GNSS Interference

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© ESA-Pierre Carril

"The Full Operational Capability phase of the Galileo programme is managed and fully funded by the European Union.
The Commission and ESA have signed a delegation agreement by which ESA acts as design and procurement agent on
behalf of the Commission. “Galileo” is a trademark of the European Union."
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Executive summary
GNSS signals are vulnerable to radio- Over the last 20 years, GNSS has truly established itself as part of the
frequency interference. To address this critical infrastructure in today’s world – no longer just for positioning
threat, for more than 15 years Septentrio and navigation but across a diverse range of applications and
has been perfecting and fielding unique markets, especially autonomous vehicles on land, in the air and at
interference mitigation techniques. sea. These satellite navigation signals are very weak and vulnerable
to interference: a phenomenon where other radio signals disrupt
These countermeasures include adaptive
the GNSS signals causing reduced positioning accuracy, or even the
notch filtering, pulse blanking, and unique
complete lack of position availability.
wide band interference mitigation. Working
in concert, these and other analogue and This brochure introduces the different types of radio-frequency
digital countermeasures form Septentrio’s interference (RFI), their effect on GNSS signals and receivers, and
AIM+ (Advanced Interference Mitigation). how Septentrio GNSS receivers identify, monitor and overcome the
effects of such harmful interference, along with real-life examples
The effectiveness of AIM+ has been from the field.
demonstrated repeatedly in various real field
applications. AIM+, as part of a larger range
of Septentrio innovations, helps safeguard
positioning accuracy and availability in all
possible circumstances.

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It’s a noisy, crowded
world out there! NON-IONISING IONISING

The electro-magnetic radiation Inmarsat

Iridium
5G

and radio frequency spectrum WiFi

4G

GNSS radio signals as received on the Earth are GNSS

extremely weak by design: about 100 times

weaker than the background noise of other
radio signals. Without special techniques, using
a general purpose radio-frequency receiver and
antenna, you would not even “hear” the signals
above the background static. Think of this as if
Figure 1 − RF spectrum
you would try watching a 100 W lightbulb flying
at a height of 20 000 km, it would be impossible
to see. The RF spectrum is packed with many Even though the various GNSS (GPS, GLONASS, Galileo and BeiDou) transmit in
existing signal bands such as VHF, microwave, dedicated frequency bands, there are many RF signals which are emitted ‘just
3G, WiFi and Bluetooth, yet the introduction of next to’ GNSS. Some of those signals spill over into the GNSS bands, impacting
new protocols such as 4G LTE and 5G amongst quality and accuracy of the position, and sometimes even drowning out GNSS
many others is crowding it further. signals completely. Moreover, sometimes people disturb the GNSS signals
directly, unintentionally or on purpose. There have been reports of flawed
maritime television antennas jamming GNSS signals. And with the proliferation
of vehicle tracking systems and GNSS-based road tolling, there is a clear increase
in the presence of illegal but cheap GNSS car jammers.

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How interference impacts GNSS
Professional GNSS receivers can still extract the GNSS information from This redundancy allows the positioning accuracy of high-end receivers
the background, even if that background noise is increased slightly by the to remain unaffected when only few satellite measurements are
spillover signals. For the majority of applications using GNSS, positioning is disturbed by interference. However, a source of interference is likely
the main objective. to affect multiple signals in the same GNSS frequency band and may
even completely block reception of a whole GNSS band. In this case,
the effect at the positioning level can be more severe.

Consider if GLONASS L2 (G2 above) reception were completely

ACCURACY RELIABILITY AVAILABILITY lost, a receiver in GPS and GLONASS dual-frequency RTK mode
Closeness Confidence that Amount of time the
to the truth the position is expected solution is would have to switch to GPS-only dual-frequency RTK mode, with
correct and accurate available to the user potentially reduced accuracy as a result. Should L2 reception be
completely lost on both GPS and GLONASS, the same receiver would
Key GNSS positioning performance metrics have to fall back to another position mode such as L1-only RTK, to
DGNSS operation or even stand-alone mode.
GNSS positioning performance depends on the availability and the accuracy
of satellite measurements (code pseudo ranges and carrier phases). To deliver Single-frequency stand-alone
high-accuracies and resilience, such high-end receivers track signals at various 5 - 10 m
phones & tablets for consumer use

16 - 32 ft
frequencies and of multiple GNSS constellations as seen below.
Multi-frequency GNSS stand-alone
1.5 - 1 m general tracking, marine navigation
5 - 3.3 ft

