FULE v.

CA
- Petitioner-appellant was convicted of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in the RTC of Lucena City on the
basis of the Stipulation of Facts entered into between the prosecution and the defense during the pre-trial
conference in the Trial Court.
- On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed the judgment of
conviction. Hence, this recourse, with petitioner-appellant contending that the Honorable Respondent Court
of Appeals erred in the decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting the petitioner of the offense charged,
despite the cold fact that the basis of the conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts made during
the pre-trial on August 8, 1985, which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel.

Issue: WoN the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible
in evidence.
Ruling: Yes. By its very language, the rule is mandatory. In Sec.4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures:

SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. — No agreement or admission made or entered during the
pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by
him and his counsel.

Under the rule of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while
those in the affirmative are merely directory. The use of the term “shall” further emphasize its mandatory character
and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced. And more importantly, penal
statutes whether substantive and remedial or procedural are, by consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the
government and liberally in favor of the accused.
BAYAS Vs SANDIGANBAYAN
- Three Information were filed before the SBN, charging Petitioners with violation of Section 3(e) of RA No.
3019, as amended; and two counts of malversation through falsification penalized under Article 217, in
relation to Article 171, of the Revised Penal Code. They were charged in their capacities as municipal mayor
and municipal treasurer, respectively, of the Municipality of Kabayan, Province of Benguet.
- -During their arraignment, petitioners pled "not guilty." The parties submitted a "Joint Stipulation of Facts
and Documents." Later on, the accused, represented by their new counsel, Atty. Cinco, moved to withdraw
the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents.

Issue: WoN there is a law or rule which would bar petitioners from withdrawing their Joint Stipulation of Facts and
Documents from the respondent Sandiganbayan.
Ruling: Yes. Sec 2, Rule 118. A pretrial agreement to be binding on the accused, it must satisfy the following
conditions: (1) the agreement or admission must be in writing, and (2) it must be signed by both the accused and
their counsel. The court's approval, mentioned in the last sentence of the above-quoted Section, is not needed to
make the stipulations binding on the parties. Such approval is necessary merely to emphasize the supervision by the
court over the case and to enable it to control the flow of the proceedings.
Another cogent reason why the Joint Stipulation should be binding. It must be noted that the SBN could not fully act
on the matter, not through its fault, but because of the continued absence of petitioners' counsel. Verily, the records
reveal that at the intended completion of the pretrial on January 14, 2000, it could not pass upon the Joint Stipulation
because he was absent. Also, the pretrial conference had to be re-scheduled six times, just to ensure the attendance
of the parties and their counsels and to prepare them for the conference.
ZALDIVAR Vs PEOPLE
- Zaldivar and Artajo were charged with Estafa pursuant to a complaint filed by respondent Dumasis before
the RTC. The pretrial conference was held by the trial court and a pre-trial order was issued on the same date
february 15,2005.
- The case was then re-raffled to a new judge (judge Catilo) upon a inhibition filed by Dumasis which was
granted.
- Zaldivar filed a Motion to Declare Prosecution’s Case Terminated
- Zaldivar points out that the denial of the admission of exhibits of the prosecution upon timely and sustained
objections of the accused has the effect of terminating the case of the prosecution for failure to adduce
competent and admissible evidence during trial proper.
- Judge Catilo stated that the pre-trial order did not contain matters ought to be the subject matter of a pre-
trial conference

Issue: WoN RTC Judge Catilo gravely abused its discretion in nullifying and setting aside the previous proceedings
conducted and ordered anew a pre-trial conference.

