Sample Forensic Audit Report
Sample Forensic Audit Report
Prepared by:
SLI Compliance®
4720 Independence St.
Wheat Ridge, CO
80033
(303) 422-1566
www.SLICompliance.com
Revision History
Trademarks: All products and company names are used for identification purposes only and may be
trademarks of their respective owners.
Disclaimer
The observations and conclusions reported herein must not be used by the client to claim
product certification, approval, or endorsement by NVLAP, NIST, or any agency of the Federal
Government. Results herein relate only to the items evaluated.
All evaluation conducted for this engagement has been done outside of the U.S. Election Assistance
Commission's (EAC) Test and Certification Program. In no way does this report represent an EAC
certification against the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) or any other standard.
The audit activities referenced in this document were performed in a controlled environment using
specific systems and data sets, and results are related to the specific items evaluated. Actual results in
other environments may vary.
Contents
1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 4
2 Process ........................................................................................................................... 6
3 Examination .................................................................................................................... 7
4 Audit Findings Determinations ................................................................................... 11
5 Summary Findings ....................................................................................................... 17
1 Introduction
SLI Compliance is submitting this report as a summary of forensic auditing efforts, solicited
by Maricopa County Elections Department. The forensic audit conducted consisted of an
analysis and review of the voting system equipment used in the November 3rd, 2020
presidential election and records from that election, to extract facts about the use of the
Dominion Voting Systems Democracy Suite 5.5B voting system.
The Maricopa County forensic audit was conducted on the Dominion Democracy Suite (DS)
5.5B system and included examination of the following items per direction given by
Maricopa County Elections Department:
• 100% (9) of the County’s central count tabulators (ICC) (4 Hi-Pro high-speed
scanners and 5 Cannon high-speed scanners), which are used for processing large
quantities of ballots.
• 100% (4) workstations and (2) servers used to operate the election management
system (EMS), which includes pre-election functions for creating the election
definition for the specified election, as well as post-election activities including
accumulating, tallying and reporting election results.
• 10% sample (35) of the County’s 350 precinct-based tabulators (ICP2s) that were
utilized in the election, at the polling centers.
• 20% sample (4) of 20 adjudication stations, which allow ballots with exceptions or
outstack conditions such as over-votes, blank ballots, write-ins and marginal marks,
to be resolved.
This effort included verification of the following items:
1. Verifying that the software installed on the tabulation equipment is the same as the
software certified by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission and the Arizona
Secretary of State.
This item is applicable to ICP2 (precinct scanner), EMS (election management
system – workstations and servers), ICC (central count system) and Adjudicator
(ballot resolver).
2. Verifying that no malicious software is running on the component.
This item is applicable to ICP2 (precinct scanner), EMS (election management
system – workstations and servers), ICC (central count system) and Adjudicator
(ballot resolver).
3. Verifying that the components are not connected to the internet and that they have
not been connected to the internet during the period of July 6, 2020 through
November 20, 2020.
Below is a listing of when each item above was completed for each relevant
component.
For Item #1, verifying component hashes against EAC generated hashes:
• Item #1 was complete for ICP on Day 1
• Item #1 was complete for EMS workstations on Day 3
• Item #1 was complete for EMS servers on Day 5
• Item #1 was complete for ICC on Day 3
• Item #1 was complete for Adjudicator on Day 3
For Item #2, verifying that no malicious software is running on the
component:
• Item #2 was complete for ICP on Day 3
• Item #2 was complete for EMS workstations on Day 4
• Item #2 was complete for EMS servers on Day 4
• Item #2 was complete for ICC on Day 5
• Item #2 was complete for Adjudicator on Day 4
For Item #3, verifying components are not connected to the internet:
• Item #3 was complete for ICP on Day 3
• Item #3 was complete for EMS workstations on Day 4
• Item #3 was complete for EMS servers on Day 5
• Item #3 was complete for ICC on Day 5
• Item #3 was complete for Adjudicator on Day 4
For Item #4, verifying physical audit of the ICP component:
• Item #4 was complete for ICP on Day 1
2 Process
SLI Compliance conducted the forensic audit in a way that maximized efficiencies in
examining the election artifacts.
The process included creation of raw disk images that allowed the examiners to audit and
analyze the systems without the risk of changing the original system environments. Once the
system media was imaged using a bit-to-bit copy of each item of system media, the examiners
were able to mount and use forensic tools to inspect the systems for indicators of internet
connectivity, as well as indicators of malicious or unauthorized software present on the
systems.
Due to the County’s strict policies regarding maintenance of the election infrastructure air gap,
where election related devices are not allowed to be connected to non-election devices, SLI
Compliance had to demonstrate the ability to prevent write back to any election media or
resources. To fulfill this requirement, SLI Compliance utilized the WriteProtect™-BAY
technology to prevent contamination of any of the election media during the forensic audit.
The WriteProtect™-BAY technology provides read-only, write blocking technology at a
hardware layer, preventing inadvertent modification of election media during the audit. The
WriteProtect™-BAY provides multiple write protected ports that allow for a wide variety of
storage media to be connected in a read only write protected manner.
