CHARITA CHAN VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts

 On Agust 10, 2016 two information were filed against Charita M. Chan for violation of
section 3(j) of RA 3019
 As for the first information, it was alleged that Chan granted a mayor’s permit for the
operation of Batbangan Gallera cockpit infavor of Nicomedes Alde, who is not entitled for
the said permit being a public official which is prohibited under RA7160
 The second information alleges Chan’s issuance of permit to a person not legally entitled to
such license and that holding of cockfights every Saturday is prohibited by law particularly
PD 449 and Municipal Ordinance number 281.
 A warrant of arrest was issued to Chan who posted bail for temporary liberty. During
arraignment she pleaded not guilty
 The prosecution presented 3 witnesses namely Balboa, Pulma and Rondina
 The defense presented no evidence and witnesses. However, Chan argued in her
memorandum that the prosecution failed to established sufficient evidence to hold her
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the offense charged.
 The Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioner for violation of RA3019. Aggrieved she filed a
petition for Review on Certiorari assailing that the prosecution failed to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue:

W/N the prosecution proves the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:

Yes, the prosecution was able to prove Chan’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating section 3(j
) RA 3019.

SECTION 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or

omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or

benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such
license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of

one who is not so qualified or entitled.

The prosecution
proved each element of Section 3G) of RA 3019 which are as follows: (1) that
the offender is a public officer; (2) that he/she knowingly approved or granted
any license, permit, privilege or benefit; and (3) that the license, permit,
privilege or benefit was granted in favor of any person not qualified or not
legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or in favor of a
mere representative or dummy of one who is not qualified or entitled.

In the case at bar, it was undisputed, even stipulated and

admitted that Chan was the incumbent Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte at the time
material to this controversy. In order to promote efficiency of the proceedings,
the parties enter into stipulations of fact and admissions during pre-trial. This facilitates the entire
proceedings because it has been a long-standing principle
that admissions require no proof. At
this juncture, the prosecution established the first element through the
stipulation of facts and admission.

The second element of the crime provides that the public officer knowingly
approved or granted a permit. Evident from the wordings of the Mayor's Permit is the grant in favor
of
the Liga ng mga Barangay to hold cockfights during Saturdays. The existence
of a Mayor's Permit in favor of the Liga ng mga Barangay points to Chan's
culpability such that she knowingly approved or granted a permit satisfying the
second element ofthe offense.

The last element was also established. The permit was granted in favor of
those not qualified or legally entitled thereto. The Liga ng mga Barangay,
whose members were barangay officials are not qualified to such grant pursuant to the prohibition
set forth by Section 89(a)(2)58 RA 716059 or the Local
Government Code of 1991.
People of the Philippines vs Fandialan

FACTS:

 Joel Fandialan, accused-appellant was charged with violation of Sections

5 and
11, Article II of RA 9165.
 POI Lubrin testified that around 9:30
p.m. of 10 November 2015, he and PO2 Francis Caparas (PO2
Caparas) were on duty at Bay Municipal Police Station, Bay, Laguna
when their confidential informant (CI) came to their office and reported that he would
be buying shabu
from Fandialan alias "Pusa" that night. PO1 Lubrin claimed they
relayed the information to Police Chief Inspector Owen Banaag (PCI
Banaag) who immediately formed a buy-bust team to entrap
Fandialan.
 POI Lubrin claimed that
Fandialan agreed to meet the CI that night. Upon arrival of Fandialan they were
introduced by the CI as a user who
would like to buy shabu. He handed the
buy-bust money to Fandialan who, in tum, handed over a small plastic
sachet of suspected shabu. PO I Lubrin alleged that he immediately
grabbed Fandialan's arm then introduced himself as a police officer
and that PO2 Caparas immediately rushed to assist hini. POI Lubrin
claimed that after apprehending Fandalian, PO2 Caparas was able to
recover the marked buy-bust money from Fandialan.
 POI Lubrin claimed that he then ordered Fandialan to take out
all other things he was keeping and in the process, a "Mentos" candy
container was recovered from Fandialan. PO1 Lubrin alleged that he
opened the candy container and saw the three small plastic sachets of
suspected shabu.
 The RTC found accused appellant guilty of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA
9165. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused-appellant

is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article
II of RA 9165.
RULING:

No,

The elements of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs under Section 5,