1 - 0.5 m SBAS, DGNSS

3.3 - 1 ft aviation landing approaches

1 - 5 cm PPP, SSR
0.5 - 4 in machine control, autonomous vehicles

< 1 cm RTK
< 0.4 in robotics,
Figure 3 − GNSS accuracy grades mapping and scientific
Hz

Hz
Hz

Hz

Hz

Hz
Hz
Hz

Hz
M

M
M

M
M
M

For applications relying on an RTK solution accuracy of a few

M
40

2
5

46

02
98
0

.4
.4

.5
.6
.1

.7
12

16
75
.0
76

68
27
07

78

61

15
11

12
12
12

12

15

centimetres, falling back to a non-RTK mode (such as differential code)

GALILEO Band GPS Band GLONASS Band BEIDOU Band QZSS Band could be unacceptable and stop the application from working.
Figure 2 − RF spectrum for GNSS

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 The good, the bad and the ugly
Interference can come in many different forms, but Interference can be described physically through the following two behaviours:
first it is useful to consider how it is generated. The „ Temporally – depending on how the interference changes over time (in the ‘time
most common sources are electrical and electronic domain’).
devices, from everyday items in a home, office, An interfering signal may be either:
shopping centre or construction site, to those more  non-pulsed (i.e. continuous and always on) or
specific to airports, military installations, ships,  pulsed (behaving like a flashing light)
industrial machines and communication towers. „ Frequency – where in the RF spectrum the interference comes from, and its footprint.
One simple example is how a radio can sometimes  in band – directly on the same frequency as a GNSS signal
buzz when a mobile phone is operating nearby.  partially in band – overlapping across the same frequency as a GNSS signal,
Different interferers leave their own footprint on the  out of band – adjacent or nearby in frequency to a GNSS signal
RF spectrum. Read multiple interference insights on  narrow-band or wide-band – this describes the width of the RF band that the
our website septentrio.com/insights interference occupies.

Wide-band jammer Multiple narrowband interference Self-interference

1583 MHz 1607 MHz

Chirp Jammer
Power (dB)

Power (dB)
1559 MHz
dBm/Hz

Mitigated

Normal Level

GPS L1 MHz Frequency (mHz) Frequency (mHz)

Figure 4 − GPS L1 signal contaminated Figure 5 − Satellite communications Figure 6 − L1-band Interference
with a chirp jammer signal: before (blue) signals can interfere with GPS signals from a GoPro™ Hero 2 video
and after (red) activation of WIMU in L1 band camera picked up by GPS antenna
(Wide-band Interference Mitigation Unit)

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Beating interference
Interference in all its forms must be factored into
the architecture, design and development of a high-
end GNSS receiver from the very start of the design
process and impacts all parts of the receiver. From
the analogue design in the RF front end – the antenna
and those parts of the receiver which capture and
treat the high-frequency signals – to the conversion to
digital signals and the treatment of those signals with
various digital filters and countermeasures, all have
to work in concert to effectively combat interferers.

As each interfering signal has its own individual

Figure 7 − Visualising RF interference – the spectrum view plot
fingerprint, adaptive filtering and innovative signal
processing techniques are needed to effectively deal
with the many forms of interference encountered Visualising the RF spectrum, the type and frequency of the interfering signal,
in real life. AIM+ combines an array of techniques provides an easy way for users, and especially for law enforcement officers,
to mitigate jamming: a set of configurable adaptive to investigate whether RF interference is present and what may cause them.
notch filters and special pulse blanking technology are Using a real-time spectrum analyser built into the receiver, the user can
complemented by an adaptive wide-band filter capable assess the frequency spectrum of all signals entering the receiver. Spectrum
of rejecting more complex types of interference such figures in this brochure have been created using this internal receiver
as that from GNSS chirp jammers, frequency-hopping spectrum plot capability. Figure 7 shows the L2 frequency band with the
signals from aviation devices as well as high-powered GPS L2P signal at 1227.60  MHz indicated. Via an intuitive user interface,
Inmarsat transmitters. other bands can easily be selected and visualised as well.

