HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMMING AND

MONITORING
IN INACESSIBLE CONFLICT SETTINGS:

A Literature Review

Simran Chaudhri (UNICEF)

Kristina Cordes (CDC)
Nathan Miller (UNICEF)

February 2017
The W orld Health Organization is the
Cluster Lead Agency and provides
secretariat support.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5
1. BACKGROUND 11
1.1 Reference Table: Terms and Definitions 12
2. METHODS 13
2.1 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 13
2.2 Systematic Published Peer-reviewed Literature Methods 13
2.2.1 Search Strategy 13
2.2.2 Included Papers 14
2.2.3 Quality Assessment 14
2.3 Grey Literature Search Methods 14
2.3.1 Included Papers 14
2.3.2 Analysis of Grey Literature 15
3. RESULTS 16
3.1 Causes and Motivators of Remote Operations 16
3.1.1 Causes of Reduced Access 16
3.1.2 Motivators for Considering Remote Operations 16
3.2 Traditional Modalities of Remote Operations 17
3.2.1 Remote Control 17
3.2.2 Remote Management 18
3.2.3 Remote Support 18
3.2.4 Remote Partnership 18
3.3 Other Remote Operating Methods 18
3.3.1 Community Partnership Arrangements 19
3.3.2 Government Partnership Arrangements 19
3.3.3 Outsourcing to Commercial Contractors 20
3.4 Remote Operations Challenges, Considerations and Approaches 25
3.4.1 Need to maintain humanitarian principles 25
3.4.2 Partnerships 25
3.4.2.1 Selection 26
3.4.2.2 Capacity 27
3.4.2.3 Communication and Trust 29
3.4.2.4 Sustainability 30
3.4.2.5 Examples of Partnership Strategies 31
3.4.3 Coordination and Collaboration 32
3.4.4 Acceptance 34
3.4.5 Risks and Risk Management 36
3.4.5.1 Risks to National/Local Staff 36
3.4.5.2 General Risks 37
3.4.6 Advocacy 39
3.4.7 Monitoring & Evaluation 39
3.4.7.1 Upward Accountability 40
3.4.7.2 Downward Accountability 40
3.4.7.3 General M&E Methods 42
3.4.7.4 Technological Support 44
3.4.8 The ‘Remote Operations Trap’ 50

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 3.4.9 Planning and Guidance 50
3.4.9.1 Adapting Protocols to Context 51

4. LIMITATIONS 52
5. CONCLUSIONS 54
5.1 Contributions to the Understanding of this Field 54
5.2 Gaps in the Literature 54
5.3 Priority Areas for Future Research 54
5.4 Next steps 55
Annex 1 - Summary of peer-reviewed articles 56
Annex 2 - Summary of grey literature articles 63
Annex 2 – GOAL Monitoring tools and examples of use 19 80
Annex 3 – UNICEF Checklist for implementation of remote programming 35 85
Annex 4 – UNICEF How to assess non-security enterprise risks of remote
programming35 87
Annex 5 – TEARFUND Summary checklist for remote project monitoring good
practices33 90
REFERENCES 92

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. Background
The changing nature of conflicts has resulted in an increased risk to humanitarian
actors, reducing access for programming and monitoring, as well as the humanitarian
presence in emergency settings; this withdrawal of international organizations has a
harmful effect on affected populations. Remote operations (defined below) provide
an alternative method to continue programs and services while reducing the risk faced
by program staff. Although remote operations have been in use for several years, this
programming method has mostly been implemented on an ad hoc basis with limited
guidance. This review aims to identify approaches, lessons learned, and best practices,
which will ultimately aid the creation of formal evidence-based guidance that supports
future humanitarian programming and monitoring activities in inaccessible conflict
settings.

2. Methods
The peer-reviewed literature was identified though a systematic search of 6 search
engines, resulting in 1,853 abstracts screened, 63 full texts reviewed, and 14 studies
eventually included in the final analysis. The online systematic review organizer
Covidence was used and two independent researchers from UNICEF and CDC agreed
upon all screening and selection decisions.

Grey literature resources (all documents that were not published in a peer-reviewed
journal) were identified via a Google search, requests to humanitarian organizations,
and snowball sampling to obtain additional contacts. The same two researchers
screened all resources, coming to consensus on which complied with inclusion criteria;
all findings and themes were summarized in this document. All results presented in this
review were entirely taken from the literature and do not include any opinions from the
authors. Because this field is not yet well-developed or defined, much of the literature
outlines concepts and definitions, and addresses the preliminary steps required to
advance this burgeoning field.

3. Results
3.1 Causes and Motivators of Remote Operations

The main causes of reduced access include general insecurity or a specific security
incident, and restrictions on the movement of aid workers imposed by authorities in
power. Many factors affect an organization’s decision to switch to remote operations,
including: the length of insecurity (it may be more feasible to temporarily shut down
operations if risk is perceived as brief), the size of the program (larger programs are
more difficult to handover than smaller ones), the feasibility of program activities in the
context, the capacity of local partners, and the vulnerability and need of the affected
population.

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3.2 Traditional Modalities of Remote Operations

There are four modalities of remote programming that exist on a spectrum, varying by
depth of roles and responsibilities of both international and local staff. They are:

1. Remote Control: commonly a reactive stance (action in response to a situation

that has already occurred) and a last resort with the least amount of delegation
of authority to field staff, and little capacity development or skills transfer.

2. Remote Management: a reactive stance with some delegation of authority to

national implementers, moderate investment in capacity building, and
procedures in place for better monitoring and quality. Assumes that decision-
making and authority will revert back to internationals following restoration of
security.

3. Remote Support: a proactive strategy (action in preparation for a situation that

has yet to take place) with full investment in national staff capacity building,
mentoring, and planning for eventual full handover of authority.

4. Remote Partnership: a proactive strategy where equal partnership is fostered

with a local partner that already has significant internal capacity. The
international organization supports via administration, resource mobilization, and
advocacy, while the operational partner focuses on context and
implementation.

3.3 Other Remote Approaches

Other remote approaches include community partnership arrangements, government

partnership arrangements, and outsourcing to commercial contractors. Neutrality and
impartiality remain issues in all remote approaches, including the traditional modalities
outlined above.

3.4 Remote Operations Challenges, Considerations, and Approaches

3.4.1 Need to Maintain Humanitarian Principles

The humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence are

necessary, albeit difficult, to maintain during remote operations. Humanitarian actors
must increase efforts to both be and appear neutral and not align with any side of the
conflict. Impartiality can be a concern when relying on local actors who may be
influenced by parties to conflict or community pressures. Capacity building on
humanitarian principles is required for all national staff and partners in order to ensure
the program is delivered safely and as intended.

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3.4.2 Partnerships

Selection: Selecting a suitable partner to implement remote operations requires

protocols and checks in place to ensure partners have sufficient capacity and
experience in the context, and are not influenced by alternate agendas. Hiring third
party accounting firms, deferring to community elders, and identification through
contacts have all been described as potential partner selection methods. Ultimately,
selection must be transparent and benefits from more active recruitment methods such
as consulting local experts and utilizing pre-conflict networks.

Capacity: Building the capacity of local staff is important to ensure the fidelity of
remote operations, autonomy, and project ownership. Training needs (operational
methods, security protocols, etc.) and methods (planned site visits, staff secondments,
etc.) are varied and complex; see the full text for complete details. National staff can
be experienced and assuming all nationals require training can create an unequal
relationship and should be avoided.

Communication and Trust: Building trust is key for partnerships and is intrinsically linked to
communication. Useful trust building mechanisms include: maximizing face-to-face
contact, regular sharing of ideas and information, enhanced interactions (for example,
videoconferencing), transparent decision making, and joint agenda setting, among
others. A minimum level of face-to-face contact between senior staff and
implementers is required to build trust and capacity.

Sustainability: Sustainability is a growing concern where national staff are relied upon to
deliver services for increasing lengths of time. Prioritizing the sustainability of local
partners involves focusing on operational and organizational capacity building of entire
institutions, supporting long-term projects, providing core funds, and supporting
alliances among local groups, thereby building a strong civil society.

3.4.3 Coordination and Collaboration

Coordination and collaboration are essential to ensure cohesive remote programming,

however, certain coordination structures can also compromise an organization’s
independence and capacity. Structures should be rooted in the cultural context, with
coordinating bodies and leadership carefully selected to promote neutrality and local
ownership. There is a need for coordination mechanisms and standards to be adapted
to the realities of operating in conflict contexts, and to improve the efficacy of the
cluster approach for remote programming.

3.4.4 Acceptance

Acceptance of the program, by both the community and the local implementers, is
necessary to ensure the fidelity, execution, and uptake of remote operations.
Acceptance is both a security measure and used to eventually regain access,
however, it should never be solely relied upon to reduce security risk.

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Regular contact and participatory management styles that include national staff in
decision making increase trust and acceptance by local staff; while selecting culturally
appropriate staff, using diaspora nationals, and community outreach and participation
increase beneficiary acceptance. The fundamental prerequisite to acceptance is
competent and committed humanitarian programming with tangible results.

3.4.5 Risks and Risk Management

Risks to Local Actors: Remote operations involve the transfer of risk from international to
local actors, who are assumed to be at lower risk for targeting and therefore safer when
implementing. This is often a false assumption as they face unique threats that are
often not acknowledged in security assessments. Additionally, local actors are
infrequently present at trainings on security, and are often left with minimal security -
related equipment when expatriates evacuate.

Mitigation of this risk can be achieved via: conducting thorough risk assessments,
preparedness planning that decentralizes authority and transfers security equipment to
nationals, capacity building on security issues and protocols, and additional monitoring
and triangulation with community members for risk updates.

General Risks: General risks in remote operations are many and include: inadequate
and poor quality information management, credibility, coordination, monitoring, and
programming; inciting conflict; casualties and fatalities; insufficient impact; limited or no
program expansion or adaptation; compromised neutrality and impartiality; corruption
and fund diversion; and reduced advocacy or speaking out on behalf of affected
populations. These risks are exacerbated by inadequate risk perception and a
decreased sense of urgency from remote managers who lose touch with the situation
on the ground.

General strategies for reducing risk include: building strong relationships with
communities, strategic coordination with partners, and detailed monitoring, among
others. Additionally, donor and organizational reporting requirements need to ensure
they do not put national staff at increased risk and clear contingency plans are
required prior to deterioration in security in order to maximize risk management.

3.4.6 Advocacy

Advocacy suffers in remote operations, as its legitimacy is highly dependent on the

presence of international staff and cannot be substituted by that of local staff who
carry less influence. Advocacy is closely linked to protection activities, which tend to
suffer when field presence is reduced.

3.4.7 Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E)

Accountability is a crucial component of risk mitigation and management. Remote

operations require increased monitoring and reporting requirements than traditional
programming due to the lack of field presence and direct oversight by international
organizations, but often have fewer resources to meet these increased demands.

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Accountability is further compromised by limited opportunities for data collection, poor
quality data and inaccurate information, and lack of monitoring skills and capacity of
local staff, among others.

Upward Accountability: Upward accountability to donors is the focus of the majority of

monitoring activities. However, donor expectations are often not well-suited to fragile
settings, can increase risk to local partners, and can detract needed funds from
programming; increased flexibility and realism is required.

Downward Accountability: Downward accountability to beneficiaries ensures target

population needs are being met and aid is delivered equitably and as intended,
however it is often forgotten by organizations. Methods for monitoring of downward
accountability include: beneficiary rapid assessment surveys, feedback forms, and
hotlines; meetings and discussions with communities; systems of complaints redress;
structures that promote beneficiary participation; and prioritizing beneficiary
accountability within senior management.

General Methods: A clear plan for M&E must be designed; monitoring in remote
operations may need to be more intensive and can require significant resources and
tools beyond those used in direct management settings. Several general methods exist
to support internal and external M&E initiatives in remote operations; internal M&E is
considered less rigorous than external due to reduced transparency, neutrality,
objectivity and impartiality.

Internal monitoring methods include: having clear monitoring and reporting structures
delineated in advance, specific monitoring capacity within an organization, and
regular communication, written reports, and strict deadlines for field staff. External
monitoring methods include: contracting local firms for independent third party
monitoring, cross checking information with field and community contacts, and sharing
monitoring capacity with other organizations. See the full text for complete details of
methods used.

Technological Support: Technology has been employed in a variety of facets to enable

electronic or web-based monitoring. Examples include mobile phone monitoring
applications, satellite imagery, barcode tracking systems, and mapping software,
among others. Further research and investment in data collection and analysis, and
communications technology is required with the aim of streamlining its incorporation
across programs.

3.4.8 The ‘Remote Operations Trap’

The ‘remote operations trap’ refers to the inability to transition back to traditional
management structures after a program has been implemented remotely for some
time. This is caused by reduced ground-level information, less credibility of the agency,
and increased risk for local partners. A well-defined exit strategy is required to ensure
programs do not get stuck in remote mode and are not managed remotely for longer
than is necessary.

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3.4.9 Planning and Guidance

There is a significant need for proactive planning and guidance on when to employ
remote methods, how to operate effectively remotely, and when to exit remote
operations; most agencies lack specific criteria to assess risk and guide these transitions
(including an exit strategy), plans for potential partnerships, and appropriate situation
specific risk transfer practices to support decision making. Guidance should cover all
these topics, include indicators and checklists, and be integrated into the initial
program planning documents. When original remote operation guidance has not
been produced, adapting protocols to the new context must be prioritized; it should
not be assumed that strategies outlined for regular operations would be appropriate in
an inaccessible conflict setting.

4. Conclusions
This review demonstrates that while many organizations are participating in remote
programming or monitoring, few articulate their experiences in writing to disseminate
lessons learned directly to other organizations or stakeholders, or to be available
generally to guide future operations. More studies of the challenges and needs of local
partners and staff who implement projects is required, as well as studies of beneficiary
perspectives and how remote operations impact their communities.

International, national, and local partners must all be encouraged to document their
work and consider incorporating areas of operational research from the onset of
remote programming and monitoring activities, in order to improve knowledge of best
practices and create practical tools and guidelines that can be used to improve
humanitarian aid delivery in inaccessible conflict settings.

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1. BACKGROUND
W hile the end of the Cold W ar saw a decline in conflicts affecting multiple countries,
since 2013 there has been a rise in both number of conflicts and battle casualties;
between 2013 and 2014 the number of conflicts increased from 34 to 40.1 Humanitarian
aid workers have been increasingly targeted in conflict; there were 190 attacks on aid
workers in 2014, resulting in 121 deaths; this is three times the 2004 number of 63
incidents (with 56 deaths). 2 International actors are preferred as kidnapping victims as
they provide both a higher ransom and a more visible political sta tement.3 The need to
maximize the safety of staff results in reduced access for humanitarian programming
and monitoring. This access is further limited by restrictions imposed by both
governments and non-state actors seeking to exercise control over territories; there is a
direct correlation between increasing violence and shrinking humanitarian presence. 4

W hen the risk to international organizations working in conflict zones becomes too great
or access is severely restricted, they are often left no other choice than to remove
themselves from the situation. This has a harmful effect on local populations who are
forced to remain without any support. Remote programming is an alternative to
‘bunkerization’.5 It aims to continue the provision of services while operating under the
assumption that local actors, through their greater knowledge of local context and
acceptance in the community, are able to provide services at a reduced level of risk
than that faced by international staff. In some situations where grave risk prevents
access for expatriate staff from international organizations and national staff from
national organizations, remote programs are executed and managed by local actors
from communities.

This literature review aims to identify these remote approaches, collating lessons
learned and best practices for humanitarian programming and monitoring in
inaccessible conflict settings. While humanitarian programming and monitoring in
inaccessible areas has been required in several recent conflicts, it is has largely been
governed by trial and error due to lack of comprehensive instruction and detailed
strategy. This review hopes to inform the creation of formal evidence-based guidance
to support future humanitarian initiatives in these settings.

A table of terms and definitions unique to this field is provided in the reference table on
the following page.

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1.1 Reference Table: Terms and Definitions
TERM DEFINITION
The barricading of aid w orkers behind highly secure w alls, isolating them
Bunkerization from the populations they are serving.

International Non-Governmental Organization/International

INGO/IO Organization

Ex patriate staff from an international humanitarian organization or

International Staff ex patriate actors working w ith large national organizations

Local Non-Governmental Organization

(Can be at national level or smaller, includes community -based
LNGO
organizations)

Humanitarian stakeholders indigenous to the location in w hich they are

w orking; can be national staff, staff from local community -based
Local Actors
organizations, or even community members.

Humanitarian staff native to the country in w hich they are working,

National Staff w orking for a national or international organization.

Action planned as a means of preparing for a situation that has not yet
Proactiv e Strategy taken place.

Action taken in response to a situation that has already taken place.

Reactiv e Stance
A reactive stance in response to insecurity w here relocated international
managers have the most responsibility, making nearly all the decisions,
w ith limited or no delegation of authority to field staff. The risk is
Remote Control
completely transferred to national staff, w ho are left to implement
programs w ith little capacity development or transfer of skills.

A reactive stance in response to insecurity that involves some delegation

of authority and decision making responsibility to national implementers.
There is commonly a moderate investment in capacity building for
Remote Management nationals and procedures in place that enable better communication,
monitoring, and quality. Assumes that decision-making and authority will
revert back to internationals following the restoration of security.

The inability to transition back to traditional management after a

Remote Management Trap program has been implemented remotely for some time.

A general term for remote programming or monitoring. Used in this

Remote Operations paper w hen the specific modality is not known.

A proactive strategy that requires equal partnership between both

international and national/local staff. Each organization contributes
different resources and there is a near-complete handover of
Remote Partnership responsibility and authority to local organizations. International staff
often support via administration, resource mobilization, and advocacy,
w hile the operational partner focuses on contex t and implementation.

A proactive strategy that is purposefully developed with the aim of

handing over authority to national/local staff in the long term. Remote
managers usually take on financial and strategic oversight to ensure
Remote Support
donor accountability, how ever it is up to the field implementers, who are
familiar w ith the current context, to make decisions on a daily basis.

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2. METHODS
This literature review was completed in two parts: a systematic review of peer-reviewed
published articles and a search of grey literature sources. Both parts were completed
using consensus methodology by two independent researchers from the United Nations
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

2.1 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria

English language articles published in peer-reviewed journals between January 1, 1990
and March 1, 2016 (inclusive) were included. Included studies met the following
criteria: described real-world humanitarian operations, and took place in an
inaccessible location in conflict or disaster. Humanitarian programming in disasters was
included with the aim of identifying novel strategies that could be translated to an
inaccessible conflict setting, however we were unable to identify any humanitarian
strategies used in disasters that were transferable. Exclusion criteria were as follows:
technology or methods described as having a potential humanitarian application but
not yet proven (including simulations), technology or methods used in an inaccessible
development context, studies with no specific intervention or outcomes, studies that
examine preparedness or resilience not linked to response, and review papers;
however, references of review papers were screened for primary data sources. Given
the burgeoning nature of this field and the limited published literature on the topic, all
study designs were considered.

2.2 Systematic Published Peer-reviewed Literature Methods

2.2.1 Search Strategy

Three search strings (Box 1) were entered into six search engines: Pubmed, Scopus,
MEDLINE/Ovid, W eb of Science, Cochrane, and EMBASE. All search results were
exported to the online systematic review organizer Covidence. 1,853 titles and
abstracts were screened, followed by the full text screening of 63 studies. References of
all 63 studies that progressed to full text review were also screened to identify primary
sources.

Box 1: Peer-reviewed literature search strings

1. (humanitarian OR crisis OR conflict OR disaster) AND (remote OR inaccessible) AND (Health OR

nutrition OR polio OR w ash OR trauma OR obstetric)

2. (humanitarian OR crisis OR conflict OR disaster) AND (remote OR inaccessible) AND (Health OR

nutrition OR polio OR w ash OR trauma OR obstetric) AND (monitor OR program)

3. (humanitarian OR crisis OR conflict OR disaster) AND (remote OR inaccessible) AND (Health OR

nutrition OR polio OR w ash OR trauma OR obstetric) AND tool

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2.2.2 Included Papers

Ultimately, 14 papers were identified as meeting all

criteria and included in this review. The breakdown
by study design was as follows: 4 retrospective
analyses of programs, 1 retrospective analysis of
populations, 5 descriptive case studies, 1 case
series, 2 cross-sectional surveys, and 1 before-and-
after study.