Examination for Item #2, checking for malicious software, included usage of
• ClamWin Antivirus checks for software threats including viruses and spyware
(utilizing engine version 0.99.4)
• Malwarebytes protection against software threats like viruses, malware, and spyware
(utilizing component package version 1.0.1157, update package version 1.0.1157)
• Microsoft Defender Antivirus protection against software threats like viruses,
malware, and spyware (utilizing security intelligence version 1.331.708.0)
• ESET Endpoint Antivirus protection against software threats including malware,
viruses, worms and spyware (ESET Antivirus 7.3.2044.0)
• OSForensics, a digital examination tool that extracts data, including hidden data,
from a PC
• Manual review utilizing a malicious software review checklist
• For the EMS servers, due to their configuration, a different antivirus, Avast, was
utilized for examination
3 Examination
This section details the proceedings of the examination, as conducted onsite at the
Maricopa County Elections Department facilities.
Day 1
• Out of a pool of 315 available ICP2 precinct scanners (35 had been examined in a
previous audit), SLI Compliance examined each and selected 35 ICP2s, based, in
part, on any anomalies noticed on devices. This included missing labels or seals.
Note: Due to defective batteries that would not attain the 10% minimal charge
Report Number MCA-21001-AR-01 Page 7 of 18
Template Rev 2015-06, Doc Rev 01
Dominion Voting Systems
Democracy Suite 5.5B
Maricopa County Forensic Audit Report
needed to operate the device, five of the ICP2s originally selected would not power
up, so they were replaced by five other ICP2s.
• Out of a pool 16 available Adjudication workstations (4 had been examined in a
previous audit), SLI Compliance selected 4 Adjudication workstations.
• SLI Compliance auditors then recorded serial numbers of each of the 35 ICP2s, 4
adjudication workstations, all 9 of Maricopa County’s ICC central count stations and
all 4 Maricopa County EMS workstations, and 2 EMS servers. All labels and seals
which had an associated serial number were recorded as well.
• To capture a full data set of the environments being examined, and to prevent
contamination of the environments, SLI Compliance performed cloning operations on
all workstations and all Administrator SD cards collected from the ICP2 devices.
• Dominion voting system files were extracted from the 35 ICP2s to validate against
EAC generated hash codes, which are used to validate that each file’s content has
not been modified.
• The files were then hashed and compared to the EAC generated hash codes and
verified to match. This verified Item #1 for the 35 evaluated ICP2 components.
• Cloning of the 4 Adjudicator workstations was initiated and completed.
• Cloning of the 9 ICC workstations was initiated.
• Physical audit of 5 ICP2s was conducted to verify no unexpected hardware was
resident within the device. This verified Item #4 for the ICP2 components.
• The ICP2 contains an internal SD card that contains all information resident on the
ICP2. That card was removed and examined to verify that no unexpected or
malicious items were resident. Contents were also compared to artifacts that were
extracted earlier as part of the Dominion file extraction process. All artifacts matched
as expected.
Day 2
• Cloning of the 9 ICC workstations was completed.
• It was determined that the audit log (needed for review for determination of any
connections to the internet) was resident on both the Administrator SD card and the
Pollworker SD card. As the Pollworker card is the card pulled during election
activities for results determinations, SLI Compliance auditors utilized the
Administrator SD card. These cards were pulled and cloned, and then the audit log
was obtained.
o Note that six of the sampled ICP2 devices did not have SD cards. Maricopa
County personnel informed the auditors that when a device needs to be
replaced, the cards are pulled and utilized in the replacement device.
Documentation was provided by the County for five of the ICP2 devices as
Report Number MCA-21001-AR-01 Page 8 of 18
Template Rev 2015-06, Doc Rev 01
Dominion Voting Systems
Democracy Suite 5.5B
Maricopa County Forensic Audit Report
being replaced in the field. These devices were replaced due to tabulators not
powering on, or needing to be replaced due to ball point pens being used
which smeared the mylar screen on the scanner. The County indicated that
the sixth device was prepared as a spare unit, but was never utilized in the
election, and thus never had SD cards inserted.
• Review of ICP2 logs for any internet connections was initiated.
• Review of ICP2 files for any unknown/malicious software was initiated.
• Review of Adjudicator workstation logs for any internet connections was initiated.
• Review of Adjudicator workstation files for any unknown/malicious software was
initiated.
Day 3
• Dominion voting system files were extracted from the four Adjudicator workstation
cloned images to validate against EAC generated hash codes, which are used to
validate that each file’s content has not been modified.
• The Adjudicator workstation files were then hashed and compared to the EAC
generated hash codes and verified to match. This verified Item #1 for the 4 evaluated
Adjudicator workstation components.
• Dominion voting system files were extracted from the nine ICC workstation cloned
images to validate against EAC generated hash codes, which are used to validate
that a files content has not been modified.
• The ICC workstation files were then hashed and compared to the EAC generated
hash codes and verified to match. This verified Item #1 for the 4 evaluated ICC
workstation components.
• Review of ICP2 files for any unknown/malicious software was completed. This
verified Item #2 for the ICP2 components.
