and (iii) its Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster
Response (HADR) activities in South and East Asia. As the following
analysis demonstrates, through these overlapping actions the ROKN has
been able to contribute functionally to the reduction of maritime piracy and
tensions between naval forces, increased international cooperation, and
alleviated the impact of natural disasters and other humanitarian crises; all
while elevating South Korea’s status as a middle power capable of contribu-
ting limited public goods.
The first pillar of South Korea’s public naval diplomacy is its anti-piracy
and evacuation efforts, closely associated with its Cheonghae Unit, formed
in 2009 as part of a multinational response to a dramatic surge in maritime
in the Vietnamese port city of Danang, signaling an improvement in the two states’ post-
War bilateral relations (Beech 2018).
piracy in the Gulf of Aden and waters off the eastern coast of Somalia
(Roehrig 2012, 28). At the peak of this crisis in 2010, a record-breaking
US$9.5 million ransom payment was delivered to Somali pirates for the
release of South Korea’s Samho Dream oil tanker (Kaprove 2013, 114)
underlining the threat posed to the country’s interests in the region. At risk
is the country’s vital South-bound SLOC, one of the country’s four major
shipping arteries (Park S.Y. 2012, 146). Many of Seoul’s energy imports
pass through the Gulf of Aden along this route, alongside around 29% of the
country’s entire maritime cargo (MND 2019, 217).
Deployed continuously from 2009 as part of the multilateral Combined
Task Force 151 (CTF-151), the Cheonghae Unit consists of a single
Chungmugong Yi Sunshin DDH-II class destroyer, together with several
rigid-hull inflatable boats and a helicopter—assets manned by just over 300
troops (MND 2019, 217).2 Although the Cheonghae Unit is primarily tasked
with protecting the security of Seoul’s commercial shipping assets and South
Korean sailors, it rarely makes use of its hard power capabilities by facing
off against small pirate skiffs. Instead, it is routinely engaged with foreign
publics, having protected 4,729 non-Korean vessels through a combination
of safe voyage escort and convoy services up to November 2018 (MND
2019, 218), financed by the South Korean government. One grateful message
addressed to the unit by a Chinese vessel’s crew in June 2016 thanked it for
its ‘earnest and professional escort’ (MND 2017a), suggesting an appreciation
among international commercial sailing publics for the contribution
provided by the ROKN. Added to this is the fact that on the 16,327 occasions
(MND 2019, 218) in which South Korean vessels were given protection by
the Cheonghae Unit, the guarded ships were typically manned by crews of
mixed Korean and non-Korean nationality. For example, when the 17,000-
ton Korean vessel Azalea was successfully defended from pirate attack by
the Cheonghae Unit in July 2011, its crew consisted of four Koreans, two
Britons, and 18 Filipinos, a fact that did not escape the attention of the
2 These required assets are, in practice, multiplied due to the distance of the deployment. As
Roehrig (2012, 42) notes, in order to achieve a continuous presence in the theater, the
Cheonghae Unit requires a commitment of three DDH-II ships. While one is actively
carrying out its mission, another is in training or transit to or from the Korean Peninsula,
while repairs and essential maintenance are being carried out on a third ship after its return
from the theatre.
Philippines’ media (PNA 2011).

South Korea has repeatedly justified its deployment of the unit in terms
of its practical interests, alongside explicit reference to its own global status.
In its 2009 Diplomatic White Paper, Seoul claimed that ‘(a)s the world’s
sixth largest maritime country, the ROK has a legitimate concern over the
scourge of piracy’ (MOFA 2009, 208). In 2013, it similarly stated that ‘(a)s
the ninth largest maritime economic power and a country affected by piracy,
the Republic of Korea has actively participated in the global fight against
Somali pirates with a keen interest in its eradication’ (MOFA 2013, 271).
Promoting the Cheonghae Unit to an international audience, in 2017 South
Korea’s English-language broadcaster Arirang TV released the documentary
Cheonghae Unit: Peacemaker of Aden, documenting the actions of the unit
and its role in protecting commercial shipping (Arirang TV 2017). The
Ministry of National Defense has similarly produced its own promotional
materials directed towards English-speaking audiences (MND 2017a).
In support of these actions at sea, South Korea has also been actively
involved in the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS),
an inclusive, informal forum for international maritime actors established in
2009 to coordinate anti-piracy efforts in the region. Much of the CGPCS’
contribution has been conducted through working groups, of which Working
Group 4 (WG4) had a clear, targeted, public diplomacy brief (Meron 2014,
50). WG4’s two central aims were to inform the international community of
the work of the CGPCS, and to influence public opinion by delegitimizing
piracy both inside Somalia and among external Somali diaspora com-
munities (50). South Korea was actively involved in this group, financing
the creation of a CGPCS website in 2011, and along with the UK and US
governments paying maintenance costs for the site and an associated
Facebook page (51). By backing the CGPCS’ website, Seoul demonstrated
its awareness of, and commitment to, public diplomacy as a method for
combatting piracy in the region. As South Korea’s 2015 Diplomatic White
Paper notes, ‘the Korean government operated the official website of the
CGPCS from 2011 till 2014, thereby contributing to the facilitation of
communication among the CGPCS participants and raising public awareness
on piracy issues’ (MOFA 2015, 321).
Expanding on these activities, the Cheonghae Unit has been tasked with
conducting three evacuations, twice from Libya (2011, 2014) and once from
Yemen (2015), transporting 61 South Korean nationals and 92 non-Koreans
to safety (Dong-a Ilbo 2014; MND 2019, 218). Commenting on the inclusion
of six non-Koreans in its evacuation from Yemen in 2015, South Korea’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that ‘(o)n humanitarian grounds, the ROK
government evacuated two Americans, two Canadians, one New Zealander,
and one Swiss… at the request of their countries’ (MOFA 2015). Once
again, the actions of the ROKN appear to be motivated as much by status as
functional concerns, with the South’s 2014 Defense White Paper noting of
the Cheonghae Unit’s missions that ‘(s)uch accomplishments raised the
status of the ROK’s armed forces in the world’ (MND 2015, 147), and
similarly two years later that ‘(s)uch accomplishments raised the stature of
the ROK armed forces in the world’ (MND 2017b, 175).
The second pillar of South Korea’s public naval diplomacy is its naval
cooperation projects. In addition to protecting Korean and non-Korean
citizens from the threat of piracy, by joining CTF-151 the ROKN has had
opportunities to collaborate with leading regional and global naval forces,
legitimizing the presence of the ROKN and enabling it to play a leadership
role in the international maritime realm. One highly visible display of this
leadership role is the fact that South Korea has taken temporary command
of the CTF-151 five times during the last decade, most recently in June
2019 (Naval Today 2019), a role described by the South Korean government
as ‘an opportunity to internationally demonstrate the excellence of the ROK
Navy’ (MND 2017b, 147). At the same time, the Cheonghae Unit has
contributed to enhancing South Korea’s international status by engaging in
joint naval anti-piracy training exercises with major powers, such as those
held in the Gulf of Aden with China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy in
2010 and again in 2012 (Erickson & Strange 2015, 78). However, the
ROKN’s involvement in joint training is far from limited to the Gulf of
Aden. In fact, South Korea has been participating in major multinational
naval exercises far from peninsula waters for around three decades.
Alongside a number of smaller drills, ROKN vessels have been actively
involved in the large biannual US-hosted Rim of the Pacific Exercise
(RIMPAC) since 1990, at which time it ‘acquired the honor of best
marksmanship’ (Meconis & Wallace 2000, 101). By 2018, a much-
expanded ROKN committed the Aegis destroyer Yulgok Yi I to the drills, in

addition to two other ships, three planes and 700 personnel (Yonhap News
2018). Per Bowers, ‘RIMPAC has been used by the ROKN as [an] indicator
of its status among the world’s top navies’ as well as ‘an arena to build
operational expertise, not just with the United States but also other navies’
(2019, 100). The ROKN has increasingly been included in even more
exclusive regional joint maritime drills, such as the inaugural Pacific
Vanguard exercise in May 2019 alongside naval contingents from the US,
Japan and Australia (Yonhap News 2019).
In 1992, two frigates completed the ROKN’s maiden voyage to Europe
(Meconis & Wallace 2000, 101), a statement of intent of Seoul’s expanding
maritime interests. Subsequently, the ROKN has steadily built up its
capacity to conduct port visits outside peninsula waters, a key element of its
ongoing engagement with foreign publics and attempts to build blue-water
soft power. To take one example, in 2019 the Philippines’ media reported on
the friendly three-day call of 700 ROKN personnel aboard destroyer
Munmu the Great and support ship Hwacheon in Manilla, noting ‘scheduled
shipboard tours, sports events, and joint performances… throughout the
visit,’ and that ‘(t)he Philippines is the first stop of the ships, which aim to
drop anchor in 14 ports and 12 countries’ (Mangosing 2019). During such
port calls, Seoul’s soft power is cultivated in target countries through
interactions between ROKN personnel and foreign publics, joint events with
local naval forces, and through the favourable media coverage that the visits
inevitably prompt (e.g. Gotinga 2019). In sum, such projects provide an
opportunity for exchange and dialogue in target countries, while
simultaneously naturalizing the presence of South Korean naval vessels on
the high seas in cooperation with other navies.
The third pillar of the ROKN’s public naval diplomacy, humanitarian
assistance and disaster response (HADR), has taken shape over the last two
decades through its involvement in East Timor (2000-2002), Afghanistan
(2001), the Asian Tsunami (2005) and in response to Typhoon Haiyan in the
Philippines (2013) (Bowers 2019, 68). In preparation for further
humanitarian campaigns, the ROKN has also cooperated closely with other
regional navies in drills specifically focused on enhancing HADR
coordination, such as the Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo (MNEK)
hosted by Indonesia in 2018 (Naval Technology 2018).

The ROKN has been actively involved in disaster relief since at least
2005, when it was deployed to Indonesia following the devastating Asian
Tsunami (Hyun 2010; Park S.Y. 2012, 160). In fact, in the context of the
Asia Pacific theatre, there is a strong logic to empowering the ROKN to
play a leading role in delivering South Korea’s HADR. The predominantly
littoral location of recipient states allows for relatively quick, easy and safe
access for naval platforms in what may be unstable operating environments.
Hitherto, ROKN HADR campaigns have utilized Landing Ship Tank (LST)
platforms, able to unload personnel and large quantities of supplies without
access to infrastructure such as docks, giving it greater flexibility in delivering
support where it is most needed. However, in recent years the ROKN has
begun to invest in larger Dokdo-class Landing Platform Dock (LPD) vessels
that, in addition to their warfighting capabilities, are ‘tasked with PKO
(Peace Keeping Operations) support, humanitarian operations and national
prestige enhancement’ (Bowers 2019, 91).
The ROKN’s HADR projects have engaged with local communities in
several countries in the Asia Pacific region. In 2002, it was reported that, in
addition to official assistance, ROKN staff had personally raised US$2000
to donate to local schools in East Timor (Kookmin Ilbo 2002), with a later
report citing an ROKN officer as saying that such ‘humanitarian gestures
will also promote the image of the ROKN and South Korea’ within the
country (BBC 2003). In a further symbol of the public diplomacy bond
formed between the ROKN and East Timor during this engagement, ROKN
personnel formed a cheer squad for East Timor’s athletes at the 2002 Asian
Games in South Korea (Yonhap News 2002). A decade later, South Korea’s
US$3.8 million contribution to disaster-relief efforts in the Philippines
following Typhoon Haiyan included the dispatch of ‘two ships full of
restoration equipment and relief supplies’ (KBS World 2013). Senior figures
in the Philippines’ government subsequently visited South Korea’s HADR
unit, with one commenting that ‘Korea is the only country that helps the
Philippines with heart’3 and President Aquino even saying ‘thank you’ in the
Korean language (gamsahamnida) (Korea Policy Briefing 2014).
3 Author’s translation.
Overall, with the Asia Pacific region being uniquely vulnerable to

natural disasters (Wood 2018), ROKN HADR support is well-poised to
continue making a modest but vital contribution to the wellbeing of
communities affected by disaster, while simultaneously shaping perceptions
of South Korea in ways favourable to its desire for enhanced status.
Together with anti-piracy and evacuation efforts and the ROKN’s
cooperation projects, it is clear that Seoul is actively pursuing public
diplomacy in the maritime arena. The following section outlines three key
elements working to the advantage of the ROKN’s public naval diplomacy
in comparison to other regional navies.
Comparative Advantages of ROKN Public Naval

Diplomacy
South Korea’s military forces are outnumbered and outspent by many of its
neighbours in the Northeast Asian region, including China, Japan, Russia
and the US (MND 2019, 330). As much in peacetime contexts as in
conventional conflict scenarios, this disparity in resources would appear to
put Seoul at a major disadvantage in its use of military means for soft power
ends. Clearly, there have been limits to the naval resources that Seoul has
been able to spare away from peninsula waters in pursuit of its regional and
global interests, a factor exacerbated by continuing provocations along its
maritime border with North Korea (BBC 2020). However, when it comes to
deploying the ROKN in a public diplomacy role in the Asia Pacific region
and beyond, South Korea also enjoys several advantages over some of these
peers that have gone largely unrecognised.
First, South Korean naval activity is unlikely to be seen as threatening at
a regional or global level. This is a particular strength in Asia, where ‘states
remain deeply sensitive to foreign attempts to influence domestic public
opinion’ (Hall & Smith 2013, 11). Seoul benefits in this respect partly due
to its smaller size, its lack of territorial claims, and the fact that it has fewer
resources than its neighbours, but its policies are also not prone to ‘appear
as narrowly self-serving or arrogantly presented’ in ways that ‘prohibit
rather than produce soft power’ (Nye 2008, 102). In this battle of perceptions
central to the generation of soft power in the region, Seoul has neither the
historical baggage of Japanese imperialism, nor the contemporary position of
China, often seen as a militarily aggressive and potentially threatening
revisionist power (Lee S.J. 2011, 143). Nor does it share the US’ predilection
for unilateralism (Hocking 2005, 34). In the maritime arena, Seoul has been
careful to stay neutral in sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea, and
has not suffered from tensions with regional partners of the sort that led to
the closure of the US Naval Medical Research Unit Two (NAMRU-2) in
Indonesia in 2010 (Smith 2014). In a discussion of Beijing’s attempts at
naval public diplomacy, Zanardi (2016) argues that the intended effects of
its maritime activities are potentially disrupted by perceptions that its naval
power is threatening due to its ongoing maritime disputes such as the South
China Sea. Similarly, Erickson and Strange note that ‘there are objections to
the notion that China’s antipiracy missions are benign’ (2015, 82) and even
China’s port visits are at times viewed with suspicion (Greene 2019).
Whereas Beijing has, along with Moscow, had its soft power public
diplomacy initiatives maligned as ‘sharp power’ (National Endowment for
Democracy 2017), Seoul has rarely faced distrust or public backlash related
to its own activities. Even when the ROKN has exercised considerable
force—such as the killing of eight Somalian pirates during Operation Dawn
of Gulf of Aden in 2011—this resulted in largely positive international
media coverage (e.g. NPR 2011).
Second, while Great Powers like China and Japan are expected to
contribute public goods in the Asia Pacific region (Goh 2013, 216), as a
middle power South Korea is not viewed as having the same responsibilities
for the management of international society. Consequently, even more
minor contributions in the form of narrowly guarding individual SLOC or
HADR aid distributed by the ROKN are likely to be viewed positively. One
prominent example of this phenomena came during the 2013 humanitarian
response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, when China faced sustained
criticism for ‘contributing only’ around US$2 million in donations, and was
subsequently shamed into sending additional resources in the form of its
Peace Ark hospital ship (Zanardi 2016, 440). In contrast, South Korea’s
decision to involve the ROKN in delivering US$3.3 million, along with a
‘Disaster relief team; food assistance; (and) emergency health services’
(Lum and Margesson 2014, 21) was viewed positively, with Manilla’s
Department of National Defense Secretary, Voltaire Gazmin, later saying
that those impacted by the South Korean presence in the country ‘only had
good things to say,’ and that ‘(w)e truly thank you.’ (Asia News Monitor
2015). One slight caveat to this advantage is that it may diminish over time,
with an expectation that Seoul can and should contribute more, on land and
sea, in line with its status as a rising middle power (Roehrig 2013).
Finally, as a young, vibrant, liberal capitalist democracy conforming to
international maritime norms, South Korea’s public diplomacy is potentially
more appealing to regional and global publics than that of more authoritarian
states such as China and Russia. As Choi notes, ‘South Korea’s strength lies
in its experience of democratisation and liberal capitalist development’
(2009, 61). While Seoul’s limited Cold War public diplomacy was focused
upon defeating communism, its rapid economic development and
consolidated democratization over the last 30 years is seen as a ‘more solid
basis for its… public diplomacy’ (Lee S.J. 2015, 107) and a potentially
attractive model for publics in developing states. Notably, Seoul’s economic
development was achieved in part through its once unrivalled shipping
industry and its sea-borne trade (Park B.S. 2015). It is fitting that this period
in the country’s history is often referred to as the Miracle on the Han River
(Scarlatoiu 2008). In contrast to the other two advantages listed above, this
factor is not related to the country’s size and strength, meaning that even
were South Korea to continue to grow in hard or soft power terms, it would
not necessarily be weakened.
In sum, despite a deficit in material resources, at a regional level South
Korean public naval diplomacy has three core advantages. It benefits from
existing perceptions that it is comparatively non-threatening in its policy
prescriptions; from the fact that, unlike Great Powers, it is not expected to
contribute public goods to international society; and from its soft-power
underpinnings as a liberal capitalist democracy seen to have rapidly
transitioned from ‘developing’ to ‘developed state’ status via its maritime
trade. Recognizing these advantages, the following section offers two
modest practical recommendations that would enable it to build on the
ROKN’s existing public diplomacy strengths, while simultaneously
recognising the resource limitations placed upon it.
Strengthening South Korea’s Public Diplomacy at Sea
The ROKN has laid strong foundations in its public diplomacy work by
offering protection to international commercial shipping, expanding dialogue
and cooperation with international maritime publics, and engaging in
HADR work in the region. Looking ahead to the future, what can be done to
strengthen and expand upon this work, without detracting from the essential
role of the ROKN in peninsula waters? What follows is a brief, exploratory
outline of two interrelated arguments. First, that the ROKN should be
cautious about following other regional navies by purchasing hospital ships
to upgrade its HADR public diplomacy. Instead, it should preserve
maximum operational flexibility by maintaining and expanding its fleet of
LST and LPD platforms, capable of both combat and non-combat functions.
Second, building on its record of leadership on environmental issues, that
the ROKN should add a fourth pillar to its public naval diplomacy work by
pursuing an explicit environmental agenda in the maritime domain. In the
pursuit of this goal, the ROKN could begin by considering donating some
of its retiring platforms to be strategically sunk in locations throughout the
region as artificial reefs.
Hospital ships have existed at least as far back as the 17th century as a
means of providing medical support services to expeditionary forces; yet
only in recent decades have they begun to take on an explicit humanitarian
and public diplomacy brief (Ray and Naidu 2017). The use of these vessels
is regulated through the 1907 Hague Convention X, which states that,
among other conditions, ‘Governments undertake not to use these ships for
any military purpose’ (IPC 1907, Art. 4). As a result, hospital ships cannot
take on combat functions, and are a potentially attractive platform for public
naval diplomacy—offering a visible sign of humanitarian support without
risk of being perceived as threatening. Following Washington’s use of the
USNS Mercy and USNS Comfort in pursuit of soft power objectives
(Sokolowski, 2011) other navies have begun operating hospital ships in the
region, including Moscow’s Irtysh, and also Beijing’s Peace Ark, which
entered service in 2008 (Mackenzie 2011, 11). Meanwhile, pressure has
been steadily building in Japan towards the same approach, and Tokyo now
appears poised to invest in similar platforms (Nishioka 2020).
In line with this regional trend, senior naval officers and academics in
South Korea’s maritime strategy community have begun to publicly
advocate for the ROKN to acquire its own hospital ships (Yu 2020; Song
H.C. 2020). Whilst such proposals deserve praise for instigating a debate
over how to expand Seoul’s public naval diplomacy, the analysis presented
here suggests that any acquisition of hospital ships should proceed with
caution. Domestically, South Korea needs to ensure it moves in lockstep
with public opinion, which ‘has not yet fully embraced the idea of…
assuming a leading role in the provision of public goods’ (Choi 2009, 64).
Internationally, too, Seoul is not expected to contribute as many public
goods as Great Powers, and it is broadly trusted by actors at the regional
and global level, meaning that the ROKN’s combat ships can more easily be
converted into temporary use for South Korea’s HADR projects. Moreover,
the ROKN’s existing LST platforms have greater operational flexibility
during a disaster than hospital ships, as they can land on almost any
beach—unlike the larger, more cumbersome hospital ships. Seoul is also
more heavily constrained in its resources due to its smaller economic base
and the challenges posed by the (North) Korean People’s Navy in peninsula
waters. Besides which, if navy funds were diverted to such a project, South
Korea’s hard naval power would likely fall further behind its neighbours.
The purchase cost for a single hospital ship has been estimated at as much
as $US327 million, with maintenance costs running as high as US$23
million per year (Japan Times 2020). Were the ROKN to make such a large
investment in a hospital ship platform, it would leave itself open to allegations
that it had prioritised its blue-water ambitions ahead of its core mission of
protecting peninsula waters, leading to a potential public backlash if it were
to find itself exposed to any major provocation along its local maritime
boundaries. Overall, taking account of these advantages and constraints, the
ROKN’s best option in the short to medium-term may be to continue to
invest in LST and LPD platforms that can be utilised in both combat and
non-combat roles.
How, then, could the ROKN feasibly expand its public diplomacy
activities, while taking into consideration the country’s distinctive advantages,
constraints and agendas? One promising avenue for consideration is to
develop the ROKN’s status as a leader in maritime environmental conser-
vation issues. Seoul has long been concerned with declining fishing stocks
and ‘other environmental factors’ in peninsula waters that ‘have put
increased emphasis on conservation measures’ (Bowers 2019, 9). However,
despite its recent attempts to ‘demonstrat[e] environmental leadership at
low costs’ (Song A.Y. 2020) on the global stage, there are few signs that
Seoul is yet applying this agenda in the maritime arena.
One way that the ROKN could begin to craft such a role for itself is by
donating some of its retiring naval vessels for use as artificial reefs throughout
the Asia Pacific region. Until now, such platforms have predominantly been
used as training vessels for the ROKN and Korean Coastguard (Park 2019;
Ahn 2019), as public displays, and as artificial reefs in peninsula waters
(Park 2019)—the latter proving that the ROKN has the expertise required to
safely prepare its retired platforms to be used as artificial reefs. Recently,
retired vessels have also been employed in more soft power-oriented ways.
In 2017, Seoul Battleship Park was opened to the public, and has since been
promoted as a destination for foreign visitors to Korea (VisitSeoul.Net
2017). Old ROKN platforms have also been donated for use by around ten
smaller friendly regional navies (Park 2019). With the ROKN’s fleet having
expanded significantly since the end of the Cold War, however, it could now
examine the feasibility of donating retired platforms for use as artificial
reefs in the Asia Pacific region. A recent study by Williams (2015) of the
US’ so-called ‘Ships 2 Reefs’ program concludes that the construction of
artificial reefs is ‘(a)n important nonmilitary use of navies’ (114) that
‘provide(s) one practical solution to the precipitous decline in marine
resources’ and ‘can play an important role in conservation and restoration of
natural reefs by relieving pressure of use and establishing habitats to increase
marine life’ (123-124). By engaging in this practise, the ROKN could
enhance South Korea’s attractiveness to regional maritime publics by
contributing to increased fish stocks and boosting scuba-diving tourism
industries around the sites of these wrecks, with corresponding economic
development payoffs to the affected communities. Put simply, instead of
acquiring new costly single-use hospital ship platforms to pursue expanded
public diplomacy goals, this paper suggests ROKN may be strategically
better placed to first consider how it can more creatively dispose of its
existing vessels, while simultaneously expanding its naval public diplomacy
activities.
Conclusion
In December 2018, ten years after its initial deployment in the Gulf of
Aden, the ROKN’s Cheonghae Unit was awarded the prestigious Prime
Minister’s Award, in recognition of its ‘contribution to protecting the
country’s vessels and citizens off the coast of Somalia’ (Arirang TV 2018).
It would be wrong, however, to think that such activities by the ROKN
beyond peninsula waters in the last two decades have benefitted only South
Korean nationals and businesses. Instead, as this paper has argued, the
ROKN has engaged in sustained public naval diplomacy at a regional and
global level, providing leadership on major international issues such as
maritime security, international cooperation and HADR, while elevating
South Korea’s status as a country capable of providing the international
community with valuable public goods.
By seeking to examine the ROKN’s public naval diplomacy in isolation
from other non-state maritime actors, one limitation of this work is its
traditional focus on state-based activity. As Christian Le Mière (2014) has
argued convincingly, diplomacy in the maritime arena is no-longer the sole
preserve of naval forces. Future research could fruitfully build on this work
by examining the existing and potential role of South Korean conglomerates,
non-governmental organisations, charities, and even Seoul’s small maritime
security industry in contributing to the country’s public maritime diplomacy;
supporting efforts to strengthen maritime order and provide humanitarian
support while engaging in dialogue about the country’s maritime role with
foreign publics at a regional and global level. Additionally, it would be
highly valuable to periodically survey strategic maritime publics and elites
in the Asia Pacific and around the Gulf of Aden, to better gauge the impact
of Seoul’s public naval diplomacy on international maritime publics’
perceptions.
Ultimately, despite its strong maritime history and identity, Korea ‘has
often ignored both the advantages the sea provides and the vulnerabilities
the sea exposes’ (Bowers 2014, 443). During the first two decades of the
twenty-first century, however, South Korea has successfully bucked this

trend, recognizing many of the opportunities and risks that await it on the
high seas. As such, it is well-placed to begin to expand its public naval
diplomacy into new areas. While the ROKN faces continued constraints and
resource limitations as a result of the unique challenges posed by the
maritime environment in Northeast Asia, the ROKN’s ambitions outside
peninsula waters can be further harnessed by the country’s public diplomacy
entrepreneurs, if they are willing to think creatively about how to engage
with its capabilities and limitations, providing leadership on maritime
environmental conservation and other global challenges.
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67
Korean Health Diplomacy Amidst COVID-19

and Its Impact on Public Diplomacy
How Korean health diplomacy amidst the COVID-19
pandemic serves as a soft power tool
Korean Public Diplomacy paper contest – 30 September 2020
Floortje Fontein
Abstract | South-Korea’s health diplomacy efforts amidst the COVID-

19 pandemic can play a meaningful role in the country’s global public
diplomacy strategy. This paper aims to broaden the understanding of public
diplomacy by engaging different international relations subfields. It advocates
a Korean public diplomacy strategy that does not rely solely on efforts of
cultural diplomacy, but on those of health diplomacy as well. It argues,
based on data collected and analyzed through a literature study, that Korea
has implemented two important policies during the pandemic which serve as
soft power tools. First, Korea’s successful response to the pandemic resulted
in a growing international demand for Korean medical supplies that the
Korean government has met in a way that advances the country’s diplomatic
interests. Secondly, the Korean government launched a public campaign, in
which their democratic and transparent response to the pandemic is
promoted to the foreign public. The above discussed efforts of health
diplomacy may significantly enhance the country’s public diplomacy
strategy by establishing supportive relationships with other nations and
improving Korea’s image to the foreign public.
국문초록 | 코로나19 전염병 중 대한민국의 보건 외교 노력은 국가의 세계 공

공 외교 전략에 의미 있는 역할을 할 수 있다. 이 논문에서는 여러 국제 관계론의
하위 분야를 끌어들임으로써 공공 외교에 대한 이해를 넓히고자, 한국의 공공 외
교 전략이 단순히 문화 외교 노력만이 아닌 보건 외교 노력에도 의존하고 있다고
보았다. 문헌 연구를 통해 모으고 분석한 자료를 바탕으로 한국이 코로나 19 전
염병 동안 소프트 파워의 도구로 작용한 두 가지 중요한 정책을 시행했다고 보았
다. 첫째, 전염병에 대한 한국의 성공적인 대응이 한국의 의료 물자에 대한 국제
적 수요의 증가를 불러왔고, 대한민국 정부는 이를 국가의 외교 이해관계를 진보

시키는 방향으로 충족시켰다. 둘째, 한국 정부는 그들의 민주적이고 투명한 전염
병 대응을 해외 대중에게 홍보하는 공공 캠페인을 시작했다. 위에 언급된 보건
외교 노력은 다른 국가들과 지지적인 관계를 쌓고 해외 대중에게 한국의 이미지
를 개선시킴으로써 한국의 공공 외교 전략을 상당히 강화시킬 수 있다.
INTRODUCTION
On the 20 th January 2020 the first case of COVID-19 in South-Korea

(hereinafter: Korea) was confirmed. The COVID-19 virus originated from
Wuhan city, China, and rapidly spread to various countries around the
world. The number of infected cases in Korea gradually increased
throughout February. According to the Korea Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (KCDC), the critical case that led to a quick transmission of
the virus throughout the rest of the country was labeled ‘Patient 31,’ a
61-year-old Korean woman from Daegu (Cha & Kim, 2020). Several
months after the first infected case, Korea is now praised as one of the
leading countries in reducing the number of deaths caused by the virus. By
5 August 2020, Korea had about 14,456 confirmed infected cases and 302
deaths. Furthermore, Korea has a case fatality rate of 2,09%, compared to
the global case fatality rate of 3,76% (Coronaboard, n.d.).
Korea’s successful response to the pandemic can be used to establish
diplomatic relations through activities relating to ‘health diplomacy’. The
COVID-19 pandemic is an example of a health issue that transcends
national boundaries and requires global action. The broad political, social
and economic implications of the pandemic have brought more actors,
including diplomats, into the health arena (Kickbusch, 2007). Health
diplomacy involves activities that improve global health while
strengthening international relationships (Wise, 2009). Successful health
diplomacy efforts amidst the COVID-19 pandemic can play a meaningful
role in improving the image of Korea in other nations, thereby making a
positive impact on ‘public diplomacy,’ i.e. “the means by which
governments, private groups and individuals influence the attitudes of other
people and governments in such a way as to exercise influence on their
Korean Health Diplomacy Amidst COVID-19 and Its Impact on Public Diplomacy 69
foreign policy decisions” (Cho, 2012, p. 279).

Thus far, public relations scholars have not yet noted the importance of
health diplomacy efforts in relation to public diplomacy (Wise, 2009). For
the diplomatic studies to further develop empirically and theoretically, it is
important that we engage different international relations subfields in order
to contribute to a more complete view on the forces reshaping modern
world politics. Moreover, the Korean government has mainly based its
public diplomacy strategy on the narrow terms of cultural diplomacy, which
has its shortcomings (Cho, 2012). Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to
advocate a Korean public diplomacy strategy that relies more on the
country’s health diplomacy efforts amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. This
paper will thus focus on the impact of Korean healthy diplomacy during the
pandemic on the country’s public diplomacy. According to this, the research
question central to this paper is: How do Korea’s health diplomacy efforts
during the COVID-19 pandemic impact its public diplomacy? In what
follows, this paper starts by laying out the theoretical framework on public
diplomacy and health diplomacy. Followed by the data which will then be
analyzed using a qualitative literature study. Finally, the paper closes with a
discussion of the findings. This paper will contribute to academic literature
as the COVID-19 pandemic is a new phenomenon, especially in
combination with public diplomacy-health diplomacy literature.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The following will outline the most relevant existing literature on the
concepts of public diplomacy and health diplomacy. Conducting a literature
review will demonstrate the crucial role public relations and diplomacy play
in the era of globalization, in which health issues, such as the COVID-19
pandemic, affect countries all over the world and require global action. This
will set the theoretical framework this paper is based on.
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND SOFT POWER
The term ‘public diplomacy’ was first used in 1965 by former American
diplomat E. Guillon, he defined the term as “the means by which
governments, private groups and individuals influence the attitudes and
opinions of other people and governments in such a way as to exercise
influence on their foreign policy decisions” (Cho, 2012, p. 279). Public
diplomacy involves dimensions of international relations beyond traditional
diplomacy. First of all, public diplomacy focuses not only on establishing
inter-governmental relations, but also emphasizes supportive relations with
foreign publics. Secondly, central to public diplomacy are ‘soft power tools’
(Istad, 2016). Soft power refers to the means and efforts to establish
supportive international relations based on a nation’s attractiveness: for
instance, a nation’s appealing values and desirable international reputation.
Soft power diplomacy might enable a nation to achieve diplomatic
objectives that otherwise could not have been achieved through hard power
instruments, i.e. the use of military or economic force (Cho, 2012). Finally,
public diplomacy involves governmental as well as non-governmental
actors, such as citizens, private groups and non-governmental organizations
(Istad, 2016).
The main purpose of public diplomacy would be to establish supportive
relationships with a range of (non-)governmental stakeholders that influence
a nation’s capability to achieve their foreign policy objectives (Wise, 2009).
To achieve this purpose, the practice of public diplomacy focuses on soft
power tools and the way one nation communicates with citizens of another
nation (Cho, 2012). Through the means of soft power, as opposed to hard
power, we can get others to want the outcomes you want by shaping their
preferences, rather than relying on coercion (Nye, 2004).
According to American political scientist Nye (2004), the soft power of
a nation comes from three resources, that is: 1) the attractiveness and
(moral) legitimacy of its culture, 2) political values and 3) foreign policy.
He further lists the three dimensions of public diplomacy through which a
nation can accomplish its diplomatic objectives:
1. ‌Daily communication: this first dimension involves explaining the

background of domestic and foreign policy decisions, for instance

by offering (one-sided) information to the press. Hereby, it is
important to focus on domestic and foreign journalism to justify
policy decisions not only to the nation’s own citizens, but the
foreign public as well.
2. ‌Strategic communication: the second dimension involves
developing a set of themes, as in political or advertising
campaigns, with the purpose of promoting central themes of a
particular policy. For instance, by launching a public campaign
surrounding a particular policy that emphasizes the central values
behind it.
3. ‌The development of lasting relationships with individuals: the
final dimension involves human exchange programs; such as
scholarships, seminars and conferences. This dimension advances
interactive communication between the providers and receivers of
public diplomacy.
Technological advances and other dramatic changes of the 21st century

international arena have emphasized the ever-growing importance of public
diplomacy. In the era of globalization, public attitudes and opinions now
directly impact a nation’s capability to achieve their diplomatic objectives
through the development of information and democratization. Costs of
processing and disseminating information have been reduced, public
citizens’ power to access information and express their opinions on foreign
policy has increased (Cho, 2012). Promoting a positive reception of a
nation’s policies, culture and values to a foreign public through the means
of public diplomacy is now more significant than ever.
HEALTH DIPLOMACY
As mentioned before, 21st century diplomacy has transformed to fit a

globalized international arena. There is an ever-growing scope of health
issues that transcend national boundaries and that need to be approached
with global action. In addition, these health issues are interdependent with
broad political, social and economic implications that bring more

stakeholders, including diplomats, in this arena. Diplomacy is no longer
solely the practice of traditional diplomats; public diplomacy entails that
increasingly many new actors and an informed (foreign) public are also
engaged in these processes. International relationships are managed at
numerous diplomatic venues and they function on a multi-level global
governance structure, which increasingly includes a regional level. Regional
international organizations; such as the EU, the African Union and ASEAN,
are acquiring new strength as decision-making platforms as they are
expanding their areas of work and putting health issues on their agendas
(Kickbusch, 2013). Finally, there is a much greater need to consider the
interaction between domestic and foreign policies and cooperation with
national ministries (Kickbusch et al., 2007).
Diplomacy is traditionally understood as the conduct of international
relations through the negotiations of professional diplomats from ministries
of foreign affairs. The term ‘global health diplomacy’ or ‘health diplomacy’
is a form of diplomacy that works against the backdrop of a 21st century
globalized international arena, it refers to the multi-level and multi-actor
negotiations that manage the global health policy environment (Kickbusch
et al., 2007). It is considered a method for reaching consensus on health
issues while taking into consideration other interests that are interdependent
with these issues; such as political, economic, social and ethical interests
(Kickbusch, 2013). In the face of a pandemic, policies that are not health
related; such as environmental, trade, economic development and security
policies, need to be complemented by those in the area of health (World
Health Organization, 2020). Moreover, health diplomacy is a method to deal
with health issues working together with other nations, non-governmental
organizations and other private sectors (Subarkah & Bukhari, 2020). The
global governance structure in which health diplomacy functions
increasingly includes the regional level. More countries are participating in
decision-making through international platforms, more power centers are
rising and negotiation and coalition-building becomes more important
(Kickbusch, 2013).
Even though these health issues have a transnational scope, sovereign
nations remain the core actors that must shape their health and foreign
policies in such a way that aligns their national interests with international
ones (Drager & Fidler, 2007). Health diplomacy can therefore be a useful
instrument to maintain global health and build relations with other nations.
Health diplomacy is recognized as a key contributor to significant benefits
in the areas of health, development, peace, reduced poverty, social justice
and human rights (World Health Organization, 2020). According to the
World Health Organization (2020), health diplomacy has three main
purposes:
1. To improve population health and health security.

2. ‌To improve relations between nation states and to establish com-
mitment of a wide range of actors to work together to improve
health.
3. ‌To achieve outcomes that are deemed fair and support goals of
reducing poverty and increasing equity.
Many examples show how governments use health programs to improve

their relations with other nations, to build coalitions and improve their
international reputation (Khayatzadeh-Mahani et al., 2018). For instance,
the United States used health diplomacy during its war efforts in 2003
through the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).
This program was initiated during the internationally criticized Iraq war,
besides its humanitarian purpose and it being a successful program in
reducing infection rates and mortality, it also served to improve international
public perceptions of the United States (Khayatzadeh-Mahani et al, 2018).
Another example is Brazil, which was the first developing country during
the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual property Rights agreement
(TRIPS-agreement) in 1995 to successfully link the trade and public health
arenas, which resulted in the country offering free treatments to AIDS
patients leading to a decrease in mortality. Brazil’s initiative supported the
expanding of global support for AIDS treatment in other countries, such as
Thailand, South Africa and India (Khayatzadeh-Mahani et al, 2018). These
diplomatic efforts in the health arena that lead to achieving foreign policy
goals can be understood as the exercise of soft power. Brazil’s effective use
of soft power in this case has led the country to play a leading role in
negotiations on the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) by

building broad coalitions (Khayatzadeh-Mahani et al, 2018).
CASE SELECTION
This research paper focuses on Korea’s health diplomacy efforts during the
COVID-19 pandemic and the possible influence this has on the country’s
public diplomacy performance. By early March of 2020, Korea became the
country with the most infected cases of COVID-19 after China. However,
due to the country’s early and rapid response to these first cases, Korea was
soon praised in being able to maintain a relatively low case fatality rate
(Cha & Kim, 2020). Korea has proven itself capable of responding quickly
and decisively to the crisis, while keeping the public informed by frequent
and transparent information dissemination (World Economic Forum, 2020).
Korea’s response to the pandemic; focused on widespread testing and
contact tracing, while pursuing democratic values of transparency and
openness, serves as a model for other countries battling the virus. Especially
as recently there has been a debate on whether democratic versus autocratic
governments are better able to contain the virus. Korea has shown how
being open and transparent about how the virus is spreading and how the
government is acting is the key to their success in managing the crisis
(Ferrier, 2020).
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Korea has plans to promote the
country’s reputation as “a leading nation that upholds international order of
solidarity and cooperation while prioritizing human life and public safety”
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, 2020b). For this
purpose, the Ministry has launched a public campaign, dubbed the “TRUST
campaign” to promote the country’s democratic, open and transparent
response to the pandemic, while emphasizing the need for solidarity and
cooperation. The Ministry shows its willingness to utilize their efforts
during the COVID-19 pandemic to influence the country’s international
reputation and to establish supportive relationships with other nations. This
paper aims to find out how these efforts of health diplomacy could impact
Korea’s ability to achieve their foreign policy objectives, i.e. how Korea’s
health diplomacy during the pandemic influences its public diplomacy.
EXPECTATIONS
As established before, health diplomacy efforts, particularly those during

the pandemic of a new virus that also carries political, social and economic
implications, can be understood as the exercise of soft power. Health
programs to assist other countries in containing the virus; for instance, by
supplying quarantine supplies such as test kits, can help strengthen relations
and improve political reputation (Khayatzadeh-Mahani et al, 2018).
Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Korea has established plans
to promote their response to the crisis and the values they are pursuing
through a public campaign, once more showing their ambition to utilize
their accomplishments to improve the country’s international reputation.
This paper therefore expects that Korea’s health diplomacy efforts amidst
the COVID-19 pandemic will positively impact its public diplomacy and
therefore instill a positive perception of Korea among the foreign public.
Hypothesis 1: Korea’s health diplomacy efforts during the COVID-19
pandemic, such as the granting of quarantine supplies to strategic partner
countries and the carrying out of public campaigns to promote their
successful response to the pandemic, will positively impact its public
diplomacy by strengthening relations with other countries and improving
their reputation with the foreign public.
The research question central to this paper will be studied through a
qualitative research method. To explain how Korean health diplomacy
efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic influence its public diplomacy, this
paper has collected data through a literature study, analyzing various
existing documents such as academic articles, reports, official published
government documents and online news articles that are relevant to the
research. The data is analyzed and presented in order to draw conclusions
and formulate recommendations on how to further utilize health diplomacy
efforts during the pandemic to advance the country’s public diplomacy
strategy.
DESCRIPTION OF EXPLANATORY FACTOR: KOREAN HEALTH

DIPLOMACY AMIDST THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC
In what follows, recent efforts of health diplomacy amidst the COVID-19

pandemic and the Korea’s current public diplomacy strategy will be more
closely examined. Next, findings that have been analyzed through a
qualitative literature study will be presented and it will be considered whether
this paper’s previously formulated expectations may be confirmed or
disconfirmed.
As discussed previously, Korea has shown itself capable of responding
quickly and decisively to the COVID-19 virus outbreak, which resulted in
the country maintaining a relatively low case fatality rate (Cha & Kim,
2020). The government further explained how being transparent to the
public about how the virus is spreading and how the government is
responding has been vital in securing people’s trust and the key to their
successful handling of the crisis (World Economic Forum, 2020). Korea
was able to utilize their experience from the sudden and unexpected Middle
East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) outbreak in 2015, which established
the country’s belief that rapid action, social distancing, transparent
dissemination of information and most importantly mass testing should be
central to an effective response to a viral epidemic. Korea’s strong trust in
mass testing learnt from the MERS outbreak, has set the country apart from
other nations in dealing with the COVID-19 virus (World Economic Forum,
2020).
As Korean biotech companies followed the development of the virus in
China, they rapidly produced tests in response. The country was therefore
able to open various drive-through testing centers, where as much as 20.000
people a day could test themselves for free. Information of identified
infected cases was obtained so the government was able to track the spread
of the virus and share this information with the public (Al Jazeera, 2020).
Another feature of the Korean response that stands out in comparison to
other countries is that there has not been a lockdown. Korean citizens
practiced voluntary passive social distancing, citizens’ immediate and
widespread cooperation has helped the country to avoid a total lockdown as
implemented in countries like Italy, China and the UK (Attias, 2020).
Korea is now actively seeking to utilize their successful response to the

virus in order to support similar attempts by other countries through efforts
of health diplomacy. There has been a growing international demand for
Korean quarantine supplies, such as testing kits. Seoul has been given the
task of meeting this demand in a way that advances the country’s diplomatic
and economic interests. Seoul officials have therefore instituted the
“interagency team on the strategic decisions” that is in charge of sending
support to strategic partners in a way that maximizes Korea’s “soft power as
an advanced nation in terms of quarantine expertise” (Korea Herald, 2020).
Seoul officials have stated that the United States, the United Arab Emirates
and Indonesia are the countries placed on the priority list for exporting
quarantine supplies.
The United States has been chosen because of Korea’s longstanding
diplomatic relationship with the United States, and since president Trump
had personally requested help from Korea because of the sudden surge in
new infected cases in his country (Korea Herald, 2020). Furthermore, the
United Arab Emirates has been chosen because the country has maintained
a very successful diplomatic relationship with Korea for 40 years now. It
was during the 2018 visit of Korean president Moon to the UAE that both
countries agreed to the status of a “special strategic relationship” between
the countries (Miere, 2020). Finally, Indonesia was chosen as a priority
country because of Korea’s recently established commitment to support
regional partners and to improve relations with ASEAN member countries
(Korea Herald, 2020). In a telephone conversation between the Korean and
the Indonesian Ministers of Foreign Affairs it was agreed that the two
countries would communicate and work closely together in responding to
the pandemic. Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Retno, had praised
Korea’s testing capacities and ability to contain the virus and stated that he
would like to learn from these experiences (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Republic of Korea, 2020b). With the choice of these three priority
countries, Korea has clearly conducted efforts of health diplomacy to
contain the spread of the virus and to improve relations with strategic
partner countries.
In addition to directly supporting other countries through the export of
quarantine supplies, Korea has plans to launch a public campaign in which
the country’s democratic, open and transparent response to the pandemic

will be promoted. This campaign, named the “TRUST campaign,” aims to
solidify Korea’s status as “a leading nation that upholds international order
of solidarity and cooperation while prioritizing human life and public
safety” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, 2020b). The
first TRUST campaign stands for: Transparency, Robust screening and
quarantine, Unique but universally-applicable; and Strict control and
Treatment. Whereas the second TRUST campaign stands for: Transparency,
Responsibility, United Actions, Science and speed; and Together in solidarity.
These abbreviations aim to summarize the Korean response against
COVID-19 and the values it pursues. It mostly emphasizes Korea’s testing
capabilities, data monitoring and sharing, technological innovations, free
treatments and citizens’ compliance to self-quarantine. While the second
campaign stresses more Korea’s interest in working together and sharing
their experiences, information and testing supplies with the global community
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, 2020b). The goal of
these public campaigns is to share information and key values of the Korean
response with the foreign public and improve the country’s international
reputation.
Moreover, Korean president Moon has voiced his ambition of pursuing
climate conscious policies in fighting the virus. The administration wishes
to enact the ‘Green New Deal’ in which the country commits to reducing
emissions. This policy is part of a bigger policy plan designed to prepare the
Korean economy for growth after the COVID-19 economic decline
(Stangarone, 2020). This recent reinforcement of pursuing green initiatives
aims to help revitalize the economy during the crisis, it could also help to
improve the country’s international reputation. In 2017, Korea was the
world’s seventh largest carbon dioxide emitter and recent studies concluded
that Korea’s commitments to reduce emissions under the Paris Agreement
were insufficient (Stangarone, 2020). This Green New Deal could positively
transform the foreign public’s perception of Korea as a country that actively
pursues green policies.
DESCRIPTION OF OUTCOME: KOREAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
This paper focuses on Korea’s public diplomacy efforts from the 2000s until
today. Korea’s public diplomacy strategy during this period was focused
predominantly on improving the country’s international reputation through
the so-called ‘Korean Wave’ (Hallyu) and secondly on developing a new era
of public diplomacy activities by officially introducing the term ‘public
diplomacy’ in government for the first time in 2010 when the first Korean
Ambassador for Public Diplomacy was instituted (Choi, 2019). In addition,
the term ‘cultural diplomacy’ was officially first introduced when the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Korea instituted the Bureau of Cultural
Diplomacy, which today is called the Public Diplomacy and Cultural Affairs
Bureau. Finally, Korea’s first Public Diplomacy Act was established in
2016, creating a legal framework to ensure the stable and successful
implementation of public diplomacy activities (Choi, 2019). The Public
Diplomacy Act lays down general outlines and broad directions for the
strategic implementation of public diplomacy activities. The law gives the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs legal authority to strengthen cooperation with
other ministries, local governments and the private sector. It further
specifies that the state is the main actor to lead public diplomacy activities,
the local governments and private sector are cooperative actors. According
to this law, the goal of public diplomacy is to increase foreign public’s
understanding and confidence in Korea by using tools as culture, knowledge
and policy (Choi, 2019).
As more power centers are rising, like China in East-Asia, various
governments and citizens in the global community would like to see an
effective counterbalance to China. Korea constitutes a strong contender as
the country pursues attractive values and is strongly committed to democracy.
It has a thriving economy and longstanding ties to Western countries, such
as the United States. In addition, Korea is improving every year in terms of
soft power performance because of the country’s widely acknowledged and
popular culture, as well as technological assets (Seib, 2013).
China is also committed to using public diplomacy and soft power to
appeal to the foreign public. China is trying to promote a reputation of the
country as an attractive partner and a source of inspiration in terms of
economic development, which in combination with development aid is very

appealing to developing countries in the region. They have set out clear and
realistic public diplomacy goals and selected target groups for each of these
goals, making use of a wide variety of instruments to convey their message
(d’Hooghe, 2007). In spite of these successes, China’s public diplomacy
efforts are often undermined by suspicion of the country’s motives and
goodwill. The foreign public worries about China’s increasing economic,
political and military power, particularly in combination with the country’s
violations of human rights. China undermines its image as a responsible
member of the international community by denying the Chinese public
certain basic freedoms (d’Hooghe, 2007). Korea could use this to their
advantage by employing a public diplomacy strategy that emphasizes the
values and attributes that contrast with those of China. By using freedom as
a public diplomacy tool, Korea has a great advantage over China’s restrictive
government (Seib, 2013). For instance, through the use of social media and
underscoring the country’s political and cultural freedom, as illustrated by
the Korean Wave.
Thus far, Korea has thought of public diplomacy mostly in terms of
‘cultural diplomacy,’ i.e. the exchange of various aspects of culture among
nations and the foreign public in order to advance mutual understanding
(Waller, 2009). Korea’s cultural diplomacy since the 2000s was driven by
the so-called Korean Wave. The Korean Wave (or: Hallyu) refers to the
global increase of interest in popular Korean culture, first driven by the
spread of Korean dramas and pop music through the internet and social
media (Farrar, 2010). While these products of the Korean Wave serve as a
strong soft power resource and have proven to increase the foreign public’s
interest in Korea, they are also products of private businesses and there are
worries associated with the reliance on the private sector for public diplomacy
resources. For instance, the private sector is unstable and responsive to
changes in the market and economic environment (Cho, 2012). In addition,
these businesses can be sensitive to scandals, such as the ‘Burning Sun
scandal’ that happened in the entertainment industry in 2019, where several
Korean Wave celebrities were involved in allegations of sex crimes (Kil,
2019). When Korea depends too much on cultural diplomacy and the
Korean Wave for their public diplomacy strategy, their international
reputation will change based on whether these developments in the private

sector are good or bad (Cho, 2012).
Korea could improve their public diplomacy strategy by using the
increased awareness and interest in their country and culture by taking
follow-up measures through diplomatic missions and actively promoting its
values, culture and policies through appropriate channels (Cho, 2012).
Korea should establish a well-organized objective for its public diplomacy
and set up effective strategies in order to grow and be recognized as a
leading nation in the international community.
FINDINGS: HEALTH DIPLOMACY AS A SOFT POWER TOOL
Associated with the interest in public diplomacy is a recent increase in

scholarly activity regarding health diplomacy (Wise, 2009). Increasingly the
role of relationships and collaboration between multiple stakeholders, such
as governments, diplomats, the private sector, non-governmental organiza-
tions, the media and the public, becomes important when addressing global
health issues. In addition, global health challenges are paired with issues in
other areas such as the economic, environmental and security policy fields.
Addressing global health issues through international cooperation has
become an important part of foreign policy (Wise, 2009).
As previously discussed, health diplomacy can act as a tool in improving
Korea’s international reputation and eventually lead to the achievement of
several other foreign policy objectives. The COVID-19 pandemic requires
an increase in global collaboration and diplomacy, it is in this context that
Korea is pursuing a public diplomacy campaign to improve the country’s
global image (Attias, 2020). Activities of health diplomacy may serve as a
soft power tool and can help to elevate this public diplomacy campaign,
through the sharing of information, action plans and medical supplies that
have proven to be essential to other nations in battling the virus. Korea’s
leadership in the global health crisis caused by COVID-19, can provide a
positive framework to push towards what is in their interest as well as that
of the global community (Wise, 2009). Accordingly, this paper hypothesized
that Korea’s health diplomacy efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic will
positively impact its public diplomacy, by strengthening relations with other

countries and improving their reputation with the foreign public. In what
follows, this paper will further lay out the specific actions of health diplomacy
that served as soft power tools in Korea’s public diplomacy campaign, and
what this means for the achievement of Korea’s foreign policy objectives.
Korea was once the country that suffered the second largest outbreak
after China. Now they have successfully shown that their swift government
intervention was effective in flattening the curve, forming an example for
other nations (Lee, 2020). The virus rapidly spread to countries outside of
Asia, and Western countries turned to Asian countries like Korea to find
solutions quickly and learn from their experience. The COVID-19 outbreak
and Korea’s effective response led to an improvement in the country’s
international reputation (Attias, 2020). Korea’s mass testing capacity has
impressed the global community and led to a vast increase of international
demand for Korean testing kits and medical equipment, and will most likely
come paired with an increase in foreign investment (Attias, 2020).
Besides Korea, China has also attempted to join the soft power race
during this pandemic, exporting medical supplies and face masks to other
nations. Korea however, has not fallen behind China in this race. Korean
test kits and quarantine supplies have become a major export item, with
demand by over 120 foreign countries. The Korean government utilized
their diplomatic connections, among others with the US and ASEAN
countries, such as Indonesia and Vietnam, to export quarantine supplies and
to bring Korean residents overseas back home (Lee, 2020). Korea has a
further advantage over China in this soft power race, as their COVID-19
response strategy; based on values as democracy, transparency and openness,
is highly praised in international media (Lee, 2020). After all, Korea was
able to avoid a total lockdown imposed on its citizens, because the country
continuously disseminated information about the spread of the virus and the
actions the government had taken in response, which resulted in Korean
citizens voluntarily complying with government recommendations of social
distancing (Attias, 2020). Korea is currently promoting their response
strategy with public campaigns such as the previously discussed ‘TRUST
campaign,’ that emphasizes exactly these values that are very attractive to
the global community and that contrast with China’s restrictive government.
FINDINGS: CONSEQUENCES FOR KOREAN FOREIGN POLICY
After having discussed what activities of health diplomacy in particular

serve as soft power instruments for Korea’s public diplomacy strategy, this
paper further goes into what the consequences of these efforts may be for
Korea’s foreign policy objectives.
It was previously discussed how Korea has chosen the US, the UAE and
Indonesia as the three priority countries to grant medical supplies and
testing kits. The choice of these partners has positively impacted Korea’s
diplomatic relations with these countries, as well as helped them achieve
their foreign policy objectives. For instance, in return for Korea’s aid, the
US has not hindered the entry of Korean citizens into the US, and struck a
currency swap deal which brought stability to the Korean market that was
marked with uncertainties amidst the pandemic (Korea Herald, 2020).
Secondly, the UAE has agreed that in return for Korean aid, they will closely
cooperate with Korea further in various important policy sectors, such as the
trade and energy sectors. Finally, Indonesia was an important choice because
Korea is trying to strengthen their relationship with ASEAN countries. This
may enable Korea to diversify its foreign policy strategy by expanding trade
and investment with these countries. Doing this allows Korea to rely less on
fellow superpower China and diminish risks of Chinese economic coercion
and US-China trade friction. Additionally, Korea and ASEAN countries
could also collaborate to boost regional security cooperation and protect
their interests, further helping Korea to become an effective counterbalance
to China’s power in the region (Yeo, 2020).
Furthermore, Korea’s commitment to mutually beneficial international
collaboration and serving as an honest intermediary in the region may aid to
mobilize cooperation in various policy areas between China and the US
amid their declining relationship. Korea may serve this role of middle agent
that could be very critical as more and more issues, regarding for instance
health and climate, require a global approach and international cooperation
for solving; and a superpower fall-out between the US and China could
have great negative consequences when it comes to addressing these issues
(Ferrier, 2020).
Korea may gain considerable international advantages by using health
diplomacy to achieve their foreign policy objectives. Supporting global

health efforts worldwide may enhance Korean national security, increase
prosperity and promote democracy in developing nations (Kassalow, 2001).
The COVID-19 pandemic provides an opportunity for international
leadership that is grounded in Korea’s strength in handling the crisis. It may
help Korea grow and be recognized as a leading nation that supports global
solidarity and cooperation, while promoting values of democracy and public
health.
In the theoretical framework of this paper it was briefly mentioned how
the soft power of a nation comes from three resources; the attractiveness
and moral legitimacy of its culture, political values and foreign policy (Nye,
2004). Before, Korea’s public diplomacy strategy relied mainly on cultural
diplomacy and the Korean Wave. Increased interest in Korean culture is a
great soft power resource, but relying solely on efforts of cultural diplomacy
and the private products of the Korean Wave can limit public diplomacy
achievements. Therefore, this paper argues, that the above discussed efforts
of health diplomacy during the COVID-19 pandemic serve as powerful
additional soft power resources that will enhance the country’s public
diplomacy strategy and will help establish supportive relationships with
other nations as well as improve Korea’s image to the foreign public.
Moreover, according to Nye’s (2004) dimensions of public diplomacy;
the daily communication of Korea’s health policy decisions through
international media and strategic communication through the public
campaigns issued by the Korean government will further aid the country to
achieve their diplomatic objectives. In short, this paper concludes that the
hypothesized positive impact of health diplomacy efforts during the
COVID-19 pandemic on Korea’s public diplomacy may be confirmed.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this research paper it has been discussed how Korea’s health diplomacy
efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic impact the country’s public
diplomacy campaign. The COVID-19 pandemic came paired with broad
social and economic implications that have brought more actors, such as
diplomats, in the health arena. The pandemic requires to be approached with

increased global cooperation and diplomacy. In this context, efforts of
health diplomacy can be a useful instrument to maintain global health and
build relations with other nations.
Successful activities of health diplomacy can play a significant role in
improving Korea’s global image. Health diplomacy then serves as a soft
power tool that positively influences Korea’s public diplomacy, through the
establishment of supportive relationships with a range of (non-)governmental
stakeholders that influences the country’s capability to achieve their foreign
policy objectives. Especially in the 21st century era of globalization, public
attitudes and opinions of the global community directly impact a nation’s
capacity to achieve their diplomatic goals. Theory explains how the soft
power of a nation comes from three resources; the attractiveness and moral
legitimacy of its culture, political values and foreign policy (Nye, 2004). In
this paper’s findings it was concluded that Korea has done two things in
particular during this pandemic, that serve as important soft power tools.
Firstly, Korea has demonstrated how their mass testing abilities were
vital in being able to maintain a relatively low case fatality rate. As a result,
there has been a growing international demand by over 120 foreign countries
for Korean medical supplies and testing kits. The Korean government has
attempted to meet this demand in a way that advances the country’s
diplomatic and economic interests, by prioritizing close cooperation with
and support to strategic partner nations, such as the US, the UAE and
ASEAN countries. Establishing strong relations with ASEAN countries,
such as Indonesia and Vietnam, may enable Korea to diversify its foreign
policy strategy by expanding trade and investment, as well as boost regional
security cooperation. This is very important for Korea to become an effective
counterbalance to China’s power in the region. With this attractive foreign
policy, Korea is demonstrating their dedication to mutually beneficial
international cooperation, serving as a strong soft power resource and
boosting their public diplomacy campaign.
Secondly, the Korean government aims to advance their political values
by launching a public campaign, called the ‘TRUST campaign’ in which
their democratic, open and transparent response to the pandemic will be
promoted to the foreign public. By promoting values of openness,
transparency and democracy; that contrast with those of China’s restrictive

government, Korea further holds an advantage over China in this soft power
race. Moreover, Korea’s reputation as an honest intermediary in the region
may help them serve the critical role of middle agent in supporting
cooperation between superpowers China and the US. This may help Korea
be recognized as a leading nation that supports global solidarity and
cooperation.
Previously, Korean public diplomacy efforts were mainly focused on
increased international interest in Korean culture as driven by products of
the Korean Wave. This may serve as a powerful soft power resource, but
focusing too much on the private products of the Korean Wave can limit the
effects of public diplomacy. The above discussed efforts of health diplomacy
therefore may significantly enhance the country’s public diplomacy strategy,
by establishing supportive relationships with other nations and improving
Korea’s image to the foreign public.
RECOMMENDATIONS
This paper thus advocates a Korean public diplomacy strategy that relies
more on the country’s health diplomacy efforts, particularly those efforts
amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. However, for Korea’s public diplomacy
strategy to be strengthened even more there are a few other shortcomings
and focus areas that need to be addressed.
First of all, studies point out how problems have emerged as a result of
the absence of overall coordination and consultation among the various
actors participating in Korea’s public diplomacy (Choi, 2019). As mentioned
previously, modern public diplomacy involves the actions of many different
actors; including governmental, non-governmental and private actors. When
there is a lack of overall coordination at the government-wide level between
these actors, it may cause inefficiencies and inconsistencies that damage the
effectiveness of the public diplomacy strategy (Choi, 2019). This paper
therefore recommends that Korea organizes a network among the major
organizations involved in its public diplomacy. The participation of non-
governmental and private actors besides governmental actors becomes ever
more important and working together in this network may enable them to
cope more effectively with the rapidly changing international environment
(Cho, 2012). Additionally, 21st century foreign public has become more
suspicious about propaganda, skeptical of authority and often mistrust
governments. As credibility is an important soft power source, it may be
helpful for governments to work closely with non-governmental and private
actors as channels of communication for public diplomacy (Nye, 2004).
Secondly, because of the short history of public diplomacy in Korea,
only a small number of citizens understand its nature and objectives. Most
public diplomacy efforts are initiated without due recognition of them as
public diplomacy (Choi, 2019). It is for the effectiveness of the public
diplomacy campaign very important that the domestic public is aware of the
necessity of public diplomacy and its possible outcomes. Public diplomacy
should be a feature of domestic public affairs, citizens need to be aware of
the essentiality of public diplomacy and a national consensus over public
diplomacy should be established. National images and values that are not
acknowledged by the domestic public are unlikely to be effectively
recognized by the foreign public (Cho, 2012).
Thirdly, as international affairs increasingly include the regional level, it
is necessary for Korea to construct public diplomacy strategies that are
region-specific. Strategies may be adapted considering the different cultural
backgrounds of these regions and the images of Korea that the people of
these regions hold (Cho, 2012). As we have briefly discussed before, it is
very beneficial for Korea to prioritize public diplomacy efforts targeting
developing nations in the region, such as some ASEAN countries. Korea
should share its experience of having risen from poverty to becoming a
prosperous and advanced democratic nation. Korea may take on the role of
exemplar by sharing their knowledge on economic growth and development
and establish a positive image of itself on the developing countries as a
leading nation in the international community (Cho, 2012).
Finally, in our 21st century information age, the costs of disseminating
and processing information has drastically been reduced. Consequently, the
public is faced with an explosion of information, causing them to be
overwhelmed with the information they have available and having difficulty
of what to focus on (Nye, 2004). Korea should therefore fully utilize
interactive communication as a major means of its public diplomacy,

employing its strong digital assets to make itself more accessible to the
international community and better communicate its positive global image.
By doing this, Korea can fill the current existing gap between the country’s
soft power assets and the perceptions the foreign public has of Korea.
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91
Analysis of Rok Public Diplomacy on Social

Media
Abdou Chakour Arouna and Maissou Yacoubou
Abstract | The revolution in Information and Communication

Technologies (ICTs) has had significant impacts on public diplomacy. The
way people communicate, and exchange diplomatic information has
dramatically changed. This paper aims to analyze the Republic of Korea’s
public diplomacy on social media. It investigates the way Korean MOFA and
embassies use social media (Facebook and Twitter) for public diplomacy, the
effectiveness of embassies by country and public engagement, and the
perception of the Korean social media public diplomacy by foreign publics.
Using quantitative and qualitative approaches, findings show that user
engagement in general is very low. For instance, despite having the highest
number of followers, MOFA has one of the lowest rates of user engagement
per follower (below 0.5%). The ROK embassy in Kenya has the highest user
engagement per follower (2%). This may be due to the nature of the content
posted by these social media platforms. Moreover, these social media
accounts do not reflect the ambitions or the technological and digital
strength of the Republic of Korea’s position on the international scene. The
scope of activities on the accounts is very limited and Korea focused. The
posts and tweets rarely discuss geopolitical matters and controversial topics.
Finally, survey responses show that the followers of these platforms are not
totally satisfied with the content being published or the language in use.
Keywords | Digital Diplomacy, Social Media, 4th Industrial Revolution,
Republic of Korean (ROK) Public Diplomacy,
국문초록 | 정보통신기술 혁명은 공공 외교에 굉장한 영향을 미쳤다. 사람들

이 외교 정보를 소통하고 교환하는 방법이 극적으로 바뀐 것이다. 이 논문은 공
공 외교에서 대한민국의 소셜 미디어 활용을 분석하고자 한다. 양적이고 질적인
접근법을 이용하여 우리는 대한민국 외교에 대한 대중의 의견(설문을 통해) 뿐만
아니라 대한민국 외교부와 몇몇 대사관의 소셜 미디어 계정(페이스북과 트위터)
을 조사했다. 양적 연구를 통한 결과는 소셜 미디어 사용에 있어 외교부와 대사
관, 그리고 대사관과 대사관 사이에 통합된 전략이 없음을 보여준다. 외교부와

같이 각 대사관은 소셜 미디어를 각자의 방식으로 사용한다. 이 계정들의 활동
범위는 매우 제한되어 있으며 한국 중심적이다. 게시물들과 트윗은 지정학적 문
제나 논란이 많은 주제들을 거의 언급하지 않는다. 따라서 사용자 참여율이 전반
적으로 매우 낮다. 질적 접근 면에서 설문지 응답은 이 플랫폼들의 팔로워들이
게시되고 있는 내용물이나 사용되는 언어에 완전히 만족하지 않는다는 것을 보
여준다. 결론적으로, 4차 산업 혁명 속 해외 대중과 강한 관계를 성공적으로 쌓기
위해서는 목표 대중에게 무엇이 중요한지 관심을 갖고, 목표를 성취하기 위한 적
절한 전략이 무엇인지 정의할 필요가 있다.
INTRODUCTION
In this era of the fourth industrial revolution, the revolution in Information

and Communication Technologies (ICTs) is having significant impacts on
public diplomacy. The way people communicate, and exchange diplomatic
information has dramatically changed. Referred to as “digital public
diplomacy” or “public diplomacy 2.0” by the Obama administration,
today’s diplomacy leverages on the Internet and social media to achieve its
goals. Lee B. J. (2017) states that social media and public diplomacy go
hand in hand, with both relying on interactive two-way communication with
the public. With more than 3 billion people using social media platforms
such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and LinkedIn daily, digitalization has
truly made the world a global village (Olubukola S. Adesina, 2017).
The Republic of Korea (ROK), one of the technologically advanced
countries investing in building powerful networks to promote its geopolitics,
can maximize its diplomatic presence on digital platforms. Since the middle
of twentieth century, the Republic of South Korea has reconstructed its land
and its connectivity with the support of technology, which has transformed
it into one of the most high-tech countries in Asia and the world today (Jan
M. et al, 2017). The internal information and communication of the country
has reached a very desirable level. Access to needed information at the time
when it is needed is not a problem anymore for the government or the
public. This can be illustrated by the example of the spread of the COVID-
19 pandemic. South Korea is easily coping with the issue due to the free
Analysis of Rok Public Diplomacy on Social Media 93
circulation of information around the country and the ability to track both
confirmed and suspected cases. However, in the international arena, the
country does not seem to be doing so well. Byung Jong Lee (2017) suggests
that a well-defined strategy will help South Korea improve its way of
promoting its culture and building its connectivity with international partners.
In this paper, we aim to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of
Korean Digital Public Diplomacy, identify the challenges it faces, and
propose a few measures the country should consider taking to achieve its
diplomatic objectives in the era of digital revolution. To do so, we first
explore the Facebook and Twitter accounts of the Minister of the Foreign
Affairs (MOFA) and the Republic of Korea’s embassies (ROKE) in a few
countries. Moreover, we design a survey to collect data from the public
about their interactions with the Korean diplomacy.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Public diplomacy is usually described as ‘soft’ power. According to Nye

(2004), “soft power means getting others to want the same outcome as you
want.” Soft power is “a kind of mental power” that enables nations to rally
national and international will (Nicolae HANEŞ & Adriana ANDREI,
2015). Nye also divided soft power into 3 dimensions:
i. Daily communications
ii. Strategic communication
iii. Development of lasting relationships with key individuals.
Daily communications entail briefing the press corps and the public about
domestic and foreign policy, while strategic communication focuses on
promoting the vision or policies of the government. Building solid
partnerships with key individuals is achieved through “scholarships,
exchanges, trainings, seminars, conferences, and access to media channels”
(Nye,2004).
Soft power or Public diplomacy is defined in the Korean Public
diplomacy act as “diplomacy activities through which the state enhances
foreign nationals understanding of and confidence in the Republic of Korea

directly or in cooperation with local government or private sector through
culture, knowledge, policies” (Act No 13951, Feb 3. 2016). By this definition,
the state, local government, and Korean firms can be identified as the
entities responsible for representing the position of the Korean Republic on
the international scene. “The tools of public diplomacy listed as, culture,
knowledge, and policy are to be used to enhance foreign audience
understanding of and trust in South Korea” (Kwang-Jin Choi, 2019).
According to MOFA, the goal of the Republic of Korea’s public diplomacy
is to (i) share Korean culture, (ii) deepen understanding of Korea, (iii) gain
global support for Korea’s policies, (iv) strengthen public diplomacy
capacity, and (v) promote public-private partnership. To attain these goals,
the Korean government has put in place a series of strategies, among which
figures the development of online platforms for communication and
information sharing.
Following those strategies, the Korean public diplomacy is shifting from
the traditional ways of conducting diplomacy (exclusive exchange between
governments or diplomats) toward digital diplomacy. Digital diplomacy
“involves the use of digital technologies and social media platforms such as
Twitter, Facebook, and weibo by states to enter into communication with
foreign public usually in a non-costly manner” (Olubukola S. Adesina,
2017).
Although the concept of public digital diplomacy is broadly known and
practiced by the Korean government, there is little existing literature about
it. Journal articles such as “South Korea’s Digital Deficit “and “Korea’s
Digital Diplomacy: The Most Technologically Advanced Avoider?” by
Jeffrey Robertson, point out the absence of a master plan or clear strategic
narrative from the Korean government to enhance its public digital
diplomacy. These sources highlight that despite Korea being among the
topmost connected countries in the world in terms of internet connectivity
and speed and smartphone ownership, it falls behind other technologically
advanced countries in terms of leveraging technology to advance public
diplomacy. However, “Korea’s Soft Power and Public Diplomacy Under
Moon Jae-In Administration: A Window of Opportunity” by Kadir Ayhan,
showcases Korean public digital diplomacy as in transition from being a
mere cultural promoter to a global leader of development cooperation.