Article II of RA 9165 are: "(a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment." 13 Meanwhile, the elements of Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 are: "(a) the
accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited
drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
For a successful prosecution of the offenses of Illegal Sale and/or
Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must establish with
moral certainty not only the elements mentioned above but also the
identity of the dangerous drug, which in itself constitutes an integral part
of the corpus delicti of the offenses. 15 Hence, the prosecution must be
able to account for each link in the chain of custody from the moment
the dangerous drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as
evidence of the offense.
In the chain of custody of the confiscated item, the links that
should be established are the following: (1) the seizure and marking of
the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;
(2) the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to
the investigating officer; (3) the turnover by the investigating officer of
the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and
(4) the turnover and submission of the illegal drug from the forensic
chemist to the court.
In this case, the Court finds that there was a gap or break in the
fourth link of the chain of custody. "It has been held that there is a gap or
break in the fourth link of the chain of custody where there is absence of
evidence to show how the seized shabu was handled, stored, and
safeguarded pending its presentation in court."
The testimony of forensic chemist Bombasi is not sufficient to establish the
fourth link of the
chain as nothing was mentioned regarding the following necessary
pieces of information: (1) condition of the specimens when FC Bombasi
received them; (2) description of the method utilized in analyzing the
chemical composition of the drug samples; (3) whether she resealed the
specimens after examination of the content and placed her own marking
on the drug items; and (4) manner of handling and storage of the
specimens before, during, and after the chemical examination. There was
likewise no showing that she took precautionary measures after
examination of the seized drug items to preserve their integrity and
evidentiary value
The prosecution's failure to establish with moral certainty the
identity and the unbroken chain of custody of the dangerous drugs
allegedly seized from accused-appellant creates reasonable doubt on
whether the said illegal drugs were the same drugs presented in court.
This undoubtedly compromises the identity, integrity, and evidentiary
value of the corpus delicti of the offenses charged. Hence, acquittal is in
order
People of the phils vs JUMARANG
FACTS:
 On April 27, 2010, an Information was filed against Jumarang for the violating
Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
 PO2 Tanay and PO2 Buena were conducting surveillance outside the house of
Jumarang because of the tip they received from someone. They were positioned
around 10 meters away. From where they were standing, they could see a man, later
on
identified as Jumarang, tending to some plants at the roof of the house. Not
long after, the man, holding a three-foot tall potted plant with '"five finger
leaves," started descending the roof
 Suspecting that Jumarang was bringing the plant inside his house, the
two police officers called out to him and rushed inside the compound. They
instructed Jumarang to put the plant down so they could closely examine it.
Jumarang complied while asserting that it was a medicinal plant. They also
asked Jumarang if they could go inside the house. Jumarang relented and
allowed PO2 Tanay and PO2 Buena inside the house.
 When PO2 Tanay and PO2 Buena went up the roof, they found two
other pots ofwhat they identified as marijuana plants. They decided to bring
Jumarang and the plants to the police station.
 The next day, the plants were brought to
Camp Simeon Ola for scientific examination. The tests conducted by Police
Senior Inspector Wilfredo I. Pabustan, Jr., a forensic chemist, confirmed that
these were marijuana plants.
 The RTC convicted him of the crime charged and it was affirmed by the CA upon
appeal.

ISSUE:
I. Whether the marijuana plants seized from accused-appellant is
admissible in evidence to prove his guilt for the crime of
violation of Section 16, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
 II. Whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of accused appellant beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of Section 16, Article II of R.A. No.
9165.

RULING:
I. NO
Section 2, Article III ofthe 1987 Constitution mandates that search and
seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant
predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which, such search
and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the said
constitutional provision.
However, there are instances when a warrantless search is valid. The
following are recognized instances of permissible warrantless searches: (1) a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) search of evidence in plain
view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless searches; (5)
customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency
circumstances.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there must
first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be
reversed. 22 Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a warrantless
arrest may be made under the following circumstances:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a

private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
In warrantless arrest made pursuant to Section 5(a), two elements must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that
he has just committed, actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
In an arrest made in flagrante delicto, it is required that the
apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause to arrest a
person caught. Probable cause refers to "such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent [person] to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested

In the case at bar, when the police officers saw accused-appellant, he

was simply going downstairs while holding a potted plant. Accused-appellant
was, at this moment, not committing a crime and it was not even shown that
he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending from the stairs, and there was no outward indication that called for
his arrest.