• Review of ICP2 logs for any internet connections was completed. This verified Item
#3 for the ICP2 components.
• Dominion voting system files were extracted from the four EMS workstation cloned
images to validate against EAC generated hash codes, which are used to validate
that each file’s content has not been modified.
• The EMS workstation files were then hashed and compared to the EAC generated
hash codes and verified to match. This verified Item #1 for the 4 evaluated EMS
workstation components.
Day 4
• Review of EMS files for any unknown/malicious software was completed. This
verified Item #2 for the EMS workstation components.
• Review of EMS logs for any internet connections was completed. This verified Item
#3 for the EMS workstation components.
• Dominion voting system files were extracted from the two EMS servers to validate
against EAC generated hash codes, which are used to validate that each file’s
content has not been modified.
• The EMS server files were then hashed and compared to the EAC generated hash
codes and verified to match. This verified Item #1 for the 2 evaluated EMS server
components.
• Review of Adjudicator files for any unknown/malicious software was completed. This
verified Item #2 for the Adjudicator components.
• Review of Adjudicator logs for any internet connections was completed. This verified
Item #3 for the Adjudicator components.
Day 5
• Review of EMS server files for any unknown/malicious software was completed. This
verified Item #2 for the EMS server components.
• Review of EMS server logs for any internet connections was completed. This verified
Item #3 for the EMS server components.
• Review of ICC files for any unknown/malicious software was completed. This verified
Item #2 for the ICC components.
• Review of ICC logs for any internet connections was completed. This verified Item #3
for the ICC components.
clean snapshot of the ICC client systems examined. It should be noted that additional hardware
was required to process and image M.2 NVMe drive technology. All ICC systems were
successfully imaged using the WriteProtect™-BAY technology.
2) Inspection of the system file system and installed programs: installed programs,
autorun commands, shellbag entries, Windows userassist, download history, and USB
history.
3) Inspection of the system audit logs. Includes Windows event logs, browser history,
search terms, website logins, Windows timeline events, and host system antivirus logs.
On the two servers, Avast antivirus was utilized, as well OSForensics, a digital forensics tool,
to examine the contents of each component. The examination of the EMS servers was
performed manually, and all information for the EMS servers was pulled manually, for export
and examination with the OSForensics tool on a separate system.
No instance of malicious software was found on any of the devices.
2) Inspection of the system file system and installed programs: installed programs,
autorun commands, shellbag entries, Windows userassist, download history, and USB
history.
3) Inspection of the system audit logs. Includes Windows event logs, browser history,
search terms, website logins, Windows timeline events, and host system antivirus logs.
No instance of malicious software was found on any of the devices.
Item #3: Verifying that the components are not connected to the internet and that they
have not been connected to the internet during the period of July 6, 2020 through
November 20, 2020.
1) Inspection of the system registry. This included items such as Windows ‘Run’ entries,
most recently used programs, recent documents, and Windows Explorer last visit.
2) Inspection of the system file system and installed programs: installed programs,
autorun commands, shellbag entries, Windows userassist, and download history.
3) Inspection of the system audit logs; includes Windows event logs, browser history,
search terms, website logins, and Windows timeline events.
4) USB history, to determine if there were any unauthorized wireless or USB ethernet
devices plugged in and to determine if the systems were connected to an unauthorized
network connection via a USB device.
One ICC had a log entry of a connection attempt, with no corresponding DNS failure message,
on August 26, 2020. The connection attempt itself was a search for how to adjust screen
brightness. Examination of all other log files on that machine did not provide evidence of a
successful internet connection.
No evidence of internet connectivity was found. Such evidence would have been found if the
system had been connected to the internet.
SLI Compliance found there to be no internet connectivity occurring within the specified time
period (July 6, 2020 through November 20, 2020) on any of the examined components.
Item #4: Performing a physical audit of the components to verify there is no unexpected
hardware (5 ICP2 precinct scanners).
Physical examination of the ICP2 component included removal of the outer cover, as well an
inner cover to expose the resident circuit boards and accompanying components on four
ICP2s. A fifth ICP2 precinct scanner was taken even further, such that all components were
completely removed from the chassis for examination.
The examination showed that there were no physical components resident that were not
expected to be there.
SLI Compliance’s findings indicate that the installed hardware is the hardware that was
certified as part of the EAC certification and that none of the examined components contains
any malicious or unexpected hardware components.
5 Summary Findings
SLI Compliance has completed the audit of the Dominion Voting Systems Democracy Suite
5.5B voting system components as prescribed by the Maricopa County Elections Department.
SLI Compliance maintained the integrity of the audited system components by performing a
bit-by-bit image of all systems examined by SLI Compliance, except for the two EMS servers
that were live systems. Unused media from original packaging was used to remove or extract
data from the live systems. In all instances when removing or examining system storage
media, the County required that proof of write back protection be demonstrated, to protect the
election infrastructure’s air-gapped environment.
