Defamation against Lawyer
[Victorio vs CA, G.R. Nos. 32836-37. May 31, 1989.]
1. CRIMINAL LAW; SLANDER; DEFINED. — The term oral defamation or slander as now
understood, has been defined as the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice
another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood (33 Am. Jur. 39).
2. ID.; ID.; GUIDELINES TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE IMPUTATION IS SERIOUS OR
SLIGHT. — To determine whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, the Court
adopted the following guidelines: ". . . We are to be guided by a doctrine of ancient respectability that
defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending upon, as Viada puts it, ‘. . . upon their sense
and grammatical meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case,
antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the
intention of the offender at the time: . . .’" (Balite v. People, Ibid., quoting Viada, Codigo Penal, Quinta
edicion, page 494).
3. ID.; ID.; DEFAMATORY WORDS TOUCHING ON THE PROFESSION OF A LAWYER,
LIBELOUS PER SE; CASE AT BAR. — Defamatory words uttered specifically against a lawyer when
touching on his profession are libelous per se. (Kleeberg v. Sipser, 191 NY 845 [1934]) In the instant
case, appellant-petitioner imputed the crime of estafa against a prominent lawyer — one time Justice of
the Peace and member of the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, a professor of law and for sometime a
president of the Nueva Ecija Bar Association. As the scurrilous imputation strikes deep into the character
of the victim, no special circumstance need be shown for the defamatory words uttered to be considered
grave oral defamation (Balite v. People, supra). In addition, the fact that the offended party is a lawyer,
the totality of such words as "kayabang", "tunaw ang utak", "swapang at estapador", imputed against him
has the import of charging him with dishonesty or improper practice in the performance of his duties,
hence, actionable per se.
4. ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE THAT DEFAMATORY WORDS UTTERED IN THE HEAT OF ANGER
CONSTITUTES SLIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION, NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. —
Petitioner argues that this Court in People v. Doronila (40 O.G. No. 15, Supp. 11, p. 231 [1941]) and
People v. Modesto (40 O.G. No. 15, Supp. 11, p. 128 [1941]) ruled that defamatory words uttered in the
heat of anger could only give rise to slight oral defamation. We disagree. An examination of the rulings
relied upon by petitioner showed that said cases were decided not by this Court but by the respondent
court. Suffice it to say that said decisions do not bind this Court. The fact that the defamatory words were
uttered by the petitioner without provocation by private respondent and taken seriously by the latter,
renders inapplicable the cases relied upon by petitioner.
"That on or about the 9th day of January, 1964, in the City of Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused moved by resentment and
hatred which he entertained against the person of one Vivencio Ruiz, and in order to put him into public
ridicule, discredit, and contempt, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and in the
presence of many persons, uttered the following defamatory words, to wit: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘LASTOG TA UKINNANATA ABOGADO RUIZ, SWAPANG, ESTAPADOR, PALTOGAK TA
UKINNANATA. 1
and other words of similar import to the great embarrassment of said Vivencio Ruiz.
Contrary to law." cralaw virtua1aw library
Both accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment (Original Record, p. 10; p. 4) and the cases were tried
jointly.
After trial, both accused were convicted in a decision of the City Court dated April 10, 1968, *** the
dispositive portion of which reads: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the
accused, Exequiel Victorio, is hereby found guilty of Grave Oral Defamation and is hereby sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6) MONTHS & ONE (1) DAY, and the accused Daniel Victorio is
hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY and to pay the costs
proportionately.
"SO ORDERED." (Original Record, p. 179).
Their motion for reconsideration and/or modification of judgment (Original Record, p. 181) filed on the
same date was denied in an order of the trial court dated September 25, 1968 (Original Record, p. 189).
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, on October 9, 1968 (Original Record, p. 201) affirmed the decision of
the trial court but modified the penalty to the indeterminate sentence of one (1) month and one (1) day of
arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum
(Resolution of August 7, 1970; Rollo, p. 19). The motion for hearing and/or reconsideration filed on
October 15, 1970 as well as their urgent motion for reconsideration filed on October 19, 1970 were
denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated October 28, 1970. Thus, this petition for review by
certiorari filed with the Court on December 18, 1970 (Rollo, p. 9).