In this new era of big data, high speed internet and IoT, the use of digital
platforms for publicity or public relations is becoming a popular topic of
academic research. Saxton and Watson (2014) studied the Facebook
accounts of the 100 largest noneducational nonprofit organizations in the
US over a period of two months. The study focused on the number of likes,
comments, and shares of the posts to measure the public’s interest in and
reaction to organizational messages. The number of likes were used to
quantify the sentiment of the public toward the posts, comments to measure
followers’ responsiveness and shares to reflect the number of people willing
to advocate for the organization.
Following the same rules as Saxton and Watson (2014), B. J. Lee (2017)
analyzed 715 Facebook posts of major embassies in Korea. Their research
highlights the overall communication strategies of the embassies, public
diplomacy domain and user interactions by counting the number of shares,
likes, and comments. The posts were classified into two public diplomacy
dimensions (information and engagement), which were then subdivided into
6 different public diplomacy domains: advocacy, information & news,
listening, exchange, contribution, and cultural program. The research
concluded that one-way information-based public diplomacy was more
practiced, while two-way engagement received more reactions from the
public.
But it was not just Facebook accounts that were studied. Embassies’
accounts on Twitter were also subject to academic research (Meghan Sobel,
Daniel Riffe, & Joe Bob Hester). Their study focused on US embassies in 8
countries across different region. It found that there was “a lack of
consistency among US embassies with regard to formally furthering US
department mission” (ibid.) by leveraging twitter.
These studies will serve as reference points as we seek to answer the
following questions:
RQ1: How do The Korean MOFA and embassies use social media
(Facebook& Twitter) for public diplomacy?
RQ2: Which embassies receive more interest from the public?
RQ3: What is the foreign public perception of the Korean social
media public diplomacy?
METHODOLOGY
We adopted several approaches to analyze how the Korean Government

uses social media for Public diplomacy. Two primary data sources were
used, one quantitative and the other qualitative.
QUANTITATIVE METHOD
We analyzed 10 Facebook & twitter accounts comprised of Korean MOFA

and Korean embassies around the world. We counted not only the number
of posts made by each embassy and MOFA but also their number of
followers and users’ interactions (Likes, Comments, Shares) from June 1st,
2019 to May 31st, 2020. Korean MOFA has two different accounts on social
media, one in English and the other in Korean.
For our research, we analyzed only the English account on both
Facebook and Twitter. The selection of the embassies was based on several
criteria, such as the economic power of the country based on the 2019 GDP
ranking by the world bank, the popularity of ROK in the country, location,
and whether the embassy has both Twitter and Facebook accounts. These
factors were used to make the comparisons as fair as possible between
embassies on the same continent and others. To measure the popularity of
ROK in a country, we used the ratio of followers to population. The Korean
embassy in China, for instance, was excluded because it does not have
Facebook and Twitter accounts, and the Korean embassy in India was
excluded because the ratio of followers to population was very low. We
ended up with 9 Korean embassies (United States of America, Canada,
Singapore, Indonesia, United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Kenya, and
Ethiopia).
Table 1. Summary Of Selected Embassies

Embassies Location
ROK Embassy to the USA America
ROK Embassy in Canada America
ROK Embassy in Singapore Asia
ROK Embassy in Indonesia Asia
ROK Embassy to the UK Europe
ROK Embassy in Germany Europe
ROK Embassy in Spain Europe
ROK Embassy in Kenya Africa
ROK Embassy in Germany Africa
PARAMETERS
Our quantitative analysis focused on parameters such as the number of

posts, likes, comments, shares, and followers. The number of posts will help
us understand the frequency with which MOFA and embassies communicate
with the public, and the number of followers will help translate the
popularity of the embassy in each country and the popularity of MOFA on
social media. Also, through statistical analysis (likes per follower, likes per
post, etc.), we analyze if user interactions depended on the popularity of the
account, the number of posts, or the contents. Through those analyses, we
gauged the strategies used on social media by the South Korean government.
QUALITATIVE METHOD
Our second primary source of data was gathered via survey. It was created
on Google surveys and made available online, where it was spread for
approximately a month through Facebook groups that deal with Korea
related issues. It targeted anyone interested in Korea whether the person
lived in Korea or not. Overall, 174 participants were registered. The purpose
Table 2. Summary Of Collected Data

Facebook Twitter
Number Number
Accounts Followers Likes Comments Shares Followers Likes Comments Shares
of Posts of Posts
MOFA 58232 77 10645 377 1218 21612 81 58967 1837 39215
ROKE
3327 167 930 20 100 2477 343 1180 30 414
USA
ROKE
2751 382 1812 75 366 1154 336 326 2 241
Canada
ROKE
5013 145 1935 64 222 27 108 69 2 41
Singapore
ROKE
4261 356 14914 454 2368 3685 200 2590 168 1987
Indonesia
ROKE
6074 284 5204 307 825 2710 138 411 40 240
UK
ROKE
4699 117 6169 228 469 233 94 91 2 95
Germany
ROKE
3613 158 6749 251 1200 1258 70 564 10 184
Spain
ROKE
4699 81 5998 178 144 804 33 151 31 60
Kenya
ROKE
1226 142 1762 163 120 221 53 27 13 3
Ethiopia
Total 92895 1909 56118 2117 7032 34181 1456 64376 2135 42480
Source: Authors
of the survey was to understand the sentiment of the public toward ROK
digital public diplomacy accounts. Also, it will help us to determine whether
the conclusions drawn via statistical analysis make sense.
FINDINGS
User Engagement on Facebook
Source: Authors
Among the analyzed accounts, MOFA has the highest number of followers
on Facebook with almost 60,000 followers, representing 63% of the total.
This is followed by ROKE in the UK (6%). ROKE in Ethiopia has the
lowest number of followers (1%). MOFA has the highest number of
followers not only because it has accounts and contents in English, but also
while embassies’ unique missions permit them to only target the countries in
which they are located, MOFA has the ability to systematically attract any
foreign public. Also, the increasing interest in Korea’s foreign activity may
have played a role in the popularity of MOFA’s account.
Many MOFA posts are about the diplomatic activities of the minister of
foreign affairs, such as meeting with foreign diplomats, while on the
embassy level, most posts focus on new decisions made by the government
concerning people traveling to Korea, cultural activities and exchanges, and
more recently, COVID-19 related news.
User engagement in general is very low. Despite having the highest
number of followers, MOFA has one of the lowest rates of user engagement
per follower (below 0.5%). This may be due to the nature of the content
posted by MOFA. Contents such as donations, exchanges, and health
campaigns received more reactions from the public compared to diplomatic
news. Also, the presence of spam comments on many of MOFA’s posts may
be another factor contributing to low engagement by followers in the
comment section. Interactions between MOFA’s page administrator and
followers are non-existent. The posts are in general one-way engagement
posts. Other factors, such as followers’ willingness to like or comment and
share diplomatic activities of a country other than their own on Facebook
may also explain why the MOFA Facebook page has less engagement from
its followers.
ROKE in Kenya has the highest user engagement per follower (2%),
followed by Spain, Germany, Indonesia, and Ethiopia. Many embassy
followers prefer to like posts rather than comment. Although rare, some
followers are willing to share specific posts, usually posts concerning
Korean cultural exhibitions or performances. Followers in Spain and
Ethiopia appear to be more willing to advocate for embassy activities.
User Engagement on Twitter
Source: Authors
MOFA has the highest number of followers on Twitter among the 10

accounts we analyzed. It is followed by ROKE of Indonesia, the UK, and
the USA. The Korean embassies in Singapore, Ethiopia and Kenya have the
lowest number of followers. With Kenya and Ethiopia being in Africa, and
many other Korean embassies on the continent such as the ROKE in south
Africa and Ghana not having a twitter account, we can speculate that the
reason why those embassies in Africa have lower number of followers on
Twitter compared to Facebook is due to the fact that the latter is more
popular in Africa.
The characteristics of the tweets were like the posts on Facebook, but
unlike on Facebook, MOFA has the highest rate of user engagement per
follower on twitter, followed by ROKE in Singapore. There is a clear
difference in attitude between MOFA followers on Facebook and Twitter.
Followers of the MOFA account on Twitter appear to be more willing to like
the tweets and advocate for it by retweeting. Likes per follower is around
3.5%, while shares per follower is around 2.5%. However, the percentage of
comments per follower is still insignificant.
The rate of user engagement per follower on the ROKE Singapore
account is high because despite having the lowest number of followers (27),
there appears to be a clear willingness from those followers to like and
share the content that is being posted on the platform. Compared to the
ROKE in Singapore account, the followers of the ROKE accounts in Africa
are less active on Twitter, even though they have similar number of followers.
Followers of ROKE accounts in Europe and Americas are moderately
active on twitter. ROKE in UK and Canada are the exception, and just like
on Facebook, the followers on Twitter are not very engaged either.
OVERALL ACTIVITIES ON SOCIAL MEDIA BY EMBASSY
Korean embassies use social media differently. There does not seem to be a
general strategy behind embassies’ posts on social media, and the frequency
of posts varies from embassy to embassy. Although many of the contents
are written in both Korean and local languages, some of them are only in
Korean. We should note that no interaction between the followers and the
embassies has been recorded after analyzing the posts on Facebook, but
there have been answers to inquiries from followers on Twitter.
Embassies’ Activities on Facebook
Source: Authors
The Korean embassy in Canada has the highest number of posts (382 posts),
but it has the least average user interaction per post. This might be due to
the fact that most of the posts are informative and do not incite the viewer to
engage with them. Unlike in Canada, the embassy in the USA posted less
content, but just like the one in Canada, it generated few reactions from
users. The embassy has a lot of posts in only Korean although it is located
in the US. This might be one causes of the lack of reactions from users.
The ROK embassy in Kenya, has the highest average interaction per
post (74 Likes, 2.2 comments, and 1.8 shares) despite having the lowest
number of posts (81). Although many posts are one-way engagement posts,
the followers seem to have an interest in specific content. Posts by the
embassy that are on culture and exchange seem to create more reactions
from users. For example, posts about the Korean government scholarship
received a noticeable amount of attention from the public. Positive actions
toward the improvement of the diplomatic relationship between the republic
of Korea and Kenya incited lots of reactions from the host public on
Facebook.
The Embassy in Ethiopia generated less reaction (12.4 Likes, 1.1
comments, 0.8 shares per post) than the one in Kenya, although it has more
posts (142). Just like in Kenya, posts about exchanges (donation and
Scholarships) created more user reaction than news or embassy notices.
The accounts of the South Korean embassy in Indonesia (356 posts) and
Singapore (145 posts) generated user reactions proportional to the number
of posts. On average, the embassy in Indonesia received 41.9 Likes, 1.3
comments, and 6.7 shares per post, while the embassy in Singapore
generated an average of 13.3 likes, 0.4 comment, and 1.5 shares per post. In
Indonesia, contents that were in either English or Indonesian, whether news
or not, received attention from the public. However, the lack of two-way
engagement content may have affected the number of comments per posts.
Unlike in Indonesia, the Singaporean account did not generate as much
reaction from political or diplomatic news. The users reacted more to
cultural events and cultural news.
The embassy in the UK had 284 posts with an average of 18.3 Likes, 1
comment and 2.9 shares per post. Compared to the embassy in the UK, the
embassy in Germany (117 posts) and Spain (158 posts) has put out less
content but generated a higher user reaction per post. The Republic of Korea
embassy in Germany received on average 52.7 likes, 1.9 comments, and 4
shares per post, while the Korean embassy in Spain received 42.7 Likes, 1.6
comments, and 7.6 shares per post. Based on these results, we can conclude
that there is a weak presence of the Korean diplomacy in the UK as opposed
to its presence in Spain and Germany on Facebook.
Embassies’ Activities On Twitter
Source: Authors
Apart from the Korean embassies in Africa, the remaining embassies were
very active on Twitter. The embassies in the USA and Canada have the
highest number of tweets, but just like on Facebook, user reaction was very
low. On average, the embassy in Canada generated 1 Like and 0.7 retweets
per tweet. The one in the USA received 3.4 likes, 0.1 comment, and 1.2
retweets per tweet.
The embassies in the UK, Germany and Spain were moderately active.
Compared to the Korean embassy in Germany, the other two received more
reactions from the public, but in general the reactions were low. There is
still a lack of interest in Korea’s digital diplomacy in Europe. The European
public seems to be more interested in the cultural aspects of Korea.
Therefore, Geopolitical activities of Korea do not seem to receive much

attention.
The activities of the embassy in Indonesia generated the highest user
reaction. Just like on Facebook, the embassy tweeted frequently and
received on average 13 Likes, 9.9 retweets, and 0.8 comments per post.
Compared to other countries in general and Singapore in particular, the
public in Indonesia appears to be very interested in matters that concern the
Republic of Korea.
OVERALL SOCIAL MEDIA ACTIVITY OF MOFA
As the first representative of the Korean diplomacy, MOFA’s account on

social media is in general very active. On Facebook, MOFA had 77 posts
with an average of 138.2 likes, 4.9 comments, and 15.8 shares per post. The
user reaction level was quite high compared to embassies. On Twitter,
MOFA had 81 tweets with an average of 728 likes, 484.1 retweets, and 22.7
comments per tweet.
Interactive posts and tweets are very rare, which in turn might affect the
number of comments received on both social media accounts. The MOFA
account on social media does not reflect the ambitions or the technological
and digital strength of the Republic of Korea’s position on the international
scene. The scope of the activities on the account is very limited and Korea
focused. The posts and tweets rarely discuss geopolitical matters or
controversial topics.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper is designed to analyze “Korean Digital Public Diplomacy in the

4th (fourth) Industrial Revolution.” To do so, the study was structured into
two objectives. The first objective was to examine the usage of social media
(Facebook& Twitter) by the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affair (MOFA) and
nine embassies for public diplomacy. In the interval of one year, from June
2019 to May 2020, the total of 1456 posts on Twitter and 2167 posts on
Facebook were registered. The posts covered multiple issues such as political
and economic relations, businesses, aids and supports, culture, news and
information, and health care (especially during the COVID-19 period). The
results show that social media is still not used efficiently and effectively.
Interactions with the public are not as strong as expected in the 4th industrial
revolution from a technologically advanced country such as the Republic of
South Korea.
More specifically, the followers of those platforms appear less engaged
in conversation and seem to show less interest in what is being posted. For
example, on average, 0.237%, 0.008%, and 0.027% of the total Facebook
followers of the Korean MOFA have respectively liked, commented, or
shared each post that is posted. This raises several questions concerning
which strategies the public diplomacy needs to adopt on digital platforms
about the contents that are published, the languages to use, and so on. To
illustrate, on a platform where 70% to 80% of the followers speak only
English and French, should contents be posted only in Korean? Korean
posts should have adequate English or French translations for the efficiency
of the platform. By re-strategizing the way it uses social media, Korean
public diplomacy could take advantage of its high-tech status to promote its
country and to build better relationships with the foreign public. The perfect
achievements come with the perfect strategies—there are no miracles in the
4th industrial revolution.
Another objective of this paper was to find out the perception of the
foreign public toward the Korean digital public diplomacy, or in other
words, Korean social media public diplomacy. Here, a survey was
conducted (see the survey questions and direct responses in appendix). A
total of 174 participants were registered. Although this number is very low,
some meaningful conclusions could be drawn from the survey. The
responses show that the followers of these platforms are not totally satisfied
with the content that is being published and the language in use.
Also, the survey’s findings suggest an issue related to translation of the
contents on these platforms. The translations, most of the time, devalue the
real meaning of the published content compared to the original. Many more
suggest the irrelevance of the content on these pages, often a mismatch of
content with the objectives of the platforms, which leads to withdrawal of
some followers. This sheds light on the questions previously raised about
the strategies of the Korean digital public diplomacy in the 4th industrial
revolution. One possible way to effectively address the issue is to carefully
analyze what the foreign public really wants and needs to know about ROK.
Another one is to know how to provide it. Referring to the responses of the
survey, more than half of the participants suggested topics related to art and
culture, tourism, politics, and business.
In summary, the findings of this study show that to succeed in building a
strong relationship with the foreign public in the fourth industrial
revolution, you need to pay more attention to what is essential to your target
audience and define the proper strategies to achieve that goal. Olubukola S.
Adesina (2017) state that the objectives of the Nation to be achieved and the
structured way to achieve them are the two major ingredients of foreign
policy in the era of digital diplomacy. ROK possesses more than enough
technology to excel at such a challenge.
LIMITATIONS
Yet, this paper cannot claim to be the most accurate one for multiple
reasons. First, the social media account activity analyzed in this paper
encompasses a period of one year. What happened before that and what is
happening now were not taken into consideration. In addition, the survey
has registered only a fraction of the target audience, and the responses
cannot be taken as completely unbiased. Another shortcoming is the fact
that some countries could not be chosen due to our criteria, such as China,
France, Brazil, Russia, India, etc.
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ROK Embassy to Ethiopia: http://overseas.mofa.go.kr/et-en/index.do.
ROK Embassy to Germany: http://overseas.mofa.go.kr/de-frankfurt-de/index.do.
ROK Embassy to Indonesia: http://overseas.mofa.go.kr/id-id/index.do.
ROK Embassy to Kenya: http://overseas.mofa.go.kr/ke-en/index.do.
ROK Embassy to Singapore: http://overseas.mofa.go.kr/sg-en/index.do.
ROK Embassy to Spain: http://overseas.mofa.go.kr/es-es/index.do.
ROK Embassy to UK: http://overseas.mofa.go.kr/gb-en/index.do.
ROK Embassy to USA: http://overseas.mofa.go.kr/us-en/index.do.
ROK Ministry of Foreign Affaire: http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/index.do.
Shuo-Yan Chou, (2017), The Fourth Industrial Revolution: Digital Fusion with
Internet Of Things, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 1, p. 107-120.
Survey Questions : https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1U5BGyYNheaOFJpFo2fDshw
jDoy3FWTzL2yvSK3Rf28/edit?ts=5f2bd055.
Survey Responses : https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1U5BGyYNheaOFJpFo2fDsh
wjDoy3FWTzL2yvSK3Rf28/edit?ts=5f2bd055#responses.
Verrekia, B. (2017). Digital Diplomacy and Its Effect on International Relations.
https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3619&context=
isp_collection.
Appendix: The Survey Questionnaires

113
Addressing Global Issues through Science

Diplomacy: Towards a South Korean
Approach
Thyene Ribas Moreira
Abstract | This research seeks to portray how science diplomacy has

gained strength in recent years, and how South Korea has become one of the
major players in terms of global scientific and technological cooperation.
South Korea is an economic and technological power and has presented its
economic and social development through organized mechanisms.
Furthermore, the country also boasts one of the best hubs of technology and
innovation in the world. Based on a qualitative and exploratory research this
study demonstrates that, with all its know-how, South Korea has great
conditions to become one of the great actors to lead world science
diplomacy and cooperate to solve global issues.
Keywords | Public Diplomacy, Science Diplomacy, South Korea,
International Cooperation, Science and Technology
국문초록 | 이 연구는 과학 외교가 어떻게 최근 힘을 얻었는지, 대한민국이

어떻게 국제 과학기술 협력의 주요 국가들 중 하나가 되었는지 설명하고자 한다.
대한민국은 경제적, 기술적 강국이며 체계적인 구조를 통한 사회경제적 개발을
보여왔다. 나아가 대한민국은 전세계 기술과 혁신의 중심지 중 하나임을 자랑한
다. 이 연구는 질적이고 탐색적인 조사에 기반해 대한민국이 과학 외교를 이끌고
전 세계적인 사안들을 해결하기 위해 협력하는 주요 국가 중 하나가 될 훌륭한
조건을 보유하고 있음을 보여준다.
1. INTRODUCTION
Among the tools of South Korean public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy1

and sports diplomacy2 are undoubtedly the most explored channels in the
country. However, science is also a channel for public diplomacy that can be
used for the construction of a nation’s brand and, with a greater potential to
influence the international system. In recent years, debates on complex
global issues, such as climate change, sustainable development goals (SDGs)
or internet governance, have placed science diplomacy (SD) at the center of
the international agenda (Onuki, 2020). Science diplomacy can be understood
as the process through which States represent their interests in the
international system when it comes to the areas of knowledge, i.e. science,
and its uses, acquisition, and communication. (Turekian et al., 2015).
In this context, this article aims to address the topic of South Korean
science diplomacy as an important tool of the country’s public diplomacy3.
It is understood that public diplomacy is an umbrella concept, which
incorporates state practices of formulation and projection of image,
information, and communication, as well as building and maintaining
relations with foreign audiences. (Cho, 2012). Science diplomacy is the set
of actions that connect diplomacy and science, aiming at building joint
solutions to global problems.
Issues of global interest (climate change, sustainable development,
global health, etc.) must be worked on along with other actors in the inter-
national system. The role of public diplomacy and, consequently, science
diplomacy, is to correctly address these issues, positively influence and
coordinate actions in favor of building a safer and better developed world.
In this sense, the congruence of the actions of science diplomacy, reinforces
the objectives of Korea’s public diplomacy “to enhance our diplomatic
relations and national image by gaining the trust of the international
community and increasing our country’s global influence” (MOFA, 2020).
1 Hallyu (Korean Wave)

2 Examples of sports diplomacy : Taekwondo and PyeongChang Olympic Winter Games
(2018)
3 Korea’s public diplomacy entails promoting diplomatic relations by sharing history,
traditions, culture, arts, values, policies, and views through direct communication with
foreign nationals.
Addressing Global Issues through Science Diplomacy 115
According to Turekian (2015), science diplomacy is increasingly critical

in addressing many of the planet’s most urgent challenges - such as
management of global commons, faltering public health systems, and the
threat of collapsing ecosystems. It can also be used to enhance one nation’s
interests with respect to another and to defuse international tensions.
Thus, for Krasnyak, (2018) building South Korea’s reputation among the
core of scientifically developed countries will not only increase trade benefits,
but also help to solve the current security dilemma, shape future geopolitical
outcomes in a multilateral world, and accelerate Korea’s participation in
emerging scientific projects. Science diplomacy is an essential tool for
addressing global issues, increasing cooperation between countries, and
leveraging a country’s influence. In this sense, it is a significant soft power4
generator, a potent form of attraction that uses national image, reputation
and brand to convince, persuade and influence in the international scene
(state, private actors, international organizations, civil society, etc.).
Interest in science diplomacy is growing at a time when international
relations are changing. Fortifying the contribution of science to foreign
policy objectives and facilitating international scientific cooperation through
science are essential tools of the 21st century. Improving relations between
countries, leveraging the technological system, and directing policies
towards current global issues - which can lead to historic crises, such as the
current Coronavirus pandemic - are among the main objectives of science
diplomacy. Accordingly, as it has been very well highlighted by Oliveira
and Onuky (2020), there is no unilateral solution to a phenomenon that
demands a level of global coordination.
International cooperation in Science, Technology, and Innovation
(ST&I) has achieved increasing prominence in the scope of international
relations in recent decades. Technological innovations, the constant need for
technical improvement, is among the main goals of governments of
different states. In the contemporary scenario of economic globalization and
striking social challenges, science diplomacy enables the development of
answers through scientific cooperation linked to countries’ foreign policy
4 Term coined by Joseph Nye as the country’s ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes
one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment. A country’s soft power rests
on its resources of culture, values, and policies.
(Anunciato and Santos, 2020). Science diplomacy seeks to facilitate access

to technological products, the internationalization of knowledge, the
attraction of investments in research and development, and the mobilization
of researchers who work outside and inside their country of origin.
It is within this larger context of the relationship between the knowledge
produced in academia and the doing of international politics that this article
is offered and justified. Based on a qualitative and exploratory research,
this study seeks to contribute to the enrichment of conducting and studying
science diplomacy and for South Korean’s contribution to be increasingly
influential and assertive, being an incentive for researchers and scholars to
carry out researches on the country’s potential for global cooperation and
collaboration. The current new Coronavirus Pandemic scenario reinforces
this need and broadens the discussion on the creation of dialogues with
other areas of knowledge and science, through the creation of joint investment
projects, the facilitation of state, academic and private investments for
cooperation and incentive for academic research in this area.
This article is structured as follows. In addition to the introduction, the
first chapter will explain the development of science diplomacy in the 21st
century. Subsequently it will discuss how South Korea has a structured body
for “using” science diplomacy, and how it has already been practicing this
type of diplomacy. Thirdly, we will analyze some projects where these
partnerships tend to be the beginning of South Korea’s science diplomacy.
And lastly, the final considerations will be made.
2. Science as a tool of Diplomacy
The use of science as an ally of diplomacy and international politics is not a

recent phenomenon.5 However, the use of science as a central tool for
international relations is new (Turekian, 2018). This is a phenomenon that is
increasingly relevant to the 21st century society, which has been taking
shape through great technological advances and innovation. Scientific-
5 There is a long historical association between Science and international cooperation. In the
West, for example, the post of Foreing Secretary of Royal Society was instituted in 1723.
technological development then becomes a fundamental requirement to

understand the dynamics of conflict, negotiation, and international
cooperation (Royal Society, 2010). In this context, science offers new
spaces for engagement in addition to making itself more and more notorious/
evident in the international agenda, offering answers for the articulation of
policies and collaborative projects in ST&I that aim to face main global
issues.
Although the term science diplomacy has been gaining ground in
academic and governmental discussions, its definition is still much debated,
as it has many attributes and practices, and it is not possible to have just one
understanding or definition of it. However, it is possible to assert that it
consists of the intersection between science and technology policies and
foreign policy (Flink & Schreiterer, 2010). The term “science diplomacy”
has been increasingly used to address the international insertion of states in
the field of S&T, and has replaced the subject “international cooperation” as
the most discussed topic in articles, conferences and presentations on how
S&T and IR interact and bear fruits to national states (Domingues, 2019).
Science diplomacy is more than just international scientific collaborations;
it is the involvement of actors and political interests.
Facing global challenges through science diplomacy and scientific
excellence are essential, especially in a society marked by the current
pandemic of the new coronavirus. According to Ademar Seabra da Cruz Jr
(2010), the link between diplomacy, innovation and development becomes
evident when pointing out that national innovation systems only develop in
international environments and networks of knowledge, productive
investments, factor mobility and innovation. The scientific community may
be able to mediate new and different types of international partnerships.
Thus, science diplomacy enables the creation of responses through scientific
cooperation linked to the countries’ foreign policy, and is now at the heart of
the international agenda. Science being considered an instrument of
engagement and contribution to world policies.
In recent years, debates on complex global problems, which go beyond
territorial limits, such as climate change, sustainable development goals,
internet governance and threats to global security, justify the greater
importance of technical-scientific knowledge in international relations and
in the formulation and development of policies that facilitate and go about

these partnerships.
The circulation of knowledge through the internationalization of
partnerships and the involvement of different stakeholders may also produce
multiplying results that go beyond the effect of the sum of the participations
(Costa, 2020). Charles Weiss (2015), the first S&T adviser to the World
Bank, also stresses that International Relations professionals need to
understand the scientific and technological dimension of international issues
and their economic, political, legal and cultural impacts to mobilize
knowledge that supports solving critical global problems (so-called
“societal challenges”). Diplomats act as promoters and facilitators to bring
scientists and innovative companies into contact. Scientists work to bring
countries closer together in search of multinational solutions.
The very character of the science of rationality, transparency and
universality allows the development of a universal language (Royal Society,
2010). These are the values that, through the neutrality of science, allow
more channels of dialogue between nations to be developed and help to
build trust and international governance in a nation. Science offers a non-
ideological environment for the participation and free exchange of ideas
between people, regardless of cultural, national, or religious origins. It
allows international actors to cooperate, regardless of their origins.
The scientific community often works across national borders, addressing
issues of common interest, so that it has a good basis for providing support
for emerging forms of diplomacy, which require non-traditional alliances
between nations, sectors and non-governmental organizations. If these
channels of scientific exchange are aligned with broader international policy
objectives, they can contribute to building coalitions and resolving conflicts.
Cooperation on the scientific aspects of sensitive issues, such as nuclear
non-proliferation, can sometimes provide an effective route to other forms
of political dialogues. (Royal Society, 2010) The premise is that no single
country will be able to tackle global problems such as climate change, food
security, poverty reduction, and nuclear disarmament. The scientific journey
is based on the need for collaboration and connection, which are no longer
based solely on historical, institutional, or cultural ties. This creates an
opportunity for the international policy-making community.
The Royal Society, a leading institution, has attempted to characterize

SD programs according to its various possible developments. As maintained
by the New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy memo published in 2010,
science diplomacy can be understood as three different dimensions:
• ‌Science in Diplomacy – Science providing information and support

for the purpose of international policies. Strengthening the scientific
contribution to foreign policy objectives. Science will be crucial to
address these challenges, and its priority, along with diplomacy.
Establishing and encouraging links between the scientific and
foreign policy communities is helpful to advise both scientists and
policy makers. The scientific community must keep policymakers
informed and updated about the dynamics of the Earth’s natural and
socioeconomic systems (Royal Society, 2010).
• ‌Diplomacy for Science – Diplomacy facilitating international
scientific cooperation. International scientific and engineering
collaboration is imperative to meet global challenges. Models of
international scientific collaboration can lead the way for inter-
national political diplomacy. Whether seeking top-down strategic
priorities for research, or bottom-up collaboration between individual
scientists and researchers, science can be a bridge to communities
in which political ties are weak. However, in order for relationships
to develop in these areas, scientists may need diplomatic assistance,
whether in contract negotiations, intellectual property agreements
or to deal with visa regulations. (Royal Society, 2010).
• ‌Science for Diplomacy - Scientific cooperation improving inter-
national relations. Cooperation on scientific aspects of sensitive
issues can sometimes be the only way to initiate a wider political
dialogue. The convincing power of science and the universality of
scientific methods can be used to redeem tensions, even in hard
power scenarios, such as those related to traditional military
threats. Scientific soft power interacts with international relations
in several ways, from cultural diplomacy to the more traditional
forms of negotiation and mediation.
Seeking to establish a more pragmatic view of science diplomacy,

Glukman et al., in 2017, drew up new distinctions for a country’s
motivations to develop this type of diplomacy. The authors understood that
the dimensions developed in the memorandum contained - and still do - a
theoretical framework developed for academic studies, and thus also
developed new models for the recognition of science diplomacy. In this
approach, the authors sought to develop a spectrum of political reasoning
and needs, as they recognize that functions will be managed by different
government agencies. Consequently, the clarity of expectations, as
illustrated in this more practical framework of science diplomacy can help
producing effective initiatives and coordination. They are:
• ‌Actions designed to directly promote a country’s national needs:

Science diplomacy can be used to meet several domestic needs, from the
employment of soft power to meeting economic interests and promoting
innovation. Countries are looking to become more strategic in identifying
how scientific relations can promote trade and other diplomatic interests.
Much of the aid has a technological dimension, either to address water and
other environmental and resources issues, public health, food, and energy
security, or to grow and diversify the economy. The scientific contribution,
therefore, needs to be incorporated into the evaluation and design of the
proposed programs.
The National Security and Emergency Response also benefits from
science diplomacy as science and technology can instruct on transnational
scientific responses, and assistance in arms control treaties for scientific
verification. Economic Dimensions also fall into this category, as more and
more scientific and health parameters are included in trade regulations,
intellectual properties and products manufactured between different
countries, etc. Finally, the National Science, Technology and Innovation
Systems benefit from these approaches as they engage globally with other
research and innovation agencies, with their own scientific diasporas, or
with access to large research infrastructures not present in their own
systems.
• ‌Actions aimed at serving cross-border interests:
This application involves bilateral issues or shared natural cross-border
resources and the exploitation of shared technical services (pharmaceutical

regulations, food security assessment, refugee crisis, pollution, etc.).
• ‌Actions designed primarily to meet global needs and challenges:
In this group, the authors include the SDGs, which comprise a global
context for development and partnership where both developed and devel-
oping countries can have measurable goals to increase their international
and domestic development activities. The SDGs provide an excellent
meeting point for global interests and national priorities. These actions
would also involve access to scientific exploration of ungoverned spaces,
such as Antarctica, the digital world, or space.
Scientific organizations, including national academies, also play an
important role in science diplomacy; the range of actors involved in these
efforts should be expanded to include non-governmental organizations,
multilateral agencies, and other informal networks. A nation’s scientific
diaspora is also strategically important since scientists who live outside the
country are eager to maintain close involvement with their place of origin.
More effective mechanisms and spaces will be required for the dialogue
between policy makers, scholars and researchers working in scientific and
international policy communities to identify projects and processes that can
advance the interests of both communities. International policy institutions
and thinktanks can offer leadership through the dedication of intellectual
resources to science as an important component of diplomacy today.
Science diplomacy needs the scientific community to have support and
encouragement at all levels. Younger scientists need to have career
opportunities and incentives from the early stages of their professional
journeys, so as to engage in political processes. Science diplomacy also
provides researchers with an opportunity to become ambassadors on behalf
of their national academic community.
For Dolan (2012), science diplomacy is an important soft power tool,
facilitating a transformation of diplomatic relations by building bridges
using science as an instrument, through decisions based on merit,
transparency, and evidence. Highlighting cooperation between nations and
showing the value of S&T commitments to diplomats who are, for the most
part, focused on issues such as the threat of terrorism, tough economic
choices or disputes over territories, should contribute to the protection of
national security and building relationships with long-term benefits to

mitigate and smooth out international conflicts.
3. South Korean Science Diplomacy
South Korea is an economic and technological power, a world leader in a

variety of technologies (digital technologies, materials, and nanotechnologies,
biotechnology, and green technology). It presented economic and social
development through state and private organized mechanisms, and today
boasts one of the best hubs of technology and innovation in the world.
In the 1960s, South Korea was one of the main beneficiaries of
international development assistance and has now changed its status from
beneficiary to donor. It took about four decades and plenty of governmental,
private, and academic effort for the Korean innovation system to be
developed from the beginning of the STI capacity building to the model
presented today (STEPI) being recognized as a high-end and technologically
advanced country among its partners in the OECD (OK, 2011).
With all its know-how, South Korea has great conditions to become one
of the great actors to lead world science diplomacy and become an important
research and innovation partner for other countries. Although science
diplomacy is briefly mentioned in the 2019 diplomatic Whitepaper, dealing
with collaboration in the Arctic, this tool can become a powerful vehicle for
the country’s influence in the international system. Science and scientific
cooperation, in this regard, may be among the most expressive manifestations
of Korean soft power, along with its already successful cultural diplomacy.
Science diplomacy must be included in Korea’s political and institutional
vocabulary, especially considering the enormous potential for its success,
based on Korea’s scientific excellence with well-known applied technologies
and its medium-powered diplomacy (Robertson, 2017).
Thus, understanding how science is developed in South Korea is very
important. A top-down innovation system promotes collaboration between
government, industry, and the academic community in the nation-building
process (Shin, et al., 2012). Science and politics were decisive for the
development of internal structures in the country, which built a structurally
well-developed and strategic body. An advanced educational model, with

institutes focused on advancing technology and private companies at the
forefront of innovation. By adopting a prominent role for science diplomacy,
the country will benefit from bilateral and multilateral, cooperative and
collaborative scientific cooperation, completing the relationship between
science and diplomacy.
The South Korean government has been demonstrating very strategic
efforts in the relationship between ST&I and national innovation systems
and has been spearheading a series of potential cooperation agreements in
technological and social development projects with countries in the North
and the Global South. The formation of these collaborative research networks
with other countries reinforces the country’s political and scientific capital,
and the need to include science diplomacy on the agenda of political and
strategic decisions. It seems likely that more and more advances will occur
to support the interaction between states and civil society, including actors
in the scientific community. Nevertheless, efforts to define and strengthen
the role of scientists in this architecture of change of government and
diplomacy (South Korean) are still at an early stage (Krasnyak, 2018)
According to Pierre Runifi, three are three fundamental actions for
science diplomacy: attraction, cooperation and influence. Korea is
successfully undertaking the first - and to some extent - the second, in
seeking the image of a scientifically attractive and technologically
developed country (Krasnyak, 2018). However, Korea’s ability to generate
knowledge-based soft power from science diplomacy and increase
international influence is now their new aspiration.
Attraction - Building Knowledge and Brain Circulation

South Korea is internationalizing its university curriculum, recognizing that
both native Korean and foreign speakers are demanding graduate programs
in English, and many of the universities have started offering classes in
English. One of the initiatives was to establish partnerships with universities
and institutions from around the world to exchange students and
transnational education projects. Attracting even more researchers interested
in taking both South Korea as an object of study (mainly in the fields of
international relations and social sciences) and in South Korea, due to its
investment in infrastructure in the exact sciences, such as physics, sciences,

mathematics, chemistry, nanoscience, engineering, biological sciences,
computing, and material sciences. Additionally, the government has
invested in attracting foreign students through the “Study in Korea” project.
Attracting these students is essential for the development of greater
collaborations among researchers and to improve Korea’s international
competitiveness.
Universities like SKY (Seoul National University, Korea University and
Yonsei University) are internationally recognized among the best in the
world, increasingly offering an international study environment. Among
these programs is the Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS). This
program, by training highly qualified professionals in a multidisciplinary
approach, encourages students to expand their perspectives beyond national
and cultural borders.
Furthermore, universities like POSTECH, founded in 1986 to provide
advanced education for potential engineers, are also internationalizing
education in the quest to attract even more qualified students. The university
also offers courses and opportunities for students to become entrepreneurs,
such as membership in clubs, preparation groups for startups, and training
on patents and licenses to create a new venture. UNIST stands out with a
reputation for rapid growth for its research and impact in a wide range of
fields dedicated to science and technology research. The university’s
research facilities and state-of-the-art equipment are examples of how the
entity invests on its campus.
KAIST (Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology), probably
one of South Korea’s largest technology centers, has become a prolific
institution, often found among some of the leading universities in global
scientific education and research. The Institute has a project called Vision
2031 “innovation in science and technology for the happiness and
prosperity of humanity.” Among its initiatives, KAIST intends to transform
the campus into an environment without linguistic and cultural barriers, to
increase the diversity of the student body, form a globalized faculty, create
educational centers abroad, send research volunteers to developing
countries and various other actions to increase the globalization of
education.
Korea has a large network of contacts, with an increased demand for

“brain circulation.” According to OECD statistics in 2011, Korea is the third
largest student exporter, behind only China and India. It is true that these
Korean students who have studied abroad have played significant roles
worldwide to increase the value of the “Global Korea” brand. (Minara,
2012).
Shin, Hong, and Kang (2012) point to the significant increase in the
2000s in the demand for highly qualified labor, quantitatively and
qualitatively, according to the structure of the new knowledge-based
economy. But since the 1970s, the government has already started efforts to
attract new researchers from abroad and to train its personnel
internationally. According to the data reported by the authors (2012), the
number of full-time research personnel was 5,628 people in 1970 and shot
up to 264,118 people in 2010; an increase of about 47 times in the last 40
years. In addition, the government implements several policies and
programs to connect research personnel abroad, whether foreigners or
Korean. These policies promote the global exchange and flow of
knowledge. The connection with the diaspora is one of the main tools for
the development of science diplomacy, alongside the quality of brain
circulation in the country.
Cooperation - Building Bridges

Korea today develops scientific cooperation projects with countries in the
North and the Global South, in addition to establishing research and
innovation institutes and centers interested in expanding South Korea’s
influence internationally and strengthening the country’s research and
innovation. With their neighboring countries, South Korea and ASEAN
have developed agreements to expand the promotion of cooperation in
science and technology, and in 2019 South Korea and ASEAN have agreed
to establish a center for science and technology partnership to promote
exchanges and policy sharing programs (Ministry of Science and ICT).
The relationship of cooperation and partnership with the United States is
a long one, and they were one of the great promoters of South Korea’s
development through economic and technological agreements and
development aid. The emergence of South Korea as a global leader has led
to an increasingly dynamic US-South Korea Alliance, focused on future-

oriented partnership opportunities, including space, energy, health, climate
change and cybernetics. (USA, Department of State). In 2019, the United
States and the Republic of Korea entered into a bilateral partnership for
deeper cooperation in scientific and technological research and the
development of solutions for natural disasters and issues closely related to
public security, such as security and infectious diseases.
In 2007, a scientific and technological cooperation agreement with the
European Union was established. This agreement was already aimed at the
rapid expansion of South Korean scientific knowledge. After the scientific
cooperation agreement, three new agreements were settled addressing a
wide range of international issues, including the non-proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, human rights, cooperation in the fight against
terrorism, energy security, climate change and development assistance.
Even today, cooperation with South Korea is a priority for the European
Union.
The relationship with Latin American countries started at the end of
World War II. However, these gained strength as of the 2000s. The rapid
economic and technological development in South Korea is very relevant
for the analysis and comparison between the development policies carried
out by Latin countries and the trajectory developed by the Korean country.
There is a range of possibilities for cooperation between the region and
South Korea, as Berry (2018) points out in the support for innovation
clusters and technology parks, in cooperation for the development of
knowledge management systems, and for the development of partnerships
in important sectors of knowledge export, such as biopharmaceuticals,
radioisotopes, satellites, vaccines, biokerosene, nanomaterials and advanced
manufacturing.
With regard to the African continent, the intensification of relations is
even more recent, and can be marked by the visit of President Roh Moo-
hyun in 2006, being the first by a South Korean president to the continent in
24 years. The visit was also the debut of the Korean Initiative for the
Development of Africa, which promoted a rapid increase in official
development aid from South Korea (ODA) to the continent.
In low-income countries, South Korea provides personalized assistance
in the areas of education, technology, and infrastructure, while collaboration

with middle-income countries develops on specific research and development
projects. Due to the increase in its budget during its development, the
Korean government started to deliberate on creating an effective and
efficient system to manage South Korea’s aid programs. Currently, KOICA’s
goal is to “Create innovative values and
solutions through Technology.” Its
main cooperation modalities are projects, training programs and volunteer
programs in other countries. It looks to strengthen development effectiveness
through Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI) in the context of the
SDGs. The SDG reports highlighted STI as an important means of
implementation to address social problems and facilitate economic growth
in developing countries. Global partnerships and knowledge sharing are
being facilitated in the STI area. Priority sectors include education, health,
governance, information technology and communication, rural development,
and the environment (Chun Muhye Lee - 2010).
Likewise, other institutes, such as STEPI - Science and Technology
Policy Institute, are fundamental for the development of Korean science
diplomacy. In addition to being responsible for research in S&T and R&D
activities, they promote the strategy for the innovation system, expanding
the scope of international cooperation for the help in solving global
problems. Bridges are important between government, industry and the
academy and other research institutes. In addition to carrying out consultancy
in technology management for other countries and research on the
relationship between S&T economy and society, it works in international
collaboration, education and international training. Providing a meaningful
platform to bring together various global opinion leaders to exchange
knowledge, share lessons and ideas, build networks and engage in mutual
learning.
The Korean Institute for Advancement of Technology (KIAT) was
established in May 2009 as a public institute, under the Ministry of
Knowledge Economy, in accordance with the government’s public institutes’
plan for advancement. To promote Korea’s industrial development and
industrial technological innovation, KIAT will play a crucial role in
suggesting R&D strategies for industrial technology through systemic
technology planning and political research. It will also enhance the
competitiveness of the industrial technology ecosystem in Korea, promoting

various activities, such as transfer and commercialization of industrial
technology, establishing an industrial technology infrastructure, supporting
components and materials industries and regionally specialized industries
Influence - Building a better normal

President Moon Jae-In’s speech in March 2020 makes clear Korea’s strategy
to act as an influential actor in the international system: “we will take the
current crisis as a driving force for new opportunities and development ...
Our goal is a Republic of Korea that takes the lead in the world. This is the
new Republic of Korea, which we aspire to.” According to the president, the
country has “ample resources to lead the digital economy combining
technologies from the Fourth Industrial Revolution, such as artificial
intelligence and big data. We will work to help the Republic of Korea
emerge as a leading global digital power with innovative business ventures
and startups serving as the main driving force. We will create engines for
future growth by promoting three new growth sectors - system
semiconductors, biological health, and future-generation cars - with more
vigor.” (Moon Jae-In, 2020).
The country has been developing a knowledge-based infrastructure,
improving strategic communication, increasing awareness to support
cooperation, increasing the network, and promoting innovation through
joint activities. Science diplomacy, in collaboration with S&T, is determined
to attract the best students, researchers and companies from around the
world. This intention could make the country more competitive, improve its
reputation and make it more attractive for investment. The influence on the
use of SD may attract talent, capital, and political support, improving the
country’s international projection, emphasizing the image of Korea as an
attractive and scientifically developed country, thus gaining an earned
recognition and influence.
Korea should certainly adopt a strategy for building a high science
diplomacy profile. Paving the way for the foundations of public diplomacy,
MOFA got off to a good start in mobilizing Korea’s soft power, which
science diplomacy can continue to improve (Krasnyak , 2018). It is
necessary to promote the intellectual and practical foundations of education
on science diplomacy and the expansion of its knowledge, developing its

best practices, creating a favorable environment for networking, the training
of diplomats interested in science and in diplomatic scientists and providing
input for the academy to be increasingly connected and engaged with the
development of this knowledge.
This focus on science diplomacy should include what Professor
Krasnyak understands as “points of attention,” which make it possible to
increase the efficiency of Korean diplomacy and also improve scientific
cooperation and, ultimately, allow Korea to shape its future as an important
one. Geopolitical actors are: (1) the awareness and broad implementation of
knowledge-based policies as a national effort, (2) the direct involvement of
external non-state actors related to the academy in diplomatic affairs, (3) the
adaptation of the network of embassies and consulates abroad as centers of
science diplomacy.
4. Addressing Global Issues
So far, we have seen how Science Diplomacy is important for building

influence in the international system and how South Korea already has a
well-structured national system of innovation and research and development.
According to Krasnyak (2018), although South Korea does not have an
official policy of science diplomacy, it has a series of practical experiences
from diplomacy to science, projects directly linked to Korean technology
and innovation, which are in progress and have already been delivered and
show the strength of the country’s international capacity.
These are just a few examples that show the complexity of intergovern-
mental cooperation in scientific initiatives. Korea’s fundamental under-
standing of the importance of international programs, its scientific and
financial capacity to participate in them, and full government support
demonstrate that it has the foundation for science diplomacy to continue.
Although Korea is not yet a key player in international science diplomacy,
the potential for this is enormous. (Krasnyak, 2018).
Global Health
Amazônia - Basic Health Unit
In 2015, during President Park Geun-Hye’s visit to Brazil, a series of
cooperation agreements were established between the two countries. These
agreements involve companies, universities and research centers in joint
initiatives that provide opportunities for new businesses, the development of
high technology and the exchange of specialists. Among these agreements,
there is also the memorandum of understanding between the Ministries of
Health of both countries, which seeks to strengthen relations in the area of
health care and medications.
This was the beginning of the project that made possible the first
intelligent Basic River Health Unit (UBSF) 6 in Amazonas. Named Catarina
Brota dos Santos, it is the first to have Korean technology to provide medical
care in riverside communities and will initially serve families living in the
region of the Manacapuru River. The technology equipment was donated by
the Korean government, which will serve about 5,000 inhabitants of
Manacapuru who still had no family health coverage.
There were several stages of cooperation and coordination of various
actors, such as the Korea Institute for Advancement of Technology (KIAT),
Yonsei University, Catholic University of Korea, Bit Computer, and the
University of Taubaté. The project is the result of a deal signed between the
Brazilian and Korean governments and aims to improve medical care
provided to communities, facilitating, for example, diagnoses and expanding
prevention actions. Korea has invested around R$ 15 million in cutting-edge
equipment, providing not only the implantation of this equipment, but also
training of professionals who will be on board. With Korean technology the
storage of information about patients and the Regulation System of the State
of Amazonas will be connected. With this, the state hopes that there will be
a significant advance in basic health care, especially for people in riverside
areas. With the Intelligent River UBSF, the population of Manacapuru will
have access to medical, dental, prenatal care, child health, vaccination,
ultrasound, preventive and laboratory tests, among other services that are
6 Basic River Health Unit (UBSF) are vessels that hold Health Care Equipment for
Riverside Families (ESFF), which provide ambience, furniture and equipment required to
assist the ribeirinha population of Amazon.
characteristic of Primary Health.

“The Korean Government and several institutions and the people know
the importance of the project. In 2019, it celebrated 60 years of this
integration, friendship, and immigration between Brazil and Korea,
officially celebrated by the Korean and the Brazilian Governments. No
healthcare project, despite this long period, had taken place. That is why we
are very satisfied with what is happening today ,” said Young-Ro Yoon,
general coordinator of the project at Korea’s Yonsei University.
“ODA KOREA: Building TRUST”

In 2020, with the new Coronavirus pandemic, South Korea was quick to
launch an initiative with ODA to help partner countries in combating
COVID-19. Being itself an example of how to deal with the causes and
consequences of a virus of great potential for dissemination, Korea
launched the Development Cooperation Initiative for a Safe World Together
- ODA KOREA: Building TRUST: “an initiative to contribute to the
strengthening of Transparency, Resilience, Unity and Security alongside
partner countries.”
The program, structured into 3 pillars, provides humanitarian assistance,
health cooperation for the main countries and quarantine organizations and
support to respond to the economic and social impacts on vulnerable
groups, and also increase their resilience in areas such as education,
sanitation and food security, in partnership with the private sector, civil
society and multilateral organizations. (MOFA, 2020).
The countries and organizations targeted for support this year were
selected considering the political priorities of the Korean government, the
need to strengthen health capacity and relations between countries.
Nonetheless, there are plans to expand target countries according to
demand.7
The program aims to expand medical facilities for COVID-19, providing
diagnostic and medical equipment, educating and training medical
personnel and establishing a cooperative system with government, civil
7 Idonesia, Uzbekistan, Ethiopia, Colombia, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar,

Philippines, Intensive support for the African CDC.
society and international organizations to support the strengthening of the

response capacity to vulnerable individuals in the region. Thus, the
aforementioned support elements will be packaged and widely supported so
that the country’s ability to respond to COVID-19 and prevent infectious
diseases can be substantially and continuously enhanced beyond simple
quarantine supplies. (MOFA, 2020)
Sustainable development
Korea Green Growth Trust Fund
In partnership with the World Bank, the Korea Green Growth Trust Fund
(KGGTF) was established in 2011 to strengthen and expand the Bank’s
global green growth portfolio, drawing on the experience of Korea’s
successful green growth experience and investment through public and
private resources. Its central approach is to support the World Bank and its
clients to operationalize inclusive green growth initiatives, strategies, and
investments. The KGGTF has a close partnership with the World Bank’s
Global Practices, while working with client countries to develop a holistic
green growth strategy and, most importantly, implement the projects
identified in its strategies.
Today, the Korea Green Growth Trust Fund finances local programs, as
well as knowledge exchange activities, and has so far approved 144 grant
programs in the urban, transportation, information and technology, energy,
environment, water, climate and agriculture sectors, focusing on low and
medium-low income economies.
Operating green growth and sector integration to develop green policies
and programs that increase productivity and create jobs and providing clear
and specific technical concepts and activity planning. They have the
potential to become large-scale projects led by the World Bank Group or
client countries.
Knowledge sharing and building networks are an integral part of
implementing green growth. Facilitating the sharing of best practices for
green growth and technical knowledge through on-site learning and the
development of hands-on learning tools is part of what makes the Korea
Green Growth Trust Found unique. (KGGTF, 2020).
The Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI)

Korea successfully launched GGGI in 2012. From a domestic thinktank,
GGGI is today an international intergovernmental organization. GGGI has a
unique presence in the country and a prominent role as a neutral and reliable
advisor and integrated strategic development partner in member governments
and partners. These advisers are directly involved with national governments
in defining the strategic direction for the development of the national
program guided by a Country Planning Framework with the Government.
GGGI’s operational model maximizes the potential to translate green
growth strategies and policies (especially economic policies) into green
investment plans, mobilizing green financing commitments needed to
support low-carbon economic development.
Security
Through joint initiatives, science can help foster bilateral cooperation
between South and North Korea. Both Koreas undoubtedly have great
potential to cooperate in science diplomacy. Scientists alongside diplomats,
directly or/and with the mediation of other partners, should promote the
importance of working on science projects, emphasizing their peaceful,
scientific and non-military approach. This is the chance for science
diplomacy to build relationships between counterparts in favor of the
development of science to reduce inter-Korean regional tensions. Some
meetings have already been held aiming at the scientific approximation
between both Koreas. In 2006, in a “historic” meeting, researchers from the
North and South met in Pyongyang to discuss ways to boost scientific
cooperation. In this meeting, the organizers sought to catalyze joint projects
in nanotechnology, information technology, environmental sciences, and
biotechnology. More recently, in a forum sponsored by the Korea
Federation of Science and Technology Societies, a favorable environment
for joint research was recreated. (Science, 2018)
Final considerations
The goal of the present work was to demonstrate how science diplomacy
can be an excellent opportunity for the performance of Korean Public
Diplomacy and its international influence, working collaboratively to solve
global problems, participating in international projects and building new

opportunities for dialogue between different peoples. With a highly
technology-based society, South Korea is an important partner for countries
in both the North and the Global South, and science diplomacy allows the
advancement of sharing their views in the search for creative and
constructive solutions to common global challenges.
The work presented how science diplomacy has been working and how
it will be a defining model in the construction of actions in this current
pandemic and in the post-pandemic world. Science diplomacy strategies
allow for a more effective alignment of interests and more efficient
coordination of resources. It is an extremely useful tool to face global
challenges and to improve international relations, as long as it is not
distorted by ideological objectives that compromise the independence of
science. Thus, science diplomacy must play a greater role in efforts to solve
global challenges and promote sustainable development.
South Korea already practices science diplomacy. However, the subject
still needs more academic strength and increased political articulation to
enter the vocabulary of the government and its scientists. The conjunction
of these two worlds will open many borders to help with global problems
and to build a profile of an attractive and scientifically influential country.
South Korea has one of the largest networks of circulation of scientists, it
can use the circulation of brains so that each researcher is an ambassador of
Korea and train more academics and diplomats informed about and
concerned with science. Encouraging discussions on the topic is essential if
South Korean aspirations are to become an influential power in technology.
It is still possible to develop a Korean model of doing science. Korea can
further advance the “Korean Wave to the Korean Way” of doing science.
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139
“Smart” Korea and COVID-19: Exploring the

Potential of Smart City as a Tool of Public
Diplomacy
Ayse Durakoglu
Abstract | The term smart city refers to the improvement of urban fabric,
community services and life standards via high-technology infrastructure,
inclusive governance and connected resource management. Korea’s vision
and experience of early ubiquitous and now smart cities have transformed it
into one of the leading nations of smart urbanism in the past two decades.
This study explores Korea’s strategic usage of smart city technologies in its
effective COVID-19 management and its significant potential for the
country’s public diplomacy and nation branding. In addition to the advanced
physical infrastructure and efficient policy framework, this paper highlights
Korea’s human capital (smart people) as an important dimension of the
country’s holistic smart branding in the international scene. This exploratory
study relies on online sources including government websites, official
papers, speeches, interviews and online news media articles. Consequently,
this paper suggests that Korea’s effective pandemic control via the utilization
of advanced smart city resources can provide the country with a significant
leverage for promoting Korea for global smart city leadership and branding
it as a smart nation.
국문초록 | ‘스마트 시티’라는 용어는 연결된 자원 관리와 통치를 포함한 고기

술 기반시설을 통해 삶의 기준, 지역 사회 활동, 도시 구조가 향상됨을 일컫는다.
한국의 이른 ‘유비쿼터스’ 그리고 이제는 ‘스마트’한 도시 경험과 비전은 한국을
지난 이십 년 간 스마트 도시화를 이끈 국가들 중 하나로 바꾸어 놓았다. 이 연구
는 한국이 코로나19의 효과적인 관리를 위해 어떻게 스마트 시티 기술을 전략적
으로 사용했는지, 그리고 이것이 공공 외교와 국가 브랜딩에 어떤 상당한 잠재력
을 갖는지 알아본다. 이 논문은 세계 무대에서 국가의 전체적인 스마트 브랜딩의
중요한 측면으로, 발전된 물리적 사회기반시설과 효율적인 정책 체제에 더해 한
국의 인적 자원(‘스마트 피플’)을 강조한다. 이 탐색적인 연구는 정부 웹사이트,
공문, 연설, 인터뷰, 그리고 온라인 뉴스 기사를 포함한 온라인 출처들을 이용한
다. 결과적으로, 이 글은 선진적 스마트 시티 자원의 활용을 통한 한국의 효과적
인 전염병 통제가 한국을 세계적인 스마트 시티 리더십으로 홍보하고 ‘스마트’
국가로 브랜딩하는 데 큰 영향을 끼칠 수 있음을 시사한다.
INTRODUCTION
COVID-19 has taken the known world by storm and is changing it into a
different one. Pandemic control is essentially a major public health concern
and domestic affair for countries; however, in every crisis there is opportunity.
The South Korean government has been proactive by setting a K-quarantine
model for effective pandemic control and exporting it to other countries as a
standard management model. A top government official evaluated this
initiative as a chance for the “nation to strengthen its global leadership” and
“play a leading role in forming a new international order” (Shim, 2020).
This paper approaches Korea’s advanced smart city infrastructure as a
potential leverage for promoting the country in global smart city leadership
and branding it as a “smart nation” in the COVID-19 pandemic context.
This study is an attempt to explore South Korea’s smart city resources,
with its smart people emphasis, as a potential public diplomacy instrument
and nation brand for the country. Korean policies of early ubiquitous then
smart cities in the past decades have given high priority to the transformation
of urban fabric, community services and life standards via high technology
infrastructure and inclusive governance. Under ongoing COVID-19
circumstances, Korea’s smart city infrastructure and resources have proven
to be vital for its effective pandemic management. This study proposes that
promotion of its smart city vision with reference to this success can provide
Korea with an opportunity to cement its influential position in smart
urbanism and to establish a positive “smart” image of the country for the
international gaze. While Korea’s ICT and IoT-based smart technologies are
better established in its national image, this study underlines the further
potential of its human capital, or “smart people,” as a significant pillar of a
holistic smart Korea branding.
This paper presents an exploratory research on Korea’s smart city
“Smart” Korea and COVID-19 141
experience and its utilization in a pandemic situation. The research relies on

secondary data available from Korean government websites, official papers,
speeches, interviews and online news media articles about Korea’s smart
city policies and pandemic management. Its limitation is its timing, which is
a period of hectic effort for pandemic containment in Korea and in the
world. Any ongoing process is innately volatile and fragile, which can
invalidate the realities and suggestions of its premature study in the long
run. Focusing on COVID-19 circumstances, this paper aims to humbly
reflect the spirit of its time and provide some perspective from a specific
point in history. It also attempts to contribute to literature by incorporating
smart city policies and discourses within the discussion of public diplomacy
and nation branding agendas of Korea.
Korea’s vision of public diplomacy is about “fascinating the world with
Korea’s charms” (MOFA, 2020a). The concept of public diplomacy
fundamentally refers to a governmental “process of the communications
with the public of foreign countries to promote a nation’s goals and policies
and to promote the understanding of its thoughts and ideals as well as
systems and culture” (Tuch, 1990, p.3). Shifting towards a “new public
diplomacy” perspective, the relevance of non-state actors, digital
technologies, relationship-building, soft-power terminology and marketing
practices such as branding has steadily gained significance in past decades
(Cull, 2009, p.13-14). In this context, by sharing its history, culture, values,
policies and vision “through direct communication with foreign nationals,”
Korea appears determined to improve its diplomatic relations and national
image, build trust in the international community and increase global
influence” through public diplomacy (MOFA, 2020a).
Public diplomacy is a key instrument in exercising “soft power.” Soft
power is “getting others to want the outcomes that you want” by generating
attraction and admiration instead of resorting to coercive measures to obtain
desired results (Nye, 2008, p.95). The exercise of soft power makes other
countries “want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example,
and/or aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness” (p.94). Korea has
abundant soft power resources including cutting edge technology and a
booming cultural industry. The ever-expanding sphere of K-branding, from
K-wave and K-cosmetics to K-food, showcase the country’s effective
branding and role model potential by presenting a Korean way of doing

things. Recent promotions of the smart urban model called “K-City Network”
and standardized pandemic management design called “K-quarantine”
reaffirm Korea’s desire to establish itself as a prominent and exemplary soft
power in the international community.
Nation branding has risen as an important strategy for building soft
power and its exercise through public diplomacy. A nation brand is a
“unique, multi-dimensional blend of elements that provide the nation with
(…) differentiation and relevance for all of its target audiences” (Dinnie,
2008, p.15). Nation brands highlight distinct qualities of countries to
improve their reputation and build a positive association with their image.
Having established a Presidential Council on Nation Branding (PCNB) in
2009, Korea put top level state attention on the betterment of its national
image. Approaching nation-branding as a matter of “the dignity of a country,”
official vision emphasized an improved international status and national
self-esteem as the foundation to create a reliable, credible, likable and
dignified Korea (PCNB, n.d.). This study will discuss “smartness” as a
potential brand for Korea and show the possibility of expanding said label
beyond smart technologies in a way to include its advanced human capital.
This paper starts with a literature review of the smart city concept and its
dimensions such as smart governance and public health services. The
following two sections focus on the Korean experience of smart cities. The
first section discusses smart urban infrastructure, planning and practices
with reference to administrative and discursive frameworks and policy
agendas. The second one concentrates on the human component of smart
city notion, highlighting smart people and governance in Korean smart
cities. The next section overviews Korea’s effective COVID-19 pandemic
control with reference to smart city infrastructure, services and citizens. The
analysis section discusses the possibility of Korea’s effective smart city
policy and pandemic control as a “smart” public diplomacy and nation
branding agenda. Lastly, the conclusion provides a brief summary and
underlines the main points of the study.
LITERATURE REVIEW: THE CONCEPT “SMART CITY”
“Smart city” refers to a multidimensional concept that has become relevant

among academics and policy makers in the past two decades. Growing
urban studies literature, alongside economics, governance and policy areas
attached various adjectives to cities and urban trends such as “sustainable,”
“digital” and “global.” Lately “smart city” has gained wide recognition for
encompassing both technological and social dimensions of the urban fabric
and for doing so without political connotations (Eremia, Toma & Sanduleac,
2017, p.14). Caragliu, Del Bo and Nijkamp (2011) observe that a large body
of scholarly works focuses on the role of ICT (information and communica-
tion technologies) infrastructure in urban fabric alongside human capital,
education, social inclusion and environment in smart cities (p.66). In a
broad sense, smart city refers to “a city in which ICT is merged with
traditional infrastructure, coordinated and integrated using new digital
technologies” (Batty et al., 2012, p. 481). Smart “labelling” of cities
encompasses several key elements, such as the “utilization of networked
infrastructures for economic and political efficiency,” an “emphasis on
business-led urban development,” “social inclusion of various urban
residents,” the “role of high-tech and creative industries,” as well as social
and relational capital in urban development (Hollands, 2008).
Technological infrastructure and resources, increasingly with reference
to the Internet of Things (IoT), Artificial Intelligence (AI) and ICT,
constitute core dimensions for a smart city. As Heo et al. (2014) argue,
smart city applications “revolutionize” cities by providing a city-scale
infrastructure that integrates information from different application systems,
thereby creating a city where “the citizens can securely collect, manage and
share information that relates to all aspects of their everyday lives in a
ubiquitous and sustainable manner” (p.109). In smart cities, technology
plays a central, strategic yet instrumental role that far exceeds the mere
celebration of technical achievements seen in digital1 and intelligent2 cities.
In this context, the human component is equally essential in smart city
1 See Dameri & Cocchia, 2013.

2 See Nam & Pardo, 2011, p.285, also in Deakin & Al Waer, 2011.
philosophy, which aspires to use technology to bring about a higher quality

of life and citizen well-being alongside the consolidation of social and
cultural capital in the city (Dameri & Cocchia, 2013). For Angelidou
(2014), it is a conceptual urban development model “based on the utilization
of human, collective, and technological capital for the enhancement of
development and prosperity in urban agglomerations,” emphasizing its
social welfare objectives (p.S3).
With this emphasis on human component, changing dynamics of urban
governance and citizenship through smart urbanism has been explored in
academic works (Lee & Lee, 2014; Rodriguez-Bolivar 2015). Meijer and
Rodriguez-Bolivar (2016) point out that governing a smart city is “about
crafting new forms of human collaboration through the use of information
and communication technologies” (p.392). This approach underlines the
fact that smartness is not only about installing the latest technologies, but
also about the political understanding of said technology through more
participatory processes and its role in promoting public values alongside
economic gains. “Smart governance,” often combined with “e-government,”
is noted as one of the six main axes of a smart city, alongside smart people
and smart living (Caragliu, Del Bo and Nijkamp, 2011). Bringing govern-
ment together with various stakeholders and social actors, smart urban
governance underlines the significance of inclusivity, citizen participation in
urban procedures, transparency and access to information. Cities are
increasingly approached as “constellations of active agencies and groups”
and a mixture of top-down and bottom-up procedures (Batty et al, 2012,
p.497). Smartness is also noted to possess positive connotations with respect
to pro-business neoliberal urban governance in a way that smart labelling is
used for city branding to improve cities’ images (Hollands, 2008, p.304).
Public health and healthcare services in smart cities have also gained
increasing attention in recent years. There has been rapid progress in
“developing smart healthcare and health monitoring in non-clinical
environments” (Jalali, El-Khatib & Mcgregor, 2015, p.111). Organization,
accessibility and coordination of healthcare services for citizens and
management of public health have become a subject of urban governance
with the help of digital infrastructures. Scholars have discussed “smart
management of medical equipment and supplies” (Su, Li & FU, 2011),
integrated healthcare systems to early detection of potential epidemics

(Yigitcanlar, 2015), monitoring of increasing and aging urban populations
and ubiquitous management of public health (Heo et al., 2014; Hussain et
al., 2015). Compared to everyday healthcare applications, epidemic control
via smart applications has received limited attention, yet it can be expected
to expand with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic (Kickbusch & Sakellarides,
2006; Allam & Jones, 2020; Xu et al., 2020).
In the Korean context, smart cities have been discussed in policy making
and academic contexts alongside the “ubiquitous city” (U-city) concept.
Promoted as a comprehensive urban policy since early 2000s, the country
has attracted academic and professional attention via its booming urban
developments and projects. Korean smart cities have been studied for their
urban governance (Lee and Leem, 2016; Kim & Jung, 2019), impact on
national economy (Kim, Jung & Choi, 2016), smart services and
applications (Lee & Lee, 2014), as well as e-government services (Lee,
2010). Some case studies focused on New Songdo City, which was built
from scratch upon smart city principles (Shwayri, 2013; Kshetri, Alcantara
& Park, 2014; Benedikt, 2016). The role of smart city applications in
effective mapping and contact tracing during the pandemic has also
received recent academic attention (Sonn & Lee, 2020).
SMART CITY IN SOUTH KOREA
South Korea’s experience with technology based pro-active approaches to

urban space goes back to the 1990s and early 2000s. Launching the
Ubiquitous City Comprehensive Plan, a national government program as
early as 2003, the concept “ubiquitous city” (U-City) has been central to
Korea’s urban growth and management approach in the new millennium. In
the Korean context, the U-City concept is often used interchangeably or in a
complementary way with the smart city concept. The term refers to the
“integration of ubiquitous computing within an urban environment”
(Kogan, 2014). The U-City framework was further established with R&D
programs; the Korean Ubiquitous-Eco-City Project (2007), which
developed ICT-based eco-technologies for sustainable growth; The Business
Management Guidelines for the Construction of Ubiquitous Cities (2009); a

Five-Year U-City Master Plan and the K-ICT Strategy (Lee & Lee, 2014).
After two consecutive Ubiquitous City Comprehensive Plans (2009-2013
and 2014-2018), currently the Smart City Comprehensive Plan (2019-2023)
is under operation (Smart City Korea, 2020b). The Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure and Transportation (MOLIT) operates as the main government
body for coordination of smart city policies along with the Ministry of
Science and ICT (MSIT), the Ministry of Interior and Safety (MOIS), the
Ministry of Environment and other government bodies. The Smart Cities
Special Committee within the Presidential Commission on the Fourth
Industrial Revolution (PCFIR), which was established in August 2017, also
plays a key role in policy making procedures on smart cities in Korea
(Intralink, 2019).
The Korean government has continued its prioritization of smart urban
management throughout the 2010s, this time by shifting to “smart city”
terminology. President Moon Jae-in highlighted smart cities as “one of the
government’s top priorities” and “the cradle of the Fourth Industrial
Revolution” in his speech in February 2019 (Maresca, 2019). The President
also pointed out that Korea is the first country to adopt laws related to smart
cities, emphasizing Korea’s pioneer role (Lee & Ko, 2019). The “Korean
Smart Cities” brochure released by MOLIT defines the Korean vision of
smart city as “a platform to improve the quality of life for citizens, enhance
the sustainability of cities, and foster new industries by utilizing innovative
technologies of the 4th Industrial Revolution era” (2020, p.4). U-City is
defined as a phase of Korea’s smart city development while the country’s
rapid urbanization journey is worded as a trial-and-error process for the
further smartization of Korean cities on the local and national scales. The
same document shows that the Korean government has played an active role
in promoting the development and expansion of smart cities across the
country with fiscal investment and drastic deregulation. Seventy-eight local
governments are reportedly promoting smart city services and developing
solutions that fit their local circumstances (p.7).
This emphasis on smart city policies in past two decades, alongside the
country’s advanced human, technological and R&D capital on ICT have
given Korea considerable leverage in terms of smart city development and
implementation. One example is the Songdo International Business District,

located in the Incheon Free Economic Zone. This District, though
controversial, was built entirely on smart city principles and largely on
private capital. The government is currently pursuing a three-step strategic
plan for national smart urban development, consisting of “national pilot
projects” (in Busan and Sejong), developing “smart city foundations” (e.g.
R&D, “living labs,” smart solutions in cities and villages) and creating an
“innovative ecosystem” for public and private actors (Smart City Korea,
p.12-18). By establishing this national scale government policy, President
Moon framed pilot cities as “business models” that can be exported as
“overseas development projects” and expressed his full support for smart
city industries “as a platform for innovative growth” which is expected to
grow at full speed on a global scale (Yonhap, 2019).
South Korea’s investment in smart cities is best manifested in the
country’s capital, Seoul. As of 2020, the metropolitan area has over 10
million residents, while the larger Seoul Capital Region has over 25 million
residents, roughly half of the Korean population (Seoul Metropolitan
Government, 2020). Former Mayor Park Won Soon promoted a smart
vision for a city “based on data” with “citizens as mayors” in the past
decade (Smart Cities World, 2020). In March 2019, the Seoul Metropolitan
Government (SMG) announced a 1.2-billion-dollar investment plan to fund
further smart initiatives in the city through 2022 (Carter, 2020). SMG plans
to deploy an enterprise-grade, city-wide IoT network to increase connectivity
and create one of the “world’s first hyper-connected cities” by 2022
(Weekes, 2019). Other 2022 Smart City Goals include real-time monitoring
of senior citizens, a 70 percent reduction in traffic fatalities and deployment
of 50,000 IoT sensors in the entire city (Carter, 2020, p.3). Public-private
partnerships and involvement of various industrial and societal actors are
widely encouraged for the city’s smart initiatives. Start-ups are supported
and employed in city-wide smart platforms. With the launching of Open
Data Plaza in 2012, third-party developers and researchers gained access to
urban datasets to generate new services and technologies.
Korea has been expanding its smart city vision beyond national
territories as well. The Korean government promotes the exportation of
“K-smart City” models to overseas markets in cooperation with government-
owned developer LH (Korea Land and Housing Corporation). The first such
export was Abdullah Smart City Project in Kuwait, launched in 2016, and
the first Latin American export was made to Santa Cruz New Town in
Bolivia (Smart City Korea, p.22). During his speech at a smart city
conference in 2019, President Moon expressed his confidence in Korea’s
“possibilities and capacities” and underlined the fact that the country is
globally recognized for its “advanced information and communication
technology, including the IoT, and its experience in building many
successful new cities” (Yonhap, 2019). The President expressed government
support for new smart city projects and promoted the export of said Korean
smart business model that encompasses “the entire process of planning,
design, construction and management of the city in a single package.” To
make this vision true, Busan and Sejong test-cities are expected to receive
3.7 trillion won funding from the government by 2021 to serve as blueprints
for the K-smart city model to be exported overseas.
In July 2019, Korea stepped up with standardization and systematic
exportation of “K-smart City” as a business model with MOLIT announcing
a government investment of 500 billion won for overseas smart city projects
(Lee & Ko, 2019). In January 2020, the Ministry launched a new program
called K-City Network Global Cooperation Program. The Director of the
Overseas Urban Cooperation Team, Ahn Sae Hee, defined this program as a
“key policy tool with which Korea expands its efforts to promote and export
Korea’s smart city technologies” and expressed MOLIT’s strong wish to
work in cities in ASEAN and other countries to build smart cities. Director
Ahn further emphasized that the vision of the program was to “help Korea
position itself as the leader in global smart city development” and that “the
government will continue to give active support to make that reality”
(MOLIT, 2020). The program envisions a “full-package approach” that will
provide both software and hardware support for selected overseas projects.
Opening the first round of applications in early 2020, MOLIT received 80
applications from 23 governments and public institutions around the world.
The program selected 12 smart city projects and plans to export smart city
technologies, know-how and expertise to 11 countries including Peru,
Myanmar and Russia (Choi, 2020).
SMART PEOPLE OF KOREA’S SMART CITIES
The Korean vision of smart cities is intertwined with a strong emphasis on

the human component of this urban model. In line with the smart city
concept’s strong humane, social, inclusive and communitarian motivations,
South Korea’s experience with smart cities has shown the importance of the
smart human factor both in theory and implementation. Korea has a
considerably high rate of urban population with 84% of its residents living
in cities, in comparison with the world average of 54% urbanism rate (Lee
& Ko, 2019). In 2018, Korea ranked second in the World Bank’s Human
Capital Index, which measures the “amount of human capital that a child
born today can expect to attain by age 18,” including the factors of expected
years of schooling, test scores and survival rates (Yonhap, 2018).
In Korea’s smartization of cities, smart citizenship and governance
appear among the core principles in Korean government alongside SMG’s
vision of smart urbanism and governance. Comparing former U-city policy
with the Smart City, a report by the Institute of Construction and
Environmental Engineering underlined the differences in their focus: the
former focuses on “means,” which is installing the necessary infrastructure,
while the latter is about “purpose,” providing services that improve citizens’
quality of life (Lee & Ko, 2019). Government discourse underlines smart
citizens as one of the two strengths of Korea’s success in developing smart
cities, alongside smart technology by world-class ICT companies (Smart
City Korea, p.5). Korea is defined as smart and an “IT-friendly country with
the world’s highest smart phone penetration rate and high internet usage.”
The same paper shows Korea’s top worldwide rankings in human capital
indices such as the Bloomberg Innovation Index, OECD data and ICT Index
on IT development to underline country’s significant human capital.
In a similar vein, Seoul City’s smart city masterplan identifies “smart
citizens” as one of the three cornerstones alongside smart services and
infrastructure (Carter, 2020). Having established the first steps of its
e-government in the 1990s, South Korea’s experience of electronic and
digital services as an interactive tool of governance has further expanded in
the 2000s. The former Mayor Park expressed his vision of Seoul citizens as
“mayors” who would “co-create their cities” with open access to urban data
and the “free data city” plan aiming to extend free public wi-fi infrastructure
to the entire city by 2022 (Stevens, 2020). ICT platforms and services such
as the Citizens Complaint and Comprehensive Advice Center (CCPIS), the
Mobile Voting App and Oasis of 10 Million Imagination have been made
available to the public for better citizen access to government services and
increased transparency (Seoul Solution, 2020). With the Digital Mayor’s
Office launched in 2017, citizens are able to access a website version of the
Mayor’s information system notifications on “city status, public opinion,
key project progress, decision-support tools and operational control,”
providing greater connectivity in urban management (Smart Cities World,
2020). The Seoul Digital Foundation, the Seoul Social Economy Centre and
the Seoul Youth Hub are some examples of inclusive platforms for different
segments of society (Smith, 2018).
Seoul was globally recognized by constantly ranking the top spot in the
E-Governance Survey by the United Nations (2003-2018, 8 times) and the
Municipal e-Governance International Survey by Rutgers University. The
city has become a trademark example in e-government strategies across the
world as a special report on Seoul was published by UN-affiliated
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) where the city was referred
as “one of the world’s tech-savviest cities” (Holzer et al., 2016, p.5). The
Seoul Metropolitan Government also took the leadership and President City
roles in 2010, in the establishment of WeGO (World e-Governments
Organization of Cities and Local Governments) currently an organization
with over 150 members from local governments, companies and
organizations.
Korea’s smart city vision emphasizes its human component as a core
pillar through new projects and technologies as well. In his participation to
third Smart Tehran Congress in Iran, WeGO representative Lee defined
smart city as a “happy city for smart people.” He emphasized that smart
cities are possible with and for smart people, and “homo sapiens (smart
people)” build smart cities because they are capable and happy doing so
(Iran Press, 2019). Similarly, President Moon emphasized the value of new
technologies not limited to their invention but “in the way it is used to
improve the quality of life” (Lee & Ko, 2019). Recently, SMG and Seoul
Design Foundation have hosted the second Human City Design Award,
aiming to “design a sustainable urban environment in which humans can

enjoy creative lives” by overcoming the harmful effects of human alienation
and materialism (UNESCO, 2020).
KOREA’S SMART MANAGEMENT OF COVID-19
As one of the first countries infected by COVID-19, South Korea’s

experience with epidemics in the twenty-first century goes back earlier than
the current global pandemic. In the past two decades, East and South East
Asian countries experienced two highly infectious diseases: SARS in 2002
to 2004 and MERS in 2015. These earlier epidemic experiences in the
region appear to have had a positive influence on these countries’ preparation
and ability to control COVID-19 effectively, as evidenced by the relatively
successful pandemic control in countries like Singapore, Hong Kong and
South Korea (Fox, 2020).
Earlier epidemics have brought policy shifts and structural changes to
the public health system in Korea. Without a confirmed SARS case in the
country, there was still a paradigm shift in the national disease control
mentality which led to the establishment of the Korea Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (KCDC) in 2003. The MERS outbreak in 2015 was
more impactful in the country, with 186 confirmed cases and 38 deaths, the
highest number outside of the Middle East “despite the country’s world-
class medical infrastructure” (Kim, Lee & Lee, 2020). Issues with disclosure
of cases and data, failure in early diagnosis and containment of the virus in
hospitals, the cumbersome testing procedures led KCDC3 to further reform
its system, strengthen its risk communication and assessment strategies and
establish an Emergency Operations Center (Cho, 2020). After the MERS
experience, public disclosure provisions were added to the Infectious
Disease Control and Prevention Act, the legal framework for disease-
prevention policy in the country.
The first case of COVID-19 in Korea was detected on January 20 in an
3 In September 14, 2020, before this paper was finalized, KCDC was reorganized as KDCA
(see KDCA, 2020).
imported case from China. The number of cases did not accelerate until
February 17, the infamous 31st case. The Patient 31 who refused medical
attention and joined a gathering after showing symptoms has become a
global example of the importance of social distancing and isolation. In three
days, the numbers increased to 70 new cases and blew out as an outbreak. In
February 29, the pandemic hit its peak with 909 news cases. In the
following two weeks, efficient response greatly slowed down the viral
contagion, which resulted in only 64 new cases in March 23. In parallel to
the global second of wave and rapid spread of the pandemic, case numbers
considerably increased throughout the summer (going up as high as 441
new cases in August 26). Currently, the cases have been in decline as of
early Autumn. According to the Ministry of Health and Welfare, as of
September 19, 2020, 2.219.162 people have been tested; 22.893 were
confirmed positive; while 19.970 recovered. 2.545 people are currently
isolated, with 110 new cases; and 378 people in total deceased due to
COVID-19. (MOHW, 2020c).
The Korean response to COVID-19 has been deeply influenced by its
ineffective measures in past epidemics. The core values of Korea in the face
of COVID-19 are officially named (and abbreviated as) “TRUST,” standing
for transparency, responsibility, united actions, science & speed and together
in solidarity (MOFA, 2020b). In a WEF COVID Task Force meeting in
March, Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-hwa explained her country’s effective
response as a “joined up, all-government approach” which integrated all
central, regional and city governments, “absolute transparency with the
public” and testing as the central course of action (Fleming, 2020). Korea’s
current government response system consists of three main steps: 1.
preventing importation of the virus through border screening, 2. early
detection and control and 3. preventing spread of the virus through
epidemiological investigations and quarantine of contacts (MOHW, 2020a).
Early intervention, fast, frequent and widespread testing, effective tracing,
case surveillance and active public help and engagement are noted as key
characteristics of the country’s pandemic control strategy (Fisher & Choe,
2020).
Korea’s extensive ICT, AI and big data infrastructure is central for the
management, analysis and usage of the immense flow of information
regarding COVID-19. Since the first confirmed cases, public health

authorities have collaborated with local governments for the detailed
documentation of infected people, having a thorough investigation of
patients’ and potential patients’ moving histories via testimonies, CCTV
records and smartphone GPS data (H. J. Kim, 2020). Data accessibility in
the country has been high with the help of central and local governments
sharing information via websites, text messages and media organs, and
private companies developing applications to provide user-friendly access
to pandemic-related information. KDCD and MOLIT jointly developed the
Epidemic Investigation Support System (EISS), a system for epidemiological
investigations with the use of data provided by Smart City Data Hub, an
urban data analysis tool launched in 2018 (Millard, 2020). The system
allows health investigators to access surveillance cameras and credit card
transactions of confirmed cases. The self-quarantine safety protection
application by the Ministry of the Interior and Safety puts people in
quarantine in touch with case workers and can track their real time
locations. The Corona 100m (Co100) app allows citizens to be alert about
locations within a 100-meter radius visited by an infected person. Coronaita
functions as a search engine for risky areas and the Coronamap website
shows the travel histories of confirmed cases (Wray, 2020).
In addition to digital infrastructure; high public awareness, transparency
around data, widespread internet usage and digital literacy are critical in
Korea’s fight against COVID-19 through public support and trust in
government measures. Poll results displaying public trust in the government’s
response, high confidence and low panic also highlight people’s awareness,
cooperation and direct involvement in the pandemic control process. With a
“near wartime like common sense of purpose,” the Korean public has been
well informed and directed about the risks of the pandemic and primed by
the government to handle it as a national emergency (Fisher & Choe, 2020).
Vice Health Minister Kim Gang-lip credited the Korean people for the
effective flattening of the curve and underlined the importance of fully
informed citizens for the cooperation and public support in their fight
against pandemic (A. Kim, 2020). Similarly, Seoul Metropolitan
Government underlined international media attention on “Korea’s open
democracy and mature citizenship respecting the community spirit” and
highlighted the citizens’ strong sense of hygiene and voluntary participation

in social distancing as positive factors for effective pandemic control in the
city and country (Andrews, 2020).
With a response system that assumes looser lockdown measures, Korea
has expressed its intention to become a pioneer country in managing this
pandemic and doing it so with a distinct Korean style. Having effectively
flattened the curve of contagion as early as April, the government expressed
confidence in its effective measures to contain the virus and willingness to
share K-quarantine model with the international community. Defining it as a
“sturdy shield against COVID-19,” Korea pushes the standardization of its
K-quarantine model as a global standard for the effective management of
pandemics (MFDS, 2020). Based on a 3T approach (Testing/Confirmation,
Tracking/Epidemiology, Treatment/Quarantine), K-quarantine proposes an
18-step model including “drive-thru/walk-thru screening clinics” and “the
community treatment center operation model” (Shim, 2020). 11.4 billion
won ($9.5 million) is reported to be allocated “specifically for promoting”
K-quarantine (Lee & Baek, 2020).
By exporting K-quarantine, Korea aims to establish itself as a model
country in the face of a global pandemic. Sung Yun-mo, the Minister of
Trade, Industry and Energy underlined that “by making K-quarantine an
international standard, the nation will strengthen its global leadership and
play a leading role in forming a new international order” (Shim, 2020).
Similarly, Minister of Economy and Finance Hong Nam-ki emphasized
Korea’s “elevated stature in the international society for its handling of the
COVID-19 outbreak” and noted it as a chance for enhancing Korea’s global
reputation and branding as a “developed nation in the realm of preventing
the spread of infectious diseases” (Lee & Baek, 2020). The World
Economic Forum (2020) acknowledges the role model status of Korea by
putting “setting an example during a pandemic” as one of the major key
words on its strategic trends profile. Moreover, the K-quarantine model is
promoted for providing Korean brands and companies with an opportunity
to expand and become internationally better known. To showcase the
increasing demand across the world, government-led online platform Korea.
net has released an article series that “features every week a ‘K-quarantine’
company that is expanding internationally through an opportunity presented
by the pandemic” (Xu & Lee, 2020).