Ruling: Yes. There is nothing on record that will show any disregard of the rule (Sec 1 Rule 118). Pieces of evidence
were marked, objections thereto were raised, issues were identified, no admissions on factual matters were arrived
at, and trial dates were set. It cannot, however, simply set aside the proceedings that have been previously duly
conducted, without treading on the rights of both the prosecution and the defense who did not raise any objection
to the pre-trial proceedings.
The purpose of pre-trial was clearly subverted when the trial court hastily set aside the pre-trial proceedings and its
results. Absent any palpable explanation as to why and how said proceedings were conducted is in violation of the
rules and thus should be set aside.
ESTIPONA Vs JUDGE LOBRIGO

- Salvador Estipona, Jr. was indicted for violating Section 11 (illegal possession of illegal drugs) of Republic
Act No. 9165 or the Dangerous Drugs Act as he was alleged to have been caught in possession of shabu.
Initially, Estipona pleaded not guilty but later, with the assistance of the Public Attorney’s Office, he filed a
motion to withdraw his initial plea and with a simultaneous motion to enter into plea bargaining.
- The prosecution opposed the motions on the ground that plea bargaining is not allowed under Section 23 of
RA 9165.

Issue: WoN plea bargaining was proper

Ruling: Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even until the prosecution rests its case.
If the accused moved to plea bargain subsequent to a bail hearing or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules
allow such plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime
charged. The only basis on which the prosecution and the court could rightfully act in allowing the change in the
former plea of not guilty is the evidence on record. The ruling on such motion must disclose the strength and
weaknesses of the prosecution’s evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge’s
acceptance of the defendant’s change of plea is improper and irregular.
DAAN Vs SANDIGANBAYAN

- Joselito Daan and Benedicto Kuizon were charged before Sandiganbayan for three counts of malversation of
public funds which they purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying the time book and payrolls for given period
making it appear that some laborers worked on the construction of the new municipal hall and collected
their respective salaries when they did not.
- Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found as acceptable the proposal of the
accused to plead guilty to the lesser crime of falsification of public document
- As to the malversation cases, the prosecution was likewise amenable to the offer of Daan to plead guilty to
the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts because he has already restituted the
amount involved.
- However, the Sandiganbayan denied Daan’s Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by
the prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent reason was presented to justify its approval. Likewise, it
denied Daan’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the plea of guilty to a lesser offense is proper in this case
Held: YES. In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on the ground that petitioner and
the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal would redound to the benefit of the public.
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea bargaining may be made, i.e.,
that it should be with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, and that the plea of guilt should be to a
lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial
stage, as in the present case, the trial court's exercise of its discretion should neither be arbitrary nor should it
amount to a capricious and whimsical exercise of discretion.
PEOPLE Vs GUZMAN

- the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with two other persons, and mutually helping one
another with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, assault and employ personal violence
upon a minor.
- appellant avers that his constitutional rights to produce evidence on his behalf and to due process were
violated when the trial court denied the motion of his counsel to present substitute witnesses.
- In the Pre-Trial Order of the RTC, the defense named only four witnesses.
- During the trial, only appellant and Antonio were able to testify. When the two other witnesses in the pre-
trial order, namely, Lizardo Dedase and Eduardo Bidia, failed to appear and testify in court several times, the
defense counsel moved to substitute them explaining that they were hesitant to testify, and, that one of them
went home to his province.

Issue: whether or not the lower court erred in not allowing the accused-appellant to produce substitute ir additional
witnesses for his defense.

Ruling: The RTC was correct in denying the defense counsel’s motion for substitution of witnesses since Section 4,
Rule 118 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure mandates that the matters agreed upon in the pre-trial
conference and as stated in the pre-trial order shall bind the parties.

The pre-trial order of the RTC dated 29 February 2000 clearly shows that the defense named only four witnesses.
The parties were also informed therein that witnesses who were not mentioned in the pre-trial order will not be
entertained during the trial on the merits. Thus, pursuant to the afore-stated provision and its purpose of preventing
undue delay in the disposition of criminal cases and ensuring fair trial, the denial of the defense counsel’s motion for
substitution of witnesses is justified.

