1Silva vs Honorable Presiding Judge of the RTC, Negros Oriental

G.R. No. 81756, October 21, 1991

Facts:
On June 13, 1986, M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, Jr., as chief of the PC Narcom Detachment in Dumaguete
City, Negros Oriental, filed an "Application for Search Warrant" against petitioners Nicomedes Silva and
Marlon Silva. 1 This application was accompanied by a "Deposition of Witness" executed by Pfc. Arthur
M. Alcoran and Pat. Leon T. Quindo, also dated June 13, 1986.

On the same day, Judge Nickarter A. Ontal, then Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial, Branch XXXIII,
Dumaguete City issued Search Warrant No. 1, directing the aforesaid police officers to search the room
of Marlon Silva in the residence of Nicomedes Silva for violation of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
In the course of the search, the serving officers also seized money belonging to Antonieta Silva in the
amount of P1,231.40. Antonieta Silva filed a motion for the return of the said amount on the grounds
that the search warrant only authorized the serving officers to seize marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes
and joint, and that said officers failed or refused to make a return of the said search warrant in gross
violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
On July 28, 1987, petitioners filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No. 1 on the grounds that (1) it was
issued on the sole basis of a mimeographed "Application for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of
Witness", which were accomplished by merely filling in the blanks and (2) the judge failed to personally
examine the complainant and witnesses by searching questions and answers in violation of Section 3,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
On August 11, 1987, respondent trial court, through Judge Eugenio M. Cruz, who, by then, had replaced
retired Judge Ontal, issued an Order denying the motion for lack of merit, finding the requisites
necessary for the issuance of a valid search warrant duly complied with. A motion for reconsideration
dated September 1, 1987 filed by petitioners was likewise denied by Judge Cruz in an order dated
October 19, 1987.
Issue:
WoN Respondent court acted in grave abuse of discretion in issuing the said warrant

Held:
The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent
violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home,
by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such
usurpations when attempted.
Sec. 2, Article III of the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right to personal liberty and
security of homes against unreasonable searches and seizures. On the other hand, Sections 3 and 4, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court provide for the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant. Based on the
aforecited constitutional and statutory provisions, the judge must, before issuing a search warrant,
determine whether there is probable cause by examining the complainant and witnesses through
searching questions and answers.
In the case at bar, Judge Ontal failed to comply with the legal requirement that he must examine the
applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers in order to determine the
existence of probable cause. The joint "Deposition of Witness" executed by Pfc. Alcoran and Pat.
Quindo, contained, for the most part, suggestive questions answerable by merely placing "yes" or "no".
The above deposition did not only contain leading questions but it was also very broad. The questions
propounded to the witnesses were in fact, not probing but were merely routinary. The deposition was
already mimeographed and all that the witnesses had to do was fill in their answers on the blanks
provided.
In issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional and statutory
requirement that he must determine the existence of probable cause by personally examining the
applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. His failure to comply with
this requirement constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The officers implementing the search warrant clearly abused their authority when they seized the
money of Antonieta Silva. This is highly irregular considering that Antonieta Silva was not even named as
one of the respondents, that the warrant did not indicate the seizure of money. Thus, the then presiding
Judge Ontal likewise abused his discretion when he rejected the motion of petitioner Antonieta Silva
seeking the return of her seized money.
Search Warrant No.1 is null and void.
 Mata vs. Bayona
G.R. No. 50720, March 26, 1984

Facts:
The contention is that the search warrant issued by respondent Judge was based merely on the
application for search warrant and a joint affidavit of private respondents which were wrongfully
alleged, subscribed, and sworn to before the Clerk of Court of respondent Judge. Furthermore, there
was allegedly a failure on the part of respondent Judge to attach the necessary papers pertinent to the
issuance of the search warrant to the records of the criminal case wherein petitioner is accused under
PD 810, as amended by PD 1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took
and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by "selling illegal tickets known as 'Masiao tickets' without any
authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities
concerned."

Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of
the said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance
of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry
respondent Judge replied, "it is with the court". The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who
attached them to the records. This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant
and for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Motion was denied by respondent-judge stating that the court has made a
thorough investigation and examination of the Police Officers, that in fact the court made a certi fication
to that effect; and that the fact that documents relating to the search warrant were not attached
immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no moment, considering that the rule does not
specify when these documents are to be attached to the records.

Issue:
WoN the Search Warrant is invalid rendering the confiscated items inadmissible as evidence

Held:
Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the
Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce". More emphatic and detailed is the
implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, Section 4 of Rule 126 which provides that the judge
must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any
witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in
addition to any affidavits presented to him.6

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to
take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to
the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly
determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person
giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.