Physical examination of the County election infrastructure indicated that the physical setup of
the systems is arranged so that all network connectivity is clearly marked and delineated. This
means that, at any time, observers can examine and determine that the election systems are
connected only to authorized networking. Separate cable runs are positioned to clearly
identify all network cabling to and from election devices, and cables are color coded for easy
identification. In addition, the entire election area is fully covered by cameras that may be
used for observing the election process and maintaining a historic record of events on the
election processing floor.
While the systems examined showed no malicious or networking related USB devices being
connected, the systems examined didn’t provide a physical or a digital method of preventing
unauthorized USB devices to the systems. In this particular case, County policy drives control
of USB connectivity.
For the four items being examined,
1. Verifying that the software installed on the tabulation equipment is the same as the
software that was certified by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission and the
Arizona Secretary of State.
Adjudication
Version: 5.5.32.1
Filename SHA-256 Value
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
5b07834c5bb79c542df57fadb9dc6ddd37159d2d9318a2be20edc0762a71d14a
Client\AdjudicationClient.exe
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
ac104ab9b4f2c5921f8dd2ad8c2042c5c1313315bb94f31b770a3c932e26c484
Client\AdjudicationClient.exe.config
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
f752a459a1eb5d35c597ff26437a75cc9aff7a5ca1d4fcdb2bc08ded5cb71465
Client\BitMiracle.LibTiff.NET.dll
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
2350a09486f0bc62c96607b6ea70e1edf9731803a5ef622302144a9fe043bb00
Client\DVS.Common.dll
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
08bff90e689c25cf3e4a23b91e11932e5d868c7ec12455ca6794937414116c91
Client\DVS.EMS.Infrastructure.dll
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
636fda238c8c96e2fd25a6d6af897558950c2694be398fbecc8f681a3952bdbd
Client\DVS.EMS.Services.Common.dll
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
d5fa1b91e9e915eaa2a3801bae98166c0fb3dd33353e9fde951b2409104f6b2a
Client\DVS.Utilities.Common.dll
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
b3ecc7e75b0eef7c86e2faf4bab3485f97822a1ca48dd0b73905b78925a96839
Client\DVS.Windows.dll
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
814817711f24e4b213db6cd3766f5ab8ecb402e7cf57c2c61f64653e1d284c69
Client\logging.config
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
cb0153495092cab9bb80803c51b25f00a550deae28b35007c60888dbc1529673
Client\Microsoft.Practices.EnterpriseLibrary.Common.dll
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
d11e92f738e6f1ac5b8ba1393d2ae3378ba55757822a856da3a9cba9fe124723
Client\libeay32.dll
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
f6576c783a8db98c4a09919ea0a8b8bff70ac1729d3aa2935e07c6e639f25070
Client\itextsharp.dll
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
6f785c20eae305a430d1bfc358d8a54b3a218238fd3a444ca29aba1e77108fa8
Client\Microsoft.Practices.EnterpriseLibrary.Logging.dll
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
f1043059a9a6630d152bb6a56effb3f1e295546ab4cf791487762571866b740f
Client\Microsoft.Practices.Prism.dll
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
01762c0060c3a080c3f99c6b7b8574643a904b360be2bd006484b3e00be0cbff
Client\Microsoft.Practices.Prism.UnityExtensions.dll
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
2028dba77ffefc0fb9f3cf5aba68868d6f706cb2599b1a67d5784d1cc411ccf7
Client\Microsoft.Practices.ServiceLocation.dll
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
d91f9863439bd849889105ecc3182eb1dc14e8e6bcb7aa33b9058b5e837ea271
Client\Microsoft.Practices.Unity.Configuration.dll
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
201655cd2f641ac05e450fb03ce763afbc5e859d6ce1a25ae7fef3c27a2ee39a
Client\Microsoft.Practices.Unity.dll
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication Client
79ec0b9b9752fe63c0c37bc4217c2e7d9ea33016107e3870d5e61889eb8cc3e3
\Microsoft.Practices.Unity.Interception.dll