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 Adaptive notch filtering
USER STORY - Overcoming jamming
An adaptive notch filter minimises the impact of continuous wave and in the fields
narrow-band interference on a receiver’s performance, by continuously
A local farming co-operative near Tyumen in Russia was
monitoring the incoming signals for the presence of an interferer. Whenever
upgrading their farm equipment to add high precision
one is identified, a narrow digital filter (notch filter) is aligned with the
systems for autosteer and precision-farming applications,
interfering signal so that specific interferer is mitigated or suppressed. This
along with a local base station to provide the required
operation of the notch filter can be fully automated (including the adaptive
RTK corrections. When they were trying to activate the
fine-tuning of its bandwidth and centre frequency) but, if required, can also
base station’s correction data service, all rovers were
be set up or adjusted manually.
unable to obtain an RTK position because of high levels
of local interference. Equipping the base station with
AIM+ capabilities, and activating adaptive notch filtering,
largely suppressed the local interference and cm-accurate
L2 band before applying L2 band after applying positioning became possible.
notch filter notch filter
Power (dB)

Power (dB)

Frequency (mHz) Frequency (mHz)

Figure 8 − Local interference Figure 9 − Note how the peaks have

shown as the large spikes been suppressed by the notch filter

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 USER STORY - Fixing RFI to get RTK fixes

Many GNSS surveying receivers in the region of Hilversum had trouble maintaining an RTK fix
(necessary for centimetre accuracy). When investigating this further, the problem was traced
to a radio tower housing an amateur radio transmitter. As this transmitter had a centre
frequency of 1240.4 MHz, it was essentially a narrow-band jammer in the GLONASS L2 band
(figure 2).

_______ L1 Figure 10
_______ L2
Observed L1
and L2 signal
power before
Power (dB)

C/N0 (dB-Hz)
enabling AIM+
showing
significant
impairment Without AIM+ countermeasures enabled,
of L2 C/N0
Frequency (mHz) the C/N0 (a measure of the GNSS signal
Time (s)
strength against the background noise)
_______ L1
_______ L2 Figure 11 of the L2 signal was severely degraded
Observed L1
and L2 signal (figure 10).
Power (dB)

C/N0 (dB-Hz)

power after
After enabling adaptive notch filters, the
enabling AIM+
extraneous signal was suppressed and
most importantly, the C/N0 of the L2
Frequency (mHz)
Time (s) signal was much less affected, allowing
cm accurate positioning again (figure 11).

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Wide-band interference mitigation unit (WIMU)
The intermittent nature of most jamming events makes them difficult to detect and even more difficult to
overcome or predict, which is why Septentrio offers built-in protection against jamming as standard.

GNSS chirp jammers, for example, are small portable low-power devices available via the internet which can
easily block out GNSS signals to the extent that it prevents tracking any GNSS satellite. A single 10 mW chirp Chirp Jammer

jammer powered from a 12 V car socket is powerful enough to knock out GNSS signals in a radius of several
hundred metres. Chirp jammers are much more difficult to protect against than narrowband 'accidental'

dBm/Hz
Mitigated
jammers, because of the rapid frequency variation (or 'chirping' nature) of their signal which makes notch
filters ineffective.

To illustrate the effect, a test was done with a GNSS simulator to see the real impact on positioning in Tampa,
MHz
Florida. A 10 mW PPD chirp jammer in the centre of Tampa would jam the GNSS signal over a radius of 400
Figure 12 − GPS L1 signal contaminated
metres meaning ‘No RTK’ for any GNSS receiver within the red zone indicated in figure 13. The blue trace with a chirp jammer signal: before (blue)
and after (red) activation of WIMU
from the chirp jammer below in figure 12 shows the dramatic results when it interferes with the GPS L1 band.
(Wide-band Interference Mitigation Unit)

Once interference mitigation measures have been applied by the AIM+ enabled
GNSS receiver, the red trace in figure 12 shows how the (normal) signal (re)
appears. With AIM+ activated, the red ‘No RTK’ zone, is reduced from about
400 m to a few metres effectively confining the range of the jammer to the d
7y
car it’s plugged into. It is worth noting that any other GNSS receivers in the red /43
0m
zone which don’t possess AIM+ technologies would not be able to get RTK fixes 40
No RTK Zone
within that area.

Figure 13 − 10 mW Chirp jammer Figure 14 − 10 mW Chirp jammer with

without mitigation activated AIM+

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Are you ready for driverless cars and GNSS road tolling?
The steady increase in road-going vehicles and the trend towards autonomous vehicles, both of which demand GNSS positioning, is matched by a
growing number of illegal jamming devices on the road. Jamming signals can affect GNSS availability over several kms, making it difficult to reliably
identify those vehicles equipped with jammers.