2.2.3 Quality Assessment

A checklist adapted from the STROBE criteria was

used for quality assessment of observational studies,
resulting in a rating of high, moderate, or low
quality.6 The one qualitative study 7 was assessed
using the CASP checklist,8 with a score of 1-4 considered low, 5-8 moderate, and 9-10
(out of 10) high. The case series study 9 was assessed Figure 1 - Study selection flow chart
using the NIH Quality Assessment Tool for Case
Series,10 with a score of 1-3 considered low, 4-6 moderate, and 7-9 high (out of 9). Given
the lack of a validated tool, the quality of descriptive case studies could not be formally
assessed.

Upon quality assessment, 2 studies were found to be low, 6 were moderate, and 1 was
high; 5 studies were not assessed due to the lack of an appropriate validated tool. A
table summarizing the articles included and their corresponding quality assessments
can be found in Annex 1.

2.3 Grey Literature Search Methods

2.3.1 Included Papers

The grey literature search included all sources that were not published in peer-reviewed
journals, some examples of document types are: organizational guidelines,
programming notes, program evaluations, presentations, and meeting notes.

In addition to a Google search, a call for resources was sent out to humanitarian
organizations, with additional contacts obtained via snowball sampling. Contacts were
asked to provide any grey literature sources pertaining to humanitarian programming
and monitoring in inaccessible areas from their organization or elsewhere. References
of documents received were also screened for additional primary sources.

All resources were screened by two researchers and consensus was reached on which
were relevant and would be included. 131 total documents were reviewed, with 55
documents proceeding to in-depth analysis and included in the final report. The main

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reason for exclusion was that several documents pertained to emergency settings but
did not specifically discuss operations in inaccessible contexts within these settings.

2.3.2 Analysis of Grey Literature

Both researchers performed thematic analysis of the grey literature independently.

Documents were reviewed and coded based on a defined set of codes created
following the initial review; code conflicts were discussed until consensus on which
code to include was reached. Examples and excerpts where then grouped into
themes and included in the relevant sub-sections of the final report.

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3. RESULTS
The information in this section was entirely taken from the literature and does not
include any opinions from the authors. Because this field is not yet well-developed or
defined, much of the literature outlines concepts and definitions, and addresses the
preliminary steps required to advance this burgeoning field.

3.1 Causes and Motivators of Remote Operations

3.1.1 Causes of Reduced Access

The main causes of reduced access include general insecurity or a specific security
incident, and restrictions on the movement of aid workers imposed by authorities in
power. Additional factors that contribute to limited access include: weak international
support or pressure to negotiate access with host states, tendency towards risk
avoidance over risk management, and poor infrastructure requiring expensive airlift
capacity.11

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) has developed
a tool to aid countries to collect and analyze data on access constraints in
humanitarian settings. 12 This tool suggests incidents and policies that should be
monitored and reported, indicators to facilitate this monitoring, and how to effectively
track action taken to address constraints. Information generated can be linked to the
OCHA access database; OCHA also provides guidance for using this information for
advocacy and negotiation.

3.1.2 Motivators for Considering Remote Operations

Many factors need to be considered when determining whether to switch to remote

operations. The first is the level and predicted length of insecurity; if the security risk is
perceived as temporary, it may be more feasible to close the program and resume
when the setting has become secured. The size of the program must be considered,
with large programs harder to hand over than smaller programs; this may cause an
organization to reduce services and hand over a scaled-back version of the program in
order to maintain presence in a location. Feasibility also plays a role in choosing to
operate remotely; activities for certain sectors can be more or less feasible based on
security or capacity of local staff (for example, highly insecure road travel may make
distribution of food aid less feasible). Feasibility will also be governed by an
organization’s operational history in a specific context. This ties into context
considerations where the range, quality, and capacity of local partners must be
considered, as well as their ability to operate freely in a region. Finally, the level of
vulnerability and need is also a major consideration when debating the shift to remote
programming, with organizations frequently opting to provide a program with reduced
quality, monitoring and impact, rather than no support at all.4, 11, 13 One example of the
prior consideration required comes from the UNICEF Peshawar office in Pakistan who, in
conjunction with the Security Management Team, preceded their 2009 switch to

16
remote programming with a ‘Program Criticality Exercise’ to assess the need and
feasibility; this resulted in reduced program activities with a strengthened focus on
immunization and internal capacity development.14

The primary benefit of remote programming and monitoring is the continuation of

assistance, services and flow of funding. It allows the retention of local knowledge,
making it easier to return to traditional programming when access is restored, and
provides opportunities for closer community involvement and local ownership. Remote
operations increases the capacity of field staff, which contributes to sustainability.
Additionally, the continued visibility of an organization will increase local acceptance
of both current and future programming.11, 15 Despite these benefits, programming and
monitoring quality tends to suffer with lack of international non-governmental
organization or international organization (INGO/IO) presence and all options for
keeping staff on the ground should be considered prior to moving to remote operations
as a last resort.16 The potential benefits and challenges of shifting a program to remote
mode require full consideration to inform the decision; challenges and considerations
will be discussed in detail below.

3.2 Traditional Modalities of Remote Operations

Remote operations are often the only choice for organizations that wish to continue the
delivery of aid in inaccessible conflict-affected locations. Remote programming and
monitoring involves a shift in responsibility to national or local staff on the ground. They
become the project implementers, while the program is managed by international staff
from a secure remote location. There are four modalities of remote operations that
exist on a spectrum and vary by depth of roles and responsibilities of both international
and local staff; they are remote control, remote management, remote support, and
remote partnership (Table 1). They will be referred to together as ‘remote operations’
for the reminder of the paper, unless a certain modality is being specified. It is useful to
note that the literature often uses the term ‘remote management’ to discuss remote
operations generally and not this specific modality. All of these definitions were taken
from the literature and do not include opinions of the authors.

3.2.1 Remote Control

Remote control is commonly a reactive stance in response to insecurity and is

considered to be a last resort prior to closing a program. Relocated international
managers have the most responsibility, making nearly all the decisions, with limited
delegation of authority to field staff; in some situations the international managers can
have control over all decisions and resources, leaving field staff with none. The risk is
completely transferred to national staff, who are left to implement programs with little
capacity development or transfer of skills.

Remote control is the least sustainable of the remote operating modalities as it is highly
vulnerable to staff turnover, inflexible, and tends to lack monitoring and data on the
changing needs and context, all of which contribute to low quality programming. It is

17
most suitable for short-duration projects where there is little organizational capacity on
the ground, such as isolated distributions in highly insecure areas.17-19

3.2.2 Remote Management

Remote management is also a reactive stance. However, it involves some delegation

of authority and decision making responsibility to national implementers. There is
commonly a moderate investment in capacity building for nationals and procedures in
place that enable better communication, monitoring, and quality. Despite this, it is still
considered temporary, and assumes that decision-making and authority will revert
back to internationals following the restoration of security. Remote management is an
option for agencies with some infrastructure and experience in the context; it is not
appropriate for newcomers. As with remote control, it is very vulnerable to staff
turnover.17-19

3.2.3 Remote Support

In contrast to remote management and control, remote support is a more proactive

strategy that is purposefully developed with the aim of handing over authority to
national/local staff in the long term. Remote managers usually take on financial and
strategic oversight to ensure donor accountability, however it is up to the field
implementers, who are familiar with the current context, to make decisions on a daily
basis. This is a developmental approach with full investment in capacity building, skill
transfer, mentoring, and planning for eventual handover. As such, it is less susceptible
to disruptions. A high level of experience in the context, organizational infrastructure,
and commitment to adaptability and neutrality are required for this modality. 17-19

3.2.4 Remote Partnership

Remote partnership is also a proactive modality but entails equal partnership between
both international and national/local organizations and staff. Each organization
contributes different resources and there is a near-complete handover of responsibility
and authority to local organizations. International staff often support via administration,
resource mobilization, and advocacy, while the operational partner focuses on context
and implementation. The international partner is unlikely to engage in capacity
development, as the local partner would already need to have significant internal
capacity for the partnership to function. While this is beneficial for sustainability and
adapting to the changing context, it can be difficult to en sure equitable status
between partners and funding due to donor reluctance.17-20

3.3 Other Remote Operating Methods

Additional options, other than working with local organizations, include community
partnership arrangements, government partnership arrangements, and outsourcing to
commercial contractors.11

18
3.3.1 Community Partnership Arrangements

Community partnership arrangements involve an INGO/IO forming an agreement with

a community wherein community leaders or a group of selected individuals implement
a program in the area in which they live. This can range from full program
implementation to aid distribution or monitoring. This approach is ben eficial as it
promotes community ownership and resilience against insecurity, and community
members delivering aid will be highly accepted and better able to target needy
beneficiaries. On the other hand, community members can be less impartial and more
susceptible to influences from family and friends; there is an increased risk of corruption
and aid being selectively distributed to influential members of the community. 11

Case Study 1: Community partnership in Northern Uganda13

An anonymous NGO working in Uganda without access to their project area for a
number of years looked to the community they were serving for help with
programming. Through regular meetings in the neighboring town where the NGO
office was located, community representatives developed program activities and
implementation timelines together with the NGO. Community members took on the
responsibility of program implementation (with private contractors employed for some
technical components) and documented implementation using a field journal to
detail various steps and activities, which were corroborated by photographs taken
with a digital camera. The NGO provided support to the community implementers
via supplies and training. Regular guidance and feedback was given following
review of field journals and photographs, enabling the constant improvement of the
project.

The community was made aware that the NGO would be monitoring activities, and
independent monitors from the communities were recruited to triangulate
information. However, a change in the security situation, which permitted the NGO
to visit the project area with government escorts, led to the findings that this
monitoring system was unreliable. Work was found to be of a low standard, and in
some cases not carried out at all, despite payments being made and verification of
the work by the NGO’s national staff. Community members were found to be
providing information that they thought the NGO wanted to hear, instead of reporting
on the realities on the ground.

This case highlights both the advantages and disadvantages of relying on

communities to implement projects.

3.3.2 Government Partnership Arrangements

Government partnership arrangements involve an INGO/IO developing a program in

conjunction with and/or handing over an existing program to authorities. This can
promote long-term development, sustainability, and community acceptance;

19
however, impartiality, independence, and neutrality can suffer. There is also increased
risk of corruption or that the government may not have the support of the community.11

3.3.3 Outsourcing to Commercial Contractors

Outsourcing to commercial contractors is when an INGO/IO arranges a fee for service

with a private firm or local academic institution. This is commonly for specified services
such as distribution of basic provisions, but can include more complex services such as
independent third party monitoring. Benefits of this approach include neutrality and
impartiality; however, targeting of beneficiaries may be weaker. 11

20
Table 1 - Summary of Remote Operation Modalities 11, 17, 18, 20

REMOTE REMOTE
REMOTE CONTROL REMOTE SUPPORT
MANAGEMENT PARTNERSHIP

Nature Reactive Reactive Proactive Proactive

International staff High/Complete M oderate Low Low /None

authority

National staff Low /None M oderate High High/Complete

authority

National staff Little M oderate Full Unnecessary

capacity
development

Monitoring Little Some Full Full

Flexibility Little Some Very Very

Quality Low M oderate High High

Sustainability Low M oderate High High

Time-line Short term M edium term Long term Long term

Vulnerable to staff Highly Highly No No

turnover

Experience in None Some Yes Yes

context and
infrastructure
required

Potential benefits - Continuity of - Continuity of - Continuation of - Continuation of

program program program long program long
- Better oversight - Better oversight term, sustainable term, sustainable
- Capacity building - Tailored to - Tailored to
changing context changing contex t

Potential - Communication - Communication - Corruption risk - Corruption risk

weaknesses problems problems - Lack of oversight - Lack of oversight
- National staff - National staff - Scarcity of - Scarcity of
bear much of bear much of ex perienced ex perienced
responsibility and responsibility and national staff national staff
risk w ith little risk w ith little - Reduced
authority authority funding due to
- Unsustainable donor
reluctance

21
Table 2 - Summary of potential benefits and hazards of operating agents 4, 11

PRESENCE AT POTENTIAL WEAKNESSES AND

DESCRIPTION POTENTIAL BENEFITS
PROJECT SITE HAZARDS

Senior agency  Limits transfer of responsibilities to

International staff staff visit the  Provides continuity of leadership national and local staff

project site on a  Show s accountability and  International visits attract
regular basis. attention to the project
transparency from better
 Leads to possible suspension or
Senior agency monitoring and oversight

w ithdrawal if a staff member is a
staff direct  Demonstrates solidarity w ith victim of violence

programming local population, and possibly  Communication difficulties due to
and manage lack
of continuous international
offers a level of ‘protection by
employees from presence and management
presence’
a distance. oversight
 M aintains perception of

neutrality and impartiality


 Show s that management
has a

better understanding
of the

contex t which can
lead to

better planning and

implementation


 Encourages donor trust

 Puts pressure on staff (if not
National and/or  Increases ow nership by trained, lacks capacity)

National local staff assume national/local staff
  Allow s potential for
‘relocatable’ decision-making  Emphasizes capacity-building corruption/collusion

staff and/or local authority.  Ensures sustainability in the  Ex poses national staff (if security
staff program assessment determines they are
 Allow s monitoring and
at risk and the organization has
evaluation by agency staff not responded appropriately with
training, assets, and procedures)
 Communication difficulties
 National/local staff may accept a
greater degree of risk than is
deemed appropriate
 M ay lead to suspension or
w ithdrawal if a staff member is a
victim of violence
 Risks undermining the perception
of neutrality and impartiality

22
  Often has limited capacity and
Local NGO The international  Shares the values of the aid w eak incentives for accountability
agency hands organization
to donors and beneficiaries, as
over program/  When done properly, supports w ell as the possibility of corruption
project to local the development of an


NGO to manage. indigenous civil society  Communication difficulties
 Emphasizes capacity-building  Transfers risk
and sustainability  Local NGO risks being used only
 Increased program acceptance as service provider

and targeting within local  Risks undermining the perception
community of neutrality and impartiality

 Risks undermining the perception

National or local The international  Promotes long-term of neutrality and impartiality,
government agency develops development especially if the host government
authorities program in  Emphasizes capacity-building is a party to the conflict
consultation
w ith and sustainability  Government may not have local
government  M ay promote security via support
authorities and/or increased community  Possibly allow s weak
hands over acceptance accountability to beneficiaries
ex isting program
 Risks corruption
as ‘ex it strategy’.  Transfers risk
 M ore suitable for development
aims than emergency relief
 Does not share the values,
Commercial The international  Increases technical capacity including humanitarian principles,
contractors agency has a fee  Infrastructure projects often seen of the aid organization; partiality
for service as easier to monitor especially a concern
 Greater acceptance (if
arrangement with
contractors are local to the  Communication difficulties
a private firm to community)  M ay lower quality of service
do logistics or  Better targeting  Risks corruption and collusion
other activities.  Transfers risk
 Lack of contex tual analysis
 Difficult to identify/screen

 Capacity deficits
Community International  Partners have a vested interest  Projects can only be
based agency arranges in the right implementation of implemented at a very local level,
organizations for community the projects and have to be small in scale
group or leaders  Promotes best community  Lacks impartiality
to implement a participation  Communication difficulties
 M ore stable and familiar
portion of the
presence to local population  Risks corruption and collusion
program.  Better targeting of beneficiaries  M ay put populations at risk
 Community ownership  M ay not be representative
 M ore resilient to insecurity  Risk of elite capture

23
Table 3 - Remote control strategy and implications 11

IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY,

STRATEGY MODALITY
ACCEPTANCE AND QUALITY
Provision of funding and/or in kind goods for  M ay generate acceptance
humanitarian response to local NGOs,  Quality of programming and financial
churches, mosques, and/or the national Red management may suffer
Removal of all or
Cross or Red Crescent society (some
nearly all staff ex amples of international NGOs handing
over programs other international NGOs).

National staff run programs, and  M ay expose expatriates to higher risk

international staff may make occasional w hen visiting due to lack of security
visits to bring funds, monitor programs and infrastructure/carrying cash for program
Removal of expatriate give technical assistance. A variation on this  M ay expose national staff to higher risks
staff model is the use of ex patriates from w hen ex patriates absent
developing countries, w ho may be less at
risk than Westerners.

Normally to a tow n or city where security  Beneficiaries ex posed to risk in

can be managed more easily. This may be accessing assistance
Removal of program
temporary or intermittent. In this model,
staff and infrastructure some beneficiaries may access programs by
from insecure area traveling themselves.

Removal of program Use of contractors to deliver assistance.  Quality of programming may suffer
staff from insecure
areas

24
3.4 Remote Operations Challenges, Considerations and Approaches
Several themes were identified throughout this literature review. Themes pertained to
challenges, considerations and lessons learned for remote operations, with detailed
programming and monitoring methods often omitted from documents in an effort to
protect security. The themes identified are as follows: need to maintain humanitarian
principles, partnerships, coordination and collaboration, acceptance, risk and risk
management, advocacy, accountability, the ‘remote operations trap’, and the need
for planning and guidance. Each will be explored in detail below.

3.4.1 Need to maintain humanitarian principles

The humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence21

are necessary to ensure the safety of staff and communities. However, they are difficult
to maintain during remote operations. Many IOs give little consideration as to whether
or not local partners seek to uphold these principles. 11 Neutrality can be affected
through partnering with military forces to deliver aid,14, 22 while impartiality can be
compromised by religious, ethnic, or political dynamics that put pressure on local staff. 4,
23 One example of compromised humanitarian principles was the UNICEF operation in

Afghanistan between 2007 and 2010. Military partners were relied upon to access
southern provinces and meetings with populations and stakeholders were held in
military-controlled Provincial Reconstruction Team facilities; while this was the most
feasible option at the time, it severely compromised their stance as an impartial and
neutral actor.24 Ensuring national and local staff have a sound understanding of
humanitarian principles is necessary for programming and monitoring to be delivered in
keeping with global standards. 5

Some discussion posits that while impartiality and neutrality are important in these
contexts, the core principle that deserves emphasis is the humanitarian imperative: the
need to get critical assistance to those in need regardless of the method. This
argument implies that a “by any means necessary” approach should be favored over
attempts to maintain humanitarian principles in these settings.4

Key Lessons i n Humani tari an Pri nci ples

 Humanitarian actors must make an increased effort to appear neutral and not
align themselves with any side of the conflict.
 Impartiality can be a concern with a reliance on local actors who may be
influenced by community pressures.
 National and local staff require capacity building on humanitarian principles to
ensure programming is delivered as intended.

3.4.2 Partnerships

Effective partnership is a crucial component of any remote operation. Clearly

delineated responsibilities, a defined supervision structure with a variety of focal points,
and transparent policies allow all parties to make informed choices and adequately

25
fulfill their roles.11, 25 Four sub-themes emerged throughout the partnership discussion,
these are: selection, capacity, communication and trust, and sustainability.

3.4.2.1 Selection

Selecting suitable partners can be difficult in conflict settings where scarce resources
and desperation are primary influencers. It is necessary to have protocols and checks
in place to weed out disreputable partners or those with alternate agendas, such as
those linked to political parties, commercial business, or with religious motives; while
partnering with private companies or individuals with strong beliefs or affiliations may
sometimes be advantageous, it is important to ensure that biases do not negatively
effect programming.4 Considering national NGOs early on and having a list of pre-
qualified partners can be beneficial. 25 UNICEF hired a local accounting firm in
Afghanistan to assess both the skills and finances of potential and current partners.
W hile this proved to be effective in some parts of the country, the limited number of
potential partners with the required capacity and reputation in Kandahar proved to be
a risky roadblock. Capacity building interventions were put in place but were ultimately
a longer term process, necessitating dependence on the government to implement
projects in the near term. This resulted in the transfer of significant amounts of resources
through government channels known to be corrupt and lacking oversight; the risk was
further exacerbated by UNICEF’s inability to monitor government activities. 24 Another
example of partner vetting is the use of the US Provincial Reconstruction Team’s and
other partners’ lists to recruit national NGOs in Iraq. 26

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) Somalia described a method of selecting unskilled staff
that involved deferring to community elders or the local administration for suitable
recruits; this ensured both an appropriate clan balance and MSF was not held
responsible for a community’s potential dissatisfaction. This same mission found that
pre-existing programs in the field were crucial for the success of remote operations, as
nationals were already familiar with MSF protocols and principles and therefore were
excellent candidates to take over when the international staff were forced to
evacuate.23

Partners have also been identified through contacts, coordination meetings with local
non-governmental organizations (LNGOs), and local organizations that contact the
INGO/IO. This is a form of passive selection that biases towards LNGOs with networks.
W hile this method was prevalent in Syria, more active methods, such as partner
mapping, consulting local experts, searching via social media, interviews with
community members, and utilization of pre-conflict networks were considered to be
better alternatives. Additionally, partner selection works in both directions, with
INGO/IOs required to have good relationships with reputable partners if they are to be
chosen by LNGOs.27

Transparency of the selection process and terms of employment is also important. 28

Deciding on the most appropriate contract type can be a point of contention, with
NGOs preferring Project Cooperation Agreements (an agreement between the UN and
an NGO that will be executing the project) that portray equal partnership, despite
often suffering from liquidity and capacity issues that may prevent them from making

26
an equal contribution. UNICEF Chief of Operations in Pakistan has highlighted the
Special Service Agreement as their preferred contracting modality;14 this modality is
used for short-term contracts between the UN and a contractor or supplier of services,
and typically carries very few employee benefits. The ethics of each contract type
must be explored in each context to ensure maximum risk is mitigated.