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
6e51b3c847ce90e67314f2a0b691448f68b412bfc18a89cb7914792165b836c4
Client\Modules\DVS.Adjudication.Clients.AdjudicationClient.Module.dll
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
27fb3194185ddcfe4814bff84e3a8c6c9394eb7937e632c0c573ded596851f10
Client\Modules\DVS.Adjudication.Domain.dll
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
85c6fe8ba99309224162f47200209e7051a6082141c98291166a77586874cccc
Client\Modules\DVS.Adjudication.Services.Data.Contract.dll
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
560e67fe10fb370119bcf3a43a22620b2d05699a93e5600c2782ca37eb5ecede
Client\Modules\DVS.Tabulation.Domain.dll
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
ed6ebd749052f9018f6699671ae5469adedf086cf8b1bd4256bbe9c4e7f6ff05
Client\Modules\EntityFramework.dll
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
a1bf6c9e3820e83f43e9f20dd7d9b0a3362a93146f0afe0b1330185e2d51b0cb
Client\Modules\EntityFramework.SqlServer.dll
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
0b48851dd13827e8e823309de69903a5343f31c05f7d0e3dc73753ff7055b6ff
Client\Modules\InfragisticsWPF4.Controls.Reports.v13.1.dll
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
4c8c0860c7adc2007fde5e242086df7f52807907dba5e21cfb9569f56e65e271
Client\Modules\InfragisticsWPF4.Models.Data.v13.1.dll
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
f778ce2c251ffa7b029148b0cf126a71e30a1a16a98f23f8494bb40bb1bb1a07
Client\Modules\InfragisticsWPF4.Models.Presentation.v13.1.dll
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
a5bc22bda49b24597b3572be6c72b897c7b58765a836034042dcaddb6b217765
Client\Modules\InfragisticsWPF4.Reports.Client.v13.1.dll
Version: 5.5.32.1
Filename SHA-256 Value
Program Files (x86)\ Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
5b07834c5bb79c542df57fadb9dc6ddd37159d2d9318a2be20edc0762a71d14a
Client\ AdjudicationClient.exe
Program Files (x86)\ Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
ac104ab9b4f2c5921f8dd2ad8c2042c5c1313315bb94f31b770a3c932e26c484
Client\ AdjudicationClient.exe.config
Program Files (x86)\ Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
f752a459a1eb5d35c597ff26437a75cc9aff7a5ca1d4fcdb2bc08ded5cb71465
Client\ BitMiracle.LibTiff.NET.dll
Program Files (x86)\ Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
2350a09486f0bc62c96607b6ea70e1edf9731803a5ef622302144a9fe043bb00
Client\ DVS.Common.dll
Program Files (x86)\ Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
08bff90e689c25cf3e4a23b91e11932e5d868c7ec12455ca6794937414116c91
Client\ DVS.EMS.Infrastructure.dll
Program Files (x86)\ Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
636fda238c8c96e2fd25a6d6af897558950c2694be398fbecc8f681a3952bdbd
Client\ DVS.EMS.Services.Common.dll
Program Files (x86)\ Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
d5fa1b91e9e915eaa2a3801bae98166c0fb3dd33353e9fde951b2409104f6b2a
Client\ DVS.Utilities.Common.dll
Program Files (x86)\ Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
b3ecc7e75b0eef7c86e2faf4bab3485f97822a1ca48dd0b73905b78925a96839
Client\ DVS.Windows.dll
Program Files (x86)\ Dominion Voting Systems\ Adjudication
f6576c783a8db98c4a09919ea0a8b8bff70ac1729d3aa2935e07c6e639f25070
Client\ itextsharp.dll
Program Files (x86)\ Dominion Voting Systems\ Adjudication
d11e92f738e6f1ac5b8ba1393d2ae3378ba55757822a856da3a9cba9fe124723
Client\ libeay32.dll
Program Files (x86)\ Dominion Voting Systems\ Adjudication
814817711f24e4b213db6cd3766f5ab8ecb402e7cf57c2c61f64653e1d284c69
Client\ logging.config
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting cb0153495092cab9bb80803c51b25f00a550deae28b35007c60888dbc1529673
Systems\AdjudicationClient\Microsoft.Practices.EnterpriseLibrary.Com
mon.dll
Version: 5.5.32.1
Filename SHA-256 Value
Program Files (x86)\ Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
5b07834c5bb79c542df57fadb9dc6ddd37159d2d9318a2be20edc0762a71d14a
Client\ AdjudicationClient.exe
Program Files (x86)\ Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
ac104ab9b4f2c5921f8dd2ad8c2042c5c1313315bb94f31b770a3c932e26c484
Client\ AdjudicationClient.exe.config
Program Files (x86)\ Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