Korean official information services are doing an effective job in
promoting Korean pandemic management to the international community.
Government websites are largely available in English and COVID-19 data
is conveniently accessible for the international audience. Supported by
charts, daily press releases contain regional data, cluster outbreaks
(industries, hospitals, events etc.) and chains of transmissions in an
intelligible and transparent manner (MOHW, 2020c). The Ministry of
Health and Welfare releases material for foreign media on its website
(MOHW, 2020b). COVID-related official data are also delivered via
Arirang TV/Radio, an English-language public service agency that aims to
“burnish Korea’s image in international communities and to improve
relationships with foreign countries” (Arirang, 2018). Arirang’s TV, radio
and online platforms cover daily pandemic data, provide commentaries and
broadcasts government briefings to inform international audience.
“SMART” KOREA AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
The Korean style of doing things, or “K-style” is an important public

diplomacy item for Korea’s international recognition. Korean smart city
policy and official discourse showcase that the country takes pride in being
a role model in smart developments across the world and intends to ensure
it by exporting Korean style smart city package programs to other countries.
This study observes that Korea’s smart city policies and implementations in
the past two decades can serve as an instrument for forming and conveying
a “smart Korea” image to the foreign publics. Led mainly by the government,
Korea does not only aim to perfect its smart technological infrastructure but
also to improve public-private partnerships, corporate initiatives, urban
governance tools as well as social inclusivity to actualize this comprehensive
urban model in practice. Continuing to grow into one of the textbook
examples of the smart city concept itself, smart Korea carries great public
diplomacy potential for Korea’s future.
Korea’s smart city infrastructure has displayed a pivotal role in the
effective management of open data, contact-tracing and successful
containment during the COVID-19 pandemic. By utilizing the smart

infrastructure of cities, Korea has been able to set itself apart as one of the
leading examples of efficient control and management of a pandemic via
smart technologies, governance and citizens. This real-life example of a
positive experience of smart city tools can serve as evidence of the
effectiveness of smart infrastructure and overall smart urban models in the
country. Tangible results obtained via effective use of smart city tools
during a global pandemic can be expected to attract a greater international
audience since sharing best practices and applying them in local contexts
proves especially important during a global public health crisis. K-quarantine
modeling, which was initially produced for the domestic containment of the
virus, shows the Korean government’s determination to make country’s
name connote positive, smart and capable solutions in the middle of a crisis.
The smartness of Korea is not limited to its technology. In line with the
smart city concept’s emphasis on social and humanitarian applications,
Korean smart cities are able to function with and for Korean people. While
the central government sets the legal and administrative framework, official
discourse highlights the importance of the participatory, inclusive and
interactive nature of smart cities with its citizens. From the Seoul
Metropolitan Government’s “citizens as mayors” approach to “smart
people” being one of the major pillars of the government’s smart city
masterplan, smart people are a fundamental part of the Korean smart city
vision. Korean citizens are also an essential component for the country’s
smart response to the pandemic. Utilization of smart city infrastructure
during COVID-19 has underlined the importance of citizens’ management,
self-control and understanding of flexible lockdown measures on their daily
lives. Officials crediting Korean people for their cooperation and
commonsense, effective containment of the virus is made possible not only
with smart technologies but also with smart people who utilize them to
produce better life conditions.
Given pandemic circumstances, Korea’s will to establish itself as a role
model in smart city developments has found solid ground in the COVID-19
world. In this new configuration, Korea displays a remarkable example of
smart urbanism. Led by administrative and financial support of the central
government, public-private partnerships, large industries, small start-ups
and social stakeholders have ensured the sustainability and adaptability of

smart systems in Korean cities. High internet penetration, digital literacy
and e-government experiences have prepared the Korean public for an open
data circulation and equipped them with a smart citizen attitude. This
smartization also represents a breakaway from less-transparent management
of the MERS crisis with lower levels of public confidence and knowledge.
In a COVID-infected world, Korean smart city resources, both with
technologies and people, can be more relevant than ever as nation brands.
Korean smart cities were already important urban models for better life
standards and sustainable urban spaces in the pre-COVID world, but they
reemphasize their immense potential as engines of public health and
wellbeing now. Pandemic circumstances have presented Korea with a
chance to establish or further improve a “smart Korea” brand with the
effective use of its smart resources and its promotion in the international
community. The country already invests extensively in smart city policies,
possesses and develops high-tech infrastructures along with expertise,
highlights its merits in official discourse and exports them under Korean
named commercial packages. With this leverage, Korea can take a step
further and expand its smart branding beyond high-technology to include its
human capital and expertise. A comprehensive “smart Korea” / “smart
nation” brand which simultaneously encompasses technology, citizens,
governance and know-how would enhance Korea’s overall nation brand and
highlight it as a smart international player.
CONCLUSION
This paper observes that the Korean smart city experience proposes a high
potential for the country’s smart branding and provides it with a strong
public diplomacy leverage as a leading model in holistic smart systems.
Actualizing the smart city ideal, which incorporates ICT and IoT-based
connected technological infrastructure with communitarian, inclusive and
humane ends, Korea’s COVID-19 experience highlights the country’s
leading role in smart urban developments and enables it to set itself apart as
an exemplary case. Both governmental and citizen level smart attitudes
appear to have played an important role in the transparent, accountable and

clear communication of pandemic-related data in Korea’s COVID-19
management. With local government and business level contributions for a
smoother communication across the country, Korea has served as an
example of a smart national experience of a pandemic situation.
Smartization policies and smart technological advancements are nothing
novel for Korea, even less in the world. While physical infrastructure is a
significant component of smart urban systems, their positive, communitarian
and inclusive results in real life are not guaranteed. Massive flow of data,
mapping and tracing contacts, keeping travel histories and utilization of
surveillance systems are susceptible to create unbalanced, authoritarian and
nearly dystopian managements. This paper suggests that pandemic control
in Korea has presented the opportunity for the international community to
witness utilization of smart technologies by purposeful management of
central government with local, corporate and citizen partners to function
altogether for effective and transparent crisis management. Korean people,
already well-accustomed to ICT and smart data literacy and inclusivity
through smart and e-government services on daily lives, have shown the
possibility for participatory use of smart technologies. The post-pandemic
world may remain unpredictable; however, it can be one in which Korea
reaffirms its role as a smart urban model and inspires the world with its
enhanced smart image.
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165
Korean Anti-Corruption Public Diplomacy
Azul van Marrewijk and Genaro Viesti
Abstract | No country is free of corruption and the Republic of Korea is

no exception. In the last decade, civil society has taken an active role in the
fight against it: the Candlelight Revolution and the removal of Park being
the most important events. The Moon administration has tried since the
beginning to portray a renewed and more proactive attitude in the fight
against corruption around the world. In order to demonstrate the changes
occurring in regards to anti-corruption, public diplomacy has become key.
This paper focuses on the international work of the ACRC as a public
diplomacy tool and the values transmitted by the ODA regarding anti-
corruption. Furthermore, it points out the changes of the official authority’s
speech and the efforts to strengthen and deepen bilateral and multilateral
relations.
Key words | Corruption, Korea, Public Diplomacy, Candlelight
Revolution, ACRC, ODA, Speech, bilateral relations.
국문초록 | 어떤 국가도 부패에서 자유로울 수 없으며 대한민국도 예외는 아

니다. 지난 십여 년 간 시민 사회는 부패에 맞서 적극적으로 싸웠으며, 촛불 항쟁
과 박근혜의 하야가 그 중 가장 중요한 사건들이었다. 문재인 정권은 처음부터
전세계의 부패에 맞선 싸움에 대해 새롭고 적극적인 태도를 보이려고 노력했다.
반(反)부패에 관련해 일어나고 있는 변화들을 보여주기 위해 공공 외교가 매우
중요해졌다. 이 논문은 공공 외교 도구로서 ACRC의 국제적 사업과 공적개발원
조가 반(反)부패에 대해 전달하는 가치에 초점을 맞춘다. 나아가 이 글은 공권력
담화의 변화와 양자적, 다자적인 관계들을 강화하고 심화시키기 위한 노력들에
주목한다.
INTRODUCTION
In 2016, for the first time in history, the Republic of Korea went through a
successful impeachment for corruption and influence peddling, which ended
in the anticipated exit of the former president Park Geun-hye. Since this
scandalous event, Korea’s new administration has been trying to strengthen
and deepen its bilateral and multilateral relations in various regions of the
world, in order to portray a renewed and more proactive attitude towards
fighting corruption.
Before the impeachment, the Republic of Korea was actively trying to
grow as a good international citizen. Not only helping multiple countries of
the world to economically develop by following its historical experience,
but also fighting against corruption and keeping high levels of transparency,
vital for any democratic model. The most vital tools for the development of
this stance were the approval of different plans of action against corruption
from international forums and organizations as, for example, the G20 and
the OECD (organization for economic cooperation and development), the
formalization of economic relations and the use of elements like the ODA
(Official Development Assistance) with different states.
Nevertheless, the impeachment process wrecked these plans. On the one
hand, it called into question the integrity of Korea’s own political system.
On the other hand, it questioned the integrity of the plan to show Korea as a
diplomatic example for other countries. In this unique context, the Moon
Jae-In administration came to power with the difficult task of improving the
country’s internal transparency and making the heavily criticized public
diplomacy mechanisms more efficient.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the context, the mechanisms and the
changes that the Republic of Korea underwent during the Moon
administration, in regards to anti-corruption and public diplomacy. In order
to do so, this paper will focus on a series of specific questions which shift
from horizontal to vertical approaches of the society and the state.
1. ‌How has public diplomacy related to anti-corruption changed

during the Moon administration in the Republic of Korea?
2. ‌What changed in the official authorities´ speech regarding the
Korean Anti-Corruption Public Diplomacy 167
corruption and which was the international reception?

3. ‌Which is the role of ODA in the public diplomacy of the Republic
of Korea in matters of anti-corruption and what have been its
recent changes?
Corruption is a wide concept with multiple definitions, Arvind K. Jain

explains that “How corruption is defined actually ends up determining what
gets modeled and measured” (Jain, 2001, p. 73). It is because of this that
this paper is going to use the next definition that frames itself within the
public sector and is proposed by Norman Abjorensen (2014):
In its general use in public discourse, it is understood, firstly, to

categorize those practices, mostly illegal but not always, in which
people or organizations bribe officials responsible for granting
permissions, awarding contracts or issuing licenses contracts. It is
also understood secondly, in the sense of avoiding punishment for
offences committed. In other words, corruption is understood as
obtain privileges against the law or against the rules and regulations
of the bureaucracy. (...) (p. 14).
This becomes especially important because during the destitution

process, a great number of public figures, with economic and political
power were involved in alleged fraudulent connections, in order to obtain
benefits and privileges.
Moreover, another main concept is Public Diplomacy, which has had
multiple definitions over time. According to Snow (2009) public diplomacy
was traditionally understood as the dialogue between governments and the
international public, where they aim to influence, communicate and create
acceptance to the national interests. However, the proliferation of different
actors and mass media created a need for a redefinition of public diplomacy.
Hans Touch understood then the concept as “a process of the communications
with the public of foreign countries to promote a nation’s goals and policies
and to promote the understanding of its thoughts and ideals as well as
systems and culture.” (Yun. 2012. pp. 279-280). On the other hand, Paul
Sharp defined it as “a process of forming a direct relation with the people of
other nations in order to enhance the interests of the people and to promote
their values.” (Yun. 2012. p 280). These two definitions are, under the
context in which this paper is framed, more accurate as they show the
different channels of public diplomacy. As Ma, Song & Moore (2012) say
“Public diplomacy is aimed towards winning the hearts and minds of
foreigners. Governments are not alone in enacting public diplomacy, but
enterprises, non-government organizations (NGOs), and even private
citizens can play a large role.” (p.3).
One of the biggest challenges of this paper lies in the intrinsic nature of
the problem studied. Corruption is hardly ever outsourced beyond the
borders of a country or discussed as a priority to public diplomacy. It is
important to mention, as public diplomacy is the main element that states
like the Republic of Korea use to express their image on an international
level. For this reason, it becomes a key factor in this study.
Therefore, this paper will be focused in a qualitative and quantitative
analysis using public declarations and statistics from different official
institutions of Korea like the presidential office, the Anti-Corruption and
Civil Rights Commission (ACRC) and other international organizations like
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the
International Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA), the United Nations (UN)
and others. Furthermore, some specific indicators like the volume and type
of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) that Korea destines for
Education and Government and Civil Administration will be taken into
account.
Regarding structure, the paper will, firstly, explain the context previous
to the arrival of the Moon Jae-in administration, with a brief historical
analysis of the Republic of Korea, and the historical changes regarding the
fight against corruption. Secondly, there will be an analysis of the changes
caused by the demonstrations known as the Candlelight Revolution, with an
emphasis in the new international role of the current administration as an
active force in the fight against corruption. Thirdly, the main element of
Korean public diplomacy, the ODA, will be analyzed through its executing
bodies and its variations during these last years. Finally, there will be
conclusions and challenges drawn from the investigation.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The history of corruption in Korea is complex and full of variations. Its

beginning can be tracked to the rise to power of dictator Park Chung-Hee in
1962. Chung-Hee ruled the country for almost two decades and was the
progenitor of the current economic model. This new economic model aimed
to break the agrarian nature of the country to transform it into an urban and
industrial one that would be closely controlled by the government. Thanks
to its success, the Republic of Korea evolved from one of the poorest
countries, dependent on international help, to one of the rising Asian Tigers,
a country in the process of industrialization1 (Cho. 2017. P.11).
During this period and the following military regime of Chun Doo-
Hwan (1980-1988), the government “was characterized by the shameless
and ruthless exercise of power, the ordering of policies in a one-way
fashion, cronyism and rampant corruption from the top.” (Cho. 2017. p 13),
there was a close relationship between economy and government. This
relationship was so strong that the political donations that the big
corporations gave to the governing group came to consideration as a method
of “Quasi taxation” (Park. 1995. P.177). Many of the recently consolidated
Chaebols2 were looking to establish good relationships with these regimes
in order to create favorable power relations. Besides, it was believed that
state officials and other persons with access to secret information exploited
this privilege to obtain different benefits (Park. 1995. P.180).
All the above was socially acceptable due to the huge desire from the
society to get out of poverty and accomplish material prosperity. As Kim
said (2006) “the traditional Confucian work ethic and the willingness of
parents to sacrifice for their children’s education must have played a role in
economic development. 3 “(Cho. 2017 p 12). This imperious need of
economic growth avoided for some time the debate about those dubious
practices, creating some kind of tolerance or as Lintjer (2001) would say,
they started to be seen as “an indispensable lubricant for economic growth.”
1 Personally translated quote. The original text is in Spanish.

2 They are large economic conglomerates that specialize in multiple areas. The best known
are Samsung, Lg, Hyundai or Lotte.
(Abjorensen, 2014, p. 6).

As a consequence of the repressive nature of those regimes and their
hierarchical and competitive character, a new movement in favor of the
democratization of the country was born between university students,
intellectuals and religious sectors. This demand was highly influenced by
the excessive work hours that the working class (to which a lot of students
belonged) endured, their bad economic remuneration and the lack of civil
rights and liberties because of the abuse of power. Those movements aimed
to establish democracy in a country known for being ruled by authoritative
military regimes that prioritized the economic development over the welfare
of the citizens4 (Cardenas. 2017 p. 99).
The theoretical term Minjung started to be used for all those movements
in favor of democracy. The theory addresses the importance of an emotional
connection between the oppressed and demands that the ruling elite respects
the minimum of moral norms (Cárdenas. 2017. p.99). This is important
because it is the first time that the Korean society demands responsibility
and good use of trusted power.
After the return of democracy in 1988, the civil governments found
themselves in a highly favorable situation (both internal and international)
to make changes and expand in the diplomatic field. On the one hand, the
end of the Cold War gave those governments the ideal opportunity to
expand their relations with other parts of the world. During the ‘90s the
Republic of Korea experienced a peak in its public diplomacy, especially by
joining the UN in 1991 and the OECD in 1996. Furthermore, the government
created some tools to communicate its plan of public diplomacy:
The Foreign Ministry created the Korea Foundation in 1991 in order

to do the following: (1) raise awareness of Korea in international
society; (2) promote international friendship and cooperation; and (3)
support Korea’s increasingly proactive diplomatic status in the
international community as a result of its entry into the UN and
OECD (Choi. 2019 pp 11-12).

Meanwhile, in the internal affairs, the government tried to consolidate

some cultural elements (language, sports, gastronomy). Besides, they
created some regulatory mechanisms for activities inside the country. For
instance, in 1993, the Kim Young-Sam´s administration introduced new
asset disclosure regulations for senior government officials and certain
elective office holders (Park 1995 p. 181). Or the creation of the Korea
Independent Commission Against Corruption (KICAC) in 2002, as a
product of the joint effort between civil society, the academy and the
government to emphasize the fight against corruption as a key element of
their agendas, in tune with global anti-corruption initiatives like the Anti-
Bribery Convention of the OECD.
This was the first time that the anti-corruption agenda coincides with an
international guideline and it’s shown as an important part of public
diplomacy, no longer being only an internal issue but an international one.
Regardless of the Korean efforts and the ideal context, the country could
not control corruption in the highest levels of political and economic power,
the one that most impacts citizens. Every president, except Park Chung-Hee
(who was killed in 1979), was investigated for causes of corruption or
involved in fraud scandals both during and after their terms (Pohlmann &
Kwon. 2017). This was due to multiple factors that occurred simultaneously:
In regards to party politics, Korea has very closed and highly

competitive politics, which according to Cho (2017) are of personal
nature and create patron-client relations, where the voters of a
political faction should try to have strong links with the leader to
obtain benefits, which causes favoritism or personal cronyism
relations 5 (p 23). This coincides with You´s statement that “In
today’s South Korean politics, clientelistic competition based on
particularistic provision of constituency services and favors for
political support is still significant (…)” (You. N.d p. 4).
Regarding the economy, the huge concentration of business power of the

Chaebols and their deep links with politics are historically known. They

tend to maintain clientelistic relationships and sustain a vertical political

status quo thanks to their capacity to give resources, especially money. Cho
(2017) says that those relations have generated economic groups to seem
“untouchable” by society. In addition, they were protected by state sectors
that consider them essential for the development of the country6 (pp. 21,
24-25).
Socially, you would say that after 1987 there was a big social pressure
and civil interest to deal with the issues related to corruption and transparency,
especially via NGOs (pp 24-25). As seen previously, this pressure led to the
government caving to these demands. However, Cardenas (2017) states that
the lack of agreement between progressive sectors (heirs to the pro-
democracy movements) and the shift towards more economic interest by the
citizens after the crisis of 1997 made the Minjung smaller 7 (p. 101).
Consequently, it resulted in a gradual loss of interest in the fight against
corruption that made it difficult to maintain cohesion of the message at the
international level.
THE CONSERVATIVE RETURN AND THE CANDLELIGHT

REVOLUTION
The arrival of the “conservative decade” increased those problems. Lee

Myung-Bak came to power in 2008, reinforcing the economic rhetoric
again. Cho (2017) states that “Lee sought policies that favored the
concentration of national resources in the capital, Seoul, as well as the
economic stimulus based on mega-projects of large-scale civil engineering
construction and the reduction of the corporate tax” (p 14). In comparison
with the previously mentioned era, it meant an increase in the power of the
large economic groups, which benefited greatly. And, it meant the decline of
social freedoms, for example, workers´ protests tended to be repressed.
Using these mechanisms, the new administration prioritizes security over
freedoms. This was reflected in various international indexes and reports8

(Bavoleo, 2016 p. 20).

Despite this, the conservatives won the elections again in 2013, now
under the leadership of Park Geun-Hye, the daughter of the dictator Park
Chung-Hee. Her rhetoric was not only focused on the economic premises
that her party proposed, but also contained a strong traditional element that
echoed her father´s former mandate during the 60s and 70s. After having a
rapid ascension in politics, Park quickly styled herself as a candidate with
principles and created a lot of expectations. Sung & Uk (2017) argue that:
“(…) there were high expectations of her administration as no woman

had previously played an important role in South Korean politics.
Thus, Park Geun-hye’s victory in the presidential election led to the
belief that South Korea’s democratic system would further mature,
and gender inequality in politics and society would improve.” (p. 2).
Nevertheless, Park would go down in history not because of the positive

changes people expected from her, but, in fact, because she was the first
president to be successfully removed from office after being involved in
multiple corruption scandals during her term. This would generate, given
the high level of the scandals, a social turmoil that would radically change
the control over this type of activities.
Even though the country was continuing with Action Plans against
Corruption from forums like the G20, a series of controversial and internally
mishandled events began to show that corruption and transparency were not
properly addressed and there was no correlation with the international
message that was taking place.
In 2014, a ferry carrying students on a school trip sank and left more
than 300 dead. The media immediately covered the incident while the
government chose to remain silent. Later on, instead of clarifying the facts
behind the sinking or supporting the families of the victims, the government
reacted by repressing both the relatives and those who demanded in depth
investigations9 (Cardenas. 2017 p.104). This proved again that there is
certain secrecy and private control of information in an exclusive sector,

which limits transparency.

Moreover, there was an even worse case in 2016. Cho (2017) mentions
several news stories started to emerge about the diversion of funds in the
form of large donations from Chaebols to shell companies that belonged to
a close and unknown friend of the President Park.
These revelations aroused the anger of the population. Even more so
when it was discovered that the mysterious friend, later known as Choi
Soon-Sil, had used part of those suspicious funds to place her daughter in
one of the most prestigious universities in the country, when she did not
meet the minimum requirements for admission. People were outraged by
the scandal because it proved that the political system was flawed and full
of special privileges, irregularities and inequalities (Lee. 2018. p. 10).
In parallel, several civilian groups began to demand justice and changes
within the system (in addition to Park´s own removal) in their Saturday
marches characterized by the use of small candles. Named the Candlelight
Revolution, the movement that started with the marches was fully horizontal,
reviving some of the old Minjung and showing high levels of consensus and
common interest. Its enormous size helped the demands be collected by the
political parties, the same that would later organize the impeachment trial.
The Legislative Power approved the impeachment and the constitutional
court ruled against Park (both with conservative majorities), establishing
that she would be removed from office on March 10, 2017.
This experience of citizen expression made clear some questions that
Cho (2017) points out:
The importance of the power of the people (People Power) is as

follows: first, it drives the change on truly important issues for society;
second, it provides a psycho-political catharsis; third, it plays a
concrete role in the civic and political education of the nation. (pp
21-22)10
As a result of the Candlelight Revolution, civil society brought back the

need for moral and political responsibility. Society felt a change was needed

to transform from mere spectator to active monitor in their democracy.
THE ACRC’S ANTI-CORRUPTION PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THE

MOON JAE-IN’S ERA, AN OPPORTUNITY FOR CHANGES
Moon Jae-in became the direct heir to most of the demands from the
Candlelight Revolution following his inauguration in 2017. In light of this,
Moon’s opening speech11 had a peacemaking undertone that made it clear
that the demands for increasing control and prosecution of corruption were
not going to be ignored (Arirang News, 2017). At the same time, the
horizontal approach from the president and his efforts to be closer to his
countrymen showed the intention to create a new governmental standard
where disinformation and concentrated power will no longer be tolerated.
This optimistic tone and the growing relations between society and state
were used to emphasize the need to answer the demands and show a new
methodology to do so. An interesting change in the rhetoric is that from here
on, more active relations with the world will be proposed in order to fight
its inequalities. This clearly implies that what happened is not going to
remain in Korea, but will be shared with a double purpose that is worth
mentioning, we consider pertinent to the study: (i) the mention that he
would take into account the international environment is a clear way of
signaling the path of public diplomacy. One that would go hand in hand
with the idea of “Korea as an example.” (ii) The country’s increased
international participation in activities against corruption can be seen as an
indicator for the society that their demands are taken seriously and are a
priority in the government’s agenda.
Inside the wide concept of Public Diplomacy, declarations and speeches
are considered valid elements for its analysis. In this particular case study,
we found that corruption is greatly considered in these matters. Specially,
through a specific organism like the ACRC that its related with multiple
forums and international organizations like the UN, OECD, IAAC, and
11 For more details, we recommend watching the full speech. https://www.youtube.com/

watch?v=iu0xFdKcLRs&ab_channel=ARIRANGNEWS.
others.
The words of Moon’s opening speech quickly became part of a
continuous rhetoric in forums with his citizens and with other world leaders.
In 2017, his first year as a president, he made a point to contact other
leaders. For example, during the visit of the president of Sri Lanka, he
pointed out the similarities between the two countries and the shared
interest in defending human rights and advocating towards more
transparency. Besides, this also happened after the summit between North
Korea and USA in Singapore, when Moon gave a speech in a university. In
it he encourages both societies to participate in the fight against corruption
and acknowledge that Korea can learn a lot of lessons from Singapore.
(Cheong Wa Dae, 2018)
Abjorensen (2014) states that the Asian continent is considered one of
the most vulnerable to corruption due to its large size, fast economic growth
and large demographics that make it difficult for the government to reach
and control irregular activities. Because of this, it is not surprising that most
allies and examples for Korea during Moon’s presidency have been Asian
states. Furthermore, Asia is the main destination of Korea´s ODA and most
of its public diplomacy efforts.
The importance given to the president and what he says and does can be
explained by two reasons. The first is the high degree of presidentialism that
strongly represents the Korean political system according to Cho (2017).
This major element has a lot to do with its importance and representativeness.
In addition, the presidency has historically been one of the most vulnerable
figures to high level corruption (his predecessor being the clearest example).
The second reason is that the president and the ACRC are the greatest
exponents to show changes and continuities in the matters of transparency
since they both contribute and are vital for an adequate and clear development
of public diplomacy.
At the international level, Korea has always shown itself as a country
with some elements that allow corruption, acknowledging it and always
searching for new ways to fight it. Park’s impeachment and the Candlelight
Revolution were reinforcement of this will for change and the country used
this experience to be an example for others in different forums and
conventions.
The ACRC serves as the other great Korean weapon to fight against
corruption and create transparent frameworks. This Commission was
created in 2008 and is the merger of its predecessors, the KICAC, the
Ombudsman’s office and the Administrative Appeals Commission. It works
as an independent body from the political power and only responds to the
president. Furthermore, in regards to public diplomacy, it is more often than
not the head of the delegations in front of conventions, forums and
organizations that fight corruption and work towards higher levels of
transparency. It also contributes to bilateral cooperation against corruption
with other states and its counterpart organizations, mostly in Asia. (ACRC,
2015)
From the beginning, the ACRC has made efforts to implement the
international conventions that the country and the organization had signed
and ratified. Its presence as an advocate to the country in matters of
corruption shows the status that the organization has, one that has been
strengthened with the new administration, which has a very similar agenda.
One of the main elements used by the ACRC in public diplomacy is the
Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) that are signed by different states
and organizations, most of them about anti-corruption cooperation that
encourages the exchange of tools, experience and information. The MOU
on anti-corruption cooperation with Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia were
signed before 2013 and have had different renewals.
In 2011, the G20 Anti-corruption Working Group was created and the
ACRC has been in charge of leading the Korean delegation in it since then.
The organization is also responsible for monitoring and making reports on
the activities of different governments to the group. The presentations vary
every year but the ACRC always makes sure to be present and take part in
the discussions. (ARCR, 2015)
In 2012, the ACRC signed a MOU to share information and experience
with the International Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA). They seek to form
professionals and public officers to be able to make lasting impacts in the
fight against corruption.
During Park’s government in 2014, the commission worked closely with
the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other
government agencies to fulfill their role as head of the Korean delegation in
the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group, where they reported the country’s
efforts against corruption. Additionally, it held talks with the World Bank
about techniques to improve transparency. In addition to this, in an attempt
to improve the Corruption Perception Index, the ACRC held its seventh
briefing session for all CEOs in the country and to present their plans to the
Center for Public Integrity (CPI). It helped that an ACRC officer was
elected senior academic officer for the IACA educational program.
Meanwhile, the commission carried out a bilateral project with the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom to improve the
Korean legal frameworks against corruption, while reporting activities to
the public and the private sectors. Together they also hosted an informational
seminar.
In 2015, the ACRC signed an anti-corruption MOU with the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP) in order to share Korea´s best
practices with developing countries. The Republic of Korea seeks to open
up via its public diplomacy about its successful model of growth and
development. This agreement is very important because it comes along with
measures and tools to be used by developing states to prevent problems that
come with growth, like corruption and the mishandling of public
information. (ACRC, 2015)
The MOU with the UNDP bolsters the Korean efforts of accomplishing
the Sustainable Development Goals that the country signed as part of the
Agenda for Sustainable Development. In this case, the SDG number 16 is
taken into account, which stands to promote just, peaceful and inclusive
societies and two of its goals are to significantly reduce corruption and
bribery in all its forms and to create effective and transparent accountable
institutions at all levels. (UN, 2015)
Furthermore, the ARCR co-created next to the UNDP a project to
introduce anti-corruption policy evaluation in public institutions of Vietnam.
It was called the Anti-Corruption Initiative Assessment (AIA).
In addition, the importance that Korea gives to its regional allies in
cooperation with transparency was shown in the signing of a MOU with
Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) with the presence of
both presidents, Park Geun-Hye and Joko Widodo. This time without the
presence of the presidents, the ACRC also signed a MOU with Vietnam to
continue cooperating for two more years (when it would be renewed).

The presence and participation of the ACRC in the G20 Anti-Corruption
Working Group Meeting, in the APEC and in the ADB/OECD (Consultative
Group for Asia Pacific) during 2016 was shadowed by the internal turmoil.
(ACRC, 2016) They created a series of questions about the correlation
between what was shown and its effectiveness.
The election of Moon meant a new opportunity to make amends for past
errors and increase efforts in the international fight against corruption. The
ACRC underwent multiple changes in internal personnel. It changed and
updated its logo and its networks, as a way to show the change and the
intention to meet the demands of the people. At the international level, the
presence in forums and conventions was maintained and in some cases
increased, while more MOU were signed and there was an effort to organize
more international activities.
In the first year of the new administration, two big conventions were
organized in the capital to present cases of anti-corruption that the
Commission was working on and during the G20 it shared its experience
from the last year. This was also used as a way to promote the 2018 Winter
Olympics that took place in Pyeongchang.
Besides, the ACRC with the UNDP replicated the AIA project in Kosovo
and Myanmar. (ACRC, 2017)
During 2018 four MOU of anti-corruption cooperation were signed with
Tunisia, Myanmar, Iraq and Qatar and the ones with Indonesia and Vietnam
were renewed. In the APEC Working Group the ACRC presented the
Korean system for protection of public interest whistleblowers, which was
deemed the best practice of the year by countries like Canada, Taiwan and
Malaysia. Furthermore, the Commission published the Best Practice
Compendium based on the studies from 2017 about the policies that the
G20 countries did to encourage public organizations to take the initiative in
the effort against corruption. And the ACRC presented its system for
prevention in public institutions called the Korea Online E-Procurement
System at the ABD/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative meeting.
Korea also received an inspection from the OECD secretariat, which
recruited the help of Italy and Finland to see the progress in implementation.
The inspection resulted in a series of recommendations about strengthening
regulations for corporations and promoting cooperation between police and

the prosecution. (ACRC, 2018)
The ACRC continued to work toward the increase and straightening of
bilateral relations with other countries during 2019, when it signed two
MOU with Kuwait and Uzbekistan. This meant that in the three years of the
new administrations, six MOU were signed.
The commission was the head of the delegation in various conferences
and forums, setting its plans into motion. It drew attention because of the
technical assistance it gave to developing countries to fight against corruption.
(ACRC, 2019) During these presentations it mentioned the conferences that
would be held in 2020 in the country. Specially the International Anti-
Corruption Conference (IACC), the largest conference about corruption,
that is programmed to take place in December 2020 in the city of Busan. In
order to prepare properly for it, the ARCR signed a MOU to organize it with
Transparency International. The agenda will be “Designing 2030: Truth,
Trust and Transparency.”
In February of 2020 the council chair Hughete Labelle of the IACC
visited Korea and gave a conference to motivate civil society to continue
participating in anti-corruption activities. President Moon acknowledged
that part of the reason he was elected was due to the interest in society for a
more transparent government. For this reason, he wants to reach the top 20
in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index by 2022.
(Cheong Wa Dae, 2018). Even though Korea has been rising steadily in that
index, this goal is very ambitious and shows the interest in increasing
transparency.
It can be said that Korea has always shown an interest, participating in
forums, conventions and projects to fight corruption, even though it is a
systemic problem of the country. But the Candlelight Revolution can be
considered an inflection point in the country that obliged the new
administration to have more correlation between its international and
internal message and its policies and projects against corruption.
THE USE OF ODA AS A COMPLEMENT AGAINST CORRUPTION
After Korea’s sustained economic growth, it started to invest and participate

in aid programs with developing countries of various regions of the world
during the 80s. In the beginning, under a military regime, the aid programs
were used for political and diplomatic purposes, or as Teo, Singh and Tan
(2013) mention “Korea’s deeper engagement was driven by “an attempt to
increase its worldwide legitimacy in contrast to the influence of [North
Korea]” (p. 10). Years later, under democracy, the aids started to be closely
related to specific government goals, like deepening bilateral relations,
economic goals or the exportation of Korean culture.
After joining the OECD in 1996 and the DAC (Development Assistance
Committee) in 2010, the ODA became the main element in Korean public
diplomacy because it is a good way to maintain deep relations with the
states that received the aid and permits the country to share its experience as
an exemplary state. Especially since Korea is the latest country to join the
DAC to date.
The Committee for International Development (CIDC) is the main one
in charge of ODA in Korea and recognizes it as “government aid that is
designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing
Source: OECD.stats and CIDC.

Figure 1.
countries, and includes the provision of grants, loans and technical

assistance to developing countries or international organizations” (CIDC.
2017. P. 8). It is chaired by the Prime Minister and formed by a group of
experts in development cooperation, different ministers (especially Minister
of Economy and Finance and Minister of Foreign Affairs) and the president
of KOICA and KEXIM.
The ODA does not have a specialized sector to fight against corruption.
Because of it, many scholars cannot find an agreement on the effects the
ODA has on transparency in the recipient countries. Especially because of
how difficult it is to measure its overall effectiveness. As Jeong (2018)
explains:
“The criticism leveled against foreign aid volumes given by donor

countries is that it has led to grown government bureaucracies, bad
governance, and high corruption within governments where a few
elites benefit as the majority poor become poorer since they have to
shoulder the burden of repaying the concessional loans given
through tax.” (p 1446).
Nevertheless, it is possible to analyze two specific areas that can be seen

as pillars to generate more regulated frameworks and stronger and more
transparent institutions in the recipient states. Those two areas are Education
and Government and Civil Administration, where Korea shares its
experiences and knowledge.
Even though the previous administrations were essentially different,
they both placed a strong emphasis on ODA for Education, mostly at the
secondary and university level. According to the CIDC definition, the ODA
has an economic and commercial perspective of productive development
and its derivatives. But in this case, it comes with the promotion of Korean
culture, history and values.
ODA for Education is not only to acquire tools and knowledge for
professional development but to get values and costumes that are vital for
the next generation of a transparent government. According to Lintjter’s
definition these values are extremely necessary to fight parsimony and
passivity in the face of corruption or private management of public
Table 1.
*all the numbers are in millions US$. Source: OECD.Stats
information. Education creates a movement of ideas and a greater awareness,

which indirectly, have an impact on the treatment of corruption and the
search for greater transparency frameworks.
In addition, the ODA for Government highlights the importance of
strong institutions, vitals to democracy and as a control mechanism between
the government and the society. It is important, then, to observe Robert
Dahl’s (1979) polyarchy concept: “polyarchies are substantially liberalized
and popularized systems, that is, very representative while frankly open to
public debate” (p 18). Polyarchies are characterized by being democratic
regimes with a high degree of transparency in regards to transparent
management of information. Besides, they value equality and equity
between who composes them. Finally, citizen participation and shared
information are key elements to the shaping of political agendas.
The Candlelight Revolution could be used as an example to developing
countries, reflecting the values necessary in a society to work towards
transparency.
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
No country is free of corruption. It is an evil that affects all levels of

governments to a greater or lesser extent. In the case of the Republic of
Korea, through time corruption became a systemic problem strongly related
to its corporation-centered economic model. Regardless, in the last decade,
civil society has taken an active role in the fight against corruption,
demanding government openness. The Candlelight Revolution and the
removal of President Park are proof that the civil society will not accept
corruption anymore. The new administration or the ones to come know
what is to be expected from them and that a good economic plan does not
exclude their moral responsibilities.
The Moon administration understood that people needed a change in the
way to fight corruption, and as a result, created different plans of action
implementing them with the assistance of the ACRC. The commission also
handled a big part of the international relations regarding anti-corruption.
Delegating has always been a part of the ACRC’s activities, but, since the
change of government, it can be seen as a growing international presence
and an effort to cooperate with other countries against corruption. This was
well received and helped to build the image of Korea as a country advocating
transparency and giving it an important place in its public diplomacy.
Korea´s ODA is not specialized in the fight against corruption. Still,
some side benefits can be recognized that help inform and provide tools to
encourage transparency. Specifically, the ODA for Education and
Government and Civil Administration, in spite of having the strong
commercial undertone of the ODA, encourage good values. These values
point out to developing countries the importance of looking beyond the
Korean economic model and take into consideration the effects of not
demanding government openness. During the Moon administration the
ODA regained momentum because they were complemented by the actions
of several institutions and from civil society.
Corruption is one of the most difficult problems to measure and control
and is usually considered only from an internal perspective. Studying
corruption through the ODA indicators is a challenge because they are not
specified for that task. This paper intended to analyze the changes made by
the Korean government to fight against corruption, highlighting the

importance of international transparency in order to achieve sustainable
democracies and economic growth.
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189
Personalized Soft Power: An Innovative

Model for South Korea’s Public Diplomacy
Bui Linh Nguyet Ha
Abstract | Public diplomacy is a resourceful channel for a country to

change its image in the global landscape through the employment of
different national assets, among which emerge soft power and its diverse
variations. Policy makers, nevertheless, tend to lock the definition of soft
power within the narrow constraints of their countries’ cultural appeals
without giving thoughts to other less conventional but potential sources. One
of these overlooked sources that policy makers can utilize to influence how
others perceive their countries and devise public diplomacy campaigns
accordingly is through the image of leaders. This paper examines the
concept of personalized soft power and its implications for public diplomacy
practices by reviewing different theories in transnational political communi-
cation, the effect of credibility in cognitive psychology as well as the source
cue effect in the social and political psychology literature. It also attempts to
systematically conceptualize public diplomacy, soft power and their dynamic
relationship, as well as proposes ways for South Korea to navigate between
elements of favorability and familiarity to better its image internationally
through an assessment of the foreign public’s attitude towards the country
itself and its incumbent.
Keywords | personalized soft power, public diplomacy, image of leader,
familiarity and favorability, transnational political communication
국문초록 | 공공 외교는 다양한 국가 자원의 활용을 통해 세계 무대에서 국가

의 이미지를 바꿀 수 있는 유용한 수단이며, 그 와중에 소프트 파워와 그것의 다
양한 변형들이 나타난다. 하지만 정책 입안자들은 다른 잠재적인 덜 전통적인 원
천들을 고려하지 않은 채 소프트 파워의 정의를 국가의 문화적 어필이라는 좁은
제약에 가두는 경향이 있다. 이렇게 경시되는 원천들 중에서 정책 입안자들이,
다른 국가들이 그들의 국가를 어떻게 인지하는지와 그에 따라 어떻게 공공 외교
캠페인을 고안하는지에 영향을 끼치기 위해 이용할 수 있는 것 중 하나가 지도자
의 이미지이다. 이 논문은 맞춤형 소프트 파워의 개념과 이것이 공공 외교 관행
에 끼치는 영향을 국가 간 정치적 소통, 인지 심리학에서 신뢰성의 영향, 사회 심

리학과 정치 심리학의 소스 큐 효과(source cue effect) 문헌의 다양한 이론들을
검토하며 살펴본다. 이 논문은 또한 공공 외교, 소프트 파워, 그리고 이 둘의 역동
적인 관계를 체계적으로 개념화하며, 대한민국이 국가와 재임자를 향한 해외 대
중의 태도를 평가함으로써 국가 이미지를 향상시키기 위해 호의성과 친숙성의
요소들을 어떻게 다룰 수 있는지 제안하고자 한다.
How can a country move others to change their perceptions of its image?
What can a government do to improve its international standing, which is
instructive of its country’s overall standing in general? The answer is
obviously multifactorial, but this paper argues that one of the most important
factors behind a country’s attitude shift toward another lies in the latter’s
personalized soft power. Put differently, how favorable a leader’s image is
can influence other countries’ perception of the country in question.
A probe into the inner working of this potentially useful mechanism
would shed light on how impactful leaders can be in shaping the attitude of
outsiders about the countries they’re representing. This study will attempt to
separate soft power of cultural origins from that of politics, and will posit
that while cultural capitals can create a wide-ranging effect on the country’s
overall image in general, they tend to be perceived independently from that
of the government. This begs the question of how a government can
improve its standing in the eye of other countries’ publics by utilizing the
resources at its fingertips that would have an immediate associative effect
on the reputation of these institutions. What could qualify, aside from the
traditional appeal of a country’s ideology and culture, to be a new, albeit
short-term resource of national soft power?
Because of the experimental and speculative nature of this proposition, it
is very difficult to vigorously test the initial hypotheses against empirical
data. This is especially true when one thinks about the availability of public
opinion data, let alone that of a foreign country about South Korea.
Regardless, the thrill of possibly discovering a new approach to the old
cookie-cutter mold of public diplomacy analysis outstrips that reservation of
mine and results in the birth of this paper. It is also clear that due to the
gradual exhaustion of research avenues on a broader scope, recent studies
Personalized Soft Power 191
often focus on individual cases and hence have low generalizability. This is
in no way synonymous with saying that they are unnecessary, in fact it is
actually through having knowledge about a large number of small cases that
political scientists and policy makers can search for a commonality, a
unifying framework with high applicability and devise appropriate
initiatives for their countries thereafter. But to switch place and view the
transnational diplomacy effort from a big picture perspective, the paper
offers a fresh theory that draws the perceptual connection between the
image of a country’s leader and that country itself in the realm of public
diplomacy. It is vital to keep in mind that this search for a new theory is the
premise leading to the work’s incubation, and that the end goal is to
encourage future empirical research to support, or falsify its hypotheses and
assumptions.
In her comprehensive probe for a theory of public diplomacy, Gilboa
(2008) spoke about the need to have a clear “conceptual and operational
relationship” between public diplomacy and soft power, citing incidents of
the terms’ misusage. Recognizing that deficiency, this paper strives to
illustrate the main differentiating features between the two, before
proposing an innovative framing to think about the latter. It then goes on to
address two questions concerning the individual political leader’s image
along with its role in the larger realm of international relations and the
smaller public diplomacy framework. The research will expand on
Entman’s theory of magnitude in political communication, Goldsmith and
Horiuchi’s of credibility in cognitive psychology and the source cue effects
in the social and political psychology literature. It will also offer a model to
determine when the effect of the so-called personalized soft power, defined
as the framing of political leaders as soft power resources, can be realized
and maximized on a target public. To that end, a review of the geopolitical
climate and bilateral relation between the US and South Korea on several
issues provide the basis to examine the latter’s ability to ‘soft power’ its
leaders. The study makes extensive use of international media reports,
government policies and public data from various authorities. The
suggestions are tentative, but remain an important and much-needed starting
point for future research on the intersection of personal branding, public
diplomacy and political communication.
Q1: How can personalized soft power assist nation-states in enhancing

their public diplomacy and management of interstate relations?
Q2: Can this apply to South Korea and what are the possible impli-
cations of such an application?
The Public Diplomacy and Soft Power Conundrum
The origin of public diplomacy is considered by the majority of the

scholarly community to date back to the Cold War. Employed by the US
government to actively influence the foreign publics in other jurisdictions
during the Cold War, public diplomacy was, at its most basic form, the
means through which a country’s government harnesses and exports its
attractive values to another country to serve the former’s goals. The goal of
public diplomacy, as often claimed, is to persuade the foreign publics and
win their support for a policy initiative of a country. In 2008, Joseph Nye
expounded greatly about the concept of public diplomacy, its potential
effect and how to exercise it in a close-knit relationship with soft power. But
since then, many scholars have accidentally or conveniently conflated these
two concepts, blurring the distinction between the two by using them
interchangeably. A larger body of work delineates soft power and public
diplomacy as the resource and tool through which its value is extracted.
Others allude to the possibility of different origins. In his discussion of the
same topic, David Shambaugh points to the source where these two
concepts originate to distinguish them. While soft power largely finds its
root in civil society, public diplomacy is an instrument of governments.
Although that comparison seems less apt today where not only governments
but also non-state actors can utilize this tool, his clarification of their
difference remains relevant. Similar to Nye, he emphasizes the importance
of having intrinsic soft power, which is the key factor in producing effective
public diplomacy practices – “no matter how well resourced by government,
if the message is not sellable the messenger will have difficulty selling it”
(2013). Only when seen as legitimate and having moral authority will
people act through cooperation rather than force or coercion (Nye, 2004).
As a result, public diplomacy is usually regarded as effective only if it can
maximize the possible returns on its soft power in the form of outsiders’
support and affinity for a country. But is this entanglement warranted?
As the conventional wisdom makes clear, public diplomacy is not the
substance, but a tool that governments utilize to extract benefit from their
countries’ soft power. Seeking to use an ambitious analogy, the author
proposes to think of soft power as something that accumulates and builds
upon itself in the course of history, much like fossil fuels. As a matter of
fact, the values of these resources can only be realized if they are converted
from their natural form to a different form of energy usable by potential
consumers - electrical power. If this analogy survives criticism, then similar
to fossil fuels, soft power does us no good if it remains crude and
unprocessed, its potential left untapped into. In other words, no matter how
appealing a message is, without a resourceful messenger, it will remain far
from sellable. As a result, it would be deeply flawed to view the interaction
between these two concepts as one-sided. This is especially relevant in
interstate public diplomacy when soft power is enlisted to “sell” a foreign
audience. Because there might be obstacles in translating the values of a
country’s soft power into something harmonious with another’s local culture
and politics, a government needs to devise appropriate converting tools to
gradually introduce its soft power to the foreign market. In other words, just
like how public diplomacy needs to base itself on a valid appealing source
of soft power, soft power also needs public diplomacy to transform into
concrete foreign policy initiatives carried out by the governments. Most of
the time, people seem to overestimate the power of one and underestimate
the other.
Another critical but frequently overlooked point is that public diplomacy
does not have to be associated exclusively with soft power all the time. As a
matter of fact, since soft power is valued for its authenticity and relatability
(which makes it both unique and universal), it remains scant in its existence.
Not all public diplomacy efforts can lead to soft power, but that does not
mean they should be lumped together as uninteresting, bad-faith or worse,
fruitless. In their unsubtle attacks against public diplomacy campaigns
carried out in undemocratic states, some critics tend to deride the essential
link between the local governments and such initiatives, lauding the true
soft power coming only from society and rejecting any other state-
sponsored attempts to promote the same thing: “…China’s government does

not know how to get out of the way… trying itself to generate soft power by
the use of public diplomacy” (Buzan, 2016). To support this claim, they argue
that the full potential of soft power will not be realized if the government is
behind its circulation, whether publicly or not. Some even go further and
warn against these state-centric attempts because when the value chosen
(assuming that governments sincerely believe this chosen property would be
appealing to outsiders) for promotion is incongruent with the target subjects’
native values, they will backfire. This caveat does not seem to hold much
water. Except for cases between states with extremely salient divergence or
convergence in history and culture, it is likely that a perceived soft power of
a country is neither diametrically opposed nor enthusiastically received by
another. Indifference, occasionally coupled with a piqued curiosity would
tend to dominate the reaction spectrum. Given that human beliefs, social
constructs, ethics, norms and taboos normally exist on a huge spectrum, a
value offering will most of the time be of little to no interest where it’s
offered and generate insubstantial return. After all, the main reason for a
government’s inability to flex its soft power could also be just that, a
limitation.
Others invoke people’s natural disposition to be suspicious of governments
as a legitimate cause for group-shaming state-sponsored promulgation of
soft power. But democratic or not, governments will always be govern-
ments. An intrinsically good soft power is by no means synonymous with an
intrinsically pure motivation behind the selling of that soft power. The label
of democracy is not, although too often considered to be, clear from all
vestige of propagandization. In fact, the line between benign public
diplomacy and manipulative propaganda is incredibly thin, and their
distinction can only become visible once the promise of a nation’s rhetorics
shows signs of departure from the reality. For example, although the US
was perceived as very credible at the dawn of the War on Terrorism, its
public diplomacy efforts after that period were indisputably followed by lots
of international blowback. A large majority of the public during this time
believed that the phrase public diplomacy and propaganda were used
interchangeably by the US government to camouflage its true intention and
draw its allies into an already anticipated quagmire in disguise of heroism
(Zaharna, 2004). This accusation was probably too far-fetched and

apocryphal. But even granted that no tangible benefits of soft power in
changing public attitude can be realized in such “government-meddling”
cases, they are still legitimate efforts of the representative body to genuinely
promote its culture or implicitly seek to advance an interest of its own,
targeting a foreign subject. Either way, the utility of public diplomacy ought
not be judged by its relationship with soft power. The former does not
always have to exist in equality with the latter.
National Leaders as Soft Power Resource
This trend of pushing back against government-sponsored public diplomacy

and what it promotes leads to a failure among scholars and researchers to
recognize a latent source of soft power that is on the horizon. Country
leaders and heads of state, most often presidents and prime ministers, have
increasingly been shown to possess a far-ranging capability to influence
foreign publics and sway these societies’ opinions in their countries’ favor.
Some scholars have tried to categorize soft power into different dimensions,
one of which centers on increasing the approval ratings of a leader or
support for a government, but only in a domestic context (Lee, 2009).
Although in recent years there have been many empirical findings about the
connection between a country’s image and its leader through experimental
research, nevertheless, to the author’s knowledge no one has ever tried to
dissect the phenomenon and its potential impacts from the analytical angle
of soft power. Rather, not many studies on political personalization and
foreign leaders’ appeal to both the domestic and foreign public have been
conducted in the arena of public diplomacy At best, the ability to engage
with a foreign public is only conceded to be a form of public diplomacy
carried out by political leaders (Goldsmith & Horiuchi, 2009), but not a
potential source of soft power for the countries they represent. In this
interpretation, a political leader is not the source of power, but accepts the
role of a tool that converts soft power into realizable benefits. Although this
characterization can be true, constraining the role of a foreign leader to a
body that orbits around the barycenter instead of embracing its rightful
place reduces the possible payoffs from sourcing soft power directly from
the subject. What is the cause of this large schism in the public diplomacy
literature? If it’s visible, what is the rationale for this intentional exclusion
of powerful and attractive leaders from the soft power table? If the
incomplete account merely goes unnoticed, how can we make sense of this
myopic observation in the international relations landscape?
One possible answer for this question would bring us back to the
initially discussed feature of soft power. As opposed to public diplomacy
which is an instrument in the hand of the state, soft power has traditionally
been viewed as a “product of the civil society” (Shambaugh, 2013). A leader
apparently does not fit into this realm. More than anything, he or she is
typically thought of as a self-interested individual who represents, above all
things, the government which he also leads and is often the antithesis to the
free, vibrant, organic forces of a civil society. But is this image a fair
evaluation of all leaders in all countries across the board? And even if it
applies in all cases, does that description of self-interest and political
calculation proscribe him from being a legitimate influencer that can change
outsiders’ opinions in a positive way? If one re-examines the definition of
soft power, which is said to be “the ability to attract and co-opt rather than
coerce” through appeal and attraction, no phrase in this statement would
disqualify a leader from asserting himself as a source of soft power. Yet, the
close political association between a leader and his cabinet, party, coalition
and government seems to be the stage of vetting in which he fails to
persuade meticulous and demanding scholars to list him somewhere he
should be. Indeed, it might be hard to make a clear distinction between the
impact of a leader’s true appeal with the variety of tools available for
pressuring another leader or country at his disposal.
In fact, it is actually unfathomable how far the study of soft power and
public diplomacy in international relations has lagged behind compared to
other fields dealing with the power of individual leadership. In an article
written in 2004, the Harvard Business School discussed soft power which
was newly coined by Joseph Nye, the then Dean of the Kennedy School and
drew a starkly similar analogy in the world of business. It says: “smart
executives know that leadership is not just a matter of issuing commands,
but also involves leading by example and attracting others to do what you
want.” At the same time, the article recognizes the importance of individual
soft power in individual leadership: “Soft power is a staple of daily
democratic politics. The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated
with intangible assets such as an attractive personality, culture, political
values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having
moral authority” (HBS, 2004). Personal branding, and in particular the
impact of CEOs’ perceived reputation on the performance of his firm, has
practically been recognized as common sense in business nowadays. This
fascinating connection between leaders and their organizations apparently
reveals a lot about how our perceptual psychology works, our patterns of
associative memory and a tendency to make judgments through the use of
shortcuts in order to accommodate our limited knowledge about the world.
It is quite strange to ponder that whereas the natural acceptance of a country’s
leadership as a result of others’ voluntary subscription to the values it
exemplifies makes a fit sub-category for soft power, the leadership of that
country’s leader, in the same context and under the same conditions, is
likely not.
The implications of this shift in perception on soft power can be powerful.
If a leader is the soft power instead of the engineer of its effects, more
public diplomacy initiatives should focus on promoting this individual to
the target audiences. The president can facilitate cross-border educational
and cultural exchanges through the office of his foundation, which in return
will improve his image as well as that of his country in the eye of
international participants. The leader can hold town hall events during his
visit to a foreign country to interact with its students, entrepreneurs and
members of the civil society. According to Manheim (1994), presidential
visits are usually considered as a “package” of public diplomacy activities.
This is because during these trips, a leader can engage with the foreign
public to influence their views about particular policies of her country. An
example is when US President Bill Clinton insisted on being permitted to
address the Chinese people on his official visit to China, which he did by
making two speeches on national television and took questions on a radio
call-in show (Goldsmith & Horiuchi). In the same fashion, President Obama
has used many of his foreign visits to openly address students in Vietnam,
Japan, Korea, … about a wide range of international issues. Although the
main purpose of these undertakings was to communicate with the mass

domestic public on specific policy initiatives, the president was also
simultaneously delivering a certain impression about the country of his
origin to his listeners. Moreover, because many obstacles in transnational
communication have been removed thanks to the wide spread of digital
technology, the venues available for political leaders to create influence on
the foreign public are not as limited as in the past. The following section
will revisit different models in the political personalization literature that
support the correlation between how a leader is viewed and his country’s
image.
Political leaders and foreign publics
In the media landscape, it’s not an overstatement to claim that the most
frequently featured unit of subject on the news is the individual. This was
attributed by Gitlin (1980) to a “perpetual quest for face and voice” between
different media channels aiming to dramatize the content of their coverage
for readership increase. As a result of this race to sensationalism and a
growing emphasis on discourses of human interest, national news starts to
gravitate toward the covering of “national figures,” people who play
important official roles and hence take up the central place in the reporting
of national activities (Gans, 1979). These officials, or political leaders are
individuals that make up the highest or most prominent leadership positions
of a nation, and they typically assume the titles of presidents or prime
ministers. Although initially this trend was by no means limited to
individuals in the political field, the dominating and monopolistic ability of
these actors to exert influence through their decision-making power in
almost every other field might have inevitably given them an edge in
securing media attention.
Recent works have substantiated this observation that leaders are
increasingly appearing at the forefront of the news. The political communi-
cation field terms this change in news reporting of politics in which the
focus on an institution is diminished and that on its most salient individuals
is heightened “mediated political personalization” (Downey & Stanyer,
2010; Wilke & Reinemann, 2001). Balmas and Sheafer (2013) build on
previously existing studies and explore how mediated political personali-
zation takes place in a transnational context. They go on to discover a link
between the geographic, political and cultural proximity of two countries
with one’s propensity to focus intensively on the other’s leader and
subsequently project its impression of the leader onto all members of his
society. In parallel with the contact hypothesis, they account for such
simplified perceptions of the other group, or in this case country, by looking
at the lack of contact between members of the two groups. “We” tend to
think that all members of the distant group are “all alike” because our
knowledge about other members of that group is insufficient (Boldry,
Gaertner, & Quinn, 2007). As digital media becomes the main platform for
human consumption of the news, coverage of countries is gradually
simplified to an extent whereby the individual leaders become its sole focus
and personalize the countries to their own images.
Because a national leader can direct his nation’s reputation abroad and
hence serves as a principal agent, the personality of that leader will be
critical in creating the personality of his country in the mind of foreigners.
Yoo and Jin test the effect of the image of Chinese leaders on the country’s
reputation among Korean citizens and found that after exposure to the
leaders’ images, the same respondents’ perception of the country’s reputation
drops significantly (2015). In psychology, scientists have for a long time
found that human beings tend to employ heuristics, or mental shortcuts, to
help ease the cognitive load required in decision-making (APA, 2017).
Because individuals suffer from a limited attention span and want to
economize the cognitive effort put into making policy judgments, they rely
on their evaluations of the source which communicates the message as a
heuristic cue in assessing the actual message that is being communicated
(Lupia, 1994; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998). This reliance on the communicator
to judge the validity of the message generates what is called the source cue
effect in the literature.
Goldsmith and Horiuchi (2009) propose that from a public diplomacy
approach, a leader’s transnational efforts to swing foreign opinion can only
work if the general image of her and her country are credible. Considerable
evidence in cognitive psychology has pointed out that sources perceived as
trustworthy are more likely to be accepted as true than others faring worse
in the credibility scale, even though they are sending the same information
(e.g., Bloom and Weisberg, 2007). Goldsmith and Horiuchi expanded on
this model by testing three scenarios in which the foreign public perceives a
leader’s image to be credible, controversial, or non-credible and how each
affects her transnational communication efforts regarding her country’s
foreign policy during high-level visits. Their findings show that once that
credibility is diminished, the leader’s ability to influence the foreign public
weakens and there is even a potential for negative backlash. All in all, these
works emphasize the importance of national leaders’ image in “high-level
public diplomacy” and suggest a way to capitalize on that image that
national leaders to sway foreign public opinion (Goldsmith & Horiuchi).
In the arena of public affairs, often the only time when the executive
branch actively pays attention to how impactful the image of its leader can
be is during election cycles. This is because between members of the same
country, the presidential candidate has to sell his image to the domestic
electorates. The whole campaign becomes a strategically planned and heavily
invested effort, coordinated by a large group of people to shine the spotlight
on this one single individual who personalizes the message and breeds life
into the entire campaign. But once that individual gets elected, the focus
now magnifies and shifts from the person to the broader institution in which
he has successfully entered. In fact, there is still room for the president to
sell his image, but this time in front of a different, broader audience. Given
that elected officials tend to be considered the exemplar of their countries,
selling the image of President Obama is also selling the image of America.
If the leader has “the ability to attract rather than coerce,” or could
combine both of these capitals as he wills to get what he and his country
wants out of other states, we can say that she possesses soft or smart power.
At the same time, if the link between the image of a country and its leader
continues to stay rigorous, a positive reputation on the latter’s part (her soft
power) will definitely lead to a net gain in the former’s, effectively making
her image a soft power of the country. But of course, the essential
characteristic that makes her a soft power resource as opposed to a skillful
negotiator or diplomat in the traditional understanding of the term, is that
her appeal cannot just affect other negotiating parties in the physical confine
of a conference room, it must also influence their home publics at large.

Most typically, because an individual often finds out about a foreign leader
via newspapers, radio, television, and other forms of digital news
broadcasting, mediated international personalization naturally supports and
propels this utilization of personalized soft power. Then what exact effects
will the personalized soft power of political leaders have on the exercise of
public diplomacy and the governing of interstate relations?
The first benefit will be that countries can be more incentivized to learn
about foreign states (Dragojlovic, 2013). Promoting more knowledge of
one’s country, no matter in what forms and under whose leadership, should
always be one of the first priorities on the national branding agenda.
Previous studies have shown that people are on an average fairly uninterested
in politics, and usually feel that they shouldn’t devote much time to learning
about political issues (Hacker, 2004). Especially with respect to the input of
foreign affairs, this aversion seems more amplified when the individual is
required to learn and make political judgments about a vast array of
unfamiliar issues (Krosnick, 1990). Nevertheless, when people can associate
and attach new pieces of information with a leader’s well-known image, the
input becomes “easier to organize and process” (Kinder, 1986). When the
image is perceived in a positive light, which is the case for personalized soft
power, the payoffs are doubled because the individual becomes self-
motivated by the leader’s appeal to learn more about where he comes from.
The leader projects his positive image onto the country, effectively making
the learning process more self-driven and simpler. The media’s zooming in
on foreign leaders and their policy-making decisions again piques people’s
interest in these other countries, leading to even more concentrated coverage
on the leader.
But insofar ass individuals can have the flair for interpersonal persuasion
and social charm, the aforementioned reason is not in any way unique.
Other individual members of a country, no matter what their occupation is,
will always be able to use their personal images to influence others. Then
what makes personalized soft power of political leaders different from that
of societal, cultural or economic leaders?
Political leaders do not only have the representational power of their
countries, they are in a narrower sense also representatives of their govern-
ments. Although the size and complexity of what constitutes a “government”

depends on the domestic context, it is likely that political figures are the
most salient faces of the cabinet, party, and coalition which they lead. As a
result, besides creating an effect on the image of their country, these
individual leaders can also better the image of their governments through
their personal reputation, which is something that no other soft power
resource can afford to do. For example, the positive valence of an actor can
only at best spill over to her field or the cultural scene, it cannot transfer
onto the government of her country. Despite being the cornerstone of
American soft power, Hollywood could not save the US from taking a nose
dive in its global reputation during the War on Terror. That is also the reason
why in reference to an earlier point, critics in international relations often
point fingers at the involvement of governments as a nullifying cause of soft
power’s realization failure, no matter how attractive that country’s cultural
resources can be - “China needs to get used to the idea… that outsiders
make a sharp differentiation between the Chinese party/state on the one
hand (which mostly they do not like very much) and the Chinese people and
culture on the other” (Buzan, 2016). Ironically, the author sounds like he is
implying that China’s image depends more on its party/state than other
conventionally “soft” assets of culture and people.
It is an undisputed fact that a government’s image, not just that of its
country, is extremely important in managing foreign relations. If the goal is
to use soft power in public diplomacy to communicate better with a foreign
public, countries have to first address the deficiency and skepticism
characteristic of how people think about governments. And one of the most
efficient ways to change this prejudice, or inherent penchant for doubting
state institutions, is to make one of their most salient bodies more attractive,
trustworthy and responsive to the public. To that end, personalized soft
power can play a role by embracing the effect of mediated political
personalization and working people’s cognitive shortcuts to its advantage.
Perceptually, while both a better civil society and a better cultural icon can
make a better country, only a better political leader can make a better
government.
Personalized soft power at its peak
Drawing from the corpus of political communication research, Dragojlovic

(2013) finds that source cue effects can only likely work if the audience is
“sufficiently familiar with the leader so as to evaluate her or his credibility.”
Familiarity is an important factor due to the fact that trust is usually formed
through one’s prior exposure with the source. This is in line with previous
studies in social psychology which show that an individual is more likely to
be persuaded by a source if he has made prior contact with it. Entman
(2004) draws attention to the magnitude of communication around a
specific issue in the news media and its effect on influencing public opinion
through increased frequency and prominence. It is important to point out
that despite placing emphasis on the same aspect of familiarity, Dragojlovic
frames his argument around the individual leader while Entman chooses a
specific issue as the unit of analysis.
Combining these past models in the literature, the author argues that a
leader can create attitude change with the presence of two elements: the
leader’s familiarity and his country’s favorability. While familiarity denotes
the ‘magnitude’ and ‘frequency’ of a leader’s appearance in the media
(Entman, 2004) and can correlate with perceived political awareness,
favorability points to how positively, as opposed to negatively the country is
viewed by the target audience. Accordingly, the two variables can result in
the formation of four different scenarios, depending on how high and low
countries score on each metric.
I argue that an ideal situation of high credibility for both the leader and
the country can be created in the last scenario, with high favorability
perceived by the foreign public of the state and high familiarity for its leader.
This combination is most ideal to the framing of political leaders as the soft
power resource of a country. Of course, the underlying assumption of this
argument is that a country is generally always more recognizable than its
Table 1. Scenarios for personalized soft power
High favorability/ Low familiarity High favorability/ High familiarity

Low favorability/ Low familiarity Low favorability/ High familiarity
incumbents. A country’s favorability rating is important in assessing how

effective the leader can project his image on that country, as opposed to
being affected by it. Studies have actually found that if the foreign public
perceives a country and his leader unfavorably (correlation tends to be
strongest in negative valence), that can generate an unintended negative
consequence on the country’s political communication efforts and result in
pushback from the foreign audience (Goldsmith & Horiuchi). Familiarity is
chosen to be more important in measuring the leader’s persuasiveness
because less prominent national leaders may have limited capacity to
change the policy attitude of foreign publics even when their images are
positively perceived (Dragojlovic, 2013). For the association with one’s
country to become strong, a leader first has to be recognizable. And because
countries align themselves on different principles and ideologies, even when
the majority does subscribe to a quasi-universal set of values, a leader can
always find another country which shares with him a common definition of
goods, meaning its people will likely perceive him through a favorable lens.
It is this existence of bipolarity in politics and the aim at high generalizability
in this paper, at least at a minimum, that confers more weight upon the
familiarity factor than its favorability counterpart. As long as the undertaken
actions do not result in outright violations of international norms which
would cause irreparable reputational harms to that country, states to an
extent can always benefit from this ‘unfavorable’ appeal of their political
leaders. The more crucial question here is whether these individuals are
prominent enough to attract attention from the foreign public.
As discussed above, the conditions most conducive to the actualization
of personalized soft power are when a foreign public perceives a country’s
image as favorable and its leader reaches high familiarity. This is when the
payoffs are at the highest level if the leader is to influence another public
using his image. The next section proposes that South Korea by now has,
relative to its previous presidencies, attained these two conditions and
therefore, can produce personalized soft power if it wishes. The target
audience chosen for analysis will be limited to the American public. The
rationale for this particularization is due to the differences in culture and
political ideology, the interpretation of what is favorable can vary vastly
from one end to another. For example, although more people see Russia
unfavorably than favorably worldwide according to a Pew Research Survey

this year, in several countries like Slovakia and Bulgaria, a large majority of
60 percent and 73 percent respectively still have a positive opinion of the
country (Pew Research Center, 2020). Also, given that the difference in
cultural conventions generates the need for customized political communi-
cation processes according to the international comparative analysis
(Downey & Stanyer, 2010), it would be imprudent to mass-produce a
universal diplomatic strategy that can apply for all countries.
Another distinction worth making is that this analysis will not be
focusing on the US government’s attitude toward the variables being
weighed. This is because the target subject of one country’s public
diplomacy, or at least in this study, is the public of a foreign country and not
its government. As a result, even though sharp divergences can be recorded
in South Korea and the US relation and more so under the current two
administrations, the topic is out of the scope of this discussion. In order to
evaluate South Korea’s image and Moon’s familiarity in the eye of
American audience, the part will make use of international news reporting
and public opinion polls.
The South Korean Case
A Favorable Nation
Security concerns dominate the sphere of cooperation between US and
South Korea, with the issue of denuclearizing North Korea takes up a major
part in their bilateral relationship. While both sides have tried to pursue
rapprochement with Pyongyang and relative diplomatic success has been
seen with three summits held between Kim and Trump and three others
between Kim and Moon, denuclearization progress has largely stalled since
2019. This is caused by a failure to agree on the next step of the negotiation,
with North Korea blaming the continuation of sanctions as a ground to
resume the DPRK’s missile testing moratorium (Macias, 2019). The
differences in the overall political orientation of these two leaders and their
parties also prevents any viable progress from being accomplished. Another
issue concerns the renewal of the Special Measures Agreement.
Source: Chicago Council Surveys

Figure 1. American Public Opinion on the Use of US Troops against North Korea.
Disagreements between the two countries regarding burden sharing and

how much South Korea should increase its contribution have delayed
settlements, leading to an unprecedented furlough of over 4,000 US Forces
Korea (USFK) Korean staff (Kim, 2020). As a consequence, these critical
security deadlocks have raised questions about the sustainability of the
alliance over the long haul.
In contrast to this skeptical sentiment, public opinion in the US has
recorded a steady increase regarding support for the US - Korea (ROK)
alliance. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs 2014 survey of American
public opinion on foreign policy shows that favorability toward South
Korea has surged from 44 out of 100 in 2006 to 56 out of 100 in 2014. In
the same vein, the Council’s 2018 survey illustrates a bipartisan support for
the use of force if North Korea were to attack either South Korea or Japan.
The results record an all-time high in public support for the use of US
troops in defense of South Korea against North Korea’s invasion with 70
percent of Republicans, 63 percent of Democrats and 61 percent of
Independents favoring the option (Friedhoff, 2018). The 2019 survey again
finds that Americans remain committed to South Korea and 70 percent of all
Americans believe that the relationship with South Korea does more to
strengthen the US’ national security. A similar bipartisan support for
continuing and even increasing the number of US forces stationed in South
Source: Gallup
Figure 2. Americans’ Ratings of South Korea.
Korea is found, tracking a majority’s favor to use troops to defend the East
Asian ally.
In terms of social exchange, it is impossible to overstate the influence of
Korean culture on the American public, especially the young population.
The Korea Tourism Organization reports in 2019 that foreign tourists were
estimated to have spent roughly $1,007 on average to consume Kpop goods
and content. Hallyu (the Korean Wave) has become more prominent in the
US over the last few years, starting with BTS hitting number one on the
Billboard 200 chart and more recently the Korean masterpiece Parasite
making history by becoming the first foreign language film to win Best
Picture in Oscar. These have long been considered the conventional sources
of soft power and cultural diplomacy for South Korea and they undeniably
play a great role in promoting Korean cultures in the US as well as seeking
to influence the American public’s perception about South Korea as a
country. From a public diplomacy aspect, the Korean Wave proves
extremely effective in portraying Korea’s international image as charming
and unique through a combination of traditional appeal including K-food
and Confucian ethics, with its contemporary culture through K-pop and
K-drama. After South Korea hosted the 2018 Winter Olympics Game in
Pyeongchang, a Gallup poll recorded an increase in how favorably
Americans viewed South Korea, beating its previous high favorability rating
in 2011 by 12 points at 77 percent (Gallup, 2018).
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs introduced a new survey item to
assess South Korea’s global influence in 2019. Perceived influence of South
Korea reached a record high at 5.0 on a 10-point scale. This rise in the
American public’s perception of South Korea can be attributed to the
whirlwind of diplomatic summitry during the past two years and the
increasing infiltration of Korean culture, including Korean food, dramas,
movies and music in the US. South Korea’s image has also been greatly
enhanced by its prompt and effective response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Indeed, according to the most recent Global Attitude poll conducted by the
Pew Research Center, Americans give South Korea the highest rating for its
coronavirus response, surpassing Germany at second place (PRC, 2020).
From the data collected, it could be argued that South Korea has reached
a new height in promoting its national image not only in the US but also in
other regions. This rise in the level of both recognizability and especially
favorability is the result of two main factors: ramped up talks and
negotiations regarding security issues surrounding the Korean peninsula and
a sky-high rise in the consumption and circulation of Korean music and
movies abroad.
The Familiar Head of State

Compared to his predecessors, President Moon proves to be a very proactive
actor in formulating new foreign policies and involving regional partners in
South Korea’s agenda with an emphasis on balanced diplomacy. A goal
repeatedly pledged during his election campaign and inauguration speech
demonstrated his commitment to securing two principles: peace on the
Korean peninsula and South Korea’s active involvement in North East
Asian politics. Compared to previous administrations, Moon works frequently
and closely with the US with the aim of achieving his foremost policy
agenda – forging a “permanent peace regime” on the Korean peninsula
(Ministry of Education). This section conjects that Moon has now attained a
sufficient level of familiarity to the domestic audience of the US, and hence
is capable of assuming the soft power role through his public image to
increase the American people’s positive valence toward South Korea.
Albeit different in their approach to handling public affairs, Moon and

Trump surprisingly found a common ground in their management of the
North Korea issue. Moon’s continuous attempts to engage North Korea has
facilitated more dialogues and diplomatic breakthroughs, although until
now this process has yielded little impact. Through the call for cooperation
with the international community to push forward with the dismantlement
of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program while framing the unification
question in a regional context, President Moon has successfully earned high
approval ratings from South Koreans and been portrayed as a “savvy
diplomat” by the media (Park, 2019). For example, Moon seized on the
Winter Olympics in PyeongChang as an opportunity for further engagement
with North Korea. In this historic moment in the inter-Korean relation, the
two countries marched together under the same united flag. His serious and
persistent efforts to include all sides in the dialogue were the major
precursor for Trump and Kim’s subsequent summit in Singapore, and later
Hanoi. Through sports diplomacy to talk-brokering between North Korea
and the US, the South Korean leader’s pivotal gamble on diplomacy made
him the runner up for TIME’s 2018 Person of the Year (Campbell, 2019).
With respect to media appearance, the news coverage of President Moon
Jae In is extensive. By utilizing the search engine Newslookup, which
aggregates news articles and allows users to arrange search results by geo-
source of the news organization and categorization by news media type, the
author was able to gather a total of over 58722 results for the keywords
‘Moon Jae-In South Korea President’. The site draws news data from multiple
online sources and news agencies all over the word such as the New York
Times, the Washington Post, the Independent, Aljazeera… After filtering
out the results to correctly reflect the number of news articles published by
American media outlets, this is a sizable estimate of how frequently
featured the president is. The number of news articles are also distributed
consistently and equally over the span of Moon’s ongoing presidency,
whereby over half (32031 articles) of the total chunk are dated 2018, the
year where trilateral negotiation efforts started to pick up steam. This is an
enormous quantity compared to that of his predecessor, Park Geun-Hye,
who according to the search engine only appeared in 17081 articles during
the course of her four-year presidency since 2013.
Although there are insufficient data points on the American public’s

awareness of the South Korean president, internationally it is safe to predict
that Moon is a fairly well-known leader. A recent survey conducted by the
Korean Culture and Information Service among 8,000 people from 16
countries found that more than 70 percent of foreigners have a positive view
of South Korea. What is surprising in this survey though, is that Moon
surpassed K-pop supergroup BTS to lead in the category of Korean public
figures, showing an unexpected high degree of familiarity (Oh & Lee,
2020). The decisive factor contributing to such an outcome is likely his
continual appearance in the media, which is the result of the President’s
extensive role in breaking the impasse between the US and North Korea. It
seems that Moon’s active foreign policy approach indisputably helps inform
the American public more about him as well as the issues being discussed.
This gives him considerable coverage in different media outlets in the US at
an unprecedented frequency for a South Korean president. In 2019, Arthur I.
Cyr, the famous professor of Political Science in Carthage College
published an opinion piece titled “President Moon personifies South Korea
success,” making a case for an attractive South Korean image that is
exemplified under Moon’s leadership. All in all, the media undertone shows
that this could be the right timing for South Korea to exercise public
diplomacy through the use of its soft power, derived directly from the
president’s diplomatic appeal (Cyr, 2019). Although it still takes a long time
for a middle power to exert the same amount of influence on the
international society that a major power does, with a vibrant culture that is
sweeping across many countries and a more concrete identity mirrored after
its leader, the public diplomacy potential for South Korea is both
encompassing and limitless.
Most middle powers prepare for their ascent to claim regional or global
dominance by presenting a prominent leader to the world. A leader is the
most personalized image of a country, so in order for another country to
endorse what South Korea seeks to pursue, its leader first has to build a
trustworthy and credible image to gain support from the foreign public. An
identifiable leader is a potential source of soft power that can give South
Korea a more distinct identity internationally, and could also help
communicate its foreign policy objectives to the outside world better. This
support could then be extremely helpful for the country not only in dealing
with its adversaries, but also managing its alliance with the US, especially
when Seoul and Washington apparently do not see eye to eye with each
other on every matter.
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215
Korean Digital Public Diplomacy: A Case

Study of the Embassy of the Republic of
Korea in Brazil’s Facebook Page
Camila C S Carneiro
Abstract | The constant development of digital technologies influences

human relations, considering internet has become an important factor in
societies’ daily life. It has changed the way communication is used in many
fields such as diplomatic communication between countries and citizens,
which can now be done on a large scale between geographically distant
populations. Thus, this paper aims to better understand the use of social
media by South Korea’s digital public diplomacy. Specifically, a case study
of the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Brazil’s Facebook page was
conducted using content analysis, intending to comprehend how the
communication is made through posts, if dialogical communication is used
and what the effects on the online users. The research shows that the
communication made by the ROK’S Embassy in Brazil has satisfactory
aspects from which positive effects regarding the followers’ behavior result;
however, it also shows improvements can be done especially regarding
dialogical communication.
국문초록 | 인터넷이 사회의 일상 생활의 중요한 요소가 되었음을 고려했을

때 지속적인 디지털 기술의 발달은 인간 관계에 영향을 미친다. 이는 국가와 시
민 간의 외교적 소통과 같이 다양한 분야에서 소통이 이용되는 방법을 바꾸었다.
대규모로 그리고 지리적으로 먼 인구에까지 미칠 수 있기 때문이다. 그러므로,
이 논문은 대한민국의 디지털 공공 외교가 어떻게 소셜 미디어를 이용하는지 이
해하고자 한다. 특히 게시물을 통해 어떻게 소통이 이루어지는지, 대화체의 소통
이 사용되는지, 온라인 사용자들에 어떤 영향을 끼치는지 이해하기 위해 내용 분
석을 이용하여 브라질 대한민국 대사관의 페이스북 계정을 사례로 연구한다. 이
연구는 브라질의 대한민국 대사관의 소통이 팔로워들의 행동에 긍정적인 영향을
미치는 만족스러운 측면이 있음을 보여준다. 하지만 특히 대화적 소통에 있어서
는 개선점 또한 있음을 보여준다.
INTRODUCTION
The technological advance of digital culture that marked the last decades
has transformed human relations and people’s daily routine, as well as the
functioning of large industries and the interaction between countries.
Society now has more access to items and information from distant
countries; additionally, public organizations can now work online with the
prospect of much greater reach, without geographical limits.
Thus, the Internet has become an important part of the daily life of many
organizations and has consolidated itself as an inevitable ingredient of the
contemporary social fabric and political practices. In the digital sphere,
social media has become an important tool inserted in national and
international political debates and has positioned itself as an indispensable
means of interaction between government authorities and their citizens. In
this context, most countries’ foreign policy, including South Korea’s, have
also been adapting to this new reality. Diplomatic activity started to
incorporate several online communication channels aimed at the general
public, whether internal (domestic) or external (foreign).
Thus, public diplomacy is known as one of the academic fields that has
to adapt to technological changes and development. As a consequence, the
term digital diplomacy was created. Although its exact meaning is still
under discussion, the term refers to the use of public diplomacy through
digital technologies. Among the diverse forms of digital diplomacy is the
use of social media. Author Martyna Tomiczek (2012) argued that based on
the feedback given towards certain issues, it’s possible for organizations to
review policies, most particularly using feedback through Twitter and
Facebook. Both platforms are relevant in this context, as they are
considered the most used social networks among governments, diplomats,
and institutions (Twiplomacy, 2018).
Social media is also seen as a tool to conduct diplomacy through
dialogue with followers to create and maintain relationships. A satisfactory
relationship with an online audience may not only facilitate the acceptance
of a nation’s foreign policy among foreign audiences, but also be a tool that
may help increase popularity towards foreign populations. In this sense, it is
important to note that according to Shiren (2013), popularity, reputation,
Korean Digital Public Diplomacy 217
and identity are respectively the three different levels of goals for public
diplomacy.
Accordingly, the dialogue between institutions and its followers also
enables a better understanding of the needs of different audiences, as
monitoring users’ behavior may be helpful for the use of platforms and
messages more effectively towards specific goals. Thus, it is important to
understand how the communication is being done through social media, also
considering the relevance of using dialogic models instead of monologic
ones, to better create a long-lasting relationship with online audiences.
Studies of social media use for public diplomacy are essential considering
the increasing number of online users worldwide. According to a survey
conducted by We Are Social (2020), 3.96 billion people, more than half of
the world population, use social media. Therefore, in order to better
understand the impacts of new media on public diplomacy, this research
aims to understand the use of social media from South Korea’s digital
public diplomacy.
Moreover, the We Are Social (2020) survey concludes that South
America is the second region in the world with the highest percentage of
active citizens in social media, and the one with the highest number of
active users is Facebook - which was therefore the subject chosen for the
analysis in this research. According to the survey, in Brazil there are
reportedly more than 140 million people using social media, which
represents 66% of the population - 11 million more than the previous year -
and 130 million are on Facebook - the fourth-highest country in the world in
terms of Facebook users. Thus, Brazil seems to be one of the most active
countries not only in social media, but specifically on the Facebook
platform. From this perspective and also considering the approach by South
Korea to Latin American countries in recent decades (mostly based on
economic ties and Official Development Assistance (ODA), the specific
South Korean organization’s Facebook page chosen to be analyzed in this
research was the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Brazil.
In addition to the massive use of social media by the subject country
chosen to be analyzed, it is also important to highlight the recent increasing
interest of Brazilians about South Korean matters, a direct effect of South
Korea’s soft power. The graph below shows a graph using the Google
Figure 1. Searches about South Korea on Google Trends
Trends tool that measures the number of internet searches related to the
keyword “South Korea” in Brazil for the last 10 years.
The graph shows clear growing interest in South Korea demonstrated by
deliberate web searches from Brazilian online users. The facts given above
indicate that studies about use and influence of social media on public
diplomacy can be useful, as it can bring much enlightenment on how to
carry out public diplomacy in the age of new media.
The academic field lacks studies about Brazilian-Korean relations, so
considering the latest growing interest by Brazilians about South Korea and
the recent approach of Brazil-Korea’s bilateral diplomacy, this research field
therefore should be better studied.
This research therefore aims to analyze how the Embassy of the
Republic of Korea in Brazil communicates through their Facebook page, in
order to better understand South Korea’s digital public diplomacy under the
new media environment. For this, a case study of the embassy’s official
page on Facebook was conducted, using Content Analysis on the posts and
also using the theory of Dialogical Communication for analysis. This paper
proposes the following questions: how is the communication by the
embassy made? Is dialogical communication used with followers? What are
the effects of that communication on the audience involved?
Thus, this paper is divided into two parts: first, literature review
approaching matters such as digital diplomacy, dialogic communication and
social media; second, the presentation of the methodology and results of
analysis.
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND DIGITAL DIPLOMACY
The debate on digital diplomacy has gained prominence in recent years

fueled by the dissemination of tools such as the Internet, which has had an
impact on various aspects of international politics. The internet represents
an intensification of information flows scenario, multiplying communication
channels and substantially increasing the interaction of foreign organizations
with national and international audiences in a more direct way. Due to this
aspect of communicational approach with the public beyond the small
diplomatic sphere, the literature on digital diplomacy has been recurrently
linked to the concept of public diplomacy (Holmes, 2015; Cull, 2008;
Khatib; Dutton;Thelwall, 2012; Lozev; Murray, 2013; Strauß, Nadine et al.,
2015). Edmund Gullion, in the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public
Diplomacy (1965, p. 1), defined public diplomacy as an area that
deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and

execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of
international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation
by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction
of private groups and interests in one country with another; the
reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication
between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign
correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications.
Thus, if public diplomacy is the diplomatic activity aimed at broader

audiences through processes of circulation of information and communica-
tion, this naturally includes the use of online media. And this is where the
idea of digital diplomacy comes into the discussion.
In recent years it is remarkable how government institutions’ social
media use has increased, as digital platforms provide an opportunity for the
officials to build a direct connection with global audiences. The author
Ciolek (2010) argues that social media did not essentially change the
objectives of public diplomacy but are useful new tools and platforms for
“facilitating engagement with audiences in an evolving information
environment” (Ciolek, 2010, p. 2). Therefore, this concept suggests that
social media platforms can be helpful as it enables creation of a positive

image through engagement and dialogue.
In this context, social media appears as a promising element for the
development of digital diplomacy due to its informative, communicative
and interactive character. Assuming that good public diplomacy cannot be
based on monologues but on dialogues, authors Bjola and Jiang (2015, p.
74) believe that
Social media, with its interactive feature, has much to offer in this
regard as it can generate a quasi-continuous dialogue between
diplomats and foreign publics. Two-way conversations allow
diplomats to readjust the focus of their agenda, reduce misinformation
and enhance mutual understanding. [...] These mutually exclusive
dimensions of social media impact offer a comprehensive and
reliable framework for assessing the effectiveness of digital diplomacy.
All of these dimensions enable us to think about the role of social media
in the more specific scope of digital diplomacy and in the broader context of
public diplomacy policies. They also represent challenges to approach
relatively abstract concepts with normative content. To this end, it is
considered that empirical analyzes and case studies are useful to build a
more detailed and practical understanding of these processes today,
characterizing at least part of these phenomena in effusion. Therefore, the
following topic presents a better understanding of social media use, online
interactivity and dialogic communication.
SOCIAL MEDIA AND DIALOGIC COMMUNICATION
Studies related to new media are extremely relevant today, considering that
the internet and social media have changed the world we live in. Nowadays,
society is generally studied under the influence of social networks, mostly
considering that it enables interactions on a large scale (RECUERO, 2015).
The concept of social networks, of self-explanatory name, refers to the
social groupings that unite individuals, making connections and social ties.
It differs from social media as it can establish itself in offline spaces, as in

communities. As an emerging phenomenon, which emerged after users
appropriated social networking websites (RECUERO, 2015), social media
are new communication platforms between individuals and their
productions - environments where it is possible to create a personal profile
or page, interact through comments and expose of participating social
actors, in addition to conversation (RECUERO).
When discussing social media and conversation, it is relevant to study
concepts such as those of the author Henry Jenkins (2014), who calls
participatory culture the possibility of producing and sharing content in a
much more participatory way. Jenkins (2014) also points out that the
participatory culture already existed before the digital age, but the action
was enhanced with this new technology. He explains that the participatory
culture is a characteristic of a world in which users have become suppliers
of material to other users, which occurs more widely in the digital age.
Intrinsically to the participatory culture is online conversation on social
media such as Facebook, often mediated and integrated by institutions that
disseminate information and encourage discussions. Examples of this are
the journalistic industry or even public organizations from diverse sectors
such as those about international relations, which can nowadays spread
information without geographic limitations.
This emerging format which is marked by interactivity and conversation,
according to the author Elias Machado (2007) arouses public interest and
participation in the most varied subjects, especially if, today, we consider
smartphones as the primary platform for access to all this content, causing
the facilitated process of feedback and emission of messages or responses
by the public using the online network, which is typical in the case of
Facebook pages used by institutions or organizations. For this reason, the
use of dialogical communication in social media is considered important.
A dialogic perspective, according to the authors Michael Kent and
Maureen Taylor (1998), focuses on the attitudes toward each other held by
the participants in a communication transaction online. They explain that
The concept of dialogic theory is often associated with the philosopher

Martin Buber. Buber viewed human communication as an intersub-
jective process in which parties come to a relationship with openess

and respect. Dialogue is the basis for that relationship. Buber’s
conception of dialogue focuses implicitly on ethics. That is, for a
dialogic relationship to exit, parties must view communicating with
each other as the goal of a relationship. (p. 324)
The authors also highlight an interesting aspect of the dialogue that is,
according to Jürgen Habermas’s framework, concepts that examine
communicative ethics. According to them, Habermas asserts that dialogue
occurs when both parts agree to coordinate in good faith their plans of
action. Consequently, ethical communication cannot be dominated by one
party. Dialogue then inherently involves a cooperative, communicative
relationship.
In that sense, Kent and Taylor (1998) reaffirm that dialogic relationships
online necessarily require, mostly, dialogue, otherwise Internet public
relations would be nothing more than a new monologic communication
medium, as “the web provides public relations practioners an opportunity to
create dynamic and lasting relationships with publics, however, to do so
requires that dialogic loops be incorporated” (KENT, TAYLOR, 1998, p.
325).
Following from this, the authors created the principles of dialogical
communication, which will later be used for the analysis of this paper.
Among the principles, there is first the Dialogic Loop, which essentially is
the agent’s response to comments, questions and messages. A dialogic loop
would offer organizations the opportunity to respond to questions, concerns
and problems, as it is not enough to have “information” for publics if the
organization cannot provide the information that publics most need or
desire. According to the authors, presence is no more important than the
service provided online or the content generated. The role of this principle
in Facebook pages is then emphasized, since it refers to the direct mediation
between the Embassy and the audience that possibly consume contents
related to South Korea.
Usefulness of Information, another principle, is related to how much the
information is relevant to the audience. It is measured to indicate the extent
to which government organization engage a national and international
audience; in the case of this research it is then worth analyzing whether the
publications of the Embassy of The Republic of Korea in Brazil are matters
that interest the local or international public, as the “content” is what should
drive an effective web site (KENT, TAYLOR, 1998 , p 327).
The third principle, Generation of Return Visits, refers to methods used
to draw public attention and keep them interested, creating on them the
desire to return to the page again in the future. As explained by Kent and
Taylor (1998, p. 329)
Contain features that make them attractive for repeat visits such as
updated information, changing issues, special forums, new commen-
taries, on-line question and answer sessions, and online “experts” to
answer questions for interested visitors. Sites that contain limited/
unchanging information are no longer useful after one visit and do
not encourage return visits. [...] Interactive strategies include forums,
question and answer formats, and experts.
Considering these principles as essential for the use of Facebook pages

by public organizations, they will be used in the analysis proposed by this
research, which will be carried out in the following section. The following
sections introduce first a better detail of the methodology and, later, the
analysis results.
METHODOLOGY
This research aims to investigate how the embassy communication on the

Facebook page is made related to its contents, whether dialogical communi-
cation is used with followers and what the effects of that communication on
the audience are.
For this, the research carried out a case study based on the concept of
Robert Yin (2001). According to the author, the main purpose of this
procedure is to understand the significant characteristics of events,
investigating a contemporary phenomenon within a real life context - a
strategy for which it is necessary to answer questions such as “how” or
“why” (YIN, 2001 , p.32). The concept of this strategy is exploratory, since
it aims to provide greater familiarity with the phenomena of digital public
diplomacy by South Korea and then build hypotheses or improve ideas. It is
intended, by studying the case of the South Korean embassy in Brazil, to
understand more comprehensively the strategy of digital diplomacy of the
country on social media.
This case study is done through posts by the Embassy on the Facebook
page, based on the concept of Content Analysis by Lawrence Bardin (2004).
This type of analysis is a way of systematically extracting meaning from
texts. It is a technique that classifies and categorizes content based on the
observation of similarities, aiming to infer components in the collected data.
It is an approach consisting of several different techniques, both qualitative
and quantitative. According to the Bardin (2004, p. 47), the analysis is
a set of techniques for analyzing communications in order to obtain,

by systematic and objective procedures for describing the content of
messages, indicators (quantitative or not) that allow the inference of
knowledge regarding the production / reception conditions (inferred
variables) of these messages.
The chosen period of publications to analyze was from July 1, 2019 to

July 1, 2020. 347 posts were analyzed in total. The categories of analysis
were divided into three sections. First section is related to the content of the
posts, in order to understand how the embassy communicates through the
publications. In this section, these are the categories: (1) Quantity of posts;
(2) Use of Images; (3) Use of videos; (4) Use of hyperlinks; (5) Discursive
emphasis; (6) Thematic emphasis.
The second section analyzes the reception of readers, aiming to
understand the effects that the communication used by the embassy has. The
categories are (1) Volume of likes; (2) Volume of comments; (3) Volume of
shares; and (4) Characteristics of readers’ comments.
Finally, in the third section the categories were used in order to observe
and analyze the mediation of the page regarding dialogical communication,
with the categories related to the concept of Kent and Taylor (1998)
previously explained. The categories are (1) use of Dialogic Loop; (2) The
Usefulness of Information; (3) The Generation of Return Visits.
RESULTS
COMMUNICATION VIA FACEBOOK

This first part focuses on the content posted by the Embassy on their
Facebook page, with the primary objective of learning what the posted
content most focused on.
(1) Quantity of posting

The first item analyzed was the amount of posting, which refers to the
chronological record of publications on the page per month. The purpose of
this analysis is to understand the volume of posts, as well as the peaks or
troughs of this process. The graph below shows the results.
It is noticed that the embassy does not present a strategy for the number
of monthly posts since, as noted in the graph, within the analyzed period
there was a great contrast between months, with the lowest number of posts
Figure 2. Quantity of posts

being 16, and the highest, 43. This can be a problem in the sense of social
media algorithms, which favors accounts with a greater number of posts to
appear in the feed of the profiles that follow the page. The post volume
control is a monitoring strategy, considered indispensable nowadays for
those who want to obtain greater visibility. The author Caio Costa (2014,
p.87) points out that monitoring the page, including making regular posts, is
essential as it is intended to have visibility. As he states:
posting regularly on any network helps to build audience loyalty.