The term "depositions" in its more technical and appropriate sense, the meaning of the word is limited
to written testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding in advance of the trial or
hearing upon oral examination. A deposition is the testimony of a witness, put or taken in writing, under
oath or affirmation before a commissioner, examiner or other judicial officer, in answer to interlocutory
and cross interlocutory, and usually subscribed by the witnesses. The searching questions propounded
to the applicants of the search warrant and his witnesses must depend to a large extent upon the
discretion of the Judge just as long as the answers establish a reasonable ground to believe the
commission of a specific offense and that the applicant is one authorized by law, and said answers
particularly describe with certainty the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The
examination or investigation which must be under oath may not be in public. It may even be held in the
secrecy of his chambers. Far more important is that the examination or investigation is not merely
routinary but one that is thorough and elicit the required information. To repeat, it must be under oath
and must be in writing.
nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal requisites Thus, in
issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the Constitution and
the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in favor of the individual to prevent
stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. No
presumption of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it.
 Macad vs People
(G.R. No. 227366, August 1, 2018)

Facts:
Petitioner Domingo Macad and PO1 Davies Falolo rode the same bus bound for Bontoc, Mountain
Province. They sat on top of the bus as it was full. The petitioner threw his carton baggage over to PO1
Falolo. Petitioner, also carrying a Sagada woven bag, then sat 2 meters away from PO1 Falolo. When the
box was thrown over to him, PO1 Falolo suspected that it contained Marijuana due to its distinct smell
and irregular shape. Upon reaching Bontoc, FO1 Falolo sought to inform the other police officers. The
Petitioner and FO1 Falolo rode the same tricycle. When the tricycle reached the Community Police
Assistance Center (COMPAC) circle, PO1 Falolo stopped the tricycle and called SPO2 Gaspar Suagen
(SPO2 Suagen), who was then on duty. While SPO2 Suagen approached them, PO1 Falolo asked
petitioner if he could open his baggage, to which the latter replied in the affirmative. However,
petitioner suddenly ran away from the tricycle. Both police officers ran after him and apprehended him
in front of Sta. Rita Parish Church. Petitioner was then handcuffed and he, together with his baggage,
were brought to the Municipal Police Station. At the police station, the baggage of petitioner were
opened and these revealed eleven (11) bricks of marijuana from the carton baggage and six (6) bricks of
marijuana from the Sagada woven bag.

Petitioner asserts that the search conducted was neither an incident of a lawful arrest nor was it made
with his consent. He assails that PO1 Falolo's actions belie that he had probable cause to believe that
petitioner was transporting marijuana because it took him a long time to make any overt act in arresting
petitioner. In addition, petitioner argues that the integrity of the items seized was compromised
because the baggage, which contained the drugs, were left behind when the police o􀀻cers chased him.
Also, he claims that the procedure prescribed under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not followed
because the marking, photography and inventory were not immediately made at the place of arrest.

Issue:
WoN The Warrantless Arrest and Search and Seizure were valid

Held:
A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent search is one that is carried out under the
parameters of Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which requires that the apprehending o fficer
must have been spurred by probable cause to arrest a person caught in flagrante delicto. To be sure, the
term probable cause has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. Specifically, with respect to arrests, it is such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. In this light, the determination of the
existence or absence of probable cause necessitates a re-examination of the factual incidents.
Accordingly, after a valid warrantless arrest is effected, the officer may also conduct a valid warrantless
search, which is in incidental to such arrest.

There were numerous circumstances and overt acts which show that PO1 Falolo had probable cause to
effect the said warrantless arrest: (1) the smell of marijuana emanating from the carton baggage; (2) the
irregular shape of the baggage; (3) the hardness of the baggage; (4) the assent of petitioner in the
inspection of his baggage but running away at the sight of SPO2 Suagen; and (5) leaving behind his
baggage to avoid the police officers.

Nevertheless, when petitioner suddenly ran away from the tricycle while SPO2 Suagen was approaching
and left his baggage behind, PO1 Falolo also obtained probable cause to conduct a warrantless arrest.
He was earnest in his probable cause that petitioner was committing a crime in flagrante delicto, thus,
PO1 Falolo religiously pursued him until he was arrested and his baggage eventually searched as an
incident thereof.