This is not to say, however, that such provision is absolute. It can be relaxed in the greater interest of justice.
Nevertheless, the exception does not apply in favor of appellant as the RTC had observed that his motion for
substitution of witnesses appears to be a "fishing expedition" of evidence which is clearly unfair to the case of the
prosecution.
AGBAYANI Vs COURT OF APPEAL

- Agbayani and Genabe were both employees of the RTC of Las Pinas, working as Court Stenographer and Legal
Researcher
- Agbayani filed a criminal complaint for grave oral defamation against Genabe before the Office of the City
Prosecutor for allegedly uttering against her, in the presence of their fellow court employees and while she
was going about her usual duties at work.
- Prosecutor found probable cause for the filing of the Information for grave oral defamation against Genabe.
- Genabe filed petition for review with the DOJ wherein the resolution of the Prosecutor was reversed and set
aside. DOJ directed City Prosecutor to move for the withdrawal of the information.
- Agbayani filed a petition for certiorari with the CA but was dismissed by CA finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the DOJ.

Issue: WoN CA gravely erred in affirming DOJs dismissal of the complaint

Ruling: No. both parties are residents of Las Pinas city anf both work at the RTC, and incident which is the subject
matter of the case happened in their workplace. Agbayani’s complaint should have undergone the mandatory brgy.
Conciliation for possible amia=cable settlement with respondent. Oral defamation under the RPC, is penalized by
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prison correctional in tis minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting
nature; otherwise, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos. The DOJ found probable
cause only for slight oral defamation. The CA did not commit reversible error in upholding the Resolution of the DOJ.
MARI Vs PEOPLE

- Private Complainant Mari executed a sworn statement before the police alleging that she was raped by
Private Respondent Paloma.
- Paloma filed a motion for bail. During the hearing for bail, Petitioner failed to appear, and an Order granting
bail was given to Paloma
- During the different stages of arraignment, pre-trial, and trial, both Public and Private Prosecutors, as well
as the Complainant herself failed to appear despite due notice. Some of their reasons for failing to appear: a.
That there is still a pending petition for change of venue
- Also, the accused has already invoked his right to a speedy trial. Accused was already in jail.
- The Respondent Judge eventually dismissed the case for failure to prosecute.
ISSUE: WoN The accused right to speedy trial is violated (YES)
RULING: Court disagrees, a reading of the rule would show that the rule shows that the only delay that may be
excluded from the time limit are those resulting from the proceedings concerning the accused. The change of venue
proceeding can only be excluded if the accused was the one who filed for it, contrary to what happened in this case.
Petitioners are also mistaken that the mere pendency of their petition for change of venue would interrupt the
proceedings before the trial court. It is the same as when a petition for certiorari is filed; it does not interrupt the
proceedings before the trial court unless a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order is given.
OLBES Vs BUEMIO

- Samir and Rowena Muhsen filed a complaint against petitioner Frederico Miguel Olbes. Olbes was then
indicted for Grave Coercion
- Olbes posted bail and was released. Judge Hipolito dela Vega denied Olbes’s motion to defer or suspend his
arraignment in light of his pending petition for review before the DoJ
- Pre-trial was moved several times. Olbes failed to appear thus prompting the trial court to issue a warrant
for his arrest. The warrant was later recalled on discovery that neither Olbes nor his counsel was notified of
said schedule.
- Olbes filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information on the ground of violation of his right to a speedy trial
- Respondent Judge Danilo A. Buemio denied Olbes’s Motion to Dismiss

ISSUE: WoN Olbes’s right to speedy trial is violated

RULING: NO, “speedy trial” is a relative term. On his arraignment on February 12, 2003, Olbes interposed no
objection to the setting of the pre-trial, which was holiday. Inarguably, the cancellation of the scheduled pre-trial on
that date was beyond the control of the trial court. jurisprudence continues to adopt the view that the concept of
speedy trial is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept and that while justice is administered with
dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious, and not mere speed. It is consistent with the delays and
depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice.