f752a459a1eb5d35c597ff26437a75cc9aff7a5ca1d4fcdb2bc08ded5cb71465
Client\ BitMiracle.LibTiff.NET.dll
Program Files (x86)\ Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
2350a09486f0bc62c96607b6ea70e1edf9731803a5ef622302144a9fe043bb00
Client\ DVS.Common.dll
Program Files (x86)\ Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
08bff90e689c25cf3e4a23b91e11932e5d868c7ec12455ca6794937414116c91
Client\ DVS.EMS.Infrastructure.dll
Program Files (x86)\ Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
636fda238c8c96e2fd25a6d6af897558950c2694be398fbecc8f681a3952bdbd
Client\ DVS.EMS.Services.Common.dll
Program Files (x86)\ Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
d5fa1b91e9e915eaa2a3801bae98166c0fb3dd33353e9fde951b2409104f6b2a
Client\ DVS.Utilities.Common.dll
Program Files (x86)\ Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication
b3ecc7e75b0eef7c86e2faf4bab3485f97822a1ca48dd0b73905b78925a96839
Client\ DVS.Windows.dll
Program Files (x86)\ Dominion Voting Systems\ Adjudication
f6576c783a8db98c4a09919ea0a8b8bff70ac1729d3aa2935e07c6e639f25070
Client\ itextsharp.dll
Program Files (x86)\ Dominion Voting Systems\ Adjudication
d11e92f738e6f1ac5b8ba1393d2ae3378ba55757822a856da3a9cba9fe124723
Client\ libeay32.dll
Program Files (x86)\ Dominion Voting Systems\ Adjudication
814817711f24e4b213db6cd3766f5ab8ecb402e7cf57c2c61f64653e1d284c69
Client\ logging.config
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting cb0153495092cab9bb80803c51b25f00a550deae28b35007c60888dbc1529673
Systems\AdjudicationClient\Microsoft.Practices.EnterpriseLibrary.Com
mon.dll
Version: 5.5.32.1
Filename SHA-256 Value
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Adjudication f8daea1ac561f05ec9340c9abbd45fcdf4e72b849441f97eaa6218763f5e4022
Services\DVS.Adjudication.Infrastructure.dll
EMS
Election data Service
Version: 5.5.32.4 32-bit
Filename SHA-256 Value
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Election Data
9bccd581ded96a7d99ed0000e774a656a0c0e490531ab6cc99d4ea9b01e584b0
Service\BallotCoordinates.dll
EMS Logger
ICVA
ProgramFiles\DominionVotingSystems\ICVA\DVS.DemocracySuite.Expo bbfa1e0a11c5bb1dd78797e99b2a9cbc8c38b4f0a6a3d5861783e9aa1757e839
rtImport.Formats.dll
Version: 5.5.32.4
Filename SHA-256 Value
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Election Data f752a459a1eb5d35c597ff26437a75cc9aff7a5ca1d4fcdb2bc08ded5cb71465
Service\\BitMiracle.LibTiff.NET.dll
Version: 5.5.32.4
Filename SHA-256 Value
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\Election File f752a459a1eb5d35c597ff26437a75cc9aff7a5ca1d4fcdb2bc08ded5cb71465
Manager\BitMiracle.LibTiff.NET.dll
EMS Logger
Version: 5.5.32.4
Filename SHA-256 Value
Program Files (x86)\ Dominion Voting Systems\ EMS
031f812ea18dc0ddb81ec0512f7c57e47d9e5a29aa33814e7f39a49ff26829af
Logger\ EMSLogger.exe
Version: 5.5.32.4
Filename SHA-256 Value
EMSApplicationServer\ AdjElectionProcessor.svc 31d36240cdb0a3c04475f79facbfe6431cc70e0c8495722f8e8243d77486b0c2
EMSApplicationServer\ App Code\ ServiceInitializer.cs 75d7c6f478de40fd1e87c6c222578c95de1de91f7877bb8f97e441df7c08f478
BallotCoordinates.dll 9044db9520a276d57cfc4d6fd59004baabbe820161667a8c4150b2f25f642cdd
BallotCoordinatesManager.dll 74e41318b8a30dff1d3732cd07609e07fd83c1967cdcc1ba1df362b3345ee954
BallotGeneration.dll 702e7d8eac2db77397afdf0ebeb43ff466f5c59491c4348da69e07eabbbf7415
BitMiracle.LibTiff.NET.dll f752a459a1eb5d35c597ff26437a75cc9aff7a5ca1d4fcdb2bc08ded5cb71465
CoordinateServicePersisenceLayer.dll f656156bd14daa9a6cd0ae3bb834a974427ec42d71bfb50dea43b4cf8d91b26d
DefModificator.dll 89e4bcbea3a2a643effd3616bf0ae3003052b315cd4b31c3dc20c189b429c3ea
DrawingWorkbench\ CanadaMunicipalStyle.dwf bce006f73fa6138e5e5a545d05547f2206473cd2eec362caf6bd8852cb56c36f
DrawingWorkbench\ CanadaMunicipalStyle.sha 32907b397f77c41870c751550ff8baf8a5b2f44096e0034c39572cbdd2bb96b2
DrawingWorkbench\ CanadaProvincialStyle.dwf 2164e3575561fba413513d79d555ec92601b83d0e9faa2fd6767213a6924031f
DrawingWorkbench\ CanadaProvincialStyle.sha c67205e15650fe005097c42796722a67ef1fe3d827ecbbae09de207ced5156e2
DrawingWorkbench\ CanadaVBMStyle.dwf 6bc40acb91860f230cb55c989eacdf4ad7a01ff4c58ab946a6a8185ab1ef6a7a
DrawingWorkbench\ CanadaVBMStyle.sha 8bfa79c0860f0353a9d0573ca4d32347e943accc3f9225af32bbe3badecb23e8