3.4.2.2 Capacity

Building the capacity of local staff is incredibly important to ensure the fidelity of remote
operations, autonomy and project ownership. While local partners may be well versed
in the culture and context of a situation, they may be less adept at technical and
operational activities. Training needs to include:
 Operational methods/implementation,
 Security protocols,
 Negotiation skills,
 Monitoring and evaluation methods,
 Proposal writing,
 Advocacy,
 Rights and humanitarian law,
 Basic problem solving, and
 Management skills.4, 14, 18, 26, 29

Training must take into consideration the capacities and needs of those being trained,
acknowledging cultural and linguistic differences in both training and mentoring. 11 It
should be prioritized before remote operations take effect and include follow-up and
feedback to ensure retention and continuous improvement.4, 19, 30 Trainings by local
staff/non-experts are not well received 15 and LNGOs dislike top-down trainings as they
are not always relevant to their needs; instead they prefer smaller trainings on mutually
selected topics that are tailored to their priorities. 27 Training has also been found to be
more effective when trainees shadow international staff and learn by exposure. 13
Monitoring of training is important to ensure standardization.31 One program evaluation
found that LNGOs provided with capacity building training were significantly better at
meeting program outputs and quality goals compared to INGO/IOs.4

Methods used for capacity building include:

 Planned site-visits from remote management and support staff
o These were especially useful for fostering mutual trust and improved
coordination,32
 Bringing field staff to secure locations for trainings or implementing a training of
trainers approach,19, 23
 Distance learning (where technology permits),23
 Participatory workshops,27
 Partnership focal points/forum for local partners to learn from one another
o This was considered more useful than top-down training,27
 Staff secondments,27
 Pilot projects,27
 Cross-program exposure visits, and
 Good practice presentations.33

27
 Case Study 2: Capacity building in the NGO Coordinating Committee in Iraq (NCCI)
Field Focal Point Network4

An example of effective knowledge sharing is provided in the NCCI Field Focal Point
Network. The NCCI is a consortium of 67 INGOs and NGOs operating aid programs
in Iraq. This focal point network consists of 24 local NGOs across the country who
gather and monitor information in their localities, guided by ongoing training on
data collection and dissemination provided by the NCCI. They then come together
to share security and political information; participate in trainings on monitoring,
advocacy, rights and humanitarian law; and share information and experiences.

INGOs working remotely from offices in Amman, Jordan benefitted by having

evolving real-time information of the situation on the ground throughout all 18
regions of the country; while national NGOs gained a deeper understanding of
humanitarian issues as well as regional and national information that would not
normally be received. This system not only improved collaboration and
programming, but was also crucial for civil society empowerment.

On the other hand, it is important not to create an unequal relationship by assuming all
national staff require capacity building; many have years of experience and expertise
in management, implementation, and monitoring, and disregarding these skills can
create a divide between internationals and nationals that inhibits collaboration and
negatively impacts programming quality.34

W hile capacity building is important, it is a long term goal that can also lead to a short-
term loss in efficiency; this trade-off requires consideration and needs to be evaluated
against the urgency and needs of the context.35

28
 Case Study 3: Tele-medicine and tele-mentoring by MSF

Information and communication technology has also been used to provide clinical
health care at a distance (telemedicine) and build capacity (tele-mentoring). 36 It
has been successfully used by MSF in Somalia to support Somali clinicians when
expatriate staff were no longer able to be physical on site at a district hospital due to
security risks. 37 Daily video conferencing was set up to link clinicians with a pediatric
specialist in Nairobi. Specific referral criteria were used, resulting in 346 of 3920 (9%)
of cases being referred for telemedicine. A significant change was made to the
management of 222 (64%) of these cases, and a life-threatening condition was
detected that had previously been missed in 88 (25%). Clinicians’ capacity also
improved through regular education via tele-mentoring, as demonstrated by the
drop in adverse outcomes from 7.6% in 2010 (without telemedicine) to 5.4% in 2011
(with telemedicine) (30% reduction, odds ratio 0.70, 95% CI: 0.57-0.88, p=0.001). In
addition to improved management and recognition of risk signs, clinicians also found
it to be of high value as it built a relationship of solidarity with distant specialists,
improving morale in an otherwise isolating situation.

A retrospective analysis of pediatric cases handled by the MSF telemedicine system

from April 2010 to March 2014 across 28 countries found that two thirds of responses
were deemed useful by the patient and three quarters were found to be useful by
the medical team.38

3.4.2.3 Communication and Trust

Building trust is key for partnerships and is intrinsically linked to communication.

Maximizing face-to-face contact, regular sharing of ideas and information, enhanced
interactions (for example, through videoconferencing or instant messaging),
transparent decision making, joint agenda setting, forums for feedback and reflection,
regular mentoring/supervision, clarity about conditions that would necessitate
withdrawal of funding, and a general openness to partner perspectives are all
considered to be useful trust building mechanisms in remote operations. 19, 27, 33, 39, 40
Communication can be enhanced by the designation of a focal point, responsible for
communicating messages between the field and the office, and communications
should be sure to reference the value of work and provide moral support to field staff. 25
Communication strategies should specify the frequency, mode and type of information
to be shared.19

29
 Case Study 4: Partnering in Syria27

An examination of partnerships in Syria identified several variables that strongly

influenced partnerships in this context. How an INGO/IO defines its end goal affects
the relationship, with organizations who are looking for a delivery system to reach an
inaccessible population fostering much different relationships than those looking to
build capacity and strengthen civil society. The partnership is also affected by the
INGO/IO’s capacity to partner and the manner with which they approached the
partnership; an organization’s culture (partnerships that are streamlined into
programming were found to be more effective than those viewed as a last resort),
the stability of the INGO/IO within the local context (infrequent staff turnover,
consistent funding, and well defined strategies), and the donor’s level of comfort
with risk all influence their capacity to partner.

Partnerships in Syria were enhanced with a collaborative and trusting operative

environment; a partnership with joint-problem solving between all levels, information
sharing, and cooperation improves project quality and coverage. On the other
hand, lack of INGO/IO support of local partners’ core costs was associated with
mistrust.

Table 4 - LNGO opinions of what builds or diminishes trust27

BUILDING TRUST LACK OF TRUST

- Face to face meetings - Lack of overall transparency
- Dedicated partnership person in INGO/IO - Feeling used (for networks/sub-contracts)
- Language capabilities - Excessive documentation
- Clearly defined roles - Top-down communication
- Fulfilling commitments - Condescending attitude
- Demonstrated flexibility - Cultural insensitivity
- Joint problem solving - Slow response time
- INGO/IO respects LNGO opinions

3.4.2.4 Sustainability

Sustainability of remote operations is a relevant concern in this growing climate of long-

term conflicts where national staff are relied upon to deliver services for increasing
lengths of time. Prioritizing the sustainability of local partners involves focusing on
operational and organizational capacity building of the institutions (not just the
individual), supporting long-term projects, providing core funds (funds for daily
operations and salaries), and supporting alliances among local groups, thereby
building a strong civil society. Local partners should also be encouraged to develop
their own contingency plans and procure goods locally. 27

LNGOs have cited a variety of approaches to promote sustainability in the face of

donor withdrawal, these include: switching to less capital-intensive activities (for
example, switching from aid distribution to education and awareness initiatives),
diversification, downsizing (relying on volunteers), dormancy, and approaching other
donors and the private sector for funding.27

30
Sustainability is also supported by rapid decentralization to skilled staff and flexibility in
rapidly changing contexts, versus hierarchical management structures and
procedures.17

3.4.2.5 Examples of Partnership Strategies

The peer-reviewed literature described several specific examples of remote

approaches that emphasized task-shifting to local providers. A 2015 UNICEF project
implementing Community Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) in Somalia found the use of local
health NGOs crucial to successful execution, given their access to communities, even in
conflict-affected areas.41 Their longstanding commitment to the health of the
community made them ideal implementers of a comprehensive and enduring
sanitation program. A MSF surgical program in Somalia also took advantage of local
expertise when the expatriate presence ended in 2008 due to insecurity. 42 The surgical
program was then run remotely by a coordination team in Nairobi, with services
provided by 1 Somali doctor who had trained under the expatriate surgeon for 2 years,
1 surgical nurse, and 1 anesthetic nurse. Peri-operative mortality was found to be lower
when the procedures were performed by non-surgeons between 2008-2009 (0.2%) than
when performed by surgeons between 2006-2007 (1.7%, p<0.001).

Further examples of effective task-shifting have taken place in Myanmar. The

Backpack Health Worker Team (BPHWT) is a group made up of indigenous health
workers who provide care to internally displaced people and local tribal communities,
not accessible to international organizations due to insecurity and government
restrictions when the country was ruled by a military junta. BPHWT was able to
complete a retrospective mortality survey of conflict zones,43 as well as provide critical
health services to over 78,000 individuals.44 The latter was made possible via a cross-
border global-local partnership where BPHWT team leaders crossed into Thailand twice
annually to resupply, receive training, and compile collected health information at the
administrative headquarters; technical support was provided by international NGOs.
BPHW T was also involved in a trauma management program where indigenous health
workers were trained for 4-6 days in trauma management; 200 patients were treated
between 2005 and 2007 and 91% of cases survived. 45

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) described local contractors and
consultants as essential to their remote water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) program
in Iraq.46 2006 marked the year this program attempted a new operational framework,
reducing staff exposure and increasing networking to promote acceptance while
building up a system of local implementers; the extensive network of competent local
staff, working with ICRC engineers, was crucial in carrying out 78 remotely manage
projects in 2007.

However, not all humanitarian programs are amenable to remote operations. MSF’s
long term Human African Trypanosomiasis (HAT) campaign, which began in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2007, found that the complexity of HAT’s
diagnosis and treatment prevented any emergency handover to local partners when
MSF was forced to evacuate due to insecurity. 47

31
Key Lessons i n Partnershi ps
 Vetting the quality of potential partners early can make selection easier when a
shift to remote operations is required.
 Targeted proactive recruitment of partners must acknowledge social divisions.
 Focusing on operational and organizational capacity building of the entire local
institution is a prerequisite for sustainable programming.
 Capacity building of local staff should favor participatory approaches and be
tailored to national/local staff needs and priorities.
 Regular communication with field staff is required by any means necessary
(Skype, E-mail, Facebook, WhatsApp, etc.).25
 A minimum level of face-to-face contact between senior staff and implementers
is required to build trust and capacity.48

3.4.3 Coordination and Collaboration

Coordination between internationals and national staff is essential to ensure cohesive

remote programming and monitoring. One study found that many agencies lack an
internal communications protocol, leading to serious reductions in real-time
information.4 An Iraq case study found that while the cluster system was in place
throughout remote programming, it was not inclusive of the Inter-agency Standing
Committee or LNGOs.28 The inability of international humanitarian actors to coordinate
the response and share information in Syria led to a disharmonized approach that
negatively affected the absorptive capacity of LNGOs and compromised
programming.27 A study of the humanitarian space in Somalia found that actors were
pulling away from the conventional cluster coordination system to work independently.
W hile in some cases this improved access and allowed organizations to implement their
own tactics, the lack of a common standard to deal with demands (for example,
negotiation techniques, stances on taxation and fees, etc.) and lack of understanding
of what other actors were doing ultimately compromised program activities. This same
study found that the 2007-2008 OCHA joint operating principals for Somalia were never
operationalized as actors were worried that they would not be able to operate if they
followed international humanitarian standards. 49 Dependence on the UN system for
logistics was also found to be an issue by MSF in Yemen as it locked INGO/IOs into
decisions made, or not made, by the UN, ultimately compromising their independen ce,
mindset, and capacity. 50

In addition to structured and regular communication strategies,15 coordination is

achieved through regular interaction between various levels of staff (site visits, video
conferencing, etc.).19, 32 With whom an agency coordinates must be carefully
considered in order to appear neutral and reduce security risk. 20 Proximity of support
departments is thought to be important as well, with central administration and logistics
centers increasing coordination. 13

An example is UNICEF’s Iraq mission where a cadre of 15 senior facilitators was

established to strengthen coordination across all governorates; this group was then
coordinated by the emergency specialist. 28 The International Organization for Migration

32
(IOM) in Iraq found that coordination with the government’s Ministry of Displacement
and Migration, the IDP working group, and with at least two implementing partners per
program helped to avoid duplication. 51 The NCCI has also used coordinated local
networks to map the security situation. 52

Case Study 5: The shura (council) system in Afghanistan 4, 18, 26, 53

One example of effective coordination is the shura (council) system in Afghanistan

developed by Tearfund to mimic the local decision-making structure based around
group consultation. Following insecurity that forced coordination activities to
relocate from Kandahar to Kabul, the lack of an expatriate program manager was
feared to unleash tribal differences among Afghan staff members. In an attempt to
preempt these tensions from causing problems, a shura was developed with the 5
program heads from the Kandahar office, each taking turns to coordinate the shura;
all other staff members were invited to participate in deliberations as well. The
inclusiveness to all opinions and lack of one controlling member helped to manage
conflict and tensions between staff and prevented fraud or corruption as all
members worked together and monitored each other.

While this process was slow to develop and resulted in slow decision making initially, it
was important given the cultural context and demonstrated respect for local
governance mechanisms. The shura system led to programming that was highly
accepted by the community, well-coordinated, and fairly implemented, while
building sustainable local capacity and ownership. This system also generated
meeting minutes and weekly reports that could be used for monitoring. The
expatriate coordinator also benefitted by receiving multiple perspectives on any
situation through individual contact with each member.

Collaboration between multiple organizations at all levels is an important component of

effective remote operations. Low collaboration was found between UN agencies in
Pakistan which negatively affected programming.14 UNICEF Somalia demonstrated
effective collaboration through teaming up with the World Food Program (W FP) on
missions and access negotiations, resulting in increased field time, more effective
response, and good staff security. This approach of teaming up with other
humanitarian agencies was thought to be more beneficial than being locked in the
United Nations Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS) structure. 54 The Ministry of
Public Health in Afghanistan partnered with ICRC to conduct negotiations and gain
access for their polio eradication initiative in high-risk areas.55

Recommended mechanisms to improve collaboration include: best practice learning

events, training and capacity building workshops, resource sharing, and engagement
with humanitarian and development coordination bodies. 33 Cluster leads should
support the sharing of good practices and lessons. 5

Key Lessons i n Coordi nati on and Col l aborati on

 Coordination structures should be rooted in the cultural context to promote
acceptability and community ownership. 4

33
  There is a need for coordination mechanisms and standards that take into
account the realities of operating in conflict contexts.
 A designated network of focal points can relay goods, equipment, information,
and lessons and improve coordination. 17, 18, 28
 There is a need to improve the efficacy of the cluster approach for remote
operations.24
 Good practices exist, but are generally confined within an organization and
need to be shared.33

3.4.4 Acceptance

Acceptance is important to ensure the fidelity, execution, and u ptake of remote

operations. Activities need to be accepted by both the national/local staff
implementing them and the communities they aim to serve; program ownership is
linked to program success. 23 Acceptance is both a security measure and used to
eventually regain access,53, 56 and is closely linked with trust, which is difficult to foster in
situations with limited contact. One study found pervasive levels of distrust at all levels:
between agencies and local staff, between agencies themselves, and between
agencies and beneficiaries; reasons cited included distance, lack of local presence
and contact with people, and differences in pay. 34 Additional reasons for growing
mistrust include: the establishment of heavily guarded compounds (“bunkerization”)
further distancing agencies from locals, heavily guarded visits by internationals leaving
locals unguarded, and reduced dialogue with local actors. 4, 15 Reputation building is
further compromised by disruptions in and poor quality of programming. 57, 58

Having national staff visit locations where the program is being remotely managed is
thought to be especially important to build trust between internationals a nd local staff
in cases where the local staff have little experience in the setting.11 Planned site visits by
managers to the remote locations also promote project ownership.32 Face-to-face
communication helps both management and trust building. 4, 26 Participatory
management styles that include both national staff and communities in decision
making, planning, and implementation are thought to be especially important as they
promote acceptance and increase uptake of services.13 One example of promoting
acceptance was the hiring of retired army members and bureaucrats as facilitators by
UNICEF Iraq; this promoted good relationships with the government and acceptance
on a national level. 28

Several techniques have been employed to increase beneficiary acceptance.

Ensuring staff are from an appropriate cultural, religious, or geographic background is
important when programming in sensitive areas. 52 The use of diaspora nationals as
international staff was found to increase acceptance in Somalia, as, in addition to
bringing technical skills, they are better able to assimilate and communicate with local
populations. However, this case also noted that resentment could foster among these
communities due to diaspora nationals receiving high salaries and seeming to be out of
touch with the context.5, 26, 49, 59 Increased communication and advocacy efforts
promote local ownership.24 An example of successful community outreach is that
established by an INGO/IO in Afghanistan that built relations via discussing the

34
similarities between the Islamic teachings and the ICRC code of conduct; this initiative
was supported by the Ministry for Hajj and Religious Affairs as well as influential Islamic
scholars.26 Another example in Afghanistan linked the teachings of the Qur’an to
humanitarianism when gaining support from community members during the transition
to remote operations; they also found that explaining the project to the communities
prior to the deterioration in security, along with their operational history in the area, led
to increased acceptance.13 The UN Mine Action Coordination Center Afghanistan
(UNMACCA) recruited young adults in areas that needed demining via community
nomination; they received two months of training and went back to work in their own
community, demonstrating the possibility of local staff utilization for activities that
require defined skills. 5 Training community volunteers can also be used to shift program
ownership.60

Case Study 6: Building of community acceptance by International Medical Corps (IMC)

Somalia 61

IMC Somalia used Community Health Committees (also known as Health Center
Committees) to bridge the gap between the organization and the community. These
volunteer committees were established at every health facility and were comprised of
elected and well-respected community members with an appropriate clan balance.
They generated demand for the services and increased community ownership of the
health facility by facilitating health promotion and mobilization activities. They also
served as a mechanism for beneficiary accountability by feeding back the community’s
concerns and needs and holding IMC accountable. They have also acted as
mediators, de-escalating conflicts when they arise and reducing security risks.

Additionally, this program also found that using 100% local staff with an appropriate site-
specific clan balance fostered good local perception and minimized checkpoint bribes,
confiscations, raids, and threats of violence when hiring or firing staff. Interventions that
have also reduced risk for IMC (compared to other INGOs operating in the same areas)
include: giving local sites the authority to hire their own non-skilled staff, replacing skilled
staff who leave with someone from the same clan, using the Community Health
Committees to informally recommend new staff, and ensuring transparency when staff
are let go, including the provision of a culturally appropriate severance package.

Further examples of the benefits of building acceptance include a World Health

Organization (WHO) report on poliomyelitis eradication in Afghanistan and Pakistan
that found that indirect contact with anti-government groups, and the support gained
as a result of this contact, allowed hostilities to be ceased during immunization
activities, increasing areas accessible to vaccinators between September and
December 2007.62 Support from community leaders was found to be crucial during
triggering and implementation of the CLTS program in Somalia 41 and for project
implementation and gaining safe passage for program staff in insecure regions
throughout Global Fund-supported malaria programs. 7 Additionally, the ICRC found
strong collaboration with and ownership by local authorities to be essential for the
success of their remote W ASH program in Iraq.46 MSF’s pediatric tele-consultations and
tele-monitoring program in Somalia required awareness raising meetings with
community elders prior to its introduction;37 understanding new technology was key to

35
program acceptance in this community whose cultural beliefs negate the use of
cameras.