On February 11, 1971, the Court resolved to deny the petition for insufficient showing that findings of
facts are unsupported by substantial evidence and for lack of merit (Rollo, p. 43). However, in its
Resolution of April 15, 1971, the Court, considering the grounds of the motion of petitioners for
reconsideration of the resolution of February 11, 1971, resolved to: (a) reconsider said resolution; and (b)
to give due course to the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (Rollo,
p. 56).
On October 15, 1974, counsel for petitioners-appellants filed a motion to dismiss G.R. No. L-32836
(Criminal Case No. 9469 of the City Court of Cabanatuan City and CA-G.R. No. 09243-44-CR),
manifesting that the petitioner-appellant Exequiel Victorio died on April 14, 1974 at Guimba, Nueva
Ecija where he was then residing (Rollo, p. 131). There being no objection interposed by the Solicitor
General in his comment filed with the Court on December 11, 1974, the death of petitioner-appellant
having occurred prior to the rendition of final judgment (Rollo, p. 154), the Court resolved on December
18, 1974 to dismiss L-32836-37 only insofar as appellant Exequiel Victorio is concerned (Rollo, p. 157).
The lone assignment of error (Brief for the Petitioners, p. 91), is as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE WORDS
UTTERED BY THE PETITIONERS IN CONVERSATION WITH EACH OTHER AND WHILE IN
THE HEAT OF ANGER CONSTITUTE GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION INSTEAD OF MERELY
LIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION." cralaw virtua1aw library
In effect, counsel for petitioners abandoned all the assignments of error in the Court of Appeals, confined
himself to only one, and practically admitted that the accused committed the crime charged although of a
lesser degree that of slight oral defamation — only, instead of grave oral defamation.
There is no dispute regarding the main facts that had given rise to the present case. Appellant-petitioner in
this instant appeal, does not deny that the accused, on the occasion in question, uttered the defamatory
words alleged in the information. Thus, the sole issue that the Court has to resolve is whether or not the
defamatory words constitute serious oral defamation or simply slight oral defamation.
The term oral defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as the speaking of base and
defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of
livelihood (33 Am. Jur. 39). Article 358, Revised Penal Code, spells out the demarcation line, between
serious and slight oral defamations, as follows: "Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if it is of a serious and insulting nature,
otherwise, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos." (Balite v. People, 18
SCRA 280 [1966]).
To determine whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, the Court adopted the
following guidelines: chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
". . . We are to be guided by a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamatory words will fall under one
or the other, depending upon, as Viada puts it, ‘. . . upon their sense and grammatical meaning judging
them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between
the offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time: . .
.’." (Balite v. People, Ibid., quoting Viada, Codigo Penal, Quinta edicion, page 494).
Thus, in the same case cited where scurrilous words imputed to the offended party the crime of estafa, the
Court ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The scurrilous words imputed to the offended party the crime estafa. The language of the indictment
strikes deep into the character of the victim; He ‘has sold the union’; he ‘has swindled the money of the
vendees’; he ‘received bribe money in the amount of P10,000.00 . . . and another P6,000.00’; He ‘is
engaged in racketeering and enriching himself with the capitalists’; He ‘has spent the funds of the union
for his personal use.’
"No amount of sophistry will take these statements out of the compass of grave oral defamation. They are
serious and insulting. No circumstances need to be shown to upgrade the slander. . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library
In another case where a woman of violent temper hurled offensive and scurrilous epithets including words
imputing unchastity against a respectable married lady and tending to injure the character of her young
daughters, the Court ruled that the crime committed was grave slander: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The language used by the defendant was deliberately applied by her to the complainant. The words were
uttered with evident intent to injure complainant, to ruin her reputation, and to hold her in public
contempt, for the sake of revenge. One who will thus seek to impute vice or immorality to another, the
consequences of which might gravely prejudice the reputation of the person insulted, in this instance
apparently an honorable and respectable lady and her young daughters, all prominent in social circles,
deserves little judicial sympathy. Certainly, it is time for the courts to put the stamp of their disapproval
on this practice of vile and loud slander." (U.S. v. Tolosa, 37 Phil. 166 [1917]).