II. No
It bears emphasizing that the failure of accused-appellant to timely
object to the illegality of his arrest does not preclude him from questioning
the admissibility of the evidence seized. "The inadmissibility of the evidence
is not affected when an accused fails to question the court's jurisdiction over
their person in a timely manner. Jurisdiction over the person of an accused and
the constitutional inadmissibility of evidence are separate and mutually
exclusive consequences of an illegal arrest.
This Court has held that the consent to a warrantless search and seizure
must be "unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and unattended by duress
or coercion. Mere passive conformity to the warrantless search is only an
implied acquiescence which does not amount to consent and that the presence
of a coercive environment negates the claim that [accused-appellant] therein
consented to the warrantless search."
Accordingly, there being no valid warrantless search under a search
incidental to a lawful arrest and a valid consented search, the marijuana plants
seized from accused-appellant are rendered inadmissible in evidence for being
the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. As the seized marijuana plants are
the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, accused-appellant must be
acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS GELACIO

FACTS:

 Gelacio, the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of

the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) was
charged of violating Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and Sec. 7(d) of R.A. No.
6713 for allegedly soliciting and
accepting, on separate occasions, the aggregate amount of Pl20,000.00 and
a whole tuna fish in consideration for his issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) relative to a case pending
before him.
 The prosecution presented four witnesses: (1) Lorna Nietes Garte the
Supervising Agrarian Reform Program Officer, who proved the existence of
the Complaint in the DARAB case and the issuance of the TRO and WPI in
the said case; (2) Atty. Landero, who positively testified on the delivery of the
Tuna fish that was requested by the accused-appellant; (3) Herminigilda
Garbo,
the wife of private complainant and a co-complainant in the DARAB case, who
directly saw the giving of money of the private complainant to the accused-
appellent in his office;
and (4) Dominador Egagamao, a co-complainant in the DARAB case, who
testified that he contributed his money to come up with the amounts
demanded by accused-appellant in exchange for the issuance ofthe TRO and
WPI in the DARAB case.
 Accused-appellant denied all the charges against him, stating that
private complainant had filed a disbarment case against him before this
Court, which was dismissed for being inconclusive and unreliable. Bebiano
also testified that it was true that their group held meetings and contributed
money, but he claimed that it was given to Atty. Landero, their lawyer in the
DARAB case. Lastly, Atty. Lechonsito testified that he assisted private
complainant in drafting an affidavit of retraction of his accusations against
accused-appellant, which he filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman).
 The Sandiganbayan found
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
 ISSUES:
I. WHETHER OR Not HEARSAY EVIDENCE
Is admissible in court and whether or not the evidence presented by the
prosecution was hearsay evidence
II. WHETHER OR Not THE
PROSECUTION HAD COME TO COURT WITH
UNCLEAN HANDS, HAVING PROSECUTED
ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO THE EXCLUSION OF
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AND HIS WITNESSES

RULING:
I. NO
It is a basic rule
in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts that are of his own
personal knowledge, i.e., those which are derived from his own perception.
Hence, a witness may not testify on what he merely learned, read or heard
from others because such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be
received as proof of the truth of what he has learned, read or heard. Thus,
the general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible.

In the present case, the Sandiganbayan, in its decision, outlined the

testimonies which it did not consider being hearsay evidence. Nevertheless,
even if these hearsay testimonies were set aside, the remaining pieces of
evidence would still be sufficient to establish the guilt of accused-appellant
for the crimes charged beyond reasonable doubt. Notably, most of the
testimonies of Atty. Landero and Herminigilda
were all drawn from their own personal knowledge. Atty. Landero was the
one who called accused-appellant directly and delivered the fish to him
personally.
Meanwhile, Herminigilda had accompanied her husband to see
accused-appellant and was the one who carried the money for safekeeping
before handing it over to accused-appellant's assistant. She also witnessed
private complainant handing another sum of money to accused-appellant.60
These testimonies were all taken from their own perception, the parties

II. NO
It is understood that
the legal doctrine is a maxim of equity upon which: (1) he who seeks 6quity
must do equity, and (2) he who comes into equity must come with clean
hands. The general principle is that he who comes into equity must come
with clean hands applies only to plaintiff's conduct in relation to the very
 matter in litigation. The judicial process is sacred and is meant to ptotect
only those who are innocent. It would certainly be unwarranted to allow
accused-appellant, who solicited money for the release of the provisional
reliefs, to escape criminal liability simply because of this legal mhxim.
Equity does not apply to a situation when fraud and dilatory schemes exist.