Visibility has also been cited as necessary for long-term acceptance, but while having
logos present during programming can help ingratiate an organization with the local
population, it must be balanced with the risk to security and could jeopardize
effectiveness in the short-term.17 Techniques used to build an agency’s reputation
include identification at distribution points with removable signage and the use of
media messaging.63 In Pakistan, negotiations with local tribes to deliver food aid to
remote communities raised visibility and built confidence with the locals. 26

Two caveats regarding acceptance are: an organization can never rely on

acceptance-based security alone in dangerous environments, and the fundamental
prerequisite to acceptance is principled, competent and committed humanitarian
programming with tangible results. 5

Key Lessons on Acceptance

 Investment in highly localized staff structures and hiring of local technical staff
should be prioritized where possible.
o Local staff are familiar with the context and can help facilitate working
relationships.5
 Adopt participatory management styles and recruit staff members in
consultation with communities.5
 Pursuing and sustaining positive community relationships is crucial for beneficiary
acceptance.33, 60
 Acceptance cannot be solely relied upon for security.

3.4.5 Risks and Risk Management

3.4.5.1 Risks to National/Local Staff

Remote operations involve a transfer of risk from international staff to national and local
staff, who are thought to be at lower risk for targeting and therefore safer as program
implementers.19, 64 This risk is exacerbated by the under-representation of national/local
staff in security training and unequal distribution of assets and support; very few
agencies have clear policies outlining which security-related equipment will be turned
over to partners when expatriates are forced to leave. The assumption that nationals
are at a reduced risk because they are more familiar with the local context is often
false; national staff can be seen as outsiders if they are from a different part of the
country, which can result in higher levels of mistrust than with internationals.5 Nationals
face different threats that need to be acknowledged in comprehensive security
assessments, with the implementation of security measures unique to these risks, and
agencies’ risk thresholds, applying equally to all staff.3, 4, 11, 34, 56 Another issue is that
incidents involving national staff are not documented as thoroughly due to separate
insurance policies and reporting requirements, contributing to the underestimation of
the risk that they face. 3

36
Local aid workers are further influenced by financial and other competing priorities that
encourage risk taking and they may not be in the best position to assess what are
acceptable risks. They are also often excluded from international staff support
arrangements like hazard pay, rest leave, and counseling;34 whether or not partners fully
understand and accept risks and whether their profile truly allows them to undertake
tasks with less risk should be assessed.16 Additionally, they often accept additional
security risks to comply with donor requirements; for example, a local partner reported
having to use money from their already small core budget to pay smugglers to move
people and documentation across siege lines so the INGO/IO could be provided with a
beneficiary list.27

Mechanisms to mitigate this risk include:

 Conducting thorough risk assessments,16, 19
 Preparedness planning that decentralizes authority,59
 Transfer of security equipment (vehicles, communication tools, etc.) to nationals
and transparent guidelines that allow them to know what they will be receiving
and make informed decisions accordingly,11
 Employing nationals that will “blend in” 56 and are able to maintain a low profile,13
 Recruitment of non-western staff from neighboring countries with similar
cultures,56
 Capacity building on security issues and protocols,4
 Additional monitoring,4, 19 and
 Liaising with community members for risk updates. 58

3.4.5.2 General Risks

General risks in remote operations are many and include: inadequate and poor quality
coordination, information management, credibility, monitoring, and programming;
inciting conflict; causalities and fatalities; insufficient impact; limited or no program
expansion or adaptation; compromised impartiality; and reduced advocacy or
speaking out on behalf of affected populations.23, 32 These risks are exacerbated by
inadequate risk perception and a decreased sense of urgency from remote managers
who lose touch with the situation on the ground;19, 50 this distance is thought to
undermine the emergency mindset and the solidarity with victims needed to be willing
to take risks.17, 63 UNICEF Somalia found that the indecisive and process-focused culture
of their Nairobi-based remote management center contributed to a habit of risk
avoidance over risk management, preventing the seizure of opportunities and new
implementation modalities. Specifically, this inhibited the creation of an independent
monitoring system with partners and contractors when opportunity permitted, resulting
in the later creation of weaker monitoring structures that became an accountability
and reputational risk. 54

One example of combatting remote operation risks is the Risk Management Unit formed
in 2011 by the UN country team in Somalia. It maintains a directory of aid and local
actors to ensure quality and accountability, and advises all agencies through
monitoring of financial, programmatic, and reputational risks. 26 General strategies for
reducing risk include:

37
  Building strong relationships with communities,
 Strategic coordination with partners,
 Gaining support and acceptance from partners,
 Employing qualified staff with capacity and skills,
 Regular communication across all levels, and
 Detailed records and monitoring.19, 65

Financial and programming concessions are commonplace yet rarely addressed. Risky
practices include paying money at checkpoints and unofficial taxes, employing local
militia, avoiding need areas that will potentially antagonize local authorities, altering
target criteria, and risky partnerships. Corruption and fund diversion is prevalent
throughout these complex settings where chronic poverty is prevalent and local actors
are often acting with little to no supervision. Attempting to control corruption requires
checks and monitoring, and not an unrealistic zero tolerance policy.24, 29, 58 Reduced aid
diversion and increased program quality have been found to be correlated with
increased face-to-face contact between INGO/IOs and LNGOs.40 International staff
are thought to be better able to resist local social and political pressures to divert
resources and impartially target beneficiaries, contractors, or suppliers.23, 58

Additionally, not wanting to take the same risks as other agencies contributes to a
tendency to act independently, which is more prevalent in remote operations than
regular programming.4

Box 2: The UNICEF Minimum Components of the Comprehensive Risk Management

Approach:65
1. Assessing the non-security risks for UNICEF programs;
2. On the security side, linking our planning with the Stringent Regulatory Authority
and the inter-agency Program Criticality exercise;
3. Comprehensive multi-source monitoring with capacity to triangulate and analyze
information, including:
a. Regular program monitoring by staff
b. Self-reporting by partners (high frequency output level)
c. Independent third-party verification/monitoring systems
d. Affected populations / community feedback mechanisms (including use
of call centers);
4. Internal management measures such as training, partner screening, audit and risk
management working group/committee at Country Office level.

Additional components of risk management may include:

1. Capacity building for staff, partners, facilitators and contractors, on risk
management and on red lines based on humanitarian principles;
2. Agreeing on and implementation of common UN risk management tools, due
diligence measures and mechanisms;
3. Conflict sensitive programming;
4. Overall: Country Office articulates its approach to mitigation based on the threat
and risk analysis.

38
Key Lessons on Ri sk and Ri sk M anagement
 Donor and INGO/IO reporting requirements need to ensure they are not putting
national staff at increased risk.
 Risk needs to be managed not avoided.
 Opportunities to mitigate future risk need to be seized and not succumb to
bureaucratic delays.
 Clear contingency plans are required prior to a deterioration in security,
including local security costs in the budget. 27, 35
 Ongoing risk analysis, regular security training, and equipment and psychological
support for national staff is essential, and should be comparable to that of
internationals.5, 35
 Policies need to be implemented that acknowledge the realities of fraud and
corruption on the ground.

3.4.6 Advocacy

Advocacy suffers in remote operations, as it is highly dependent on the presence of

international staff. The legitimacy of the message is directly related to presence in the
field, and cannot be substituted by that of LNGOs who do not carry the same weight
and influence as their international counterparts. Remote operations were found to
weaken protection activities in Afghanistan that were dependent on advocacy from
INGO/IOs.4 Communication and advocacy efforts are also critical to the re-
enforcement of community ownership and program acceptance, thus despite the
restrictions, they should be increased when shifting to remote operations.24 UNICEF Iraq
found that implementing partners could be used to deliver messages on the ground,
however policy and decision messaging had to come from UNICEF directly to be
effective.28 MSF Somalia reported that outsiders (international staff) were in a better
position to witness and speak out about intolerable situations. 23

Key Lessons on Advocacy

 Advocacy is dependent on the field presence of international staff.
 Protection activities suffer when advocacy is reduced.

3.4.7 Monitoring & Evaluation

Accountability in remote operations is multifaceted and includes both upward

accountability to donors and downward accountability to beneficiaries. Its value lies in
its ability to contribute to prioritization in these fragile and resource-limited settings.66
Accountability is a crucial component of risk mitigation and management, with
increased monitoring and reporting requirements than traditional programming due to
the lack of field presence and direct oversight of INGO/IOs. Accountability is further
compromised by limited opportunities for data collection, poor quality data and
inaccurate information, lack of monitoring skills and capacity of local staff, lack of good
baseline data for performance indicators, issues with safely sharing information, rapid
aid influxes that necessitate immediate action and prevent M&E from being built in at
the onset, and difficulty gaining support from local staff who may feel money is better
spent on delivery of aid.18, 30, 32, 33, 53, 58 One study found that only eight out of the 20

39
INGO/IOs interviewed had an organizational monitoring and evaluation (M&E)
framework.58

3.4.7.1 Upw ard Accountability

Donor accountability is essential to ensure continued funding and confidence in

programming, despite common apprehensions associated with lack of senior staff
presence. Meeting donor accountability expectations tends to be the focus of the
majority of M&E,4 however, these expectations are often not well suited to fragile
settings, can increase risk to local partners,27 and can detract much needed funds from
programming; this has led to a call for flexibility and realism from donors.24, 32 Straying
away from institutional donor agreements towards unnecessary reporting requirements
was observed in Afghanistan and resulted in the limited human resources being
directed away from program implementation. 24

3.4.7.2 Dow nw ard Accountability

Accountability to beneficiaries ensures the needs of target populations are being met,
that aid is delivered equitably to all that require it, and that any (inadvertent) harm to
beneficiaries by humanitarian actors is addressed, however, it is often forgotten by
organizations.19, 67 The Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) essential
benchmarks of beneficiary accountability good practice are outlined in Box 3. A
recent study across four conflict settings found that surveys of local beneficiaries
reported that aid received was frequently not what was most needed. 29 It is especially
important to have independent beneficiary accountability mechanisms in remote
operations as communities are unable to directly follow-up with management.15
Monitoring of downward accountability can be achieved by:
 Beneficiary rapid assessment surveys,51
 Beneficiary feedback forms,19, 32, 52
 Beneficiary hotlines,26
 Meetings and discussions with communities32, 53
o Designated “Beneficiary Reference Groups” to provide direct feedback
on program and implementation quality,4
 Transparency of entitlements: ensuring the aid is expected and beneficiaries
know what they are meant to be receiving so any large diversions are noticed ,4,
19

 Systems for complaints redress,4, 19, 33

 Qualitative story telling from beneficiaries,53 and
 Community structures that promote beneficiary participation.33

40
 Case Study 7: Tearfund Darfur’s beneficiary and community oversight committee33

When using a remote operating approach in Beida, West Darfur, Tearfund

established a number of committees to support project monitoring and
implementation. One such group was the beneficiary and community oversight
committee that assisted Tearfund personnel based in the neighboring Geneina
Region. This included representatives from the local beneficiary population and
from wider communities where projects were being implemented. Tearfund
personnel were able to visit activity locations twice weekly when they would meet
with the committee and exchange views and ideas on how the project was
progressing and its level of quality; concerns and issues were then addressed by
Tearfund staff. Committee representatives also participated in exchange visits
between project sites that enabled them to evaluate and compare activities. This
participatory accountability mechanism was essential in improving project
implementation, quality, and impact.

Tearfund Afghanistan found that beneficiary accountability improved following its

prioritization within senior management. The hiring of a monitoring, evaluation,
accountability, and learning (MEAL) officer resulted in dedicated capacity to provide
training on accountability practices and to monitor their progress. Progress was
assessed by the incorporation of beneficiary accountability indicators in project
evaluations and the liaising of the MEAL officer with project offices and staff.33

Box 3: The 2010 HAP essential benchmarks to support beneficiary accountability good
practice33, 68

1. Establishing and delivering on commitments: the organization sets out the

commitments that it and its partners or contractors will be held accountable for
and identifies how they will be delivered.

2. Staff competency: 
 the organization ensures that staff and/or partners or

contractors have competencies that enable them to meet the organization’s
commitments.

3. Sharing information: 
 the organization ensures that the people it aims to assist
(directly or remotely), as well as other stakeholders, have access to timely,
relevant, and clear information about the organization and its activities.

4. Participation: the organization listens to the people it aims to assist, incorporating

their views and analysis in program decisions.

5. Handling complaints: the organization enables the people it aims to assist and
other stakeholders to raise complaints and receive a response through an
effective, accessible, and safe process.

6. Learning and continual improvement: the organization learns from experience to

continually improve its performance.

41
3.4.7.3 General M&E Methods

A clear plan for M&E must be designed; monitoring in remote operations may need to
be more intensive and can require significant resources beyond those used in direct
management settings.19 Several general methods and practices exist to support internal
and external M&E initiatives in remote operations. Internal M&E is thought to be less
rigorous than external consultants due to reduced transparency, neutrality, objectivity,
and impartiality.30

Internal Monitoring Methods:

 Decentralized organizational authority.59
 Clear monitoring and reporting procedures, instructions, and advanced
planning.4, 19, 31
 Daily or weekly debriefings.4
 Regular communication between remote managers and field staff (telephone,
e-mail, instant messaging, etc.).4, 31
 Regular written reports with strict deadlines.4, 13
 Date and time stamped, and Global Positioning System (GPS) encrypted
photographs of project sites/activities.4, 13, 27, 51, 69
o UNHCR Somalia found that having camera phones, and even taking
notes, could be risky in the field, resulting in monitors having to mentally
retain information and report it via the internet once they returned
home.26
o Training to take effective photos is required, they are only useful to assess
tangible outcomes (less so for intangible outcomes like social change),
and may not always be culturally appropriate. 53
 Bringing local personnel out of the field for monitoring reviews, technical
discussions, coordination meetings, and forward planning.4
 Unplanned visits by senior staff to project sites.4, 13, 51
 Selection and performance review committees.26
 Regular strategic surveys that consider the program within changing context.39
 Simulated technical field visits.69
 Independent INGO/IO and LNGO monitoring for the same program to allow for
cross-checking of data.40

42
 Case Study 8: Save the Children Somalia simulated technical field visit 69

Save the Children Somalia experimented with simulated technical field visits to provide
support to their nutrition operations in Hiran, Somalia; the first visit was completed over
Skype in October 2015. The objectives of the visit were to monitor the nutrition programs
and verify their existence, assess quality against benchmarks, identify gaps and areas for
capacity development, and motivate the field teams via establishing rapport.

After agreeing upon standards and benchmarks, the field team would provide
electronic evidence (scanned patient cards and stock records, focus group discussion
notes, completed checklists, photographs, etc.) for the international staff to review prior
to the call. Document analysis included assessing whether cards were filled in properly,
if correct treatments were prescribed, and if follow up was tracked properly, among
others. The Skype or phone call would then take place allowing for a joint review of the
documents with the field, providing feedback, and agreeing on an action plan.

Findings from a recent simulated field visit included the mean upper arm circumference
measurement was too tight in six out of ten photographs submitted and outpatient
cards were being filled out improperly, indicating further training was required. They
were also able to assess the site via photographs, noting the buildings did not provide a
shaded waiting area for mothers and lacked adequate furniture.

Several lessons were learned from this process: prior preparation and extensive
communication is required to ensure a complete set of documents is delivered for
assessment, taking representative photographs is a skill that must be taught, quality
checklists were very useful, and strict discipline was required to set aside uninterrupted
time to complete the visit. However, the question remains of how useful can a simulated
field visit be when the field team is choosing what to show you.

External Monitoring Methods:

 Independent third party monitoring via contracting local firms.4, 5, 28, 32, 39, 51, 70
o Recruitment from local communities allows monitors to move around
without incident.28
o Shared third party monitors across the UN system could reduce costs.24
o Quality of monitoring was found to be higher for supply-related
programming (i.e. infrastructure) versus more complex programming (i.e.
child protection).28
o Third party monitoring is considered the gold standard as it is assumed to
be the most neutral and impartial; however, it is resource intensive,
expensive, and its objectivity can be compromised through the repeated
use of the same firm.27
 Project/data verification through cross checking information with other field and
community contacts (triangulation).4, 5, 19, 39, 48, 59, 70
o UNHCR Somalia used simple feedback from people, contractors, and
implementers who were in the area but not a part of the program for
post-distribution monitoring; it was significantly cheaper than hiring a third
party contractor to be present during the distribution. 26
o On the other hand, the Northern Uganda case study described the use of
community members for triangulation as unreliable because they

43
 provided unrealistic information that they thought the NGO wanted to
hear.13
 Joint monitoring: sharing the monitoring capacity of other organizations.35
o UNICEF Afghanistan reduced costs by using the monitoring capacity of
W FP.24
 Peer-monitoring (also known as cross-monitoring): inter-agency agreements
allow staff from different NGOs, staff from different programs within an NGO, or
even between government agencies, to monitor each other’s programs.33, 39, 53
 Community/beneficiary-led monitoring: training of community facilitators or
mobilizers in monitoring techniques.
o Tearfund in Darfur (2009 – 2011) used village supervisory committees to
report on project concerns and share notes on implementation and
quality.33

Case Study 9: Quality Assurance Unit in Afghanistan33

One anonymous INGO operating remotely in Afghanistan described the creation of a

highly efficient Quality Assurance Unit. Each member of the unit was from a different
province in Afghanistan, with all members based in Kabul. In addition to a strong
understanding of the people and culture, each member was previously immersed in
the organization, where they built knowledge of the INGO’s values and ethos.

This unit was regularly dispatched to project locations where they monitored project
quality and implementation, and assisted field staff with the development of work
plans and log frames. With their deep cultural, contextual, and organizational
understanding, they were able to provide objective and effective third party
monitoring to the INGO’s projects.

3.4.7.4 Technological Support

W eb-based monitoring allows projects and activities to be verified over the Internet
through uploaded visual evidence with geo-referenced data.19, 27, 39, 59 The UNHCR has a
Project Tracking Database that allows for evidence of projections (GPS encrypted
photographs, costs, delivery info, etc.) to be uploaded, with payments tied to
photographic evidence. 5 UNHCR Iraq found that the downsides of their Project Tracking
Database was that it was costly, labor intensive, and required constant maintenance. 26

One organization in Afghanistan has developed a Geographic Information System

(GIS) Internet database that allows for program monitoring via the extensive storage of
photos, maps, and cross-checking data. It allows for the superimposing of activities
onto satellite maps and can be accessed from any location with internet. 4 Satellite
imagery has also been used to identify appropriate camp locations, obtain information
regarding impact and needs of emergencies, and aid first responders. 71

44
 Case Study 10: Technology for monitoring in Syria40

An anonymous INGO working in Syria described the technology employed to

monitor project implementation as one of its major strengths. The INGO operates
remotely but manages a cloud server that allows them to maintain daily oversight
of project activities; dedicated skilled INGO staff focus on data management and
analysis full time.

Data collection is facilitated by forms and questionnaires programmed into Open

Data Kit (ODK), enabling field staff to use android tablets to enter data that is
encrypted and automatically uploaded to the cloud server when the tablet is
connected to the internet. Additionally, WhatsApp on each tablet allows for
direct communication between data collectors and the INGO. This process has
the added benefit of data coming directly from the field to the INGO, bypassing
the middle partner organization. This system is used to collect data from
warehouses, pharmacies, communities, and clinics, with a variety of data
collection tools covering rapid needs assessment, WASH, nutrition, health, and
logistics.

Data cleaning and organization is performed automatically, with data

downloaded and stored in a series of folders daily. Folders are only accessible by
the monitoring officers and senior management, with subsets stored in different
folders for access by partner organizations as required.

QLIK Dashboards (a business analytics tool) are used to analyze and visualize data,
depicting indicators visually and allowing for easy exploration by the user. QLIK
Dashboards are dynamic so clicking any part of the dashboard filters and shifts the
visual representation to enable a more in-depth look. It also incorporates GPS
data and GIS to create maps on program updates.

INGO program officers and managers review the analysis before it is shared with
senior management and technical advisors; relevant results are then shared with
donors and partners. Manual cross-checking between different data sources is
used to make sure logistics operations correspond with program delivery and
results. Data is also cross-checked with partner monitoring data (photographs,
videos, paper forms, etc.) to ensure ODK forms submitted match with hard copy
stock and distribution records, for example.