USER STORY - Setting the trap

to catch vehicle-mounted jammers

A new technique uses an AIM+ enabled system,

mounted on a gantry spanning the toll highway which
monitors the presence of GNSS jamming passing
through the toll gate. By having two GNSS antennas
monitoring for interference, a very reliable means of
identifying the exact lane of the offending jammer-
equipped vehicle was provided. The system also
provides a precise time stamp of the exact moment
that the jammer passes the detection system and can
be connected to cameras for license plate identification.
For the full story see GNSS Jamming and Road Tolling
on septentrio.com/insights Figure 15 - White truck with illegal jamming device to avoid paying road toll

In a recent experiment, over the course of just 7 days, 115 hours of data was collected and 45 jamming events were seen: 16 from chirp jammers,
10 from pulsed jammers and 19 interference events from other sources. Remember that these jammers not only disable the GNSS receiver in
the offending car or truck, but possibly GNSS receivers in a wide area surrounding this vehicle.

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Drones and jamming
The use of drones in everyday life has rocketed with applications going from real estate photography and event videography over parcel delivery,
surveillance and inspections to aerial mapping and many more. One of the biggest threats to drone safety is GNSS interference. At the very least,
disruptions to GNSS signals can impact position quality to drop below high-accuracy RTK to less-accurate positioning modes, hampering some of the
high precision applications. In the most extreme cases, interference can cause the drone to lose position awareness and force it to land immediately
regardless of where it is and what may be below.

USER STORY - The effect of a 10 mW jammer

With only 10 mW, jammers are powerful enough to knock out GNSS signals for several hundred metres on land. In the air, the jamming signals
have a greater reach – up to 1 km or more – as they are unhindered by trees, buildings and the like. Figure 17 below shows how a 10 mW jammer
knocks out RTK positioning over more than 1 km in an unprotected high-accuracy receiver in the air. Even a lower accuracy consumer grade L1
receiver (figure 16) as often used in the navigation system of drones, which is less accurate and less sensitive to interference, loses positioning
information up to several hundred metres from the source of interference. With AIM+ countermeasures activated (figure 18), the receiver is able
to maintain an RTK fix throughout the simulated flight as well as showing no degradation to its position. More details on this case can be found
in our Jam Proofing Drones insight, see septentrio.com/insights

Chirp jammer Chirp jammer Chirp jammer

m

m
Low-end receiver High-end receiver Septentrio receiver
(standalone) (RTK) (RTK)

m m m
Figure 16 Figure 17 Figure 18

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Internal interference: self-jamming of drones caused by a camera
The small size of drones often means that many different electronic systems are packed closely together and in close proximity to the GNSS antenna.
These other electronics, such as motors or cameras often cause harmful interference that degrades or inhibits GNSS positioning.

USER STORY - Drones and self-jamming

1583 MHz 1607 MHz

GNSS
Antenna
1559 MHz

Power (dB)
Normal Level

Camera

Frequency (MHz)

Figure 19 - GoPro™ Hero 2 camera pick-up monitored by an AsteRx4 receiver

The above figure 19 shows what happened to the GPS L1-band spectrum when a consumer action camera was installed on a quadcopter.
The three peaks in the spectrum are exactly 24  MHz apart pointing to their origin: the MMC/SD logging interface used in a range of
consumer action cameras. For the design engineers this view of the RF spectrum analyser was an invaluable tool for both identifying the
source of interference and determining the effectiveness of measures such as modifying the setup or adding shielding, measures which
are important complements to receiver solutions such as AIM+. For the quadcopter installation in this example, the loss of RTK was solved
by a combination of placing the camera in a shielded case and activation of AIM+ interference mitigation.

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Fighting military interference peacefully

USER STORY - Protecting against unwanted leaking of military jammers into civilian waters and
projects
Commercial marine dredging operations are essential Thanks to AIM+ technology being activated on these receivers, dredging work
to keep busy waterways and harbours open for could continue with minimal delay from external interferers, avoiding losses in the
international trade. However, as happened recently, range of 10 000s of dollars per hour of interrupted operation of these expensive
these operations can significantly have an impact dredging ships.
when the transmissions of a military system normally
used for military exercises ‘leaks’ into commercial
waterways. The impact of this military system was
significant with major periodic in-band interference,
knocking out the complete L2 band (both for GPS
and GLONASS) on all commercial receivers every
7 seconds for a few hundred milliseconds (ms).
With the activation of AIM+ countermeasures in the
land-based reference receivers and the ship-based
receivers, all of the in-band interference was reliably
filtered out from the GPS and GLONASS L2 bands
leaving real high-quality GNSS signals available for the
high accuracy real-time positioning needed for these
dredging operations.