SAGRIT VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILS

FACTS:
 On August 16, 2011 at around 7:30pm, Leo and his wife were heading home
onboard their motorcycle when suddenly Cesar and his son Charles armed
with fan knife and gun blocked their way.
  Leo fled towards his father’s house where Charles followed yelling and
pointing his gun to people.
 Leonardo, leo’s father tried to pacify Charles but Cesar arrived and stabbed
Leonardo in the chest.
 Leonardo ran towards Leo’s house Cesar pursued him with a fan knife.
 At that instance, Leo followed Cesar and when the latter tried to stab him he
got hold of a bolo and hacked Cesar’s right hand.
 Cesar dropped the fan knife but manage to picked it up, leo stabbed him
again in his stomach which cause Cesar’s death.
 Leo surrendered himself to the authorities he was charged with Homicide
before RTC
 Leo pleaded not guilty. He contended that he acted in self-defense and
defense of stranger
 The RTC convicted Leo and it was affirmed by the CA upon appeal. He
sought reconsideration but it was also denied

ISSUE:
Whether or not Leo failed to prove reasonable necessity of the means employed to
repel the unlawful aggression.

RULING:
no
The admission of self defense and defense of relative frees the prosecution from the
burden of proving that the accused committed the crime. The burden is shifted to the
accused to prove that their act is justified. This justifying circumstances must be
clearly established through convincing evidence. They cannot be appreciated if
uncorroborated by competent evidence or is patently doubtful.
In self defense the following elements must concur: 1. Unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim; 2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel such aggression; 3 lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
resorting to self defense. In defense of relative, the accused likewise needs to
established the first two requisites of self defense. In lieu of the third requirement,
however, the accused must prove that “ incase the provocation was given by the
person attacked, that the one making the defense had no part therein”.
Here, it is undisputed that the first and third requisites of self defense and defense of
a relative are present.
TAN VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILS

FACTS:
 Petitioner Albert K.S. Tan II (Tan), president of AT Intergrouppe Inc. applied
for a loan with the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to finance its purchase of materials and
equipment which would form part of an automotive painting and finishing
system to be exported to Indonesia.
 DBP approved an omnibus credit facility in favor of ATII in the total amount of
P260,500,000.00, secured by a real estate mortgage over a property located
in Parafiaque City.
 DBP accordingly issued Domestic Letters of Credit, which were used by ATII
to pay its suppliers for the materials it needed for the automotive system. ATII,
represented by Tan, also executed three (3) trust receipts in favor of DBP
covering the materials to be purchased.
 The items subject of the trust receipts were delivered to ATII. 11 ATII
subsequently defaulted on the payment of its loan, and despite repeated
demands by DBP, ATII failed to either pay the loan or tum over the items
subject of the trust receipts to DBP
 DBP filed a criminal complaint against Tan and the other officers of
 ATII for three (3) counts of Estafa under Article 315 of the RPC, before the
Makati City Prosecutor's Office (OCP Makati). However, the complaint was
dismissed because the OCP Makati found ATII' s liability to DBP to be only
civil in nature. DBP filed a Petition for Review with the DOJ praying that the
criminal complaint be reinstated. The DOJ initially affirmed the findings of the
OCP Makati, but subsequently reversed itself and granted DBP' s Motion for
Reconsideration.
 An lnformation against Tan was filed before and raffled to the RTC of Makati
City, Branch 143
  Tan filed a Motion to Dismiss praying that the Information against him be
quashed because his right to speedy disposition of cases was violated, and
that the transaction between ATII and DBP was a simple loan transaction
which is not criminal in nature.
 Tan was arraigned, at which he refused to enter a plea, and a plea of "not
guilty" was entered for him. The prosecution was given ten (10) days to file a
Comment on Tan's Motion to Dismiss
 the RTC issued a Resolution granting Tan's Motion to Dismiss.
 DBP, with the conformity of the public prosecutor, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration questioning the dismissal of the case. Later, on October
28,2014, DBP filed an Amended Motion for Reconsideration with Urgent
Motion to Inhibit Presiding Judge (Amended Motion). In a Resolution29 dated
March 2, 2015, the RTC denied DBP's motions.
 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed with the CA a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari which was granted on
November 3, 2015
 The CA reversed the RTC's Resolutions dated October 7, 2014 and March 2,
2015

ISSUE:
I. Whether there was a long and oppressive delay in the resolution of the
preliminary investigation which violated Tan's right to speedy disposition of
cases;
II. Whether double jeopardy had already set in in favor of Tan;
III. Whether the CA erred in declaring that the RTC should have granted the
prosecution's Motion to Inhibit;
IV. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted the
OSG's Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari.
RULING:
I. No. Tan failed to establish a violation of his right to speedy disposition of
cases

In the case of Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, 5th Division, Quezon City, et

al. ( Cagang), the Court cautioned that inordinate delay in the termination
of a preliminary investigation which would result in a dismissal of the case
against the accused is not determined through "mere mathematical
reckoning but through the examination of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case."