DrawingWorkbench\ Census - Census Grid.dwf d2e5524f708ff35476b19f25fe05cfe7e7dc398f6854e9386a791caeb2cee031
DrawingWorkbench\ Census - Census Grid.sha 12f7fe0af8c263c31fe0478cb7ab51241abd54a16f86c63d0977d18e46fe648d
DrawingWorkbench\ Census - Rank Choice Grid.dwf b6c273965d353898c7010e458b9e577cfe6c39aeb8af66020a12ee802f76a5db
DrawingWorkbench\ Census - Rank Choice Grid.sha c2f06f97a5870388c2b01553ae88e06cd5a52d09ff82fa8c9e8d0d8f42e2980d
DVS.DemocracySuite.ConfigurationService.dll 257853ab3687a608df43986fc37c6f048aeaf114e9df659f00a4a5fb0537f8eb
DVS.DemocracySuite.CryptoService.dll 6a5f95179dacc8a05beb395236e0d308ad42d20087b88e008401aa5e405f2cbd
DVS.DemocracySuite.DatabaseService.dll f32446ef26a58efa6bdb6d35eeaeaefbbf41ae202416665e6859462c7a07092e
DVS.DemocracySuite.DCFFiller.dll 3a346ba6c626f6bc92429c7fb64b2754010498530b2da32b72cd77e0daaa86b2
DVS.DemocracySuite.DCFFiller.Serialization.dll e3d8dbd0dd0c56cd1dfaf9ddaa54cee2d0bf5c524b97d0bd268d725d9c9cbec6
DVS.DemocracySuite.EedAppsCommon.dll 3afffb1fbcabfe2e4b62bba6e4429296db0704879680104029edf5fc2706dbb2
DVS.DemocracySuite.EMSApplicationServer.dll 8a3c3eb9c2a11f012437cda5409fe50453a1c17bd1cfa2db58981747b11edd78
DVS.DemocracySuite.ExportImport.dll caeb49838d361a92e109b428e3aea245518d52260c315f877e14ac0ed0a8926d
DVS.DemocracySuite.ExportImport.Formats.dll 88fe717f64f48ccc47ab117da839f2bffb4f0fa99101def89a4039d6d03a0912
DVS.DemocracySuite.ExportService.BaseExportService.dll 8817bf1c1d385886405f23cbc1afb507dad216421300bafa53c6980c4e79f25b
DVS.DemocracySuite.ExportService.EMLExportService.dll 8597ec9430bfc94faa560f0cf0d130cf632436b4ed01bf3fdbaa456626dc5418
DVS.DemocracySuite.GenerationService.exe 45c9b63f223be21205195dce0c0d953a7f291f386ec6aa77850a5b914d748da4
DVS.DemocracySuite.GenerationService.exe.config 050920d14a7ec9f342e26f6008fca30d4a4de8fe9a692d0a55ecb4948082ba26
DVS.DemocracySuite.GenericDrawing.dll 19b4916e342173ebdcceada4a2fc31df474e4e01c53be8b3eb96ca124267a76a
DVS.DemocracySuite.ImageCastX.dll dfe2c1287c9b6477f4b29b02621b03bd6777c554f46bd04b3681da1c8766a0d8
DVS.DemocracySuite.IntegrationServices.dll 7fc0a0fabf375e3c4e96b5655216aa72c24cb6148a6c5c50af43d728f7121e0f
DVS.DemocracySuite.LibraryCollector.dll 4a4db87f2dde4980fb1f6807f6fbebf1b27c2082ac5067f4290a3e1b8fc39b78
DVS.DemocracySuite.PermissionManager.dll bae82141bfea41b3ad00ebc1d907f4cada34e3e3f3272e20b4a8fec4437d3763
DVS.DemocracySuite.RemoteServerProvider.dll f7e655bbe1bc46fd7e87f8b1dd51a42951f9991987c49c025d5c6d3eb647bcb6
DVS.DemocracySuite.ReportServiceBase.dll dddd7aa9ed8266e03c930a359a618554fd5deb08b983fd9c16a259bf762bddb7
DVS.DemocracySuite.ResultInterfaces.dll bb942e445f01ddfb33ed49ef34e49edb913aaadbb6089a9dccb5219a3399cb1f
DVS.DemocracySuite.ResultsBusinessLogic.dll 8c26f547f82fd02a21fdacb146115afc759602632f13f537e1c707151ac9b95c
DVS.DemocracySuite.ResultsCommonService.dll 99df97bc61b149fa1890b473b74ef80a9a4aa99626506e8d724a9f2422fe49c6
DVS.DemocracySuite.ResultsDataAccess.dll 7584b604666582863a8fc50b2a5206976ab137f4e62fc09cd64c81c46cca9175
DVS.DemocracySuite.ResultsDomain.dll 90990c5c2aa2324cccbf2a1d9d28a3fdecdd91035d2432c4ffdee99d471fb995
DVS.DemocracySuite.ResultsParsing.dll 8e5e42e76598eb883d54b0e6b309eacfea44bcf1660d0ef8cf2bddbb852cf41f
DVS.DemocracySuite.ResultTally.RcvService.dll 21be74360e1f459b3cf14309d1c752f7dfa866615abde6754ddd25529abf8b70
DVS.DemocracySuite.ResultTally.Services.dll 9f5ccb98260e3e29bca137413a86fc7b3c191cc3729eda07f0c188ed2f209d92
DVS.DemocracySuite.ServerSideReports.dll 08cda97e234b8cea8cf34a775d040aae03187288e4705e1ce14fe21d60fa334d
DVS.DemocracySuite.TabulatorGDomain.dll a088ac3e09b49f3a9897b87f9fcc399d1d4b453a819d9f90557905bed7c3b7a8
DVS.DemocracySuite.USElectionsDomain.BallotGeneration.BallotStyle.d
b095bf2465f2ba46e8e2e08024ae3b499133463ef207735f690460719c9bd7bf
ll
DVS.DemocracySuite.USElectionsDomain.BallotGeneration.dll d266567209527080a34676988106ae28ed3b99f1df9770dad90a2c23f0645acb
DVS.DemocracySuite.USElectionsDomain.BallotGeneration.Florida.dll acdca79eedbb5f29eae00bb2265400e20a70b89075f1899fed060da94e121677
DVS.DemocracySuite.USElectionsDomain.BallotGeneration.NYGeneral.d
cf0a52bf7ddcc2774008c4cefafc38901463800d0d5cb48b7b70fffc1275c5d4
ll
DVS.DemocracySuite.USElectionsDomain.BallotGeneration.RankChoice.