That interaction with the public is mandatory. Use of keywords
(so-called “tags”), titles (yes, there are companies that post videos
without titles), and miniature photos to promote posts are
indispensable.
(2) and (3) - Use of images and videos

Use of audiovisual media are considered important factors in public
disclosure, as it seeks to synthesize the purpose of the message, draw the
attention of users and also influence the algorithms, since text-only posts are
less privileged in appearance on the homepage feed.
Use of audiovisual media stood out in the analysis of the posts, with
Figure 3. Posts with images or videos

93.9% of them using some media. Images were found in 82.9% of the total
number of posts. Among them, the largest type of image were icons,
banners and posters (38%) and the second most used type were text-images
(22%), which sought to illustrate the information desired, in order to bring
more dynamism to the publication. 10.9% of publications used videos.
Among them, the majority is related to events promotion (33.3%) and the
dissemination of news and information (27.7%).
(4) Use of hyperlinks

This part analyzes whether there is a hyperlink in the message and, if so,
what types of websites it points to. It allows to check what kind of other
institutions are most shared.
In the case of the Embassy, 46.9% of the publications had hyperlinks,
which demonstrates that the institution seeks to provide readers with a
deeper understanding of the topic mentioned in the text. The large amount
of hyperlinks is also explained by the majority of publications referring to
events, contests, promotions, etc. Posting the links at these publications also
allows interested parties to know more about the activity announced. The
type of website most linked to were informative websites and newspapers
(64%). The second type were websites related to events and contests (20%).
The third most linked to was YouTube (15%).
(5) Discursive emphasis

The focus in this section is on the observation of the main discursive
function of the posts, the direction of the discursive tone that predominates
in the posts. The following sub-items were analyzed: Praise; cooperation or
solidarity; congratulating; commemoration or celebration; promotion or
divulgation.
In this category, 58.5% of the posts had an emphasis on promoting or
divulgation something; 22.5% focused on praise; 9% celebrated; 4.2%
emphasized cooperation or solidarity; 2% focused on congratulating.
Initially, the research also considered observing categories such as criticism
or contestation; repudiation or condemnation; worry or fear. However,
during the pre-analysis, it was noticed that posts with these discursive
contents were practically null, so they were removed from the categories. In
Figure 4. Discursive emphasis on posts
this sense, it shows that the vast majority of page publications by the
Embassy seek to emphasize information in a positive and light way. This is
a relevant factor in the production of page content to be considered for a
better understanding of the image that the Embassy seeks to convey to its
audience.
(6) Thematic emphasis.

The purpose of this observation is to identify the theme in which the
messages can be framed. The categories related to themes are: diplomatic
activities; events; informative announcements; speeches and interviews;
principles and positioning; historical dates; conjuncture and public interest;
interesting information about South Korea; Korean Wave; and others not
categorized (when the emphasis of the post does not fit any of the options
listed above).
As for the thematic emphasis, it was observed that the category most
identified in the contents of the page was related to information
announcements (27.4%). They sought to inform the public of activities or
events in general, merely focusing on disseminating the information. In
second place is the category public interest (21.3%) whose focus would be
news information on current social scenarios or useful information about
Figure 5. Thematic emphasis of posts
services. Interesting information about South Korea (16.4%) was the third
category most recurrent. They sought to look like “fun facts” about the
country. The fourth most used theme by the Embassy is the Korean Wave
(13.4%), related to culture and tourism. Posts related to historical dates such
as anniversaries and commemorative dates in general are present in 6% of
posts. Events such as seminars, courses and training, congresses and
festivals were found in 3.6% of posts. Then, speeches and interviews (3%),
whose emphasis were on excerpts or texts whose focus is bringing the
speech of an authority with analyzes, interviews or speeches. Finally,
diplomatic activities (2.4%), considering posts about summits, meetings and
actions of the ambassador.
The ‘principles’ category, referring to posts whose focus is to demonstrate
a certain view of the South Korean government on various topics, was only
present in 0.6%, so this section was placed on the “others” category on the
graph. However, in the following stages of the analysis this category is
relevant, so it has not been completely withdrawn from the research.
HOW POSTS ARE PERCEIVED BY FOLLOWERS

(1) Volume of likes by theme
The intention here is to observe the average number of likes that posts for
each topic received. This category allows to measure the feedback of the
message with the users as well as the degree of support received. An average
number of likes was made for each thematic emphasis of the publications.
The topic most liked by users who follow the page is related to the
Korean Wave, with an average of 267 comments per post. Next up are
publications on diplomatic actions, with 199 comments per post. In third
place are the publications referring to interesting information related to
South Korea, with an average of 131 likes per post. Historical dates follows,
with an average of 113 likes per publication; then, publications that
emphasize the principles and positions of South Korea have around 102
likes. The categories ‘events’ and ‘speeches and interviews’ shows a very
similar level of engagement in this aspect, with an average of 100 likes in
each post. Following are informative announcements, with an average of 93
comments and, finally, the least most liked theme is about public interest,
with an average of 41 likes per post.
It is interesting to highlight some contrasts observed: the themes most
used by the embassy on posts, related to information announcements and
Figure 6. Volume of likes by theme

public interest, are those that receive less likes from readers. It is noticed
that the opposite also occurs: diplomatic activities, one of the themes less
used in publications on the page, is the second-most like-receiving one. The
interest in knowing more about the embassy’s diplomacy may be related to
the willingness and curiosity of Brazilians interested in South Korea to learn
more about actions involving Brazilian-Korean relations.
Moreover, ‘principles’ is a theme that despite its low adhesion by the
embassy, has a relatively high number of average likes, being in 5th place.
This can indicate that the audience wishes to know more about South
Korea, including its ethics and moral philosophy in general.
Interesting information about the country is the third-highest theme in
terms of average number of likes and is also the third most used by the
embassy. In this sense, there is a satisfactory mediation about what arouses
interest in the public and what the embassy communicates to them.
(2) Volume of shares by theme

Sharing a post on Facebook is an action that requires a more personal and
bigger engagement of each individual, because when sharing the post is
added to the user’s personal page and homepage feed, being visible to all
Figure 7. Graph about volume of shares

friends. Therefore, sharing indicates not only interest in the theme but also
the user’s willingness to show that theme to friends on the social media.
In this observation category, it should be noted that some aspects are
repeated regarding the volume likes: the most published themes by the
embassy (public interest and information announcements) are the least
shared by readers. The number of post shares related to diplomatic activities
is also high, the third-highest category shared - however, as already
mentioned, it is least-used theme by the embassy in posts. The three most
liked and shared topics are related to the Korean Wave, interesting facts
about Korea and diplomatic activities.
(3) Volume of comments by theme

This category focuses on observing the average amount of comments that
each theme receives on posts. This allows to measure the spread of the
message, the interest of users in the theme, the repercussion of a given
message on the social media and the level of conversation generated.
As the graph above shows, the difference between the average number
of comments is large comparing Korean Wave to other themes (average of
Figure 8. Graph of volume of comments

175 comments per post about korean wave). This shows that this is the
theme that users most want to talk about and give their own opinion about.
Another interesting aspect noticed is that, contrary to the results related
to likes and shares, informative announcements are the second topic that
receives the most engagement regarding conversation through comments,
receiving an average of 15 comments per post. This may be related to the
fact that users like to demonstrate their opinions to what is happening and
also they tend to ask more questions about that specific current information.
(4) Characteristics of readers’ comments

This category sought to observe which attitudes are most present in the
comments of users who follows the embassy page, in order to better
understand the effects of publications on readers. Thus the number of
supportive comments was observed (which demonstrate agreement or
support with what was published); negative comments (which disagree or
do not support what was communicated by the embassy); and neutral
(which does not show directly to be positive or negative, but seeks to talk
and discuss about the topic).
As the graph shows, the majority of comments are neutral. The
neutrality in the comments indicates that users rather talk rationally about
the theme, pointing out aspects about the topic without really criticizing or
praising it, the focus being on the conversation itself. Many of the neutral
comments are the users tagging friends in the posts, showing them that
Figure 9. Graph of characteristics of readers’ comments

content and then consequently generating a conversation about it, which is

considered a positive result for the page.
ANALYSIS OF DIALOGIC COMMUNICATION

The third part of the analysis of the communication carried out by the
embassy proposes an observation of how the mediation of the embassy is
done with the public reading the page. Thus, three principles of dialogical
communication were used as analysis criteria.
(1) Use of Dialogic Loop

In this first category, it was observed whether the embassy usually participates
actively in a dialogue with readers based on responses to comments in the
publications. Within a year, more than eight thousand comments were
published by readers, which were analyzed manually. Among them, those
who asked a direct question to the embassy, 77% did not receive an answer.
Also during the analysis, negative comments by readers about this were
observed, containing complaints for the lack of response from the embassy
on comments and also e-mails.
It is therefore concluded that the Embassy does not use the dialogic loop
in its communication on Facebook in a satisfactory way, whereas the dialogue
does not appear to be essential in their communication strategy for the page.
In this sense, it is opposite of Kent and Taylor’s (1998) concept, who claim
that dialogue is the basis of a relationship - that needs to fundamentally be a
cooperative, communicative relationship. It is also emphasized by the authors
that the dialogic loop is crucial in the creation of long-lasting relationships.
(2) The Usefulness of Information

This second criteria observed whether the Embassy’s posts on Facebook
were targeted and of interest to the local or international public. The
analysis results showed that 78% of the publications were directed to the
local public.
Thus, it was concluded that the majority of embassy publications use the
principle of useful of information on the Facebook page, with relevant
information for the readers - this aspect, then, is positively closer to a
dialogical communication.
(3) The Generation of Return Visits

The third and final analysis criterion sought to see if the embassy publications
would possibly bring a willingness on the part of readers to return to the
page later. According to Kent and Taylor (1998), actions with this purpose
for example could be posts with forums, question and answer formats,
updated information, and experts answering questions.
Within the analyzed period a low number was observed in posts using
this principle, only 8% of them. This number draws attention in a negative
way because regardless of the post’s content quality, it does not mean that it
will make the public interested in the page to keep their interest. In this
sense, it is considered that maintaining a loyal audience is important, since,
recalling the concept of the author Shiren (2013), popularity is a goal for
public diplomacy.
Still, regarding the generation of return visits, the analysis showed this is
a pertinent principle because the only post that resembles the format
‘experts answering questions’ obtained massive engagement, with more
than 3 thousand comments. This also highlights how dialogue is an aspect
that the page’s followers seek.
CONCLUSION
This paper aimed to better understand how the digital public diplomacy of
South Korea is made by researching through a case study of the Embassy of
the Republic of Korea in Brazil’s Facebook page.
Thus, the paper intended to analyze how the Embassy’s communication
on the Facebook page is made; how posts are received by the audience and
whether dialogical communication is used with them.
The research found that the published content focuses on the dissemi-
nation of current information, with attention to the use of audiovisuals and
imagery items, important aspects in social media communication, in
addition to the use of redirecting hyperlinks to other pages, showing the
search for providing complete information to readers. Moreover, a relevant
aspect to be pointed out is the recurrent character of the posts being positive
and light.
However, it is necessary to emphasize that the number of posts strategy

can be improved, as it was noticed that in some months less than one post
per day is made. In this sense, a strategy to improve the posts regarding
their monthly volume could benefit the page, thus enabling better fidelity of
the public. It also could improve the appearing of content in the followers’
homepage feeds because of the algorithm that privileges pages with a higher
number of publications.
Another aspect to consider would be to perform a better mediation
between what the public engages the most and the thematic content that the
embassy posts, considering how the posts are received by the public. As the
research indicated, the most shared, liked and commented topics by the
public are about diplomatic activities, Korean Wave (culture and tourism)
and interesting information (about Korean society or history). However,
most of these topics are rarely addressed in publications by the embassy,
which indicates an aspect for improvement.
Still regarding the reception of the public, it was noticed that the
negative comments by readers are very few. This may be related to the fact
that the embassy’s communication focuses on positive issues, as previously
stated.
Finally, regarding the use of dialogical communication, the research
identified that only one of the three dialogical principles (the useful of
information) is effectively used by the Embassy on the Facebook page.
Thus, it is possible to conclude that dialogical communication is not used
satisfactorily by the embassy. It suggests that the Facebook page mediator
should pay more attention to the needs of the public, especially taking into
consideration using more dialogue to create a better relationship with the
audience. In this sense, a bigger attention should also be given on answering
followers’ questions and concerns more frequently, as well as opening more
opportunities in which they can express their doubts and curiosities - with,
for example, question and answer online events.
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239
The Performance of the Fourth Industrial

Revolution in South Korean Public
Diplomacy: Focus on Korea-Vietnam
Diplomatic Relations
Dong Thi Thu Hien
Abstract | Diplomacy has an important role in each country. In particular,

in the background of the globalization era, the role of diplomacy is more
central and can be a crucial chain of national development. Until now, the
process of diplomacy development has been long, and traditional diplomacy
has maintained an important mission, and as the 21st century a new concept
of public diplomacy emerges. This is a part of traditional diplomacy and has
a variety of influences on the diplomatic process of each country. Also, the
21st century is referred to as the era of the scientific revolution and the era of
the 4th industrial revolution. And the purpose of paper is to examine how
these elements are applied in the field of public diplomacy in Korea and
what effects can have. More over this paper conducted a survey on 315
Vietnamese who are living in Vietnam, entitled ‘the awareness of Korean
public diplomacy policy in Vietnam and the use of the Fourth Industrial
Revolution achievements in the process of implementing public diplomacy
policies,’ and important conclusions were presented according to the survey
results.
Keywords | Fourth Industrial Revolution, Korea-Vietnam public
diplomacy, application of science and technology, social media, major
activities in public diplomacy
국문초록 | 외교는 각 국가에서 중요한 역할을 담당한다. 특히 세계화 시대에

외교의 역할은 더욱 중요하며 국가 개발의 핵심적인 고리가 될 수 있다. 지금까
지 외교 개발의 과정은 길었으며, 전통적인 외교는 중요한 임무를 지녀왔고, 21
세기에 공공 외교라는 새로운 개념이 등장한다. 이는 전통적인 외교의 일부이며
각 국가의 외교 절차에 다양한 영향을 미쳤다. 또한, 21세기는 과학 혁명의 시대,
4차 산업 혁명의 시대로 불린다. 이 논문의 목적은 이 요소들이 어떻게 한국의 공
공 외교 분야에 적용되는지, 그리고 어떤 영향을 미치는지 살펴보는 것이다. 나

아가 필자는 베트남에 거주하는 315명의 베트남인을 대상으로 ‘베트남의 한국
공공 외교 인식과 공공 외교 정책 시행 과정에서 4차 산업 혁명 업적의 사용’이라
는 제목의 설문 조사를 실시했으며, 설문 조사 결과는 중요한 결론을 제시한다.
INTRODUCTION
South Korea entered into diplomatic relations with Vietnam on December

22nd, 1992, to increase cooperation in economic, political and cultural fields
between the two countries. Observation of the diplomatic relationship
between the two countries reveals that before 1992, relations between the
two countries were strained due to the Vietnam War. The Vietnam War,
which had lasted 21 years from 1954 to 1975, had the two countries fighting
on opposite sides. South Korea (henceforth, ‘Korea’) had entered the war
from the early 1960s until the early 1970s as an ally of the United States,
which caused a strain between the two nations.
However, the needs of globalization in the latter part of the 20th century
urged the two countries to close their traumatic history to look to the future
together and to develop a strategic and comprehensive partnership. History
cannot be changed, but we must understand it. In order to maintain a
peaceful and intimate relationship, the cooperation of governments is a
prerequisite, but so is the cooperation between each country’s citizens. How
must this be accomplished? This is the function of public diplomacy.
If you look at the friendship between the two countries, traditional
diplomacy has played an important role in significant achievements.
Additionally, the efforts of public diplomacy are also great, especially in the
era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Accordingly, in this paper, the goals
are to demonstrate how the Fourth Industrial Revolution in Korea’s public
diplomacy has been important to Korea-Vietnam diplomatic relations.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE 4TH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
The term ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’ was coined and widely used in the
The Performance of the Fourth Industrial Revolution in South Korean ... 241
21st century. ‘With the advent of this era, it is expected that human life will
change rapidly as manufacturing processes become digitized and automated,
and all things become intelligent and connected to the internet.’1 The Fourth
Industrial Revolution (or Industry 4.0) is the ongoing automation of
traditional manufacturing and industrial practices, using modern smart
technology. Large-scale machine to machine communication and the
internet of things (IoT) are integrated for increased automation, improved
communication and self-monitoring, and production of smart machines that
can analyze and diagnose issues without the need for human intervention.2
The World Economic Forum (WEF) describes the Fourth Industrial
Revolution as “a technological revolution that conflates the boundaries of
digital, biological and physical spheres based on the Third Industrial
Revolution.” Furthermore, the boundaries of physical space, digital space
and bioengineering space are being redefined as a result of technology
convergence. (WEF, 2016).3
Industrial revolutions have freed humanity from engaging the use of
animals for industrial purposes, enabled mass production, and brought
digital technology to billions of people. But the fourth industrial revolution
is fundamentally different from the ones that precede it. It combines the
physical, digital, and biological worlds; affects all sectors, economies, and
industries; and features a variety of new technologies that even challenge
ideas of what it means to be human.4
In the era of globalization and the Fourth Industrial Revolution, Korea
faces opportunities and challenges concomitantly, and the core issue is to
maximize opportunities and solve challenges agilely. The changes brought
on by the fourth industrial revolution have been pertinent to this project.
The fourth industrial revolution has brought around several changes in
1 Kim Na-hee, ‘4차 산업혁명에 대응하기 위한 IP 집중지원기술 창업지원 프로그램 구축

ideation: 정부의 창업에 대한 사업화 지원프로그램을 중심으로 (Establishment of IP intensive
support technology start-up support program to cope with the 4th industrial revolution
ideation: Focusing on the commercialization support program for government start-ups),’
Graduate School of Engineering, Korea University, Master’s Thesis, 2018, p.1.
2 https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/%EC%A0%9C4%EC%B0%A8_%EC%82%B0%EC%97%8
5%ED%98%81%EB%AA%85 (Search date: 2020.07.02)
3 Nahee Kim, ibid, p. 8.
4 World Economic Forum site (Search date: 2020.07.02)
https://www.weforum.org/about/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-by-klaus-schwab
the world. The most important is internet technology. Firstly, the internet
has developed rapidly, and it has also become a great tool for the country to
promote its national image in a certain manner. Social media has been
utilized greatly in this endeavor. The social media sector has been growing
rapidly through the internet throughout the 21 stCentury, leading to a
shortening of the geographical gap between countries, with borders becoming
blurred. As many new forms of social media emerge, human beings are
becoming more connected, and the exchange of knowledge has also become
easier and more efficient.
Secondly, the internet delivers significant benefits in promoting the use
of advanced technology facilities. In order to widely promote the image of
the country, many large-scale events should be held, demonstrating Korea’s
strong economic power and professional development. The essential
elements to achieve this are modern technology facilities. It does not require
a lot of physical effort and can produce high returns by quickly processing
and automating tasks.
However, the development of high-speed internet and many other modern
technology facilities also entails negative consequences. In fact, while
broadband connection can enhance mutual understanding between countries
by offering access to authentic facts, it also makes fake news and unreliable
contents go viral, which may threaten the positive images that a country has
built up and conveyed.
These pros and cons should be carefully considered during the process
of implementing public diplomacy policies, while being well aware of the
two-sided characteristics of information communication in the current era.
OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE WORLD AND KOREAN

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE WORLD

In recent years, especially after the September 11 attacks,5 debate over
5 The September 11 terrorist attacks are a simultaneous suicide terrorist attack in the United
States on September 11, 2001. This resulted in the collapse of the 110-story World Trade
Center (WTC) twin towers in New York and the attack and destruction of parts of the
public diplomacy has become increasingly contentious. The US government

has focused on public diplomacy in order to revive the image and political
prestige of the United States worldwide. This form of diplomacy is also
referred to as “soft power.”6 It is necessary to understand what public
diplomacy is and what characteristics it has in order to explore the case of
public diplomacy in Korea in further detail.
Public diplomacy is ‘unlike traditional diplomacy, it is a collective term
for governmental and non-governmental diplomatic activities aimed at
foreign public.’7 Public diplomacy is not only sending messages to other
countries, but also receiving messages from other countries, conducting
analysis and evaluation, and developing tools and methods to communicate
the messages about one’s nation as well. That is why public diplomacy is a
multicultural approach to learning from one another on the basis of dialogue
(duality).
Public diplomacy is a new concept in modern international relations.
The concept was first used by diplomat Edmund Gullion in 1965.8 Public
diplomacy refers to the integration of international relations outside the
framework of traditional diplomacy. It involves non-governmental
organizations, foreign relations and policies, and their influence, including
information processes and cultural exchanges between diplomats and
foreign media. The focus of public diplomacy is information and ideas that
Pentagon, the U.S. Department of Defense in Arlington County, Virginia, killing about
2,996 people and injuring at least 6,000. This also served as an opportunity for the
establishment of the US Department of Homeland Security in accordance with the
Homeland Security Act initiated by George W. Bush in 2002.
6 Soft power is a concept contrary to hard power expressed by physical forces such as
military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions. It is a term that refers
to the power to obtain what one wants by doing it, and in the 21st century, smart power,
which combines hard power and soft power, is emerging as important. (See http://www.
publicdiplomacy.go.kr/introduce/public.jsp)
7 김태환 (한국 국제 교류재단 공공외교 사업부장), 『21세기한국형 ‘신공공외교 (New Public
Diplomacy)’- 외교정책의 패러다임쉬프트와 전략적맵핑』, 국립외교원 외교안보 연구소, 2012,
No.2012-35, 1면. (Tae-Hwan Kim (Director of Public Diplomacy Business Division,
Korea Foundation), 『21st Century Korean ‘New Public Diplomacy’’-Paradigm Shift and
Strategic Mapping of Foreign Policy』, National Institute of Foreign Affairs and
Communications, 2012, No. 2012- 35, p. 1).
8 The term public diplomacy was coined by a former US diplomat in 1965 during the Cold
War and Edmund Gullion, dean of The Fletcher School at Tufts University, “Edward R. It
began to be used when the Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy) was established.
transcend borders.9
In what sense, then, is public diplomacy different from traditional
diplomacy? In particular, in the 21st century and the era of the Fourth
Industrial Revolution, what are the characteristics of public diplomacy in
the context of the globalization that has been unfolding since the 20th
century, and how is it progressing? ① Complementarity: public diplomacy
is complementary to other forms of diplomacy. ② Indirect and informal: in
some countries, the focus of public diplomacy is not only to influence the
policies and actions of other countries, but also to change perceptions,
attitudes and feelings toward the home country and to create non-
governmental relations with other countries. ③ Strategic and long-term:
anything that affects other countries will certainly require preparation and
must be seen in the long run. ④ Cohesion: in order for diplomacy to
develop, various forms of diplomacy must be combined and mutual
relations must be maintained.10
KOREAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Korean public diplomacy plays an important role in demonstrating Korea’s
power and influence on the world map. This section of the essay will
investigate the significance of public diplomacy for Korea. First of all, the
Korean government defines ‘public diplomacy’ as a ‘diplomatic relationship
by expanding consensus on our history, traditions, culture, arts, values,
policies, vision, etc., through direct communication with foreign citizens
and securing trust’11. It refers to diplomatic activities that enhance Korea’s
influence on the international community by promoting and enhancing our
national image and national brand. Additionally, public diplomacy is a
diplomacy that captures the hearts of the foreign public, free from
government-to-government diplomacy, and is a multidimensional
diplomatic activity that advances the friendly and cooperative relationship
9 Vũ Lê Thái Hoàng, 『Ngoại giao Công chúng trong thế kỷ 21』, nghiencuuquocte.org, 2014.
(Vu Le Thai Hoang, 『Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century』, nghiencuuquocte.org, 2014.)
(http://nghiencuuquocte.org/2014/06/18/ngoai-giao-cong-chung-trong-the-ky-21/).
10 Vũ Lê Thái Hoàng, 『Ngoại giao Công chúng trong thế kỷ 21』, nghiencuuquocte.org, 2014.
(Vu Le Thai Hoang, 『Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century』, nghiencuuquocte.org, 2014.)
(http://nghiencuuquocte.org/2014/06/18/ngoai-giao-cong-chung-trong-the-ky-21/).
11 http://www.publicdiplomacy.go.kr/introduce/public.jsp.
between the two countries to the next level based on genuine communication
and understanding.12
The core of South Korea’s public diplomacy is “to win the hearts and
minds of people.” This consists of four elements: ① generating an attractive
and impressive perception about Korean culture, ② securing understanding
and support for Korean policy, ③ promoting Korea through information,
and ④ maintaining good friendships through contribution and service.
Therefore, in order for public diplomacy to be successful, ‘individual
citizens, NGO, corporations, local governments, and government agencies
at various levels need to interact with each other and’ 13 their foreign
counterparts in other countries. Specifically, major public diplomacy
projects at diplomatic missions abroad are as follows: 14 ① A project to
promote Korea, introducing the overall attractiveness of Korea through
various methods such as seminars, forums, exhibitions, and performances.
② Quizzes on Korea, K-food world festival, k-pop world festival, video
contest, etc. ③ Local caravans that promote Korea by visiting local cities
other than the capital. ④ The opening of Korea corner, a complex Korean
public relations center incorporating advanced Korean IT technology into
major local universities, libraries, and cultural centers. ⑤ A Korean cultural
club composed of locals, a taekwondo club, and a k-lover (friendly foreigner)
foundation project that encourages those who have studied or worked in
Korea to voluntarily promote Korea. ⑥ A public diplomacy goodwill
ambassador project that enables famous foreigners to act as Korean public
relations representatives. ⑦ A project to expand the description of Korean
development in foreign elementary, middle, and high school textbooks.
Until now, the Korean government has not only spread the image of
Korea through public diplomacy, but has also maintained bilateral exchanges
with other nations. Based on this, the next chapter examines the relations
between Korea and Vietnam in public diplomacy in the era of the Fourth
Industrial Revolution.
12 한충희 (외교통상부문화외교국장), 『2012 외교관계수립 기념행사 결과 보고서』, 2012, 발간사.

(Choong-hee Han (Chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Culture and
Diplomacy Bureau), 『2012 Diplomatic Relations Establishment Event Result Report』,
2012, Publisher)
13 See link: http://www.publicdiplomacy.go.kr/introduce/public.jsp
14 See link: http://www.publicdiplomacy.go.kr/introduce/public.jsp
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

IN KOREAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (FOCUS ON KOREA-VIETNAM
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS)
Korea is carrying out various public diplomacy activities to maintain friendly

cooperative relations with countries around the world, and is continuing to
shape a brighter diplomatic future. At present, Korea has established
diplomatic relations with a total of 191 countries.15 Among them, Korea-
Vietnam diplomatic relations always seem to be at the core of friendly
relations between the two countries. They maintain close relationships in all
aspects, from traditional diplomacy to public diplomacy, and cooperate with
each other as important partners. Since 2017, Korea’s public diplomacy has
set specific policies and goals to further strengthen its bond with Vietnam.
The Fourth Industrial Revolution has accelerated this friendship and the
process of implementing these policies, helping the two countries achieve
incredible results.
An online survey was conducted with 315 Vietnamese participants
living in Vietnam about ‘the awareness of Korean public diplomacy policy
in Vietnam and the use of the Fourth Industrial Revolution achievements in
the process of implementing public diplomacy policies. The contents of this
paper are mainly used based on the results of this survey. First, the basic
information related to the online survey is as follows:
① Survey period: 2020.07.15~2020.07.21. (1 week)

② Survey subjects: 315 Vietnamese people living in Vietnam
③ Survey target age: 10 years or older
④ Jobs to be surveyed: any
Rapid growth of promotional strategies through social media

As illustrated by the survey results, the internet, AI, media, robots, etc., are
the most mentioned among the achievements of the fourth industrial
revolution. Among them, today’s media is the fastest way to convey human
15 Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, overseas space, diplomatic relations establishment

status
See link: http://www.mofa.go.kr/www/wpge/m_4181/contents.do
knowledge and information. Media becomes a means for expressing

everything, such as images, voices, and emotions, in various and vivid ways.
This kind of media channel, which informs all people about a wealth of
information and knowledge quickly, is truly a progressive invention of
humanity. This shortens the geographical gap and facilitate communication.
For example, when we consider the coronavirus situation, as we are dealing
with impacts around the world, we will appreciate the important role of the
media more than ever. As the time we spend outside must be reduced due to
the virus, our time at home is bound to increase. Accordingly, it is necessary
to fully recognize that the use of media channels will increase and that the
world will become more closely connected through media channels in the
future.
Since 2017, as the public diplomacy policy of Korea has expanded, the
use of media to promote Korea’s image has been vigorously deployed in
Vietnam. Social media16 (Facebook, YouTube, websites, etc.)and more
traditional media channels (TV, radio, and cinema) are performing well in
Vietnam through the search process. Traditional media channels have
developed since the Third Industrial Revolution and have only developed
more since entering the Fourth Industrial Revolution stage. Additionally,
since the Korean Wave culture began to flow into Vietnam, Korea’s image
has been promoted through traditional media channels, so it has played an
important role until now. Additionally, since social media has been widely
used in Vietnam for several years, and since this period of use coincides
with the time when the Korean public diplomacy policy was expanded, this
paper will focus on the relationship between the implementation of public
diplomacy policy and social media.
① Facebook
Facebook was founded in 2005 and opened on September 26, 2006, and it
was introduced in Vietnam on the same date. In 2008, the golden age of
Facebook began. Currently, the most popular social media platform in
Vietnam is Facebook.
16 Social Media is divided into 4 main zones. ① Social Community: Facebook, YouTube,
Twitter, Instagram, etc.; ② Social Publishing: website, blog, etc.; ③ Social Commerce; ④
Social Entertainment: Online game website, social game, etc.
Figure 1. Leading countries based on Facebook audience size as of April 2020 (in millions)17
As shown in Figure 1, by April 2020, the number of Facebook users in

Vietnam increased to 63 million, ranking seventh in the world. This
suggests that Facebook can be used effectively to relay values about Korea
to a large population of Vietnam. In fact, it is apparent that Korea has
already been using Facebook to gain favor in diplomatic relations with
Vietnam.
First of all, most of the Korean institutions that are associated with
public diplomacy issues have Facebook pages. This provides Korea with the
ability to reach the Vietnamese people and to alert them to any policies,
information, and events regarding Korea. There are a total of 13 major
public diplomacy sites,18 and the sites promoted through Facebook are as
displayed in the following table.
Table 1 shows that most public diplomacy agencies are actively promoting
their activities on Facebook. In particular, organizations that are active in
17 https://www.statista.com/statistics/268136/top-15-countries-based-on-number-of-
Facebook-users/ (Search date: 2020.07.21.)
18 http://www.publicdiplomacy.go.kr/relation/relation01.jsp
Table 1. Facebook list of major public diplomacy institutions in Vietnam (as of 20 July 2020)
Page Pages
Page likes follow mainly
No. Main site Facebook link count count targeting
(persons) (persons) Vietnamese
Ministry of Https://www.Facebook.com/
1 6995 7835 Yes
Foreign Affairs rokembassyinvietnam/
Northeast Asian
2 history Https://www.Facebook.com/nahf.or.kr/ 3069 3179 No
foundation
Https://www.Facebook.com/
3 K-pop contest 107.767 113.243 No
kbskpopworld
Trungtâmhànngữsejonghànội 1
Https://www.Facebook.com/ 17.483 17.763 Yes
sejonghanoi1khxhnv/
Trungtâmsejonghànội 2 - 하노이2
세종학당
27.237 27.389 Yes
sejonghanoi2/
Trungtâmhànngữsejonghànội 3
sejonghanoi3/
Trungtâm king
sejongtrụsởchínhtạiviệtnam.
5.657 5.883 Yes
vietnamkingsejonginstitute/
King Sejong
Trungtâmsejonghcm 2 -
4 institute
đạihọcsưphạmtp.hcm 2.417 2.517 Yes
foundation
Https://www.Facebook.com/sejongdhsp/
Trungtâmsejonghồchí minh 3 -
호찌민3세종학당
2.075 2.138 Yes
sejonghcm3/
Trungtâmsejongbìnhdương
trungtamsejongbinhduong/
Trungtâmsejongcầnthơ -
ctusejonghakdang
1.128 1.186 Yes
trungtamsejongcantho/
Trungtâmhànngữsejonghảiphòng
717 724 Yes
Https://www.Facebook.com/cklc.huvn/
Table 1. Facebook list of major public diplomacy institutions in Vietnam (as of 20 July 2020)
(continued)
Page Pages
Page likes follow mainly
No. Main site Facebook link count count targeting
(persons) (persons) Vietnamese
꾸이년세종학당
quynhonsejong/
Hànngữsejongcầnthơ_껀터한국어교육원
948 967 Yes
Https://www.Facebook.com/skeducaion/
Community of
private None
5
diplomatic (민간외교단체커뮤니티)
organizations
6 Korea.net 609.389 607.206 No
koreaclickers/
7 Dokdo Https://dokdo.mofa.go.kr/kor/
8 Arirangtv Https://www.Facebook.com/arirangtv/ 719.951 767.091 No
19.881 20.629 Main page
Korea koreafoundation
9
foundation (KF) Https://www.Facebook.com/
6.322 6.344 Yes
koreafoundationhanoioffice/
45.100 46.437 Main pgae
officialkoica
10 KOICA Koica베트남사무소(koicavietnam office)
Https://www.Facebook.com/koica. 9.184 9.414 Yes
vietnam/
VANK
(voluntary Https://www.Facebook.com/
11 24.969 25.312 No
agency network vankprkorea
of korea)
Ministry of
12 culture, sports Https://www.Facebook.com/mcstkorea 213.175 215.729 No
and tourism
Korean culture
and
13 information Https://www.Facebook.com/kocis.go.kr/ 3.028 3.273 No
service
(KOICIS)
Vietnam or have offices located in Vietnam are all approaching the

Vietnamese people through Facebook. In other words, in addition to Korea’s
main Facebook page, these organizations have created a Facebook page
focusing primarily on engaging Vietnamese people. By using Facebook, the
social media channel most commonly used by the Vietnamese people,
Korean values, policies, culture, and education are being actively promoted
to the Vietnamese people, reflected in the user engagement and interactions
through “like” and “follow” buttons.
Additionally, it seems that most of the institutions that use Facebook
pages for the Vietnamese people are writing Facebook posts in Korean, but
this fails to reach foreigners who are interested in Korea but who are not
proficient in Korean. This also nullifies the objectives of public diplomacy,
as the information is accessed by only a minority. Even when posts are
bilingual in English and Korean, the rate of effectiveness is reduced.
Additionally, as shown in Table 1, the most active organization on
Facebook in Vietnam is the King Sejong institute foundation. As the demand
for Korean language education has expanded, Korean language institutes
continue to open. Out of more than 100 Korean language centers in
Vietnam, the King Sejong institute employs effective learning methods, so it
seems that many people are interested in learning from the King Sejong
institute. King Sejong institute academies are present from northern
Vietnam to the central region to the southern regions. This has become an
effective tool for teaching Korean to Vietnamese people. All academies
vividly convey their activities and events, so it seems that they are receiving
positive feedback from interested people. A total of 15 King Sejong institutes
are currently active in Vietnam, of which eleven use Facebook to exchange
information with interested parties. Among these, only those in Thai
Nguyen and Da Nang do not use Facebook yet. Additionally, it is difficult to
distinguish whether or not it is the same system of King Sejong institute due
to an inconsistency in their names, profiles, and cover pictures. This can be
difficult for those seeking information, as they might confuse it with other
centers using the same name. Therefore, unification is needed to enhance
the efficiency and offer viewers a clearer understanding.
The chart below compares seven distinct media modes in terms of their
abilities to convey information to the Vietnamese people, as revealed by an
Figure
112.5 2: How Vietnamese access
Korea (unit: %) information about
112.5
90.
89.2
89.2
Korea
81.3 (unit: %)
112.5
90. 81.3
67.5 89.2
90. 81.3
67.5 39.7 36.5
45. 34.6
67.5 39.7 36.5 34.6
45. 14.6
22.5 39.7 36.5
45. 34.6 14.6
22.5
0. 14.6
252
22.5
0. Collection of Essays on Korea’s Public Diplomacy
0.
Figure 2:Facebook
How Vietnamese
Facebook
Youtube Friends
access information
Youtube Friends aboutTV shows
TV shows
newspapers movie theaters Main Website
newspapers Korea
Facebook (unit:
Youtube
movie %)
theaters Friends
Main Website TV shows
112.5
In90.response to 89.2
questions81.3
about what kinds of information respondents were frequently
In response to questions about what kinds of information respondents were frequently
In
67.5response to questions about what kinds of information respondents were frequently
looking for, the fields in descending order are movies and dramas (261 votes), music (251
39.7
looking
45. for, the fields in descending order are movies 34.6
36.5 and dramas (261 votes), music (251
looking
22.5 food (157 votes), traditional culture (109 movies
votes), for, the fields in descending order are and dramas
votes), Korean 14.6 (261 study
language, votes),
in music
Korea (251
(108
votes), food (157 votes), traditional culture (109 votes), Korean language, study in Korea (108
0.
votes), food
votes), (157
politics votes),
and traditional
society culture
(69 votes), and (109
othervotes),
(volunteerKorean language,
activities, study in science
cosmetics, Korea (108
and
votes), politics and society (69 votes), and other (volunteer activities, cosmetics, science and
votes), politics
technology, and
jobs, societyetc.).
fashion,
Facebook
(69 votes),
Youtube
and other (volunteer
Friends
activities, cosmetics, science and
TV shows
technology, jobs, fashion, etc.).
Figure 3: Items of Vietnamese interest in Korea
Figure 2. How Vietnamese access
Figure 3: Items of information
Vietnamese
(Unit:%)
aboutinterest
Korea (unit: %)
in Korea
In response to questions
Figure 3: Itemsabout what kinds of information respondents were frequently
of Vietnamese
90. 82.8
(Unit:%) interest in Korea
79.7 (Unit:%)
90. for, the fields
looking 82.8 in descending order are movies and dramas (261 votes), music (251
79.7
90. 82.8
67.5 79.7
votes),
67.5 food (157 votes), traditional culture (109 votes), Korean language, study in Korea (108
49.8
67.5 49.8
votes),
45. politics and society (69 votes), and other (volunteer activities, cosmetics, science and
34.6 34.3
45. 49.8
34.6 34.3
45. 21.9
technology,
22.5
jobs, fashion, etc.). 34.6 34.3
21.9
22.5
21.9
22.5 Figure 3: Items of Vietnamese interest in Korea
0.
0. (Unit:%)
90.
0. 82.8
movies and dramas 79.7 music
movies and dramas music
67.5 movies
food and dramas music
traditional culture
food traditional culture
49.8
food
Korean language, study in Korea traditional
politics andculture
society
45.
Korean language, study in Korea politics
34.6 and society
34.3
Figure 3. Items of Vietnamese
Korean interest
language, study in Korea (Unit:%)
in Korea politics and society
21.9
⓶YouTube
22.5
⓶YouTube
⓶YouTube
online survey. In particular, with 89.2%, equivalent to 281 out of 315
0.
surveyed people choosing the corresponding option, Facebook stood out as
the most popular
movies and tool,
dramas followed by81.3% music(256/315 votes) for YouTube.
Subsequently,
food
interpersonal communication accounted for 39.7% (125/315
traditional culture
votes), whereas the proportion for TV shows and newspapers were 36.5%
(115/315 votes) and 34.6%
Korean language, (109/315
study in Korea votes),politics
respectively.
and society Meanwhile, movie
theaters and official websites shared the same percentage of 14.6% (46/315
⓶YouTube
votes).
In response to questions about what kinds of information respondents
were frequently looking for, the fields in descending order are movies and
dramas (261 votes), music (251 votes), food (157 votes), traditional culture
(109 votes), Korean language, study in Korea (108 votes), politics and
society (69 votes), and other (volunteer activities, cosmetics, science and
② YouTube
YouTube is a particularly popular social media platform for Vietnamese
people. As shown in Figure 2, ranking second, there was only a narrow gap
between its user base and that of Facebook, the most prevalent counterpart.
Additionally, as people are increasingly considering YouTubers as a job in
Vietnam, everyone can participate in YouTube and yield an income,
regardless of their age, gender, and background. In particular, thanks to the
ubiquity of smartphones and Internet connection, YouTube has been more
accessible than ever. According to statistics from Statcounter Global stats,
the usage rate of YouTube has increased significantly from January to
September 2020, and in particular, from February to May, the number of
YouTube users rapidly increased due to the increased amount of time spent
at home because of the coronavirus.
According to the above statistics, YouTube is expected to continue to
gain its popularity. In the case of Vietnam, this suggests that implementing
public diplomacy plans or policies through YouTube channels can be
Figure 4. Social media stats Vietnam (from July 2019 to June 2020)19
19 https://gs.statcounter.com/social-media-stats/all/viet-nam (Search date: 2020.07.21.)

Table 2. YouTube list of major public diplomacy institutions in Korea (as of July 21, 2020)
Subcribers
No. Main site Youtube channel link
(persons)
1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Https://www.youtube.com/user/mofakorea 8.74 million
Northeast Asian history
2 Https://www.youtube.com/user/neahistory 2.92 thousand
foundation
3 K-pop contest Https://www.youtube.com/c/kbsworldtv 13.5 million
King Sejong institute Https://www.youtube.com/user/
4 4.13 million
foundation learnteachkorean
Community of private None
5 0
diplomatic organizations (민간외교단체커뮤니티)
Https://www.youtube.com/user/
6 Korea.net 11.8 million
gatewaytokorea
7 Dokdo Https://dokdo.mofa.go.kr/kor/
8 Arirangtv Https://www.youtube.com/user/arirang 390,000
Https://www.youtube.com/user/
9 KF 5.75 thousand
thekoreafoundation
코이카
10 KOICA Https://www.youtube.com/user/ 45.100
officialkoica
Https://www.youtube.com/user/prkorea/
11 VANK 3.97 million
videos
Ministry of culture, sports
12 Https://www.youtube.com/user/mcstkorea 25,000
and tourism
13 KOCIS None 0
appropriate and highly effective. In fact, when visiting major Korean public
diplomacy sites, ten out of thirteen organizations had a YouTube channel,
but there was no channel for Vietnamese people.
As shown in Table 2, all channels are connected to the main site, but
there are no channels primarily targeting Vietnamese people. However, after
Facebook, the social media most commonly used by the Vietnamese people
to search for information about Korea is Youtube. Therefore, YouTube can
be indispensable when practicing public diplomacy or activities in Vietnam.
Table 3. Languages used

in major public diplomacy sites in Korea
No. Main site Link Language
Ministry of Foreign Http://www.mofa.
1 Korean, English
Affairs go.kr/www/index.do
Northeast Asian history Https://www.nahf.
2 Korean, English, Chinese, Japanese
foundation or.kr/main.do
Http://
3 K-pop contest k-popworldfestival. English
kbs.co.kr/
King Sejong institute Https://www.ksif.
4 Korean, English, Chinese, Spanish
foundation or.kr/intro.do
(Community of private Http://www.p2pdc.
5 Korean (민간외교단체커뮤니티)
diplomatic organizations) or.kr/main.do
6 Korea.net Http://www.korea.net/ English, Korean
Korean, English, Arabic, Chinese,
Https://dokdo.mofa. German, French, Hindi. Italian,
7 Dokdo
go.kr/kor/ Japanese, Portuguese, Russian,
Spanish
Http://www.arirang.
8 Arirangtv English, Korean
co.kr/index.asp
Http://www.kf.or. Korean, English, Chinese, Japanese,
9 KF
kr/?Menuno=3241 German, Russian, Vietnamese
Http://www.koica.
10 KOICA go.kr/sites/koica_kr/ Korean, English
index.do
Korean,English, Japanese, Chinese,
Russian, French, Spanish, German,
11 VANK Http://prkorea.com/
Arabic, Thai, Vietnamese, Italian,
Portuguese, Malaysia
Ministry of culture, Https://www.mcst.
12 Korean, English, Chinese, Japanese
sports and tourism go.kr/kor/main.jsp
Http://www.kocis.
13 KOCIS Korean, English
go.kr/
③ Official website
All major public diplomacy initiatives have official web sites, and they
communicate with visitors in both Korean and English. Additionally, many
sites have other languages installed. Sharing information in various
this, it can be concluded that institutions operating in Vietnam are making remarkable progress
in public relations work and that the Vietnamese people are searching for information about
Korea in both Korean and English. Accordingly, official websites also play a role in public
diplomacy and drawing the attention of the Vietnamese people.

Figure 5: Number of Vietnamese acknowlege major public
diplomacy sites (Unit: %)
50.
45.1
37.5 34.6
31.7 31.4
29.2
27
25.
20 20.3
12.5
6 5.1
3.8 4.1
2.9
0.
Ministry Of Foreign Affairs Northeast Asian History Foundation

K-POP Contest King Sejong Institute Foundation
민간외교단체 커뮤니티 Korea.net
Dokdo ArirangTV
Korea Foundation KOICA
VANK(Voluntary Agency Network of Korea) Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism
Korean Culture and
Figure 5. Number of Vietnamese acknowlege major public diplomacy sites (Unit: %)

As mentioned above, even if the site is not available in Vietnamese, there are still
Vietnamese visitors. This suggests that rather than whether the site is accessible in Vietnamese,
languages is predicted to significantly gain the sites’ accessibility. Below is
thean overview
more importantof the languages
factor used
visiting
is searching and in major
sites public diplomacy
of institutions sites.in Vietnam.
with offices
As shown in Table 3, only two of the 13 sites, the KF and the VANK,
Additionally, all information is being updated quickly and vividly, as the main Korean
provide Vietnamese people with options. The remaining sites are mainly in
organizations
Korean and withEnglish.
a presence in Vietnamit deliver
Therefore, can bepolicies and information,
predicted mainly having
that only people through
good Korean and English proficiencies visit the site. Because of this, the
Vietnamese people inevitably have a lower access rate through official sites,
as demonstrated by Table 1. Nevertheless, when conducting an investigation
to determine which of the 13 sites are known and searched by Vietnamese
people, the result revealed that not only are the Vietnamese people aware of
these sites, but also many other sites. Through this, it can be concluded that
institutions operating in Vietnam are making remarkable progress in public
relations work and that the Vietnamese people are searching for information
about Korea in both Korean and English. Accordingly, official websites also
play a role in public diplomacy and drawing the attention of the Vietnamese
people.
As mentioned above, even if the site is not available in Vietnamese,
there are still Vietnamese visitors. This suggests that rather than whether the
site is accessible in Vietnamese, the more important factor is searching and
visiting sites of institutions with offices in Vietnam. Additionally, all
information is being updated quickly and vividly, as the main Korean
organizations with a presence in Vietnam deliver policies and information,
mainly through Facebook. These factors can make public diplomacy
policies and activities widely known. Also, since the official site, Facebook,
and YouTube are connected to each other, visitor are offered numerous and
diverse information sources, which assures an attractive and convenient
experience.
The three sources mentioned above – Facebook, YouTube, and official
sites – are the mostly used in Vietnam and play an important role in
promoting the Korean image through public diplomacy. It becomes a bridge
that connects Korean and Vietnamese citizens. As such, it is a very effective
and desirable strategy applying the achievements of the Fourth Industrial
Revolution to public diplomacy. In addition to Facebook, YouTube, and
websites, Instagram users continue to increase. Therefore, public diplomacy
needs to be agile in grasping the local situation and presenting policies and
activities appropriately according to the situation. Only then will the results
meet expectations.
In addition to the social media platforms mentioned above, broadcast
media channels such as radio and television continue to have many viewers.
Since the Korean Wave was introduced to Vietnam in the late 90s, it has
remained the main forum of publicity. It has not been discussed in depth in
this paper because its promotion has been constant since the time of its
introduction, and it remains an important means of public relations
throughout the time when foreign policy was conducted.
HOLDING LARGE-SCALE CONCERTS WITH THE AID OF SCIENCE

AND TECHNOLOGY
Every year, many Korean events are held in Vietnam. Through this, it is
possible to inform the Vietnamese people about Korean culture, history,
values and travel. The main events held in Vietnam are related to food,
1.62.4
0.4
2.4 1.6
0.4
1.6 2.4
0.4
2.4 1.6 2.4
0.4 1.6
0.4 17.8 17.8
33.2 33.2
music, travel and study abroad. These
17.8 17.8 17.8 1.6
0.4
33.2 33.2 33.2 2.4
include inviting famous or influential people
17.8
33.2 from Korean show business to Vietnam to
interact with the Vietnamese people and
44.5 44.5
selecting idols or actors to promote the image
44.5 44.5 44.5
of Korea as ambassadors. In the more than
2 0 y e a r s s i n c e t h e K o r e a n Wa v e w a s
44.5
introduced to Vietnam, many Vietnamese
Very Very
strong
strong Strong
Strong Usually
Usually Lowness
Lowness Very Very
people, especiallylow low youngNoneNone
people, favor
ong
Usually
UsuallyUsually
Lowness
LownessLownessVery low
Very low
Very low
None None None
Korean show business, and a large number of
Figure 6. Evaluation of the fan groups have formed, which indirectly
influence of the Korean Wave in
trong Strong Usually Lowness facilitate
Verythelow role of public
None diplomacy. In
Vietnam (Unit: %)
other words, through these fan groups, not
only is information about favorite idols shared, but it can also accelerate
communication of other information related to Korea. In response to the
survey question, “Have you ever heard of the term Korean Wave,” 71.1% of
the respondents said they had heard of it, and the remaining 28.9% said they
had not. Those who had heard of the Korean Wave were asked to evaluate
how it is affecting Vietnamese society. Specifically, the answer to this
question is shown in the following chart.
As seen above, Vietnamese people are well aware of the Korean Wave
and believe that it has a high impact on Vietnamese society. The most
common responses were very strong and strong (77.7% of the total).
Through this data, it is evident that policies of public diplomacy have had a
remarkable effect in Vietnam.
However, in response to the question of whether respondents had ever
participated in an event, the results came out differently from expected. Of
the 315 people who participated in the survey, 135 answered that they had
never participated in an event related to Korea, accounting for 42.9%. The
remaining 57.1% had participated, and among them, the five most popular
events were food events (30.5%), music (28.6%), study abroad (16.8%),
volunteer service (16.2%), and travel (13.7%).
When the reasons for low attendance were investigated, it was revealed
that they were not able to participate due to three major factors: geography,
time, and finances. Although several events are held every year in Vietnam,
10.4
10.4
the Fourth Industrial Revolution in South Korean ...
The Performance of10.4 259
36 56.3
36 56.3
they are held only36in large cities such56.3as 10.4
Hanoi, Da Nang, and Ho Chi Minh City, so
only people from the city or people living in
the surrounding areas participated in the
events. They also replied that even if they 36 56.3
lived in the city where the event was held,

many people were unable to participate
because they could not accommodate the
event in their schedule. For example, Have no time Have no information
Have no time Have no information Others
students and freelancers can adjust their time,
Have no time Have no information Others
but it is difficult to change schedules for Therefore, from the results of Figure 7, we find that it
Therefore, from the results of Figure Figure7. Reasons
7, we find for notthat it is necessary to give fur
Therefore,those
from who
the have
resultsa regular
of Figurejob.7, we find consideration
that it is participating
to timing
necessary in
tothe event
when
give conducting
further an event. Additionally
Therefore, from the results of Figure (Unit: %)
consideration to timing when 7,conducting an event. Additionally, 36% of respondents who
considerationweto timing whenitconducting
find that is necessaryan event. not participate
Additionally,
to give
Have further
no time 36% ofindicated
respondentsthat they
who had
Have no informationdid no idea aboutOthers
these events
not participate indicated that they had no idea about these events, even though they were u
consideration to timing when conducting an event. Additionally, 36% ofmethods. Further, as men
not participate indicated that they had no idea about thesevariousevents, social media
even though and were
they traditional
using
respondents whovarious didTherefore,
not participate
from and
social media indicated that
the traditional they
results of methods. had we findasabout
no
Figure 7,Further, idea that it is necessary
mentioned, access istostill
givelimf
various socialthese
mediaevents,
and traditional methods.
even though Further,
they wereasusingmentioned,
variousaccess
socialis still limited
media and
consideration to timing when conducting an event. Additionally, 36% of respondents wh
traditional methods. Further, as mentioned, access is still limited because
events were held not in participate
major large cities. that
indicated Therefore,
they had consideration
no idea about these of these
events, even though they were
multiple factors and detailed preparation are essential to ensure successful
various social media and traditional methods. Further, as mentioned, access is still li
hosting of any event.
In other words, food and music events can attract a lot of fans by
inviting influencers to major events held in Vietnam. Study abroad events
are centered on parents and people who want to study abroad in Korea, and
these days, as Korea offers scholarships in various forms, it has attracted the
attention and interest of numerous students and parents. Most volunteers
need to speak Korean or English to participate. The targets for recruitment
are mainly school and college students. This presents an opportunity to
work with Koreans and naturally show Korea’s strong economic power and
values. The Korean language and study abroad and volunteer activities will
be discussed in detail in the next two sections. Food and music events held
in Vietnam from 2017 to 2019, according to the public diplomacy report,20
20 Global Hallyu Status in 2017 I (Asia, Oceania); Korea Foundation for International
Relations: 2017, pp.175-178; 2018, pp181~184; 2019, pp.141~147 [한국국제교류재단
2017년지구촌한류현황 I (아시아, 대양주); 2018년; 2019년]
Evaluation
uation of success
of success
raterate
of events
of events
related
related
Korea
Koreato(Unit:
to %)%)
(Unit:
events related
Korea
Evaluation Koreato(Unit:
of(Unit: %) rate
success %) of events related to
Korea (Unit: %)
0 0
14.5
14.5 18 18
0 0
18 18 14.5 14.5
Figure
Figure
9: Evaluation
9: Evaluation
of
0
modern
of modern
technology
technology
totaled 33facilities
facilities
events, used
an used
in in from the
increase
18
ion of modern technology facilities used in(Unit:
14.5 events
events
18 (Unit: %) %) number. This is because Korea’s
previous
n technology facilities
events (Unit: %) used in public diplomacy policy was expanded
Unit: %)
9: Evaluation of modern technology facilities starting
used inin 2017. Likewise, from this time on,
events (Unit: %) the number of participants has seemingly
67.5
67.5
67.5 67.5
increased, in addition to investment in the
events and its format. In particular, the events
67.5
have successfully brought in elements from
VeryVery
successful
successful Success
Success science usually
usually Almost
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and technology. unsuccessful
unsuccessful
When surveying Complete
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the unsuccessful
unsuccessful
ul
cessful Success Success usually usually Almost Almost
unsuccessful
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unsuccessful
unsuccessful
on the effectiveness of the events,
Almost unsuccessful Among
Among Complete
the thefactorsunsuccessful
factors thatthat mademade the the events
events successful,
successful, modern
modern science
science andandtechnology
technology
ccessful Success usually Almost unsuccessful 67.5% ofComplete respondents felt
unsuccessful that the events
ors
factorsthat that
made made
the the events
Figureevents
8.successful,
successful,
Evaluation of modern
success modern science
were science and and
successful, technology
technology
18% very successful, and
uccessful, modern
facilities
facilities ratewere
science
were of events
and
important related
important to
technologyKorea
factors.
factors. In In 0.4 0.4
response
response to to
the the
question,
question, ‘What
‘What is the
is themodern
modern technology
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e factors that made (Unit: the
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%) successful, modern 15.2 14.5%
15.2 science
15.7usually
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technology Almost no
ortant
mportant factors.
factors.In response
In
15.2 response to the
15.7 to question,
the question, ‘What ‘What is the is modern
the modern technology
technology
0.4 respondents felt the events were unsuccessful
he question,
important
15.2 ‘What
facility
facility
factors.
15.7 is
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like?’modern
response 15.7%
15.7% technology
to answered
the answered
question, that thatthethe
‘What technical
technical
is facilities
the modern facilities areare
technology veryverymodern,
modern, 68.6%68.6% answered
answered
or completely unsuccessful. This is shown
% 5.7%answered
answered that that
the technical
the technical15.2
facilities
0.4facilities
15.7
are very
are very
modern, modern, 68.6% 68.6% answered
answered
facilities arethat very
that
they modern,
they werewere 68.6%
modern,
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15.2%
15.2% usually
usually below
modern, in Figure
modern, and and 8.only
only 0.4%0.4% saidsaidtheytheydiddid notnot have
have
technical
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15.7% answered that the technical facilities are very modern,
Among 68.6%
the have
factors answered
that made the events
modern,
ern, 15.2% 15.2% usuallyusually
modern, modern, and and onlyonly 0.4% 0.4%
saidsaid theythey did not
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nd only 0.4% said
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LD OF EDUCATION In order
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Korea’s diplomatic relations and image will correspondingly improve
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DIGITALIZATION OF THE FIELD OF EDUCATION
In order to understand a country, that country’s language is a prerequisite.

Public diplomacy, which understands the importance of this mission well,
has implemented various plans and policies in Vietnam as more and more
people learn Korean. This program is considered to have three core
activities: Korean language instruction, scholarships, and competitions
related to Korean. Among them, the achievements of the Fourth Industrial
Revolution are being utilized in learning Korean, which is the focus of this
part.
① Learning Korean
Learning Korean gained popularity in Vietnam beginning in the early 2000s,
but since 2014, schools and Korean language academies have rapidly
increased. Through these schools and academies, many people have an
opportunity to learn Korean.
“Although Korean was ‘introduced’ to Vietnam much later than English,
French and Chinese, it has quickly established itself as one of the most
sought-after foreign languages. In Vietnam, more than 16,000 students are
currently majoring in Korean (language) studies at 29 universities
nationwide. Thanks to the continuous development of Korea-Vietnam
relations, investment by Korean companies in Vietnam, and cultural
exchanges such as Korean drama and music, this number is increasing.
Currently, 15 King Sejong institutes have been opened in Vietnam,
including the Korean Cultural Center in Vietnam, University of Languages
and International Studies, University of Social Sciences and Humanities (Ha
Noi and Ho Chi Minh City), Thai Nguyen, and Hue. Keeping with the
demand for Korean, the number of Korean language education institutions
is expected to continue to increase. Meanwhile, the Vietnam Ministry of
Education and Training developed the ‘2020 education plan,’ which adopted
Figure 10: Evaluation of interest in Korean (Unit: %)
23.7 23.7
Korean as a second foreign language subject

23.7 in
55.2Vietnamese
55.2 secondary schools, and pilot
55.2
21.1 21.1
education was conducted in a total of eight
middle and high schools in Hanoi and Ho
55.2 Chi Minh City beginning in September 2016.
21.1 The age of Korean language learners in
Vietnam varies from 10 to 50. Motives for
pursuing Korean language learning include
Interested Interested Not interested the need to
Not interested learn
I don't knowKorean
I don't knowfor work, but many
Not interested I don't know
other learners are naturally keen on Korean
This reflects Thisthatreflects
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moreare
Figure people
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10. are interested
Evaluation inoflearning
interestin about
learning Korea.
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public diplomacy
Interested Not interested I don't know of their interest in Korean dramas,
d in learning about Korea.inSince Koreanpublic
(Unit: diplomacy
%)
movies, and music. Still others are motivated
s1 reflects21that more people are interested in learning about Korea.by a desire
Since public to study in Korea or get a job in a
diplomacy
2019 년지구촌한류현황 2019 년지구촌한류현황 I (아시아, 대양주); I (아시아, 한국국제교류재단,
대양주); 한국국제교류재단, 2019, 122~123
2019,
면. 122~123
(Global Korean
면. (Global
WaveKorean
Status Wave
in 2019
Status
I (Asia,
in 2019 I (Asia,
Korean company
류재단, 2019, 122~123 면. (Global Korean Wave Status in 2019 I (Asia, is also a major motivation for learning Korean.”21
Oceania); Korea
Oceania);
Foundation
KoreaforFoundation forAfter
International conducting
Relations,
International
2019,
Relations, a pp.
pp. 122-123.)
2019, preliminary
122-123.) survey, it can be seen that there are many
19 년지구촌한류현황 I (아시아, 대양주); 한국국제교류재단, 2019, 122~123 면. (Global Korean Wave Status in 2019 I (Asia,
p. 122-123.)
people who are interested in Korean. Among 315 participants in the survey,
nia); Korea Foundation for International Relations, 2019, pp. 122-123.)
55.2% expressed an interest in Korean. The remainder replied that they
were not interested or did not know.
This reflects that more people are interested in learning about Korea.
Since public diplomacy is a tool for better understanding this trend, various
programs are being conducted in various formats. The 15 King Sejong
institutes in Vietnam are highly evaluated by those who learn Korean. In
addition to offline classes, online classes are also offered. This is a suitable
method in an era where the internet is rapidly developing, and the
experience of the coronavirus pandemic over the past half year further
suggests the advantages of online lectures. Specifically, these include the
following:
First, it saves travel time and opens up new opportunities. Potential
students can study from remote locations, without going to the classroom
directly. The 15 language instruction centers in Vietnam are mainly only in
large cities, so people in other regions cannot attend the face-to-face classes.
Online lectures can not only prevent disruptions due to covid-19 pandemic,
21 2019년지구촌한류현황 I (아시아, 대양주); 한국국제교류재단, 2019, 122~123면. (Global

Korean Wave Status in 2019 I (Asia, Oceania); Korea Foundation for International
Relations, 2019, pp. 122-123.)
but also provide people with more opportunities for learning Korean.
Second, distance learning is financially effective. Indeed, it has
facilitated a reduction in overhead cost for institutions, since essential
infrastructure for a casual class is no longer needed. Besides, online lectures
enable learners to attend classes more than once and provide them with the
flexibility to study whenever and wherever they are available and most
productive. As a result, they can make the most of their material and,
therefore, optimize the money they invest in education.
Of course, every coin has two sides, but the advantages of online classes
are obviously many and represent a way to adapt to the changing times.
Looking at the achievements of the King Sejong Institute seems to indicate
that it is implementing the policy of public diplomacy well. However, as
discussed previously, although King Sejong Institutes are carrying out
promotional strategies through social media, limitations remain, suggesting
the need for continual adaptation to Vietnam’s unique characteristics.
② Selection of scholarships and ③ Holding of contest

As the trend of learning Korean increases, the number of people seeking to
study in Korea will also increase. However, as the number of people able to
cover expenses for studying abroad remains relatively small, obtaining a
scholarship is a priority for many, especially students with strong academic
records. At present, many institutions and individuals provide scholarships
in various forms. This paper only discusses statistics on scholarships from
the Korean government and government-related institutions for which
Vietnamese people are eligible to apply.
Table 6. Scholarship support from the Korean government and related organizations applicable
to Vietnamese22
No. Scholarship Support provided
Korean government Round trip air fare, tuition fees, living costs of 1,000,000
scholarship program won per month, research expenses of 420,000 won per year
1
(KGSP) for graduate for the field of humanities and 480,000 won per year for
students the fields of science, and medical insurance provided.
22 Ministry of Education, National Institute of International Education (NIIED), Guidebook

for International Students (Korean), 2014, pages 26-28.
Table 6. Scholarship support from the Korean government and related organizations applicable
to Vietnamese (continued)
No. Scholarship Support provided
KGSP for undergraduate Round trip air fare, tuition fees, living costs 800,000 won
2
students per month, medical insurance provided.
KGSP for visiting Round trip air fare, tuition fees, living costs of 900,000
3
researchers won per month and medical insurance provided.
Scholarship for
Living expenses: 500,000 won per month, career
4 outstanding self - financed
counseling and participation in culture experience camp
foreign students
living expenses (800,000 won per month) - reserve fund
Scholarship for
(200,000 won per month)
5 outstanding exchange
roundtrip airfares (1,700,000 won on average)
students
medical insurance premium
Art major Asian
18 million won per year for undergraduate and
6 scholarship - Ministry of
postgraduate students
Culture, Sports & Tourism
International scholar
exchange fellowship - 2.2 million won research expenses, entry expenses, return
7
Korea Foundation for airfare and insurance
Advanced Studies
The following competitions are held to create fun opportunities for those
learning Korean:
Table 7. Korean language competitions held in Vietnam

No. Competition
1 King Sejong Institute Korean speaking contest
2 Kumho Asiana cup Korean speech contest in Vietnam
3 Quiz on Korea
4 Hangeul day celebration
5 Korean speeches and students’ meetings
6 King Sejong Institute Hangeul day event
APPLYING NEW TECHNOLOGY TO VOLUNTEER SUPPORT
Volunteer support is a major force in Korean public diplomacy. In particular,

when comparing the economic power of Korea with that of Vietnam, Korea
is developing more, so at present it is donating to Vietnam in various fields,
and it supports a lot of social welfare and volunteer activities. One of the
four elements of public diplomacy is making good friends through
contributions and service. Contributions through volunteering in countries
with developing economies forms a major component of this strategy, with
the effect of not only continuing to develop bilateral friendly relations, but
also demonstrating Korea’s strong economic power globally. Also,
volunteering delivers benefits to both volunteers and recipients. In other
words, the quality of life improves for locals through the use of good
facilities and increased awareness from education-related services. At the
same time, Korean representatives can grasp the local environment through
volunteering and recommend appropriate policies or investment plans.
Additionally, while volunteering with locals, they can directly share and
spread the beautiful characteristics, culture, and values of Korea. Inother
hand, they can also learn more about Vietnam as well. Every year, many
Korean volunteers travel to Vietnam to work with local volunteers, helping
people in remote and difficult locations. The most important point of these
volunteer activities is that they need the assistance of science and technology.
Due to economic difficulties, living standard has not yet been improved
in remote area, where local authorities often face difficulties satisfying
human basic needs for residents. Korean economic power can make a
contribution in this respect through utilizing developments of the Fourth
Industrial Revolution. The Korean representative organization is KOICA.
Through KOICA, the Korean government provided 37.3 billion won to
Vietnam in the form of ODA. Therefore, Vietnam is the country that
receives the most ODA from Korea among Asia-Pacific countries. Fields of
support include mainly education, healthcare, public administration,
agriculture, forestry and fisheries, water (technical environmental energy),
energy (technical environmental energy), transportation (technical
environmental energy), science (technical environmental energy), the
environment (general fields), and gender equality (cross-disciplinary).
Figure 10. KOICA’s ODA support status (Asia-pacific region)23
Therefore, it can be seen that the relationship between Korea and Vietnam is
not merely a diplomatic relationship but a strategic cooperative partnership.
There are various fields of support, and the aid of science and
technology is applied across all of these fields. In the case of Vietnam,
KOICA provides 400 volunteers working in education, health care, and
public administration, who work in 26 provinces in Vietnam. According to
their fields of expertise, volunteers work for Vietnam government agencies,
such as vocational technical colleges (Vocational technical colleges Vietnam
Industry NgheAn province), the Vietnam-Korea friendship clinic (Hanoi),
and cultural sports tourism centers in NgheAn and Ca Mau province.
Another representative example is the case of the Vietnam-Korea
friendship information technology college. This is a public vocational
college responsible for creating experts and technicians with advanced
knowledge in their field. These people contribute to the development of
Vietnam by sharing Korea’s advanced scientific and technological
capabilities and achievements. Additionally, Korea provided 11 million
USD as ODA to invest in building lecture rooms, laboratory buildings,
libraries, administrative offices, and technical facilities, as well as by
building educational content.24
23 http://www.oda.go.kr/opo/koin/mainInfoPage.do?P_SCRIN_ID=OPOA202060S01
(Search Date: 2020.07.24.)
24 https://vi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tr%C6%B0%E1%BB%9Dng_%C4%90%E1%BA%A1i_
In January 2010, a general hospital was constructed in Quang Nam

province. The project has a total budget of 45 million USD, of which 35
million USD is Korean ODA support.25
Through the aforementioned examples, the Korean government has
supported numerous projects in Vietnam. This volunteer support is very
important and has huge significance for the development of Vietnam. In
particular, it is not only economic support, but also facilitates technology
transfer through visits by experts, and the image of Korea improves among
the Vietnamese people. Through this process, not only does the relationship
between the two governments become stronger and closer, but Korea also
establishes a beautiful relationship with the Vietnamese people. This will be
a very important bridge on which to continue and expand the policy of
public diplomacy, while utilizing achievements from the Fourth Industrial
Revolution. Therefore, the connection between public diplomacy and the
Fourth Industrial Revolution will continue to become stronger.
CONCLUSION
Korea’s public diplomacy policy is being actively implemented in Vietnam.