A 2015 study by MSF demonstrated the utility of mobile technology for capturing local
conditions as they evolve on the ground, and using them as an early warning related to
food insecurity.72 Community health workers were trained in using an android mobile
phone application to collect information about socioeconomic vulnerabilities related
to malnutrition, access to resources, and coping capacities in the Central African
Republic (CAR). This information was combined with satellite-derived information on
rainfall and soil moisture conditions to confirm that the food insecurity situation in 2013-
2014 was related to violent conflicts rather than climactic shock. Additionally, smart
phones with GPS were found to be useful for analysis as they recorded the location of
every assessment and provided a direct link to satellite-derived information. Mobile

45
phones were also found to be valuable in the MSF drug-resistant tuberculosis (DR-TB)
program in the DRC where they were used to connect non-TB clinicians to a TB
specialist.9

W hile not specific to inaccessible areas, the RAMP mobile phone reporting system in the
Central African Republic (CAR) is an excellent example of how technology can
enhance reporting. Healthcare workers from health centers across the country were
trained in sending routine health data through pre-designed forms from their phone; this
resulted in rapid field intelligence and communication that prevented stock outs and
encouraged the IFRC, MSP, and Global Fund to expand malaria services. 73 Other
emergency technology that could be useful in remote operations include
‘OpenStreetMap’ and other live crisis mapping technology,74 the Commodity Tracking
System with open source data collection, GPS mapping, and coding tools used in Syria
to monitor the movement of goods. 19, 75

Additional examples of technology that have been used to monitor supplies in remote
settings include stocks tracked digitally through a barcode system 23, 40 and GPS
shipment tracking.27

Additionally, remotely measuring populations has been demonstrated by Bharti et. al.
who used nighttime satellite imagery and mobile phone call detail records to measure
average population size and dynamic changes during the 2010-2012 Côte d’Ivoire
internal political conflict. 76 They compared composited stable nighttime lights values,
the density of phone towers, and the density of subscriber identity modules (SIMs), and
found that they were able to obtain measurements in long and short term population
dynamics by overlaying the sources. The strongest correlation between the phone and
satellite data sets were found in economic regions, and not in administrative regions
that contained varying degrees of wealth.

Key Lessons on Accountabi l i ty

 Transparency to both donors and beneficiaries is crucial.20, 26
 M&E must be incorporated into the program framework in the planning phase as
it is much more difficult when it is an afterthought. 30, 33
 A minimum standard of clear, simple, and pre-determined indicators and
procedures is required.16, 18, 20, 66
 A monitoring system requires several layers of checks and filters for continuous
verification.33, 51
o M&E officers/mentors can train and support field staff to improve the
quality of data collection and reporting.53
 Specific monitoring capacity is required that is separate from but works closely
with the program; this ensures consistent monitoring and mainstreams M&E
procedures across the program. 26, 33, 77
 A mixed-methods (quantitative and qualitative) approach is required.53
 Research and investment in data collection and analysis software and
information and communication technologies, with the aim of adopting and
streamlining it across programs, is required. 33, 39

46
 Monitoring reports must be shared with partners to validate work and justify M&E
activities.61
 Accountability networks and relationships with stakeholders can be useful for
monitoring and triangulation.18
 M&E must be relevant to the needs of the program and used for learning and
continuous improvement.33

47
Table 5 - UNICEF Remote Monitoring Modalities Summary35

INSTRUMENT DESCRIPTION ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES

Web-based As a response to high security  Information regarding  Setup costs of such systems
remote project threat environments, UNICEF remote are high. How ever, if done at
organizations such as UNHCR programming activities an organizational level,
monitoring
and the Danish Refugee can be shared in real economy of scale could
Council (DRC) have developed time w ith all relevant justify such an investment
Project Tracking Databases, i.e. partners  Such systems require a high
a computer system to monitor  Beneficiaries have a level of technological
project activities in Iraq direct line of aw areness of local partners
(UNHCR) and Somalia (DRC) communication, w ith and availability of the
undertaken by local partners. the accountable required internet facilities in
Rather than sending staff out to organization, and is the areas of operations
see the outputs of the program thereby able to report  The system relies heavily on
activities, local partners can any irregularities input from local populations,
take pictures that are  A w eb-based remote w ith little quality control
uploaded w ith GPS info monitoring system available to check the actual
(UNHCR) and submit concerns could be applied at situation on the ground
via SM S, w hich w ill be sent to scale and linked to
the program staff concerned corporate monitoring
(DRC). Evidence-based systems
monitoring of construction,
costs, and deliveries take place
before, during, and after
construction, and payments
are tied to the photographic
evidence.
Quality Establishment of QATs w ith solid  QATs can in a flex ible  Assurance teams can face
Assurance backgrounds in relevant manner bring highly similar access restriction as
technical fields, e.g. auditing, skilled national staff UNICEF staff
Teams (QAT) for
programming, protection, from different sectors  Contracting of specialized
remote
WASH, education, etc., w ho on a short, medium, or technical ex perts can have a
management have access to the operational long basis and significant negative cost
accountability areas to monitor program effectively strengthen implication on the UNICEF
activities. QATs can also UNICEF’s and partners’ program delivery
provide technical support to monitoring capacity
partners to identify critical issues
related to remote
programming.
Third party Third party monitoring can  Provides UNICEF w ith  If used alone it is neither
monitoring provide UNICEF w ith an an independent and effective nor efficient
independent and honest critical assessment of  High cost implications for
account of progress on the quality of utilizing third party monitoring
program activities, as the implemented program due to reliance on scarce
contractors are detached from activities and ex pensive consultants
the project implementation.  Is a critical data  M onitoring typically takes
UNICEF, WFP, and UNHCR have source, w hich also can place after the activities have
been using third party be used to assess taken place, leaving little or
monitoring in a number of beneficiary needs in no management influence to
contex ts, including Afghanistan, the operational areas correct malpractices
Iraq, and Somalia. (if combined w ith  Due to the difficulty related to
other types of data contractual oversight by
sources) UNICEF, there is a moral
hazard risk involved in third
party monitoring
Monitoring by UNICEF can contract a number  Provides UNICEF w ith  Local population can be co-
beneficiaries of local community groups, an evidence base of opted by parties of the
beneficiaries, or government beneficiary conflict and hence not
local community
officials to monitor program perspectives in relation provide objective monitoring
groups/ local
activities in real time, or once to program activities  By involving
government the activity has taken place.  Provides UNICEF w ith beneficiaries/local
officials local know ledge of community groups in
the situation on the monitoring, UNICEF can

48
 ground ex pose them to unwanted
 Generates a local risks, e.g. seen as closely
ow nership and affiliated w ith UNICEF
accountability of the  Requires that UNICEF
program activities dedicates time and resources
to national capacity
development
 Lack of formal technical
monitoring ex pertise

Triangulated In areas w here access is  UNICEF is able to utilize  The setup requires proper
monitoring impossible for its national and
key strengths of oversight mechanisms to be
international staff alike, UNICEF
and international and national monitoring instruments in place w ithin UNICEF to
NGOs have used a to verify program guide such a complex
combination of vendors, local activities monitoring instrument
government officials, and  Provides information  Requires contracting of
community members for
on program multiple parties, w hich can
program quality and
accountability assurance, implementation from have significant cost
w herein all parties have to sign different levels of the implications on the program
off on each project activity. operational budget
environment  Ex poses UNICEF to a w ider
range of program
management risks

49
3.4.8 The ‘Remote Operations Trap’

The ‘remote operations trap’i refers to the inability to transition back to a traditional
management mode after a program has been implemented remotely for some time.4,
78 This is caused by a number of factors and effects including: reduced ground-level

information, less credibility of the agency, and increased risk for local partners. One
NGO reported that after a year of programming remotely in Somalia, national staff
became identified as decision makers and resource handlers and threats against them
increased;3 this made it more difficult for them to reengage later by traditional means.
Additional contributors to the resistance to returning to regular operating mechanisms
are: the potentially outdated perception of dangerous areas and risk secondary to a
loss of familiarity with the operating environment, a protection-oriented security culture,
security costs allocating resources away from more comprehensive programming, and
bureaucratic inertia. 4, 15 The best way to avoid the remote management trap is
continuous reassessment and a pre-planned exit strategy.

Key Lessons on Remote M anagement T raps

 Reduced insight into the situation on the ground can lead to programs getting
stuck in remote mode.
 An exit strategy is necessary to ensure programs are not managed remotely for
longer than is necessary.

3.4.9 Planning and Guidance

The need for comprehensive planning and guidance was a recurring theme
throughout this review. This need pertained to proactive guidance on when to shift to
remote operations, how to operate remotely, and strategies to exit remote operations.
Not considering a remote strategy in the initial planning phase of a program in Libya led
to a four month long standstill of project activities during the shift. 15

Most agencies lack criteria to assess risk and guide the decision to shift to remot e
operations, and the guidelines that do exist often fail to fully consider the unique threats
and circumstance national partners face. 11 Few agencies have plans for potential
partnerships and outsourcing, appropriate situation-specific risk transfer practices or
frameworks to support decision making. 34 Programs require contingency plans built into
the programming guide, using formal checklists that dictate when and how to shift to
remote mode.14, 16, 25, 56 These checklists should consider the security risk assessment, the
political and conflict context, stakeholder interests analysis, non-security risk mapping,
cost analysis, and exit strategies. 35 Additionally, these plans should account for the
required program simplification by including details on which activities are critical versus
those that can be put on hold.18 Guidance on partner selection should be included in
the planning and preparedness process, identifying potential partners that would be
appropriate in the event of withdrawal. 11

i
While this was originally referred to as the ‘remote management trap’ in the literature, it has been
changed to ‘remote operations trap’ to maintain consistency with the terminology used throughout this
report.

50
Flexibility needs to be incorporated into the overall strategy, as it has been shown to
foster success.14, 79 It is up to donors to provide flexible funding that is able to adapt to
changes in implementation secondary to insecurity.52 Criteria for funding remotely
managed programs have also been developed, 78 but need to be more widely
adopted. UNHCR Somalia identified a situation where a lack of flexibility resulted in a
lost opportunity when IDPs requested assistance with voluntary return, the funding was
not immediately available and took six months to authorize, ultimately preventing the
assistance of these individuals. 26

Additional important components to include in planning and guidance include:

 Costs of remote management and administration,24, 67
 An effective cluster approach,24
 Team structure,33
 Training of national staff,15
 An assessment of key operational gaps that may occur,15
 Indicators to guide gradual expansion,17
 Prepositioning of emergency supplies,52
 Precise communication instructions (including methods and frequency),13 and
 Remote monitoring.25

Studies in Afghanistan and Pakistan found that while remote mode is often considered
a temporary measure, few organizations have thought through criteria that would
guide a return to traditional programming or an exit strategy. 4, 14 The incorporation of an
exit strategy into overall program strategy could facilitate the release of organizations
from the ‘remote operations trap’.4 Continuous reassessment of the situation on the
ground is required to facilitate the timely implementation of exit strategies and minimize
international staff time away from the field.35

3.4.9.1 Adapting Protocols to Context

Ensuring strategic guidance is appropriate for the context is crucial in rap idly changing
conflict settings. W hile the creation of specific remote operation guidance is ideal,
modifying previous guidance to adapt to the new setting is also an option. The CLTS
program in Somalia reported that adapted, context-specific protocols were essential in
guiding effective program roll out in their fragile context. In addition to modify ing their
protocols, they used a decentralized approach to enable implementation in a weak
central government context. 41

Global Fund-supported malaria treatment and prevention programs in Afghanistan

have found that culturally specific adaptations, such as amendments of educational
materials for rural populations, religious awareness for gender groupings for health an d
educational interventions, and amendments to program branding resulted in improved
uptake of bed nets and improved access in insecure regions. 7

A 2006 MSF DR-TB program in the DRC found that they were able to successfully treat 3
patients diagnosed with DR-TB using a simplified monitoring protocol, despite the
providers being non-TB clinicians.9 Standardized forms were used to maintain an

51
overview of treatment despite frequent changes in staff; these simplified forms were
found to be useful despite their susceptibility to transcription error.

Key Lessons on Pl anni ng and Gui dance

 Comprehensive planning is required, including integrating contingency plans
and remote operations exit strategies into initial program plans.
 Guidance on how to operate effectively and make strategic decisions based on
up-to-date situational analysis is required through all phases (initiation,
continuation, and withdrawal) of remote operations.
 Adapting previous program guidance and protocols to inaccessible settings
should be considered when specific remote operations guidance is unavailable.

4. LIMITATIONS
This review of grey and peer-reviewed literature on humanitarian programming and
monitoring in inaccessible conflict settings highlighted many themes and issues
spanning through multiple domains: humanitarian principles, partnerships, risks,
advocacy, accountability, the ‘remote operations trap’, and planning and guidance.
W hile thorough in its analysis of content, one of the main limitations found throughout
this review was that the literature focused on INGO/IO perspectives, with little
information on the experiences of other players including national and local staff,
religious and community-based organizations, and communities themselves. The
literature was also focused on service delivery, with little discussion of the needs of the
population or incorporation of a human rights framework. There is also limited
discussion on ethical issues other than risk transfer, such as confidential beneficiary data
management, appropriate engagement strategies in high-risk environments, and the
dissemination of monitoring data. 32 More documentation is required to ensure all
perspectives are considered.

An additional limitation was the general lack of discussion on the costs of remote
operations; specifically, what is sacrificed and lost when one is forced to program or
monitor remotely. Only one peer-reviewed study reported on these drawbacks, citing
limited coordination capacity resulting from reduced contact with local
implementers,46 and while it was mentioned in the grey literature, the responses were
based more on observation than rigorous analysis. Further examination of the potential
losses in program quality and fidelity are necessary to obtain a complete picture that
can then be fully addressed; this cost-benefit analysis is an important avenue for future
research in this field.

The majority of documents pertaining to this subject were neither published nor peer-
reviewed; even within the peer-reviewed literature over one third of the studies were
case studies, a study type considered to be the lowest on the hierarchy of evidence.80
This limitation was exacerbated by the lack of detail throughout the literature, often
attributed to organizations not wanting to discuss specific methods for fear of
contributing to increased security risk; resultantly, the case studies in this review were
presented with all the details available but still lack much-desired information. Despite

52
this major drawback in evidence quality, it is important to acknowledge that
emergency conflict settings, especially those that are inaccessible, are not conducive
to data collection generally, with randomized controlled trials being especially difficult.
This is true for a number of reasons including security concerns, ethical considerations,
limited resources, and the urgency with which humanitarian aid needs to be delivered.
Nevertheless, this cannot be used to excuse the humanitarian community from
committing to evidence-based practice. Rigorous data collection and reporting, using
both qualitative and quantitative methods, needs to become commonplace in
humanitarian emergencies; it is required to share lessons learned, create best practice
guidelines, and root humanitarian action firmly in evidence.

53
5. CONCLUSIONS
5.1 Contributions to the Understanding of this Field
The descriptive nature of the literature and the focus on defining concepts highlights
that this field is in a relatively nascent stage. This review provides conceptual
background and definitions that will aid in future discussions of remote operations using
a common understanding and language. The information in this review provides a
foundation of examples of and lessons learned from experiences with remote
operations in conflict-affected areas. The collection of tools that have been developed
for remote programming and monitoring should also be helpful to other stakeholders as
they work to develop their own tools.

5.2 Gaps in the Literature

The literature demonstrates that although many organizations are participating in
remote programming or monitoring, few have documented their experiences so that
lessons learned can be disseminated to other organizations or stakeholders. Of the
documentation that exists, case studies were the predominant form of literature
available; the lack of rigorous operational research measuring robust outcomes limits
the ability to draw strong conclusions on the effectiveness of different approaches.
Furthermore, there is a lack of detail in the literature on how interventions were
implemented, which makes it difficult to replicate these efforts and to evaluate which
strategies were effective.

In addition to the lack of rigorous research and evaluation of remote operations, there
is a lack of guidelines or recommendations on best practices. Although some tools exist
and are shared in this review, there do not seem to be any harmonized tools that reflect
the variety of experiences or that have been vetted by the different agencies working
in the field.

Finally, the literature overwhelmingly represents the point of view of international

agencies; the experiences of local partners who are carrying out much of the work in
extremely insecure contexts are not represented. Additionally, there is no information
representing the perspective of the communities that remote operations are intended
to help.

5.3 Priority Areas for Future Research

As the evidence base for remote programming and monitoring is extremely limited,
further research is needed on all aspects of this field of work. Specifically, we have
identified the following priority research questions:

 W hat are the best practices that should be adopted by agencies carrying out
remote operations?

54
  How effective are various guidelines and tools when implemented in different
contexts?
 W hat are feasible and effective methods of monitoring and evaluating remote
programs?
 W hat are effective communication and accountability mechanisms to ensure
adherence to implementation guidelines by remote teams?
 W hat are the key criteria for vetting local partners or local staff to help ensure
adherence to humanitarian standards?
 W hat are the critical needs and challenges identified by local partners
implementing programs in conflict settings? W hat support is needed from their
remote partner?
 W hat is the assessment of remote interventions from the point of view of the
affected populations?

5.4 Next steps

There is an urgent need for guidelines and tools to assist agencies in applying best
practices in remote programming and monitoring. Once these guidelines and tools are
available they must be piloted and validated in inaccessible conflict settings. To
develop these guidelines and tools, we suggest the following actions:

First, we propose to follow this literature review with further in -depth documentation of
experiences and lessons learned. This can be done through a combination of field visits;
detailed case studies of remote operations; qualitative research with various
stakeholders, including international and national program staff and members of
affected communities; and collection of available quantitative program data.
Following this collection of data, a comprehensive review of the evidence should be
done by an expert review panel. The conclusions and recommendations of the expert
panel will then be used to develop an initial set of guidelines and tools to be tested and
validated.

Finally, international and national partners must be encouraged to document their work
and consider incorporating areas of operational research from the onset of remote
programming and monitoring activities, in order to improve knowledge of best
practices and create practical tools and guidelines that can be used to improve
humanitarian aid delivery in inaccessible conflict settings.

55
Annex 1 - Summary of peer-reviewed articles
Location
Goal of
Author Organization Title and Type Interv ention Study Design Results Additional Details Quality
Interv ention
of Crisis
CDC, WHO Progress Afghanistan Large-scale house-to- Interrupt Descriptive - Post-SIA coverage - Extensive cross N/A
2008 62 Toward and house Supplementary transmission case study below district average border movement
Poliomyelitis Pakistan, Immunization of WPV in of 95% in 20% of necessitating SIA
Eradication – ongoing Activities (SIAs) with Pakistan and sub-districts in synchronization
Pakistan and conflict Oral Polio Vaccine Afghanistan Pakistan. - Indirect contact
Afghanistan, - 4x national - Suboptimal made with anti-
2007 immunization days coverage in insecure government groups in
- 7x subnational and remote areas an attempt to cease
immunization days along the border in hostilities during SIAs;
both countries their support
- Up to 20% of increased areas
children still missed accessible to
in areas of southwest vaccinators during
Afghanistan. Sept – Dec 2007
- In 2007, - Support from tribal
Afghanistan and and religious leaders,
Pakistan reported 17 and local communities
and 32 cases of necessary for
confirmed polio, reaching children in
respectively insecure areas
Balfour, UNICEF CLTS in Somalia, Community Led Total Improve Descriptive Initially ineffective; - Implemented by N/A
2015 41 Somalia fragile and ongoing Sanitation sanitation case study gaps and barriers to local NGOs because
insecure conflict access in CLTS approach of their access to
contexts rural areas identified during communities even in
and small training of the conflict-affected
towns and implementers in 2014 areas
describe - Began training - The development of
adaptations program for NGO adapted, context-
necessary to partners in 2015 specific protocols to
adjust to (emphasis on NGOs guide CLTS
insecure that stay in programming is
setting communities for essential for effective
years, rather than rollout in fragile
leaving once contexts.
construction is - Involvement of key
finished) traditional and
- Decentralized religious leaders
approach allowed found to be critical
implementation in during triggering and
presence of weak implementation
central government.