Petition is denied.
 Malacat vs Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997)

Facts:
In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, petitioner was charged with
violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for keeping, possessing and/or acquiring a hand
grenade, without first securing the necessary license and permit from the proper authorities. On
arraignment, petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of not guilty. After trial on the
merits, the court a quo found petitioner guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under the
said law and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less than seventeen years, four months and one
day of reclusion temporal as minimum and not more than thirty years of reclusion perpetua, as
maximum.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal indicating that he was appealing to the Supreme Court. However, the
record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals. In its decision, the Court of Appeals a ffirmed
the trial court's decision. Unable to accept conviction, petitioner 􀀴led the instant petition alleging that
the respondent court erred in affirming the findings of the trial court that the warrantless arrest of
petitioner was valid and legal.

Held:
The Supreme Court finds the petition impressed with merit. For purposes of determining appellate
jurisdiction in criminal cases, the maximum of the penalty, and not the minimum, is taken into account.
Since the maximum of the penalty is reclusion perpetua, the appeal therefrom should have been to the
Court and not the Court of Appeals. Hence, the challenged decision immediately fall in jurisdictional
grounds. Additionally, the Court is convinced that the prosecution failed to establish petitioner's guilt
with moral certainty. First, serious doubts surrounds the story of police office Yu that a grenade was
found in and seized from petitioner's possession. Notably, Yu did not identify in court the grenade he
allegedly seized. Second, if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him and that two days earlier he was
with the group about to detonate an explosive at Plaza Miranda, it was then unnatural and against
common experience that petitioner simply stood in Plaza Miranda in proximity to the police o fficers.
Lastly, even assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the grenade during his custodial
investigation police officer Serapio, such admission is inadmissible in evidence for it was taken in
palpable violation of Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. Verily, the search conducted
on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental
search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest
was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first
be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming
a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the
latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which
was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as
evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence. Here,
there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of
the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the
part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going
to be committed. Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the
search conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.

A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-
frisk" serves a two-fold interest: the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which
underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even
without probable cause; and the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the
police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a
deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
Petition Granted.
United Laboratories vs. Isip
(G.R. No. 163858. June 28, 2005)

Facts:
On January 27, 2004, the agents of the National Bureau of Investigation conducted as search of the of
the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building at 1571 Aragon St., Sta. Cruz, Manila under a valid
search warrant. In the said search warrant, the court ordered the seizure of the items Revicon
multivitamins which was allegedly being manufactured illegally by the respondents. During the search,
no fake Revicon multivitamins were found; Instead, there were sealed boxes at the first and second
floors of the Shalimar Building which, when opened by the NBI agents in the presence of the respondent
contained Disudrin and Inoflox both being manufactured by the petitioner.

The respondents filed an "Urgent Motion to Quash the Search Warrant or to Suppress Evidence." They
asserted that the NBI officers seized Disudrin and Inoflox products which were not included in the list of
properties to be seized in the search warrant. The petitioners opposed the said motion by arguing that
the seizure of the items was justified by the Plain View Doctrine.

The trial court granted the motion of the respondent.

Issue:
WoN search and seizure conducted by the NBI were valid

Held:
A search warrant, to be valid, must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. The officers of the law are to seize only those things particularly described in the search warrant.
A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing
expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The search
is limited in scope so as not to be general or explanatory. Nothing is left to the discretion of the officer
executing the warrant.

Objects, articles or papers not described in the warrant but on plain view of the executing officer may be
seized by him. However, the seizure by the officer of objects/articles/papers not described in the
warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the confluence of the essential requirements for the doctrine to apply, namely:
(a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise
properly in a position from which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover
incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the
items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.

The doctrine is not an exception to the warrant. It merely serves to supplement the prior justification —
whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search as an incident to a lawful arrest or some
other legitimate reason for being present, unconnected with a search directed against the accused. The
doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until
something incriminating at last emerges. It is a recognition of the fact that when executing police
officers comes across immediately incriminating evidence not covered by the warrant, they should not
be required to close their eyes to it, regardless of whether it is evidence of the crime they are
investigating or evidence of some other crime. It would be needless to require the police to obtain
another warrant. Under the doctrine, there is no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and
there is no search within the meaning of the Constitution.

In this case, Disudrin and/or Inoflox were not listed in the search warrant issued by the court a quo as
among the properties to be seized by the NBI agents. The warrant specifically authorized the officers
only to seize "counterfeit Revicon multivitamins, finished or unfinished, and the documents used in
recording, manufacture and/or importation, distribution and/or sale, or the offering for sale, sale and/or
distribution of the said vitamins." The implementing officers failed to and any counterfeit Revicon
multivitamins, and instead seized sealed boxes which, when opened at the place where they were
found, turned out to contain Inoflox and Disudrin.