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Interference - a fact of life
Regional communications systems adjacent to GNSS
There are several well-known examples where existing and planned
communications infrastructure around the world significantly impacts the
performance of GNSS positioning.

„ Globally, LTE (Long-term Evolution) cellular communications, Inmarsat

and Iridium
„ Regionally, Ligado (formerly Light Squared) in USA and DoCoMo in Japan

The examples of Light Squared and Ligado operation close to the GPS L1
frequency show that the RF spectrum is an increasingly rare commodity, and
efforts to expand ever more access to internet and data for ever more people
inevitably impact other existing systems such as GNSS.

Robustness against LTE interference in central Tokyo The AIM+ enabled receiver operating at this location
consistently tracks signals from more satellites than one
A LTE base transceiver station located in central Tokyo, capable of providing impacted by the LTE signal, essential when striving to provide
higher rate cellular data and voice communications, knocked out the GNSS accurate and reliable position solutions.
signals over a radius of more than 100 metres.

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Summary
The ever-increasing number of connected devices operating across the increasingly crowded RF spectrum can cause unintentional interference of GNSS
signals. Maintaining position accuracy, reliability and availability is a serious challenge both today and tomorrow for GNSS receivers operating in this
crowded RF interference environment. As more and more new applications for GNSS are developed, challenges grow as more complex forms of
interference appear worldwide. Identifying and overcoming interference with the application of advanced mitigation technologies is critical to ensure the
quality of GNSS measurements and positioning.
1. RF Interference is everywhere! 2. Solving GNSS interference 3. Adapt, evolve, overcome
RF signals can cause interference with GNSS The omnipresence of interference in all its forms Septentrio’s Advanced Interference
operation, unintentionally or intentionally. limits the accuracy, reliability and availability Mitigation (AIM+) technology has been
The presence of interference is increasing at of GNSS positioning systems, and their final designed as a core built-in component of
an alarming rate, as more and more electronic applications. Overcoming these interferers all of Septentrio’s products in the analogue
devices are being used everywhere. GNSS and reliably and effectively requires an intimate and digital domains. The resources built
its unique features make it a critical provider experience of GNSS and its characteristics, into its receivers allow the technology to
of positioning in many existing and new along with mastery of complex technologies continue to evolve and be tuned based
technologies, such as autonomous systems and algorithms. These solutions need to be on new experiences, new signals and new
(vehicles, drones, machines and vessels). designed into the GNSS receiver from the start interferers.
and complemented with other measures.

Septentrio's solutions
Septentrio’s AIM+ technology meets this challenge head-on with a market-leading range of interference countermeasures in the analogue and digital
domains, combined with Septentrio’s ongoing commitment to track all navigation signals in the sky.
With more than 15 years of experiences around interference, our latest AIM+ technology brings the best of all the latest innovations on hardware/soft-
ware and comprises of continuous design of dedicated hardware, software and countermeasures to mitigate continuous wave, narrow-band and pulsed
interference (amongst others). In most cases, position accuracy and availability can be maintained even when a whole GNSS band is jammed thanks
to the abundance of GNSS signals on multiple frequencies from multiple constellations. The more signals, frequencies and constellations a receiver can
track, the more likely its AIM+ countermeasures will be able to overcome interference on tracked signals.
In summary, the effectiveness of Septentrio’s AIM+ technology has been repeatedly demonstrated in real field applications and ensures customers of
highest possible GNSS performance (positioning accuracy, reliability and availability) in all possible circumstances – no matter how challenging the RF
environment.

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Septentrio’s AIM+ Technology
Septentrio has developed a sophisticated RF interference monitoring A never ending battle
and mitigation system (AIM+). This AIM+ technology is built into every As a premier maker of high-end GNSS receivers, Septentrio
Septentrio receiver. Working in harmony together, a suite of analog is continuously developing and optimising its AIM+
and digital countermeasures forming Septentrio’s AIM+ tools typically technologies to provide customers with the best chances
include: of overcoming the increasing number of interfering signals.

„ Adaptive Multiple Notch Filters These developments will keep evolving to rise and respond

„ Pulse Blanking Units to new interferers and threats.