Relevant to this case are Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court which set time limits for the conduct of the various stages in the
preliminary investigation process.

In this case, Tan's allegations and the records of this case, vis-a-vis
 the time periods prescribed in Rule 112, are insufficient to support a
finding
that there was a violation of Tan's right to speedy disposition of cases. Tan
counts the supposed six (6)-year delay from the filing of the Complaint
Affidavit until the final resolution by the DOJ on the appeal from the OCP
Makati's resolution. This is precisely the "mathematical reckoning"
adverted
to in Cagang. The six-year period Tan complains of does not take into
consideration the time periods allowed to the parties for filing their
respective pleadings, such as the respondent's Counter-Affidavit as
required
by Section 3 of Rule 112, While enveloped within the entire process of
preliminary investigation, such periods of time set in favor of the parties
should not be taken against the OCP Makati nor the DOJ.

II. No. Double jeopardy had not set in

The proscription against double jeopardy to operate the following
requisites must be present: (1) a valid indictment, (2) before a court of
competent
jurisdiction, (3) the arraignment of the accused, (4) a valid plea entered by
him, and (5) the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or
termination of the case against him without his express consent.

In Tan's case, the fifth requisite is lacking. It is clear that he was

neither convicted nor acquitted by the trial court, since the criminal case
against him was not concluded in a full-blown trial. Neither was the case
dismissed or terminated without his express consent. On the contrary, it
was
dismissed upon his instance, through his Motion to Dismiss. Hence,
double
jeopardy does not attach.

The Court is not unaware of the rule that double jeopardy attaches
even if the dismissal of the case was upon the accused's own motion,
when
the dismissal is based upon insufficiency of evidence or violation of the
right to speedy disposition of cases. 51 The reason for this, however, is
that such
dismissals operate as acquittals based on the merits. In contrast, the
dismissal of the case against Tan was the RTC's baseless interpretation of
PD 115, without an analysis of the sufficiency of the prosecution's
evidence.
III. Yes.
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Disqualification ofjudges. - No judge or judicial officer

shall sit in any case in which he[/she], or his[/her] wife[/husband] or child,
is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which
he[/she] is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity
or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to
the rules of the civil law, or in which he[/she] has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he[/sheJ has
presided in any inferior court when his[/her] ruling or decision is the
subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his[/her] sound discretion,

disqualify himself[/herself] from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other than those mentioned above.
Two kinds of inhibition are contemplated by the above provision. The
first paragraph refers to compulsory inhibition, while the second paragraph
refers to voluntary inhibition. The first paragraph effectively disqualifies a
judge from hearing a case where any of the instances enumerated is
present. On the other hand, the second paragraph explicitly submits the
disqualification to the judge's exercise of his or her sound discretion. In this
case, considering that none of the grounds in the first paragraph were
alleged, the RTC judge in this case was being asked to inhibit on the basis
of the second paragraph

Here, the outright dismissal of the criminal case against Tan was
indeed gravely erroneous. However, the dismissal was through the grant
of a Motion to Dismiss filed by Tan, a relief recognized and made available
to
the accused under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, it was
never
alleged, and it does not appear in the records, that the judge's dismissal of
the case against Tan was due to his own interest in the outcome of the
case
or was based on extraneous information obtained outside of judicial
proceedings. In other words, there is not enough evidence to conclude that
the RTC judge was clearly biased or prejudiced against the prosecution
and
should have inhibited himself from resolving the case

IV. No. The CA did not err in granting the OSG's Motion for Extension of Time
to File Petition for Certiorari
Indeed, as amended, Section 4 of Rule 65 requires that petitions for
certiorari shall be strictly filed within sixty (60) days from notice of
judgment or order denying a motion for reconsideration. However, the
Court
has already explained that the amendment of Section 4 of Rule 65 does
not
operate to prohibit any and all extensions of time to file a petition for
certiorari without regard to the particularities of each case.

The CA, in granting the OSG's motion for time, observed that: (a) the
language of PD 115 and decided cases67 involving violations thereof
acknowledge that failure to comply with the terms and conditions of trust
receipts involves public interest; and (b) no significant prejudice to the
substantive rights of the litigants would be caused by granting a fifteen
(15)-
day extension to the OSG, as prayed for. The Court agrees with these
observations and finds that there was enough basis for the CA to grant an
extension oftime for the OSG to file its Petition for Certiorari.