This has several causes. ① Cultural similarities. When the Vietnamese
people embrace Korean culture, they are not affected much by cultural
shock, and Korean culture can easily harmonize with Vietnamese culture
with little apparent conflict. ② common Vietnamese personality traits are
kindness, open-mindedness and gentleness. Therefore, the Vietnamese
people can adapt quickly not only to Korean culture but also to all foreign
cultures. ③ Economically, Vietnam is still developing in comparison to
Korea. Therefore, Korea can effectively implement public diplomacy policies
through volunteer activities or policies supported through ODA. ④ The
Korean and the Vietnamese governments share a strategic partnership.
h%E1%BB%8Dc_C%C3%B4ng_ngh%E1%BB%87_Th%C3%B4ng_tin_v%C3%A0_
T r u y % E 1 % B B % 8 1 n _ t h % C 3 % B 4 n g _ Vi % E 1 % B B % 8 7 t _ - _ H % C 3 % A 0 n ,
_%C4%90%E1%BA%A1i_h%E1%BB%8Dc_%C4%90%C3%A0_N%E1%BA%B5ng
(Search Date: 2020.07.24.)
25 https://baodanang.vn/channel/5425/201001/khoi-cong-xay-dung-benh-vien-da-khoa-trung-
uong-quang-nam-1994207/ (Search Date: 2020.07.24.)
Korea and Vietnam established diplomatic relations in 1992, almost 30

years ago. The two countries are making a remarkable effort to create a
bright future by moving on from the painful history. Thanks to this,
relations between Korea and Vietnam are close and friendly, and not only
traditional diplomacy, but also public diplomacy and all fields are actively
in cooperation and achieving great results. In order to achieve these results,
Korean public diplomatic institutions have an important role in adjusting
foreign policy while reflecting the changes of the times. In other words, the
progressive achievements of science and technology are used as much as
possible in the process of implementing public diplomacy policies. In the
future, in order to practice public diplomacy policy more successfully in
Vietnam, it is necessary to make tailored use of advanced science and
technology, in which advantages are optimized while disadvantages are
overshadowed. The Fourth Industrial Revolution is characterized by fast
and rapid information delivery. Taking advantage of these benefits will lead
to successfully promotion of the image of Korea. On the other hand,
incorrect information can also be rapidly distributed. In particular, since
public diplomacy plays the role of spreading a positive image of Korea to
the people of other countries, the use of progressive technology merits
caution.
This paper has examined how to apply the progressive science and
technology achievements of the era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution to
Korea’s public diplomacy policy, centering on the case study of Vietnam. In
fact, the concept of public diplomacy is still a relatively new concept, and it
is still unfamiliar to many Vietnamese people among those who conducted
the survey, 139/315 (44.1%) revealed that they had never heard of the
concept of public diplomacy and that 110 (34.9%) had heard of it, but did
not understand it. On the one hand, this raises question marks over the
mutuality and equity of the current approach, in which enhancing public
awareness of diplomacy activities must be taken into consideration, so that
it can avoid any notoriety as a manipulation rather than a pure diplomatic
strategy. However, on the other hand, in the history of the Vietnamese
people diplomacy, “people-to-people relations” existed for a long time.
People’s diplomacy has played an important role in Vietnam’s diplomatic
history, and especially during the wartime period (1945-1975), in which it
played an indispensable role in the national liberation project by combining

with Ho Chi Minh ideology. This concept has apparent similarities with the
public diplomacy that originated in the United States. This identity suggests
that the strategy Korea diploma applies in Vietnam, which is closely tied
with basic principle of inter-citizen integration, can be easily adopted,
provided that it is transparent enough. Beside, as we enter the present era,
Vietnam’s diplomacy is showing its original spirit, and it is engaged in
various activities in line with the changing times. Likewise, the successful
implementation of Korean public diplomacy in Vietnam will be a great
example for Vietnamese public diplomacy, which offers a lesson of
harnessing state-of-the-art technologies to connect individuals.
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h%e1%bb%8dc_c%c3%b4ng_ngh%e1%bb%87_th%c3%b4ng_tin_v%c3%a0_
truy%e1%bb%81n_th%c3%b4ng_vi%e1%bb%87t_-_h%c3%a0n,_
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trung-uong-quang-nam-1994207/
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5%ed%98%81%eb%aa%85
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271
Korean Public Diplomacy toward Africa:

Scoping the Cooperation and Humanitarian
Aid in the Age of COVID-19 Crisis
Iffat Tahira
Abstract | In the age of globalization, a nation’s identity and political

culture play a significant role in that nation’s behavior in any given
international dealing. Economic interests, international cooperation, norms
and values play central role and states can reconstruct them by interacting
with other nations. From this perspective, the core point of this paper is to
analyze the modern states’ assistance and cooperation to under-developed
and developing states amid the COVID-19 crisis. This paper explores
Korea’s dynamic role as a middle power, its norms of compassion,
cooperation, and aid to Africa during the outbreak of the pandemic as a form
of public diplomacy through state and non-state actors. It examines how
Korea has been helping the population of poorer continent and building its
positive image around the world. It provides the theoretical lens to
understand the effectiveness of Korea’s public diplomacy policy towards
Africa. Finally, the present study also offers suggestive ideas for global
cooperation to deal with the spread of coronavirus and collaboration with
other states by conducting public diplomacy.
국문초록 | 세계화 시대에 한 국가의 정체성과 정치 문화는 특정 국제 정세를

이해하는 데 중요한 역할을 한다. 경제적 이해관계, 상호협력, 규범, 가치들은 중
심적 역할을 하며 정부들은 다른 국가들과 상호 작용하는 과정에서 그것들을 재
(再)건설 할 수 있다. 이러한 관점에서 핵심은 코로나19 사태 중 현대 국가들이
후진국과 개발도상국들에 보낸 원조와 협력을 분석하는 것이다. 이 논문은 미들
파워로서 한국의 활발한 역할, 정부와 비정부 참여자들을 통한 공공 외교의 한
형태로 전염병이 발발하는 동안 아프리카에 보낸 원조, 협력, 동정심의 규범을
탐구한다. 이 글은 그동안 한국이 어떻게 가난한 대륙을 도우며 세계적으로 긍정
적인 이미지를 쌓아왔는지 알아보고, 대(對)아프리카 공공 외교 정책의 효과성을
이해하기 위한 이론적 렌즈를 제공한다. 마지막으로, 이 연구는 또한 코로나19의
확산에 대처하기 위한 국제적 협조와 공공 외교 실행을 통한 다른 정부들과의 협

력에 관한 아이디어를 제안한다.
INTRODUCTION
The state’s identity and political culture play pivotal roles in understanding
the global situation. A powerful state will abstain from merciless power
politics by playing by the regulations and acting through cooperation,
significantly shaping its own identity in the process. Understandings and
beliefs can change by people-to-people contact abroad. Initially, countries
may organize their institutions around economic interests, but through
continual engagement with foreign publics’ views, may eventually revise
their original intentions, norms, and values. From a constructivist standpoint,
it is important to see how the Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
pandemic changes or strengthens the understandings and beliefs which
countries support and cooperate on regarding globalization (Rausch, 2020).
From the constructivist perspective, Korea’s norms of empathy, cooperation
and financial support to Africa amid the outbreak of COVID-19 through
humanitarian aid and assistance reflect the spirit of its cooperation, as a
form of public diplomacy. Korea’s aid to African states is a manifestation of
the standards to save the lives of needy people and presents a positive
impact across the world.
The continuous movement of people in a globalized world makes a
pandemic a particularly difficult menace to resist. Cheng and Zhang (2020)
note the initial place for the outbreak of coronavirus and first reported
infected people as being Wuhan, China (Osler, 2020; Family, 2020).
Initially, it affected countries including Japan, the Republic of Korea,
France, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, the U.S, and Australia (Wick, 2020,
p.3). On January 20, 2020, South Korea’s Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (KCDC) reported its first new coronavirus case in a Chinese
female visitor who flew from Wuhan to Incheon airport (Lee, 2020). This
first confirmed case has been regarded as the beginning of South Korea’s
first wave of the virus. The second wave started with massive spread of
infection with a religious group (BBC News, 2020). Korea’s comprehensive
Korean Public Diplomacy toward Africa 273
COVID-19 response shows how information and communication

technologies for testing, contact tracing, text alerts, dissemination of data,
social distancing and support from communities enables a flattening of the
curve without the imposition of restrictions on citizens’ movement or
lockdown of cities (Woodward, 2020). In late March, experts scrutinized
Korea as a model for other states to fighting the coronavirus. Loembe, et al.
(2020) note, after emerging reports of COVID-19 from Wuhan in December
2019, Africa began to prepare for its inevitable first cases which would soon
grow due to its close links to China, a key trade partner and host to some
80,000 African students. Statistics showed based on travel records from
China that Egypt, Algeria, and South Africa at risk of developing cases and
spreading them out to other areas of Africa. The outbreak of the novel virus
is devastating lives, health care systems, and economies in the region. The
already vulnerable populations of the continent will require more global
cooperation and humanitarian assistance amid the pandemic.
Due to the importance of mutual relations, Korea’s determination and
dedication to support Africa is a form of public diplomacy in the times of
COVID-19 pandemic. This study seeks to provide comprehensive
examination of Korea’s initiative by state, non-state actors and civil society
to help the vulnerable population of Africa, particularly Ethiopia, Madagascar,
South Sudan, and Kenya with explicit types of its public diplomacy
practices. As part of the in-depth study, a theoretical lens will be applied to
understand the effectiveness of Korea public diplomacy policy towards
Africa amid the current global pandemic; the present research also provides
suggestions and recommendations for global collaboration to tackle the
ongoing pandemic and cooperate with other nations through public
diplomacy. The present study analyzes the following questions:
1. What are the actors and tools of public diplomacy?

2. ‌Which efforts have been made by Korean state and non-state
actors to support and cooperate with Africa through humanitarian
aid to elevate its public diplomacy amid the COVID-19 crisis?
3. ‌How has Korea’s assistance been helping the vulnerable
populations in Africa and what is the effectiveness of cooperation
and humanitarian aid during the current global pandemic?
Brooks (2020) notes some catastrophes such as cyclones and earthquakes

can bring people into cooperation but history records that pandemics
normally estrange them. During the times of pandemics, social distancing is
the norm. Fear erodes normal human capacities for care and togetherness.
Wang (2020) argues public diplomacy in every shape and form provides a
bringing-together of human hearts and minds at different societal levels and
is essential to enhancing the extents of our collective affinity. Lee Geun,
Korea Foundation President underscored Korea is more developed across
the globe than Korean people expect and in terms of its public diplomacy
should stress this. In dealing with the current pandemic, Korea has been
more successful in comparison to Europe and other states (Whan-woo,
2020). Korea’s capacity to tackle the pandemic at home and its humanitarian
aid to Africa is a commendable step for collaboration to fight against the
coronavirus.
EXPLORATION OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND OUTBREAK OF

CORONAVIRUS
In 1965, Edward Gullion, dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
at Tufts University, coined the term “public diplomacy” (Hayden, 2011, p.
147). Since then, the term “public diplomacy” has been in use, but it
became much more familiar in 1990, when Joseph Nye coined the term
“soft power.” Since the September 11 events, the latter term has gained
more popularity (Ahyan, 2017, p.15). Nye formulates, “soft power is both
an asset to cultivate and a tool to use, a kind of public opinion capital that
has raised the profile of communication-centric foreign policies such as
public diplomacy, international broadcasting, and other forms of strategic
communication” (Hayden, 2011, p.1). Cull describes that “public diplomacy
is an international actor’s attempt to manage the international environment
through engagement with a foreign public” (Cull, 2009, p. 12). The
definition of public diplomacy presented by Paul Sharp is probably the most
concise, which he defines as “the process by which direct relations with
people in a country are pursued to advance the interests and extend the
values of those being represented” (Melissen, 2005, p.11; Golan et al. 2015,
p. 53). Public diplomacy aims to achieve a favorable image from foreign

peoples and uses the public as a tool to attain the required objectives.
In our stormy, interconnected and interdependent world, one citizen’s
safety affects the others, and one citizen’s health or poor health can
influence others. The current world economy ties the prosperity of states
together in dealing with issues such as unforeseen food crisis, energy, and
financial crises and of course pandemics. These “crises of interdependence”
have significant public health implications (Fairman et al. 2012, p.23). In
reference to COVID-19, scientist have detailed the ways in which Coronavirus
are in fact constitutes many viruses which are found both in human beings
and animals. “The virus that causes COVID-19 is designated severe acute
respiratory syndrome corona virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2); previously referred to as
2019-nCoV” (Joseph & Ashkan, 2020, p.1). The spread of COVID-19 in
China brought the virus into the focus of attention anew, and Wuhan bore
the brunt of this spread. By the end of December 2019, cases of pneumonia-
like virus were appearing in Wuhan. Since that time, the virus not only
affected the other areas of China but spread its poison across neighboring
states (Wick, 2020, p.3) and around the world. Due to its rapid person-to-
person transmission, the World Health Organization (WHO) designated it as
a Public Health Emergency of International Concern on January 31, 2020
(Zhou et al. 2020, p.3). On March 11, the World Health Organization
declared COVID-19 a global pandemic. According to the World Meters
Information on September 10, “COVID-19 is affecting 213 states across the
globe and 2 international conveyances” (Worldometers, 2020).Tedros
Adhanom, the head of the World Health Organization urged “states to apply
the lessons learned from Korea and elsewhere” (Fisher & Sang-Hun, 2020).
Jee Young-Mee, a member of the WHO COVID-19 Emergency Committee
and Korea Foundation special representative for health diplomacy
underlines “The COVID-19 pandemic has turned from disaster to
opportunity for Korean Public diplomacy” (Whan-woo, 2020). Korea’s
swift actions to handle the novel virus in the early stages make it possible to
help other nations by sharing its experience, medical equipment and
humanitarian assistance.
ACTORS AND TOOLS OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
Public diplomacy basically deals with the “management of communication”

among actors. State and non-state actors have particular informational or
motivational goals with regards to reaching the foreign audience using
different networks of communication to promote national interests. Most
importantly, in New Public Diplomacy, “the focus has shifted from
conventional diplomatic means and goals for promotion to relationship
cultivation with key foreign public” (Golan et al. 2015, p. 2; Zaharna,
2010).
As ranked by social level, actors of institutional features of public
diplomacy are identified at macro level, micro level, and meso level. Firstly,
the state is the main actor in public diplomacy and carries out its activities
through government agents and is an aggregate of all communications
received from state and non-state actors. Secondly, scholars, politicians,
artists, and citizens perform their organizational role. Thirdly, organizations
play their role as a form of public diplomacy. All these actors form parts of
diverse social subsystems from political sphere and military to academia
and may have disagreements in their desired manifestations of public
diplomacy practices and their search for public diplomacy strategies (Auer
and Alice, 2013. pp. 12-14). Berridge (2015) advocates that new actors in
diplomacy especially international NGOs are neither new nor involved
entirely in diplomacy (p. 267).
Melissen (2006) describes the instruments of public diplomacy as: the
media, internet, events and projects, celebrities and publications (p. 96).
Ruge (2011) describes how even Facebook is an online tool of public
diplomacy efforts. An embassy can utilize these web tools in significant
ways to gauge their host public’s dispositions. He includes PAO, Adobe
Co.Nx, Flicker, Youtube, Blogs, X.life, Short Messenger Services (SMS)
among other instruments. Online-based instruments such as Twitter and
Facebook are popular platforms for discussion of local issues (p. 145). A
significant role in public diplomacy is also played by lectures, conferences,
exhibitions and outside events, (Whan-woo, 2020) face to face discussion,
cultural performances, and language programs. Edward R. Murrow has
defined the face-to-face discussion “the last three feet” which cannot be
replaced (Rugh, 2011, p. 172). Public diplomacy is a communication function

by state and non-state actors to design the practices for their diplomacy
programs.
ANALYSIS OF KOREA’S STATE ACTORS’ AND NON-STATE

ACTORS’ EFFORTS IN AFRICA THROUGH PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
Conventional constructivists are fascinated in recognizing the actor’s

inclination. According to constructivist approach, actors and systems can
change shape over time. In this context, constructivists are not afraid of
extended periods of lockdown, as this gives them time to adapt and assess
factors of risk moving forward (Asmar, 2020). History reveals the
unanticipated twists and turns of global crisis, virus epidemics or pandemics
across the world. Amid the current COVID-19 pandemic, millions of human
beings are in threat, needing prompt and dynamic response and humanitarian
aid. In this scenario, Korean public diplomacy policies and programs
implemented in Africa have and are helping the people and building
beneficial partnership with the continent.
According to Nye, there are three different aspects of public diplomacy…
“Different relevant proportions of direct government information and long-
term cultural relationships”: Communication style, timeframes, and posture
orientations are the three facets to accomplishing these purposes (Snow
&Taylor, 2009, pp.73-74; Nye, 2004). Among all these three aspects, each
aspect has a significant role to building a favorable image of a state and to
achieving its wanted results. In the last two decades, Korea’s interest in
Africa has grown due to its natural sources and huge market for manufactured
products. But, amid the ongoing COVID-19 crisis, Korea’s focus has been
providing immediate humanitarian aid and cooperation through public
diplomacy. Korea’s support to beneficiary-communities of Africa is one
such manifestation of its public diplomacy.
The capacity or incapability of global actors and multilateral cooperation
could be seen by their actions to making the situation better or worse amid
the current pandemic. In all this, Korea has been seen as a model across the
world. Whan-woo (2020) notes, before COVID-19, public health did not
have much place in public diplomacy, but the novel virus will provide
opportunity to raise Korea’s diplomatic prospects. This attests to Korea’s
engagements and concerns that Korea is acting in the same way that any
country in the world would to exercise more power through public diplomacy
especially those in the poor states of Africa. The first initiative of Korean-
African cooperation in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic was the
G-20 Extraordinary Leader Summit. On March 26, the summit convened to
discuss the global responses to the epidemic. President Moon Jae-in and
G20 members held a video conference. They discussed enhancing support
to less developed states, plans to deal the pandemic, minimization of tariffs
and trade hurdles, and sanctions in the pandemic era (Yonhap, 2020a).
President Moon spoke to G20 member states, sharing the Korean clinical
data and information from the quarantine phase to help fight against
COVID-19, and to aid in the cooperative development of therapeutics and
vaccines (Yonhap, 2020b). He asserted that it would be important to keep
the flow of economic exchanges open in order to mitigate far-reaching
impacts to the world economy during the pandemic (Yonhap, 2020c).
By mid-March, out of 54 African countries some 30 had confirmed the
coronavirus cases (Anna & Magome, 2020). Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy
Ahmed and South African President Cyril Ramaphosa appraised the
extensive impacts of corona across the continent. In the next few days
following the summit, President Moon discussed with Abiy the potential
impacts the pandemic could have on Ethiopia. Both concurred on the
significance of G20 countries giving assistance to Africa after showing
concern regarding their ability to tackle the current developments of the
pandemic (Bone and Kim, 2020). The G-20 concurred to inject $5 trillion
into world economy and said the ‘serious risks posed to Africa’ are the
result of poorly-funded healthcare facilities, and so the G20 placed
particularly focused on Africa (Marks, 2020).
Out of the Second Seoul Dialogue on Africa (MOFA, 2019) emerged
President Moon’s first key initiative for the continent. COVID-19 crisis has
brought good opportunity for cooperation between Korea and Africa. Korea
is already providing support to Africa and started swift and immediate
financial support to continent after the summit. This time, the government
leadership has focused on mutually beneficial partnership, moving Korean
nationals out of Africa while providing support to individual African

countries that needed it (Bone and Kim, 2020).
Government’s investment in public diplomacy is evaluated by the
demonstration of returns by the actions of state and non-state actors.
Evaluation is discerned as pivotal to many public diplomacy functions,
including ‘program planning, providing evidence for the impact of public
diplomacy on informing and influencing foreign publics, and, ultimately
showing support for strategic goal attainment in foreign affairs’ (Buhmann
& Sommerfeldt, 2020, p.9). Kyung-sik, (2020) notes, President Moon is
curious about promoting friendly ties with Ethiopia, who was the sole
African state to dispatch ground troops to South Korea and shed blood
alongside South Korean allies in the Korean War (1950-3). Korea and
Ethiopia have maintained close cooperative relations in the fields of politics,
trade, economy, and international relations based on bilateral trust and
friendship.
Berridge (2010) identifies Telephone Diplomacy as a more suitable tool
in some circumstances and in some relations (p. 195). Its silver-lining is
especially apparent amid the fast-changing circumstances and current global
crisis, by making less face-to-face contact with others, and by orchestrating
others response. Chi-dong (2020) notes President Moon used phone
diplomacy to share Korea’s experience with COVID-19. He received many
calls from international leadership. He said, “Behind the frequent telephone
summits were a demand for global solidarity in response to COVID-19, a
desire to share South Korea’s quarantine experience and acquire its test kits
and other medical devices.” On March 30, Korean President promised to
increase international support for Africa in curbing the novel virus during
his phone talks with Prime Minister Abiy (Kyung-sik, 2020). Before the
COVID-19 outbreak, African states Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan
were already facing the cumulative impacts of the stressful situation of dire
food insecurity. On March 20, it was reported that the novel virus is
anticipated to aggravate ongoing issues (Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations, 2020, p.11). Korea provided 16 thousand tons of rice
this year as food assistance. On May 13, Ethiopia received medical devices
including hand sanitizers, masks, and diagnostic kits from Korea. The first
humanitarian aid (worth $470 thousand) was supported by the Korea
government in collaboration with Korean NGOs. On July 24, the second

relief effort was made through the African Union. The Korean Embassy in
Ethiopia donated 2 million masks to the African Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDCP). The African Union (AU) expects that the donation
will enhance the Africa’s capacity in combating the novel virus (Senbit,
2020). In July, the Ethiopian government and the Export-Import Bank of
Korea signed a loan agreement ($70 million), which will help its efforts to
deal with the Medical Equipment Provision Project ($ 30 million) and
COVID-19 Emergency Response Budget Support Program ($ 40 million)
(Ethiopian Monitor, 2020). The permanent representatives of Korea to AU,
Amb Hoomin Lim expressed kind remarks about the crucial role in
combating novel virus through systematic and organized Pan African
policies (African Union, 2020).
On April 6, Tedros invited the Korean President Keynote speaker to
share his country’s experience to containing the virus in teleconference
taking place in May. He urged Korea to provide assistance with testing kits
and other medical equipment to sub-Saharan African states (Yeon-cheol,
2020a). On May 18, President Moon addressed in teleconference World
Health Assembly. He expressed “the power of the three principles of
openness, transparency, and democracy was demonstrated, thanks to the
members of the public who became agents of disease prevention as they
practiced the spirit of liberty for everyone with a strong sense of civic
consciousness” (Yeon-cheol, 2020b). In regard to supporting the most
affected states by pandemic, the government of Korea has provided
humanitarian aid ($4 million) to 14 states—Yemen and 8 states in Southwest
Asia, East Africa, and 5 states in West Africa. The donation was made
through the World Food Program and the Food and Agriculture Organization.
(MOFA, 2020d). Starting from July 21, Korea provided 2 million face
masks as humanitarian aid to Africa. The donation was made to 28 states of
sub-Saharan-Africa for medical staff on urgent basis through the African
CDC. On the request of 42 African states, Korea is also providing quarantine
support ($ 26 million) (KBS World, 2020).
In order to implement the containment measures, many African states,
notably Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Namibia, and South Africa imposed travel
restrictions, closing their borders and airports for international flights by the
2 nd or 3 rd week of March. (Salcedo & Cherelus, 2020). Moroccan and

Korean top diplomats talked on the phone to arrange the special plane bring
home about 105 Korean citizens including the volunteers from the state aid
agency (KOICA) and transport medical devices to Morocco (Yonhap,
2020d). Korea made efforts to bring home the Korean tourists and expatriates
in Africa via chartered planes arranged through multilateral cooperation.
Some 66 Korean citizens in Madagascar and Cameroon were evacuated by
joint arrangement from diplomatic missions of the US, Japan, Germany, and
Britain (Sun, 2020). On 31 March, some 26 Korean nationals evacuated
from Madagascar via a civilian chartered flight shared with citizens of the
US, Japan, German, UK, Australia and Norway. The plane was organized by
the Korean Embassy. According to the Korean Embassy in Cameroon, some
40 Korean citizens, tourists and KOICA volunteers in Cameroon came
together with 56 Japan International Cooperation Agency members. A
similar civilian chartered flight to Ethiopia was organized by the Embassy
(Kim, 2020). Korea provided 5,000 diagnostic kits, medical equipment, and
mobile x-ray equipped van to Madagascar to treat the novel virus patients.
On June 2, Korea donated medical supplies (worth $ 630,000) to Madagascar
(Yonhap News Agency, 2020b). On April 16, eleven Korean entrepreneurs
returned home from Mali with the help of foreign states, especially Belgium.
Due to the suspension of flights in the region and unavailability of Korean
diplomatic services in Mali, Korean officials had asked for help from its
foreign partners in Senegal (Seung-yeon, 2020). On May 21, sixty South
Korean citizens evacuated across Africa on a chartered plane, among those
36 in Ghana, 13 in Kenya, 10 in Ethiopia and one in Sudan (Yonhap News
Agency, 2020a).
Since June, by considering the urgent needs of foreign aid from
developing states across the world; Korea secured an additional budget ($21
million) for humanitarian aid to 65 states. Among others 34 beneficiary
states with poor health care services including the Africa, and the Middle
East. The government of Korea has decided that it will carry on its support
through humanitarian aid as needed to fight against the COVID-19 (Joo-
yon, 2020). Korea has also honored requests from African nations to
provide them therapeutic equipment. At the request of South Sudan, the
Korean defense ministry provided about 10,000 test kits and 20,000 face
masks to handle the health crisis (Seok-min, 2020b). On June 25, Korean
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Lee Taeho attended the Sudan Partnership
Conference, a tele-conference. He assured Korea will keep up support to
Sudan for a stable political system, and development through humanitarian
aid and collaboration. He made an announcement for assistance ($7.5
million) for the year 2020 (MOFA, 2020c).
At the request of Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Kenya, Ms.
Raychelle Omamo, Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang, Kyung-wha
had phone talks with her on June 15, to share views on tackling the current
pandemic. Minister Kang maintained that Korea will support Kenya and
other African states to curb novel virus, including by donation and humani-
tarian aid and exchanging its experience via webinars on “K-quarantine”
(MOFA, 2020a). On June 24, Kenya received donation of 10,000 tons of
Korean rice to help refugee camps. It was donated by Korean MAFRA in
collaboration with WFP Kenya (MOFA, 2020b).
Regional municipalities and civil society have been engaging in public
diplomacy practices, but the central government is the main actor to public
diplomacy in Korea. Korean embassies in Africa lead the cultural exchange
diplomacy with cultural programs like taekwondo competitions, the
screening of Korean films, and promotion of Korean food (the Taste of
Korea program) (Chang, 2020, p. 142). On May 6, the Korean Embassy in
Antananarivo made an announcement of upcoming release of a short film
series on its Facebook page Ndao hitsidika an’i Korea (Let’s Visit Korea) to
discover Korea with Lim Sang-woo, the Korean Ambassador to Madagascar.
It was hoped that the series would entertain the people amid the global
coronavirus crisis. The great interest of followers was evident through their
immediate responses on the post, receiving 500 reactions within an hour and
most liked post. Korean Ambassador has also shared videos regarding
Madagascar and the embassy’s activities via his channel on You Tube
named 마다가스카르이야기 (Ramanoelina, 2020).
Amid the global COVID-19 pandemic, BTS Army South Africa, a fan
group of South Korean boyband Bangtan Boys (BTS) donated canned foods
to support underprivileged families. Ladles of Love is a large-scale
community-based project which is dedicated to feeding the poor. It provides
food to homeless people of Cape Town on a weekly basis. It also supplies
food to struggling schools, students and people. Since its foundation in

2017, it has been organizing many charitable events (Shumba, 2020). Ladles
of Love was selected by the administrators of the twitter fanpage due to their
extensive work with schools and underprivileged people. BTS has also
more contributed to Korean food drives and soup kitchens during the
current pandemic (Court, 2020). With the support of local BTS fans, these
events have successfully provided assistance amid the pandemic.
Besides the Korean government, secular and religious nonprofits are
also playing their pivotal role to tackle the pandemic in Africa. Warmth Day,
a Korean NGO in Ethiopia, serves to support veterans of the Korean War
and their families. Recently, it has started to supply masks and other
medical goods to recipients. The Korean Christian community and Christian
NGO named Anyang Global Methodist Church and another Korean NGO
Africa Freedom Foundation have donated 10 ambulances to Madagascar
(Bone and Kim, 2020). Korea University Medicine donated a cutting-edge
virtual dissection simulator to Madagascar with Nanoori Medical
Foundation. University of Antananarivo utilizes it for primary medical
education of students and doctors training. KU Medicine supported 2
negative pressures, an automated stainer and sealer amid the current
pandemic for the establishment of a diagnostic center (http://www.kumc.
or.kr). Ramanoelina (2020) corroborates, on May 4, a Korean NGO the
Good Neighbors also arrived in Antananarivo to help those infected with
COVID-19.Ferrier and Hwang (2020) identify Korean firms are also
donating test kits to building the state’s positive image during the pandemic
crisis. Samsung Heavy Industries Nigeria has secured 5,000 diagnostic kits
from Korean government to help with the local people.
EXAMINATION OF KOREA PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFECTIVENESS
Diplomacy is born out of acting on bilateral issues to global challenges and

it has effects on all nations and every territory worldwide. In this respect, a
growing inclination towards multilateral cooperation could be expected in a
post 9/11 world in dealing with issues such as terrorism, world economic
crises, pandemics and climate change. Hence, this new perspective to
diplomacy would setup public-networks, nongovernmental and corporate

actors with particular skill suited to key issues. Public diplomacy is
identified as ways of keeping the distinct images of, and cooperation between,
organizations with various goals, but who work for alike objectives
(Pamment, 2016, p. 65; Hayden, 2011.). The Korean government accom-
plishes the aim of elevating the state’s persona worldwide through public
diplomacy. As demonstrated through state and non-state actors, the
effectiveness of Korea’s cooperation in all forms of diplomacy highlights
the importance of its engagements with Africa. Korea’s vigorous and swift
actions to help Africa during the current pandemic have been seen as a
positive impact and favorable image on the continent and across the globe.
Golan et al. (2015) note the two normative moral theories Deontology
and Utilitarianism pertinent to public diplomacy practices. Deontology puts
the stress on “duty, respect for others, rationality, moral obligations of
human beings. On the other side, utilitarianism emphasizes our mutual
interdependence (p. 172). Since the beginning of 21st century, South Korea
has expanded its relations with Africa and continues its efforts to forge
mutual beneficial ties through cooperation. Wang (2020) argues that public
diplomacy lays out collective links between national self-interest and global
common public interest. Though, Korea’s focus and interests are easily
apparent, as Africa is a resource rich continent and a huge market for
Korean manufacturers. But, due to development of novel virus emergency,
Korea’s focus has shifted to supporting Africa and adapting its public
diplomacy practices accordingly. By shedding light on the effectiveness of
Korean public diplomacy, the considerable role played by state, non-state
actors, NGOs and non-profitable organizations amid the pandemic become
evident.
Gates (2020) says leaders have two key responsibilities in the times of
any crisis: find a solution to immediate problems and prevent them from
recurring in the future (p.1677). The current pandemic is one such
immediate problem in which human lives need to be saved. The spread of
the virus is forcing a reformation of worldwide priorities, policies and
programs. Within that framework, president Moon Jae-in’s endeavor is a
shove to raise his nation’s brand through the Public Diplomacy Campaign
(Attias, 2020). President Moon’s phone diplomacy is regarded as a
‘diplomatic boon’ for Korea (Chi-dong, 2020) regarding the public health
and economic crisis. His crisis management has boosted Korea’s international
image and reputation in a sarcastic manner.
Since the outbreak of COVID-19, the government of Korea’s prompt
reaction is worthy of note. It was due to learning from past experiences in
tackling the spread of related disease, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
(MERS) in 2015 (Bickenbach & Liu, 2020, p.5). The containment of
COVID-19 is closely associated with the capability of the health care
facilities to flatten the current pandemic and recession curve (Baldwin
&Mauro, 2020, p.51). Many scholars tend to concur that humanitarian
diplomacy encompasses all negotiation activities taken on by the different
actors with “governments, (para) military organizations, or public figures”
in tandem to intercede on behalf of human beings in danger (Balzacq et al
2020, p. 254). As a key contributor, Korea has been supportive of Africa by
enhancing humanitarian aid, the health care services and medical capacity.
The Korean government considers the African CDC as a ‘priority
partner’ in fighting against coronavirus and to achieve that, it has provided
humanitarian aid and shared experience. Korean Ambassador Lim’s
indicated that Ethiopia is a top priority by Korean government. Korea is
well-connected to Africa, and failure to handle the virus in Ethiopia, Africa’s
second most-populated state, would hamper the efforts of developed countries
and severely affect the pandemic management efforts of the continent.
Senbit (2020) notes the Korean commitments to its seven decades of
friendly terms which are reflected by the Ethiopian Monitor’s remarks;
Ethiopia is the first African state to receive the Economic Development
Cooperation fund concessional loans by Korea Exim Bank for emergency
response to curb the coronavirus. The financial assistance will help to
alleviate the effects of the COVID-19 on Ethiopia. Based on medical
equipment and the emergency response budget, Korea’s funds to Ethiopia
have been helping to provide health care facilities. Korea’s continual food
assistance to Ethiopia helps to provide humanitarian aid to its affected
people. Restriction during the current pandemic crisis, integrated with
Africa’s economic decline, floods and decline in incomes has conducted a
huge humanitarian aid requires across the continent. Korea aims to further
collaborate with other states in the spirit of solidarity by continuing the
opportune and considerable ODA projects for Africa. During the Sudan
Partnership Conference, the government of Korea urged the participants to
support Sudan through foreign aid and development cooperation initiatives.
Multilateral cooperation regarding plane pooling is a good example of
collective efforts to evacuating Korean and other nationals.
In the context of New Public Diplomacy, it also worth examining digital
diplomacy; it has spread out around the world. Social media platforms have
been said to be instrumental in attracting public engagement in Korea”
(Bjola & Holmes, 2015, p.74). The internet provides inexpensive and useful
ways for bridging relationships between all public diplomacy actors, both
state and non-state (Melissen, 2005, p.183). Amid the current pandemic,
cultural activities such as the release of Ndao hitsidika an’iKorea provided
information about the size of Korea and Madagascar, population, food, and
Taekwondo. Malagasy viewers expressed their feeling of love for Korea by
saying Annyonghaseo and Khamsahamnidaon facebook. 마다가스카르
이야기 channel shows the keen interest stoked in Korean public diplomacy
through the activities of the Korean embassy.
NGOs are much effective in humanitarian missions while having no
obligation to transnational corporations and not being beholden to the
political agendas of state actors. They are well-equipped to adapt their
endeavors according to specific situational urgencies. Occasionally, NGOs
associate with local leaders and groups to make sure aid reaches the
intended recipients (Snow & Tylor, 2009, p.160). The role of Korean NGO
Warmth Day, Good Neighbors, Anyang Global Methodist Church and
Africa Freedom Foundation, and BTS donation through food drives are
commendable. Korea University Medicine’s donation illustrates the prompt
response to tackle the difficult situation during the pandemic. It is helping in
anatomy and dissection education for doctors and specialists’ training in
Madagascar.
The World Economic Forum notes85% global population belongs to
developing states, where effects of COVID-19 will be worst due to the lack
of infrastructure and poor health care services (Arirang News, 2020). World
Data Lab reports that 42 African states are in poverty and 16 among them
have a rising poverty rate (Compassion International Inc., 2020). On
September 1, 2020, Korea’s MOFA announced a 5% increase in the 2021
ODA budget. As stated by MOFA, its 2021 ODA budget will increase by
US$ 38 million, from US$ 766 in 2020 to US$804 million in 2021. MOFA
aims to enhance its strategic and humanitarian ODA in 2021 to help its
partner states that are endangered by infectious diseases such as COVID-19
(Donor Tracker, 2020). Africa will also get benefits from the humanitarian
ODA. Mcclory (2019, p.40) describes the 2019 Soft Power Index, in which
Korea ranked 19th among nations, higher than its score in previous years.
The global community is much more connected now when compared to
the times of Great Depression. Though social distancing to prevent the
spread of infection to others has kept us apart, we are connected in important
ways thanks to our tech-defused world. Scientists and researchers are
collaborating on research, tests, vaccination, and diagnostic tools. The
interconnectedness makes it possible to cooperate in a creative way at a new
stage (Knorr et al, 2020, p.204). Ferrier and Hwang (2020) advance, during
the era of global tragedy and unpredictability, Korean public and private
sectors are further enabling prompt and dynamic response across the world.
In the future, this will be more beneficial than any profit gained by the
diagnostic kits alone. Overall, Korea’s support to Africa represents a new
window of opportunity for more people-to-people contact, potentially
saving lives through outreach to millions of people by exercising various
tools of public diplomacy.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION
All of society will change owing to the impacts of COVID-19. The current
pandemic has suddenly and severely affected all nations and business across
the world. Through public diplomacy, international and regional cooperation
are key instruments during a pandemic era and after the coronavirus crisis.
Korea’s swift and sharp response to tackling the novel virus is a model and
its cooperation with other states is exemplary. Humanitarian assistance to
Africa has been remained an important factor in the advancement of Korea
to foreign audience. To further demonstrate the positive effects of Korea’s
humanitarian aid through public diplomacy, African beneficiary states have
been benefiting from medical equipment, health care services, and financial
assistance. Current health challenges and economic consequences show us

how the survival of society comes down to taking care of one another and
being cooperative. Korea is playing its role through state and non-state
actors of public diplomacy.
Culture and socio-economic circumstances of each country are reflected
in their individual approaches to alleviation, isolation, social distancing,
health care system, and quarantine to tackle the pandemic. Korea has been
measured as exemplary by overseas in coping with the coronavirus outbreak.
Media in Europe also described the success of Korean programs and policies
for pandemic management. The onset of novel virus significantly has been
affecting and presenting a considerable menace around the world particularly
for the poor nations. Korea has been quite successful in making viable
efforts in Africa by helping them in the times of pandemic.
Countries have economic and trade relations with high population
density. Therefore, failure to control the novel virus would hinder the efforts
of those states which have been containing the virus (Breevoort et al.,
2020). A State’s inability to tackle a pandemic locally can result in faster-
growing outbreaks increasing the world mortality from the virus. The
COVID-19 pandemic poses a significant threat to global health and is a big
challenge for all countries. Developed countries like the US, China and
Korea have close trade ties with Africa. It is anticipated that international
trade, tourism industry and people-to-people contacts have been stagnant
due to fast-moving and uncertain times. If Africa cannot control the spread
of COVID-19, it will severely affect African economies and influence to
sustainability of the global economy.
Public diplomacy strategist Ali Fisher defines public diplomacy objectives
as “Public diplomacy is not necessarily merely about persuading people to
adopt your goals. It is about achieving your goals through helping others
achieve theirs. Effectively, it is about realizing that an organization is part of
wider community” (Zaharna, 2010, p.168). Korea’s response to Africa has
been to view as a public good to halt the global pandemic there. In the post
COVID-19 era, it is anticipated that Korea will see less of an impact on
their economy, owing to immediate response and cooperation from citizens
to control the pandemic. By considering its score improvement in recent
years, Korea hopes at a higher score on the Soft Power Index in the post
coronavirus crisis. It illustrates how soft power can help to overcome

borders and barriers, bringing Korea closer to the world through a variety of
forms of public diplomacy.
POLICY SUGGESTIONS
In these times, the success of any state’s public diplomacy will rely heavily
on its cooperation with the global community through humanitarian aid and
medical technology. It is suggested for states to gain experience from other
states to finding swift and sharp solutions for epidemic prevention. Effects
of the current global pandemic are unpredictable, so test reliability and
therapeutic solutions are suggested to slow down the spread. Moreover,
multilateral cooperation and collective engagement play pivotal role in
providing technical assistance as a form of public diplomacy. It is expected
that medical scientists will be successful in finding a solution and vaccine
through exchange diplomacy to treat the COVID-19.
International and regional collaboration is necessary to fight against the
pandemic. It is suggested for countries to follow Korea and other states for
the containment to sporadic cluster of infections. Korea has been tackling
the novel virus through inexpensive tools as face masks, rubber gloves, and
swabs. Cooperation from people is also a key factor to its success. It is
suggested that people should avoid unnecessary movements and maintain
social distancing to avoid the locking down of cities. States’ capacity to
tackling the pandemic can help to secure an economic and business
environment for entrepreneurs, foreign investors, establishment of favorable
repute, and provision for a place for business in the future through public
diplomacy.
Considering past experiences of colossal challenges, global crises and
pandemic, there is need to establish a Global Fund by advanced countries to
respond rapidly changing circumstances like pandemics. Unity, solidarity,
collective engagement, and prompt actions by all nations are suggested to
drive this point home through public diplomacy. COVID-19 presents
different opportunities for remote work and business in an innovative form.
Balance between digital and person-to-person interaction can be useful
through the instruments of public diplomacy in the post COVID-19 era. By

considering the rapid and effective output of online work from home,
businessmen can plan their strategies and transfer their work onto an online
platform by maintaining their people-to-people contacts with limited
meetings physically. Work from home or remote work will reduce the
carbon emissions, due to reduction in means of transportation. It is possible
that we could handle global warming and climate change as part of our
ongoing response to current health crisis.
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297
South Korean New Deal and the Role of

Eco-Diplomacy
Ingrid Rafaele Rodrigues Leiria
Abstract | This study explores sustainable development goals as part of

the future of diplomacy, analyzing the Korean New Deal as part of a digital
diplomacy movement for future practices, and discussing the role of an Eco-
Diplomacy in developing nations, with South Korea playing an active role in
expanding this approach. With the development of the Korean New Deal, the
adaptation of eco-diplomacy, involving an extensive group of international
non-state actors from technical and academic communities abroad, could
allow embassies and consulates to use their networks to develop small,
focused centers to lead the way for Korea to reach an important role as a
leading nation towards innovation and sustainable development.
Keywords | Public Diplomacy, Korean New Deal, Eco-Diplomacy,
South Korea
국문초록 | 이 연구에서는 미래 관행을 위한 디지털 외교 움직임의 일환으로

한국판 뉴딜(Korean New Deal)을 분석하고, 한국이 개발도상국에서 확장을 적
극적으로 돕고 있는 환경 외교의 역할을 논의하며, 미래 외교의 일부로 지속 가
능한 개발 목표를 살펴보았다.
한국판 뉴딜의 개발과 더불어, 국제 기술 커뮤니티와 학계의 방대한 비정부
참여자 집단을 포함한 환경 외교의 이용은 대사관과 영사관들이 한국이 혁신과
지속 가능한 개발을 이끄는 국가로서 중요한 역할을 담당하고, 그들의 네트워크
를 이용해 작은 중점 중심지를 발달시킬 수 있도록 해줄 것이다.
OVERVIEW OF SOUTH KOREAN’ DIPLOMACY
The launch of the Korean New Deal has created a lot of public discussion in
all segments of society; the public, academia, and officials have been
debating the effectiveness of the ambitious plan. The New Deal was
presented to the public by President Moon Jae-in’s ruling party during the
parliamentary election in April and officially launched in July 2020. The
plan consists of a set of impressive goals, including net-zero emissions by
2050, the end of overseas coal plants support, and the introduction of a
carbon tax. It has ignited a lot of domestic debate, but it has also brought a
bigger spotlight to South Korea as a leading nation that not only has
effectively fought to flatten the curve of COVID-19 infections, but also that
already had a plan for the creation of new jobs with sustainable growth.
According to Lee (2012), South Korea could be characterized as a
middle power nation with middle power diplomacy. The country is located
in a region with constant diplomatic conflicts. The Korean Peninsula is the
stage of tensions between the North and South as well as the two great
powers, China and the United States, who are continuously competing
through their political and economic relations with both Koreas. This U.S.-
China power competition, plus the security threat from North Korea, end up
creating a barrier to South Korea’s efforts to pursue its middle power
diplomacy. This reality prompted Korean foreign affairs to come up with
new diplomatic alternatives to create an overall positive impact on the
global community. These new strategies exploit nonconventional channels
to develop the relations between governmental actors and allow Korea to
strengthen its influence on other nations. An example is the Korean “hallyu”
wave, which correlates with rising support for policy objectives to improve
cultural and public diplomacy along with improving Korean national image
and brand. The Korean Government has been seeking to take advantage of
the popularity of the Korean wave to promote national interests in the
world. The 2020 Budget Plan (Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2019),
had included an estimated investment of KRW 8 trillion into the
development of Culture, Sports and Tourism, representing an increase of 9.9
percent compared to the 2019 budget, and an allocative resource of KRW
5.5 trillion to Diplomacy and Unification, an increase of 9.5 percent
compared with the previous year. Moreover, in an effort to develop its
technology and innovation, the budget established an increase of 27.5
percent of public spending on Industry and Energy, and an increase of 17.3
percent in R&D compared with 2019.
South Korean New Deal and the Role of Eco-Diplomacy 299
With 5G launched and commercialized in 2019, the Korean government

has been increasing its investments not only to grow its role as a leading
nation in technology initiatives but also now in eco-diplomacy with the
Korean New Deal. The practice of advancing ecological protection by
conducting diplomacy that influences and sets examples of conserving
natural resources, sustainable operations, and effective environmental
management are tasks that South Korea has taken upon itself to develop
more sustainable practices. Even though the concretization of this project is
still under discussion and will require a lot of investment and commitment
from Korean society, the public sector, and the private one, in an era of
imminent global climate change, those who adapt quickly may have
substantial diplomatic advantages over those that are living in the past.
According to President Moon Jae-In, it is expected that the New Deal is
South Korea’s announcement of its transition from a country that has
struggled to a country that leads the way, from a carbon-dependent economy
to a low-carbon economy, and from an unequal society to an inclusive
society with more green and digital technologies (Lee, 2020). This movement
demonstrates the government’s purpose to make South Korea a worldwide
leader.
Diplomacy has been recognized as multi-faceted expertise for a long
time, extending far beyond politics and economics. Culture, for example, is
widely recognized as a vital part of effective diplomatic initiatives. South
Korea is attracting interest through its approach that treats diplomacy as
more than political and economic agreements, and that shows its willingness
to adapt to innovations and new technologies. This shift in the diplomatic
landscape creates a new set of challenges and questions about future
relationships among countries. For example, what challenges does South
Korea face to adapt to the future of diplomacy? What is the role of the
visionary New Deal in the diplomatic environment? and how can South
Korea actively display its Eco-Diplomacy in developing nations? Thus, the
South Korean case could provide some insight for other nations, helping
them to comprehend alternative diplomatic practices that focus on
sustainability.
To answer these questions, this study starts exploring sustainable
development goals as part of the future of diplomacy. Then it analyzes the
New Deal as part of a digital diplomacy movement for future practices.

After that, it discusses the role of an Eco-Diplomacy in developing nations
with South Korea being an active part of its development. It concludes by
analyzing how Korea can keep developing more sustainable diplomacy in
the future.
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS PERSPECTIVES
Looking to define a sustainable development agenda for the world and to

protect the planet from the harmful effects of climate change, The United
Nations has established Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which
requires a process of negotiation and implementation of sustainable
development policies and practices. The adoption of the Sustainable
Development Goals has brought to the international community a renewed
global commitment to sustainable development and set the ambitious vision
for a wide variety of goals to be achieved in the SDGs context. The
establishment of the international agreement on a range of SDGs was an
important diplomatic accomplishment, but its implementation is an even
bigger challenge. The achievement of the SDGs requires diverse agreements
regarding policy applications, strategies, and actions at all levels nationwide
and worldwide, and the consideration of the society and its various sectors.
Moomaw et al., (2017) considered Sustainable Development Diplomacy
(SDD) as the process of negotiating and fulfilling the SDGs at all ranges.
This also translates into a great challenge for sustainable development
governance due to the complexity of the subjects and the development of
diplomatic processes required to adopt the linkage throughout key areas.
According to Srivastava (2015), the sustainable development goals have
been the topic of discussion at several forums on climate change, international
trade, environment protection, conflict prevention, and other relevant subjects,
all contributing in some degree to sustainable development. The use of
multilateral diplomacy has been taking place in several fields—mutual
economic interests, natural resource limitations, and specific sector develop-
ment—with variable levels of success. A more sustainable diplomacy
environment allows multilateral approaches and recognizes these methods
as being significant for maintaining attention on subjects that were ignored

in the past. As the SDG agenda advances, it will be essential to comprehend
the history of environmental governance to guarantee that the social and
economic dimensions of sustainability can be reached in an integrated
manner.
The set of diplomatic tools that foreign policymakers have can help to
overcome some of the challenges that SDG implementation can face,
especially in fragile states. Diplomats might contribute by supporting
sustainable actions and developing cooperation between nations, considering
in what way domestic and international efforts that achieve sustainable
policies could impact countries’ foreign relations. Public diplomacy and
foreign policy can improve cooperation even in delicate contexts and can
effectively overcome geopolitical obstacles to the SDGs fulfillment. When
looking to the purpose of SDG 16 - peace, justice, and strong institutions-
and SDG 17 - global partnerships - their main ideas is to provide essential
political affairs and diplomatic relations to make foreign policy a proper
driver of policy integration and to improve sustainable development in
fragile states (Carius et al., 2018).
As nations worldwide prepare for the employment of SDGs, there is no
doubt that the world’s geopolitical dynamic is changing. With the fast
progress of new technologies, there is already alteration related to resources
that are considered necessary as the green natural gas, how to develop it,
and how these demands can be accomplished, bringing a new format of
political power redistribution. South Korea with the New Deal and the
purpose to change from fossil fuels to a low-carbon economy is an example
of the development of new policy arrangements. Though, it ought to
consider that other countries that similarly want to proceed with these
changes, even the small change, should conduct it with cautious diplomacy
to guarantee that future modifications do not create eventual threats to
stability.
According to Carius et al., (2018) efforts to implement sustainable
policies require a proactive, foreign-policy driven attitude to avoid negative
effects on external policy. Consequently, nations need to foresee the
geopolitical repercussions of a sustainable transformation. The diplomatic
tools, such as the initiation or arbitration of global relations, available in
foreign affairs, can develop a substantial part in guaranteeing that the trans-
formative changes do not damage fragile nations. Notably, public diplomacy
should take into account how the local and international efforts to achieve
the SDGs could impact countries’ external relations with other nations and
the stability of their geopolitical alignments.
Strategic responses and effective achievement of more sustainable
diplomacy require acknowledgment of geopolitics, politics, economics, and
possible sustainable actions that could be reached. The 2030 Agenda has
extensive economic and geopolitical implications; hence, it is important to
have a better comprehension of international policy consequences from the
SDGs to shape a committed Sustainable Foreign Policy (Carius et al., 2018).
SOUTH KOREAN DIPLOMACY UNDER THE NEW DEAL
The South Korean government’s understanding of public diplomacy not

based simply on marketing terms is a recent movement that the country has
been adapting since The Public Diplomacy Act reflecting a contemporary
address to the new public diplomacy (Ayhan, 2016; Ayhan 2017). From
economic factors to social changes that led to the Korean wave spread
throughout the world, nowadays Korean representatives have been expressing
an understanding that public diplomacy is more about involving and
winning over the domestic public rather than connecting or persuading
foreign audiences (Robertson, 2018).
Looking for a way to overcome even faster the COVID-19 crisis in the
country, President Moon Jae-In anticipated the launch of the Korean New
Deal, named after The United States in the 1930’s New Deal, coined by
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, a program to fight the Great Depression
that started after the stock market crash in 1929. And now, almost 90 years
later with the advance of technologies and a different perspective on
sustainable growth, South Korea decided to invest heavily in technology
and green energy to create sustainable growth of its economy until 2050.
The Korean New Deal is divided into two constituents: The Digital New
Deal and Green New Deal. To initiate the plan, the government has
established 10 major projects. For the Digital New Deal, there is the
development of smart medical infrastructure, the intelligent government,

and the Data Dam (collection of data from public and private sources to
later standardize the data so it can be analyzed). And for the Green New
Deal, with green-friendly mobilities, green energy, and ecological remodeling.
The remaining four projects are the convergences of digital and green initi-
atives with green smart schools, digital twin, digitalization of infrastructure
including public safety, and the inclusion of smart green manufacturing
complexes. South Korea will invest KRW 160 trillion by 2025 to support
the projects that are expected to create 1.9 million jobs in a way that will
overcome the COVID-19 crisis and allow a faster economic recovery. The
pandemic is leading to a great impact on energy systems around the world,
limiting investments and threatening to impede the development of main
clean energy innovations (IEA, 2020c). According to the IEA (2020b) the
global investment in Energy has already declined 20 percent compared with
2019.
Korea is aiming to establish a foundation for competitiveness in an
ecological and digital field for the future. The country was already the first
nation to implement and commercialize 5G, and it is helping broaden world
coverage. Under the New Deal, the government hopes to continue to shape
its lead. In 2019 the country had already announced an AI national strategy
to encourage the expansion of AI domestically. Thus, while most of the
stimulus plans around the world have concentrated on helping firms to
survive the COVID-19 downturn, the Korean New Deal represents a long-
term investment in the South Korean economy. It is evident that the nation
is worried not only about controlling COVID-19 infections, but also about
the future of the country and the international community.
The success of the Korean New Deal depends on its government and the
way that it will carry out the planning, implementation, and evaluation of
this project since it carries an ambitious economic development plan
requiring a lot of public spending. This depends upon a strong commitment
by all public and private officials involved in the project. And since the
project aims to create a base where the country can lead the world on green
energy initiatives, both nationwide efforts and contributions by global actors
are necessary. This includes active participation in diplomatic affairs from
South Korea and other developed and developing nations.
According to Kim (2016), the concept of Korea been considered middle

power diplomacy has been discussed in different spheres from policymakers
to experts and scholars. However, the concept and policy objectives related
to the term have some variations, leading to analytical confusion towards
South Korea’s actual role as a middle power. Krasnyak (2018) also argues
that the shaping of South Korea’s reputation as among the most innovative
developed countries will not only increase commercial benefits, but also
help address the existing security impasse, form future geopolitical
outcomes in a multi-polar world, and accelerate Korea’s participation in
emergent scientific activities such as space exploration – such as the launch
of South Korea’s first military satellite on July 2020 (Malik, 2020).
The New Deal is a challenge not only economic due to the necessarily
high investments but to the state’s competency to achieve its goals. It should
be taken into consideration that 2020 has brought a lot of worries back to
the international community due to the pandemic crisis, leading other
nations to prioritize solving their own domestic problems in the first
moment, to later be able to focus on their foreign policies. Consequently,
the way of conducting international affairs has also changed, going more
virtually than in person. In the first half of 2020, the World Bank (2020)
launched its economic outlook with a base forecast predicting a 5.2 percent
contraction in global GDP in 2020. Considering that many nations were hit
hard and are still adapting to the new way of conducting diplomatic
relations. This allows South Korea a certain advantage due to the
technology at its disposal, which enables the creation of a synergy of its
technology with other nations. This environment can create a path for South
Korea to be able to develop its still not fully developed middle power to a
well-developed one.
SOUTH KOREA ECO-DIPLOMACY ROLE AND DEVELOPING

NATIONS
Economic and military capabilities are still an important matter for diplomacy
usage in present-day foreign affairs. However, with the continuous
transformation of new technologies, the expertise in I&CT must be
understood in relational terms, disaggregated into its several magnitudes,

and viewed within specific geographic and historical backgrounds. South
Korea had created diplomatic ties with different developing countries,
throughout the improvement of economic and political alliances. Though,
even with the increasing presence of Korean industries in these regions, it
does not mean that these partners have achieved a comprehensive or strategic
relationship.
With the SDGs and the continuous effort of South Korea to embrace the
creation of Smart Cities and sustainable buildings such as the governmental
complex in Sejong City, it is entirely likely that soon more cities will begin
to switch into a more synergetic design with the world around them.
Evolution not only occurs in the top cities around the world, to reach
sustainable development growth, but all levels of society can and should be
also considered. The achievement of more eco-friendly designs has been
transitioned not only to the most powerful economies but also to different
countries around the world.
The 2030 Sustainable Agenda fulfillment should be comprehended
beyond the developed nations’ power over developing nations. The
economic influence, synergy opportunities, and free trade agreements in
developing nations can benefit South Korea as the share of knowledge,
capital transferences, and labor force prospects, and in return, South Korea
can help other foreign partners to develop a more technological and
sustainable nation. Even though South Korea has already proven that it has
one of the most technological economies with the commercialization of 5G
in 2019, the New Deal launch in 2020, and the announcement of the 6G
commercialization for 2027 (Jung, 2020; Watanabe, 2020), the country is
yet considered a middle diplomatic country due to the constant conflicts that
the Korean peninsula still keep facing, and with its wealth, resources, and
geographic location constrain its ability to grow beyond a certain point,
requiring a major effort from the Korean government to establish itself as a
significant diplomatic country. Hence more recently, there was a more
active diplomatic promotion to a Global Korea and to build the bridges
between rich and poor countries with Official Development Assistance
initiatives.
This self-identification initiated in the administration of former President
Lee Myung-Bak, between 2008 and 2013 (Kim, 2016). Since that time the
country had faced impeachment in the government of former president Park
Geun-Hye and currently is under the administration of President Moon Jae-
In, who has been since the beginning of his administration focused on more
image-oriented diplomacy (MOFA, 2020b). The rethinking of new diplomatic
communication and finding a common diplomatic approach amongst other
OECD countries is not an easy task; it is an important step for global
governance and effective multilateralism which could bring a stronger
policy consistency.
With these sets of future projects to be implanted with the New Deal,
South Korea also looks to become a significant power around the world,
which not only involves economic and political matters but also its ability in
promoting a sustainable development model, new technology transference,
trade integration, and the national capacity to produce soft power from
public diplomacy (Krasnyak, 2018). Through the ability to influence others
by different actions - not only by the power of coercion and money
transference – the country can adopt a more Eco-diplomatic approach looking
for a more ecologically and environmentally-orientated communication
between the national and foreign community to reach a Sustainable Public
Diplomacy.
When looking to the efforts already made by the government to create
strong relations with developing countries, one of the most used throughout
was the Official Development Assistance (ODA) initiative in which the
government tries to promote the economic development and welfare of
emerging countries, with the provision of grants, loans and technical
assistance (ODA, 2017). The ODA structure was implemented in 2010 in
Korea and with the success of the plan, it was launched the Second Mid-
Term Strategy for Development Cooperation (2016-2020) to evaluate the
first period (2011-2015) of Korea’s ODA, and incorporate the 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable Development into its ODA strategy. Soon the government
began the ODA expansion with a 2016-2020 strategy direction of expansion
focuses and its financial operation proposal. At the end of 2016, the Korean
government completed the development of the second phase of the Country
Partnership Strategy for 24 priority countries as a consolidated strategy for
loans and grants. And a new government strategy for humanitarian
assistance and multilateral cooperation was also applied. Thus, since the
results of ODA with the public are essential because ODA is funded by
taxpayers, it was exceptionally important to build public support towards
Korean public diplomacy policy to rapidly reach the 0.2% ODA/GNI target
by 2020. (ODA, 2017, pp. 178).
When looking to the Multilateral Environment Diplomacy, South Korea
has led the establishment of the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) as
part of its efforts to scatter the green growth program and to contribute to
the international community’s collaboration regarding a green economy
(MOFA, 2020a). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) launched the
Green Round Table at the end of 2016 to debate forms to reinforce
cooperation between international organizations and domestic agencies
related to climate change, the environment, and green economic development.
The idea behind the Green Round Table is to provide more opportunities for
students to join environmental projects throughout the forum while
fostering collaboration among national governments, public-private
organizations, and private initiatives specializing in the green economy
(MOFA, 2020a).
In order to meet its goals on Climate change and Energy, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs has established the Basic Plan for Climate Change Response
(2016), the Road Map to Achieve National Greenhouse Gas Reduction
Goals (2016), and the Global Energy Cooperation Center (GECC) in
January 2012. These initiatives help the distribution of information on foreign
energy and natural resources markets to national energy corporations,
organizations, and associations. The challenge of leading a new format of
communication under an Eco-Diplomacy oriented approach will make
South Korea rethink its foreign affairs in a way that will establish to strong
relations with developing countries using technology cooperation and green
initiatives as a link to cooperate with these nations to reach the SDGs in a
more cooperative and efficient way. Even though these ideas present
difficult tasks, as developing countries’ initiatives under green technologies
are lagging compared with developed countries, leading the way to
sustainable cooperation with green energy initiatives can shape South
Korea’s reputation as a technologically advanced power. Trying a
Sustainable Foreign Policy as an additional part of or a possible extension
of President Moon Jae-In administration’s innovative growth agenda might

contribute to its successful outcomes.
In order to build an adequate environment to create a more sustainable
Foreign Policy and develop an Eco-diplomacy with the global community,
the government should design its national and international reputation by
shaping an image of a self-sufficient country and a digital and green
innovator nation. More than the image, it is needed an additional work to
make the country more self-sufficient and more innovative in terms of
sustainability, which the Korean New Deal takes place as a socio-economic
and political strategy that should be consolidated. Accomplishing that could
be possible through (i) implementing an effective Eco-Diplomacy, (ii)
allowing the participation of non-state actors to help develop the
Sustainable Foreign Policy as a whole, and (iii) building centers of eco-
diplomacy using the network and know-how of embassies, consulates and
high commissions overseas to create strong international cooperation. These
goals can be accomplished if participating nation and non-state actors agree
upon a legal framework.
THE FUTURE CHALLENGES FOR SOUTH KOREA DIPLOMACY
The COVID-19 pandemic has brought a rapid move towards digitally

oriented jobs, agreements, and diplomatic relations for South Korea and the
world. As the quarantine has become a part of everyday life, there is a need
for remote services with remote working considered business as usual. The
outdated diplomatic practices were confronted with digital practices change
since it allows the latest technological advance to impulse alteration of the
former practices. Permitting a more active use of digital technologies,
I&CT, software engineering, and big data.
With the pandemic’s impact, more countries were challenged to work in
a more socially-distanced way, creating online-distant diplomatic relations,
denoting an acceleration to digital diplomacy. The countries have been
fighting to recover their economies, but how the world will be after the
strong blow dealt by COVID-19 remains to be seen. Governments are
looking to restructure their employment, reorganize their economies, and
maintain a more sustainable development and these alternatives will become

more and more present in diplomatic discussions. Sustainability policy is a
strategy for expansion, it is a form of relation, contracts, and when there are
contracts there are incentives present in these transactions (Laffon &
Martimort, 2002).
The government should be able to think about the delegation of actions
with well-instructed agents. Not only public officials but academics that
have been working in related areas should be able to rationally analyze the
possible external factors that building relations outside the national level
might mean to the shape of sustainable public diplomacy. When facing
complex problems, such as building relations with low-income countries or
with nations in a conflict war zone, foreign policymakers should pursue key
sector-specific activities, being able to analyze each nation by its history,
cultural, social policies, and economic development. Every nation is different
and knowing how to communicate with each one as a distinguished agent is
a factor that might allow strong cooperation towards more innovative areas.
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, we have seen the accelerated need for
tech-based communication solutions, in a way of overcoming old practice
and break barriers to help the countries to straight mutual relation to benefit
pandemic-related forces.
South Korea has embraced a distinct role in its foreign policy compared
with other states, because the Korean representatives pay a lot of attention
to domestic opinion first. Citizens’ opinions are a big part of diplomatic
alliances with other nations, meaning that domestic support counts also as a
factor for a Sustainable Foreign Policy. According to Robertson (2018),
South Korea still remains notably behind in the use of digital media.
However, there is a clear distinction between the Korean Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) online account, when using Korean and English
language. The digital diplomacy metrics comparison shows that South
Korea is significantly more advanced in the utilization of social media to
connect and involve with Korean speakers than with foreign publics. This
trend had become even stronger in President Moon Jae-In’s administration,
with officials expressing support for public diplomacy as a link to engage
with the domestic audience rather than appealing or influencing foreign
audiences (Robertson, 2018). But to improve the Korean image in the
international community it is necessary that the government make an effort

to show its commitment not only nationwide but also worldwide regarding
its foreign policy.
When thinking about the development of Eco-diplomacy centers, they
should function under the administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and incorporated into already existing embassies and consulates. Diplomats
should be able to conduct eco-diplomacy when necessary and make
modifications depending on the nation and the project. The focus on eco-
diplomacy should include: (i) Broad implementation of the New Deal
policies as a national endeavor; (ii) Allow the participation of outside
academia-related non-state actors into diplomatic relationships; (iii) Using
the know-how of embassies and consulates abroad to disseminate the eco-
diplomacy. These initiatives might increase the effectiveness of Korean
diplomacy, enhance sustainable cooperation, and allow Korea to build its
future as a significant geopolitical actor.
Korea needs to emphasize its capabilities to pursue cooperation in an
increasingly complex diplomatic environment. To be able to reach its goal,
it should embrace areas beyond current diplomacy practices. Existing public
diplomacy approaches are capable, but they can be greatly improved
(Krasnyak, 2018). Korea has effectively developed its soft power through
cultural diplomacy (Korean Wave), though the impact of this area is still
limited. The country should work on building its strengths as a middle
power to maintain its image as an innovative nation, an effort that the Eco-
diplomacy can greatly contribute to.
Another important step for Korea would be to increase participation in
intergovernmental eco-friendly organizations, green initiatives, digital
initiatives, and projects that further global sustainable development and use
its high technology to address global challenges. With the development of
the Korean New Deal, the adaptation of eco-diplomacy, involving an
extensive group of international non-state actors from technical and
academic communities abroad, foreign academics living and working in
Korea, and allowing embassies and consulates to use their networks to
develop small focused center, Korea can play an important role as a leader
in innovation and sustainable development.
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315
Moon Jae-In’s Strategy Amid Covid-19

Pandemic: Reviving the Green in the Korean
New Deal
Abstract | The year 2020 has been a conjunctural episode untenable for
many countries around the world, due to the numerous challenges that the
COVID-19 pandemic has brought; from restraining the disease to facing
economic repercussions. Nevertheless; Korea has been one of the countries
that have caught the attention of being able to demonstrate its leadership in
combating the disease and becoming an example for others. Amid this
context, the administration of Moon Jae-In has boosted the Korean New
Deal (KND), a triple edge strategy to cope with the impacts that originated
the pandemic, in economic, environmental, and social aspects. This paper
aims to provide an analysis of the potential of South Korea in acting on the
climate change issue, through the development of the green economy. The
KND is an instrument that can enhance Korea’s green public diplomacy and,
reaffirm its leadership as a developing country and middle power, in coping
with global issues, such as climate change.
국문초록 | 코로나19 전염병이 불러온 수많은 장애물 탓에2020년은 전염병을

제지하는 것부터 경제적 영향을 마주하는 것까지 전세계의 많은 국가들이 방어
할 수 없었던 위급 사태였다. 그럼에도 불구하고 대한민국은 코로나19를 이겨내
고 다른 국가들의 모범이 되는 리더십을 보여주어 주의를 끌어 모은 국가들 중
하나였다. 이러한 문맥에서 문재인 정부는 전염병의 영향을 경제적, 환경적, 사
회적으로 대처하기 위한 삼면 전략인 한국판 뉴딜(Korean New Deal, KND)을
신장시켰다. 이 논문은 녹색 경제 개발을 통해 기후 변화 이슈에 대응하는 데 있
어 대한민국의 잠재력을 분석하고자 한다. 한국 뉴딜(KND)은 한국의 녹색 공공
외교를 강화하고 기후 변화와 같은 글로벌 이슈에 대응하는 데 있어 개발 도상국
이자 미들 파워(중견국)로서의 리더십을 재확인하는 도구이다.
INTRODUCTION
The 21st-century demands solutions to major issues that affect not just the
states in a separate way, but internationally. Among these series of issues
that have been affecting the world and need solutions, it is climate change.
The World Economic Forum (2020) has cataloged it as one of the major
global risks of the next decade, which threatens the human subsistence in
the future ahead with increased probabilities of disturbances to economic
development and national security of countries around the world. Despite
the different international efforts to contain the damage, the measures have
not been enough, and uncertainty remains. Besides, 2020 has added another
challenge: the pandemic of COVID-19. The coronavirus not only has
claimed the lives of thousands of people but has also provoked other
repercussions in each country around the world, especially in the economic
aspect.
In the middle of this context, Korea1 has caught the eye of the world,
mainly because of its ability to contain the virus quickly, without a mandatory
nationwide lockdown through testing as the principal strategy, in addition to
tracing, treating, and the implementation of foreign entry controls.
Nevertheless, Korea’s economy has been affected too, as an export-oriented
economy. Today, an economic crisis looming in the wake of COVID-19 and
the growing issues of climate change question the capacity of response of
the world’s governments.
This paper aims to provide an analysis of the potential of South Korea in
acting on the climate change issue through the Korean New Deal in the
development of the green economy. Amid the COVID-19 pandemic,
President Moon Jae-In has championed this as a triple edge strategy to cope
with the factors that caused the disease, including the economic factors.
Korea has demonstrated its potential as a developing country and middle
power in not only combating the disease but also in coping with global
issues. This New Deal presents an instrument that can enhance Korea’s
green public diplomacy.
1 This paper covers only the Republic of Korea, so references to the abbreviation of ‘Korea’
allude merely to the Republic of Korea.
Moon Jae-In’s Strategy Amid Covid-19 Pandemic 317
In the first section, the concept of public diplomacy will be discussed

and its changes in the context of the 21 st century. Additionally, the
characteristics of a middle power will be analyzed, as well as how Korea
has been identified as one. In the second section, there will be a review of
the different concepts that have been involved in Korea’s green policy such
as green growth, green economy, sustainable development, and the Green
New Deal. The third segment of the paper aims to provide a background on
the economic efforts of the Lee and Park administrations related to mitigate
climate change and increase Korea’s responsibility and leadership in the
international arena. Fourth, there will be a recompilation of the actual
administration policy towards the environment. The fifth segment examines
the most recent proposal of the Moon administration (The Korean New
Deal) which claims to address the economic crisis and the climate change
issue; and finally, the conclusion.
A MIDDLE POWER PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY
In the globalized world, we cannot escape from the interconnection that

exists between one country and another. At some point, it seems the borders
have disappeared due to the development of Information and Communication
Technology (ICT), the interaction among people has increased, and in
consequence the creation of networks between businesses, governments,
and societies. These social connections influence the way one country
perceives itself, its surroundings, and wants to be portrayed by the world.
That is the main reason why public diplomacy’s significance has strengthened
over the last years.
Originally, public diplomacy was understood as “a government’s process
of communication with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about
understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as
well as its national goals and policies” (Tuch, 1990: 3). This realist vision
was state-centric, meaning that the only recognized and most important
actor in international relations was the State itself.
Nonetheless, over time public diplomacy has evolved since ICT has
advanced and more actors are involved. Now it can be said that public
diplomacy is “the attempt of an international actor to manage the international

environment through engagement with a foreign public” (Cull, 2009: 57). In
this regard, this paper is going to consider the use of public diplomacy to
promote an idea that an actor considers important in its foreign policy, such
as Korea concerning climate change.
South Korea has been recognized by the international community as a
middle power. Although there is not a consensus about the definition of a
middle power, due to its changing according to time and context, it has
caused a debate among different author’s perspectives (see Robertson, 2017
& Kríiž, et. al., 2019). In general, a middle power can be defined by its
interests, influences, and considerable capabilities recognized by other
countries. Middle power countries pursue their national interest and align it
to the international spheres. Nowadays, the increasing global importance
and influence of middle powers in solving global issues is well-known,
since these countries can have different roles from the catalyst that takes the
lead on an initiative; the facilitator who engages in coalition-building
activities; to the manager that emphasizes the creation of formal norms and
institutions (Ikenberry & Mo, 2013: 4-7).
In this sense, South Korea’s 2008 diplomatic agenda revealed great
interest in numerous global issues, from international economic cooperation,
global security, development cooperation, etc. Korea has emerged as a
middle power because of its actual position in the global economy, its
strengths in high technology and education, and the progressive development
and prominence of its cultural industries. The geographical position and
historical experience of Korea have allowed it to maintain a relationship
with major powers and act as a non-threatening bridge facilitator capable of
pursuing cooperation and interest in a specific issue through institutions or
policy frameworks, between the Global North and South, as well as,
between the West and the East (Ikenberry & Mo, 2013: 6-13; Snyder, 2013).
AMID GREENS: GREEN GROWTH, GREEN ECONOMY,

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND GREEN NEW DEAL
In the face of environmental deterioration, new approaches have emerged to

combat the impacts on the Earth, such as sustainable development, green

growth, green economy, and the Global Green New Deal. Since 1992,
sustainable development has become the ultimate goal of the international
community in the UN Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED). The United Nations define it as the “development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations
to meet their own needs” (The Sustainable Development Agenda, n. d.).
Nevertheless, from the sustainable development concept have emerged
new and interrelated terms, such as green growth, low carbon development,
sustainable economy, among others; but have been under scrutiny because
of a lack on an agreed definition or universal principles that go in accordance
with the main one (UNDESA, 2012: 5). Thus, there has been a series of
misconceptions and misuses of the terms. In this sense, International
Organizations had tried to address the problem by demystifying and
clarifying, but difficulties persist.
At the regional level, in 2005 the term green growth was proposed and
encouraged in Asia during the Fifth Ministerial Conference on Environment
and Development held in Seoul, Korea. In this conference, green growth or
environmentally sustainable economic growth was defined as a “strategy of
sustaining economic growth and job creation necessary to reduce poverty in
the face of worsening resource constraints and climate crisis” (UN ESCAP,
n. d.). Hence, green growth became an option for sustainable development
that each country itself could manage to foster low carbon emissions,
resource efficiency, and social inclusion (UN ESCAP, n. d.).
In the case of the green economy, UNDESA (2012: 9) found there is no
international consensus upon its definition. For example, UNEP (2011)
defines it as “one that results in improved human well‐being and social
equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological
scarcities. It is a low carbon, resource-efficient, and socially inclusive.”
Whilst, the Green Economy Coalition defines it as a “resilient economy that
provides a better quality of life for all within the ecological limits of the
planet.” Nonetheless, during the Rio+20 Summit in 2012, the international
community motivated the transition to a green economy. In this sense, green
growth became the “prerequisite for building a green economy in the
context of sustainable development and poverty reduction” (UN ESCAP, n.
d.).
Criticism has continued among these different terms due to its use in an
interchangeable way and blurred definitions. Notwithstanding, the efforts of
both to include and to make coexist the environment and the development
aspect have been identified, in the economic decision making, strategies,
policy, and planning of the governments around the globe (UNDESA, 2012:
60-61), which should be noted and not misplaced one from another.
The Global Green New Deal (GGND) was promoted in 2009 by the
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), to face the financial and
economic crisis of 2008. The initiative was made as an allusion of the New
Deal implemented by the president of the United States, Franklin D.
Roosevelt, in order to face the Great Depression through the stimulation of
the economy by providing jobs, social security, reform tax policies, etc. In
this regard, the GGND followed the same approach and has the idea of
creating, through public investment, jobs that promote sustainable
development, in accordance with a series of national conjunctural measures
designed to mitigate the consequences of the global crisis of 2008. At the
same time, the idea of a GGND searched a change to a new economic
model sustainable, including investment in low-emission technologies,
energy sanitation of buildings, sustainable transport infrastructure, among
others (UNEP, 2009).
In 2015, the member states of the United Nations committed to the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development. This agenda sought to encompass 17
universal, transformative, inclusive, and integrated goals to promote
prosperity while protecting the planet. Those goals “recognize that ending
poverty must go hand-in-hand with strategies that build economic growth
and address a range of social needs including education, health, social
protection, and job opportunities while tackling climate change and
environmental protection” (Sustainable Development Goals, n. d.).
Finally, it should be highlighted that UNCTAD (2019) urged –once
again– the implementation and funding of the GGND so it could be
compliant with the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030
and promote equal distribution of income as well as reverse decades of
environmental degradation.
FROM LEE TO MOON: THE ROAD OF SOUTH KOREA’S GREEN
After the climate change conferences in Copenhagen 2009, green growth

was seen as a new development paradigm for developing nations that would
not compromise development and the environment and would help to
decrease the gap between the Global North and South. However, President
Lee Myung-Bak (2008-2013) had already announced the ‘Low Carbon-
Green Growth’ (LCGG) as his core initiative for the nation’s long-term
development and his aspiration of becoming in a global green pioneer (Han,
2015: 734-735).
In face of the financial-economic crisis of 2008, Lee assigned economic
funds to the development and efficient use of resources such as freshwater,
waste, renewable energies, energy-efficient buildings, low-carbon vehicles,
and the improvement of the high-speed rail network. Furthermore, in 2010
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs specified in a Diplomatic White Paper the
“Low Carbon-Green Growth” as the “nation’s new vision” (Watson &
Pandey, 2014: 80-82).
Kalinowski (2020: 3) identifies the establishment of the Presidential
Committee on Green Growth (PCGG); the National Strategy for Green
Growth (2009–2050); the First Five-Year Plan for Green Growth (2009–
2013); and the Framework Act on Low Carbon and Green Growth (2010) as
the foundation for South Korea’s institutional environmental policies. Amid
these elements, it is the last one that ought to be recognized for becoming
the basis for the development of the national economy through green
growth. The PCGG (2009: 9-10) defined three main objectives regarding
green growth: (1) to deal with climate change and attain energy independence,
(2) to create new engines for economic growth, and (3) to improve the
quality of life for Koreans and to enhance the contributions to the inter-
national community through advocacy.
Thus, it was during the presidency of Lee that Korea showed commitment
to the climate change issue in light of the international community and the
world recognized the government’s efforts, including the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (see Shin, 2011).
Lee built the cornerstone that connected Korea’s public diplomacy with the
green facet since showed its attempt and aspiration to cope with climate
change through the economic aspect.
This recognition among the international community was part of the
president’s policy labeled as Global Korea. The Global Korea policy was
the banner policy of the Lee administration; it wanted to emphasize that the
success in the economy and democracy of the country not only gave global
reach but also the responsibility to address global issues and the opportunity
to become a leader (Snyder, 2018: 145). This was accentuated during the
speech of president Lee (2009) in the 64th Session of the General Assembly
of the United Nations:
“(…) Korea will embark on a path of actively contributing to the

world and all of humanity. This is the very goal that Global Korea
aims for. (…) Korea, while not included in Annex I of the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), plans to
make a voluntary announcement before the end of this year, its
midterm target emissions cut by the year 2020. Korea has proposed
to establish a Registry of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions
(NAMAs) of developing countries at the Secretariat of the UNFCCC,
with a view to inviting developing countries to voluntarily participate
in mitigation actions and providing the international support that
they need.”
Lastly, worthy of mention that during Lee’s tenure there was the
establishment of two international institutions to show Korea’s responsibility
with the global community; the installation in Incheon of the secretariat of
the Green Climate Fund (GCF) as an instrument that acts to promote in
undeveloped countries investments in renewable energies and climate
change mitigation; and the relaunch of the Global Green Growth Institute
(GGGI) in 2010, a think tank that aims to promote green growth as a global
issue, providing aid and strategies to the agenda of developing countries.
The GGGI also tried to promote the principle of the Nationally Appropriate
Mitigation Actions (NAMA) that encourages the creation of voluntary
emissions targets by each country depending on its means and capabilities
(Han, 2015: 740-741).
Despite the efforts, during the 2012 Korean elections, the green growth
aspect was laid aside, since it was believed it had a direct relation with the
Lee administration. Thereafter, it came under scrutiny because of the Four
Major Rivers Restoration Project (FMRRP), for allegations on corruption,
deterioration in ecology, and damage to local communities. After all, Lee’s
legacy within the green growth policy became a grand failure because it
exacerbated water pollution. President Lee was criticized for spending more
than 22 trillion KRW (Jung, 2020: 413); accused of collusion in the bidding
process for the project, bribery to secure contracts, with evidence suggesting
“favoritism to acquaintances and nepotism because his administration
awarded construction projects to businesses close to his aides and family”
(Kalinowski, 2016: 11); but also, for non-democratic decision-making
procedures since there was considerable opposition from ordinary citizens
and environmental NGOs (Park, 2011: 3-4).
When Park Geun-Hye (2013-2017) became president, she displaced the
green growth and instead promoted a ‘creative economy’ which was in
accordance with her desire of creating a ‘Second Miracle on the Han River’.
This sought to transform the economic strategy and relied on science
technology and innovation, just as it was stated during the 18th Presidential
Inauguration Speech (Park, 2013):
“The convergence of science and technology with industry, the

fusion of culture with industry and the blossoming of creativity made
possible by the breaking down of barriers between industries
together define a creative economy. It is about creating new markets
and new jobs by building on the bedrock of convergence, going
beyond simply expanding existing markets. At the very heart of a
creative economy lie science, technology and the IT industry, areas
that I have earmarked as key priorities.”
Although a second Five Year Plan for green growth was established (2014-
2018) its status was downgraded (Yun & Lah, 2020: 440), for the reasons
already mentioned. Conversely, she decided to encourage sustainable
development as a national goal and saw green growth as a mere tool and
part of the creative economy. However, the Park administration decided to
close the PCGG, erased the ‘green’ word from the names of official bureaus,
and abolished the ambassador for green growth (Shin, 2013). These actions
dealt a setback to green public diplomacy in comparison with the previous
administration.
Despite these concerns, President Park Geun-Hye decided to continue
mitigating climate change within the creative economy framework. At the
international level, she continued supporting the GGGI (GGGI, 2013) and
the GCF. Furthermore, she created the Green Technology Center Korea; and
partnered with UNESCO to implement the new 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, as well as continue with the development and the adoption of
green technologies (UNESCO, 2015). Additionally, for the UN Conference
on Climate Change (COP21) in Paris 2015, Korea committed to reducing
greenhouse emissions by 38% from the business-as-usual levels predicted
by 2030, as its contribution to the Paris Agreement (Yonhap News, 2016).
Overall, there were no significant changes in the climate change issue
and the development of green policies in the economic aspect. Besides,
there was a perception of an environmental policy less transformative in
both levels, national and international; despite the initiatives and the
potential of the country to address climate change, shown by the previous
administration. In 2016 concerns were raised when President Park became
involved in a political scandal that would finish in her impeachment for
abuse of power, extortion, bribery, and cronyism (Jung, 2020: 415).
Moreover, in the same year, Korea was classified as one of the climate
villains for the chosen path towards a zero-emission society and the low
emissions reduction targets which have been cataloged as mediocre under
the Paris Agreement framework (Watts, 2020).
MOON JAE IN’S POLICY TOWARDS ENVIRONMENT
After the impeachment of Park Geun-Hye in March of 2017, climate change

became a topic of minor importance during the presidential elections
campaign. However, Moon Jae-In promised to tackle fine dust and close old
coal-fired plants. Later, on his 100 policy tasks, he stipulated the
commitment of Korea to the implementation of the Paris Agreement on
Climate Change (The Government of the Republic of Korea, 2017). Hence

since he arrived in the presidency there have been high expectations on a
new or renewed stage of environmental policy for the country.
Yun and Lah (2020: 440-441) previewed three important changes in the
following years of the Moon administration:
1. ‌A shift from green growth to sustainable development, since there has
been a misconception and exaltation on the first concept. When the
OECD (2011: 5) has clarified that green growth should be viewed as a
sub-agenda of sustainable development. It is expected the Moon
administration could clarify the misconception through institutional
frameworks such as the Framework Law on Sustainable Development,
the Presidential Committee on Sustainable Development, etc.
2. ‌A major status and role of the Ministry of Environment (MOE) to
enhance the environmental policies related to sustainable development,
climate change, and renewable energies. In addition, a proactive and
leading role of the MOE in the Presidential Committee on Sustainable
Development.
3. ‌The implementation of more specific policies related to environmental
issues such as the incremental increase of the national share of
renewable energy generation from 4.8% to 20% by 2030; the
improvement of chemical management; the evaluation of the Four
Rivers Project to examine the possibility of restoration; the control
and reduction of the atmospheric particulates by limiting the operation
of coal power plants and diesel vehicles; and, the reduction of the
nuclear power generation from 30% to 17.8% by 2030, with the
ultimate goal of a nuclear-zero society.
Up to now, during his term President Moon has firmly maintained Korea’s
compromise with international institutions and cooperation, proof of which
being the celebration of the 48th session of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) in Incheon; the emphasis of the MOE to fulfill the
Paris Agreement obligations; being one of the initial members of the
Partnering for Green Growth and the Global Goals 2030 (P4G) and the
attendance of the president to the first P4G summit, where he praised the
necessity of international cooperation and ‘inclusive growth’. Additionally,

he has provided support to the GGGI and the GCF; and has launched the
National Council on Climate and Air Quality (Pacheco & et al., 2019:
21-23).
Nevertheless, in 2018 Korea was the seventh-largest emitter of CO2,
despite the international compromises and status acquired. Consequently,
the society has condemned the government for the nation’s climate-change
law that fails to set defined and effective targets to combat climate change
(see Climate Analytics, 2020; Mathiesen, 2016; OECD, 2018; Lee, 2020a;
Watts, 2020). Hence, it has been crucial for Korea, as a middle power, and
in the climate change problem, to demonstrate through its performance its
ability to coordinate domestic policies with the way this question is addressed
in the international system, and demonstrate it is a nation with responsible
global citizens and in consequence recover credibility (Ikenberry & Mo,
2013: 6-13; Pandey & Watson, 2014: 1-2).
THE GREEN IN THE KOREAN NEW DEAL AMID COVID-19

PANDEMIC
As stated at the beginning of this paper, 2020 has brought challenges to the
world resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. In the economic aspect, the
World Bank (2020) has foreseen a 5.2% contraction in the global GDP and
has ranked this crisis as one of the deepest global recessions in decades. In
East Asia and the Pacific, the GDP is expected to fall to 0.5%, down from
5.9% in 2019, the lowest rate since 1967. In the case of South Korea, there
has been a weakness in foreign demand and disruptions in the global chains
causing unemployment, particularly in wholesale and retail trade,
accommodation, and food; along with temporary and daily workers and
small business owners (OECD, 2020).
Owing to this, economic recovery has been crucial for all the countries;
the UN stressed the SDGs as the framework for the world’s recovery and
the necessity of a different economy (Guterres, 2020). Hence, some
countries have used the crisis as an opportunity to promote policies related
to sustainable development; for example, the European Union announced a
COVID-19 recovery package that places climate change in the center, this
has been cataloged as the largest green stimulus program in history (Hoon,
2020).
On March 2020, the Liberal Party – the current ruling political party–
announced a manifesto in favor of a comprehensive Green New Deal in
response to the ongoing global climate crisis, and in order to achieve a
carbon zero society by 2050, this was made part of their platform in the
following general elections (Greenpeace International, 2020). Korea became
the first country in East Asia to propose an institutional framework of this
type amid the COVID-19 pandemic.
On July 14th, 2020 president Moon presented the Korean New Deal
Initiative as a strategy that has the objective to implement economic,
environmental, and social reforms amid the COVID-19 juncture impacts. In
his speech he recognized how Korea has acted in a successful way to
contain the virus (Moon, 2020):
“Korea is overcoming the COVID-19 crisis in an exemplary manner.