56
 Location Goal of
Author Organization Title and Type Interv ention Study Design Results Additional Details Quality
Interv ention
of Crisis
Bharti, Part of the Remotely Côte Nighttime lights Rapid, large- Retrospective - Agreement in CDRs did not provide Low
2015 76 Human measuring d'Ivoire, satellite imagery and scale analysis average measures of long-term data on
Mobility populations internal mobile phone call measures of population sizes population
Mapping during a political detail records (CDRs) displaced - Able to obtain movements, a pre-
Project crisis by conflict - Compared populations measurements in conflict baseline or
overlaying 2010-2012 composited stable and long and short term movement across
two data nighttime lights movement population dynamics national boundaries.
sources values from 2012 and by using 2 sources - Satellite images did
2010, the density of not provide high-
phone towers resolution mobility
present, and the traces and were
density of SIMs sensitive to
- Assessed average environmental factors.
population size and - Used these two
dynamic changes complementary data
across spatial and sets to overcome the
temporal scales limitations of each;
strongest correlation
in economic regions
(not administrative
regions with varying
wealth)
Chu, MSF Providing Somalia, Task Shifting Continue Before and - 2086 operations - Low rates of spinal Moderate
42
2011 surgical care ongoing - Expat presence provision of after study were performed anesthesia due to lack
in Somalia: A conflict ended Jan 2008 due surgical care between Oct 2006 of training of
model to increased by local and December 2009. anesthetic nurse
of task insecurity doctors and - After Jan 2008 all (most general
shifting - Surgical program nurses procedures (1433) anesthesia); extra
since run remotely by following were performed by training for Somali
coordination team in evacuation non-surgeons (doctor staff required
Nairobi; visit site of expatriate with surgical skills - Videoconferencing
2x/year to ensure staff and surgical nurse) would be beneficial
standards being met - Peri-operative
- Services provided mortality was lower
by 1 Somali doc with when procedures
surgical skills (trained were performed by
under expat surgeon non-surgeons (0.2%,
for 2 years), 1 2 cases) between
surgical nurse, and 1 2008-2009, versus
anesthetic nurse 2006-2007 when
- Surgical consult surgeons were
available by email present (1.7%, 6
cases, P < 0.001)
Enenkel, - MSF Food CAR, Mobile data collection Collect Cross-sectional - May 2015: - Recording the Low
72
2015 - Vienna Security violent and remote sensing information survey households location of every
University of Monitoring conflict - SATIDA about socio- consumed 0.9 meals assessment via the
Technology via Mobile COLLECT: android economic per day; average smart phones’ GPS

57
 Location Goal of
Author Organization Title and Type Interv ention Study Design Results Additional Details Quality
Interv ention
of Crisis
(TUW) Data application that vulnerabilitie household size was receiver enabled
- International Collection facilitates rapid and s related to more than nine analysis and display
Institute for and Remote simple data malnutrition, people; despite this, of coupling between
Applied Sensing: collection. access to children between 6 drought risk and
Systems Results from - Local CHWs resources and 59 months were impacts over many
Analysis the Central working with MSF and coping not malnourished years (direct link to
(IIASA) African used mobile data capacities - Satellite-derived satellite derived info)
Republic collection application using smart information about - Complementary use
(CAR) on smart phones to phones; to rainfall/soil moisture of information from
conduct nutrition capture local conditions and the satellites and SATIDA
assessments and conditions as Standardized COLLECT can
interviews in the local situations Precipitation support the translation
language evolve on Evapotranspiration of early warnings into
- Inputs from satellite the ground Index confirmed that action, reducing the
derived drought (early the food insecurity risk of false alarms
indicators warning situation in and strengthening
related to 2013/2014 was overall disaster
food related to violent preparedness
insecurity) conflicts rather than
to a climatic shock
Kevany, - The Global Global Afghanistan Adaptation of Global - Ensure Qualitative - Service utilization - Successful Moderate
7
2014 Fund Health , ongoing Fund-supported security of study and improvements, adaptation of global
- Afghanistan Diplomacy conflict malaria treatment and staff retrospective improved access of health interventions to
Ministry of Investments prevention programs: - Improve program service delivery in insecure regions may
Health in 1- amendment of local evaluation insecure regions help to build up an
- National Afghanistan: educational materials acceptability, - Temporal international presence
Malaria and Adaptations for rural populations coverage, association noted in otherwise-
Leishmaniasis and 2- religious and service between intervention inaccessible
Control Outcomes of awareness in gender utilization and improved uptake provinces of
Programme Global Fund groupings for health of nets Afghanistan, which
(NMLCP) Malaria educational - Intervention would, in turn, be
Programs interventions implementation and impossible without
3- recruitment of local safe passage for appropriate
staff, educated in program staff were adjustments to
languages and facilitated by program design,
customs, for both negotiations with selection and delivery
quality assurance and community elders in - Must maintain clear
service delivery insecure regions and explicit
4- alignment with - Prestige and distinctions between
diplomatic principles acceptability of development, military
and avoidance of international donor and political agendas
confusion with activities were
broader strategic and observed to improve
military initiatives as a result of the
5- amendments to adaptations process
program ‘branding’
procedures

58
 Location Goal of
Author Organization Title and Type Interv ention Study Design Results Additional Details Quality
Interv ention
of Crisis

Lee, Backpack Mortality Burma - Cluster surveys Estimate Cross-sectional Completed surveys - No other Moderate
43
2006 Health rates in (Myanmar), conducted by mortality mortality survey from 1290 (64.5%) governmental or
Worker Team conflict ongoing indigenous mobile rates in households in 2002 international
(BPHWT) zones in conflict health workers conflict- and 1609 (80.5%) organizations working
Karen, - Interviewed heads affected households in 2003. with this population
Karenni, and of households over 3 areas in - Estimates of vital from within Burma.
Mon states month time periods in eastern statistics for 2002 - Use of indigenous
in eastern 2002 and 2003; Burma and 2003 mobile health workers
Burma randomly selected inaccessible respectively: infant provides one means
within clusters via to mortality rate: 135 of measuring health
systematic sampling international (95% CI: 96–181) status among
organization and 122 (95% CI: populations that would
s 70–175) per 1000 live normally be
births; under-five inaccessible due to
mortality rate: 291 ongoing conflict;
(95% CI: 238–348) advantages: high
and 276 (95% CI: level of familiarity with
190–361) per 1000 local communities, are
live births; crude highly trusted by the
mortality rate: 25 villagers, and visit all
(95% CI: 21–29) and communities in the
21 (95% CI: 15–27) course of their normal
per 1000 persons per work
year - Low response likely
underestimated
mortality
Mahn, - Back Pack Multi-level Burma Cross-border local- Provide Descriptive In 2005: Key factors N/A
2008 44 Health partnerships (Myanmar), global partnerships critical health case study - HWs had 95% contributing to their
Worker Team to promote civil conflict - BPHWT indigenous services to diagnosis accuracy success:
(BPHWT) health and health workers travel IDPs in and 85% treatment - Local access
- Karen services government to villages to provide eastern accuracy for common - Multi-ethnic
Department of among restrictions general medical, Burma illnesses collaboration
Health and internally maternal, and child - Treated nearly - Coordination (of who
Welfare displaced in health care; provide 78,000 cases delivers what
(KDHW) eastern education workshops throughout their IDP services, supply
- Local ethnic Burma - BPHTW partners service areas procurement and
organizations with KDHW, village - Administered nearly delivery, etc.)
- Regional leaders and village 43,000 doses of - Standard data
and health volunteers, Vitamin A, as well as collection; information
international Burma Medical deworming used for advocacy
partners Association, the treatments, to
National Health and children and
Education postpartum women
Committee, the Mae
Tao Clinic, the Center - The local-global
for Public Health and partnership was able

59
 Location Goal of
Author Organization Title and Type Interv ention Study Design Results Additional Details Quality
Interv ention
of Crisis
Human Rights at the to provide care to
Johns Hopkins IDPs inaccessible to
Bloomberg traditional
School of Public international
Health humanitarian models
- International NGOs
provide technical
support for the local
medical and public
health programs
- Twice annually,
BPHWT team leaders
cross from Burma into
Thailand to program’s
administrative
headquarters, to
resupply, receive
training, and compile
collected health
information
Martinez MSF A 28 Telemedicine Provide Retrospective - Mean rating for the Moderate
Garcia, retrospective countries, - 3 telemedicine specialized program quality of information
2014 38 analysis of conflict or networks combined pediatric analysis provided by the
pediatric unstable into single multilingual medical - Pediatric referrer was 2.8 (on a
cases locations system, consultations cases referred scale from 1 (very
handled by telemed.msf.org in remote to MSF poor) to 5 (very
the MSF - Case-coordinator areas telemedicine good); mean rating
tele- receives referral and platform from for appropriateness
expertise allocates to specialist; April 2010 to of the response was
system individual case follow- March 2014 3.3 (same scale)
up (progress report) inclusive - 2/3 of responses
automatically - 467 cases were useful to the
requested from total, 48 then patient, 3/4
referrers since Oct randomly responses were
2013 selected useful to the medical
team
Mattli, ICRC A neutral, Iraq, - Reinforced - Implement Descriptive - 2.7 million people Keys to the success N/A
2008 46 impartial and ongoing assistance programs programs of case study directly benefitted of the remote-control
independent conflict through remote- increasing from ICRC W&S model:
approach: control mechanisms: scope and activities in 2007 - Highly experienced,
key to work with trusted size and - In 2007, 54 water motivated and
ICRC’s implementing build and sanitation committed ICRC Iraqi
acceptance partners, periodic acceptance projects were carried employees;
in Iraq short visits by ICRC through out under direct ICRC – Strong collaboration
expatriate staff networking supervision and 78 with and ownership by
- Moved staff to and projects under the relevant local
Amman, Jordan and communicati remote control authorities;

60
 Location Goal of
Author Organization Title and Type Interv ention Study Design Results Additional Details Quality
Interv ention
of Crisis
kept only a core staff on with low- – An extensive
in Iraq due to security visibility network of local
risk presence contractors/consultant
- Remote-control for - Increase s throughout the
WASH: mobilization level of country;
of network of local competence – Strong control
contractors and and mechanisms, whereby
consultants working responsibility separate entities are
with ICRC engineers of ICRC involved in needs
- New operational local staff assessment and
framework in 2006: project design,
 Minimized implementation,
movements to monitoring and
reduce staff evaluation
exposure
 Increased - Downside: limited
networking to contacts limited
promote capacity for
acceptance coordination
Richard, - Karen Essential Myanmar, Trauma management Improve the Retrospective - Since 2000, around Moderate
2009 45 Department of trauma civil conflict program capacity of analysis of 300 health workers
Health and management - 4-6 day trauma indigenous program have received
Welfare training: course for health health Training
(KDHW) addressing workers workers to - Between June 2005
- Back Pack service - Part of CBO-run deliver and June 2007, more
Health delivery health system effective than 200 patients
Worker Team needs in providing care for trauma care recorded in the
(BPHWT) active approximately trauma patient
conflict 250,000 IDPs and registry; majority
zones in war-affected were victims of
eastern residents weapons-related
Myanmar trauma.
- Trauma victims
treated by health
workers survived in
91% of cases

Shanks, MSF Treatment of DRC, - Remote support of Provide Case series - Able to successfully - Standardized forms Moderate
2012 9 multidrug- ongoing non-TB clinicians by remote treat patients with helpful in maintaining
resistant conflict TB specialist via support from simplified protocol overview of treatment
tuberculosis mobile phone TB specialist - All 3 DR-TB patients despite multiple staff
in a remote, - Use of simplified to non-TB completed treatment changing; however,
conflict- monitoring protocols clinicians in susceptible to
affected area - Addressed stigma to remote transcription error
of the support adherence settings - Communication
Democratic using between treating staff
Republic of simplified and headquarters was

61
 Location Goal of
Author Organization Title and Type Interv ention Study Design Results Additional Details Quality
Interv ention
of Crisis
Congo monitoring a challenge
protocol
Tong, MSF Challenges DRC, HAT detection and Targeted Descriptive - 2007: 46,000 - Active screening and N/A
2011 of controlling violent treatment campaign medical case study screened and 1,570 follow up
47
sleeping conflict interventions treated for HAT compromised in
sickness in to address - 2009: 2 centers conflict
areas of operational forced to closed due - Community
violent and medical to insecurity; awareness and
conflict: challenges reopened early 2010 acceptance necessary
experience of managing - Complexity of HAT for health program
in the HAT in diagnosis and - Displacement
Democratic conflict treatment prevented potentially creates
Republic of areas any emergency new foci of
Congo handover to local transmission in
partners; operations previously cleared
suspended areas
- 2010: 770 patients -Insufficient
treated international support
and funding
Zachariah MSF Practicing Somalia, Tele-consultations Improve Retrospective - Of 3920 pediatric - Prior to introduction, High
, 2012 37 medicine ongoing and tele-monitoring quality of analysis of admissions, 346 (9%) meetings held with
without conflict - To support Somali pediatric program data were referred for community elders to
borders: tele- clinicians when care in with historical telemedicine. raise awareness and
consultations expatriate staff were remote control - In 222 (64%) understanding of new
and no longer able to be conflict (2010 data children, a significant technology; led to
tele- physically on site at setting prior to change was made to acceptance of
mentoring for district hospital due to implementation initial case technology in
improving security risk of management community with
paediatric - Specific risk criteria telemedicine) - In 88 (25%), a life- cultural beliefs that
care in a requiring mandatory threatening condition negate the use of
conflict referral defined was detected that cameras
setting in - Consultations with had been initially - Reasons clinicians
Somalia? specialist in Nairobi missed found it to be of high
scheduled every - Adverse outcomes value: helped to
afternoon; specialist fell from 7.6% in 2010 improve recognition of
spoke Somali (without risk signs (7⁄7),
language telemedicine) to 5.4% improved
- ‘Tele-mentoring’ in 2011 (with management
(education) also telemedicine); 30% protocols and
provided by specialist reduction, odds ratio prescription practices
0.70, 95% CI: 0.57– (6⁄7), built a
0.88, P = 0.001 relationship of
- All 7 clinicians solidarity through
involved rated it to be direct contact with
of high value distant specialist
colleagues (5⁄7)

62
 Annex 2 - Summary of grey literature articles
Program
Author Organization Title Location Type of Paper Results
details
Schreter Humanitarian Delivering n/a n/a Literature Literature highlights a range of good practices in remote management, including:
& Outcomes aid in highly Review - Establishing highly localized, and static, staffing which may involve an increase
Harmer insecure rather than a decrease of national staff because reduced mobility results in the need
2013 59 environment for more staff in more places 

s: A critical - The use of diaspora nationals as international staff
review of the - ‘Soft’ remote management which involves senior international staff having a
literature regular, but not 
full-time, presence 

2001 - 2012 - Methods to enhance accountability and mitigate quality deficits for remote
programming, such 
as web-based monitoring and project verification through third-
party triangulation

Literature suggests that good practice in preparedness and planning involves

decentralizing organizational authority. This can bring benefits for improved internal
monitoring, beneficiary accountability and acceptance, thereby increasing staff
security. 


Literature falls short is in documenting and providing guidance on implementing

program by remote management, particularly to ensure greater preparedness and
planning: patchy literature, need for guidance on good practice; lack of evaluations,
especially in WASH and protection; limited sharing of knowledge on targeting.
Stoddard Center on Providing aid n/a n/a Humanitarian - Remote management = devolution of responsibility to local actors
, Harmer, International in insecure Policy Group - Other factors that can limit access to those in need, which are not necessarily
Haver Cooperation environment (HPG) Report related to or driven by security conditions:
2006 11 s: trends in 1- Poor infrastructure requiring expensive airlift capacity
policy and Qualitative study 2-Political and military controls on the movements of aid workers
operations 3- Weak international support
4- Shift from refugee to internal displacement situations  complex aid efforts that
require political negotiations with host state to secure access

Motivators to consider remote management:

1- Insecurity; if temporary may close program and resume thereafter
2- Size of program: less likely to hand over large program; need to maintain
presence for solidarity/visibility encourages remote management
3- Sector and feasibility of what you’re trying to do (if goods will be secure, if
subcontractor has the capacity to move them etc.)
4- Level of vulnerability and need
5- Context: range of local partners, quality of national staff, capacity to operate in a
region

- ‘Soft services’ more easily undertaken by local entities (psychosocial) than

infrastructure or food aid
- Benefits: avoids complete closure, allows funding to continue to flow, security
environment can be better upon re-entry because local knowledge has not been
completely lost, opportunity for closer community involvement

63
 Program
Author Organization Title Location Type of Paper Results
details
- Challenges: establish trust with local staff; cultural and linguistic differences need
to be acknowledged in training and support  mobile/email helps, need to prevent
overreliance on tech given it tends to function intermittently; difficulty maintaining
strategic direction due to inability to conduct needs assessments or measure impact
- Challenge: tendency to maintain status quo instead of responding to acute issues;
due to info deficit, movement and access restrictions, low-profile security approach,
cautious remote managers, coordination challenges
- Challenges: accountability, advocacy strategies, staffing capacity

- Most agencies do not have set criteria to assess risk or to guide the decision to
shift to remote management; most guidelines and practice do not fully take into
account the unique threats, incentives and circum stances faced by national staff
- International agencies need to increase efforts to ensure security of all levels of
staff equally, assessing each levels unique risks and having transparent policies that
accommodate them

Stoddard Providing aid n/a n/a HPG Policy brief - Kidnapping of aid workers has increased by over 350% in the past three years,
, harmer, in insecure - Remote management effects that make it difficult to shift back to regular
Didomeni environment Qualitative study programming: reduced ground-level information, less credibility and trust in the
co s: 2009 agency, increased risks for local implementing actors
2009 3 Update. - Given unique tasks and relationships with the communities, national staff require
Trends in specific security measures that are proportionate to, but not the same as, those
violence provided to international staff.
against aid - Security incidents not documented as systematically for nationals, partly because
workers and the risk to the organization varies (different insurance policies and liability).
the - UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) developed
operational tracking system to monitor and report access constraints; being piloted in six
response insecure contexts.
Collinson Paradoxes of Humanitarian n/a n/a Commissioned - Lack of common framework to support decision making
& presence. Policy Group report - Local staff’s ability to assess risk can be influenced by financial or other competing
Duffield Risk Global priorities and incentives that encourage risk-taking; distinct threats rarely
2013 34 management Insecurities acknowledged and have less access to security measures, information, and support
and aid Centre - Pervasive levels of distrust: distrust between people within agencies, between
culture in agencies, between agencies and their alleged “beneficiaries”; due to distance,
challenging differences in pay, lack of local presence or contact with local people
environments.
Rivas - Integrity No Longer a Somalia, n/a Literature review - Remote programming is no longer temporary or a last resort, becoming long term
2015 32 research and Last Resort: Kenya - Literature focuses on international organizations: little information on the
consulting A Review of (Part of a DFID experiences of other bodies, including national , local, and non-Western
- Axiom M&E the Remote evaluation) organizations and staff
- UK AID Programmin - Talk of risk transfer but not other ethical problems, such as: the transfer of
g Landscape beneficiary data to third parties, appropriate engagement strategies in high-risk
environments, and how monitoring information is used.
- Most common risks: inadequate information management/credibility/quality,
corruption, inciting conflict, causalities and fatalities, insufficient impact, poor
monitoring, informal taxation, security challenges, and fund diversion
- Most common monitoring methods: third party monitoring, beneficiary feedback

64
 Program
Author Organization Title Location Type of Paper Results
details
forums, evaluations and independent analysis, and community meetings
- Donor accountability expectations are often unrealistic in these contexts; donor
flexibility and realism required
- Best practices include: remote management planning; on the ground networks to
enable accountability; third party M&E; capacity building focusing on tech support,
problem solving, and management skills
- Planned site-visits from remote management promote local capacity and
autonomy, coordination, information-sharing, and trust
Secure Briefing Afghanista 3 year Briefing note - Aid agencies tend to cluster in safer areas; presence can be deceptively shallow
Access Note, April n, research - Local beneficiaries reported that aid received was often not what was most needed
in 2016 Somalia, program Mix-methods - Concessions included: Paying for access and granting concessions are
Volatiles South exploring study commonplace, yet generally taboo as subjects of discussion. Practices include
Environm Sudan, effective paying money at checkpoints and ; paying unofficial taxes, ; altering targeting
ents Syria response (850 interviews criteria,; employing local militia,; and avoiding some areas so as not tothat would
(SAVE) delivery amid with aid actors, antagonize antagonize a local authority, armed actor or dominant community; zero
2016 29 high 4000 surveys of tolerance on corruption policies are unrealistic in war zones
insecurity affected people) - Many humanitarian actors are uncertain about whether or how to engage with non -
state armed actors; local staff need specific skills in negotiation, context, and
networking
Steets Global Public Evaluation n/a n/a Literature review - 3 methods to tackle access constraints: persuade controllers to allow more access,
56
2012 Policy Institute and review of and Qualitative mitigate and manage security risks to continue assistance, remote management
(GPPi) humanitarian study - there is widespread agreement among humanitarians that the task of negotiating
access humanitarian access with non-state armed groups should be left to implementing
strategies in (388 interviews) organizations.
DG ECHO - DG ECHO should consider seven Key issues: risk transfer to field
funded staff/partners/beneficiaries, need for plans on program acceptance building, need to
interventions specific level of experience and technical capacity of field staff, when taking these
decisions and ensure that its partners address these issues in proposals and remote
policies. First, organizations must avoid undue risk transfer to field staff, partners
and beneficiaries. Second, partners proposing remote approaches should describe
how they intend to build acceptance – both as a security measure and to eventually
regain access. Third, they need to specify the level of experience and technical
capacity of responsible field staff. Fourth, where projects are implemented in volatile
areas with fragile access, organizations should have contingency plans for how to
switch to remote mode when access deteriorates. Need contingency plans to trigger
switch to remote programming, Fifth, monitoring procedures have to be adapted to
the challenges of remote management monitoring methods require adaptation to
remote settings, preference should be given . Sixth, DG ECHO should give
precedence to organizations that have located senior staff as close as security
conditions permit to the proposed area of intervention. Finally, DG ECHO should
give precedence to organizations that seek to deliver outputs directly or limit the
chain of sub-contractors and sub-con- tractors for implementing projects for
implementation
- DG ECHO needs to improve its ability to monitor projects directly. It should recruit
senior staff who can more easily “blend in” with the respective local environment and
who are less encumbered to travel by administrative restrictions.
- These approaches entail risks that need to be carefully reviewed in each case by
DG ECHO and partners. Risk review required; Remotely managed operations can