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy
trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion
of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. Moreover, the time limits set by the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 do not
preclude justifiable postponements and delays when so warranted by the situation.
ADORIO Vs BERSAMIN

- Petitioner was counsel for the private complainant in a criminal case involving BP 22 pending before the sala
of respondent Judge. Unknown to petitioner, counsel for the accused filed several requests addressed to the
branch clerk of court for the issuance of subpoenas duces tecum. Petitioner came to court and was surprised
by the presence of the bank officials.
- Petitioner argues that: the regular procedure would have been for the subpoena to be issued during the pre-
trial stage or during the time the defense is presenting its evidence and not during the time of presentation
of evidence by the prosecution.

Issue: WoN the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum was irregular.

Ruling: No. Rule 119, Section 3 of the RoC which prescribes the order of trial in criminal cases does not preclude the
defense from procuring subpoenas duces tecum during the time of the presentation of evidence. In this case, counsel
for the accused felt that he needed the documents subject of the subpoenas for his cross-examination of the
prosecution witnesses. Accordingly respondent judge called a recess to enable said counsel to secure said documents
from the bank officials. The trial was not in any way altered; counsel for the accused did not even attempt to call any
of the bank officials to the stand. Under these circumstances, the resulting delay cannot be considered unreasonable
nor irregular.
PEOPLE Vs SPO1 MARCIAL

- Two informations, one for homicide and one for frustrated homicide, were filed with the RTC against
respondents
- On arraignment, respondents pleaded not guilty to the charges filed against them. Pre-trial was thereafter
held
- During the hearing, petitioner made an oral motion to reverse the order of the trial upon the ground that
respondents admitted committing the acts for which they were charged in the two informations but
interposed lawful justifying circumstances
- Pet: since respondents expressly admitted having committed the acts charged but are interposing an
affirmative defense, a modification or reversal of the order of trial is warranted under Section 3 (e), Rule 119
of the Rules of Court
- The assailed orders of the RTC denied the request of the prosecution for a reverse order of trial

Issue: WoN RTC erred in denying the petitioner’s motion to reverse the order of the trial.

RULING: the Court finds that the RTC did not commit any reversible error in denying the request for a reverse order
of trial, a matter which under the rules is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In fact, the rule relied
upon by petitioner clearly reflects this discretionary nature of the procedure.

In any event, a denial of a motion to reverse the Order of Trial is interlocutory in nature and, hence, not appealable.
As it turned out, petitioners appeal has in fact caused more, a lot more, delay than would have been caused by
proceeding with the trial forthwith as directed by the trial court. No further delay should be countenanced in these
cases.
VDA. DE MANGUERRA Vs RISOS

- Resp: were charged with Estafa Through Falsification of Public Document before the RTC of Cebu City
- Concepcion who was a resident of Cebu City, while on vacation in Manila, was unexpectedly confined at the
Makati Medical Center due to upper gastro-intestinal bleeding; and was advised to stay in Manila for further
treatment.
- The counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latter’s deposition due to her weak physical condition
and old age, which limited her freedom of mobility. The RTC of Cebu granted the motion and directed that
Concepcions deposition be taken before the Clerk of Court of Makati City. After several motions for change
of venue of the deposition-taking, Concepcion’s deposition was finally taken on March 9, 2001 at her
residence.
Issue: WoN Rule 23 of Rules of Court is applicable in the case of Concepcion. Thus, her deposition in her residence
is valid?
RULING: It is thus required that the conditional examination be made before the court where the case is pending. It
is also necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the examination, subject to his right to waive the
same after reasonable notice.
Unlike an examination of a defense witness which, pursuant to Section 13, Rule 119 of the present Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, may be taken before any judge, or, if not practicable, a member of the Bar in good standing so
designated by the judge in the order, or, if the order be made by a court of superior jurisdiction, before an inferior
court to be designated therein, the examination of a witness for the prosecution under Section 15 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure (December 1, 2000) may be done only before the court where the case is pending.
PEOPLE Vs OCIMAR