We have successfully implemented efficient infectious disease
prevention and control without closing any borders or stopping the
economy (…) Korea’s response to COVID-19 has become a global
model. Thanks to our success, we have minimized the economic
impact (…) The Korean New Deal is a declaration of the Republic of
Korea’s great transition into a leading nation. It is the Government’s
strong commitment to fundamentally transform the Republic of
Korea – from a fast follower-type economy into a pace-setting one;
from a carbon-dependent economy into a low-carbon one; and from
an unequal society into an inclusive one.”
According to official documents published by The Government of the

Republic of Korea (2020: 4), this deal is a national development strategy
that acts “to support the country’s recovery from the pandemic crisis and
lead the global action against structural changes.” The Korean New Deal is
divided into three main policies: The Digital New Deal, The Green New
Deal, and the Stronger Safety Net; in which the government plans to invest
a total of 160 trillion won and create 1,901,000 jobs by 2025.
The Deal has three main objectives: (1) to minimize the effects of the
crisis by creating jobs that also support the structural transition towards a
digital and green economy; (2) to return to the normal growth path by
building the necessary infrastructure for a digital and green economy; and,
(3) to be a referent and leader among the global community in the post
COVID-19 era. The deal also contemplates the establishment of a universal
employment insurance system and sets a path towards net-zero emissions
(The Government of the Republic of Korea, 2020: 4). The focus of this
paper has been the potential of the green part.
In the Green New Deal, the Moon administration plans to invest 73.4
trillion won including 42.7 trillion won from the treasury by 2025 and
create 659,000 jobs. It encompasses three focus areas (The Government of
the Republic of Korea, 2020: 25-31):
1. ‌Green transition of infrastructures: move to create a green-friendly

environment where humans and nature coexist, through zero-
energy buildings; restoration of the terrestrial, marine, and urban
ecosystems; and management for clean and safe water.
2. ‌L ow-carbon and decentralized energy: promote the use of
sustainable and renewable energy in all the country through the
active investment in research and development; for example, the
expansion of the supply of electric and hydrogen vehicles.
3. ‌Innovation in the green industry: stimulate areas of opportunity
within the green economy that contemplate environmental issues
like, technological development and green financing.
Hoon (2020) has identified the Deal as an opportunity to make the post-
COVID-19 economic recovery a green one and depending on the success
play a leading role in supporting other countries to cooperate, exchange
policy ideas, and help each other, as has been done to combat the disease,
which has transformed Korea into an international role model. President
Moon has pointed out the difference between his proposal and previous
ones, declaring that the Green New Deal is an updated version adapted to
the needs of the new era and has more weight on sustainability (Lee,
2020b).
According to Moon’s administration, it is expected that this Deal will

transform Korea into a smart country that leads future services and
innovative public services; a green country that engages and addresses the
global discussions on the climate change issue; and a safe country that
combats unemployment and social disparities (The Government of the
Republic of Korea, 2020: 39). So far, the OECD has celebrated the Korean
initiative and expects that it fosters economic revival and increases job
creation (see Stangarone, 2020).
President Moon has been praised for his strategy and the priority of his
administration in the containment of the virus. The Korean New Deal has
come in just the right moment to the boost the Korean strategy, but this time
against economic damages and climate change. Only time will tell its
effectiveness, yet it is undeniable that the initiative itself shows the resolve
of the country and the aspirations of becoming a true referent and leader,
through sustainable development.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, South Korea has caught the world’s attention not only for its
image projected through the Hallyu wave but by its active performance as a
middle power in several different international initiatives, including climate
change as seen in the previous discussion. Lately, Korea has been recognized
as one of the best countries in containing the coronavirus pandemic; amid
these circumstances, the Korean government has presented ‘The Korean
New Deal,’ the Green part of it acting to contain climate change through
various measures, including decrement of the dependency on fossil fuels
and creation of jobs, among others; in order to become a leader–among
developing countries– in resolving the actual climate change and economic
crisis.
Nowadays, climate change is an undeniable threat that has questioned
the capacity of response and interest of all countries around the globe.
Successive Korean governments have captivated the attention of the
international community by employing compromise and having a
disposition of cooperation. Nevertheless, Moon Jae-In and the presidents
ahead need to continue enhancing the public diplomacy on climate change

done by its predecessors and overcome the faults made.
In some ways, it seems the Korean New Deal incorporates both strategies
of the previous administrations; the green growth framework of Lee
Myung-Bak and the creative economy policy of Park Geun-Hye; with
Moon’s own essence of inclusive growth. Despite the stumbles of the
previous administrations, it has to be said that without its efforts on dynamic
narratives, Korea would not project its present image of active middle
power on addressing climate change within sustainable development.
However, President Moon still needs to coordinate its international ambitions
with its actions at the domestic level, so it can strengthen and solidify its
responsibility in face of the international community.
South Korean narratives and initiatives on sustainable development
demonstrate the capacity of developing countries to coordinate and not
separate the environment from the development aspect. As a considerable
economy with advanced technology, Korea has the potential to become a
model creator of products that enhance the coexistence of the humans and
the planet, since it is the second most innovative economy of the world
(Statista, 2020).
Another agent that has played an important role is the gradual increase
of Koreans environmental consciousness; according to the Pew Research
Center’s Global Attitudes Survey, the Koreans showed a higher degree of
awareness and concern about climate change (Poushter & Huang, 2020).
This fact could improve the pressure of citizens with its government to
induce politicians to make decisions and demand for effective actions
toward the environment.
Although the Green New Deal has been criticized by several civil
organizations and doubts about its efficiency remain among the general
public, this new initiative presented under the Moon administration shows
how South Korea –still– has the resolve to contain and confront the
damages that have been caused to the environment over the previous
decades. President Moon is challenged with showing the world that Korea
has a compromise with the international community and the future ahead.
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335
South Korea on the Forefront of Fifth

Generation (5G) Technology: Public
Diplomacy 2.0
Mark Joseph V. Montera
Abstract | Inspired by Retno Marsudi’s statement on the purpose of

digital technologies in the diplomatic field, we consider the research and
development (R&D) of more advanced technologies as a new characteristic
of the diplomatic paradigm. In this study, we analyze the role of 5G
technology leadership on the international audience’s stand towards the
image of South Korea, a major implication for future diplomatic undertakings.
Keywords | digital diplomacy, 5G technology, public diplomacy,
Internet, Huawei, United States, 5G+ Strategy, Artificial Intelligence (AI)
국문초록 | 외교 분야 내 디지털 기술의 목적에 대한 Retno Marsudi의 서술에

서 영감을 받아, 우리는 더욱 발전된 기술의 연구개발(R&D)을 외교 패러다임의
새로운 특징으로 바라본다. 이 연구에서 우리는 5G 기술 리더십이 한국의 이미
지에 대한 세계 대중의 태도에 어떤 영향을 끼치는지 분석하였다.
INTRODUCTION
Despite being categorized as one of the Four Asian Dragons, South Korea,
diplomatically, had a global position of using passive and noncreative
policies in the East Asian region compared with the active and aggressive
policies of powerful nations (Cho, 2012). A country that was once united by
an ancient kingdom in the Korean Peninsula, torn by a war caused by
supporting two contradicting ideologies, has proved to the international
community that such progress can be attained in such a small amount of
time. Being the home of big company names in electronic and automotive
industries such as Samsung, LG, Hyundai, KIA, and Daewoo, this small
nation of about 50 million individuals is gradually introducing their locality
overseas. According to Korea Foundation’s president Lee Geun, “we have
caught up very quickly” (2019) when he enumerated the non-state actors
(electronic giants, Samsung and LG, as well as the South Korean entertain-
ment industry) that greatly contributed to the success of the country’s public
diplomacy. What is their secret? Excellent public diplomacy by its state and
non-state actors through different platforms. Why public diplomacy is the
secret? Diplomacy serves as the greatest factor in achieving recognition
outside any nation’s borders.
Diplomacy, in its broadest sense, is the main function of international
relations in which the diplomats are the main actors. The diplomatic
practice is performed by state actors representing a government or global
organization to accomplish their goals of preserving the interests of those
institutions. The diplomat, scholar, and politician, Sir Harold George
Nicholson argued that the greatest antidote diplomats must preserve is the
loyalty to the government of their original country (1942: 129).
Public diplomacy, a more common term for diplomacy, is the method a
nation relays their foreign policy and promote their image by attracting a
legitimate nation-branding from the general public outside its territorial
borders. Legitimate nation-branding should be defined as the honest
perception of a foreign individual towards a country’s foreign policies. We
say honest perception in the terms that it could result in a negative or
positive image of a country and it depends on how a respective nation will
handle their diplomatic actions. The University of Southern California
(USC) Center of Public Diplomacy defines public diplomacy as “the public,
interactive dimension of diplomacy which is not only global in nature but
also involves a multitude of actors and networks, a mechanism to build a
secure global environment” (n.d.). Public diplomacy, in its prompt meaning,
involves the public of the respective nation, not just the individuals
representing a seat in the government to target the interest of the foreign
citizens on the former’s policies and traditions. Public diplomacy should
help in constructing a positive image, sustainable relation, and under-
standing and clarification of the policies that a respective nation carried out
to another nation (Cho, 2012). According to Cho (2012), a sustainable
South Korea on the Forefront of Fifth Generation (5G) Technology 337
relationship is also pursued through interactive communication between the

individuals involved in a diplomatic agenda by utilizing such media as the
social network services (SNS) and the World Wide Web.
Public diplomacy is divided into two categories: hard power and soft
power. The term “soft power” is first introduced by the diplomat, professor,
and scholar of American origin, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. According to Nye (2004,
pp. 5-11), Soft power diplomacy is the communication process of one
nation to another nation to convince the latter’s citizens of a positive point-
of-view to the diplomatic objectives that “hard power” diplomacy could
have not been done. Nye argues that hard power diplomacy is the traditional
diplomacy in which only the state actors, the diplomats, can perform and is
more prone to secrecy and allegations from the general public.
Digital diplomacy is the implementation of diplomatic objectives through
the use of digital technologies, such as the Internet and communication
technologies, to order and promptly attract interest from the foreign public.
Communication forms in the environment have been always the greatest
factor for diplomacy. In a world where globalization is a gradual change in
the society, relating to it the advanced developments of science and
technology, connecting more audiences at unprecedented rates that helped
policy leaders and government representatives to successfully share messages
and implement political agendas in the way they planned it to be accepted.
Digital diplomacy promptly clarifies adequate information from official
sources eliminating the widespread nature of incorrect information, online
and offline.
The developments of information technologies intensified the non-state
actors’ ability to access information and show their perception of foreign
policy (Cho, 2012). The openness of the information in the world wide web
provides additional freedom to the general public and in return, the
governments can take note of the perceptions of the public in the future
implementation of their foreign policy goals. In this paper, we propose that
leading the digital innovation is a vital advantage in promoting a nation’s
diplomatic objectives and improving its image to the international scene.
We argue that public diplomacy is the utilization and innovation of the
diverse means of communication, such as digital technologies, aimed at
attracting interests and eliminating racial differences through mutual
understanding of each other’s policies. Our argument is inspired by the

Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Retno Marsudi, in which he made a
statement on a digital diplomacy regional conference involving the
Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) countries, and several
Asian and Oceania countries:
If we can’t keep up to date with technology, we’ll be left behind.

This affects diplomacy, too. If we can’t adjust to rapid transformations
[in the tech world], diplomacy will be rendered irrelevant. Diplomacy
has to go hand-in-hand with digital innovation (2019).
Marsudi understands that diplomacy has to adapt to the changes in the

communication technologies in the environment and any nation who will be
left behind will have a huge disadvantage in promoting their foreign policy
and improving their nation-branding in the years to come. We argue that the
leadership of South Korea in the electronics and information technology
(IT) industry, take into specific the initial commercialization of fifth-
generation (5G) technology, should improve their nation-branding and be
leading for their foreign policy goals to be more accepted in the future. For
the reader to understand the basis of this assumption, we constructed this
paper in the following manner. First, we focus on the concept of digital
diplomacy through various context(s) and its history. Second, we analyze
the digital diplomacy of South Korea by enumerating its domestic and
international movements in the digital sphere. Third, we discuss how the
South Korean government implements and maintains the leadership on 5G
technology, taking into consideration the global issues and competition on
that specific digital innovation, the method used in this study. Lastly, we
offer the concluding remarks and some recommendations for the future
South Korean take on digital public diplomacy.
DIGITAL DIPLOMACY IN CONTEXT(S)
The history of the term “digital diplomacy” takes back even to the 19th
century. In the 1850s, the foreign secretary and prime minister of British
origin, Lord Palmerston, made a statement upon receiving the first telegraph
message: “My God, this is the end of diplomacy!” (DiploFoundation, 2020).
Palmerston implied the term “diplomacy” as the traditional and “hard
power” diplomacy that is only performed by state actors in a closed-door
setting. According to DiploFoundation (2020), the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) held the first online participation session in
multilateral diplomacy in the year 1963. Online participation is a vital tool
for global policy processes which is a collection of resources that promotes
openness and inclusiveness by involving even the remote participants, from
civil society to business representatives in a conference room without being
present in the room physically The invention of new digital technologies
signaled the start of “soft power” diplomacy, a contactless and open-door
communication between citizens around the world. In just less than a
century, the digital sphere has seen a rapid increase in digital technologies
brought by its endless development through engineering and computer
science. From the telephone which historically breached its 100-millionth
user about 75 years before its first commercial use to mobile phones and its
applications, the nature of diplomacy gradually changed to adapt to the
present forms of communication.
The terms “e-diplomacy,” “cyber-diplomacy,” “public diplomacy 2.0,”
“contactless diplomacy,” and many more as scholars use more often, were
created as innovations of the term “digital diplomacy.” James K. Glassman,
a Washington D.C think-tank, made a speech entitled Public diplomacy 2.0:
A New Approach to Global Engagement and defined public diplomacy 2.0
as a “new approach but not a new technology” (2008). He argued that
digital diplomacy is just an innovation of public diplomacy and not a new
form of diplomacy. The developments of information technologies
intensified the non-state actors’ ability to access information and show their
perception of foreign policy (Cho, 2012). Digital technologies gave more
eagerness and power to the general public to demand transparency on a
specific government’s policies and objectives and contribute to improving
the image of their nation in return. According to Chun (2006), and Yoon &
Jung (2009), promoting a respective nation’s policies and ideologies
through the years has relied increasingly on public information to persuade
public opinions worldwide.
State actors, such as the diplomats and government officials, are vital
propagators of improving nation-branding and promoting foreign policies.
According to Manor and Segev (2015), two levels exist for digital diplomacy:
that of the foreign ministry and that of the embassies around the world. A
nation’s foreign policy and image can result in acceptance in the way they
aim to promote by operating on these two levels. Furthermore, digital
diplomacy has eight policy goals: knowledge management; public diplomacy;
information management; consular communications and response; disaster
response; internet freedom; external resources; and policy planning (Hanson,
2012). Diplomats slowly put more attention to using social networking
services such as Facebook, Twitter, blog posts, and other social media on
the Internet as official tools of public diplomacy (Atsushi, 2017). Moreover,
according to Atsushi, “approaches to public diplomacy must change”
(2017). A single successful tweet can instantly change other nation’s public
opinion towards positivism on the image of the respective nation. A tweet of
diplomat John Roos, U.S. Ambassador to Japan, after the March 2011
northern Japan earthquake (also famous as the 3/11 Japan earthquake)11
contributed to the disaster recovery effort by asking where to deploy U.S.
military forces. By the end of December 2012, the ambassador’s followers
increased to over 50,000. Such online platforms can provide additional
accurate information on whether such policies are accepted by the general
public of another nation that the traditional diplomatic approach could not
provide as feedback.
Additionally, the Communication and Information Technology Minister
of Indonesia, Rudiantara, believed that:
Nowadays, you can’t call yourself a diplomat if you don’t have a

social media account. State officials use Instagram to communicate
with the public. We need to know how to maximize the way we use
social media and other technologies (2019).
1 Happened on March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck the northeastern region
of Japan creating a tsunami with waves that even reached the western coastlines of South
America after about 21 hours. Casualties amounted to about 18,000 individuals and
damaged a nuclear power plant.
Public diplomacy has its benefits and regrets and so the digitalized form.
Millennials, as what the individuals born during the 1990s onwards, are the
present major goal of public diplomacy efforts. Thus, digital diplomacy is
the key as the current youth are more focused on what everything online,
easy to access, low-cost, and up-to-date. Social media is a major sigh of
relief to embassies that are faced with budget cuts and increased demand for
improved promotion of foreign policies and nation-branding (Adesina,
2017). Social networking services, such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram,
have a huge percentage of the youth population. An increasing number of
embassies are building and creating their accounts via these online
platforms to greatly enhance their diplomatic tactics. Digital diplomacy is
more interactive: foreign audiences understand more the country’s policies
and culture through multimedia forms such as images and videos. Embassies
conduct online contests and events to attract more individuals on reaching
their content.
The presence of advantages always connects to the presence of
disadvantages. Digital public diplomacy is prone to various manipulations
from private individuals. The greatest threat of digital diplomacy is hacking.
Hacking is the secret and uncontrolled manipulation of an institution’s
online platforms such as websites and SNS accounts. Such crime can be a
future tool of warfare and conflicts as both sides can hire hackers to target
each other’s database and spy. It is also prone to inviting a negative image
to a country if hackers breached and uploaded incorrect and fake content for
the sake of degrading a nation. Probably one of the greatest hacking
incidents in the last several years, the 2016 US Presidential Elections, in
which the personal email account of John Podesta, the chairman of Hillary
Clinton’s presidential campaign, was breached and leaked over 20,000
emails in its content, ultimately leading to their loss. Another risk of digital
diplomacy is the presence of users hiding using the identity of others. Using
fake accounts is also a tactic used by some digital diplomacy advocates and
practitioners for their advantage. An incorrect and contradicting statement
by a diplomat uploaded to the social media can inflict damage even to the
government represented. For example, a tweet by the Swedish foreign
minister, Carl Bildt, moments before the 2012 World Economic Forum
dinner in Davos, stated that “Leaving Stockholm and heading for Davos.
Looking forward to World Food Program dinner tonight. Global hunger is

an urgent issue! #davos.” Such a message contains contradicting statements
of promoting to solve global hunger while being boastful about going to a
prestigious dinner. It is in such a manner to talk about how South Korea
performed its public diplomacy through the digital sphere and the feedback
it received. In the following section, we analyze the platforms used by the
South Korean state and non-state actors for promoting their foreign policies
and building a positive image of their nation.
LAND OF THE MORNING CALM’S DIPLOMACY THROUGH DIGITAL

TECHNOLOGIES
The current general public is increasingly gaining more curiosity about

anything related to South Korea: culture, politics, entertainment, etc. Such
curiosity should be transformed into positive perceptions of the image of
South Korea (Cho, 2012). Korean Wave, translated into the Korean language
as “Hallyu,” is the major propagator of such increasing attention towards
South Korea. According to Cho (2012), South Korea should strictly select
and propagate which universal and inclusive policies to promote on the
Internet. Cho argued that the geopolitical, physical, and demographic
classifications of each region should be carefully considered in applying
specific foreign policies. Various policies and methods are to be applied
considering the difference of each nationality and race.
According to the 2019 edition of the yearly journal published by the
collaboration between Portland, a strategic communications consultancy,
and the USC Center on Public Diplomacy, entitled “The Soft Power 30,”
South Korea ranked 19th on the soft power index, their highest ranking on
the yearly index since it started last 2015. Increasing improvement on the
government sub-index, overflowing of tourists arriving in South Korea
mainly because of Korean Wave influence, and the historic Trump-Kim
Summit and Inter-Korean Summit boosted their ranking on the soft power
index. South Korea ranked their highest in the digital sub-index, proving its
competence as the leader on digital infrastructures, relating to it their
improving e-participation index as more citizens are allowed to attain
government support through digital services provided and funded by the

government (Portland, 2019). In 2016, the Korean government passed the
“Public Diplomacy Act,” in the goals of improving and maintaining a
positive “Korean image and prestige” perception among the domestic and
international audience (Park S., Chung, & Park H., 2018). One of the
by-products of the said act is the creation of a PD committee that presented
a comprehensive PD plan through the year 2017-2021 for conducting and
coordinating activities related to public diplomacy.
South Korea is considered a giant in terms of cutting-edge IT. The internet
connectivity speed is overwhelming and very futuristic, as the result of being
the most internet-wired country in the world, even reaching a penetration
rate greater than 100% on wireless broadband access (Osborne, 2012).
Mobile phone users outnumber the population and social media traffic is
very high, losing cellular phone reception is unheard of throughout the
country. Such wide community interactions through social media is a vital
tool for public diplomacy, information is subject to openness, more inclusive,
and relayed in real time. An amount of 11.3 billion KRW is to be allocated
on the digitalization of cultural assets through the use of virtual reality (VR)
technologies, a major plan of the Ministry of Culture, Science, and Technology.
The upshot of Korean Wave via dramas, show programs, and K-Pop
idols, thanks to improved digital technologies, gave light to South Korea
which is long lingering on the shadows of its superpower neighbors, Japan
and China (Cho, 2012). We argue that the government should increase
collaboration with the private sector on promoting the country’s image and
policies towards the foreign public. Government agencies are now utilizing
social networking services. Recently, an online contest was held by MOFA,
seeking for an appropriate and engaging name for their SNS accounts. The
contest garnered an overwhelming number of suggestions from all over the
world, proving that the general public is increasingly expressing their
curiosity about helping the South Korean government on improving their
diplomatic agendas. The winning entry, “KoreAZ,” which means everything
about Korea from A to Z, is now the official SNS accounts name for the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In the wake of the CoronaVirus Disease-19 (COVID-19) pandemic,
South Korea became one of the first nations where viral breakout took place
and also the nation that became the role model of pandemic control.
Infected individuals reached over 10,000 in just a month but contained this
number through strict implementation of their 3Ts: tracing, testing, and
treatment. The MOFA established a campaign plan on the post-COVID19
environment. One of the objectives of the plan is to “promote interactive
digital public diplomacy” (MOFA, 2020). As society tends on utilizing
contactless technologies to avoid being infected by COVID-19, the
government is focusing more on interacting with the audience through
online platforms. According to Stangarone (2020), one of the proposed
projects of Moon administration for the recovery from the effects of
economic recession brought by COVID-19 is the “Korean New Deal”
which comprised two pillars: “Green New Deal” and “Digital New Deal.”
The Digital New Deal will focus on improving digital innovation and
technologies as one of the allocations of the proposed 76 trillion won ($62
billion) project.
South Korea is a deeply digitalized society, thanks to its overflowing
patents mainly concerning technological infrastructures, proving its
existence as a rising giant in terms of digital public diplomacy. As one of
the leaders of internet connectivity and speed, smartphone users, digital
technology patents, South Korea should be a great soft power in this highly-
technological age, but it’s not (Robertson, 2017). There are three broad
reasons for this failure:
First, South Korea has no strategic plan for digital public diplomacy.
In 2016, South Korea enacted legislation to support coordination,
management, reporting, and oversight of public diplomacy. The
legislation requires the lead agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
to establish a Master Plan for public diplomacy. Second, the strategic
rationale for digital public diplomacy is misunderstood. Despite
recognizing its importance, South Korea’s understanding of public
diplomacy is still evolving. In particular, the South Korean con-
ceptualization of public diplomacy conceives of a ‘borderless world,’
in which the state seeks to persuade both external and internal
audiences. Third, the Moon administration has failed to enunciate its
strategic narrative. The administration is taking a longer-term
approach to Korean Peninsula peace – a multidimensional, open-

ended, confidence-building approach that aims to remove North
Korea’s rationale for seeking and maintaining nuclear and missile
programs (Robertson, 2017).
Government officials do not utilize social media extensively: usually

have no personal SNS accounts as a result of personal decisions to maintain
flexibility in carrying the core objectives of public diplomacy. International
cultural relations and public diplomacy are in constant competition of each
other, MOFA and MCST prioritize digital technologies at its lowest level in
light of visible and underlying risks of digital public diplomacy (Melissen &
Kim, 2018). In the next section, we discuss the sense of 5G technology, the
present stand of South Korea as the leader of 5G technology commerciali-
zation, and the global competition, the method used in this paper.
SOUTH KOREA: THE ROLE MODEL OF 5G TECHNOLOGY
5G Technology is an innovation in this rapid-evolving digital sphere, enabling

industries to perform faster and more interactive through the use of more
advanced technologies. 5G Technologies is still on the initial phase of
commercialization and several countries are taking their initial step on being
the pioneers of embracing this technology, resulting in global competition
and issues.
5G TECHNOLOGY IN ITS SENSE
As the general public is more curious about embracing a futuristic way of

life, digital innovations are patented to provide more contactless and wireless
forms of technologies. An example is a 5G technology that could meet the
increasing demands of industries in the coming 2020s decade and beyond.
According to the Agence France-Presse (2019), such a generation of
technology could power up capabilities of a wide range of daily technologies,
from toasters to telephones, from electric cars to power grids, making them
more wirelessly operated. Through the commercialization of fifth-

generation technology, citizens are more instantaneously connected, making
it more focused on public diplomacy objectives. Cultural contents could be
made more realistic and interactive, providing the foreign audience a way to
feel the essence of such history. 5G technology is 20 times faster than its
predecessor, the 4G technology, enabling to download an entire movie in
just a second (Agence France-Presse, 2019). The utilization of such
technology could bring about $565 billion of global economic benefits by
the year 2034. The economy minister of South Korea, Hong Nam-Ki, once
commented, “If 5G is fully implemented, it will greatly improve people’s
lives.” (2019).
5G technology utilizes shorter wavelengths (millimeter waves), an ideal
factor for faster internet speeds containing a higher amount of data. Data
could be transferred at about 700 megabits/second, way times faster than the
30 to 50 megabits/second capability of 4G technology (Kang, 2020). These
millimeter-sized wavelengths, however, couldn’t penetrate through building
foliage and walls, requiring the installation of miniature base stations inside
structures. On the other side, these base stations are fortunately more low-
cost than traditional cell towers and could accommodate a higher number of
antennas, miniature ones, allowing more users to be connected to a single
base station.
In this sense, every newly-invented technology is a hot topic for the pros
and cons enthusiasts. 5G technology also, as it has some advantages and
disadvantages. As enumerated by Ramage (2019), 5G technology could
offer out-of-this-world internet speeds, fewer tower congestion, and new
technology options. When it comes to internet speeds, users can experience
downloading an entire episode of HD programs in a matter of seconds. Cell
tower congestion is the situation in which a single cell tower is full of users
simultaneously demanding for signal reception reaching its capacity. With
5G technology, tower congestion is a thing of the past. Unfortunately, 5G
frequencies are only available to a smaller coverage area, prone to inducing
battery heat/drain, and low upload speeds compared to its download speeds
(Ramage, 2019). Users are complaining to fast battery drain and hot phone
temperatures when using 5G reception. In this sense, advancement in
battery technology is a must to adapt to 5G development.
SOUTH KOREA’S LEADERSHIP IN 5G COMMERCIALIZATION
Ranked in the top places in terms of internet connectivity and speed and
digitalization, South Korea further improved its status on being the first
country to commercialize the use of 5G technology. April 3, 2019, is a
historic day for the digital sphere as the first 5G-capable phones and networks
are laid out in the South Korean market, hours before the US made their
move. Samsung Electronics released its first-ever 5G-capable smartphone,
called Galaxy S10, hours ahead before its US counterpart, Motorola’s
MotoZ3, was released (Ferrier, 2019). Such movement could result in more
attention to the capabilities of South Korea as a highly-digitalized nation, a
good opportunity for diplomats to better their foreign policies and nation-
branding in the future. As noted by Ferrier (2019), 5G is thought to be fully
implemented by the year 2023.
As of May 2020, the number of 5G connected subscribers amount to
about 6.9 million, roughly about 10% of the total estimated 69 million
mobile phone users in South Korea, according to the data of the South
Korean ICT ministry. An average 5G subscriber in South Korea uses about
2.6 times higher data than a regular 4G LTE user, substantial evidence of the
wide capabilities of the 5G technology. The industry tracker, OpenSignal,
measured that among the subscribers of the three major telecommunication
networks in South Korea (SK Telecom, LG UPlus, and KT Corp.), 5G
connection is only used about 15% of the time. Download speeds are
currently reaching a maximum of about 200 megabytes/second (MBps).
Note: The brackets indicate confidence intervals. (OpenSignal, 2020)

Figure 1. Comparison of the 5G Download Speed Among the Big 3 South Korean Telecom
Networks
According to Dyton (2020), the capabilities of 5G technology is starting to

be very visible in South Korea, from live streaming of sports with a
360-degree view to augmented reality (AR) smartphone applications that
could display a large cat while visiting a park. The increasing curiosity of
probably one of the most demanded futuristic machines, a self-driving
autonomous car, is one of the reasons for massive research and development
on improving internet technology. In Hwaseong, a 360,000 square meters
test site for self-driving cars was built, equipped with 5G base stations
planted on highways, city outskirts, and construction sites, making it the
world’s first testbed for autonomous cars (Paulo & Alshahab, 2019). Proof
of South Korea’s leadership on the digital sphere is further built by a
comment of Stephen Myers, principal analyst of Omdia:
The global market is steadily gearing up for 5G deployment, but

right now South Korea is leading the way – although markets like
Switzerland have also made steady progress (Myers, 2019).
The increasing demands for 5G technology have made the Moon

administration to make a move on sustaining and supporting the 5G industry.
The comprehensive plan called “5G+ Strategy” will focus on five core
services (immerse content, autonomous vehicles, smart manufacturing,
smart cities, and digital healthcare) and ten core industries (next-generation
smartphones, network equipment, information security, edge computing,
vehicle-to-everything communication, robots, drones, intelligent CCTV,
wearable devices, and virtual and augmented reality headsets), that will be a
vital foundation for the path that will be taken by the South Korean 5G
industry (Gillispie, 2020).
GLOBAL COMPETITION
Despite the leadership of South Korea in commercializing the 5G technology,

several economic nation-giants are also claiming of them being the
pioneers. The US telecom carrier, Verizon, claims they are the first firm in
the world to deploy the 5G network, in Chicago and Minneapolis, and soon
in more cities in the US. According to Verizon’s chairman and chief

executive officer, Hans Vestberg, Verizon is the first firm in the world to
have the power of 5G in their hands. Their rival counterpart, the US telecom
AT&T, deployed their “5G E-network” in 12 cities and several cities soon to
follow, with speeds greater than that of 4G networks. As proudly commented
by AT&T Labs president, Andre Fuetsch, they are the fastest wireless
network nationwide. Reach is the major problem of the US in commerciali-
zing the 5G network despite them having the fastest 5G internet speed
across all countries due to spectrum challenges. South Korea installed “mid-
band” 5G spectrums across 85 cities nationwide offering a good balance of
speed and connectivity.
5G networks in South Korea is currently offered in non-standalone
mode, a digital situation in which a user tends to switch each time between
two network generations, 4G and 5G for example. South Korea currently
uses the 3.5 gigahertz (GHz) band speed which made the mobile industry
demanding on the R&D and immediate deployment of the 28 GHz band
speed to experience lower latency and complete real 5G speeds, a nature of
5G that the digital sphere is envisioned. The US already commercialized the
28 GHz band and Japan is soon to follow tempting Kwon Kyoung-In, the
chief technology officer of Ericsson-LG, to comment, “South Korea needs
to show the leadership it has maintained” (2020).
(OpenSignal, 2020)
Figure 2. Download Speeds of Top Ten 5G Telecom Networks Worldwide
Note: ‌Maximum download speeds in four countries now exceeds over 1 Gigabit per second.
(OpenSignal, 2019)
Figure 3. Maximum Download Speeds Experienced by 5G Users in Several Countries
South Korea is at the forefront of 5G deployment but they lack in the AI

sector. Ranking only in the 26th place in terms of training and supporting AI
researchers, they lack in competitiveness compared to countries such as the
United States (Stangarone, 2020). The challenges in the AI sector prompted
the South Korean government to spend about 1 trillion won ($820 million)
in the span of 10 years to support the AI semiconductor industry. As noted
by Stangarone (2020), the KT-led AI team targets to nurture and produce
about 1,500 AI specialists by 2022.
In this sense that South Korean international relations will be a both-
sided result. When it comes to the 5G industry, the United States is an avid
supporter of the strategic interests of South Korea. The two countries alone
could account for roughly 75% of all 5G subscribers worldwide by the year
2020 and Korean vendors such as Samsung is in a favorable state in the
American market due to bilateral trade relations (O’Halloran & Segan,
2020). Reducing barriers to 5G deployment is a focus of regional partners,
in the vision to build smart cities and produce autonomous vehicles. A
potential challenge to South Korea’s long-term growth in the 5G industry is
the heated debate on the role of the Chinese company, Huawei, in 5G
development that even the US imposed sanctions on the movements of
Huawei products inside the US market. Since then, US allies are tempted to
impose similar sanctions against Huawei products, Japan and Australia for
example, making South Korea in the midst of conflict between economic
interests and international relations. However, United Kingdom strongly
opposes applying restrictive measures against the Chinese company. The
inviting and democratic policies of South Korea makes it a vital option as a
digital powerhouse,
Its inclusion in the D10 and the United Kingdom’s consideration of

Samsung as a replacement for Huawei raises South Korea’s profile in
the wider 5G ICT supply chain debate, something that the Blue
House has, until now, sought to avoid for two reasons. First, this ICT
“decoupling” is driving a wedge between technology supply chains,
which are deeply integrated for South Korean companies. The
growing bifurcation between the PRC and the United States in this
new “technology cold war” puts South Korea squarely between its
main security provider and its main trading partner: an unsustainable
position over the long run. Second, while Samsung is itself a
competitor of Huawei—particularly in the space of 5G patents and
equipment—many South Korean companies still wish to collaborate
with Huawei and other leading Chinese technology firms who will
resist the growing pressure to decouple in ICT (Gillispie, 2020).
Huawei and several South Korean electronics firms are vital trade
partners through the years, making the global debate on Huawei’s presence
a major issue on the South Korean government. Samsung supplies
electronic memory chips to Huawei and in return, LG UPlus is a major
customer of 5G-related equipment of Huawei. A result of the diminishing
presence of Huawei in the electronics industry is an advantage to the world-
class South Korean electronics industry but could damage bilateral trade
relations between China and South Korea. A vital proof of such consequence
is that,
This long-term trend became even more pronounced after the 2017
THAAD crisis showed how vulnerable Seoul was to Beijing’s
economic coercion. Shortly thereafter, Samsung started to downsize
its Chinese manufacturing presence, closing the Shenzhen production

line in May 2018, followed by its Tianjin factory in December. As
the trade war between the United States and China began to heat up,
South Korean firms continued their exodus from China, going to
replacements such as Vietnam, where South Korean FDI ($1.97
billion in the first half of 2018) exceeded FDI into China (Gillispie,
2020).
The visible and balanced leadership of South Korea and the issues
surrounding 5G development is a considerable factor in the future out-
takings of digital public diplomacy.
CONCLUSION
As digital public diplomacy becomes a great focus of diplomatic researches,

traditional public diplomacy should be still in great consideration as the two
matters could not succeed without a clear strategic narrative. Digital public
diplomacy should be South Korea’s priority; the PD Act enacted in 2016
might help in solving and guiding the path of international relations of
South Korea. The current government proposed expenditures on the
advancement of technologies should prosper the foreign public’s stand in
South Korea’s role on the digital sphere.
By sharing its know-how on being a technological powerhouse and even
a health-conscious nation, South Korea could be a nation that other nations
want to emulate, partner with, and be a long-lasting ally. South Korea
should instill a positive and engaging image in developing and under-
developed countries such as a major contributor to great historical break-
throughs of solving problems overseas, in all aspects of society.
Therefore, we have argued that the leadership of South Korea in
deploying 5G technology is a situation of bilateral consequences. In doing
so, private non-state actors such as the electronics industry proved its
essence on being a vital factor in the success of diplomatic objectives. The
international issues surrounding the 5G commercialization is a major impact
on the diplomatic field in which South Korea should take into serious
considerations. More extensive online/offline research undertakings are to

be needed, but we can take from this immersion is South Korea’s
performance in the 5G industry from a descriptive viewpoint. Being active
on the nature of globalization, such as being an economic powerhouse, is
also a form of public diplomacy in that they can prove their existence as a
self-governing nation, with cultural, political, and social viewpoints as
foundations of diplomatic success.
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357
Role of Korean Public Diplomacy in

Addressing Global Issues: South Korea
Middlemanship and Public Diplomacy
Mathew Yeo Jie Sheng
Abstract | Despite being in the world where “hard” power still

predominates (Mor, 2006), “soft” power, as espoused by public diplomacy, is
slowly gaining traction. In full anticipation of this shift, South Korea started
developing its public diplomacy a decade ago and has developed a niche in
the conduct of public diplomacy. By first critically examining the historical
and theoretical conceptualisation of public diplomacy, this paper concluded
that South Korea’s practice of public diplomacy intersects with the functional
aspect of middle power theory. Its many functional linkages between the two
seemingly suggest that the conduct of public diplomacy is an extension and
a major policy tool of a state in its conduct of middlepowermanship. As
such, Korea’s public diplomacy role in the conduct of global affairs can be
said to be subsumed and utilised accordingly within the conduct of Korea’s
middlepowermanship.
국문초록 | 이 세계는 여전히 “하드” 파워가 지배하지만(Mor, 2006), 공공 외

교가 지지하는 “소프트” 파워가 서서히 인기를 끌고 있다. 이러한 전환을 예측하
여 대한민국은 십여 년 전 공공 외교를 발달시키기 시작했고 공공 외교 수행의
틈새를 개발했다. 공공 외교의 역사적, 이론적 개념을 먼저 비판적으로 분석함으
로써 이 논문은 대한민국의 공공 외교 관행이 미들 파워 이론의 기능적인 측면과
교차한다고 결론짓는다. 이 둘 사이의 많은 기능적 연결고리들은 공공 외교 관행
이 미들파워맨십(중간자) 수행의 연장이자 주요한 정책 도구라는 것을 보여준다.
국제 외교 수행에서 한국 공공 외교의 역할은 한국의 미들파워맨십 수행에 포함
되며 그에 맞춰 활용된다고 할 수 있다.
INTRODUCTION
Having served as the United States Secretary of State and National Security
Advisor under the Nixon and Ford administrations, Henry Kissinger detailed
his acute interpretation of realpolitik issues and diplomatic experiences in
perhaps his most iconic book titled ‘Diplomacy’. In brief, this classic work
denotes that for perpetual peace to be enduring, the mastery of the art of
diplomacy is quintessential – acknowledging and understanding interstates
differences, differing bargaining positions, and geopolitics and strategic
considerations (Kissinger, 2014). Only by doing so can states discover
commonality of interests which will facilitate cooperation and increase the
cost of conflict, thereby mitigating the propensity of conflict. Going by this
logic, given that states are the main actors and decision makers, diplomacy
ought to be conducted through official government-to-government mediums.
Indeed, as Wriston (1997) commented, diplomats of the past were the sole
interlocutors between countries.
Ironically, despite discussing at great lengths the true notion and spirit of
diplomacy, the concept of ‘Public Diplomacy’ was not discussed in the
entire ‘Diplomacy’ book. To be fair, ‘Public Diplomacy’ is a relatively newly
coined form of diplomacy that has always been practised before. Public
diplomacy goes beyond mere propaganda or being a simple public relations
campaign (Nye, 2008). Certainly, as President Lee (undated) of the South
Korean Foundation surmised, ‘Public Diplomacy’ is still a term that has yet
to be properly defined. These are the fundamental questions: What exactly
is Public Diplomacy? How does it function? Why would a state adopt public
diplomacy? What is the role of South Korea’s public diplomacy efforts?
These questions will form the crux of this paper. While present literature has
overwhelmingly focused on how states conduct public diplomacy, few
studies have been conducted to provide an explanation as to why states
chose to undertake them. As such, this paper will attempt to address this
literature gap by delving deeper to achieve a more comprehensive under-
standing as to why public diplomacy is conducted and advocated.
Thus, this paper will adopt an explanatory approach toward this end.
Relying on existing but fragmented interpretations of ‘Public Diplomacy’ by
different scholars, this paper will first construct a broad overview of this
Role of Korean Public Diplomacy in Addressing Global Issues 359
abstract concept and conceptualise the meaning of Public Diplomacy. Next,

having established a theoretical underpinning for this paper, the paper will
attempt to utilise it to comprehend the basis of South Korea’s public
diplomacy efforts.
South Korea is chosen as a case study for learning more about public
diplomacy as the country has placed a strong emphasis on public diplomacy
among its diplomatic dealings. South Korea is one of the few countries that
possess an institutionalised ‘Public Diplomacy Act’ along with an enforce-
ment degree of this act. The institutionalised nature of this form of diplomacy,
along with clearly defined strategies and goals, indicates that public
diplomacy as an entity has relatively matured in South Korea. Hence, South
Korea presents itself as one of the leading states in the conduct of public
diplomacy; ergo the study of a leading and prominent actor can provide
exciting revelations as to why states choose to conduct public diplomacy.
This paper concludes that South Korea’s strong emphasis and niche in
the conduct of public diplomacy, among its repertoire of diplomatic tools, is
an extension of its middle power status. Adopting the functionalist approach
in understanding middle power, this paper argues that South Korea
developed a niche in public diplomacy, which in turn is melded into the
grand narrative of Korea as a middle power improving its international
standing. This shed light on the huge potentiality of public diplomacy, an
often-eclipsed form of diplomacy, as an important policy tool for a middle
power state to conduct its foreign affairs while elevating its international
standing. In addition, this provides indication that the role of South Korea’s
public diplomacy in addressing global issues is an advancement of its
current policies: an undertaking in its conduct of middlepowermanship.
CONCEPTUALISATION
Historical overview of ‘Public Diplomacy

Following the end of the Franco-Prussian war, which ended in French
defeat, the French government attempted to repair and rebuild its national
image by promoting its language and literature through the Alliance
Francaise (Winkler & Nye, 2005). The propagation of French literal arts
soon became integral in French diplomacy (Pells, 1997). Following the

French, other European states soon establish offices to cultivate favourable
perception and images of one’s state. The importance of having a favourable
perception globally was underscored when the Roosevelt Administration
stated that the US security depended on its ability to communicate and win
the support of people in other countries (Pells 1997). This statement was
followed US partaking in an aggressive cultural offensive globally to
cultivate a positive perception of the US. The Office of Wartime Information
(OWI) was tasked with the provision of accurate information while the
Office of Strategic Service did the otherwise by disseminating disinformation
and propaganda. At this juncture, states around the world were practising
public diplomacy unknowingly as the term public diplomacy was only
conceptualised in the 1960s by Edmund Gullion (Cull, 2008).
According to the Centre on Public Diplomacy of the University of South
California (2017), the former US diplomat coined this term in the mid-
1960s to differentiate the provision of information about a foreign country
from actual propaganda. During the cold war, to maintain domestic stability
and to avoid a repeat of McCarthyism while the US and Soviet Union were
engaged in a fierce ideological battle internationally, it was integral for the
domestic public to have the correct perception of the west. Hence, to
achieve that, the term ‘propaganda,’ which had a negative connotation, was
distanced, and replaced with public diplomacy. Public diplomacy in this
aspect meant the provision of information regarding one’s government for
its domestic audience. However, as the Cold War intensified and the US and
Soviet Union continued to vie for spheres of influences within the
international arena, there was a need for overseas audiences to develop a
favourable perspective on US’s foreign policies. Indeed, as what Nye (2008)
surmises, during the cold war, a new international arena where a battle ‘over
hearts and minds’ are formed. In this new setup, power no longer
necessitates material power but of positive perceptions of the state. In this
regard, making an impression or forming a favourable perception became
an integral part of policy planning (Mor, 2006).
On that note, public diplomacy underwent a transformation and could be
defined as a mean by which state A interacts with the domestic audience in
state B to create a favourable environment to advance state A’s policies,
particularly that of foreign policies. This was seen when President Ronald
Reagan ordered an intensification of the US’s public diplomacy and
psychological warfare efforts to counter the Soviet’s efforts to undermine
the western alliance (Scott-Smith, 2008). Undoubtedly, public diplomacy
became a tool utilised by the US to generate positive perception of the US
while countering Soviet’s attempts of misperception (Scott-Smith, 2008). As
Nye (2008) affirmed, effective usage of public diplomacy was integral in
US victory in the cold war. In short, public diplomacy seeks to convince the
foreign elites and its domestic audience that the values, policies, and actions
of the state deserve their support both from the elite and grassroots level
(Mor 2006)
As Public Diplomacy does not exist in a vacuum and is shaped primarily
by external events, the end of the Cold War drastically reduced the need for
public diplomacy (Cull, 2015). The US emerged as the sole superpower
after the Cold Warand there were no other contending powers that presented
a serious challenge, both materially and perceptually, like the Soviet Union.
As such, public diplomacy efforts were scaled back. The U.S. Information
Agency (USIA), a former autonomous agency in charge of US’s public
diplomacy, faced budget cuts and was ultimately reorganised into various
department of state offices (Frensley & Michaud, 2006). Such pompous and
complacent behaviour towards Public diplomacy would soon change when
the US experienced the September 11 attacks in 2001. Having to garner
international support for its efforts against terrorism, the US would soon
re-utilise public diplomacy (Mor, 2007; Frensley & Michaud, 2006). The
significance of public diplomacy was underscored in the U.S. Advisory
Commission report in 2002 when it denotes that US foreign policy has been
weakened by its systemic failures to include public diplomacy within
policymaking (US advisory commission 2002)
Hence, Public diplomacy experienced a resurgence since the September
11th attacks (Mor, 2007; Frensley & Michaud, 2006). In fact, recognising
that the disregard for foreign public opinion has been a key factor in US
foreign policy failures, Public Diplomacy has since been accorded a high
status in diplomatic exchanges (Nye 2004). To be sure, the promotion of
positive images and perception of one’s country is now a staple in a state’s
diplomatic endeavours. However, public diplomacy faces new challenges in
the information age (Nye, 2008). Nye (2008) discussed how the highly
globalised nature of the world, along with technological advances, has led
to a major overhaul of how the world receives and spreads information. The
increasing ease and drastic reduction in costs of processing and transmitting
information meant that Information is aplenty and readily available. This
abundance of information inadvertently increases clutter and results in a
scarcity of attention. As such, in the conduct of public diplomacy, states
have to maintain consistency and credibility in their actions and signals to
continually propagate a favourable reputation internationally.
UNDERSTANDING/ THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF PUBLIC

DIPLOMACY
Symbolic Interactionism
Symbolic interactionism came to prominence in the early 20th century (Forte
2003). LaRossa & Reitzes (2008) defines it as a creation of identity as a
result of individuals and groups’ interactions. During the interactions,
meanings and perceptions can emerge from the interpretation, and often, the
self-perceived identity reflects other people’s assessments (Cooley 1902). In
other words, this meant that through effective usage of symbols and signals,
the other agents can have a similar assessment or appraisal as the one the
principal-agent is trying to convey or portray. As such, symbolic interac-
tionism can be applied to the field of public relations and public diplomacy
(Zhang, 2006). Given that symbolic interactionism involves the interpretation
of symbols and signals amidst the interactions to form meanings and
identity, a state, with its interaction with the international community, can
use symbols or signals to construct an identity among the international
community. This identity that the state is trying to portray will be similar to
the identity that others perceive to a large degree. As such, a state can use
public diplomatic symbols, signs, and action to generate a perceived
positive identity in the international arena. Working on this premise, Zhang
(2006) furthers this by arguing that in the process of conducting public
interactions, symbols are used to cultivate national identity and advance the
state policy agenda. Such deductions followed from the basis that
symbolism is inherently entwined with diplomacy. During the conduct of

public diplomacy, symbols function as signals in which the meanings of the
signals are picked up and interpreted by the international community
through constant interactions. The interpreted meaning will then translate
into affirmative identity creation and advancement of the state’s policy.
Indeed, one of the key functionalities of public diplomacy is to build,
maintain and improve national identity (Serajnik-Sraka 1999). Thus, a state,
in its symbolic interactions with the international community, can use
signals or symbols to generate positive perceptions of themselves and their
policies to the international community.
Provision of Political Information and Advancing Cultural

Communication
Signitzer (2013) conceptualises public diplomacy on two dimensions:
political information and cultural communication. Adopting Tuch’s (1990)
definition of public diplomacy, Signitzer simplified public diplomacy as the
provision of political information aimed at explaining and defending
specific policies of one’s government. These explanations are often temporal
and aimed at persuasion, which functions as political advocacy for one’s
society. Conversely, cultural communication can be further differentiated
into two terms: cultural diplomacy and cultural relations. Cultural diplomacy
refers to the negotiation and conduct of cultural agreements, which will
ensure a favourable cultural relation between the states involved (Mitchell
1986). These relations will produce positive attitudes and perceptions which
may contribute to successful diplomatic exchanges. Cultural relations, on
the other hand, entails open exchanges to broaden the understanding and
cooperation among states on many other fronts. Once combined, cultural
communication can be interpreted to mean the long-term presentation and
introduction of one’s society with the aim of attaining mutual understanding.
Cultural communication extends beyond mutual understanding as it
includes the aspect of forming favourable perception by the other society as
well. The two dimensions – political information and cultural communication
- function in a continuum where the government can oscillate between the
two. However, Signitzer was careful in conveying that the endpoints of the
continuum are undefined. In other words, this meant that whenever a
government decides to partake in public diplomacy activities, both

dimensions will be factored in, albeit to varying degrees. Hence, public
diplomacy can be conceptualised as a concept that carries the properties of
political information and cultural communication.
Soft power
In the article titled “Public diplomacy and soft power”, Nye (2008), as the
title suggests, delineates a relationship between soft power and public
diplomacy. The principal argument is that public diplomacy is a tool to
enhance a state’s soft power. A state displaying formidable soft power can
entice, attract, influence, or compel an outcome through co-opts rather than
coercion. Nye argues that soft power is dependent on 3 vital resources:
culture, political values, and its foreign policies. Specifically, soft power is
generated when 1) a state’s culture elucidates its inherent values that draw
interest and attention; 2) a state can express its political values; 3) a state’s
foreign policy is viewed as legitimate and morally right. On this basis,
public diplomacy is viewed as a means to achieve soft power as a state can
utilise the attractive values of these 3 aspects to communicate with and gain
the favour of the public of the other countries. Hence, through broadcasting,
subsidizing of cultural exports, exchanges etc, a state is not only able to
project a favourable image, but it can establish long term relations which
are instrumental in creating an enabling and supportive environment or
governmental policies (Nye 2008). Therefore, public diplomacy is
conceptualised as a repertoire of building soft power for a state.
Convergence of the the three points

Various theoretical understanding of public diplomacy were explored here.
Public diplomacy was first viewed through a symbol interactionist
perspective, which argues that symbols and signals are interpreted by other
parties to form an interpretation. It is then aggregated to the international
level, where a state can utilise symbols, signal, and actions in a bid to
generate a favourable perspective of it by other states. This favourable
perception can then facilitate and garner support for its policies. Next,
Signitzer’s two dimensions of public diplomacy were examined. The
conduct of public diplomacy espouses elements of political advocacy and
formation of favourable perception through cultural diffusion. Both

dimensions supplement one other and exist within a single continuum.
Particularly, during the conduct of public diplomacy, a state will
simultaneously persuade and convince its policies, while forging cultural
relations to establish relations and form a deep-rooted positive perception of
the state. Lastly, public diplomacy is viewed as an extension of soft power.
A state with soft power can influence an outcome to its favour through its
latent allure and appeal to other parties. Public diplomacy then functions as
an instrument in creating a situation that makes the aforementioned scenario
more permissible.
Public diplomacy can be conceptualised in various ways. However, the
different concepts converge in its outcome. A state, through effective public
diplomacy, is able to generate positive and lasting perceptions of it, which
in turn facilitates and encourages endorsement of its policies.
SOUTH KOREA AND GLOBAL KOREA
South Korea as a middle power

To gain insight as to how South Korea conducts and became an exempli-
fication of effective public diplomacy, a more comprehensive understanding
of South Korea’s international role is required. This paper will first establish
the premise that South Korea is a middle power internationally. As what
Teo et al., 2016 espouses, the concept of middle power has often been
approached in three ways: 1) hierarchical approach, 2) functionalist
approach, 3) behavioural approach.
The hierarchical approach maintains that a state material power and its
development is able to determine one resulting influence in a hierarchical
fashion. An aspect to demarcate great, middle, and small power will be
through Ping’s (2017) comprehensive matrix. Based on his matrix, 9
indicators1 are examined before deducing the appropriate strata of influence
that a state ought to belong to in the international arena.
1 The 9 indicators are population, geographic area, military expenditure, GDP, GDP real
growth, value of exports, gross national income per capita, trade as percentage of GDP,
and life expectancy at birth
Secondly, the functionalist approach denotes that a middle power will

adopt a functional role internationally. Recognising that its resources and
influence globally are limited vis-à-vis great powers, middle powers are
unable to wield influence across the whole policy spectrum (Teo et al.,
2016). As such, middle powers have to exercise caution and be selective in
elucidating their functions (Cooper, 1997). In other words, middle powers
have to discover a niche or exclusive area where they can exert their limited
influence on.
Thirdly, a behavioural approach defines a middle power by its behavioural
tendency to partake in middlepowermanship. In the conduct of middle-
powermanship, a middle power will actively promote and participate in
multilateral institutions to manage and regulate international affairs (Shin,
2016). Its penchant to rely on multilateralism is a result of its inability to
unilaterally affect or induce international developments (Jordaan, 2003).
Utilising multilateralism will allow a coalition of similar interests, thereby
presenting a larger global voice to project their concerns. In addition, in the
advancement of multilateralism, middle power typically functions as
intermediaries between nations.
As it is beyond the scope of this paper to prove South Korea’s status as a
middle power, this paper will turn to existing literature on South Korea as a
middle power. Evidently, a multitude of scholars has already affirmed South
Korea’s status as a middle power (Emmers & Teo, 2015; John, 2014; Karim,
2018; S.-M. Kim, 2016; W. Kim, 2015; Mo, 2016; Robertson, 2007; Shin,
2016). This provides the necessary basis for this paper to proceed with the
understanding that South Korea is a middle power.
Middle power and Global Korea

Since South Korea’s independence in 1987, South Korea’s foreign policy
trajectory has often been confined within the North-East Asia region.
Geopolitical considerations such as the quagmire of North Korea; the
entrenchment of the US-ROK alliance; the rise of communist China and its
subsequent rivalry with the US and the historical animosity between Japan
and South Korea resulted in a foreign policy generally gravitating towards
its immediate region. This changed during the Lee Myung Bak admini-
stration when South Korea took a more outward-looking approach in its
foreign policy. Lee attempted to increase South Korea’s international branding

by enhancing its network and conveying power globally (S.-M. Kim, 2016).
This was attained under the campaign of ‘Global South Korea,’ in which
South Korea utilised its middle power diplomacy to achieve such aims.
Under the Global South Korea policy, Lee adopted a global conceptual
focus to solidify South Korea status as a responsible and contributing global
citizen, who has made salient contributions to the global common good
(Korean Herald, 2012). Specifically, South Korea has contributed
meaningfully and acted proactively in multilateral organisations such as
G20, OECD, nuclear security summit, and engaged in more peacekeeping
activities (Snyder, 2009). Viewed from all three approaches, South Korea
has functioned as a middle power to increase its global outreach and extend
its influence within its rights. Indeed, the impact of ‘Global South Korea’
was summarised by Professor Hwang as having a tremendous impact on
elevating South Korea’s international profile (Korean Herald, 2012). To be
sure, South Korea’s standing as a middle power solidified due to Global
South Korea, but what was the factor that compelled South Korea to possess
such capacity? Viewing through a functionalist lens, this paper argues that
South Korea, particularly since the Lee administration, has successfully
assimilated and developed public diplomacy as a niche area to functionally
increase South Korea’s international standing.
Development of a South Korean Public Diplomacy and its

interaction with South Korea’s Middle power status
As one of the 3 key diplomatic approaches adopted by the South Korean
government, public diplomacy and its resulting efforts have been gaining
traction since 2010 (South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). The
rationale, as stated by the ministry, indicated that public diplomacy aimed to
promote diplomatic relations via direct communication with foreign nationals.
In brief, public diplomacy is conducted by sharing South Korean culture,
history, values, arts, policies, and vision to cultivate and enhance the image
of South Korea. This will, in turn, increase South Korea’s global influence
and magnify South Korea’s international stature. To achieve the aim of
‘fascinating the world with South Korea’s charm,’ South Korea’s public
diplomacy is further broken down into 3 different tracks: Cultural Diplomacy,
Table 1. Public Diplomacy, with information taken from Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(n.d.)
Public Diplomacy
Cultural Knowledge-Oriented
Public Diplomacy on policy
Diplomacy Diplomacy
Increase foreign nationals trust and
Increase knowledge
Spread cultural understanding of South Korean
of South Korea
attraction policies to create a favourable
Support the teaching
Increase national environment for the attainment of
of South Korean
stature via cultural South Korea’s diplomatic goals
Aims language overseas
assets Increase understanding of South
and South Korean
Enhance Korea policy by studying diversify
studies
communication via Promotes exchanges and
Support cooperation
cultural exchange interactions with foreign students
in education
and residents in South Korea
Establish goodwill
Increase awareness Generation of a favourable
Objective and cultivate good
of South Korea perception of South Korea
relations
Promotion of South
Exhibitions at
Examples Korea-related content Public diplomacy forum
overseas mission
in foreign textbooks
Knowledge-Oriented Diplomacy, and Public Diplomacy on policy (South

Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). Table 1 provides a condensed
version of the 3 different public diplomacies. It is critical to note that the
objectives of the different tracks are derived from the author’s own personal
interpretations.
The three different tracks work in conjunction with one another. When
relations and goodwill with foreign nationals are enhanced, together with a
greater awareness of South Korea and its related policy goals, a favourable
perception of South Korea can be formed. This, in turn, will generate a
positive environment for South Korea to conduct its diplomacy and attain
its diplomatic goal. Such depictions work in tandem with South Korea’s
middlepowermanship, as the attainment of its diplomatic goals will enhance
South Korea’s international standing. Moreover, its constant interaction
with foreign nationals also unwittingly affirms South Korea’s international
position.
To highlight South Korea’s resolute commitment to the conduct of
public diplomacy, the Public Diplomacy Act, accompanied with the

Enforcement Decree of the Public Diplomacy Act, was passed in 2016
(South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). Not only did this move
affirm the importance of public diplomacy, but it also provided new impetus
and direction to the conduct of diplomacy. More importantly, the passing of
the acts formally institutionalised South Korean public diplomacy, thereby
ensuring policy consistency.
Thus, equipped with elaborate aims and strategies, along with the
institutionalised nature of public diplomacy, South Korea presents itself as a
relatively mature practitioner of effective public diplomacy. Its proficiency
in the conduct of diplomacy serves as an excellent precedent for other states
to emulate. Hence, these undoubtedly highlight South Korea’s niche in the
conduct of public diplomacy. Viewed in this vein, South Korea, with its
decade long venture undertaking of public diplomacy, solidified its status as
the forefront of public diplomacy. More importantly, its achievements, as a
result of effective public diplomacy, formed favourable perceptions of
South Korea policies. This inadvertently laid a critical and enduring
foundation for the conduct of South Korean middlepowermanship.
Such dynamics could be represented with a Venn diagram, as seen
Key objectives of South Korea

Middle power status
(Functionalist)
• ‌Develop niche area and increase
South Korea’s international
influence
Objectives of Public Diplomacy

• Establish
‌ goodwill and cultivate
good relations
• Increase
‌ awareness of South
Korea
• Generation
‌ of a favourable
perception of South Korea
Figure 1. Interactions between Public Diplomacy and Korea Middle power status.
above. Viewed generally, South Korea sought to use its middle power status
to elicit more international influence. One aspect of doing so, as discussed
earlier, was to develop a niche area that could attract and gain following and
support from other states. South Korea was able to develop and
institutionalise its public diplomacy, and in the process of doing so, set a
precedent on good public diplomacy for the world. This results in the
construction of a niche area in diplomacy, thereby fulfilling its middle
power objective. On the other hand, the key goals of South Korea’s public
diplomacy are centred around positive and favourable image creation of
South Korea, which coincides circumlocutorily with its wishes of elevating
its international standing. Attaining a positive perception overseas will
greatly enhance South Korea’s influence projection globally, thereby
fulfilling South Korea’s middle power diplomacy. Through this diagram, it
reflects public diplomacy being an extension of the grand narrative of South
Korea conduct of middlepowermanship. In other words, the role of South
Korea’s public diplomacy and its subsequent conduct of global affairs is an
extension of its middlepowermanship.
CONCLUSION
Public diplomacy is a relatively recent theoretical concept, yet its practice

predates its conceptualisation. This resulted in a plethora of different
perceptions and conceptualisations of public diplomacy. As such, to provide
a better and more concise understanding of ‘Public Diplomacy,’ this paper
adopted an explanatory approach by comprehensively examining both the
historical and theoretical understanding of ‘Public Diplomacy.’
In the theoretical conceptualisation of public diplomacy, 3 different
variants of concepts are examined - symbol interactionism, provision of
political information and advancement of cultural communication, and soft
power. The different forms of conceptualisations hinges upon one general
idea: The generation of a positive and favourable image or perception of a
state through foreign nationals of another state is essential in facilitating the
state’s interests and policies.
Next, having established what is and how does public diplomacy
function, the paper examined South Korea’s international role/ position in a

bid to understand the interactions between South Korea’s international
position and public diplomacy. 3 approaches – hierarchical approach,
functionalist approach, and behavioural approach – were examined and
together with an abundance of the present literature, South Korea’s
international position of a middle power is established. The paper then
introduces President Lee Myung Bak’s Global Korea initiative as a potential
genesis of Korean public diplomacy.
Consequently, the paper critically investigated South Korea’s public
diplomatic efforts. It found out that South Korea possesses a highly functional
and institutionalised public diplomatic machine. Its maturity in the conduct
of public diplomacy presents itself at the forefront of public diplomacy. In
other words, South Korea has developed a niche in the conduct of public
diplomacy. This critical development directly insinuates that South Korea
has fulfilled the functionalist aspect of a middle power. Based on this
trajectory, the paper discovered linkages between a middle power and its
conduct of public diplomacy. In brief, given that public diplomacy aims to
form a favourable perception of a state via foreign nationals, it directly
contributes to the aim of a middle power – increasing influence and its
international standing. This suggests that public diplomacy is an important
policy tool that a middle power can utilise. In terms of Korea, it can be
concluded that since public diplomacy function as a tool for the state to
utilise, its role in managing global issues is subsumed under its conduct of
middlepowermanship.
Implications, Limitations and Future Studies

This paper is important on three grounds. Firstly, by rearranging and
providing a historical overview and a theoretical understanding of public
diplomacy, policymakers will be able to apprehend the workings of public
diplomacy. The newfound appreciation of public diplomacy may prompt a
re-evaluation and subsequent adoption of diplomatic measures by
policymakers/ diplomats. Doing so may usher in a new era of favourable
interstate relations. Secondly, a proper re-classification of public diplomacy
literature is necessary amongst the clutter that exists. This may present
academics or budding scholars a simplified understanding of public
diplomacy, thereby facilitating new research which may provide exciting

revelations in the field of diplomacy. Lastly, understanding the dynamics
between middle power and public diplomacy not only provides information
on its plausibility, as the case of South Korea has depicted, it also highlights
that states, in their own right, can conduct its form of public diplomacy.
Recognising the success or perhaps even utilising South Korea as a
precedent case in its conduct of public diplomacy, states, be it small,
medium, or major powers, can learn to utilise public diplomacy to conduct
its foreign affairs. This presents policymakers/ diplomats with an additional
useful diplomatic tool in its conduct of interstate relations.
While these findings uncover the huge potential of public diplomacy for
middle powers, it is regrettable that only one country – South Korea – has
been examined. Based on Ping’s (2005) matrix, 14 states in Asia Pacific
region were identified as middle powers (Lee, 2012). As such, future studies
can examine the remaining 13 states in Asia Pacific to provide a more
holistic and robust understanding of middle powers and their conduct of
public diplomacy.
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377
The Role of Korean Public Diplomacy in

Addressing Global Issues
Pavlina Svobodova
Abstract | This paper aims to contribute to the existing literature of

South Korean public diplomacy by discussing two examples of global issues
in which South Korea has engaged in its public diplomacy in order to
address these issues under its own terms and conditions, and consequently
boosts its international blueprint. This paper is divided into two sections.
The first section is theoretical and consists of discussing and defining: a)
global issues; b) soft power; c) public diplomacy. The second section
discusses how South Korea addresses global climate change and terrorism
through the use of public diplomacy, and what outcomes it has brought for
South Korean global prestige. Finally, the paper will provide recommendations
on how and in what directions should South Korea utilise public diplomacy
in order to address global issues and increase its international position.
Keywords | South Korea, Public Diplomacy, Soft Power, Global Issues,
Climate Change, Terrorism
국문초록 | 이 논문은 대한민국이 글로벌 이슈를 해결하기 위해 자신만의 방

식으로 공공 외교를 펼치고, 그에 따라 국제적인 청사진을 신장시키는 두 예시를
논의함으로써 현존하는 대한민국 공공 외교 문헌에 기여하고자 한다. 이 글은 두
부분으로 나뉘어져 있다. 첫 부분은 이론적이며 글로벌 이슈, 소프트 파워, 공공
외교를 논의하고 정의한다. 두번째는 대한민국이 어떻게 공공 외교를 이용해 세
계 기후 변화와 테러리즘을 다루었는지, 대한민국의 국제적 명성에 어떤 결과를
가져왔는지 논의한다. 마지막으로, 이 글은 대한민국이 글로벌 이슈에 대처하고
국제적 지위를 상승시키기 위해 어떻게 그리고 어떤 방향으로 공공 외교를 사용
해야 하는지에 대해 제언한다.
Introduction
Traditionally, a state’s power and dominance in the international arena was

closely linked to its army and military capabilities. However, nowadays, the
state with the best story to tell or the best international image claim the
winner’s spot. The rise of soft power has been significant and forms an
important element in the international arena and global diplomacy.
Public diplomacy has been a widely used strategy to maximise one’s soft
power capabilities. The existing literature on public diplomacy is vast, yet
primarily focuses on the US and Israeli public diplomacy. South Korean
public diplomacy literature is limited despite South Korea being a huge
investor in its public diplomacy efforts. The existing literature of South
Korean public diplomacy mostly focuses on comparing the Japanese or
Chinese conduct of public diplomacy to the South Korean model, and
eventually draws recommendations for South Korea to accommodate more
effective public diplomacy approaches. Yet, the literature fails to provide
South Korea with some directions in terms of which topics or issues South
Korea should concentrate its public diplomacy efforts on.
The realm of global issues offers an opportunity for South Korea to
contribute to the world order on its own terms. Global issues require global
cooperation. Cooperation is mostly built on soft power rather than hard
power, thus, utilisation of public diplomacy in this domain could potentially
increase South Korean global prestige.
This paper aims to contribute to the existing literature of South Korean
public diplomacy by discussing two examples of global issues in which
South Korea has engaged in its public diplomacy in order to address these
issues under its own terms and conditions and consequently boosts its
international blueprint. This paper is divided into two sections. The first
section is theoretical and consists of discussing and defining: a) global
issues; b) soft power; c) public diplomacy. The second section discusses
how South Korea addresses global climate change and terrorism through the
use of public diplomacy and what outcomes it has brought for South Korean
global prestige. Finally, the paper will provide recommendations on how
and in what directions South Korea should utilise public diplomacy in order
to address global issues and increase its international position.
The Role of Korean Public Diplomacy in Addressing Global Issues 379
Climate change is an example of a global issue that poses serious

security implications. Yet, this threat is being either ignored or not taken
seriously by many states. Leaving more powerful states or superpowers to
lead the global agenda of tackling climate change turned out to be naive and
irresponsible of the international community. For example, the US is still
the world’s largest superpower, yet the Trump administration withdrew from
international climate change treaties like the Paris Agreement. Additionally,
small states usually lack the power to influence the big players or the
majority of the international community to embark on the politics of green
policies. However, South Korea has the potential to be the state that leads
the international community towards a greener future. Thus, this paper will
explain how South Korea should utilise, among other resources, public
diplomacy in order to address climate change on the global level.
Terrorism is another global threat that requires international cooperation.
Public diplomacy has been a widely used weapon in counter-terrorism
campaigns, especially by the US. The South Korean opportunity for
addressing terrorism lies in an implicit approach through state-capacity and
institutional-capacity building in areas where terrorism thrives due to state
failure. Exporting South Korean know-how of political and institutional
conduct creates an environment for South Korea to maximise its influence
in the international arena. Similarly, in the case of climate change, South
Korea should focus its soft power initiatives on weak, failed or developing
states.
Global Issues
Understanding global issues is crucial in order to address them accordingly.

Moreover, due to globalisation and internationalisation, global issues are
more visible and as the term global issues suggests, the response to these
issues requires a global effort as global issues have direct or indirect impact
on us all. Traditionally and historically, the most visible global threats have
been armed violent conflicts. The experience and aftermath of World War I
and more importantly World War II. has led to the establishment of global
organisations aiming to coordinate the international efforts to address and
mitigate such global issues. The United Nations (UN) is the primary actor
for maintaining global peace and stability. As the UN was established due to
the WWII., originally the organisation set its mission to maintain peace and
prevent re-occurrence of violent conflicts similar to WWII. The UN mission
has expanded since its beginnings in 1946. Now, the UN in addition to
preserving international peace and security also aims to protect human
rights, deliver humanitarian aid, promote sustainable development and
uphold international law (UN 2020a).
Richard Ullman in Redefining Security (1983) outlined two concepts of
security traditional threats, defined in narrow military terms, and non-
traditional or extended security threats such as climate change, terrorism,
financial instability and health security. He also argued that defining
security, thus global issues, in strictly narrow military terms gives a false
image of reality (Ullman 1983: 129). Non-military threats from outside of
one’s borders can undermine stability and security just like military threats.
Moreover, climate change or infectious diseases do not respect any borders
and their consequences are non-negotiable. Despite the confusion in the
early 1990s regarding the definition of global issues, the UN eventually
recognised the threat of non-military global issues and its 1994 Human
Development Report opened saying that:
behind the blaring headlines of the world’s many conflicts and

emergencies, there lies a silent crisis-a crisis of underdevelopment,
of global poverty, of ever-mounting population pressures, of
thoughtless degradation of environment. This is not a crisis that will
respond to emergency relief. Or to fitful policy interventions. It
requires a long, quiet process of sustainable human development.
(UN Human Development Report 1994: iii).
Orienting the international attention to non-military global issues was a

turning point. The end of the Cold War has resulted in shedding light on
other global issues that were previously overshadowed by ideology-driven
agendas. The importance of these global issues is twofold. Firstly, threats
like climate change or overpopulation have devastating consequences for all
of us. Secondly, poverty or underdevelopment are significant layers in
modern intra-state conflicts and terrorism. Therefore, addressing these

global threats is crucial for the overall international stability and peace in
addition to being a moral imperative.
Nowadays the international community recognises problems such as
climate change, infectious diseases, terrorism, poverty and development,
ageing populations, gender inequality, migration and others (United Nations
2020: Global Issues Overview). Thus, contemporary global issues require a
global response due to the fact that these security threats cannot be resolved
unilaterally without far-reaching international cooperation. Yet, what we
lack is a global governance organisation for addressing global threats. The
UN fails in this regard. The UN serves as a platform for discussion as the
UN does not have a binding legal power enforcing its charters. Thus,
tackling global issues is up to sovereign states and their abilities to influence
other states and actors to comply with their foreign policies. Here comes
into play what Joseph Nye coined as the craft of soft power.
Soft Power
Power is an important aspect of politics. Traditionally, hard power was the

ability to forcefully exercise authority domestically but also, and more
importantly, internationally. Hard power is prescribed to military and
economic abilities of a state to coerce or threaten other states to comply
with one’s objectives. These days hard power still holds its importance and
relevance, yet the Cold War and its aftermath meant a shift in the context of
power. The prominence of soft power has been rising. Soft power, thus, is
another addition to the concept of power. Power per se can be described as
an ability to influence or coerce someone else or, in the context of world
politics, another state. As being said, hard power is associated with coercion
while soft power rests on the ability to persuade by attraction. According to
Nye (cited in Byrne & Hall 2013: 422) one country’s culture and both
foreign and domestic policy ideas establish the main tenets of exportable
attractiveness. These days the winner is not necessarily the one with the
strongest army, but the one who can win ‘hearts and minds’. Unlike hard
power whose results can be seen soon and with straightforward results, soft
power is more difficult. Firstly, it might take years to see any viable results
and secondly, soft power heavily rests on the acceptance of the foreign
publics (Nye 2004). Although soft power requires patience and careful
coordination, the importance of soft power cannot be underestimated as the
US learnt in Vietnam, Iraq or the 9/11 wars despite being militarily superior
to its counterparts.
Soft power per se is not a new concept. There are many examples when
governments were using soft power to achieve their objectives by exporting
their culture and values to foreign countries before the Cold War. However,
as the end of the Cold War brought a series of authoritarian regimes
collapses, foreign publics were no longer restricted from getting access to
uncensored information (Nye 2004). Moreover, the technology advancements
made it easier to access any information in real-time.
Today, demonstrating power rests on the means of soft power rather than
narrowly projecting military might (Metzl cited in Sarvestani, Ameli &
Izadi 2018: 184). Surely, hard power cannot be dismissed as we still face
threats from rogue states or non-state violent actors that requite military
interventions. However, the so-called information age we live in makes it
easier for governments to project their soft power. Due to the globalisation
of media coverage, one government message or statement ha an international
dimension. It is no more possible to speak solely to one country’s citizens
without the world knowing the state of domestic affairs and domestic policy
efforts as well (Sheafer & Shenhav 2009: 278).
Traditionally, it was mostly governments that engaged in exporting
ideas, cultures or ideologies but these day non-state actors contribute to
creating a state’s image as well. It is not only attractive political ideologies
or likeable foreign policies, but economic strength is an important
stimulating factor as well. Privatisation of industries under the tenets of
capitalism and neoliberalism makes business corporations other players in
shaping the national image. Universities and the education sector, in
general, are major soft power makers as well. Firstly, one state’s elite
education institutions attract thousands of students worldwide. This is
re-enforced by both state and private sector advertising education
establishments worldwide and participating in exchange student programs.
Secondly, exchange and international students ‘absorb’ the culture and
political or social ideas in a given country and then help to export these to
their home countries.
The struggle for power domination in Asia is partly given by the lack of
regional integration in the region. Northeastern and Southeastern Asia
consist of dominant players with different ideologies and political
establishments, strong and dynamic economies and rich cultures. Relative
peace worldwide and in the region gave rise to pursuing non-violent means
of power domination and soft power has become the driving force of the
regional competition. China, which is very proactive and relatively aggressive
in demonstrating itself as both a regional as well as global superpower, has
been particularly active in its efforts to dominate the region and beyond
(Hall & Smith 2013: 1). China has opened hundreds of Confucius Institutes
abroad aiming to spread Chinese culture and language. This move opens up
many opportunities to attract foreign publics in order to make China more
accessible to both the general public and potential investors. However, the
reason for such heavy investment in soft power also bears a political reason.
Bringing Chinese culture closer to the foreign publics and presenting China
in the best light possible aims to counter some negative attitudes foreign
publics could have against China (Hall and Smith 2013: 4). In turn, foreign
publics are more likely to be assertive and even supportive of Chinese
foreign policies. If China manages to positively influence the foreign
attitude towards China, this significantly enables China to pursue its
normative power onto the international arena. Apart from Confucius
Institutes, China has established its Public Diplomacy Office in order to
maximise its soft power potential, and the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative
project is also a significant soft power move that bears normative political
implications for the participating states.
While other regional states do not have to worry about countering
negative perceptions as China does, their main common motive is boosting
their international influence and eventually normative power. It was not
until recently that other East Asian states started to be rule-makers rather
than rule-takers. This is particularly true for South Korea.
Public Diplomacy
The rise of soft power also means a rise in public diplomacy. These two go
hand in hand as public diplomacy serves as a means of soft power. Yet the
term public diplomacy did not escape being a contested and blurry term
both in academia and real-world politics. As academics cannot uncondi-
tionally agree on the definition of public diplomacy, Sarvestani, Ameli &
Izadi (2018: 183) put together different aspects and elements of what public
diplomacy entails. Their suggested definition is built on other academics
and their perceptions of what public diplomacy is:
Public diplomacy is a kind of policy advocacy by state, sub-state and

non-state actors (Anholt, 2008; Nye, 2004) to influence foreign
publics (Frederick, 1993; Hoffman, Edward, & Murrow Center of
Public, 1968; Malone, 1988) to extend interests and represent values
(Nye, 2011; Sharp, 2005), to impact foreign affairs, to gain
prominence in the world for small states, and to correct disturbing
stereotypical images and perceptions (Melissen, 2005). (Sarvestani,
Ameli & Izadi 2018: 183)
This definition consisting of the main objectives of public diplomacy

captures well the overall essence and purpose of this concept. Small as well
as powerful states engage in public diplomacy to either expend their
international influence or preserve it. Depending on the state’s already
established international prestige, the state chooses its objectives accordingly.
Moreover, an important defining feature of public diplomacy is the way it is
conducted. Thus, a critical feature of public diplomacy that differentiates
that from sheer propaganda is a two-way communication channel between
the recipient audience and the ‘addresser’ (Sarvestani, Ameli & Izadi 2018:
184). In this case, the ‘addresser’ is interested in the feedback from the
recipients. The feedback is valuable as it helps to adjust foreign policies to
make them more appealing and attractive to the foreign publics (Cho 2012:
276). Moreover, the widespread use of the internet made it significantly
easier to reach foreign publics and communicate the message. Information
in the age of globalisation, facilitated by internet access combined with the
lack of censorship, is not scarce. Therefore, reinforcing the credibility of

foreign policy is nowadays possible outside of one nation’s borders. Thus,
communicating such policies through the means of public diplomacy is a
clever way to strengthen one’s soft power objectives. Support for foreign
policy objectives is important both at home and abroad and public diplomacy
delivers well on this premise as it builds relations between the addressing
and recipient parties.
Although literature and research mostly focus on the American and
Israeli public diplomacy efforts, South Korea is no stranger to public
diplomacy. South Korea has been for a long time a battlefield of global
superpowers over their influence in South Korea. However, as nowadays
South Korea is one of the most dynamic states in the world with a strong
economy and stable political institutions, South Korea has managed to
transform itself into a creator of its own public diplomacy expanding its soft
power abroad. South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) defines
Korean public diplomacy as:
promoting diplomatic relations by sharing our country’s history,

traditions, culture, arts, values, policies, and vision through direct
communication with foreign nationals. By doing so, we enhance our
diplomatic relations and national image by gaining the trust of the
international community and increasing our country’s global
influence. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Korean 2020a).
The definition explicitly says the aims of public diplomacy efforts.