„ Wide-band Interference Mitigation Unit (WIMU)

„ Integrated Spectrum Analyser visualisation tools to view the RF input
from the antenna in both time and frequency domains.

To mitigate the effects of narrow-band interference, multiple notch

Power (dB)
filters can be configured either in auto or manual mode. These notch
filters effectively remove a narrow part of the RF spectrum around the
interfering signal. The L2 band, being open for use by radio amateurs,
is particularly vulnerable to narrowband interference. The effects of
wide-band interference, both intentional and unintentional, can be
Frequency (MHz)
mitigated by enabling the Wide-band Interference Mitigation Unit. This
system also reduces, more effectively than traditionally used pulse- GPS L1 signal contaminated with a chirp jammer signal:
before (blue) and after (red) activation of WIMU also shown
blanking methods, the effects of pulsed interferers. on page 6

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Glossary
Accuracy:  a common navigation system performance indicator that checks the solution error.
Adaptive notch filter: is an algorithm to achieve narrow-band interference rejection.
AIM+: Advanced Interference Mitigation (AIM+), is a market-leading range of interference countermeasures, developed by Septentrio. It is a core component of all Septentrio’s
products in the analogue and digital domains.
Availability: a common navigation system performance indicator that checks the amount of time the expected solution is available to the user.
Carrier phase measurement: a measure of the range between a satellite and receiver expressed in units of cycles of the carrier frequency.
Chirp jammer: this is a GNSS jammer or PPD (Personal Privacy Device) that is used to disrupt GNSS signals by sweeping through a certain frequency range (like a siren). It can be
installed in a vehicle to disrupt road tolling tracking equipment to avoid paying road toll. Using this device is illegal.
DGNSS: a network of reference stations. There are several DGNSS techniques, such as classical DGNSS (or DGPS), Real Time Kinematic (RTK) and Wide Area RTK (WARTK).
DoCoMo: a mobile phone operator in Japan
GNSS: Global Navigation Satellite Systems or the generic term for satellite navigation systems that provide autonomous geo-spatial positioning with global coverage. Common
GNSS Systems are GPS, Galileo, GLONASS and BeiDou.
Inmarsat: a British satellite telecommunications operator, offering global mobile services. In GNSS often used to distribute corrections to improve accuracy.
Interference: (in a GNSS context) the unwanted negative impact of other RF signals on a GNSS signal.
Iridium: an American satellite telecommunications operator, offering global mobile services.
Jamming: unintentional or intentional interference impacting the accuracy, reliability and availability of a GNSS receiver.
Ligado: an American wireless communication service provider developing a satellite-terrestrial network to support 5G and Internet of Things applications in North America. 
LTE: a 4G mobile communications standard.
MMC/SD logging: Data logging through the use of a multimedia or SD card.
Pseudo range: a measure of the distance between a satellite and a navigation satellite receiver.
Pulse blanking: technique of ‘ignoring’ all signals (including the GNSS signals) for a very short time during a strong pulsing signal that comes from a pulsing RF interference source,
whilst tracking and using signals observed between the pulses. As an analogy, think of a lighthouse at night. Every 15 seconds or so, the light is shining directly at you and ‘blinding’
you. To ignore this light, you could try and blink every 15 seconds when the lighthouse shines at you. 
Radio spectrum: The electromagnetic spectrum with frequencies from 3 Hz to 3000 GHz (3 THz). Electromagnetic waves in this frequency range, called radio waves, are widely used
in modern technology, particularly in telecommunication.
Reliability: describes the ability of a system or component to function under stated conditions for a specified period of time. In GNSS terms, the confidence that the position is
correct and accurate within the indicated error limits.
RF: Radio frequency, a frequency or band of frequencies, suitable for use in telecommunications.
RTK: Real-Time Kinematic positioning, a satellite navigation technique used to enhance the accuracy of a GNSS position.
Spectrum Analyser: visualising tool to measure the magnitude (amplitude or strength) of a given input signal set against the full frequency range of the instrument.
Spoofing: the intentional broadcast of altered and misleading GNSS signals and information, ultimately fooling a GNSS receiver into giving an incorrect position. Users typically do
not notice the presence of spoofing as there is no loss in ‘signal availability’ and can wrongly assume that signal availability means reliable positioning. 
UAV: an unmanned aerial vehicle or an aircraft piloted by remote control or onboard computers.
WIMU: wide-band interference mitigation unit that can reduce or eliminate interference from a wider frequency range.

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