- were charged in the court a quo for violation of P.D. 532, otherwise known as the "Anti-Piracy and Highway
Robbery Law of 1974,”
- he entered a plea of "Guilty".
- the prosecuting Fiscal moved for the discharge of accused Bermudez to be utilized as state witness.
- Appellant asserts that since accused Bermudez was part of the conspiracy, he is equally guilty as the others.
ISSUE: WoN a co-conspirator can satisfy the requisite of appearing not to be the most guilty.
RULING: A co-conspirator can qualify as a state witness and can satisfy the requisite of appearing not to be the most
guilty. As the evidence reveals, he was only invited to a drinking party without having any prior knowledge of the
plot to stage a highway robbery. But even assuming that he later became part of the conspiracy, he does not appear
to be the most guilty. By "most guilty", it means the highest degree of culpability in terms of participation in the
commission of the offense, and not necessarily the severity of the penalty imposed. While all the accused may be
given the same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered least guilty if we take into account his
degree of participation in the perpetration of the offense.
ROSALES Vs COURT OF APPEALS

- An Information was filed before RTC of Lucena City charging for the murder of Marcial Punzalan, an ex-
Mayor of San Antonio and Tiaong towns in Quezon Province, and his leader,
- In the trial of the case, the prosecution presented Eduardo Rosales and then Crisanto Bautista as witnesses
before moving for their discharge.
- The trial court granted the discharge of Rosales but deferred action on the motion to discharged Bautista
pending resolution of this case. Private respondents pleaded for the reconsideration of Rosales' discharge by
the same was denied.
- however, the order of discharge was recalled as the appellate court found no plausible reason for the
discharge of Rosales after he admitted his guilt in the course of his testimony.
ISSUE: Is the Court of Appeals correct in annulling the discharge of the accused?
RULING: No. At the time of Rosales' discharge, the corresponding Information against the alleged masterminds had
not yet been filed. His testimony, if ever, was then to be a future undertaking on his part, and the successful
prosecution of those responsible for the dastardly acts would hinge solely on his testimony as a state witness. As
such, his discharge satisfied the intent of Sec. 9 of Rule 119 that one or more discharged accused "may be witnesses
for the State" and was therefore in accord with law.
While it is the usual practice of the prosecution to present the accused who turns state witness only after his
discharge, the trial court may nevertheless sanction his discharge after his testimony if circumstances so warrant.
as long as the motion for discharge of an accused to be utilized as a state witness is filed before the prosecution rests,
the trial court should, if warranted, grant it. Once a discharge is effected, any subsequent showing that not all the five
(5) requirements outlined in Sec. 9 of Rule 119 were actually fulfilled cannot adversely affect the legal consequences
of such discharge which, under Sec. 10 of the Same Rule, operates as an acquittal of the accused thus discharged and
shall forever be a bar to his prosecution for the same offense.
WEBB Vs DE LEON

- pet: crime of Rape and Homicide

- Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the credibility of Jessica Alfaro as
inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies between her sworn statements.
- Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued
warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary examination.
ISSUE: WoN respondent Judges deLeon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a
preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them
RULING: The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their discretion. In arrest cases, there must
be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it. Section 6 of
Rule 112 simply provides that “upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the
accused. Clearly the, our laws repudiate the submission of petitioners that respondent Judges should have conducted
“searching examination of witnesses” before issuing warrants of arrest against them.
MONGE Vs PEOPLE

- Pet: were found by the barangay tanods in possession of and transporting 3 pieces of mahogany lumber in
Iriga City.
- The trial court found Monge guilty; Potencio was discharged because he was used as a state witness.
- Agrrieved, petitioner elevated the case to CA where he challenged the discharge of Potencio as a state witness
on the ground that there is no absolute necessity for his testimony. Monge contested that it was Potencio
who owned the lumbers and not him, that he was only hired by Potencio to transport the lumbers to a
sawmill.
ISSUE: WoN Monge’s contention is proper?
RULING: No. not a few cases established the doctrine that the discharge of an accused so he may turn state witness
is left to the exercise of the TCs sound discretion limited only by the requirements set forth in Sec. 17 of rule 119.
Thus, whether the accused offered to be discharged appears to be the least guilty and whether there is objectively
an absolute necessity for his testimony are questions that lie within the domain of the trial court, it being competent
to resolve issues of fact.