MOFA lists five main goals they hope to achieve; these are: share Korean
culture, deepen understanding on Korea, gain global support for Korean
policies, strengthen public diplomacy capacity and promote public-private
partnership (MOFA 2020a).
So far the narrative of South Korean public diplomacy motivations has
been underlined by both realism as well as liberalism. Realism describes the
international arena as a state of anarchy where states fight for domination
and survival. As there is no higher institution that would set the rules of
international politics for sovereign states, each state is free to use its
capabilities to survive there. Moreover, the absence of a global governance
institution leaves states to compete for international domination and

normative power. Realism has been heavily associated with the use of hard
power. Yet, as already was explained hard power is no longer the sole
guarantor of state’s survival and military capabilities no longer equate to
superiority. Despite the central idea that realism is power, there are other
ways to project power such as ‘power to influence,’ a manifestation of soft
power. Soft power is an important element in liberalism. Unlike realism that
describes states as solo players, liberalism encourages states to form
alliances, foster cooperation and create interdependence which in con-
sequence decrease the chances of a violent conflict outbreak. Thus, political
as well as economic ties between states should be created to preserve
international peace. Although liberalism is not about a hierarchy and
superiority of states, naturally the stronger and more powerful states set the
rules in the formed alliances. Their normative power is strongly reinforced
by soft power without which an alliance would be hard to form and more
particularly maintain in the long-run. Modern international politics requires
both realism as well as liberalism. These theories are not necessarily
mutually exclusive, and thus can be used simultaneously. Liberalism brings
a sense of interdependence into the anarchical order of the international
arena. Yet, foreign policy solely based on liberalism would be naive.
However, lack of liberalism and narrow adherence to realism would be
detrimental to the international order as there would be little to no links of
interdependency and mutually agreed obligations that liberalism brings.
South Korea aims to preserve and ideally increase its influence and power
in the international arena and insure its survival there. The chosen methods
to do so correspond with liberalism rather than realism.
By definition, soft power uses the country’s best assets to attract foreign
publics. In the case of South Korea, the country has invested and keeps
investing in cultural and educational exchanges. Prominent projects include
the Global Korea project or establishing the King Sejong Institutes abroad.
Global Korea is a project that focuses on educational and student
exchanges. Through this project, South Korea distributes scholarship to
foreign students wishing to study in South Korea. Education is a reliable
soft power enhancer. Foreign students studying in South Korea get to know
the culture, traditions, language and other socio-political aspects of Korea.
Every year under the Global Korea Scholarship students over the world get
a fully-funded scholarship to study at South Korean universities with the
premise to learn Korean before enrolling into their studies. In theory, the
project aims to build relationships with other nations and deepen mutual
cooperation and understanding. After all, national image determines the
nation’s international status that is important for shaping and influencing
global affairs (Cho 2012: 284). The King Sejong Institutes aim to appeal to
a different group of peoples and thus reach the widest range of people
possible to familiarise them with Korean culture and South Korea. These
institutes are located abroad and they are centres of teaching the Korean
language and history. Thus, South Korea utilises its cultural heritage as a
soft power maker. As in the Chinese case, South Korea aims to counter
some eventual negative perceptions foreign publics could have against
South Korea and create an environment where South Korean normative
power and international influence is more welcomed.
Despite the relatively widespread use of public diplomacy across different
regions and countries, researchers have doubts about the effectiveness of
public diplomacy. For example, Hall and Smith (2013: 6) argue that ‘…
there appears to be little if any positive correlation between…public
diplomacy and how foreigners elsewhere in the region tend to perceive
them’. Traditional diplomacy conducted strictly behind the closed doors is
no longer sufficient enough due to the development of technology, mass-
media and democratisation. Therefore, an additional element was needed to
add to the tool-box of diplomacy, and public diplomacy emerged as a
necessity for modern decision-making in international politics underlined by
the principles of soft power. It cannot be said that public diplomacy does not
bear any benefits whatsoever but is public diplomacy really a secret weapon
for winning minds and hearts, therefore making one’s foreign policy
objectives more likely to be accomplished? Particularly the collapse of the
USSR and the democratisation of Europe are seen as a success of American
foreign policy and soft power that were supported using public diplomacy.
East Asian countries recognise their considerable soft power resources and
their policy-makers do not hesitate to invest in public diplomacy in order to
maximise their bids in the international arena (Hall & Smith 2013: 10). The
struggle to stir international affairs and their outcomes in one’s favour is a
complex task. While many academics, researchers and politicians agree that
the nation’s image in the international arena matters to assert one’s
objectives, the use of public diplomacy through the means like student
exchanges, international press events and conferences, international
broadcasting like the BBC, Korean Arirang or the Chinese English-speaking
channels, and others do not deliver the results politicians investing in public
diplomacy hope to see.
Despite research suggesting that there is a weak link between public
diplomacy and winning over the foreign publics, the use of public
diplomacy is not declining in the East Asian region, particularly among the
major regional players like China, India, Japan and South Korea. Studies
point out that the relative failure of public diplomacy is due to insufficient
strategies. For example, Proedrou and Frangonikolopoulos (2012: 733)
argue that one of the significant shortcomings of public diplomacy is that it
mainly focuses on selling one’s national image in terms of education,
culture and identity. Proedrou and Frangonikolopoulos (2012), on the
contrary, suggest that states should focus on global issues that are relevant
for all. However, finding an issue that is relevant for all is in itself a
complicated task given the fact that different states have different concerns
and objectives. Therefore, it all comes down to states that aim to stir the
international community in accordance with what issues they find relevant
for their current situation. Nevertheless, global issues have in common that
they either directly or indirectly have an impact on all or at least most of us.
Furthermore, they require international cooperation to successfully tackle
these issues. In regard to global issues, public diplomacy could be a useful
ally.
Global issues cannot be addressed or solved unilaterally. Domestic and
international politics have very blurry lines and often overlap. Yet, the
international political agendas are formed on the premises of elected
candidates in the national elections. Here, influencing the foreign publics
matters. For example, climate change is a global issue directly impacting
everyone. Yet, this global issue is far from being taken seriously by the
majority of the world’s governments. If a country manages to choose and
conduct public diplomacy effectively, the chances of influencing a foreign
public to elect a government that deems climate change as an issue worth
being taken into account are significantly higher. Thus, one’s public
diplomacy to some extent achieves at least three things: 1) creates a positive
image of the given country, 2) increases a favourable competitive advantage
in the international arena in regard to influencing others, 3) manages or
helps to provide the greater good for all by addressing a global issue.
South Korean Public Diplomacy and the Climate

Change
The challenge of climate change has great implications for states from both
moral as well as pragmatic point of view. The narrative of moral duty to
preserve the planet as we know it for the next generations is not however a
strong incentive for states to act. Firstly, addressing climate change requires
vast global cooperation usually in a form of an alliance or international
coalition. That is a challenge in itself. The bigger a coalition is, the harder it
is to stick to original principles and apply them as member of such
coalitions are likely to disagree (Watson & Pandey 2014). For example,
deforestation might be a subject of dispute. While morally we can agree that
mass deforestation is wrong and potentially dangerous, when we apply the
economic factor some states are likely to remove mass deforestation from
the green policy list. However, one’s neglect of the environment might
mean a security threat to the other. A direct result of climate change is a loss
of territory or resources that carry a detrimental impact on the security,
stability and health of the population (Watson & Pandey 2014: 77).
South Korea is the regional champion of green security as it took the
leading and proactive role of environmental diplomacy in North-East Asia
(Yoon 2006: 75). South Korean orientations towards green policies are
linked to the experience of rapid industrialisation and relative lack of
regional leadership in Asia. Firstly, the success of South Korean economic
miracle when the country transformed itself from one of the poorest to one
of the most dynamic and powerful economies in the world came at the
expense of the environment. The race of economic domination in the region
also highlighted that South Korean environmental security is closely linked
to its regional neighbours as the threat of cross-boundary pollution became
more eminent. Therefore, domestic as well as regional environmental

factors gave South Korea the incentive to ‘actively engaged’ in efforts to
tackle climate change’ (MOFA 2020b). Secondly, due to the regional lack of
environmental coordination, South Korea positioned itself to lead the
regional environmental efforts to fill the vacuum (Yoon 2006).
There is another factor that South Korea played to its advantage
especially in the global arena regarding climate change. Generally, there are
tensions between developed and developing countries over the climate
issue. Like the South Korean case, industrialisation has a detrimental impact
on the environment. Due to the status of either ‘developed’ or ‘developing,’
countries have different priorities and concerns when it comes to economic
and environmental considerations. Despite the great economic success,
South Korea is not straightforwardly labelled as a ‘developed’ country, yet
the ‘developing’ label is not exactly accurate either. South Korea is thus
referred to as a so-called ‘bridge’ or ‘middle’ power. Being situated as a
middle power gives South Korea an advantage to influence the regional as
well as global agendas of the environment politics. Firstly, South Korea,
which is also an important hi-tech country, has the know-how and first-hand
experience climbing the competitive economic ladder in the world of
powerful and developed states. South Korea’sgreat soft power potential lies
in producing and selling the image of a country that can offer the helping
hand to developing countries and share the knowledge and expertise when it
comes to finding the middle ground between environment and economy.
Since the end of the Korean War, South Korea has been a relatively
invisible state whose relevance came to the spotlight only due to the inter-
Korean tensions. Moreover, South Korea was a battleground of major
foreign powers lacking any potential to stir the international order. Yet, in
combination with its economic miracle and status as a technological
powerhouse, South Korea can now utilise its soft power and, for a change,
be an important stakeholder in the international arena. The South Korean
story is an attractive one especially to developing nations. In other words,
the South Korean developing story provides a promising opportunity to
shape international environmental politics, particularly in other developing
countries. Moreover, being capable of accumulating other soft power
capabilities, South Korea has the potential to mediate the climate-talk
tensions between developed and developing nations, thus maximising its

international blueprint.
South Korea has succeeded in selling the image of a credible middle
power capable of helping developing countries to develop green policies.
But to what extent public did diplomacy contribute to increasing South
Korea’s international image and global blueprint? The Global Green Growth
Institute (GGGI) constitutes an important role in taking South Korea global
and improving South Korea’s image in the international arena. The GGGI
was established by the South Korean government; now being an inter-
governmental organisation that works primarily on a governmental level
(Global Green Growth Institute 2020). Currently, the goal of the GGGI is
‘supporting and promoting strong, inclusive and sustainable economic
growth in developing countries and emerging economies’ (GGGI 2020).
The GGGI, having as of now 37 members, has dedicated projects for each
member state aiming to support their economies while mitigating the side
effects of industrialisation on the environment. Thanks to organisations like
GGGI South Korea can increase its international blueprint and strengthen
external relations with other nations while addressing its own security as
well as global security concern regarding climate change and environment.
Though there has been a limited amount of general public engagement in
tackling the climate change issue, their actions are usually seen as micro-
ecology with relatively limited results. If climate change ought to be
addressed effectively, the efforts must be characterised by a top-down
approach (Han 2015: 732). As public diplomacy aims to extend one’s
interests and values, influencing other states to follow a path of eco-friendly
growth is a win-win situation for all, but particularly for South Korea.
South Korean efforts to engage in shaping the world climate change
paradigm have been influenced by various reasons. The most important
ones constitute South Korean ambitions to strengthen international
relations, visibility and reputation. By definition, public diplomacy aims to
communicate with foreign publics. What and who the foreign publics are,
however, seem not well defined and therefore the communication flow can
be established between the government, non-state organisations (NGOs) and
civil society. South Korean public diplomacy regarding climate change is
oriented towards foreign governments. After all, directing the communica-
tion flow towards the civil society to rearrange its attitudes towards
environment would be an impossible task regardless of how attractive South
Korean culture and history is. The climate change threat requires states to
cooperate and enforce well-developed policies that create a balance between
economic growth and environment. South Korean efforts to become the
global leader in green growth are re-enforced by the South Korean economic
and environmental past. After all, South Korea used to be one of the poorest
countries of the 20th century and on top of that one of the worst world
polluters (Han 2015: 736). Nevertheless, despite these hard beginnings that
South Korea has emerged from, the country managed to become the 12th
largest economy in the world and follow an eco-friendly path of economic
growth (World Bank 2020).
South Korean Public Diplomacy and the War on Terror
South Korea has its own first-hand experience of terrorist attacks. Most
terrorist attacks have been perpetrated by North Korea, but after the 1990s
South Koreans have been also victims of transnational terrorism (Wang,
Choi & Arnold 2003: 140). As North Korean terrorism declined and the
threat of transnational terrorism perpetrated by international terrorist
organisations increased, South Korea had to respond to the changing nature
of terrorism. The new form of terrorism that David Rapoport (2004) coined
as the fourth wave or the religious wave of terrorism is characterised by its
international manifestation and indiscriminate large-scale casualties. Unlike
the previous waves of terrorism that typically lacked the transnational
element, the fourth wave of terrorism has a global outreach and due to
globalisation and advances in technology, the attacks can be coordinated
from abroad. The 9/11 terrorist attacks shocked the world and unfolded
before the world a new age of warfare. The reaction to the attacks was a
formation of a US-led military operation against terrorism, knows as the
War on Terror (WOT) (Kattelman 2016: 803).
As terrorism became a global threat, it was apparent that the response to
terrorism must be global as well. In other words, unilateral efforts are not
sufficient or effective to eliminate terrorism. Thus, fighting terrorism
requires a strong and well-coordinated international cooperation. The

cooperation can be manifested in various ways from military and intelligence
support to imposing economic sanctions on sponsors of terrorism and thus
preventing these actors from funding terrorist activities (Kim 2001: 12).
Firstly, however, states should agree on what terrorism is. The definition of
terrorism remains an opened chapter as states fail to agree. The debate of
‘one’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter underlines the international
debate over the definition. South Korea adopted the framework of Anti-
Terrorism Act that defines terrorism as:
an act conducted for the purpose of interfering with the State, a local
government or a foreign government…in exercising its authority or
forcing it to perform a non-obligatory act, or threatening the
public… (law.go.kr 2020).
Joining the WOT was a manifestation of solidarity with the US as well

as political and security calculation of the other states. 9/11 showed that
even the most powerful country, the US, can be heavily inflicted by a non-
state actor whose size or capabilities do not match the US military or
economic might. Alliances such as this in the WOT is according to Byman
(2006: 768) ’a vital part of the war on terrorism’ as transnational terrorism is
too complex to be addressed by the US solely. Thus, due to the threat that
international terrorism poses, states that have the same interests and
objectives put together their efforts to mitigate terrorism. Besides solidarity,
South Korea is in a long-standing partnership alliance with the US since the
Korean War. Nowadays, the alliance is defined mostly alongside military
cooperation on the Korean peninsula. The 9/11 attacks allowed South Korea
to be proactive in the alliance that otherwise seems as relatively asymmetric
(Jeon 2010: 407). Therefore, South Korea was presented with a chance to
decrease the power asymmetry in the alliance and boost its global presence
and prestige through the WOT and peace-building operations after the 9/11
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The South Korean role in the WOT was limited and as Byman (2006:
797) argues South Korea is ‘less important for the struggle against Al
Qaeda’ as South Korean ‘capabilities against Al Qaeda are limited,
particularly with regard to intelligence and influence in the Muslim world’.

That does not mean, however, that South Korea had no role to play in the
WOT. Especially in the South Korean context, economic power is a strong
weapon in the realm of international relations. Economics can be used both
as hard and soft power. If economics is used as hard power, countries opt for
sanctions and embargoes. On the other hand, a strong economy is a great
soft power incentive. Firstly, if economics is coercively applied and
sanctions are imposed, terrorist organisations can be weakened as the flow
of money for their activities is disrupted. Imposing sanctions on the state-
sponsors of terrorism is a widely used method to pressure these rogue states
to refrain from supporting or harbouring terrorists. The list of nations in the
so-called ‘Axis of Evil,’ states which support terrorism, made these states a
subject of the UN framework of sanctions. As South Korea is a responsible
actor in the international arena, the country followed the UN sanctions
framework. The effectiveness of sanctions is often called into question by
academics. Moreover, imposing sanctions may in fact backfire. Choi and
Luo (2013: 221) point out that ‘leaders in sanctioned countries have every
incentive to shift the blame for deteriorating economic conditions onto the
sanctioning countries,’ thus encouraging its citizens to engage in
international terrorism. Although the use of sanctions might have potential
drawbacks, in the context of the WOT siding did matter. It was important
for South Korean international integrity, image and prestige as well as
upholding good relations with the US to show solidarity and manifest their
support for the US in practice.
Secondly, utilising the soft power of economics was a smart move for
South Korea both in the context of demonstrating support for the US as well
as increasing its own international blueprint and influence. South Korea
utilised its economic power in a form of assistance and aid to boost its
international image and fight terrorism. It is often thought that states that
cannot or are not able to provide for its citizens economically, and where the
level of poverty and inequality is high, are more prone to terrorism. The
idea rests on an assumption that humanitarian and financial help would
elevate the standard of living, decrease inequality and reduce poverty which
in consequence would prevent people from joining terrorist organisations.
However, the hypothesis of terrorism rooted in poverty has several flaws
and the latest research indicates that links between poverty and terrorism are
insignificant (Piazza 2006; Abadie 2006; Krueger & Maleckova 2003). For
example, Piazza’s (2006:170) research shows ‘none of the economic
indicators are significant predictors of either terrorist incidents or casualties,
contrary to the expectations necessary to validate the ‘‘rooted-in-poverty’’
hypothesis’.
Research, however, found correlations between terrorism and failed
states (Choi and Luo 2013: 217), particularly in the context of the fourth
wave of terrorism. Failed states are fertile and safe ground for terrorist
organisations as the state does not have the capability to enforce the rule of
law. Thus, failed states serve as a safe-haven for terrorist organisations that
tend to carry out terrorist attacks abroad (Newman 2007: 483). According to
Newman (2007: 484) the emergence of a failed state is not the primary
trigger that is responsible for terrorism per se. He argues (Newman 2007:
484) that failed states only provide a suitable environment for terrorists, and
terrorism per se is rather linked to a range of inequalities and politically
underlined motivations. For example, Al Qaeda’s objectives were political
and forwarded to deter the US foreign policy towards the Middle East. But
Al Qaeda did not emerge due to state failure. A failed state with a lack of
institutional authority only provided Al Qaeda with a place to operate in.
As research suggests there is a weak correlation between poverty and
terrorism, thus, economic soft power is not a suitable strategy for fighting
terrorism. Economic aid to a failed state is not the right answer to
transnational terrorism. However, capacity-building, strengthening state
structures and institutions, as well as helping to situate a failed state into a
financially competitive world with gearing it with business opportunities
have a significant potential for reducing the threat of transnational terrorism.
Therefore, counter-terrorism efforts should focus on state reconstruction and
institutional capacity building. There are, however, limits to this as terrorist
motivations have various reasons and there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ when it
comes to counter-terrorism. Failed states are failed due to many overlapping
issues from weak institutions to unfavourable economic and living
conditions.
States’ capacity building and development assistance can address some
of the underlying conditions that a failed state suffers from. In this regard,
international development cooperation can provide a failed state with at

least some level of ‘know-how’ and capital for reconstructing the state
institutions. South Korea is an international donor state that facilitates
assistance and aid under the Official Development Assistance (ODA). ODA
is motivated by ‘humanitarian, political and economic considerations’ that
aim ‘to promote the economic development and to improve the quality of
life in developing countries’ (ODA Korea 2020). Although ODA is not
primarily a counter-terrorism project, it touches on a range of issues that are
associated with causes of terrorism such as poverty and inequality.
Moreover, if we look into the selected countries where South Korea delivers
assistance through ODA, governance and administration capacity building
are among the targets that South Korea aims to address. Thus, the ODA
efforts provide a political realm to operate in. In this realm, South Korea can
export its policies and culture to and gain a level of influence. Moreover, as
ODA touches on the issues associated with transnational terrorism it helps
to bring international recognition and influence for South Korea.
In the context of terrorism, public diplomacy is conducted mainly on the
governmental level. The ODA funding comes from the government, and the
decision to impose sanctions is one of the South Korean government’s.
Communicating with foreign civil society is however important for
choosing the appropriate strategies for state-capacity building and the
overall state and institutions’ reconstruction. Public diplomacy enables
communication with the target foreign societies which in consequence
should lead to a) effective ODA mechanism and measures, b) introduction
to South Korea and its culture, tradition and politics to the foreign publics,
thus facilitating the extension of South Korea’s interests and making an
impact that is structured and tailored according to South Korea’s objectives.
Conclusion
This paper discussed the role of Korean public diplomacy as a tool of soft
power in the context of global issues. The concept of public diplomacy itself
is a complicated one as the definition of public diplomacy is broad and
vague. This makes public diplomacy a contested concept that often lacks
credibility due to limited results. Despite that, public diplomacy is a widely

used strategy to increase one’s nation’s image and prestige. The struggle for
soft power is rising in its importance and the Asian region and South Korea
is no exception to this. Although the craft of public diplomacy tends to be in
theory almost romanticised, in reality, public diplomacy is a form of power
and influence. After all, states do not have friends, states have interests.
Based on the existing literature and discussion of the two examples of
global issues in the South Korean public diplomacy context, this paper
concluded that South Korea must firmly establish and agree on what
mechanism it should engage in in order to achieve any tangible results. The
two discussed examples highlighted that South Korea should continue to
deal with its public diplomacy and global issues on the governmental level
as it brings a high level of efficiency. South Korea should define which
actors it wants to communicate with and with whom to engage in appropriate
channels of communication. Global issues are dealt with on the governmental
level through coalitions, alliances and signing binding international treaties.
Contemporary global issues require a top-down approach as civil society
initiatives have very limited results. Public diplomacy can however introduce
foreign publics into issues that do not directly touch them and broaden their
point of view. However, the role of public diplomacy should not be overes-
timated and politicians should have a solid idea what public diplomacy can
achieve and to what extent, and where the limits are. Based on the two
selected examples, public diplomacy is only an addition to the existing
model of modern diplomacy. Any significant results that South Korea has
achieved were through diplomacy conducted on the governmental level
either between another government or non-governmental organisation.
South Korean soft power capabilities are built on solid foundations.
Given the history of the country and its current level of development, South
Korea is well equipped to project its image to the world. When it comes to
influencing other states, South Korea should focus on developing states.
These should be the primary recipients of South Korean influence. South
Korean presence in the international arena should not be neglected and
South Korea should maintain and strengthen its bilateral or multilateral
obligations within international organisations. Being actively engaged in
international organisations and being a proactive and responsible member of
the international arena brings a high level of integrity and prestige. As

strengthening international relations is followed by a higher degree of
information and migration exchanges, South Korea in its efforts to go global
should prepare its citizens for a higher level of internationalisation of the
country. Also, based on the US experience as the global superpower and its
involvement in the reconstruction of failed states after the 9/11 wars, South
Korea should recognise that international engagement requires taking
responsibility for the outcomes.
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401
Democracy Promotion through ODA: The

Future of Korean Public Diplomacy?
Simon Bruns
Abstract | This paper investigates a potential future strategy for South

Korean public diplomacy regarding its Official Development Assistance
(ODA) policy. Korea should make democratic capacity building with a focus
on civil society inclusion an integral part of its ODA policy. Despite the
impressive pace of Korea’s democratic development, it is usually sidelined
by the country’s economic success story. This is also reflected in ODA
policy, which is predominantly technocratic and does not consider Korea’s
democratic experience to be worth sharing. Korea is more likely than most
countries to be successful with an integration of democracy promotion into
its ODA policy because of its unique development experience and lack of
colonial baggage. This paper uses a case study of German political party
foundations to highlight how Korea could promote democracy. The merits of
such a strategy for Korea’s public diplomacy span from expanding soft
power to securing Korea’s middle power status. There are also a range of
potential caveats to such a strategy, including reputational problems of the
Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and general sensitivities
associated with politically conditional aid. These can be reconciled through a
more flexible and selective aid policy. Such a policy should meet the
demand for democratic capacity building while functioning as a tool to
deepen diplomatic relations with certain partner countries that are prioritized
due to systemic similarity.
국문초록 | 이 논문은 공적개발원조(Official Development Assistance,

ODA)와 관련해 대한민국 공공 외교의 잠재적 미래 전략을 연구한다. 한국은 시
민 사회의 참여에 초점을 둔 민주적 역량 건설을 국가 공적개발원조 정책의 핵심
적인 부분으로 다루어야 한다. 한국의 인상적인 민주화 속도에도 불구하고, 민주
화는 한국의 경제 성공 이야기에 묻히곤 한다. 대체로 기술 집약적이며 민주화
경험을 공유할 만한 가치가 있는 것으로 고려하지 않는 한국의 공적개발원조 정
책이 이를 나타낸다. 한국은 독특한 개발 경험을 가졌으며, 식민 시대의 잔재가
없는 덕에 다른 대부분의 국가들보다 공적개발원조 정책에 민주주의 홍보를 성

공적으로 통합시킬 가능성이 높다. 이 논문은 한국이 어떻게 민주주의를 고취시
킬 수 있었는지 보여주기 위해 독일의 정당 기반을 사례 연구로 이용한다. 이러
한 한국 공공 외교 전략의 장점은 소프트 파워를 확장하는 것부터 한국의 미들
파워(중견국) 지위를 공고히 하는 것까지 다양하다. 이러한 전략에는 또한 한국
국제협력단(Korea International Cooperation Agency, KOICA)의 평판 문제,
그리고 정치적으로 조건부인 원조에 관한 전반적 민감성 등을 포함한 다양한 잠
재적 문제들이 있다. 이러한 문제들은 좀더 유연하고 선택적인 원조 정책을 통해
해결될 수 있다. 이와 같은 정책은 구조적인 유사성 때문에 우선시 되는 특정 우
방 국가들과의 외교 관계를 심화시키는 도구로 작용함과 동시에 민주적 역량 건
설을 위한 요구에 부응해야 한다.
Introduction
On the 15th of April 2020, South Korea (hereafter Korea) demonstrated a

first, the holding of parliamentary elections within the midst of the global
coronavirus pandemic. Not only did the elections run smoothly, but they
exhibited the highest voter turnout in 28 years (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2020).
The election success demonstrated more than the achievements of Korea’s
globally admired coronavirus strategy. It was a testament to Korea’s
impressive democratic development, further confirming that it has indeed
become a mature democracy, capable of successfully operating even under
abnormal circumstances. It was also a glimmer of hope at a time when the
only solution to containing the virus appeared to be coming from authoritarian
systems, which through a combination of faster response times, central
planning, and stronger control over the media narrative, capitalized on the
opportunity to stage the perceived advantages of their system. The Korean
case highlighted that democratic institutions, backed by the trust of the
people, are an asset to the containment of COVID-19.
Despite this success, Korean democracy is usually handled as a footnote
within the context of the third wave of democratization. Korea’s rapid
economic development is something that the country is admired for
globally, and it sees this experience as an asset that it can share with the
world. This is reflected in Korea’s ODA policy so far, which prioritizes a
technocratic approach to development. The impressive and rapid scale of
Democracy Promotion through ODA 403
Korea’s democratization since 1987, on the other hand, is presented more as

an inevitable consequence of its modernization, rather than an asset that is
worth sharing. It is in this context that this paper aims to investigate the
question of what the future of Korean public diplomacy should look like
regarding its Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy. The paper will
argue that Korea should make democratic capacity building an integral part
of its ODA policy by sharing its own experiences with other countries.
Democracy features weakly at best among the multiple foci of Korean ODA
policy. The organization that is best in place to share Korea’s unique
democratic experience, KOICA, limits democracy to a buzzword and has
not made this an integral focus of its overall strategy. This paper aims to
investigate a potential future strategy for Korea based on public and civil
society sector involvement in democratic capacity building abroad. The
paper will investigate the German system of political party foundations to
highlight a possible model for Korea to follow. This is because the German
approach to ODA is more inclusive of the non-governmental sector, yet it is
able to integrate all actors into the larger framework of German public
diplomacy. Korea is more likely than most countries to be successful with
an integration of democracy promotion into its ODA because of its unique
development experience and its lack of colonial baggage. The merits of
such a strategy for Korea’s public diplomacy are immense, as democratic
experience could serve as an element of soft power, if branded properly.
Making this a focus of ODA policy would solidify Korea’s status as a
middle power in the long run by giving it a stronger role in shaping the
realm of political ideas and ideals. This paper also considers the caveats of
such a strategy, including problems arising from the reputation of KOICA as
an arm of Korean industry and the general sensitivities associated with
political conditionality in aid. This is then contextualized within the larger
global debate on the implications behind the export of democracy and its
effectiveness. Finally, the paper will consider how to overcome these
caveats, notably through the need for a more flexible and selective aid
policy and focusing on countries where there is a demand for democratic
capacity building, which is particularly the case in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The Current State of Korean ODA: Democracy is

notably absent
Korea is a relative newcomer to the ODA scene, recently transforming itself

from a recipient to a donor. The net ODA grant equivalent for Korea sits at
2,686.14 million USD for 2019, representing 0.15% of GNI. This is still
well below the 0.3% of GNI average for all Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) member countries (OECD, 2019). The DAC has also
recommended in its latest peer review that Korea should target allocating
0.3% of GNI as ODA by 2030 (OECD, 2018, p. 18). In Korea, ODA is
jointly regulated and coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
Ministry of Strategy and Finance. Policies are then respectively implemented
by the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) in the form of
grants and the Korea Eximbank in the form of loans (ODA Korea, N. D.).
Since Korea’s joining of DAC in 2010, this structure has undergone a
degree of scrutiny. Partner countries have criticized the fragmented nature
of ODA disbursements and the strong preference given to loans. Since then,
Korea has committed to gradually untying its aid, as well as investing more
in emergency relief efforts. However, this is an ongoing process, and reform
is not popular within business and political circles (Chatham House, 2014).
KOICA is a relatively small organization, but it implements projects
across the globe and within a wide policy scope. One of the key areas of
implementation is in what has been broadly defined as “Governance.” The
overall goal of this is to increase the accountability and effectiveness of
political institutions to foster sustainable development. This is to be
achieved with three strategic foci, notably: 1. Enhancing Administrative
Service 2. Enhancing Accountability of the Political and Administrative
system 3. Enhancing inclusivity within the legal/institutional system
(KOICA, 2020). Democracy is not mentioned at all on this webpage, even
though all three are important factors that are enhanced by democratic
institutions. There have been cases where KOICA has collaborated with
other actors, notably the UN, on projects with a democratic focus, but these
have been limited to individual cases. For example, in 2015 KOICA helped
with a UNDP project to support democratic governance in Nigeria. These
projects remain the exception, however, with the UNDP project conducted
with a host of partners including the European Commission, DFID, and

CIDA (UNDP, 2015).
A particular focus of Korean ODA has been Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA),
which is strategically important for Korea because of its natural resource
wealth and large market potential. Overall, the Korean government’s
approach to ODA policy in SSA has been based on three policy objectives:
Achieving food and energy security, establishing new markets for Korean
goods, and the enhancement of its credentials as a global power. The latter
is a Cold War legacy, particularly to counter the actions of North Korea.
This remains relevant because North Korea still wields a degree of
diplomatic influence in many African states, despite its limited resources.
This new focus has also gone in Africa’s favor, as the continent seeks to
diversify its diplomatic and economic portfolio (Darracq Neville, 2014).
Another area of focus with geopolitical dimensions was recently
unveiled by the Moon administration, namely the New Southern Strategy.
While it is primarily a geostrategic initiative, it has had implications on the
disbursement of ODA funds as well as their focus areas. The new approach
is much more in line with older Korean initiatives, where ODA is included
within the larger framework of trade policy. The approach is primarily
economic and focuses on Korean companies being able to gain a stronger
foothold in South and Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia is particularly of
interest because countries there have received the bulk of Korean ODA in
the past. Even here, the larger focus has been on developing economic and
trade capacities, through the financing of infrastructure projects and
advising on new trade regulations (Lee et al., 2018).
Korea’s current approach towards ODA policy is, of course, characteristic
of the country’s own development experience. The approach is technocratic
and implies that all that is needed for economic growth are strong and
capable institutions, but not necessarily democratic ones. This technocratic
approach mainly focuses on infrastructure and expansion of trade
capabilities and does not integrate democratic values into the overall
strategy. While this approach has been taken because it frames the process
of development in a way that does not cause conflict with countries where
this view might not be accepted, it does send the wrong message. The
promotion of a solely technocratic model of development mirrors South
Korea’s own experiences, where the case seems to support the need for
economic development followed by a process of democratization. In this
way democracy is presented as an end goal, rather than a means to an end.
As valid as this may be given Korea’s own experience, it is an approach
born out of and linked to an authoritarian development state. In this sense, it
indirectly reaffirms China’s authoritarian approach to development, namely
that democracy is neither needed nor worthy of aspiration. Kalinowski and
Park refer to what has occurred in the Korean context, as “institutional
retreat.” This describes the situation in which institutions are no longer
functional in their established areas and shift their focus to other policy
fields to retain relevance. In the case of the developmental state institutions
in Korea, this has meant a continued focus on expanding industries and
promoting investment, but with a shift from the domestic to the
international context. This highlights the continued survival and
prioritization of the technocratic approach to development (Kalinowski and
Park, 2016, 62). Korea should be sharing its practical democratic
experiences by focusing on the elements of its political development that
allowed it to democratize. Korea needs to recognize that its democratic
experience is impressive and unique, and that this is an asset that can be
shared with other countries.
Case Study: German system of Political Party

Foundations and what Korea can learn
The German case highlights a potential model that Korea could adopt to
integrate democracy promotion into its ODA strategy. Germany boasts a
system of political party foundations, which are state funded and affiliated
with a political party that is in the German parliament. While these
foundations have affiliations with their respective political parties, they do
not form an integral part of them. They are independent of their parties in
terms of funding, which they receive directly from the federal government.
Despite the state funding, they are able to act independently and implement
projects as they see fit. Bartsch argues that this hybrid system makes it
difficult to classify them within the current framework of international
actors due to their ambivalent nature, thus classifying them as “international

actors sui generis” (Bartsch, 2007, p.280). The state funds these organizations
because their work is believed to be serving the public interest in a way that
the state would not be able to, and not necessarily because the state wants to
use them to exert its influence. The notion of political foundations is
nothing unique to Germany, but their degree of independence is something
that exists in no other Western country. Domestically, they play the role of
civic educators for all citizens with the goal of increasing political
participation as well as serving as an interlocutor between the scientific
community, economic actors, and the state.
The two largest and oldest foundations currently are the Friedrich Ebert
Foundation (FES) of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Konrad
Adenauer Foundation (KAS) of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU).
The main emphasis of each foundation varies, depending on the political
values of the party that it is affiliated with. For example, FES focuses on
social matters, such as dialogue between trade unions and the state, and how
to equally distribute the benefits of globalization. KAS, on the other hand,
focuses on civic education for freedom and democracy as well as a focus on
the German model of a social market economy.
In the twenty-first century, the German government has also increasingly
relied on these foundations as foreign policy assets. The foundations have
offices in many foreign countries, with the goal of engaging in democratic
capacity building and supporting local civil society. They also aid
governments in the strengthening of governing institutions and political
actors ranging from parliaments to political parties. They receive their
funding for these projects from the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal
Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Despite this,
they are considered to be independent actors in terms of their decision-
making and are classified as NGOs (Massing, 2015). The advantage of such
a system is that the foundations are able to directly engage with relevant
actors, which would generally be considered off limits to specific
government institutions, like the German diplomatic corps. This direct
actor-to-actor approach is more targeted and efficient, while simultaneously
being able to approach a larger variety of topics than a traditional
government agency could (BPB, 2013, p. 2). These foundations serve as an
outlet of German public diplomacy, through soft power initiatives in

developing countries such as the promotion of German democratic values or
through their granting of scholarships for students to study in Germany.
This is part of a larger and more focused approach with the goal
Demokratieförderung (~ Democracy promotion) launched by the BMZ and
being implemented by the Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
(GIZ), the German counterpart to KOICA, as well as these foundations. In
this strategy, democracy is not presented as an end goal to development, but
as an essential and integral part of it (BMZ, 2020).
Germany’s approach highlights the advantage of a polylateral approach
to diplomacy through ODA in the context of the sharing of political values
and experiences. Polylateralism is introduced by Wiseman as a way of
diversifying the rather rigid international relations approach to international
actors, by introducing a theoretical basis to discuss the relationship between
“official state-based entities” and “unofficial non-state entities.” This does
not imply a recognition of equivalence, but an expectation of mutual
exchange in the form of a systematic relationship between both actors
(Wiseman, 2010, p. 24). Wiseman argues that polylateral diplomacy is
particularly attractive to small- and middle-sized states as they do not have
the same resources available as major states, meaning that they have to be
much more creative in their approaches to diplomacy. This leads to a natural
tendency for smaller state actors to cooperate with transnational civil
society (Wiseman, 2010, p. 31).
Germany’s use of polylateral diplomacy therefore presents a potential
strategy that Korea could take to promote democracy abroad based on
Korean terms and experiences. Especially KOICA could move on from their
current technocratic approach to development and integrate the Korean
democratic experience into their foreign aid strategies. This does not imply
that Korea should copy the German model one to one. One contextual
feature that is particular to Germany is its long history of political parties,
which all exhibit a strong degree of continuity. The same cannot be said for
Korea, as politics is generally more a matter of personality, hence party
affiliations play a lesser role. This in turn negatively affects their ability to
be stable and continuous. Despite these differences, it does not mean that
there is nothing that can be learned from this. As in the German case, Korea
could choose to focus on the strengths that developed out of its specific
political context. Experiences relating to the active role of civil society in
spearheading Korea’s democratic transformation and still strongly shaping
Korean politics to date are something that should be integrated into such an
aid strategy. Another lesson that should be taken from the German case is
the idea of a “democratic” approach to democratic capacity building abroad.
Notably, that such a strategy is much more successful if all societal actors
are involved. The combination of different actors in the form of government,
NGOs, and private sector, offers a much more well-rounded approach that
highlights that democracy is in everyone’s interest. This also has the
potential to dispel general suspicions relating to foreign aid with political
dimensions, because by offering a variety of actors, it strengthens the
agency of the recipients and respects their sovereignty. The other advantage
of involving civil society in foreign aid is that it is in the citizens’ interest.
They can serve the double function of implementing aid projects, while
auditing government projects to ensure that funds are spent appropriately.
While there has been a move in this direction with the creation of the
Development Alliance Korea (DAK), this has been generally limited to
approaches to humanitarian issues as well as monetary and management
matters (KOICA, 2020). While these types of Public-Private Partnerships
(PPPs) are a step in the right direction, they remain limited in scope and
size. The majority of high profile PPP cases have also been in the realm of
State-Chaebol cooperation, rather than State-Civil Society cooperation.
Korea’s Democratic Assets
There are many unique aspects of Korea’s democratic development that

would make it worthy of emulation in other countries. First, despite its
relatively short existence, democracy in Korea has matured and on a strong
footing. The impeachment of President Park Geun-hye in March 2017 was a
first for Korean democracy and a test of its foundation. While it was not the
first impeachment of a chief executive in Korea, it was the first successful
one. Just like the first smooth transition of power highlights a test for
democracy, so does the successful impeachment of a leader. It shows that
the checks and balances embedded into the system are functional, especially
in the case of a presidential system like Korea, where the executive plays a
strong role.
A more unique aspect of the Korean democratic experience is the strong
involvement of the people and civil society. Shin and Moon argue that
protest-led reform had always been an integral part of Korea’s modern
political culture. This includes the stepping down of Rhee Syngman in
1960, the Gwangju Uprising in 1980, and Korea’s democratic transition in
1987. In continuation of this legacy, it was a widespread popular movement
in 2016-2017 that instigated the impeachment of President Park. The
difference is that in this case, the movement was composed of a much more
diverse cross section of society. The strong involvement of citizens and civil
society in political dialogue has in most cases been a necessary factor.
Historically, it was needed because Korea was not a democracy and the
citizens had limited options for political participation. This legacy has been
sustained to this day, in part because of the weak nature of the political
party system in Korea, as well as parties’ ineffectiveness at delivering on
public expectations. One potential challenge of this might be the emergence
of an “over politicized” society, where every decision becomes a matter of
public plebiscite (Shin and Moon, 2017, p. 130). However, these events do
not represent an attack on the institutions of democracy per se as some
commentators have suggested, but it is more the expression of anger by the
people that the ruling elite had violated the institutions of democracy (Shin
and Moon, 2017, p. 118). The proper functioning of all political organs from
accusation to trial to conviction are a sign of democratic deepening and the
maturing of institutions.
All this is not to argue that Korea is the perfect democracy, as it does
face challenges similar to those faced by other democracies around the
world, relating to a larger pattern of democratic malaise. Shin argues that
from the perspective of 2020, there have been some controversial events in
regards to democratic process in Korea. This specifically refers to the “war
on fake news,” as well a slide towards zero-sum politics. The former refers
to a 2018 push by the Moon government for state agencies to report
misleading news accounts they found online, and the latter refers to a rigid
polarization between the views of the ruling party and their opposition
(Shin, 2020, p.101). Despite this, the discussions that are conducted around
these topics indicate that democracy in Korea has matured, regardless of the
indicators of backsliding that Shin evokes. It is undeniable that some of the
causes are internal, but this ignores the global picture. The stumbling of
democracy is a global phenomenon because the challenges to democracy
are global in nature. Dissatisfaction with globalization and the resulting
inequality are a global phenomenon that have challenged democracies all
over the world, as it is beyond the scope of individual governments to
completely solve these issues on a local level. On the other hand, discussions
and disagreements relating to freedom of speech and the role of the
government in being an arbiter of the truth are signs of a healthy democracy,
as this presents an issue that would otherwise not have been a matter of
public discussion. The latter is also an issue that is a constant back and forth
in most advanced democracies and is not unique to Korea. The important
takeaway from such a discussion is that it is happening in the first place.
Notably, that there is a genuine interest from people who wish to voice their
opinions on the role that the government should be taking in moderating the
“truth.”
Another practical advantage that Korea has for implanting democracy
promotion, which does not emerge out of its democratic development, is its
perceived neutrality. Unlike most Western countries that engage democracy
promotion globally, Korea does not have a history of colonial expansion or
global interference. In fact, Korea’s own colonial history and its recent
development experience allow the country to brand any type of development
aid as genuine South-South cooperation. Additionally, Korea does not garner
the same suspicions as China, for example. Because of its size, Korea is not
in a position to pose a large threat to the sovereignty of any country (Howe,
2015). These factors combine to support a narrative that Korea is on an
equal footing and working to implement policy at an eye-to-eye level.
Simply by virtue of its size and historical development, Korea is already in
a much stronger position to engage in much more controversial forms of
ODA, such as democratic capacity building.
Merits of democracy promotion for Korea
Given the strengths of Korean democracy and the asset that this would be
for aid recipients due to a more extensive ODA policy, there must also be a
consideration of the benefits of this strategy for Korea. There are variety of
merits that democracy promotion in ODA would have for Korea as an
extension of its public diplomacy efforts. The main benefit that would come
out of such an initiative would be to solidify Korea’s grounding as a middle
power. Korea would show the world that it has more to offer than a
successful approach to economic development and that through the sharing
of its democratic experience it can provide shortcuts to other countries. It
can convince potential recipient countries of this through stronger branding,
with a specific focus on Korea as an alternative to both the West and China.
Korea already uses this branding based on South-South cooperation and
win-win rhetoric for current implementation of development aid projects.
This can easily be extended to an ODA strategy with a much stronger
democratic focus.
Another potential benefit that could be reaped from such a project would
be impetus for the opening of new channels of cooperation that do not have
to just be limited to the provision of ODA. This could serve Korean
geostrategic interests as many of the countries that Korean foreign policy
has identified as important are either outright democratic or tending towards
democracy. This includes important global and regional actors such as the
United States, the European Union, Japan, India, and Nigeria. Korea would
therefore have the opportunity to work together with other democratic
countries on the basis of common political systems and a shared political
culture. This cooperative element would not just provide a boost to Korean
diplomacy, but it will also increase the leverage that Korea has as a smaller
actor in the international system. A coalition of democracies would also be a
more effective way of targeting Chinese influence in developing countries.
In offering a more structured and thereby resource intensive approach to
ODA provision, democratic countries would have increased clout in
comparison to non-democratic actors.
Finally, a perhaps more optimistic and idealistic proposal is that a
stronger focus on democratic elements in ODA could open an avenue for
closer East Asian cooperation. This would be particularly useful with

regards to opportunities to cooperate and improve relations with Japan.
Both countries are mature democracies and have much to offer regarding
experiences in a non-western context. Japan and Korea also have shared
foreign policy objectives in their dependence on global stability for their
export-oriented economies. Additionally, the focal points and implementation
of their development aid strategies are similar so far in that they have a
strong technical focus. Stronger cooperation in terms of ODA policy would
therefore offer itself as beneficial in any case, regardless of whether this has
a stronger democratic focus or not. A united approach promoting democratic
values would also place both countries in a stronger position regarding
China. Given that neither country alone could muster the same resources, a
united approach would place both in a much stronger position. In 2012 the
Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo even proposed a “democratic security
diamond” as part of a new Japanese diplomacy espousing a stronger focus
on democracy (Ichihara, 2019, p. 8). This was met with lackluster responses
by all participants, given the strong ties with China that all entertained at the
time. Things were further complicated by the general ebb and flow of
Japanese-Korean relations. This is unfortunately once again the case today,
with Japanese-Korean relations at a low point. As a result of this, a
democratic alliance between the two, or at least closer cooperation in
democracy promotion through ODA, seems an unlikely scenario for the
near future. However, another potential option would be stronger
cooperation with Taiwan, another East Asian democracy that shares a
history of rapid economic development with Korea. Given the precarious
nature of the Taiwan issue, this type of cooperation would have to proceed
cautiously at first. However, it would represent a first step in East Asian
democratic cooperation. Taiwan would also be willing to engage in such
cooperation because it would be a way of strengthening its diplomatic
prestige and engaging China’s global promotion strategy of its own system.
Potential Caveats of Democracy promotion
A variety of caveats could emerge as a result of a stronger focus on

democracy in Korean ODA. The first issue is the limited size and extensive
range of strategic foci of KOICA. Korea’s spending on aid is below OECD
average and KOICA is only one outlet of government spending on ODA.
While the majority of ODA funding is presented in the form of grants, and
therefore through KOICA, this remains a fraction of a small overall budget.
Another issue with KOICA is that it is overstretched in terms of the policy
areas it is working in, given the current funding and size of the organization.
According to the latest numbers available, in 2018 KOICA was operating in
125 countries with a budget of USD 683,745 million (KOICA, 2018, p. 57).
KOICA has a huge program focus from PPPs, to civil society involvement
programs, to humanitarian and technical aid. Additionally, KOICA also has
an extensive list of policy foci including education, health, governance,
agriculture and rural development, water, energy, transportation, climate
change response, gender equality, and a category broadly labelled as
“Science, Technology, and Innovation” (KOICA, 2020). Given the current
budget and extent of policy foci, KOICA would not have the capacity to
include a democratic component in its aid and capacity building programs.
Even if it were to be included, it would be nowhere near the scale where it
would be effective. An addition of this would therefore require either a
reduction of foci and partner countries or a significant increase in the
organization’s budget.
Another problem are public relations issues, especially relating to
blunders by Korean industry. The former specifically refer to the Korea
National Oil Corporation (KNOC) deal in Nigeria and Daewoo’s land lease
scandal in Madagascar. The KNOC case involved a government imposed
moratorium on drilling in 2009, after the successor government found the
bidding process to be full of irregularities. This was followed by a multi-
year legal battle, which KNOC eventually won in 2017 after a supreme
court ruling (Business Day, 2017). Much more damaging in terms of
reputation, on the other hand, was Daewoo’s ninety-nine year lease on
massive tracts of land in Madagascar. The opacity of the deal and the
ignoring of customs relating to land ownership led to international backlash.
The resulting protests ousted the existing government, and their replacement
nullified the deal. These older examples primarily represented Korean
inexperience in operating in the complicated business environment that is
SSA. However, especially the Daewoo case left lasting damage to the public
image of Korea in Madagascar and SSA at large (Darracq Neville, 2015,
p.14).
Relating to the above is the reputation of KOICA especially in regards to
its close relationship with the chaebol. There has been a strong preference in
Korean aid to prioritize PPPs, with the logic of taking advantage of the
synergies between the means of the state and the efficiency of the market.
Additionally, the involvement of the private sector is simply cheaper for the
state. This is characteristic of a larger trend, which is not unique to Korea,
which has seen the increased privatization of development aid efforts
worldwide. This can be primarily attributed to the preference for and
hegemony of neoliberal ideas in economic development discourses. Korea’s
neoliberal transformation came after IMF restructuring, following the 1997
financial crisis. Schwak argues that the fallout from this crisis, as well as the
election of Lee Myung-bak, meant that there was once again increased
cooperation between the State and chaebol. In this relationship, the state
was the harbinger of economic development, with the chaebol at the center.
Naturally, such a synergetic relationship between the state and the private
sector eliminates the boundary between private and state interests in the
global market (Schwak, 2018, p. 121). For example, Chaebol considerations
are taken into account in the making of policy decisions. This becomes
apparent when regarding the choice of partner countries, where a priority is
placed on middle-income countries, which provide a higher degree of
economic opportunity (Schwak, 2018, p. 111).
The reputation aspect that Korean industry plays, as well as the strong
private involvement in KOICA projects and decision-making, are both
factors that could hinder the efficacy of ODA with a democratic focus.
Primarily, this jeopardizes Korea’s “clean slate” position, in which it brands
itself on eye-level cooperation and being free of vested interests. The
Daewoo case is particularly sensitive due to the colonial allusions that
emerge from an opaque land lease deal. Especially when it comes to aid,
issues of public perception carry high relevance if this aid is to be accepted
by the recipient country. This is even more relevant in the case of
democratic capacity building, as the sharing of values is politically much
more sensitive. Therefore, in order for such an initiative to be successful,
Korea needs to maintain its moral high ground, at the very least rhetorically.
If democratic capacity building is regarded as a conflation of state and
chaebol interests, then there is even more reason to assume that ODA
represents a neocolonial means of domination.
A domestic factor that could limit the expansion of ODA into areas of
democratic governance is based on the Korean public’s perception towards
ODA. Something that is particularly interesting in the case of Korea is
Koreans’ perception of the state of development within their own country.
In the year 2014, around 37% of the Korean public saw Korea as a
developed country (Kim et al., 2017, p.15). The results of this poll varied
with age group and education level, but the overall results do highlight that
the majority of the Korean public do not see Korea as a developed country.
This perception in turn has an effect on an individual’s support for Korean
ODA, as those who think Korea is developed were more inclined to support
ODA (Kim et al., 2017, p.16). The 2018 DAC peer review also raised the
point that Korea could do more to partner with civil society to increase
public awareness of and support for ODA (OECD, 2018, p. 22). While it is
not really the case that ODA faces stiff resistance from the public, it is the
public’s lack of awareness of the policies and effectiveness of Korea’s ODA
that present a potential barrier to increasing the ODA budget and policy
scopes. In general, attitudes towards ODA are quite positive in Korea
among both the general public and elites, with 86.5% and 99.5% respectively
in support of ODA spending (Kim et al., 2017, p.19). While Kim et al.,
mainly focus on elite attitudes, it showed that the majority of elite
respondents favored humanitarian and economic policy foci as well as the
betterment of relations between Korea and other countries as the main
reason for providing ODA. When asked what the general rationale for
countries providing ODA was, only 1% selected “Democratic and political
development of underdeveloped countries” (Kim et al., 2017, p. 26). This
rather low number indicates that the Korean public does not believe that
political development features highly as a general reason for providing
ODA.
Another domestic factor could be the Korean public’s perceptions of the
state of democracy in Korea. This has to be considered because if the
Korean public is unsatisfied with its democracy then it is unlikely to think
of this as an asset that could be shared with other countries. Hence, there
would be no popular support for the government to promote the Korean
democratic experience abroad. A 2019 Pew Research Center survey found
that overall, 55% of Koreans are satisfied with the state of their democracy,
with Koreans aged 18-29 70% satisfied with the state of their democracy.
However, this was a decrease from 2018, as general pessimism towards
democracy and democratic institutions rose in 2019, with 68% of
respondents reporting pessimism about the functions of their political
system. However, 81% felt that voting gave them a say in how the
government made decisions (Cha, 2020). This result also has to be
contextualized within larger trends affecting democracies during this time,
as pessimism and dissatisfaction with democracy were on the rise all over
the globe (Wike and Schumacher, 2020). While not yet factored in, the
strong voter turnout for the 2020 legislative elections highlights that the
democratic process remains important and that the public has faith in voting
as a means of political participation. This is despite the uncertainty of the
coronavirus pandemic and the special circumstances that this entailed.
Another factor that has to be considered is the debate surrounding the
acceptability of democracy promotion. Democracy promotion saw its apex
in the 1990s, where the triumphal mood at the end of the Cold War seemed
to have demonstrated the superiority and inevitability of democracy.
Sobriety followed relatively soon. The backlash against democracy promotion
has been strong in recent years, usually under the criticism of foreign
meddling in sovereign countries’ affairs. Countries such as a Russia and
China have introduced new laws significantly curtailing the operating scope
of NGOs, which includes political actors (OHCHR, 2016). In combination
with this much more assertive authoritarianism, there has been the democratic
backsliding and democratic fatigue in existing democracies. Problems
emerge for both promoters and recipients. On the side of the promotors,
there has been a focus on more tangible policies in support of economic and
political stability, rather than democratic governance. This is because there
is a need to remain competitive, particularly with the expansion of Chinese
aid offerings. On the receiving side, there has been a renewed skepticism
and a strong pushback against democracy promotion (Poppe et al., 2018, p.
3).
This also raises the question over whether democracy promotion actually
works. A publication by the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation, reflecting on twenty
years of democracy promotion in East and Southeastern Europe, as well as
the Caucasus, claims mixed results. It argues that it is difficult to make a
general statement because of the host of different contextual factors that
affected post-socialist transformation in these countries and by extension
their degree of democratization. These in turn affect the reception of
democracy building measures. Two contrasting examples include the case
of Russia and the Balkans. On the one hand, there is a regime that actively
opposes democratic reforms, making democracy promotion efforts of
limited value. On the other hand, there are a host of countries that hope to
ascend to EU membership someday. This creates a much stronger impetus
for implementing democratic reforms, thereby making these countries more
receptive to outside initiatives. Additionally, democratization does not exist
in a vacuum, as it is dependent on other factors. For example, if a country is
plagued by political instability and economic dislocation, then there is a
much weaker platform on which to aid in democratization (Djazic-Weber,
2010, 8). There is a particular stress on the importance of civil society in
promoting democratization, by increasing political mobilization through
niches that the state is not able to enter. Part of the difficulty of democratiza-
tion in these post-socialist countries, is their weak civil society basis, which
is a socialist legacy. Hence, the creation and support of civil society struc-
tures should be seen as a long term investment to enhance the democratization
process and the efficacy of aid (Beichelt and Schimmelfennig, 2010, p. 23).
The Synthesis: Reconciling the Merits and the Caveats
The complicated nature of this debate raises the question of how the
benefits and the caveats can be reconciled. It helps that many of the caveats
are either in the process of being addressed or rather easy to address. The
case of the reputational damage done to Korea through culturally insensitive
and morally objectionable business practices in SSA has remained a one-off
example. The Korean public perception of ODA is already rather positive
and as the OECD and authors such as Kim et al. highlight in their studies,
the government needs to increase public awareness of the role of ODA and
the type of projects supported by this structure. The public would be much
more enthusiastic about experimental approaches, such as a stronger
democratic focus of ODA, if they were more aware of how the process
operates. The involvement of civil society as aid partners combined with a
stronger government effort to promote awareness also have the potential to
increase public support for increased ODA spending. This would mean
approaching the 0.3% target promoted by the DAC, thereby increasing the
budget of KOICA and allowing for an increase in policy foci. Finally, as for
the Korean perception of their democracy, while this took a dip in 2019, this
was part of an overall global decline. The strong voter turnout in the 2020
parliamentary elections indicates that while there does seem to be an overall
level of pessimism towards democracy, there is still enough trust in
democratic practices to effect change.
The largest public relations roadblock, however, will be the close
relationship between the state and industry in the implementation of ODA.
This will also be the hardest to change, as this is tangent to a much larger
pattern in Korean politics. Given the economic history of Korea, the state
and the chaebol have always been close, and the distinction between private
and public interests has been difficult to make. The return of the chaebol
following the 1997 crisis has further cemented this relationship. This is not
to argue that private actors should play no role in the implementation of
development projects; on the contrary, private enterprise does have practical
advantages to offer in certain topic areas. However, there needs to be a
strong degree of transparency and accountability for this type of cooperation.
The reasons for this are twofold: 1. Since public money is being used, the
Korean public needs to be assured that these funds are spent efficiently on
projects with high yields 2. If the public in ODA receiving countries is to
trust Korean democracy promotion efforts, then they should also be assured
that this is not a front to disguise neocolonial corporate interests. The best
way to ensure this is once again to give civil society a larger role in the
implementation of aid projects. This way they act as a neutral third party
and can ensure that public money is spent wisely and that it is not just being
spent in the name of corporate interests.
As for the debate surrounding democracy promotion, it is usually framed
from the perspective of the promoter. This is investigated both from the
perspective of the benefits that the promoter would derive from it, as well as
in the benefit for the receiving country. The latter particularly refers to
improvements in the country’s relationship with the promoter and the
potential rewards of such a relationship. Given the nature of the power
relationship between developed and developing states, this perspective is
generally a fair assessment of the situation. However, it ignores the agency
of the receiving countries. ODA is not a one-sided affair, as projects and
policy scope have to be approved by receiving countries as well. The missing
focus on recipient agency therefore ignores that there is also a demand for
Korea to share its developmental experiences, which could easily be
expanded to a case of democracy promotion. This is particularly relevant in
Africa, where despite general dissatisfaction with the state of democracy
and the supply of it, there continues to be a genuine demand for democracy.
The yearly Afrobarometer poll for 2019 shows that despite the general
pessimism seen towards democracy in Europe and the Americas, Africans
have remained committed to it overall (Mattes, 2019, p. 1). Of course, the
picture is not quite as simple as that, with diverging results based on
countries, regions, and socio-economic standing, as well as lower levels of
commitment when asked about more specific democratic indicators (Mattes,
2019, p. 1). Overall, Mattes describes the state of commitment to democracy
in Africa as “wide but shallow” (Mattes, 2019, p. 25). Given this general
attitude, Korea is likely to face much less resistance if it were to begin
democracy promotion as part of its ODA. This is because it would be in line
with current attitudes as well as building capacity in political areas that
Africans consider important and pay great attention to. Korea’s clean slate
reputation, particularly with regards to Africa, would further help the
situation. Thus, Korea has the opportunity to not just brand itself as a
neutral partner, but justify this commitment by arguing that it is simply
meeting the demand for a sharing of its own experiences.
Given the sensitive nature of political aspects in ODA, Korea will have
to work on an ODA strategy that considers these sensitivities. Regardless of
the branding of such a strategy, there will always be a group of countries
that are not democratic, which will outright refuse a democratic dimension
to ODA. Therefore, Korea needs to develop a realistic and flexible aid
strategy that considers these political factors. This flexible aid policy should
be modeled after that of most Western countries, which already have
different policy foci depending on the country they are operating in. For
example, it is not surprising that GIZ in China only focuses on legal
cooperation and urbanization programs within its “Governance and
Democracy” policy objective (GIZ, 2019). Korea will have to take a similar
approach to maintain its public image and avoid conflict. However, this
would not require so much modification of Korea’s current strategy, which
limits cooperation to areas within the economic sphere and somewhat
ignores political issues and the notion of values.
The problem with such a flexible strategy is that it might weaken the
overall effectiveness of a stronger focus on democratic principles. This is
because there is no incentive to conduct democratic reforms, when non-
democratic countries still receive aid without these conditions attached.
There are two potential solutions to this predicament. The easier option
would be that Korea promotes democratization along the lines of the
demand and supply model of democracy mentioned earlier. This would
entail only engaging in experience sharing if this is asked for by partner
countries or agreed upon during negotiations on project implementation.
The second option would entail a larger diplomatic initiative, akin to the
democratic alliance mentioned earlier in the paper. This would mean an aid
strategy that is not just flexible, but also selective. Korea could still
cooperate with non-democratic countries, but it could significantly deepen
its cooperation with democratic ones. This would give democratic countries
a competitive edge over non-democratic countries when it comes to the
amount of resources provided through ODA, while also improving their
diplomatic standing with Korea.
While the idea of a flexible and selective aid policy may seem divisive,
it fits into the greater framework of international relations in 2020 and
presumably the years following that. The idea of systemic rivalry, though
not nearly as profound as in the past, is regaining traction in regards to
perspectives on political and economic systems and the best system of
development. This systemic friction is noticeable, especially since the
abolition of the Western monopoly on aid provision, because of the entry of
China and the enormous resources that it has made available. The West is no
longer the sole provider of large-scale aid, meaning that developing

countries have much more agency over where to receive their assistance
from. In many countries, Chinese investment has been welcomed because of
their perceived lack of conditionality. This is an illusion that some countries
are waking up from. The case of Pakistan and the long hiatus of the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor as a result of the reinvestigation of projects,
accusations of corruption, and worries over the sustainability of Pakistan’s
debt to China, is just one case (Shahid, 2020).
Conclusion
This paper sought to investigate the potential future of Korean public

diplomacy in the realm of democracy promotion through its ODA policy.
The paper has argued that Korea stands in a unique position to offer a third
way in the realm of democracy promotion through ODA. This approach
would be based on transparency guaranteed by strong civil society involve-
ment, combined with the sharing of Korea’s own historical experiences as a
former developing country and as a former colony. It would have to be a
flexible and selective strategy. This means that such projects are only
implemented in countries that are willing to accept them, but that these
countries become priority partners, which in turn incentivizes democrati-
zation. This strategy would benefit Korea by offering new means of
cooperation with democracies across the world in the context of the return
of systemic competition. This, in combination with the promotion of Korean
values through the export of its political culture, would enhance Korea’s
position as a middle power.
Korea has progressed rapidly in the scope and efficacy of its ODA
policy, considering that it is such a new donor. However, there are still
improvements to be made, to ensure that Korea does not end up with the
same tainted reputation that the Chinese and some Western donors have.
This namely refers to the close and opaque links between the chaebol and
the state in ODA decision making. Given that this is something that has
emerged out of the context of Korea’s own development experience, this
will be difficult to reverse. However, a strong civil society sector is also a
product of Korea’s specific historical experiences. Through its involvement

and the accompanying assurances of transparency, Korea has significant
potential to deliver on its rhetoric of South-South cooperation. Given the
global demand for democracy, Korea stands in a unique position to fill this
gap in a way that would be agreeable to developing countries in a way that
grants them agency and assures them of their sovereignty.
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Promoting New Southern Policy in Southeast

Asia: Killing Two Birds With One Stone
Swe Yone Nanddy
Abstract | In recent years, there has been an influx of Korean popular

culture (Korean wave) throughout the world, including the Southeast Asia
region. While the engagement of the Republic of Korea (ROK) with
Southeast Asia has spanned over decades, the strategic importance of
ASEAN was yet to become a priority in Seoul’s foreign policies. The New
Southern Policy (NSP) was initiated by President Moon Jae-in in 2017 to
enhance the ROK-ASEAN relations to a whole new level, embracing
economic, socio-cultural as well as strategic dimensions. The main focus of
the paper is to examine the nexus of the NSP and public diplomacy of South
Korea. In particular, this paper will explore the essence of the NSP in the
context of public diplomacy; how it will bring impact to the political and
policy implications of Korean diplomatic directives to Southeast Asia while
bringing prosperity to ASEAN countries. It will further explain the necessity
for the successful implementation of the NSP in the region, highlighting the
past approaches of Seoul and the contemporary global issues. Finally, the
paper will present a conclusion, suggesting ideas for South Korea in
pursuing its NSP in ASEAN looking holistically at the role of the NSP in
ASEAN amidst the other existing policy initiatives in the region.
국문초록 | 최근 들어, 동남아시아 지역을 포함해 세계적으로 한국 대중문화

(한류 파도)가 밀려들었다. 대한민국과 동남아시아의 관계는 수십년 간 지속되어
왔지만 아세안의 전략적 중요성은 아직 서울 외교 정책의 우선순위가 아니었다.
2017년 문재인 대통령은 경제적, 사회문화적, 전략적 관점을 포괄하여 대한민국
과 아세안의 관계를 완전히 새로운 차원으로 강화시키기 위해 신남방정책(New
Southern Policy, NSP)을 시작했다. 이 논문의 초점은 신남방정책과 대한민국
공공 외교의 연결점을 연구이다. 이 글은 특히 공공 외교 문맥에서 신남방정책의
본질과 그것이 아세안 국가들에 번영을 가져다줌과 동시에 어떻게 한국의 외교
지시의 정치적이며 정책적인 결과에 영향을 끼칠 것인지 모색할 것이다. 이 글은
나아가 과거 서울의 접근법과 현재 세계적인 사안을 강조하며 아세안 지역에서
신남방정책의 성공적인 시행이 필요함을 설명할 것이다. 마지막으로, 이 논문은

아세안에서 대한민국이 다른 다양한 정치 사업들 사이에서 어떻게 신남방정책의
역할을 차별화할 수 있는지 제안한다.
INTRODUCTION
President Moon Jae In’s administration is striving towards the New Northern
Policy (NNP) and New Southern Policy (NSP) where the latter emphasized
consolidating economic partnerships with South Korea and the countries to
its north: Russia, Mongolia, and Central Asian states and the former intend
to promote relations with countries to its south: those are in the Southeast
Asian region and India in addition to the existing policies such as ‘Permanent
Peace in the Korean Peninsula’ and the ‘New Economic Map of Korean
Peninsula.’ Specifically, the NSP is an established diplomatic effort of the
Moon government as a broader spectrum of its ‘Northeast Asia Plus
Community for Responsibility’ (NAPCOR).
According to the Asan Institute of Policy Studies, President Moon first
introduced the Northeast Asia Plus Community (NEAPC) during his
electoral campaign. He spoke in his campaign about the importance of
maintaining reliable relations with its four key partner countries: the United
States (US), China and Japan and bringing the ASEAN and India on the
same pedestal as the four major partners under the scope of NEAPC. (Lee,
2020) When he was elected as the President, the NSP became one of
Korea’s foreign policy priorities in addition to Northern Policy and
Northeast Asia Policy. It is also known as “New Sudpolitik” and also known
as the continuation of the previous President Park Geun Hye’s policy of
‘Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative’ (NAPCI).
Alongside this background, this paper will attempt to explain the nexus
between Public Diplomacy and the NSP by exploring the following
questions:
1. ‌Why is the better quality and longevity of the NSP crucial for
South Korea in the context of Public Diplomacy?
2. ‌Where should South Korea be pouring its resources in the ASEAN
Promoting New Southern Policy in Southeast Asia 429
region to best serve the ambitious goals of the NSP?
This study is based on a qualitative analysis of primary and secondary

sources relevant to South Korea’s public diplomacy and its ongoing
infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia. The included primary sources are
state-level public statements, official publications, and press releases from
relevant government agencies of both Korea and the ASEAN countries.
Secondary resources contain studies that focus on previous approaches of
public diplomacy of South Korea, South Korea’s soft power, and South
Korea-ASEAN relations.
The paper is composed of three sections. The first section provides the
concepts and strategies under the NSP and the developing nature of public
diplomacy in South Korea. The following section explains the linkage
between the NSP and the public diplomacy objectives of South Korea. The
next section explores the investment gap in Southeast Asia that the NSP
could fill up as an alternative. Finally, a few concluding remarks are
included over this recent breakthrough of Korea’s foreign policy in the
ASEAN and its implementation over the region.
THE ORIGIN OF THE NEW SOUTHERN POLICY
The New Southern Policy (NSP) is a foreign policy initiative by President

Moon, which was first announced during his state visit to Indonesia in
November 2017. In addition to its purpose of promoting cooperation with
its major four diplomatic partners: The United States, China, Japan, and
Russia, this policy attempts to enhance strategic ties of Korea with the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member states
and India. Three main policy agendas are established under the vision of the
“People-centric community of peace and prosperity’; which are 3Ps: people,
prosperity, and peace.
The first policy is to build “a community of people” with greater mutual
understanding which is to reach “15 million mutual visitors by 2020
annually.” Through expanding two-way cultural exchanges and HR capacity
building workshops, nearly 11.5 million mutual visitors between ASEAN
and Korea in 2018 indicated that the policy has a promising start. With the
quest to create a foundation of mutually beneficial and future-oriented
economic cooperation, the second policy of “a community of prosperity was
started with a target to reach US$ 200 billion by 2020. Provided that the
trade value in 2018 was US$160 billion, which exceeded US$114 billion in
2017, more ambitious targets can be expected for both Korea and ASEAN
for the post-pandemic years. The final policy of the NSP is “a community of
Peace” which is to build a peaceful and safe environment in the region. The
projects under this policy aim to strengthen the collective response toward
anti-terrorism, cyber threats, and maritime security as well as effective
cooperation for a prosperous Korean Peninsula.
Promotion strategies are furthermore announced after the first plenary
meeting of the Presidential Committee on the NSP in November 2018 with
16 strategic tasks and 32 main projects. To date the recent achievements, a
total of 19 strategic initiatives and 92 key projects were determined by the
Committee. ASEAN-Korea Financial Cooperation Center was also
established in Indonesia to elevate the presence of financial accessibility. It
will provide support to help Korean financial institutes participate in the
NSP countries’ local markets and encourage collaboration between intra-
ASEAN and Korean companies in local development projects.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN FOREIGN POLICY

OF SOUTH KOREA
The term ‘public diplomacy’ has various understandings. Nonetheless, all of

them can be summed up as public diplomacy being an attempt to
communicate with the foreign public. Sharp (2005) defines that public
diplomacy is “the process of direct relations with people in a country
pursued to advance the interest and extend the values of those represented.”
It is also suggested to be white propaganda by Berridge (2015) which is
mainly applied by state actors to influence other states by winning the heart
of its people. Rana (2011) defines public diplomacy as “activities through
governments, working with non-state agencies, reaching out to publics and
nonofficial actors abroad, covering information, culture, education and the
country image.” What distinguishes public diplomacy from traditional

diplomacy is that the former extends its emphasis to the relationship with
the foreign public in addition to the main focus of the latter: maintaining
friendship between governments.
Till recent times, public diplomacy was applied by South Korea as a
mere tool of marketing; used in promoting the charm of Korea. Indeed,
creating a positive image of Korea is very much essential as this brand
marketing strategy was successful with the influx of ‘Korean Wave’
throughout the world. Intriguingly, the recent discourse in the field witnessed
some changes together with the establishment of the Public Diplomacy Act
in 2016. This indicated not only the acknowledgment of the significance of
public diplomacy by the Korean government but also proved that Public
Diplomacy is no longer just a tool of a mere nation-branding.
The act also led to the foundation of the Public Diplomacy Committee
under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is involved by respective
stakeholders from local and national administrations, individuals from the
private sectors, and academics. Therefore, the South Korean Government is
now utilizing the whole-government-approach in integrating public
diplomacy as major diplomatic themes, without necessarily denoting the
term “public diplomacy.” The first meeting of the Committee resulted in
Korea’s First Basic Plan on Public Diplomacy (2017-2021) that will provide
instruction for the Moon Jae In administration.
Under the vision of “Attractive Korea Communicating with the World
Together with Citizens,” the plan contains four goals: to promote Korea’s
status and image through rich cultural resources, to distribute accurate
information about Korea, to build a friendly and strategically favorable
surrounding for Korea and to empower public diplomacy agents and
promote intra-collaboration. The strategies are identified under these goals
in which ‘cultural diplomacy’ aims to utilize Korea’s cultural assets;
‘knowledge-oriented diplomacy’ to elevate accurate knowledge and
information about Korea and to support Korean studies in academic
cooperation, and ‘public diplomacy on policy’ to expand understanding of
Korea’s policies by the general foreign public and to create a favorable
environment for Korea’s major diplomatic goals. Therefore, the core values
of the NSP which promote its vision of 3Ps through two-way culture
exchanges; through enhancing cooperation in the defense industry to

contribute peace across Asia, and through better reciprocal economic
cooperation are essentially contributing to the efficacy of the modernized
public diplomacy strategies of Korea.
NEW SOUTHERN POLICY THROUGH THE LENS OF PUBLIC