In a case where the accused, a priest, called the offended party a gangster, in the middle of a sermon, the
court affirmed the conviction of the accused for slight slander (People v. Arcand, 68 Phil. 601 [1939]).
There was no imputation of a crime nor a vice or immorality in said case. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In the instant case, appellant-petitioner admitted having uttered the defamatory words against Atty.
Vivencio Ruiz. Among others, he called Atty. Ruiz, "estapador", which attributes to the latter the crime of
estafa, a serious and insulting imputation. As stated by the Court in Balite v. People, supra, "no amount of
sophistry will take these statements out of the compass of grave oral defamation . . . . No circumstances
need to be shown to upgrade the slander." cralaw virtua1aw library
Defamatory words uttered specifically against a lawyer when touching on his profession are libelous per
se. Thus, in Kleeberg v. Sipser (191 NY 845 [1934]), it was held that "where statements concerning
plaintiff in his professional capacity as attorney are susceptible, in their ordinary meaning, of such
construction as would tend to injure him in that capacity, they are libelous per se and (the) complaint,
even in the absence of allegation of special damage, states cause of action." Oral statements that a certain
lawyer is ‘unethical,’ or a false charge, dealing with office, trade, occupation, business or profession of a
person charged, are ‘slanderous per se.’ (Kraushaar v. La Vin, 42 N.Y.S. 2d 857 [1943]; Mains v.
Whiting, 49 NW 559 [1891]; Greenburg v. De Salvo, 216 So. 2d 638 [1968]).
In Pollard v. Lyon (91 U.S. 225 [1876]), the court there had occasion to divide oral slander, as a cause of
action, into several classes, as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(1) Words falsely spoken of a person which impute to the party the commission of some criminal offense
involving moral turpitude for which the party, if the charge is true, may be indicted and punished;
"(2) Words falsely spoken of a person which impute that the party is infected with some contagious
disease, where, if the charge is true, it would exclude the party from society;
"(3) Defamatory words falsely spoken of a person which impute to the party unfitness to perform the
duties of an office or employment, or the want of integrity in the discharge of the duties of such office or
employment;
"(4) Defamatory words falsely spoken of a party which prejudice such party in his or her profession or
trade; and
"(5) Defamatory words falsely spoken of a person, which, though not in themselves actionable, occasion
the party special damage." cralaw virtua1aw library
In the instant case, appellant-petitioner imputed the crime of estafa against a prominent lawyer — one
time Justice of the Peace and member of the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, a professor of law and for
sometime a president of the Nueva Ecija Bar Association. As the scurrilous imputation strikes deep into
the character of the victim, no special circumstance need be shown for the defamatory words uttered to be
considered grave oral defamation (Balite v. People, supra). In addition, the fact that the offended party is
a lawyer, the totality of such words as "kayabang", "tunaw ang utak", "swapang at estapador", imputed
against him has the import of charging him with dishonesty or improper practice in the performance of his
duties, hence, actionable per se.
Petitioner argues that this Court in People v. Doronila (40 O.G. No. 15, Supp. 11, p. 231 [1941]) and
People v. Modesto (40 O.G. No. 15, Supp. 11, p. 128 [1941]) ruled that defamatory words uttered in the
heat of anger could only give rise to slight oral defamation (Rollo, p. 13).
We disagree.
An examination of the rulings relied upon by petitioner showed that said cases were decided not by this
Court but by the respondent court. Suffice it to say that said decisions do not bind this Court.
chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Nevertheless, the cases adverted to by petitioner would not in any manner help his cause. As pointed out
by the Solicitor General, there was no reason for the petitioner to be angry at the offended party who was
merely performing his duties as a lawyer in defense of his client. Petitioner’s anger was not lawfully
caused. (Brief for the Appellee, p. 7). The fact that the defamatory words were uttered by the petitioner
without provocation by private respondent and taken seriously by the latter, renders inapplicable the cases
relied upon by petitioner.
As a matter of fact, the scurrilous remarks were found by the respondent court to have been uttered in a
loud voice, in the presence of at least ten (10) persons, taken seriously by the offended party and without
provocation on his part.