65
 Program
Author Organization Title Location Type of Paper Results
details
bring about a loss of control and oversight. Further, remote approaches potentially
lead to a transfer of risk to national staff and recipients
- Switch to remote mode can reduce project complexity and quality; should thus be a
last resort
Stoddard Humanitarian Lessons and Afghanista n/a Report for - The most successful examples of remote management found involved coordination
, Harmer, Outcomes challenges in n case Center of structures rooted in the local context, with potential for building sustainable local
Renouf remote study International capacity in humanitarian action
2010 4 management with+ Cooperation - NCCI (NGO coordinating committing in Iraq) Field focal point network: 24 LNGOs
of compariso across country, share security/political info, receive training on how to
humanitarian ns to Iraq, Mixed methods collect/disseminate info, advocacy, rights/law; share info and experiences with other
operations Somalia, study LNGOs; civil society empowerment
for insecure Sri Lanka - Shura system developed with heads of program and all nation staff members: each
areas and (58 interviews member coordinated council for 1 month in absence of expatriate, permanent
Sudan field visit to coordinator eventually agreed on; shura members involved in all important
Afghanistan and decisions; downside: slow to develop, slow decision making
desk review) - Potential pitfalls: remote management trap, risk transfer to nationals with few
resources and training; reduced program quality and effectiveness; reduced efficacy
and accountability; impartiality of local actors
- Need better/more differentiated risk assessment for national staff, capacity building
on implementation and security, and coordination structures rooted in local context
- Reasons for shift to remote mode: security, political, solidarity, visibility, develop
capacity of local actors, donor support, sustainability
- Factors that govern shift: range of local partner organizations, quality of national
staff, and their freedom and capacity to operate in a given country or region
- Despite largely considered temporary, few organizations have exit strategy or
criteria to guide shift back from remote management
- Remote management trap shaped by: potentially outdated perception of no-go
areas, cost pressures, need to follow protective stance of other organizations as to
not become a target, bureaucratic inertia
- Risk issues: transferred to national staff, may change after internationals leave and
difficult to assess remotely
- Management and communication in remote operations are helped by face-to-face
interactions; important for trust
backgrounds
criteria and selection process.
- Methods to mitigate quality deficits: clear procedures and instructions for
monitoring and reporting; maintain regular communication between field staff and
external managers; bring implementers to remote area regularly for discussion and
planning; spot checks; crosscheck information with other field contacts; third party
monitoring; and ensure beneficiaries know what they should be receiving
- Guidelines for improving RM: plan for it, adopt a long-term view, develop practical
and policy guidance, avoid risk transfer, invest in relationships with local
staff/partners and community authorities prior to shift, coordinate policy
development, and share lessons learned among agencies and donors
Herbert GSDRC Remote n/a n/a Helpdesk - Key factors that can foster success in remote management projects include:
79
2013 management research report acceptance of activities by local communities; effective staff recruitment, training and
of projects in retention; flexibility in programming and budgeting; proximity to beneficiaries;
fragile states visibility; mobility; and effective preparation for fast changing environments

66
 Program
Author Organization Title Location Type of Paper Results
details
UNICEF UNICEF Unicef and Afghanista n/a EMOPS - Relied on military partners to access southern provinces; impartiality issue
EMOPS Remote n guidance on - Selection of credible and competent partners was critical; local accounting party
2011 24 Programmin remote hired to assess all potential and current partners (skills and finances)
g: programming - Kandahar risk: had to transfer funds to the government to manage long term
Afghanistan background capacity strengthening initiatives given limited partners with required capacity;
case study papers government known to be corrupt yet were unable to monitor government activities
- Used remote monitoring capacity of WFP; joint monitoring reduced costs
Case study - Need to consider effective cluster approach in remote programming
- Communication and advocacy efforts should be strengthened when moving to
remote programming; critical to pro-actively re-enforce community ownership and
acceptance of the program
- Need for constructive dialogue with donors to establish realistic benchmarks for
remote context
UNICEF UNICEF UNICEF and Iraq - Gradual EMOPS 2004 – 3 rd party monitoring contract signed w Iraqi company (Al -Sami); monitors
EMOPS Remote shift to guidance on recruited from communities and able to move around without incident; group
2011 28 Programmin remote mode remote assigned to each sectorial priority – 60-70% WASH
g: Iraq case triggered by programming 2006 – monitors role expanded and became facilitators, duties included: service
study 2003 Canal background delivery, program planning and coordination with government and other partners; 80
Hotel papers facilitators by end of 2007
bombing; - Remote mode did not results in increased collaboration between the UN system;
relocated to Case study cluster system not inclusive to NGOs
Amman Qualitative - Partnerships: must ensure transparency in selection and terms of employment,
- Remote involve contractors in planning, and maintain single point of contact
management - Communication and Advocacy: implementing partners can be used in practical
intensified advocacy on the ground, however policy decision and messaging has to remain
from 2008- within UNICEF control
2009 as
security
deteriorated

UNICEF UNICEF UNICEF and Pakistan 2009 move EMOPS - KPK and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) highly volatile; 2010 remote
EMOPS Remote to remote guidance on program in these regions in response to floods
2011 14 Programmin mode remote - Program criticality exercise for Peshawar office conduction to prioritize prior to shift;
g: Pakistan following programming resulted in decreased activities with a focus on immunization
case study kidnapping background - Conducts orientation sessions on remote operations to build partner capacity,
papers however, largely learning by doing
- Removed all logos to keep low profile
Case study - Third party monitoring found program to be below standard; resultantly, invested in
national capacity building, coaching, and training
- Issues: involvement of military to deliver aid, low collaboration between UN system,
lack of formal guidance and checklists to guide programming
- Need for flexible program policy and procedure in changing environment
UNICEF UNICEF UNICEF and Somalia: EMOPS - Presence over 18 years, strong partnership with local NGOs and government
EMOPS Remote protracted guidance on allows maintenance of good delivery in reduced access settings
2011 54 Programmin crisis with remote - Efficacy and security may be enhanced by a UNICEF system that works closely
g: Somalia annual programming with that of the other humanitarian agencies, rather than being locked into UNDSS
case study flood background structures
cycles papers - Issues with large Nairobi-based remote support center: indecisive culture,

67
 Program
Author Organization Title Location Type of Paper Results
details
processes dominate over results and diverts resources from field offices, habit of risk
Case study avoidance rather than management, have prevented seizing access opportunities
and new implementation modalities
- Opportunity to build independent monitoring system through partners and
contractors was not seized when local access would have allowed negotiations;
resulted in poor feedback on aid delivery and reliance on external partners to set up
smaller/weaker monitoring structures on their behalf (accountability and reputation
risk)
- Lessons: stay focused/don’t stretch too thin; be decisive and use strategic
opportunities; try new deli very methods; unite and have sectors work together;
regular and honest dialogue with partners and donors builds trust
Belliveau MSF ‘Remote Somalia - Remote Humanitarian - International staff benefits: bring outside experience and technical skills, increased
2013 23 management mode Practice Network legitimacy of advocacy, increased ability to resist local pressures for resource
’ in Somalia following Paper diversion
2008 - Risks of remote mode: reduced control over resources, declining quality, limited or
roadside no program expansion or adaptation, increased risk to national staff, potential loss of
bomb and impartiality and ability to witness/speak out on behalf of affected population
deaths of 3 - Key concepts of model: centralized decision making, micro-management and
MSF cross-checking, support and training (increased frequency and wider range)
employees - Local administration or community elders aid recruitment of unskilled workers to
- Country ensure appropriate clan balance and deflect potential dissatisfaction away from MSF
management - External evaluation concluded that strong remote management procedure and
team in extra scrutiny work well, no systematic leakage or noticeable corruption, high
Nairobi standard of stock management and financial control
- 2 new - Success due to: rigorous control system, competence of national field staff, their
hospital familiarity with MSF’s principles and ways of working, high degree of national staff
wards ownership
opened
Howe, Tufts Breaking the Turkish- Remote Historical - Access dependent on local networks and reputations; partners identified through
Stites, University Hourglass: Syrian operations analysis contacts, coordination meetings with LNGOs, and LNGOs who reached out to INGO
Chudaco Partnerships boarder from outset (passive and bias towards LNGOs with skills and contacts, active methods of
ff in Remote 2013 in Syria due Qualitative study recruitment preferred)
2015 27 Management to - Technics for capacity building: trainings, workshops, partnership focal points, staff
Settings – government (123 interviews secondments, pilot projects
The Cases of regulation with 46 - Innovative M&E approaches: call centers, GPS shipment tracking, debriefing
Syria and organizations) meeting with local partners; local methods: photos and videos of distributions, web-
Iraqi based remote project monitoring, daily verbal reports, peer observations; 3 rd party
Kurdistan monitoring = gold standard
- Donors can prioritize longer-term sustainability of local partners via: organizational
and operational capacity building, a focus on the capacity of the institution,
supporting longer-term projects, providing core funds, and supporting alliances
among local groups
- Trust building key for local partnerships; build trust with the their local partners via:
regular in-person meetings, transparent decision-making, robust feedback
mechanisms, joint agenda setting, and openness to partner perspectives
- Need to prioritize security for both national and internationals with clear
contingency plans and ensuring local security costs are included in budget
Same Syria case n/a Modes - Inability to engage in coordinated response led to disharmonized approach to

68
 Program
Author Organization Title Location Type of Paper Results
details
study employed: working with small pool of organizations; negatively affected the absorptive capacity
direct of local organizations and ultimately compromised humanitarian activities
implementati - Partner selection is two-way street; INGOS need to have good relationships with
on fully or reputable partners if they want to be chosen by LNGOs in future
partially by - LNGOs prefer tailored smaller trainings on mutually selected topics; dedicated
INGOS with focal point person can help to address local partners needs
hired Syrian - Issues with third-party monitoring: resource intensive, expensive, repeated use of
staff; Sub- same firm can compromise objectivity and neutrality, firm accountable to same
contract, organization that hired them (limits objectivity)
short term - Donor requirements can be security risk and prohibitive to programming; to provide
and logistical international organizations with beneficiary lists from under-siege area, local
(ex partners were obliged to pay smugglers to move people and documentation across
distribution of siege lines
food aid); - Sustainability in the face of donor withdrawal: LNGOs switched to less capital -
Partnerships intensive activities when access reduced, diversified, and approached other donors
for funding
- Lack of INGO support of core costs (operating, salaries) of local partners inhibits
trust and sustainability
Same Iraqi n/a n/a LNGO coping strategies to withdrawal: dormancy, downsizing (reliance on
study Kurdistan volunteers), private sector and income generation,
Case
Hammon HPG Humanitarian Somalia - Remotely Working Paper - Use of diaspora returnees; advantages: technical skills and more acceptable than
d, ODI space in managed out westerners; disadvantages: resented by locals for large salaries and being out of
Vaughan Somalia: a of Nairobi or touch with realities on the ground
-Lee scarce Mogadishu - Have pulled away from conventional coordination mechanism (cluster system) to
2012 49 commodity since late work independently: some cases improved access but no understanding of what
90s; other actors are doing or common standard for dealing with demands
increased - 2007 – 2008 development of OCHA joint operating principals for Somalia : never
when formally operationalized; likely worried that if they followed international
security risks humanitarian standards would not be able to operate
significantly
increased in
2007 – 2009
IMC IMC Details from Somalia n/a Email - Increase beneficiary access via: mobile teams, community messaging advertising
2016 61 IMC Somalia communication service availability, demand generation via “spreading word” (discharging patients
Programmin with literature and simple repeatable messaging), used Community Health
g (e-mail) Committees (elected respected volunteers) as bridge between IMC and community
- Used nearly 100% local staff with appropriate clan-balance, resulted in good local
perception and minimal bribes at check points, confiscations, raids, and threats
- M&E methods: spontaneous visits and planned-capacity-building-visits, third party
monitoring
- Transparency: shared reports with employees to validate work and justify visits
IOM IOM Programme Iraq - Remotely Book chapter - Coordination with government of Iraq and international community via IDP working
2008 51 Management managed group (NGOs, NCCI, UN) to avoid duplication
by ‘Remote from Amman - Types of monitoring used: direct by IOM staff traveling to sites; IOM staff and third
Control’ - At least 2 party; IOM-contracted external consultants; monitoring of NGO-implemented
implementing projects by external organizations who visit every 2 weeks
partners per - Monitoring procurement system has several filters: program unit goes through

69
 Program
Author Organization Title Location Type of Paper Results
details
program checks, logistics unit that double checks prices/contract terms/authenticity of
requests, also do unannounced spot checks
Kjaerum Danish Remote Libya 12 month Evaluation and - No remote management contingency plan despite ongoing tensions in country prior
15
2015 Refugee Management Armed Learning Brief to planning, resulted in standstill of project activities from July – Oct 2014 during shift
Council in Violence - Capacity issue: several activities required presence of international technical
Humanitarian Reduction Qualitative study expert and were cancelled; trainings by local staff (non-experts) not well received
Operations: program in - Bunkerisation contributes to beneficiary mistrust and remote management trap
Lessons Sabha - Benefits of remote mode: increased local ownership, deci sion making, increased
learned from capacity/sustainability of field staff; continued engagement builds trust among
Libya and Remotely communities/stakeholders making it easier to shift back to normal operations
beyond managed - Need for country offices to develop remote management plans, training plans for
from July national staff, and assessment of key operational gaps that would occur following
2014 to shift to remote mode
today
from Tunisia
Cunning MSF Emergency Yemen Managed Qualitative study - Remote managers had inadequate risk perception and decreased sense of
ham Gap Series 2015 from Amman urgency to the needs on the ground
2016 50 02: To Stay - Locus of security decision-making misplaced: decision making should be in hands
and Deliver? of operational managers rather than security personnel
The Yemen - Dependence on the UN for logistics is major issue: locks INGOs into decisions
Humanitarian made, or not made, by UN, and affects INGO independence, capacity, and mindset
Crisis 2015
Hansen NGO Operational Iraq n/a Briefing paper - Need for acceptance: achieved over time through dialogue and staff actions
2008 17 Coordination Modalities in - Need for flexibility: rapidly changing context; rapid decentralization to skill field staff
Committee in Iraq gives more options for continuing programming
Iraq - Need for proximity to victims: increases quality of humanitarian data, safe access,
aid effectiveness
- Need for visibility: necessary for acceptance in long term but jeopardizes
effectiveness short term
- Need to expand operations: expansion should be gradual and controlled in order to
groom partners without becoming a target; sudden increase in resources interferes
with team dynamics and contributes to loss of control on how they are used
Hansen NGO Adapting to Iraq n/a Briefing note - Withdrawal of international staff and mobility constraints on national staff result in
2008 63 Coordination Insecurity in incremental increases in geographic and psychological gaps between beneficiaries
Committee in Iraq and providers
Iraq - Flexible management where remote managers play supporting role to skilled
teams; authority delegated to field staff to make decisions about operations and
safety as intimately familiar with context requirements
- Identification at distributions via removable signage or via media useful for building
reputation of organization and acceptance
Oxfam NGO Remote Somalia Remotely Discussion - Remote control used for distribution of goods; issues: inflexible, limited delegation
and Consortium Programmin managed paper of authority, increased local staff security risks, loss of access to adequate
Merlin g Modalities (Insecurity from Nairobi information about need and context
2009 20 in Somalia and or Hargeisa - Remote support: national managers receive additional training, mentoring that
drought) enables handover; senior staff well respected, good relations with communities and
large decision making autonomy. Issue: working through specific institutions can be
seen as taking sides and has potential to increase security threats
- Remote partnership: strong risk management needed, funding an issue due to

70
 Program
Author Organization Title Location Type of Paper Results
details
donor reluctance, limited number of sufficiently strong partners
- M&E needs: minimum set of clear simple indicators for basic standard s;
transparency with donors about challenges; build capacity to collect data; verification
mechanisms: staff visits, activity monitoring, third party monitoring; triangulation and
communications technology
Polio PGEI Decision Pakistan n/a Decision paper - Primary strategy: negotiated access with community/religious leaders, military/law
Oversigh Paper: enforcement, and armed groups
t Board Strengthenin - Used military and law enforcement protected vaccination campaigns
2014 22 g Program - Increase acceptability via community engagement via media, interpersonal
Leadership & communication
Management
in Pakistan
Jeene Save the Integrated Karkaar - ICCM Case study with - High staff turnover and long vacancies contributed to supply chain disruptions and
2014 57 Children Community region, around Survey data stock outs, inhibiting treatment and reputation building
Case Puntland watering - Long time to take action when supply chain failed due to remote management;
Management State, points need for improvement in quality of support systems
In a Pastoral Somalia serving small - Issues: increased cost and reduced effectiveness
Society settled and
large
transient
populations
- Remotely
managed
from Kenya
UNHCR UNHCR Remote Somalia Multiple Case study - IDPs requested assistance to voluntarily return but funding was not immediately
2014 26 Management programs available; took 6 months for budget to be authorized and lost opportunity to adjust to
in High-risk Qualitative study changing situation
Operations - UN country team formed Risk Management Unit (2011): maintains directory of aid
Good and local actors, monitors and analyzes financial programmatic and reputational
Practice and risks to advise operations of all agencies
Lessons - Facilitating face-to-face meetings with local actors and beneficiaries helps to
Learned maintain closeness and supervision
- Transparent reporting raised credibility among donors
- Considered unacceptable in remote mode, resulting in suspension or closure of
program: direct payment (material or cash) for access to people in need; payment of
taxes, registration fees, any form of payment to armed groups; transfer of
humanitarian goods to any party to the conflict for distribution
Same Iraq - Recruited and intensively trained 50 national NGOs, vetted using US Provincial
study Reconstruction team and others’ lists of partners
- Established Project Tracking Database: GPS encrypted and time -stamped digital
photographs taken by local partners to monitor programs; data uploaded and
payments tied to photographic evidence. Issues: costly, labor intensive, constant
maintenance required
Same Afghanista - Worked closely with Shuras (councils) and Community Development Committees
study n to ensure fairness in implementation of shelter assistance and income generating
activities. Ensured local ownership, accountability, checks and balances, but
decision making and local capacity building were slow
- M&E methods: beneficiary hotlines, informal contacts with other agencies,

71
 Program
Author Organization Title Location Type of Paper Results
details
implementing partners; changed monitoring partners every two months to avoid
conflict of interest and collusion
- Community outreach team with mullah established by an INGO to build relations,
discussed similarities between Islamic teachings and ICRC code of conduct
- Triangulating monitoring techniques by one NGO: used vendors, local government
officials, and community members to monitor project outputs and quality
Same Pakistan - Negotiated with local tribes to deliver flood aid to remote communities, raised
study visibility and built confidence with locals
- Methods to address fraud: complaint mechanism for refugees; implementing
partner selection and performance review committee; grievance committee of field
staff; multi-function team to assess implementing partner processes on procurement,
recruitment and financial monitoring
Same Syria - Relies on local staff and created networks of volunteers to assist with operations
study
UNICEF UNICEF (Unofficial Syria n/a E-mail - Inaccessible/armed group controlled areas: programs planned and developed
2016 70 title: Syria correspondence jointly with implementing NGOs and local communities.
and Yemen - M&E via third party monitors who provide weekly reports, data, and photos;
lessons telecommunication with inside informants; reports from UN humanitarian convoys
learned) when allowed access
Same Yemen - Community midwives in isolated conflict areas set up make shift primary care
study clinics in their homes; UNICEF supported with provision of supplies
- Empowered female health worker in conservative communities
Oxfam NCCI Rising to the Iraq n/a Briefing paper - Prepositioning of emergency supplies supports efforts in hot-spots
Internatio Oxfam humanitarian - Donors must provide flexible emergency programming and overcome reluctance to
nal challenge in fund remotely managed programs
2007 52 Iraq - Strategies: using local contact networks to map security situation; making sure staff
working in particularly sensitive areas are from appropriate religious, cultural, or
geographic background and have experience in insecure environments; and keeping
low profile (operating in unmarked vehicles, varying routines, not using permanent
offices where possible, and restricting accumulation of assets)
- One NGO relied on personal contacts in different project locations to monitor,
evaluate, assess impact of the projects; included surveys of beneficiaries
- Previously established relationships with locals leaders and communities enabled
rapid assessments and monitoring
Ministry Ministry of Annual Afghanista n/a Government - Permanent transit teams (PPT) established at entry points of inaccessible area to
of Public Public Health Report 2015 n report vaccinate children coming and going; 165 PPTs; 6,271,752 children vaccinated
Health Afghanistan Polio - At least one district polio officer employed in all conflict affected districts for
Afghanist Eradication surveillance, actively searching for cases and case response vaccinations
an Initiative - Partnered with NGOs that have access to inaccessible areas for delivery of vaccine
2015 55 Afghanistan and campaign monitoring
- Negotiated through partners (such as ICRC) for full access in high-risk areas
Rogers University of Accessing Afghanista Program Master’s Thesis - Process of transitioning to remote mode: held meeting with community members
2006 13 York the n assisted and supporters, thanking them for their help and requesting assistance; outlined
Inaccessible. returnees to Case study teachings of Qur’an linked to humanitarianism
The Use of build a - Close relationship organization had with communities and operational history
Remote shelter increased acceptance
Programmin - Unannounced monitoring visits when security improved; no major problems
g Strategies identified, beneficiaries and communi ty members did not report any problems when