DIPLOMACY
South Korea is indeed generally well-loved by the people of the ASEAN

region. It is one of the leading trade partners of most of the ASEAN
countries. ASEAN member states are charmed by South Korea’s soft power
through the manifestation of the massive “Korean Wave” in the forms of
K-drama, pop music, Korean Cuisine, or Korean traditional medicine. So,
why does Korea need to promote the NSP in the ASEAN under the spectrum
of public diplomacy? Although the country begins to occupy an increasingly
influential position with the ASEAN, public diplomacy with only the basis
of soft power resources is not adequate to transform the bilateral relations
into a stronger political-diplomatic partnership between South Korea and
the Region.
Since the establishment of sectoral dialogue relations between ASEAN
and Korea in November 1989, the past 30 years of relationships have
experienced various crucial improvements in every bilateral aspect. Bilateral
trade volume has grown 17-fold as a substantial expansion of Korean
investments in the ASEAN economies. With frequent mutual visits and
student exchanges, the socio-cultural facet of bilateral relations has made
considerable progress. As regional multilateral integration in Asia continues,
more opportunities for this partnership to flourish and grow closer to open
discussions on issues of common interest are also prevailing.
Paradoxically to these impressive bilateral records, policy initiatives of
the Blue House towards ASEAN have frequent up-and-downs where some
skepticisms in the region occur to the sustainability of the engagement
activities led by South Korea. Despite the official statement of bilateral ties
in 1989, the real beginning of cooperation between ASEAN and South
Korea started in the late 1990s under the administration of President Kim
Dae Jung. This development was based on his personal knowledge and
interests in the ASEAN as friendship with some Southeast Asian leaders,
Aung San Suu Kyi of Myanmar, and the Philippines President Corazon
Aquino and also due to the foundation of the ASEAN+3 initiative as a way
to overcome the Asian Financial Crisis of 1998, which subsequently brought
South Korea closer to ASEAN and its members. Since Korea began to
cooperate under the institutional frameworks of ASEAN+3 and East Asia
Summit (EAS), the increasing momentum of regional integration laid the
basis of growing economic interactions between ASEAN countries and
Korea.
Although the basis of the strong potential partnership has been laid, the
three administrations after President Kim appeared to weaken their
commitment towards the ASEAN-Korea tie. President Roh Moo Hyun
altered his regional policy focus back to Northeast Asia and the Korean
Peninsula which was clarified by his initiative “Korea, Northeast Asia Hub
Country,” where he put effort to obtain distinctive changes in the Korean
Peninsula situation. The Lee Myung Bak administration had its approach
called the “New Asia Initiative,” but very much brought the regional focus
on the entire Asian region. It was accused by some critics as South Korea
became mercantilist and that the ASEAN region was viewed as a market
area for South Korea under this context. Then under President Park Geun
Hye, the policy shifted back to Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula, as
“Korean Peninsula Trustpolitik” and included ASEAN as a mere observer in
“Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative” (NAPCI).
Resulting from such inconsistencies of Korea’s policies toward ASEAN,
the presence of South Korea in the region was observed to be declining
prior to President Moon Jae In’s administration. The more frequent omissions
of ASEAN from Korean regional foreign policy regardless of merely
considering its position, the lesser the confidence of the ASEAN leaders or
the ASEAN citizens on South Korea when it comes to new foreign policy
initiatives, despite the huge success of Korea’s cultural diplomacy in the
region.
Even the launch of the NSP in 2017 generated various responses and
even skepticism from the Korean public as well as from the Southeast Asia
region, questioning the commitment of the Korean government as the void
in the further improvement of ASEAN-Korea relations originated from the

commercially-oriented, inconsistent and unpredictable approaches of the
past administrations. Therefore, through committing more significant
progress in executing the NSP initiative of President Moon, it will not only
be advantageous for both Korea and the ASEAN in term of economics,
socio-cultural aspect, and strategically development under current geopolitical
uncertainties, but also can foster the values of public diplomacy of South
Korea in the region, thus delivering Korea’s policies more effectively and
efficiently in the present era.
The NSP displays distinct features apart from the previous approaches of
the Blue House to the ASEAN in taking initiatives, setting diplomatic
procedures, and achieving policy connectivity. For instance, the NSP copes
with security and diplomatic aspects in addition to economic and socio-
cultural cooperation, where former South Korea’s ASEAN policy agendas
placed emphasis only on the latter ones. Furthermore, the NSP focused on
construction and preservation of existing ties with the NSP partners by
showing its solemnity with President Moon Jae In’s state visits to India and
all ASEAN members after the announcement of the policy in 2017.
Highlighting the ASEAN-ROK commemorative summit and the first
Mekong-ROK summit of November 2017, these events evoked the 30 years
of Korea-ASEAN dialogue partnership while enthusiastically declaring to
build a new wave of shared prosperity for the next 30 years.
Relating to the ASEAN, the NSP directs its functional focus towards
cooperating with its ASEAN members in infrastructure building to ride the
waves of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. South Korea has been striving to
spur its growth in innovative industries in terms of artificial intelligence, 5G
network, digital commerce, automotive technology, and bio healthcare
systems, taking a leadership role in the region. On the other hand, ASEAN
is eager to connect the advanced ICT technologies with its abundance of
resources in manufacturing, agriculture and service sectors. Together, they
both realize their complementary role on how to play their parts
successfully and effectively in the era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
Thus, South Korea will gain access to the yet to be explored human capital
of the ASEAN for the future industries, while the ASEAN local firms will
have access to competent technologies, skills and training from South Korea.
In addition, South Korea anticipates establishing a strong and trusted

partnership for peace with the ASEAN. Witnessing the prevailing superpower
rivalry that deteriorates the efficacy of the regional order that so far has
been beneficial to peace and prosperity in Asia, cooperation and collaboration
for peace between Korea and the ASEAN will surely contribute in restoring
multilateralism in Asia and help in reducing tensions and reestablishing
confidence for a stable regional order. After all, ASEAN has served as a
major regional organization in Southeast Asia, providing necessary platforms
for a better integration and warmer understanding among Asian nations. The
South Korean government needs to exert its utmost effort in strengthening
the core values of ASEAN: ASEAN centrality, inclusiveness and respect for
international norms and national integrity, while carrying out its strategies
of the NSP. Through assisting the ASEAN community building and helping
in addressing the challenges of the ASEAN, if successfully implemented,
the NSP is sure to win the heart of the ‘ASEAN citizens’ and will be making
another milestone as a role model in carrying out public diplomacy initiatives.
FINDING A GAP: THE INVESTMENTS OF THE ASEAN FOR THE NSP
Another reason why the successful implementation of the NSP in Southeast

Asia needs to be more conceivable is that the ASEAN and Korea shared
similar strategic dilemma and similar interests than in past years. The desire
for South Korea to restructure and expand mutually benefited economic
portfolios in ASEAN and the ASEAN member states, partly came from
Seoul’s strategic need to leverage its dependency on the US-South Korea
military alliance for its security, against the potential threats and provocations
from North Korea and to reduce external vulnerability coming from its
concentrated trade relations with China, as Beijing is the largest trading
partner of Seoul. A case such as China’s informal economic retaliation over
South Korea right after its deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) system in mid-2016, made many Koreans realize the
absolute necessity to diversify economic relations with its geographically
adjacent regions.
Southeast Asia is not new to such super-power competitions. As the
rivalry gets stronger, the ASEAN inevitably becomes the center of attention
for the US and China since the region encompasses the countries that have
the closest partnerships with both Beijing and Washington. Although China
can contribute to development of the ASEAN member states, there remains
a severe trust deficit in relations with China. The scaling back of global
security guarantees and unpromising behaviors of the present US
administration make the Southeast Asia countries more difficult to find a
balance between raging and intensifying rivalry.
Now, both ASEAN and Korea are walking on a tight rope amidst the
contradicting pressures as strategic competition between the US and China
deepens. They both are seeking diplomatic leverage to expand their
autonomous capacity in the region and a strategic dialogue and profitable
cooperation with substantial mutual trust are likely to bring ASEAN and
Korea to a middle ground amidst the superpower rivalry. Seldom can an
individual small or middle regional power country exert a great impact on
such strategic competition. In unity and collectively, those countries can
yield a reliable safety or security and protect the interests of small and
medium powers from any potential fallout of a super-power rivalry or
conflict.
Despite global uncertainties, the ASEAN region as a whole is experi-
encing a significant economic development and substantial population
growth in recent years – with expected GDP to reach US$4.7 trillion by
2025. This has led to the ASEAN countries demanding more reliable
infrastructure investments in order to reach the targeted goal. According to
the report of the Asia Development Bank in 2017, the infrastructure needed
in the ASEAN will increase from US$2.8 trillion (baseline estimate) to US
$3.1 trillion (climate-adjusted estimate).
Indeed, the ASEAN countries have certain plans to supply the specific
infrastructure developments such as the Socio-Economic Development Plan
of Vietnam (US$61.5 billion), the National Medium-Term Development
Plan of Indonesia (US$460 billion), the ‘Build, Build, Build’ Development
Plan of Philippines (US$71.8 billion), and the Transport Infrastructure
Development Plan of Thailand (US$76 billion). Likewise, major sources of
FDI inflows in the ASEAN: the European Union (EU), Japan, the US and
China are contributing to the need for large-scale infrastructure development,
covering projects including transportation and energy, oil and gas

infrastructure and construction.
While the term ‘infrastructure’ has become a popular foreign economic
policy term in Southeast Asia, into which sectors of ASEAN exactly should
South Korea put its money in order to serve as a support for the existing
large-scale projects?
The field of digital startups in Southeast Asia also seems to be promising.
From the developed economies such as Singapore and Malaysia to the
emerging industries such as Thailand and Myanmar, these ASEAN
countries are now undoubtedly transforming to a new area of competition
for technology (tech) entrepreneurs. The launch of innovative startups, tech
companies and e-commerce businesses generating impressive profits, have
become more frequent since the region began to focus its interest in
developing the digital economy which is going to worth nearly US$300
billion by 2025.
There are indeed joint development initiatives under the NSP, based on
the different phases of economic and industrial advancement among the
ASEAN countries. The high-tech industries of South Korea, particularly in
the fields of AI, robotics and ICT, make it an appealing partnership for
ASEAN. Korean companies can expect an upper-hand in engaging in
ASEAN’s telecommunications infrastructure, as it will be perceived as a
viable alternative for ASEAN at a time when its members are very much
worried of getting caught up in the present technological rivalry between
the US and China, especially in introducing 5G.
Korean tech giant Samsung Electronics has its largest smartphone
manufacturer in Southeast Asia, which is based in Hanoi, Vietnam, since
2009, supplying many of the smartphones and accessories to global
markets. LG Electronics, another Korean tech titan, produces television
screens at a US$1.5 billion factory in Haiphong, a port city of Vietnam. The
city has also acted as a major manufacturing center for televisions, cell
phones, washing machines, and air conditioners. Moreover, Indonesia is
now gaining attention as one of the leading automobile markets in the
ASEAN by automakers, with its status as the fourth highest population and
annual economic growth of more than 5%. In June 2019, in partnership with
taxi and ride-sharing firms, Hyundai Motor has signed an agreement with
ComfortDelGro, the largest land transport firm of Singapore, to supply

2,000 Ioniq Hybrid vehicles by 2020, expanding its eco-friendly car models
in the country. Again, as for Korea’s largest steelmaker, Posco has
production plants in Indonesia, Vietnam, and Myanmar.1 The Southeast
Asian startups also welcome the influx of South Korean venture projects not
only because of their massive capital but also for the advanced technologies
and approaches they will be bringing in.
As a follow-up, a new southern business branch was launched by the
state-run Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) in May
2019 with the aim to help in customizing the Korean firms that would meet
the expectation of the ASEAN partners. Consultation will be provided by
Korean companies facing problems in the areas of labor, trade, law, and
finance in respected ASEAN countries, according to KOTRA.2 Moreover,
the Presidential Committee of NSP has promised to support the Korean
companies in infrastructure projects in the NSP target countries to build an
international innovation platform as a joint response to the Fourth Industrial
Revolution under the NSP pillar of Prosperity. Therefore, adding to the
existing cooperation in small cities and tech sectors, the NSP of South
Korea can have comparative advantage by promoting the Prosperity pillar-
oriented activities in the ASEAN and achieving technology-driven economic
development.
What is interesting is that the infrastructure initiatives of Seoul will not
be contradicting with massive infrastructural projects of Beijing, or with
long-lasting record of infrastructure partnerships of Tokyo in the ASEAN
member states. In fact, the focus and direction of the NSP in the
technological sector and smart city projects will be creating more
opportunities for collaboration with the existing major players, where South
Korea can provide detailed technical modifications for specific countries in
support of grand undertakings of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or
to provide technical expertise which is included as criteria of Japan’s
Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (PQI). This indicates that the
investments in the abovementioned sectors can offer higher potential for the
1 (Asia News Network, 2019)

2 (Herald, 2019)
NSP that could represent South Korea as a supportive comrade for China
and Japan, rather than as a strategic rivalry for them.
CONCLUSION
This paper has so far argued that the New Southern Policy of the President
Moon Jae In has an innovative beginning towards creating a newer, brighter
and better era or future between ASEAN and South Korea. It is truly a
considerate and practical policy to achieve goals that have been incompletely
and inadequately carried out under the previous Korean foreign policy
initiatives towards Southeast Asia. First, this study analyzed the connection
between objectives of public diplomacy and strategies of the New Southern
Policy in general, highlighting the quest for more potent commitment in this
present attempt, by providing the policy inconsistencies of the previous
administrations towards ASEAN.
Carrying substantial geopolitical potential and prospects, the establish-
ment of the NSP certainly offers new opportunities for South Korea and the
ASEAN to expand their cooperation to mitigate their vulnerabilities in their
partnerships with major powers, or to dodge the complications resulting
from US-China competition. So as to complement the existing major
players in the ASEAN, various infrastructure initiatives of the NSP in the
niche areas of Korea are vastly welcomed by the ASEAN and its members.
However, there are challenges to be considered in order to win confidence
for the NSP. Firstly, the ASEAN countries are looking forward to the
continuation of the policy initiatives advocated strongly in the current five-
year presidency and into the next administration. At present, there is an
increasing optimism from both sides on ASEAN-Korea relations, as the
cooperation and collaboration increase with shared benefits and converging
strategic outlooks on regional community building, etc. And yet, time alone
will tell. Credibility of the NSP will likely be questioned should a crisis
occur on the Korea Peninsula that South Korea would become distracted
and follow the same patterns of its previous policies. Thus, in order to
preserve a sustained and purposeful foothold in the ASEAN’s infrastructure
development, both ASEAN and South Korea should remain dedicated and
constructive enough to cooperate in infrastructure projects with their

inherent strategic commonalities and previous oversights at heart. After all,
true care, sincerity, generosity and goodwill to the region, and real sharing
of prosperity with the people are crucial for the success of any regional
policy.
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443
A Causality Analysis of the Impact of Korean

Public Diplomacy Strategies on Human
Capital and National Capacity Development
in Nigeria
Temitayo Shenkoya
Abstract | This research focused on determining the effects of the public

diplomacy strategies of the Korean government in Nigeria and its effects on
human and national capital development. Within this study, factors such as
Official Development Assistance (ODA), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI),
Technology transfer (TT), Global Korea Scholarship, and the Technical
Assistance of Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) – were
considered. The Theory of Change -which is based on a causality analysis -
was used to examine the information collected during this study. The
methodology used was a mixed - which involved a systematic literature
review as well as a quantitative analysis of secondary data. The results show
that the benefits of the public diplomacy strategies of the Korean government
are leading to positive changes in the development of human and national
capacities in Nigeria and is bolstering the development of the economy in
Nigeria. Also, it has a positive effect on the public perception of people in
Nigeria towards Korea, improves bilateral relations between Korea and
Nigeria, and has a positive effect on trade, relations between Korea and
Nigeria. In-line with this, recommendations on how to - improve the
diplomatic efforts of the Korean government, tailor its approach / strategies
to improve efficiency, and on how to improve foreign diplomacy in Nigeria -
were identified.
Keywords | Public diplomacy, Official Development Assistance, Foreign
Direct Investment, Technology Transfer, Bilateral relations
국문초록 | 이 연구는 한국 정부가 나이지리아에서 펼치는 공공 외교 전략의

효과와 이것이 인적 자원과 국가 자원의 개발에 갖는 효과를 판단하는 데 초점을
맞춘다. 이 연구에서는 공적개발원조(Official Development Assistance, ODA),
해외직접투자(Foreign Direct Investment, FDI), 기술 이전(Technology

Transfer, TT), 글로벌 코리아 장학금(Global Korea Scholarship), 한국국제협
력단(Korea International Cooperation Agency, KOICA)의 기술 지원과 같은
요소들이 고려되었다. 연구 중 수집된 정보를 조사하기 위해 인과관계 분석을 기
반으로 한 변화 이론(Theory of Change)이 사용되었다. 이 연구의 결과는 한국
정부의 공공 외교 전략의 혜택이 나이지리아의 인적 자원과 국가 자원 개발에 긍
정적인 변화를 이끌어내고 있으며 나이지리아의 경제 발전을 촉진시키고 있음을
보여준다. 이는 또한 한국에 대한 나이지리아 사람들의 대중 인식에 긍정적인 효
과가 있고, 한국과 나이지리아의 양자 관계를 향상시키며, 양국 간 무역에 긍정
적인 영향을 준다. 이와 같은 맥락에서 어떻게 한국 정부의 외교 노력을 개선시
키고, 효율성을 높이기 위해 접근법과 전략을 조정하며, 나이지리아에서의 외교
를 개선시킬 수 있을지 제안한다.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the influence of Korea has been on the increase in Africa
(most especially in Nigeria). This is largely because of the need for the
Korean government to expand trade, development, investment, and research
cooperation with their African counterparts. On the other hand, the Korean
government is currently using its foreign aid to increase its soft power in
Africa (Hwang, 2014). This is because, these efforts improve favorable
public perspective towards Korea and strengthens the ability of the Korean
government to influence policies in Africa. This influence is often referred
to as Soft power. According to Lee (2009), soft power entails the use of soft
resources to influence others. Soft power has been used by various countries
to influence other countries to support their cause, most notable in war time
situations (Nye, 2008). A tool for propagating soft power is the use of public
diplomacy. Public diplomacy is the effort of a foreign government to
influence the perception of an international audience towards achieving a
certain objective (Pamment, 2018).
But why has the Korean government adopted the use of public
diplomacy in Nigeria? The importance of Nigeria in Africa based on the
availability of economic opportunities and a large consumer base, makes it a
target of world powers seeking to increase their influence in Africa. Several
countries have been competing to gain supremacy of influencing policies in
A Causality Analysis of the Impact of Korean Public Diplomacy ... 445
Africa – using public diplomacy; these include – China, India, US, and
Korea (Wu & Yang, 2017; Taylor, 2015; Ochieng & Kim, 2020; Lomer,
2017). A key benefit of public diplomacy is the strengthening of relationships
between countries for bilateral partnerships. According to Sevin (2017), the
impact of public diplomacy can be divided into 3 - namely, public opinion,
relationship dynamics, and public debates. Public Diplomacy influences
public opinion – for instance, the Turkish government is using its narrative
on the Syrian refugee crisis to shape international perspective of Turkey as a
country with high standards in protecting human rights (Akşak, 2019). On
the other hand, a study of the development of a hydropower station in
Myanmar, shows that the use of public diplomacy was effective in
improving foreign relations between China and Myanmar (Mogensen,
2017). While public diplomacy improves foreign relations, it also affects
and influences public debates and is essential to the content of news,
in-addition to developments in the public sphere (Helmers, 2016).
Traditionally the relationship between Korea and Nigeria has been fluid,
but in recent time, the increase in the presence of the activities of the
Korean government in Nigeria is changing the status quo. The presence of
the Korean government and investors is evidence in the collaboration on the
development of the first government innovation cluster in Nigeria and the
activities of the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) in
Nigeria (Shenkoya & Kim, 2018). While there are various factors used in
public diplomacy, in this study, the following factors were examined in the
study of the influence of Korean public diplomacy strategies on the human
capital and national capacity development in Nigeria. These include – the
use of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Official Development Assistance,
Technology Transfer, Global Korea Scholarship, and the Technical
Assistance provided by KOICA. The methodology that was used to achieve
this was the use of a systematic literature review, as well as the quantitative
analysis of secondary data. This study presents itself as the first study to
examine the impact of Korean diplomacy in Nigeria. Also, the theoretical
framework developed and adopted herein is also been used for the first time
to examine the subject matter. In line with this, this research seeks to
provide answers to the following questions:
R1: ‌What are the benefits of the public diplomacy strategies of the
Korean government on the development of human and national
capacity in Nigeria?
R2: How has the efforts of the Korean government affected public
perception of Korea in Nigeria?
R3: What is the Korean government currently doing right and what
needs to be done to improve the efforts of the Korean government’s
diplomacy in Nigeria?
R4: What are the immediate benefits as well as the long-term benefits
for the Korean government?
Theoretical framework
In this research, the Theory of Change (which is based on causality analysis
using the results chain framework) will be used to examine the effects of
Korean public diplomacy in Nigeria. According to Organizational Research
Services (2004), the Theory of Change (TOC) identifies the methodology
that will be used to create a certain change. In this study, the change that
will be examined is the human capital and national capacity development,
as a result of the Korean government’s diplomacy in Nigeria. On the other
hand, the results chain is a logical flow of how strategies align to deliver
results. According to Ferretti (2003), results chains are frameworks that
show how policies are turned into specific results. This framework is a
decentralized network of steps that shows how inputs, and activities deliver
results (output, outcomes, and impacts) of an intervention. This was done
while considering each step using a causality relationship in a logical flow
of events. According to MacKenzie (2013), a causality relationship is also
known as a cause and effect relationship. In these relationships, the results
at each level are as a direct result of activities that takes place in the lower
level. As such, in this study, the strategies used by the Korean government
in its public diplomacy strategies in Nigeria will be examined using the
TOC (See Figure 1- for more details).
The five levels in the results chain that will be considered are the ‘Input,’
‘Activities,’ ‘Output,’ ‘Outcomes’ and ‘Impact’ stages. In the ‘Input’ stage,
the inputs used by the Korean government will be considered. Herein, it is
assumed that the inputs of the Korean government’s diplomacy in Nigeria
Impact Improved multilateral cooperation between Nigeria and Korea
Outcome Improved human capacity and national capacity development
Number of
Output
Official Foreign KOICA’s Global Korean
Technology
Development Direct Technical Scholarship
Transfer
Assistance Investment Aid Program
beneficiaries
Branding public Cultural public

Activities
diplomacy diplomacy
Input Financial Aid Technical Aid
Figure 1. Theoretical foundation
can be classified into financial, and technical Aids intervention and they
influence the second stage. This means because of the inputs mentioned, the
next stage - which is the ‘Activity’ stage is established. In this study, activities
will be classified into 2 - namely, Branding diplomacy, and Cultural
diplomacy. Branding diplomacy focuses on creating a national brand (for a
country) in another country - to improve its perception, while cultural
diplomacy develops a broad understanding of cultural practices (of a
country) through the use of cultural tools that projects its national culture
(Dubinsky, 2019; Hurn, 2016).
A summation of the effects of these two forms of diplomacy, leads to the
next level – the ‘Output’ level. In this level, the Korean government uses
policy tools such as Official Development Assistance (ODA), Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI), Technology transfer (TT), Global Korea
Scholarship, and the Technical Assistance provided by KOICA. The results
from this level gives rise to the next level - which is the ‘Outcome’ level. In
this level, it is believed that the results from the ‘Output’ level will lead to
an improvement in human capital and national capacity development in
Nigeria. Finally, the added value of the ‘Outcome’ level is responsible for
the ‘Impact’ level. This means, as the human capacity and national capacity
of a country improves, multilateral cooperation is strengthened between
Korea and Nigeria. This study presents itself as one of the earliest studies to
use the TOC in studies relating to foreign / public diplomacy. Hence, within
this study the results chain concept as described above.
METHODOLOGY
The methodology adopted in this study is a mixed method - which comprises

of a systematic literature review and a statistical analysis of secondary data
relating to the subject matter. The factors that will be examined include -
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Official Development Assistance, Technical
Assistance, Technology Transfer, Global Korea Scholarship, and the
Technical assistance provided by KOICA. The reason for the choice of these
variables relate to the public diplomacy strategies of the Korean government
in Nigeria. In this study – based on the theoretical model examined herein -
the following assumptions will be made:
H1: The Official Development Assistant of the Korean government

has a positive influence on the development of human capacity and
national capacity in Nigeria.
H2: The Foreign Direct Investment of the Korean government has a
positive influence on the development of human capacity and
H3: The Technical Aid of KOICA has a positive influence on the
development of human capacity and national capacity in Nigeria.
H4: The transfer of technology by the Korean government has a
positive influence on the development of human capacity and
H5: The implementation of the Global Korea Scholarship of the
Korean government has a positive influence on the development of

human capacity and national capacity in Nigeria.
It is important to that research in this field in Nigeria is still in its infancy,

hence there is a paucity of literature on the subject matter. To ensure that
this did not have a negative result on the results obtained herein, a mixed
methodology was adopted.
ANALYTICAL RESULTS
Determining the impact of ODA in Nigeria

The analysis in this study will be divided into 4 sections - based on the
hypothesis made in this research. In the first section, the first hypothesis
will be examined. According to OECD (2020), Official Development
Assistance (ODA) is an economic tool used to enhance economic develop-
ment of developing / under-developed countries; these include - aids, soft
loans and provision of technical assistance. It is important to note that while
some developed countries deliver ODAs by themselves, other deliver them
through multi-lateral development agencies like the United Nations or the
World Bank. In this research, special consideration is given to ODA aid
delivered directly through the Korean government to the Nigerian
government. While the United Nations (UN) has a target that seeks to see
that developed countries give 0.7% of their Gross National Income (GNI) to
ODA (OECD, 2020), the ODA profile of Korea shows that Korea’s
contribution to ODA support is lower and the top 10 recipients are Iraq, Sri
Lanka, Bangladesh, Indonesia, China, Vietnam, Yemen, Cambodia, Kenya,
and Laos (OECD, 2008).
However, Sungil (2015) deduced from his research that key priority
recipients of ODA from Korea to Africa - are Cameroon, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, and
Uganda. In-line with this, the aim of this examination is to determine the
relationship between ODA and human capital and national capacity
development. The results of a systematic literature review carried out is
presented in Table 1. The results show that while the Korean government
Table 1. Evaluation of the effects of Korean ODA in Nigeria

Author Year Journal Research scope Main findings
This study shows that while the
Korean government’s ODA is
How efficient is
increasing, it is little compared to
Lumsdaine The Pacific the Korean
2007 that of other developed countries.
& Schopf Review government’s
Hence, the impact of the ODA
ODA?
(relating to public diplomacy and
poverty alleviation) is less
The results of the study show that
the Korean government’s ODA
initiative has been essential in the
improvement of the welfare in
The impact of Nigeria and in ensuring that
Yoon & Journal of East
2014 Korean ODA in public perception of Korean
Moon Asian Studies
Africa remains positive. The study
further shows that the ODA of the
Korean government to Africa
from 2003 to 2011 has been
increasing
The purpose of the Korean
government’s ODA can be
classified into 3, namely - to
The influence of
improve food and energy security,
Darracq & South Korea in
2014 Chatham House establish new markets, and
Neville Sub-Saharan
counter the influence of North
Africa
Korea, while strengthening public
diplomacy in Sub-Saharan
countries
Understanding
The use of ODA by the Korean
the ODA
government is to ensure the
Journal of East strategies of the
Park 2014 development of Nigeria and to
Asian Affairs Korean
foster the economic development
government in
of Korea in Africa
Africa
Determining the
Asian The strategy of the Korean
strategy of the
Education and government’s ODA is the use of
Chung 2016 Korean
Development education as a tool for
government’s
Studies development
ODA
The ODA support of Korea is
Understanding
African and focused on alleviating poverty in
Kim 2017 South Korea’s
Asian Studies Africa while improving public
Aid to Africa
diplomacy
Table 1. Evaluation of the effects of Korean ODA in Nigeria (continued)

This study shows that while the
Korean government’s ODA is
How efficient is
increasing, it is little compared to
Hwang et the Korean
2018 Sustainability that of other developed countries.
al. government’s
Hence, the impact of the ODA
ODA?
(relating to public diplomacy and
poverty alleviation) is less.
The main aim of the Korean
A study of the
government in giving ODAs to
impact of ODA
Jung et al. 2018 Pacific Focus developing / underdeveloped
on foreign
countries is to strengthen
cooperation
international cooperation
An examination
of the Korean
This project is improving the use
government’s
of ICT and electronic media in
The Association Multimedia-
Nigeria and it is envisaged that
YoungSoog 2018 of North-east based Education
the long-term impact will be the
Asian Cultures Program for
development of the most robust
Nigerian Primary
electronic facility in Africa.
and Secondary
School Teachers
The ODA support from the
An examination Korean government has a positive
Journal of
of the Korean impact in the development of
Convergence
Kim 2020 e-Government governance in Nigeria. However,
for Information
ODA Project in more needs to be done to improve
Technology
Nigeria the speed of development /
change.
has been increasing its ODA to Nigeria, the main strategy of the Korean
government is to alleviate poverty in the country. This Korean government
does through the use of projects in Nigeria. These projects seek to foster
development within various sectors and strengthening the education sector
in Nigeria.
Investigation on the effects of Foreign Direct Invest in Nigeria

According to OECD (2020), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is a class of
overseas investment in an economy which seeks to establish a long-term
interest in securing a degree of authority over the economy in the
Source: OECD (2020)

Figure 2. Korean Foreign Direct Investment in Africa
benefitting country. Based on this definition, it is clear that - one of the key
reasons why countries give FDI is for public diplomacy. However, they are
2 types of FDIs: namely inflow and outflow. FDI inflow represents the
value of investment coming in from a transcontinental source - which
consists of company loans, capital, and investments, while FDI outflow is
the value of investment going out from a foreign source - which consists of
company loans, capital, and investments (UN, 2017). In this study, only the
FDI outflow from Korean to Nigeria will be considered. This is because the
focus of this study is to examine the effect of Korean FDI in Nigeria. An
examination of data collected from the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (2020) - shows that the Korean government’s
FDI in Nigeria has varied over the years (See Figure 2 - for more details).
While there was a sharp decline from 2006 to 2009, 2010 to 2012 showed a
steady rise. According to Ugochukwu et al. (2013), FDI plays a very
important part in the development of Nigeria and is a source of resources
for development. As such, the profile of countries with high outflows of
FDIs to Nigeria is relatively held high in the public. In essence, FDI is a
useful tool for public policy and development in Nigeria.
While Nigeria receives FDI from different countries, countries in Europe
and the United Kingdom offer more compared to other continents, including
- Asia (See Figure 3- for more information). As a result, European countries
Source: UNCTAD/DITE/WID
Figure 3. FDI flows abroad, by geographical destination, 1990-1998 (Millions of Naira)
and countries within the United Kingdom have more influence on policies
in Nigeria and a better relationship with the country. This is evident in the
fact that Nigeria already has bilateral treaties to promote investment, and
treaties to avoid double taxation with France, and the United Kingdom
while other countries have one or none of the treaties (UNCTAD/DITE/
WID, 2020). Korea, particularly, only has a treaty to avoid double taxation
in Nigeria but is yet to sign a treaty that promotes investment between the 2
countries. This represents a fundamental challenge to the quest of Korea to
increase its public and foreign diplomacy in Nigeria. Based on the review of
literatures carried out, no correlation was established between the FDI of the
Korean government to Nigeria and human capital and national capacity
development.
Analysis of the activities of KOICA in Nigeria

Studies that focus on examining the activities of KOICA in Nigeria are few,
hence there is a paucity of resources relating to the subject. However, in this
research, most of the available information regarding the subject was
examined. According to the International Disability Alliance (2020),
KOICA was established by the Korean government in April 1991 and is
Table 2. An examination of the activities of KOICA in Nigeria

The efforts of the Korean government
to improve South - South and
triangular cooperation in Nigeria - is
Examining South-
delivered by KOICA - through the
South cooperation
UNU-IIST development / implementation of the
in the
Ojo et al. 2007 Technical master plan of the Nigerian
development of
Report 371 government, capacity development,
software
e-Learning, computerization of
technology
government offices, and Software
Technology / human resource
development
Scientific KOICA has been involved in the
An analysis of
Journal of development of the education sector
universal basic
Tsafe 2013 Pure and in Nigeria, particularly in the
education in
Applied development of classrooms in Kogi,
Nigeria
Sciences Katsina, Gombe and Adamawa States
Asia-Pacific The Nigeria government engaged the
World Examining services of KOICA in enhancing
Jonathan et Congress on bilateral relations e-governance in Nigeria. The results
2014
al. Computer between Korea of these partnerships show that the
Science and and Nigeria Nigerian government is learned
Engineering through the Korean experience
African The efforts of the The Korean government has been
Journal of Korean contributing to Democratic
Political government to Governance for Development (DGD)
Abdullahi 2015
Science and promote credible project through KOICA and so far, it
International elections in has contributed $230,000 from 2012
Relations Nigeria -2015
A study on the
The Korean government through
International approach of the
KOICA is implementing various
Journal of Korean
Park et al. 2015 programs in education focused on
Educational government in
children-centered integrated
Development delivering
community development approach
education projects
Understanding the
role of KOICA in
the development The role of KOICA in the
Journal of
Magatakarda of Technical development of TVET in Nigeria has
2017 Arts &
and Ibrahim Vocational been critical to the successes recorded
Science
Education and within the education sector in Nigeria
Training in
Nigeria (TVET)
saddled with the responsibility of maximizing Korean grants to foreign

countries. The commitments of KOICA include to - eliminate stigma and
discrimination, improve inclusive education, provide viable routes to
economic empowerment, harnessing technology and innovation, ensure data
disaggregation, and empowering women and girls with disabilities - in
conflict and humanitarian contexts (International Disability Alliance, 2020).
However, in this study, only the activities of KOICA relating to inclusive
education will be considered because the scope of this study is to investigate
the effects of the activities of KOICA on capacity building. In this study, all
available documents and research paper were reviewed, and the results
presented in the Table 2. The results from the evaluation shows that the
activities of KOICA in Nigeria has been to actively support the development
of the education sector in Nigeria – through funding and various projects
that seek to develop the education infrastructure all over Nigeria.
On the other hand, an analysis of the investment of the Korean
government through KOICA show no steady trend. In Figure 4, it can be
seen that the highest investment was recorded in 2017 but declined in 2018.
However, the most important fact from the review of literatures shows that
the Korean government has presence in Nigeria and is actively supporting
human capital and national capacity development in the country.
Transfer of technology from Korea to Nigeria. In this section, two
projects (on-going projects) that involve technology transfer from Korea to
Nigeria - will be considered. This is because these are the only known cases
of technology transfer between the Korean and Nigerian government. EU
(2020) – defines Technology Transfer (TT) as a way of transferring scientific
and technological research - along with associated skills / procedures - to a
specific market or society. This transition may be carried out on a bilateral
level, national level or amongst the components of the national innovation
system. The stages involved in a technology transfer can be classified as –
discovery, disclosure, evaluation, intellectual property protection, marketing,
licensing, project development, and public use / financial returns (EU,
2020). In this study, however, technology transfer through project
development was considered. Previous studies have shown a correlation
between Technology Transfer and public diplomacy in various countries.
For instance, Cho & Shenkoya (2019) - in their research on the factors that
Figure 4. Trend in KOICA’s investment in Nigeria
influence technology transfer between transferor and transferee – concluded

that public perception - in each country involved in a technology transfer -
determines the choice of partner in a partnership or collaboration.
The first project that will be considered involves a partnership between
the African Development Bank and the Busan Metropolitan City and the
Busan Techno Park - to enhance Technology transfer in Africa. One of the
strategies adopted by this project is the use of Korean government’s funding
- for the development of Innovation Clusters in Africa. Even though, many
instances of the development of innovation clusters exist in Nigeria, none
has been completed. A notable example of a project that is benefitting
(directly or indirectly) from this partnership is the Abuja Technology Village
Science Park. According to Shenkoya & Kim (2018). This project is still
receiving ongoing technical and financial support from the Korean govern-
ment, and the Korean government - through the Ministry of Science and
ICT is partnering on the project and has successfully developed the Master
plan for the science park (Shenkoya & Kim, 2019). On the other hand, the
Korean government is involved in the development of the ICT infrastructure
in the Science Park (Shenkoya & Kim, 2018). This partnership strengthens
bilateral trade and development. This is because the ICT infrastructure as
well as some of the technical skills required for the project are from Korea.
The second project to be considered herein - involves a two-year Masters’
degree program in Information Technology. This program provides an
integrated course focused on the IT technologies and Korean business

strategies (Financial Nigeria, 2019). While Nigerians are benefitting from
the project, the statistic on the number of beneficiaries is not available, at
the time of completing this study. However, the President of the African
Development Bank (Akinwumi Adesina) noted that - this partnership will
improve technology transfer from Korea to Africa, as well as improve
capacity development in Africa (Financial Nigeria, 2019). The underlining
aim of these partnerships is to strengthen the Korean government’s public
diplomacy in Nigeria while improving the capacity of the people.
Global Korea Scholarship and benefits to Nigeria. The Global Korea
Scholarship is a program of the Korean government that seeks to improve
the capacity building of students all around the world, in Bachelors,
Masters, Doctoral and Post Doc levels. This program, which is fully funded,
provides students most especially from developing countries, with quality
education. In 2020, the scholarship granted 1,276 international students
from 153 countries (OFA, 2020). Since the start of the program in 1967,
many Nigerians have benefitted from the program. This program has gone
through many changes, the most recent is the integration of various related
scholarship programs of the Korean government into the Global Korea
Scholarship in 2009 (Bader, 2017). Since 2010, over 11 graduates and about
4 undergraduate students benefit from the program yearly – in Nigeria.
These students, at the end of the program, return to Nigeria and create
positive change – by using the knowledge they gained from Korea. On the
other hand, during this program, Nigeria students are exposed to Korean
culture as well as lifestyle. This exposure creates a favorable perception of
Korea - that will be useful in the future in public and foreign diplomacy.
This is because, according to Abimbola et al. (2015), Australia uses education
scholarships to strengthen its foreign diplomacy in Africa. In-line with this,
China is also using its education aid to strengthen relations in Africa
(Tingting, 2014). On the other hand, some of the successful Nigerian
graduates from the Global Korea Scholarship Program - are full time lectures
at various institutions in Nigeria, while others are gainfully employed in the
public or private sector (Shenkoya & Kim, 2018). A decent amount was able
to start their own enterprise. The exact statistics relating to this is not
available at this time, but in future this limitation will be resolved. The
results from this analysis shows that indeed the activities of KOICA in
Nigeria strengthen human and national capacity development.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study started off by examining the impact of the Korean government’s
public diplomacy strategies on the development of human and national
capacity in Nigeria. In-order to achieve this, a theoretical approach that
focuses on causality analysis of various strategies (using the results chain)
was used. Based on this theoretical model, 5 hypotheses were made and
studied. The first hypothesis (H1) assumed that the ODA of the Korean
government to Nigeria has a positive impact on the development of human
capital and national capacity in Nigeria. In-line with the systematic review
of literature and the analysis of secondary data carried out, the results show
that this hypothesis is indeed true. This is because the strategy of the Korean
government in delivering its ODA in Nigeria focused on strengthening the
education system in the country and building the state of the art infrastructure
to enhance innovation – which will drive economic growth in the long run.
According to Dahlman & Nelson (1995), the development of educational
system leads to progress in the social absorption in the National Innovation
System (NIS) of a country - which will improve economic development. A
NIS is a framework of key players within an economic system that enhance
innovation through sharing - information, and resources (human, capital and
financial) through a partnership. This partnership leads to developments
within the economy. As, human resources represents a key component of
the NIS, enhancing the capacity of these components has a direct influence
on strengthening the system. Hence, the contribution of the Korean govern-
ment, creates positive change in Nigeria. However, it is important to note
that the results obtained in this study shows that the ODA of the Korean
government is little compared to its competitor like China in the region. As
such, China enjoys better policy influence in Nigeria, compared to Korea,
and has more trade partnerships. China’s strategic partnership (most
especially in trade) in Africa has been on the rise over the years (Regissahui,
2019). On the other hand, an examination of the trade export from Korea to
Source: IMF (2020)

Figure 5. Volume of Export from Korea to Nigeria
Nigeria from 2006 to 2018 shows that the trend has been fluctuating and has
been reducing since 2017 (See Figure 5 - for more information).
In-order for Korea to increase its public diplomacy in Nigeria, it is
important that the Korean government continues to implement its strategy to
focus its ODA on education, but must also seek to increase its presence and
commitment to Nigeria – through improved funding. Another approach to
improve the impact of ODAs will be to diversify its use. A notable way of
doing this is to use ODA to develop social media and other mediums of
communications - to advocate the interest of Korea in the country. In a
study on the use of social media in public diplomacy in Turkey, Zaharna &
Uysal (2006) concluded that social media is an effective way of building
strong partnerships, managing relationships, and public diplomacy. However,
this may present a problem for the Korean government unless it is willing to
overcome the language barrier between the country. China has been able to
overcome this using bi-directional language cooperation in Africa (Kathina
et al., 2018).
Even though the UN recommends that developed countries should have
an ODA bench mark (to developing countries) of 0.7% of their Gross
National Income (GNI), the share of the gross national income of Korea that
is dedicated to ODA is still less than 0.2% (OECD, 2008). As such, the
Korean government’s contribution to ODA must change to improve its
efforts of public diplomacy all over the world and in Nigeria as well.
According to (OECD, 2018) - after a review carried out on the ODA of
Korea in foreign countries - the following recommendations were made to
improve the impacts of the Korean governments ODA;
I. ‌The Committee for International Development Cooperation

(CIDC) should be reformed through imbibing the concept of
strategic planning and programming - in its delivery of ODA.
II. ‌All agencies involved in delivering Korean ODAs must use - a
result-based management system, better risk management,
improved project finance, and must learn from experience - to
improve the delivery of results.
III. ‌The Korean government should set out a timeframe and targets
for allocating 0.3% of its national income as ODA by 2030.
IV. ‌Korean embassies and country offices must be active participants
in supporting the government’s ODA interventions.
V. ‌The process of selecting projects for ODA intervention must be
robust and inclusive (both partnering countries and benefitting
countries should be involved).
The second hypothesis (H2) considered herein – assumes that the FDI
(outflow) of the Korean government to Nigeria has a positive impact on the
development of human and national capacities. The results herein show that
while records of FDI from Korea to Nigeria exist, in recent times it
continues to reduce compared to other countries. On the other hand, there
exists no link between the FDI of the Korean government on the development
of human capacity in Nigeria. However, the results show that the Korean
government’s FDI has been useful in building public infrastructure. This
result does not support the assumption that FDI is used by the Korean
government in its public diplomacy efforts in Nigeria rather it shows that
the Korean government uses its FDI to alleviate poverty in Nigeria.
In-relation to this, there are many evidences to prove that FDI are effective
tools for economic development (Buzdugan & Tuselmann, 2018, Abdouli &
Hammami, 2020). However, the approach of the Korean government’s FDI
support in Nigeria is not effective as previously discussed. In-order to
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Korean governments FDI,

the FDI to Nigeria should improve. According to Abekah & Nwaba (2018),
the Chinese government’s approach to FDI in Africa is to ensure a steady
outflow to Africa – which is responsible for the influence of China in
Africa. According to Marchick & Slaughter (2008), for FDI to be effective,
they must meet 4 criteria which include:
I. ‌FDI should be focused on enhancing national security in the

recipient country,
II. ‌FDI should be regular and time bound, and the review process of
the effects of FDI must be confidential with no information sent
to beneficiaries, and
III. ‌FDI should be based on tackling a certain issue rather than
having a sectoral focus.
The third hypothesis (H3) considered in this study sort to determine if

the activities of KOICA in Nigeria had a positive effect on human capital
and national capacity development. The results obtained herein show that
the activities of KOICA indeed has a positive effect on building human and
national capacities in Nigeria. This is because most of the activities of
KOICA in Nigeria focused on technical capacity building. Most especially,
KOICA carries out its duties through the implementation of education
projects focused on helping the Nigeria government develop education
systems in the country and human capacity in Nigeria. Also, the impact of
KOICA in developing human capital of Nigerians can be seen in the
increase in the number of students going to study in Korea. According to
ICEF (2018), the number of international students from Africa in Korea is
on the rise and most of these students are from Nigeria. However, it is
important to note that they are many prevailing problems in Nigeria – such
as, hunger, poverty, lack of potable water, poor health care and education,
insecurity, climate change and sanitation issues, and other issues (Idemudia,
2016; Ogbuabor & Onwujekwe, 2019). Some of the most severe and
pressing issues are hunger, lack of potable water, insecurity, and health care.
In-line with this, the activities of KOICA need to include other sectors and
should be based on the criticality of the problems in the sector. It is recom-
mended that the Korean government adopt a similar model used by the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Nigeria.
The USAID just like KOICA engages in activities to develop the education
system in Nigeria but is also actively managing interventions focused on
climate change, gender, and nutrition (Thomas et al.,2017; Wunti, 2014).
Other ways KOICA can improve its activities and impact in Nigeria;
include – developing and implementing Active Labor Market Programs
(ALMP), designing and implementing career guidance programs, and
engaging in informal sector training (Sangbaek, 2014).
The fourth hypothesis (H4) examined - focused on whether the transfer
of technology from Korea to Nigeria had an impact on developing human
and national capacity. The results obtained in this study shows that indeed
the transfer of technology from Korea to Nigeria was building human and
national capacity – through foreign exchange of experts, trainings, and the
movement of technologies - to Nigeria from Korea. The Korean government
is actively involved in the development of ICT infrastructures in Nigeria
and is actively trying to improve the use of updated e-platforms in governance
in Nigeria. However, the use of technology transfer by the Korean govern-
ment in Nigeria is limited and in most cases in its infancy. Nevertheless, if
the impact of the activities of the Korean government must increase, it is
important that the Korean government seeks to take an active role rather
than a passive role.
A notable hindrance in Technology Transfer between Korea and Nigeria,
is the cost of Korean technology compared to their Chinese counterpart.
According to Byung-Wook (2020), Chinese technologies are cheaper
compared to their Korean counterpart thereby negating the market share of
Korean technology globally. This is evident in the fact that China is in the
top 10 trading partners of Nigeria in terms of export, while Korea is not
(Workman, 2020). According to Lee & Kim (2013), the following measures
will help the Korean government improve its technology transfer efforts;
these include-
I. ‌The Korean governments R&D efforts should be transformed

into R&BD (a more focused research based on the needs
presented within global economies).
II. ‌The organizations and agencies responsible for technology

transfer must be independent.
III. ‌Within the university systems, sections which aims are to attract
investment must be established.
IV. ‌The laws, regulation, and policies relating to TT must be revised,
improved, and reformed.
V. Monitoring and databases of TT should be updated.
The final hypothesis (H5) considered, sort to check the impact of the
Global Korea Scholarship Program on human and national capacity
development. The results show that this program has contributed to the
development of Nigerians. This is because the program allows students
from poor and disadvantaged families to have access to world class education
for free. This would have been impossible for them without the generous
support of the Korean government. Furthermore, the process of selection is
highly competitive and promotes hard work and excellence. The results
show that most of the graduates from the scholarship, return to Nigeria to
contribute their quota using the knowledge gained. This in turn leads to
economic growth. However, the Global Korea Scholarship needs to overcome
certain problems. Some of these problems; include – growing cultural issues
faced by beneficiaries, student exchange issues, and stress faced by students
during the program (Badar, 2016). These problems need to be addressed to
improve and attract more students - internationally.
Conclusively, this research has been able to answer the 4 key questions
in which it seeks to provide answers to. Firstly, the benefits of the public
diplomacy strategies of the Korean government is leading to positive changes
in the development of human and national capacities to drive economic
development in Nigeria. Secondly, the public diplomacy efforts of the Korean
govern is yielding positive effects in the public perception in Nigeria and
strengthens the bilateral relations between Korea and Nigeria. Thirdly, the
Korean government needs to increase its ODA in Nigeria, diversify its
approach to FDI, subsidize the cost of Korean technology to Nigeria and
continue its scholarship program. Fourthly, the long term benefits of the
public diplomacy of the Korean government can be seen in increased trade,
public perception and partnership between the 2 governments. Conversely,
like every study, this research has its limitations. A notable limitation of this
study is the paucity of research and the effects of limited data collection of
public data in Nigeria. However, this does not affect the results of this study
because a mixed method (a systematic literature review and an evaluation of
secondary data) was used. Future studies will need to overcome this issue
by including a survey.
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469
Humanitarian Aid and Public Diplomacy:

How Helping Developing Countries Combat
COVID-19 is a Win-Win for South Korea and
the World
Zachary Lavengood
Abstract | The COVID-19 pandemic has been particularly difficult for

developing countries which have seen their healthcare infrastructure
overwhelmed and vital aid and assistance programs disrupted. South Korea,
one of the first countries to be affected by the outbreak, has successfully
avoided many of the harsh containment measures implemented elsewhere
thanks to an organized and innovative response which allowed it to return to
a tentative sense of normalcy. This paper argues that South Korea’s
successes in dealing with COIVD-19, coupled with its status as a nexus of
international development, present an opportunity for a win-win scenario for
Korean public diplomacy through the implementation of aid programs
designed to combat COVID-19 and the societal issues it creates in
developing countries. In addition to reviewing the applicability of existing
Korean aid programs, such as those conducted by KOICA, KOFIH, and
others, for combating COVID-19, this paper concludes with policy
recommendations which serve to work in alleviating the challenges the
developing world faces during the pandemic, namely: procuring medical
supplies, food insecurity, and promoting health literacy.
국문초록 | 코로나19는 의료서비스 기반시설이 압도되고 필수적인 지원과 원

조 프로그램이 저해된 개발도상국에게 특히나 어려웠다. 전염병 발발에 가장 처
음으로 영향을 받은 나라 중 하나인 대한민국은 체계적이고 혁신적인 대응 덕분
에 다른 곳에서 시행된 가혹한 봉쇄 조치를 성공적으로 피했고 잠정적인 정상감
을 찾을 수 있었다. 이 논문은 국제 개발의 연결점이라는 지위와 더불어 대한민
국의 성공적인 코로나19 대처가 한국의 공공 외교에 윈-윈 시나리오의 기회를 제
시하며, 이는 개발 도상국에서 코로나19와 그와 관련된 다른 사회적 문제에 맞서
싸우기 위해 고안된 원조 프로그램의 시행을 통해 가능하다고 주장한다. 이 논문
은 한국국제협력단(KOICA), 한국국제보건의료단(KOFIH) 등 현존하는 한국의

원조 프로그램이 코로나19와의 싸움에 적용 가능한지 검토하고, 이 전염병이 도
는 동안 의료 물자 수급, 식량 불안정, 보건 지식 교육 등 개발도상국이 마주하는
어려움들을 완화시키는 데 도움이 될 수 있는 정책 조언으로 마무리한다.
Introduction
South Korea was one of the first countries to be affected by the Coronavirus
Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, and due to organized and innovative
containment measures was among the first to control the spread of the virus
within its borders, thereby avoiding many of the more harsh quarantine
protocols seen elsewhere around the world (You, 2020). While South Korea
has returned to a tentative sense of normalcy, COVID-19 remains a serious
crisis globally and has disrupted the normal workings of the World-system
in ways not seen since the Second World War. Looking for similar successes
in their own countries, many are now turning to the South Korean model of
testing, tracing, and containment in an effort to fight the pandemic.
(Cunningham, 2020; Maresca, 2020; Hendrie, 2020).
Discrepancies between the capabilities of the developed and developing
world to cope with a major health crisis have been highlighted since the
pandemic began to spread outside of its epicenter in East Asia during the
first quarter of 2020. The healthcare and aid infrastructure in the latter was
quickly overwhelmed by the virus; containment measures to slow the spread
of COVID-19 in the developing world have had limited impact outside of
draconian lock-downs which have been found to be only had marginally
successful, and in some cases, have been shown to have serious unintended
consequences such as increases in rates of starvation and increased
likelihood of physical and sexual abuse in vulnerable populations (Dettmer,
2020). The pandemic has also had serious economic repercussions for the
developing world whose populations often work in informal occupations
with no social safety net, compounding aforementioned problems along
with a host of other issues which self-perpetuate once the fragile balance of
society is disrupted (Letzing, 2020).
South Korea has become an international development nexus due to its
Humanitarian Aid and Public Diplomacy 471
history as a recipient of aid and its present status as an international

coordinator of development and assistance (Baker, 2017). Focusing on
medical assistance, humanitarian aid, and development assistance, this
paper will argue that South Korea’s domestic containment policy successes
during the pandemic and renowned medical expertise, in tandem with its
network of aid organizations, gives it a unique opportunity to help the
developing world combat COVID-19 through a combination of existing
programs and new initiatives. This also presents an opportunity for South
Korea’s public diplomacy, wherein the positive image projected by this aid
during an international crisis will reinforce the relationships South Korea
has forged with the developing world and raise the international prestige of
South Korea as a partner of those in need. This win-win scenario will help
stem the tide of COVID-19 across the globe as well as promote the South
Korean model for international cooperation during the pandemic (Morin-
Gelinas, 2016).
This paper will first briefly outline South Korea’s pre-pandemic
humanitarian and medical aid to the developing world. Following this are
sections on the unique problems the developing world faces during the
pandemic and ways in which existing South Korean aid programs and aid
infrastructure can be used to help alleviate the impact of many of these
issues. This is followed by a look into how South Korea’s humanitarian and
medical aid to developing nations during the COVID-19 pandemic serves as
a successful policy for public diplomacy and as well as examines its
secondary benefits. Finally, a conclusion will close the paper with policy
recommendations.
South Korean Medical and Humanitarian Aid to the

Developing World
South Korea holds a unique position in the history of modern global

development, having advanced from acute underdevelopment and poverty
after the Korean War to becoming one of the most powerful and developed
economies in the world within a matter of decades. It was able to achieve
this astounding turn-around through receiving international assistance
totaling $12 billion USD over a number of decades from the Development
Assistance Committee (DAC), a forum within the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), and has now become one of the
largest donors of Official Development Assistance (ODA), helping others in
similar positions it was in itself less than a lifetime ago (WHO, Republic of
Korea-Who Country Cooperation Strategy 2019-2023, 2019).
The resources, training, and other medical aid that South Korea received
during its years as an ODA recipient were key factors in developing the
world class healthcare infrastructure Korean citizens enjoy today. According
to the South Korean Ministry of Health and Welfare, this experience is at
the core of their philanthropic assistance goals of helping developing
partner countries “in the hope of elevating the overall wellness of world
citizens” (MOHW, 2020). This assistance takes form in multiple programs
with participants and recipients in dozens of countries around the world,
with the majority being located in Asia and Africa (Kim, Ha, & Kwon,
2015). The humanitarian aid to South Korea during its time as an ODA
recipient helped bring the country out of endemic poverty through donations
of food, equipment, and expert advisement. Now, as a donor, South Korea
now sends similarly needed resources to developing countries alongside its
unique experiences of transitioning across the spectrum of development. Of
the many aid organizations originating in South Korea, two in particular
stand out for their impact in the developing world, the Korea International
Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and the Korea Foundation for International
Healthcare (KOFIH).
KOICA has been a cornerstone of South Korea’s international develop-
ment assistance since its foundation in 1991 and works in partnership with
many ODA projects and strategies. KOICA’s health program has three
strategic health objectives: enhancing water/sanitation access and access to
comprehensive nutritional services; ensuring access to essential health
services such as reproductive, maternal, child, and adolescent; and
preventing diseases and ensuring treatment. Focusing on the subject matter
of this paper, KOICA’s programs regarding disease prevention and
treatment have centered on performing vital services such as diagnostics,
strengthening national laboratory systems, public education programs,
creating professional exchange programs, and many others (KOICA, 2020).
KOFIH has also played a major role in South Korea’s international

medical aid. Working in 20 partner countries across Africa, Asia, and South
America, KOFIH’s projects center on access to healthcare for women and
adolescents, strengthening the quality of local healthcare services, and
preventing communicable diseases in local populations. KOFIH states on
their website that their mission is to “aggressively respond to the many
diseases that pose a threat to the security of humankind for future genera-
tions” (KOFIH, 2020). Many of their projects include training local medical
professionals and providing modern medical equipment in remote and
impoverished areas with the goal of establishing local medical self-
sufficiency. The medical supplies (medicines, machinery, and products) that
KOFIH donates to recipients must meet stringent guidelines, such as
medicines having expiration dates at least one year from the date of
donation and equipment donated having expected lifespans of at least three
years after technical inspection and repair to ensure that resources donated
throughout their programs provide acceptable benefits. Alongside its
projects around the world, KOFIH also works to provide healthcare
assistance to North Korea and has seen several successes including training
North Korean healthcare workers (2007-09 & 2015), supporting the
manufacturing of pharmaceuticals (2007-09), and vaccinating North Korean
children against hepatitis B (2010-12) (KOFIH, 2020).
The Developing World and COVID-19: Challenges
Communicable diseases are an ever-present threat in the developing world.

Poor sanitation infrastructure, underfunded or absent healthcare systems,
and little to no public education in health and hygiene synergize into
recurring outbreaks of diseases and viruses which claim untold scores of
lives yearly. Now COVID-19 joins a host of other ailments such as cholera,
tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, measles, and pertussis which the developing world
is unable to effectively combat with the resources at hand (Stevens, 2004).
Already many localities in the developing world have seen their healthcare
systems collapse under the burden of this new and highly contagious threat
leaving their populations with nowhere to turn for help. Below are three of
the primary challenges the developing world faces during the COVID-19
pandemic: a shortage of medical supplies, a disruption in subsistence aid,
and chronically low rates of health literacy. These are not issues unique to
the time frame of the pandemic; they have been persistent challenges to the
developing world for generations, now they serve to exacerbate what would
be a health crisis even under ideal conditions.
One of the problems national healthcare systems in the developing
world have faced since the beginning of the pandemic has been a global
shortage in personal protective equipment (PPE) and other hygienic resources
which are needed to effectively protect healthcare workers from becoming
infected by those they are treating with COVID-19, as well as prevent
patient to patient spread within healthcare facilities (McMahon, Peters,
Ivers, & Freeman, 2020). While the developed world has been able to
manufacture its way out of the critical PPE shortage after months of high
demand, many nations in the developing world have little to no existing
industry which is capable of producing either the quantity of PPE necessary
for a pandemic nor the quality of PPE which can reliably inhibit the spread
of COVID-19 from patient to caretaker. Alongside the shortage of PPE and
hygienic resources, the specialized equipment used in caring for patients in
critical condition, such as ventilators for assisted breathing, are equally
scarce, as the developed world stems the supply chain of such products to
meet their own urgently rising demands (Setipa, 2020). While some
developed nations and NGOs have donated critical goods to countries
experiencing these extreme shortages, the amounts can hardly mitigate the
extreme want that the developing world faces for quality medical goods
during the global crisis. A New York Times investigation in April 2020
showed that there were fewer than 2000 working ventilators across 41
African countries, creating such grim ratios as one working machine for
every 1,266,440 persons in Nigeria or even more shockingly, one working
machine for every 20,356,053 persons living in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. (Maclean & Marks, 2020). As the pandemic spreads in the
developing world, the inadequacy of medical supplies will become more
apparent and serve as a catalyst for widespread infection and under-care
(El-Erian, 2020).
The lack of healthcare resources in developing countries to combat
COVID-19 has led to national lockdowns as ‘hail Mary’ measures in order

to relieve pressure on healthcare infrastructure. But as India discovered
soon after its own national lockdown, the unintended consequences of such
actions can cripple economies where many rely on informal employment
and market sales as a sole source of family income (Fliegauf, 2020). During
the first quarter of the 2020-2021 fiscal year when the national lockdown
began, the Indian economy contracted by 23.9%, the worst quarterly
performance since records began in 1996, leaving millions of people
questioning how they will meet the most basic of human needs in the near
future as the pandemic remains far from contained (Frayer, 2020). The
World Bank has projected that the economic fallout from COVID-19 will
hit those at the lowest tiers of society hardest as the World-system grinds to
a crawl; a large share of the population in low income countries will retract
into extreme poverty, and those already in extreme poverty will descend
into destitution, reversing decades of development and assistance. The same
World Bank report also warns that malnutrition in the most vulnerable
populations will become exacerbated as a halt in food aid programs, such as
those which supply education systems, shut down, and supply chains from
agricultural areas become stretched or cut-off as governments lock-down
affected areas with no way to ensure an adequate and safe distribution of
food (World Bank, 2020). The World Food Programme (WFP) issued a
warning for a potentially massive spike in food insecurity in developing
regions as a direct result of the pandemic, with East African nations and the
Horn of Africa being particularly hit. WFP spokesperson Elisabeth Byers
has said that the number of food insecure people in this region is likely to
increase “to 34 million up to 41 million people in the next three months due
to the social-economic impact of COVID-19” (Kaizer, 2020).
A significant factor in the spread of communicable illnesses in the
developing world, such as COVID-19, is the low rate of health literacy
among significant portions of society. Health literacy, as defined by the
WHO, is the “level of knowledge, personal skills and confidence to take
action to improve personal and community health by changing personal
lifestyles and living conditions” and is integral in promoting the general
welfare of society (WHO, Health Promotion Glossary, 1998). Low health
literacy leads to individuals who are unable to manage their own health and
the health of their family effectively and often coincides with an individual’s
functional literacy and conceptual literacy (Kanj & Mitic, 2009). A study by
(Schrauben & Wiebe, 2017) conducted in Zambia found that six in ten
respondents had low health literacy, with especially high rates among
women (married and widowed/divorced) and younger respondents, and a
higher instance of low health literacy among those more likely to be
disadvantaged, such as those living in rural areas and without access to
education (Schrauben & Wiebe, 2017). In the current pandemic, low health
literacy can hasten the spread of COVID-19 with individuals inadvertently
promoting transmission through bad hygienic practices and misunderstanding
the nature and severity of symptoms. Low health literacy can also cause
individuals to misinterpret or reject recommendations or regulations
designed to impede the spread of the virus such as social distancing and
quarantine measures (Paakkari & Okan, 2020).
Using Existing South Korean Aid Infrastructure to

Fight COVID-19 in the Developing World
South Korea is in a prime position to assist the developing world during the
COVID-19 pandemic due to its existing aid infrastructure and its good
standing with its partner countries. As stated above, three key issues the
developing world faces during this crisis are a lack of medical supplies, a
disruption in subsistence aid, and chronically low rates of health literacy.
Below demonstrates how the South Korean government, aid organizations,
and private businesses have already begun to assist those in need as well as
how these entities’ existing networks and infrastructures can be used to
effectively distribute aid.
Beginning with medical supplies, South Korea is well known globally
for the quality medical products it produces, ranging from high-end devices
such as MRI devices and CT systems to PPE products such as masks and
gowns for medical workers (International Trade Administration, 2019).
Since the COVID-19 pandemic began, South Korea has become one of the
largest international producers of PPE products with manufactures receiving
orders from countries which are unable to fill the growing demand for PPE
with domestic production. One manufacturer alone received an order for

2,000,000 PPE kits from the Indian Union Ministry of Health and Family
Welfare, which cited the company’s production capacity as a key factor in
its decision (Chaudhury, 2020). While some countries are able to pay to
keep up with the ever-increasing demand for medical supplies during the
pandemic, many who were already struggling economically are unable to
pay the costs associated with purchases off of the international medical
supply market and must rely on assistance.
South Korea is a leading donor to nations which have experienced
shortages in PPE and medical equipment during the pandemic, with both the
public and private sector making substantial donations of these desperately
needed supplies. In early April 2020 in Indonesia saw KOICA implement
the donation and shipment of much needed COVID-19 test kits and
sanitizing sprayers to the capital Jakarta. Indonesia also received generous
donations from some of South Korea’s most iconic conglomerates, with LG
Group donating 50,000 test kits and Hyundai Motor Manufacturing pledging
50,000 full PPE equipment sets (Prasidya, 2020). The South Korean Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has played a role in ensuring that aid is distributed
at the state level to those most in need through utilizing its extensive network
of international partners. On June 6, 2020 the South Korean embassy in
Uganda, in partnership with the government of South Sudan and the United
Nations Mission in South Sudan, oversaw the donation of testing kits with
the capacity to test 10,000 patients as well as supplying 20,000 face masks
(MOFA, 2020). MOFA has also worked to assist South Korean companies
contributing to the global COVID-19 response by holding web seminars and
video conferences with leading international organizations to coordinate
relief and donations as well as providing consular support where needed.
The Director of Development Cooperation for MOFA, Cho Young-Moo said
he expects Korean companies to contribute to the promotion of global help
by “supplying excellent domestic diagnostic devices and medicines to the
international community through cooperation with the global fund.” 1
(MOFA, 2020)
The direct donation of medical supplies however is not the only way to
1 Translated from Korean, found on (MOFA, 2020)

alleviate a shortage. With many developing nations having little in the

means of liquid assets at the governmental level to purchase supplies, an
injection of funds for the purpose of financing public health projects and
buying supplies on the open market can be just as effective. On June 26,
2020 South Korea’s Finance Ministry announced the approval of $75.5
million in aid to 13 developing nations, part of a larger plan to ultimately
provide $400 million in loans and grants to help the fund health projects in
the developing world with the goal of containing COVID-19 (Yonhap,
2020). Existing aid programs, such as the Healthcare Resources Support
program run by KOFIH have the expertise to ensure the proper dispensation
of monetary aid and to ensure a high standard of oversight in the purchase
of medical supplies from the global market with the allocated funding
(KOFIH, 2020).
The economic disruption caused by COVID-19 has most affected those
who were already facing extreme hardships. The closure of borders and the
selective lockdown of provinces and regions stagnates the normal flow of
agricultural goods around the world as workers are unable to migrate during
harvest seasons, supply chains are unable to ship products, and markets are
shuttered in quarantine. Many who had been living a hand-to-mouth existence
prior to the pandemic are now finding themselves unable to fulfill basic
human needs. Several South Korean aid organizations are primed to meet
the food insecurity which has already begun to surface in developing areas.
An example of this ability to provide subsistence aid during the pandemic
can be found no closer than North Korea which in August 2020 became the
recipient of $10 million in aid from the Inter-Korean fund. These funds will
be used to buy 9,000 tons of fortified food for pregnant women, nursing
mothers, and young children, as well as 3,600 tons of food products
including corn, soy, and cooking oil (Zwirko, 2020). This donation comes
from the partnership between the WFP and South Korea, a relationship
which has helped millions around the globe through both monetary
assistance and food donations.
Other recent programs in partnership with the WFP highlight South
Korea’s ability to successfully provide aid to the developing world in
situations involving displaced peoples, a group which is particularly
vulnerable to the effects of the pandemic and whose numbers are likely to
rise as the fallout from economic disruptions brought about by COVID-19

reverberate throughout the developing world (OECD, 2020). In February
2020 a South Korean contribution to the WFP for internally displaced
peoples in Iraq was able to fulfill the food needs of 53,400 people through a
cash-based transfer program which allowed displaced families to purchase
local food, giving them the freedom to make their own dietary choices as
well as pay into the local economy (WFP, 2020). A similar e-voucher
program in Gaza and the West Bank provided funding which was able to
support more than 38,000 food insecure people, the economic impact of this
program was called by WFP Country Director Stephen Kearney “a massive
boost to the local economy and to hundreds of small businesses that would
otherwise struggle to stay afloat.” (WFP, 2019). Voucher and transfer
programs could be effective in alleviating economic strains in developing
areas during the pandemic, which has seen many who were employed in
informal work lose their primary source of income. These programs also
ensure that locally produced goods remain in circulation and help prevent
supply chain stagnation.
Concerning health literacy, South Korea is a global leader in creating
effective programs to educate individuals on how to lead healthy lives and
prevent the spread of communicable diseases. KOFIH has made great
strides improving health literacy in partner countries in Africa and South
East Asia with several of their projects running for multiple years on well-
funded annual budgets. One such project in Myanmar’s Yangon region
which began in 2014 has worked to promote health literacy in sanitation
among the community as well as train local volunteers in basic medicine. A
related project began in 2019 in the Philippines where KOFIH, in partnership
with the WHO, worked to improve and promote health-seeking behaviors
among the urban poor of Manila, this project is currently working on a three
year budget of ₩1 billion (roughly $900,000), a substantial sum for a health
literacy program and has seen compelling results for project prolongment.
(KOFIH, 2020) (Kim, Park, Shin, & Kim, 2019). KOICA has also deployed
mobile medical clinics to promote health literacy and provide medical
services for a number of years. Former agency head Kim In-shik called the
program a success, and a cost-efficient means of serving remote areas which
lack essential infrastructure (Shin, 2016). Another KOICA program, World
Friends Korea, has sent thousands of volunteers around the world in the
name of development assistance, many of whom were tasked with
promoting public health in developing regions. Their work has advanced not
only health literacy in disadvantaged regions, but also been a victory for
South Korea’s public image, drawing comparisons with the work of the
United States’ Peace Corps (Baker, 2017).
The experiences accumulated by the years of work these programs have
carried out are essential in creating public health campaigns during the
COVID-19 pandemic. The health literacy programs conducted by KOFIH,
KOICA, and others are trusted by the communities they work in and have
deep connections with partner governments, putting them in a ready
position to craft customized campaigns for local areas to meet the unique
challenges presented by local deficiencies in health literacy. These programs
are also well networked with other international aid organizations such as
the WHO, allowing them to produce broader campaigns with effective
messages related to COVID-19. Improving health literacy in key subjects
such as hygiene and basic medicine are critical to containing the spread of
the pandemic in the developing world.
South Korean Humanitarian Aid During the COVID-19

Pandemic: A Win-win for Public Diplomacy and Global
Health
International development assistance and aid as an approach to public

diplomacy has garnered increasing attention in the last decade as both
analysis from academia and feedback from the public sphere confirm the
benefits which can be realized from effective humanitarian campaigns
(Çevik, 2015) (Rawnsley, 2014) (Pamment, 2016). South Korea’s position
as a bridge between the developed and developing world allows it to use
innovative methods to foster cooperation for international development and
humanitarian aid. Due to this, South Korea has been able to “promote its
positive image among recipient nations and other foreign audiences”
boosting its international prestige and reputation and showing the utility of
international aid as a tool for strategic public diplomacy (Baker, 2017, p.
40). The COVID-19 pandemic presents an opportunity for South Korea to

use its ‘bridge’ reputation to make gains in the realm of public diplomacy as
well as become an integral force in the international effort to contain the
virus. This win-win scenario is a cornerstone of South Korea’s public
diplomacy strategy, especially in the developing world, where the relation-
ships between Seoul and its partner countries work to meet the needs of a
recipient country by finding sustainable program solutions which match
South Korea’s soft power capacities and policy goals (Morin-Gelinas,
2016).
South Korea’s aid infrastructure in the developing world and its ongoing
policies and programs as described in the previous section fit well within
Karolina Zelinska’s description of “development diplomacy”; specifically
aid such as training, consultations, and small-scale projects embedded in
local communities which show to be the most promising in meeting both
public diplomacy and aid goals (Zielińska, 2016, pp. 9, 23). Aid which was
dispensed in the early months of the pandemic has already begun to produce
positive gains for South Korea’s international reputation and the inter-
national reputation of organizations which participated in the procurement
and dispersal of the donated resources. After LG contributed their donations
to aid efforts in Indonesia, BKPM’s spokesperson Tina Talisa said “Here,
we can see that LG is not only an investor but also Indonesia’s best friend.
We certainly hope that the current solid teamwork between Indonesia and
South Korea will become stronger.”2 (Prasidya, 2020). In Kenya, a hospital
serving as one of the country’s leading COVID-19 response centers was
built with funding from KOICA in 2018 and with continued financial
support from the organization has been vital in coordinating the country’s
fight against the pandemic. Esther Somoore Kaziado, a state health official
in Kenya said in response to the aid from South Korea “Thank you for
strengthening our health care capabilities so that we can respond immediately
to the Corona 19 situation, I hope that we will overcome the current crisis
with [the help of] Korea, which has the most advanced infectious disease
response capabilities.”3 (Bone & Kim, 2020) (Kang, 2020). These accolades
2 Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal (BKPM) is the Capital Investment Coordinating

Board of Indonesia, a non-departmental government institution
3 Translated from the original Korean quote found in (Kang, 2020)
are not unique; the quality of assistance provided by South Korea to

countries in need have gilded its reputation around the world.
South Korea will continue to receive dividends from its public diplomacy
efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic well into the future. Its humanitarian
aid and development assistance to the developing world during the global
crisis, cement its place as a bastion of cooperation and guidance which is
recognized not only by governments, but also by the populations who are
the direct beneficiaries of South Korea’s assistance programs. The public
and private organizations which organize these programs are both the
propagators of this public diplomacy success and its recipients. Public
organizations such as KOICA, KOFIH, and the South Korean government
itself, benefit from the prestige of successful aid campaigns through
receiving increased funding from international bodies, increased interest in
the South Korean model of governance and development, as well as new
opportunities for partnerships as the prestige from associating with South
Korea grows. Private organizations who contribute to aid projects stand to
receive not only international recognition for their efforts, which increases
their brand reputation, but also stand to see increased revenues as demand
rises for quality South Korean goods such as PPE, sanitization products, and
medical equipment. This rise in demand could present the opportunity for
these brands to further internationalize and open manufactories in new
markets.
Conclusion & Policy Recommendations
South Korea has fared better than most other countries thus far during the
COVID-19 pandemic. Its successful containment protocols and robust
healthcare measures have ensured many of the hardships being endured
elsewhere remain foreign. These successes have led to the global community
turning to South Korea for guidance and assistance in their fight against the
virus, though for many, especially in the developing world, the high costs
associated with effective containment has put them at an insurmountable
disadvantage. Noting that as a constituent of the global community they
remain at risk so long as others remain burdened by the virus, South Korea
has used its extensive aid infrastructure to implement assistance programs

and distribute aid to those most in need, proving itself as a global leader in a
time of crisis. Organizations such as KOICA and KOFIH that have had a
presence in the developing world for decades and have created a positive
image for themselves and for South Korea among their network of partners.
With this reputation as a reliable benifactor they are able to launch successful
aid programs with the dualistic purpose as acts of public diplomacy and
humanitarian aid. Their portfolio of success lays the groundwork for the
larger programs which will be necessary for global containment of COVID-
19. Private conglomerates have also showed their ability to contribute to
ending the pandemic; the donation of money and critical resources from LG
and Hyundai to developing nations has served as an effective tool for brand
building, both for themselves and for South Korea, with the economic
incentive of increasing stability in areas of production.
The humanitarian actions taken by the public and private sector in South
Korea during the COVID-19 pandemic have served to improve its prestige
not only in the developing world, but to the entire international community.
These public diplomacy successes have reaffirmed findings by (Zielińska,
2016), (Baker, 2017), and others that aid and development assistance
present circumstances for countries to improve their international image
while helping build a better world. As the pandemic continues, South Korea’s
reputation as a bridge between the developed and developing world creates
new opportunities for its public diplomacy strategy, with countries from
both sides of the development spectrum seeking out Korean expertese. The
benefits from these actions during a time of crisis will pay out long after the
threat of the virus has subsided.
This paper closes with three public diplomacy policy recommendations
which serve to work in alleviating the challenges the developing world
faces during the pandemic mentioned above, namely: procuring medical
supplies, a disruption in subsistence aid, and low rates of health literacy.
1. The creation of a partnership between the South Korean public and
private sector to foster the domestic manufacturing of PPE and other
medical supplies in the developing world. Aiding the growth of domestic
manufacturing in critically needed resources creates three benefits for both
South Korea and for recipient countries. One, most obviously, is meeting
the demand of these products locally which directly correlate to the

containment of COVID-19. Secondly, local production of these products
can provide employment and market opportunities in areas which have had
traditional economic structures disrupted since the beginning of the
pandemic, creating stability where many are now facing an uncertain future.
Thirdly, developing local production presents an opportunity for South
Korean industries to increase their brand presence in these areas as well as
ensure that production meets the standard of quality that is to be expected of
their goods.
2. In order to meet the growing concern of food insecurity during the
pandemic, voucher and transfer programs can be created similar to those
seen in the partnership between South Korea and the WFP which promote
economic stimulation along with meeting humanitarian needs in areas
which are not under a complete lock-down. In areas under lock-down where
normal food distribution through markets is impossible, direct food
distribution through food trucks is necessary. This method of distribution is
able to take advantage of local organizational knowledge of neighborhoods
and population centers to create plans of aid dispersal which can avoid mass
gatherings which could serve to spread the virus.
3. To effectively promote health literacy in key areas such as sanitation,
hygiene, and symptom recognition, a partnership between aid organizations
and South Korea’s booming entertainment production industry can produce
high quality, easy-to-digest messages and programs which serve to inform
the public on how to best combat COVID-19. This media could prove
particularly persuasive in areas where the South Korean hallyu has taken
hold, especially if these programs have the cooperation of ‘big name’ labels
and studios. Inspiration and successful precedent can be found in Deutsche
Welle’s Crime Fighters radio and internet drama broadcast in Africa which
successfully tackles a number of social issues specifically targeting young
Africans, as well as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s
international media campaign which creates anti-drug abuse and illicit
trafficking media for global consumption (UNDOC, 2020) (Deutsche Welle,
2020).
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Chapter · December 2020

Karla Villalobos Cruz

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Publication Date December, 2020

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Copyright © 2020 by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

1. ‌YouTube Diplomacy: A Sentiment Analysis of Global Reactions to

3. ‌Korean Health Diplomacy Amidst COVID-19 and Its Impact on

4. ‌Analysis of Rok Public Diplomacy on Social Media • 91

5. ‌Addressing Global Issues through Science Diplomacy: Towards a

6. ‌“Smart” Korea and COVID-19: Exploring the Potential of Smart

7. ‌Korean Anti-Corruption Public Diplomacy • 165

8. ‌Personalized Soft Power: An Innovative Model for South Korea’s

9. ‌Korean Digital Public Diplomacy: A Case Study of the Embassy of

10. ‌The Performance of the Fourth Industrial Revolution in South

11. ‌Korean Public Diplomacy toward Africa: Scoping the Cooperation

13. ‌Moon Jae-In’s Strategy Amid Covid-19 Pandemic: Reviving the

14. ‌South Korea on the Forefront of Fifth Generation (5G) Technology:

15. ‌Role of Korean Public Diplomacy in Addressing Global Issues:

16. ‌The Role of Korean Public Diplomacy in Addressing Global Issues

17. ‌Democracy Promotion through ODA: The Future of Korean Public

18. ‌Promoting New Southern Policy in Southeast Asia: Killing Two

19. ‌A Causality Analysis of the Impact of Korean Public Diplomacy

20. ‌Humanitarian Aid and Public Diplomacy: How Helping Developing

Jenna Gibson is a PhD student in the Department of Political Science at the

Alexander M. Hynd is a PhD candidate at the University of New South

Floortje Fontein is a third year Public Administration bachelor student at

committed to improve the political representation of women and encourage

Abdou Chakour Arouna is a Global Korea Scholarship (GKS) recipient

Maissou Yacoubou holds a double BSc degree in Aviation Management

Thyene Ribas Moreira has a Bachelor’s in International Relations and is

Ayse Durakoglu is a master’s student in Asian Studies at Middle East

Azul van Marrewijk is a graduate student of International Relations at

Genaro Viesti is a graduate student in International Relations at Universidad

Bui Linh Nguyet Ha is an undergraduate student at Ewha Womans

Camila Carneiro holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Journalism and is currently

Iffat Tahira is a graduate student in the Department of Political Science and

Ingrid Rafaele Rodrigues Leiria is a Ph.D. Candidate in Economics at the

Karla Villalobos Cruz is an Undergraduate Student of International

Mark Joseph Montera is an undergraduate student of mechanical

Mathew Yeo Jie Sheng is a graduate student pursuing a Masters’ Degree in

Pavlina Svobodova is a Master’s student at Catholic University Leuven.

negotiations with non-state violent actors as a conflict resolution strategy.

Simon Bruns is an undergraduate student at Franklin University Switzerland,

Swe Yone Nanddy is a recent graduate from the University of Yangon,

Temitayo Shenkoya is a recent PhD. graduate from the Graduate School of

Zachary Lavengood is an Area Studies Ph.D. candidate at Charles

YouTube Diplomacy: A Sentiment Analysis of

Abstract | In early April 2018, a delegation of South Korean musical

국문초록 | 2018년 4월 말 문재인 대통령과 김정은 의장 사이에 있을 첫 정상

몇몇 노래의 감정적 가사에 공감하기까지 하며 콘서트 영상에 긍정적으로 반응

connecting audiences who already have an existing interest in the more

On April 6, 2018, a YouTube Channel called MBCkpop posted 18 recorded

Table 1. Summary Statistics, 2018 Spring is Coming YouTube Clips

despite this changing context.

As the results above show, viewers expressed overall positive thoughts in

“I can relate so much to this as Germany once was also separated,

1. ‌YouTube Diplomacy: A Sentiment Analysis of Global Reactions to

3. ‌Korean Health Diplomacy Amidst COVID-19 and Its Impact on

4. ‌Analysis of Rok Public Diplomacy on Social Media • 91

5. ‌Addressing Global Issues through Science Diplomacy: Towards a

6. ‌“Smart” Korea and COVID-19: Exploring the Potential of Smart

7. ‌Korean Anti-Corruption Public Diplomacy • 165

8. ‌Personalized Soft Power: An Innovative Model for South Korea’s

9. ‌Korean Digital Public Diplomacy: A Case Study of the Embassy of

10. ‌The Performance of the Fourth Industrial Revolution in South

11. ‌Korean Public Diplomacy toward Africa: Scoping the Cooperation

13. ‌Moon Jae-In’s Strategy Amid Covid-19 Pandemic: Reviving the

14. ‌South Korea on the Forefront of Fifth Generation (5G) Technology:

15. ‌Role of Korean Public Diplomacy in Addressing Global Issues:

16. ‌The Role of Korean Public Diplomacy in Addressing Global Issues

17. ‌Democracy Promotion through ODA: The Future of Korean Public

18. ‌Promoting New Southern Policy in Southeast Asia: Killing Two

19. ‌A Causality Analysis of the Impact of Korean Public Diplomacy

20. ‌Humanitarian Aid and Public Diplomacy: How Helping Developing

1. ‌Daily communication: this first dimension involves explaining the