72
 Program
Author Organization Title Location Type of Paper Results
details
in Highly interviewed individually
Insecure - Highly experienced afghan staff, without whom operation would have been
Countries to suspended
Ensure the
Provision of
Humanitarian
Assistance.
Iraq: A Case
Study
Same Northern IDP camps - Community representatives worked in collaboration with the agency to develop
study Uganda program activities and timelines for implementation; guidance on activities provided
Case through use of field journals by community members implementing the work and
study digital cameras to record activities.
- NGO visited once a week when security improved; found that work was not being
completed as expected by community or contractors
- Independent members of community used for monitoring and triangulation;
monitoring system proved to be unreliable as they provided info rmation that they
thought agency wanted to hear, not reality
Same Iraq Remotely - Lack of face-to-face contact lead to misunderstandings and difficulty maintaining
study Remote managed interpersonal relationships
programmi from Jordan - Need more support departments centralized in Iraq to improve function,
ng since coordination, and coherence
2004 - Trainings included: security related courses, administration, project management,
finance and conflict resolution; better when shadowed international staff
• Length of operational history in country enabled agencies to move from more
directive remote control strategy to more supportive role
• Strong understanding and awareness of local culture and religion required
• Greater use of participatory management styles is required
Faubert UNDP Assessment Somalia Remotely Evaluation report - Insufficient written institutional guidance for programs operating in complex
2010 67 of managed circumstances; country office not proactive enough in seeking guidance and tapping
Development from Nairobi institutional resources.
Results. - Strategic partnership agreement eventually developed with Bureau for Crisis
Evaluation of Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), providing resources and technical support
UNDP - Increased exposure to operational risks regarding effectiveness, cost efficiency,
Contribution and accountability
Somalia - High travel and per diem costs for limited staff visits, setting up expensive network
of NGOs, and liaising with Somali partners; administrative costs need to be more
clearly defined and planned for
Anonymo Anonymous Remote Syria, n/a Qualitative study - Syria: local groups provide a lot of support in inaccessible areas (monthly
us Partner Lebanon, monitoring reports)
2015 40 Management Egypt, 12 interviews - Iraq: involved both IDPs and their host communities in planning and
-- Monitoring Iraq, with staff implementation of interventions; eased tensions between the communities and
and Sudan increased uptake of services
Accountabilit - Egypt: deployed Syrians as outreach workers to do referrals and spread
y Systems awareness; good entry point into Syrian community in Egypt and cultivated trust with
for Limiting community members.
Aid Diversion - Capacity of local partners quite low, need to invest a lot in training
Zyck n/a Remote Afghanista n/a - Need for remote mode contingency plan which can be activated when designing

73
 Program
Author Organization Title Location Type of Paper Results
details
18
2012 Control n programs in order to account for required simplification
Project - Need to develop accountability networks: establish relationships with stakeholders
Management that can help independently verify projects are being implemented as intended; and
build partnerships for third party monitoring and evaluation
- Need to build capacity of local partners to enable daily decision making
- Need for coordination bodies and networks to share good practices and lessons
learnt
- Issues with M&E: site visits rare, external monitors not given accurate information,
local staff require training on monitoring and reporting, lack of independent
beneficiary feedback mechanisms
Benini ACAPS Information Syria Syria Needs Report - In situations of frequent lack of access and patchy indicators, severity of situations
2016 66 gaps in Assessment and quality of assessment information were best measured on simple ord inal scales;
multiple Project 2012 assessment gaps and priorities established by comparing the values of
needs governorates, districts, etc. on these scales. 

assessments - Assessment information allows for prioritization
in disaster
and conflict
areas

IFRC IFRC Central CAR RAMP Report - RAMP is a monitoring and evaluation tool using mobile phones and simple to use
73
2016 Global fund African mobile pre-designed forms
Republic phone - Health care workers trained to send routine health data from health centers via
and RAMP
 reporting mobile phones
How system - Rapid field intelligence and communication resulted in the expansion of malaria
technology is throughout services, prevented stock outs, allowed for monitoring of malaria prevalence and
transforming country trends
health facility
reporting in a
complex
operating
environment

CDC CDC CDC remote Variety of n/a Excel - Staff required a lot of training due to varying capacities and some hired due to
2016 31 monitoring countries spreadsheet bureaucratic/political reasons rather than skill or abilities
summary (unpublished) - Due to lack of commitment from lead agency, surveillance staff did not receive
salaries or funds to carry out regular activities, and system could no longer function.
- Within survey duplication and duplication over time between repeate d surveys
should be checked for potential fraud; pre-programmed algorithms are an essential
tool in detecting survey quality and fraud consistently and rapidly
- WhatsApp allowed for daily communication with teams in Syri a; however,
communication of more technical concepts was challenging
- Ensuring data quality was the biggest challenge; training and working with staff
prior to data collection helps to ensure quality and consistency of data
Balslev- IRC Consultancy. Eastern n/a Independent - Regular and strategic surveys have allowed remote managers to be less cautious;
Olesen Thailand Strengthenin Burma evaluation sets programming in reality
Huls Burma Border g Monitoring - Strong community connections resulted in strong participatory planning,
2011 39 Consortium in Eastern (18 interviews) implementation, and monitoring
Burma - Recommendations: systematic but voluntary horizontal data exchange, support

74
 Program
Author Organization Title Location Type of Paper Results
details
Final Report partners with common standard in collecting monitoring info; more consistent and
regular mechanisms for client/comm unity feedback; cross-monitoring; common
protocols and global standards; consistently analyze and correlate data ; harmonized
and coordinated in house support for monitoring; training on humanitarian principles
and sample techniques to monitor performance against principles; direct investment
in M&E
- M&E methods used currently: web-based (project activities verified through visual
evidence, geo-referenced), quality assurance teams (national staff travelling to
monitor program activities, indicator-based terms of reference); triangulated local
monitoring; third party monitoring
IRC IRC Project for Eastern SHIELD PowerPoint - Challenges: log books sent to Thai based office, some missing, several languages
year Local Burma program presentation and format (could not be reviewed from all ethnic health organizations)
unknown Empowerme - 6 local - Lessons learned: need for multi-lingual data entry staff, standardized case
77
nt partners definitions, and check-lists for log book review; activities should not be donor driven;
(PLE) - Thai based need to strengthen technical support to partners via team of experts; program
REMOTE office implementation team and monitoring team should be separate but work closely
MONITORIN
G
Jansury International Findings in n/a n/a Situational - Challenges: lack of good baseline data for performance indicators make it difficult
2015 30 Business & Monitoring analysis for third party evaluators to measure impact; rapid influxes of aid required prohibit
Technical and M&E practices from being built in from onset; explaini ng to local staff why M&E is
Consultants Evaluations Literature review necessary; coordination difficult due to distrust between orgs and lack of
Inc. (IBTCI) Practices Interviews transparency (duplication of efforts and hard to ensure accuracy)
During - Internal M&E tends to be less rigorous than external consultants as third parties
George Humanitarian have less vested interests, increased transparency and therefore legitimacy
Washington Emergencies - Building local capacity (ideally prior to emergency) leads to trust and more
University autonomy by implementing partners, and therefore better M&E
- Need to mainstream M&E and incorporate into planning phase
Zikusook Save the Simulated Somalia Simulated PowerPoint - Aims: provide support to inaccessible program, monitor nutrition program and verify
a Children Technical field visit Oct presentation existence, assess program performance against quality benchmarks, identify gaps
2015 69 Support Visit 2015 and areas for capacity development; connect with field teams
to - Methodology: minimum standards/quality benchmarks agreed  documents and
Inaccessible photos provided by field (photos with GPS encryption, scans of patient cards and
locations in stock records, etc.)  Skype/phone calls with field  joint review of documents with
somalia field  feedback and action planning
- Analysis: was card filled in correctly? Was correct amount of meds provided? Was
follow-up tracked correctly? Etc.
- Lessons learned: prior prep required to ensure complete set of supporting
documents are received; must train team to take quality photos; discipline required
to set up uninterrupted time to complete whole process
Souness Tearfund Monitoring & Kandahar, Relocated Independent - 3 types of monitoring in Kandahar: direct monitoring in the field, operational
2011 53 beneficiary Afghanista coordination assessment monitoring and report, and activities to build M&E capacity
Accountabilit n to Kabul in - M&E methods: field data collection, monitoring by Afghan Kabul-based specialists,
y in Remote 2008 Qualitative beneficiary feedback, stories of transformation (collected by field staff), monthly
Managed following study program reports, project evaluations, office shura, weekly progress reports, peer
Locations kidnapping of monitoring
An expat NGO (interviews, - Reliance on national staff resulted in lower quality reporting in some cases
assessment worker observations, - Recommendations: establish clear methodology; improve rigor of qual itative and

75
 Program
Author Organization Title Location Type of Paper Results
details
of Tearfund’s document quantitative methods, KAP survey to track changes over time; peer monitoring
Monitoring & analysis) - Must focus on building capacity of staff; M&E officer mentors project managers and
accountabilit trains staff to build capacity in monitoring
y practices - Strong relationships with communities and acceptance necessary for security
(a part of during field visits
larger - Allowing field staff and communities to tell their stories is important method of
Tearfund monitoring; mixed-method monitoring required
report,
below)
Norman Tearfund Effective Afghanista Programs Qualitative Study - Remote Monitoring issues: quality, ensuring rigorous monitoring system, reduced
2011 58 Monitoring n, implemented regularity of visits to implementation areas, inaccuracy of project data and reporting,
and Pakistan, in 42 (Interviews and limited capacity of staff, weak technical oversight of implementation, poor
Beneficiary Somalia, locations that focus groups communication between head office and field, increased risk to staff and
Accountabilit Sudan, use some with 28 beneficiaries, increased pressure on local staff, increased risk of corruption and
y Practices South remote mode organizations) fraud
for Projects Sudan approach
Implemented
Remotely in
Insecure
Environment
s (Interim
report)
Norman Tearfund Monitoring Afghanista Programs Qualitative Study - Much existing good practice but confined to single org and not shared
2012 33 and n, Iraq, implemented - Remote Project monitoring good practice recommendations: limiting size and
accountabilit South in 42 (Interviews and scope of programs, building positive community relationships, targeted recruitment
y practices Sudan, locations that focus groups of local recruitment, capacity building of local staff, regular face -to-face meetings,
for remotely Pakistan, use some with 28 promoting organization values, developing a remote management strategy, building
managed Sudan, Sri remote mode organizations) micro-management approaches to monitoring, ensuring dedicated monitoring and
projects Lanka, approach evaluation capacity, developing an M&E framework, investing in information and
implemented Somalia, communication technologies, peer-monitoring, beneficiary led monitoring, increasing
in volatile collaboration between humanitarian and development communities
operating - Essentials for beneficiary accountability good practice: establishing and delivering
environment on commitments, staff competency, sharing information, participation, handling
s complaints, learning and continual improvement
(final report)
ACF Action Contre Be prepared n/a n/a Power point - Lessons learned: focus on building staff capabilities, build relationships with
2015 60 la Faim to switch to presentation community stakeholders, simplify reporting, transfer reporting responsibility to field
remote staff, formalize current/target roles and responsibilities for all activities
operations - To better communication with field: promote proactive regular timely
communication, make remote supervisors liable to field staff as well , prove utility of
monitoring systems to field staff by providing timely meaningful data interpretation,
regularly contact all staff to boost morale, communicate face-to-face as much as
possible
ECHO ECHO Instruction n/a n/a Organizational - Building acceptance among governments, non-state authorities, and beneficiaries
2013 48 note for guidance note is most sustainable and effective way of gaining and maintaining access
ECHO staff - Crosschecking local staff assessments through trusted third parties is essential
on Remote - Recruit national partners with experience, train and build capacity
Management - Minimum face-to-face contact between senior staff and field staff/beneficiaries

76
 Program
Author Organization Title Location Type of Paper Results
details
required
- Monitoring mechanisms: photo, telephone complaint system for beneficiaries,
triangulation, peer monitoring, third party monitors
IMC IMC Field n/a n/a Email - Communication: maintain regular communication by whatever means possible,
2016 25 practices for correspondence designate field focal point, communicate value of work to team
remote - Contingency planning: ensure there is one for both foreseen challenges and
management potential emergencies
- Training and capacity building: ensure tools and support to implement activities is
provided before hand, training of trainers with key field staff
- Data and information management: triangulate info, third p arty monitors, explore
mobile technologies, develop strong protocols
- Personnel structure: ensure clear field supervision with specific focal points
- Policies and procedure: have written procedures on which to conduct internal
training prior to deployment
- National partners: consider working with national NGOs early, have a list of vetted
partners
Egeland OCHA To Stay and Field Desk review and - Remote management good practices: invest in highly localized field staff, recruit
2011 5 Deliver research qualitative study staff in consultation with communities, web-based monitoring, quality assurance
Good in: teams for accountability, third party monitoring, triangulated local monitoring
practice for Afghanista (255 interviews, - Methods to build acceptance: outreach teams, community memorandums of
humanitarian n, DRC, 1100 national understanding that stipulates its role in program, local broadcasting and published
s in complex occupied staff surveyed) materials, community co-ownership, positive associations with trusted entities,
security Palestinia ongoing local consultations
environment n 
- Recommendations: address gaps to mitigate risk and ensure duty of care to
s territories, national staff, ensure strong cooperation that meets the needs of partners, ensure
Pakistan, deployed staff understand humanitarian principles and organizational policies, share
Somalia, good practices and lessons learned
Darfur,
Sudan
UNHCR UNHCR Remote n/a n/a Part of 4 th edition - Guidelines: conduct thorough risk assessment considering needs of all parties,
2016 16 management of UNHCR weigh whether partners fully understand and accept risks, build partnership
in high Emergency networks
security risk Handbook - Monitoring guidelines: exploit tracking and information technologies; keep methods
operations and messages simple; explore peer monitoring, monitoring by communities, national
and local staff, local authorities, private companies, consultants, other agencies; set
up clear and simple monitoring and reporting procedures; communicate frequently
with partners
- When regular programming starts, build on increased capacity of local partne rs
and do not replace them with internationals
- Risks: less able to monitor needs and understand local perspectives, assistance
may not reach those on need, difficult to detect fraud, donors may be unwilling to
fund due to lack of direct monitoring, UNHCR less visible in communities and among
donors
UNICEF UNICEF Remote Program - Steps towards decision to switch to remote mode: security risk assessment,
EMOPS Programmin guidance political context/conflict dynamics and stakeholder interests analysis, cost analysis
35
2012 g in or options, map non-security risks, exit strategies
Humanitarian - Incorporate exit strategies into program management cycle; must reassess
Action situation on ground to determine when to return

77
 Program
Author Organization Title Location Type of Paper Results
details
- Implementing Remote programming: partner mapping and assessments of
capacity and position in conflict should inform partner selection
- Must engage partners in security management and planning activities, budget for
appropriate logistical and security communication, and establish clear procedures
for reporting security incidents

EHCO ECHO ECHO’s n/a n/a Organization ECHO funding for actions involving remote management is based on seven
Director- Approach to guidelines questions:
General, Remote - Is there an access problem due to security or administrative obstacles?
2015 78 Management - Does the proposed action include acceptance-building measures?
- Is it a direct life-saving action or an action aimed at preserving livelihoods?
- Have all possible measures been taken to reduce the risk of losing the lives of
those undertaking the work on the ground?
- What is the source of the needs assessment in a remotely managed action?
- Have robust systems been put in place to allow staff on the ground to provide all of
the relevant information to those who are ultimately responsible for the management
and the quality of the action?
- Are monitoring arrangements adapted for remote management?.
GOAL GOAL Remote General, n/a Draft guidance GOAL uses seven minimum criteria when determining whether to use remote
2016 19 Management examples document management:
Guidance in Sudan - Access restrictions or the risk to staff in the project area is unacceptable
v0.4 DRAFT and Syria - Risk faced by staff or partners is acceptable to the organization and individuals
implementing the activities
- Context analysis and needs and security assessment justify remote management
- Sufficient capacity among staff and/or partners to deliver the program (or training to
build capacity)
- Program activities can be implemented following humanitarian principles
- GOAL provided added value to meeting the humanitarian needs
- Minimum standard of monitoring can be implemented

- Strategies for mitigating risks: planning, risk analysis, program and policy
adaptation, prioritizing staff training and development, increasing resources for
monitoring and evaluation, clear communication and strong information
management tools, and community accountability procedures to strengthen
acceptance and program support
Hüls, n/a Remote n/a n/a Essay - Risks include: shifting risk to local staff, reduced quality assurance and timely
2011 64 Management action, decreased knowledge transfer to local staff,
of - Methods of risk mitigation: third party monitoring or verification, information and
Humanitarian communication technology, community involvement
Assistance
UNICEF UNICEF Compendium n/a n/a Minimum The Minimum Components of the Comprehensive Risk Management Approach:
year of best standards - Assessing the non-security risks for UNICEF programs;
unknown practices: guideline - Linking security planning with the SRA and the inter-agency program
65
UNICEF - Comprehensive multi-source monitoring with capacity to triangulate and analyze
approach to information
Comprehensi - Internal management measures such as training, partner screening, audit and risk

78
 Program
Author Organization Title Location Type of Paper Results
details
ve Risk management working group
Management Additional components of risk management may include:
and Due - Capacity building for staff, partners, facilitators and contractors
Diligence in - Agreeing on and implementation of common UN risk management tools
Complex and - Conflict sensitive programming
High Threat
Environment - General strategies for reducing residual risk: building stronger community
s relationships, actively managing security risks, weighing short versus long -term risks,
coordinating with and gaining support of partners, employing qualified staff, and
ensuring records on all decisions are maintained
Bally, European Remote n/a n/a Review article - European Space Agency is utilizing satellite imagery to assist the European
2005 71 Space Sensing and Community Humanitarian Office to obtain information regarding the impact and
Agency, Humanitarian needs of both slow and sudden onset humanitarian emergencies: development of a
Directorate of Aid – A life- database for use in GIS, up-to-date topographic maps for responders, identifying
Earth saving appropriate locations for camps and fulfilling camp-setting criteria, and aiding food
Observation combination and supply distribution
Programmes
- Satellite imagery also used to identify hidden water sources and site ne w camps,
and estimating available wood and allocating cooking fuel resources
Meier, n/a New Haiti Crisis Review article – - Article focuses on use of information and communication in Haiti, Russia, Libya
74
2011 information earthquak mapping and case studies and Somalia, particularly crisis mapping and crowd-sourcing information
technologies e, Russia digital - There are still concerns over the ethical and security concerns of mapping user-
and their forest volunteer generated content during conflict, the liability of volunteers, data protection
impact on fires, Libya networks protocols, verifying information in real time, and the capacity of humanitarian
the humanitari organizations to respond to all information added to the maps
humanitarian an crisis,
sector Somalia
complex
emergenc
y

79
Annex 2 – GOAL Monitoring tools and examples of use 19

80
81
82
83
84
Annex 3 – UNICEF Checklist for implementation of
remote programming35

85
86
Annex 4 – UNICEF How to assess non-security
enterprise risks of remote programming35

87
88
89
Annex 5 – TEARFUND Summary checklist for remote
project monitoring good practices33

Continued on next page

90
91
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