021c377076830d7f52d5ed84ece2648c96de3090cb06c63e1256afb256af77b5
dll
DVS.DemocracySuite.USElectionsDomain.dll fd8ca9f5c446279a55397b488d372b489d81b6b82157a9449e0341cbda288231
DVS.DemocracySuite.USElectionsDomain.ElectionFiles.dll fe16d6487dc6bf86d70c91bc73c5f1c7097b89674100162310f414a7a94816b8
DVS.DemocracySuite.VotingMethods.dll 8acc48537bcbe53c9c750b3c6a2522a39892fe1b9922cb5b5c60497986f9513d
DVS.DemocracySuite.VotingRules.dll fd85ca314e97e8856ad33964c5f0860ccf401e3e418ebfaa6190123c0d7baf67
DVS.ElectionEvent.BallotRenderer.dll 32d7761021bbf707fe684ec5c7c4cc710f53ce5d0b63bc8987aa803886cbc648
DVS.ElectionEvent.BallotRendererSupport.dll d6ee320421bd5dece9aba97bc1b0c75a3e35cab356eebb6e7656fc0718d9860c
DVS.ElectionEvent.Layouting.dll 877e4ca2baff924bd678ba7cfd9fc83e8484f8c53c5cb3a031fea2d24fb0e30c
DVS.ElectionEvent.RtfInterpreter.dll 3c4318582fa22f2cb70e3a93cac5aaaf3f616a0f4fa5475f073819df43faf1a6
DVS.ElectionEvent.SVG.dll 101cc5e1f04009d5a4b9f330b52c242032e17ba90b2a913353a2f2bf700f01ea
DVS.EMS.Services.ElectionService.BusinessLayer.dll 22b6fcec7c07c4f59c2de4dc634f7268f26f937117a7437a8bfcc93352e82bf8
DVS.EMS.Services.ElectionService.Contract.dll b95cc0a4a88667f2882fb6866d92f61a3a75d59adba99a80e426f8da67b0b2f7
DVS.EMS.Services.ElectionService.PersistenceLayer.dll c26527b0acbb5bf3204f3d7747704955192393e52aa4ce3c625900d394295dc4
DVS.Framework.Commands.dll cdccc83e317ce88ad44470dffa4e4c77b2ecdcd924117663954b0358359c7eac
DVS.Framework.DbMaker.dll de8ea3d1359f53c3f47a5396ca94d6771aca9ae9e6cdaf7a7185289490e7a65e
DVS.Framework.Domains.Logging.dll 0d2e63331877955eebc06811d5accb371cb342a4b0cf5fc924b2713c581fbe71
DVS.Framework.Domains.Parametrization.dll 9e730aacb31de5f3e82ea74525a5d2e3fa0dda1d0d75d2f47e6b2843fa606ae3
DVS.Framework.Domains.PermissionManagement.dll 92c7960571d3f242984b69205ab64c3d67481af523e8ea7ec3b87654cbbd1fd4
DVS.Framework.Domains.SystemVariables.dll ec01a7ce1b1e7641791ace29dfb2cc13bdbffc7b3521b21fcf8bd30433831ddc
DVS.Framework.GUIConfiguration.dll 91b85fa83175b6919245520895cf0e006f4ea3450cb915ba2576d292a3c0d4f0
DVS.Framework.GUICore.dll d1226bb58d3d6d98753edd76263ed6bf4bfe83d570e9661e198d5ebf86dd0e6a
DVS.Framework.MemoryCore.dll 44fbdf9d5dfcc671781874fc85ec000802a7bc648af2d9e535e8340c45b8ff64
DVS.Framework.RemotingAdo.dll 5f2a9b557970248a0949f4681deb0e362367d1f3a6121d91608d620eeff0882e
DVS.Framework.RemotingAdoExe.exe 10b79e84d083dafee839d098a3a628d1c073237e322be0d27c547d50ec47d672
DVS.Framework.ResourceTranslator.dll 08ed8a5ca35a922a21f8b8cff84630531961ff2d881d962d74e0c21c1ff84db8
DVS.Framework.Serializer.dll 2d53bd1ebbb65c1dae4b9e98088365a4b421e2180bb7edf73200c4751d809da9
DVS.Framework.Utilities.DbModificationFilter.exe 32b3e201399e97f22cf13452ac6b941aa064d9f4a12584f7eb7ba627a45666eb
DVS.SmartCardManager.dll 79d2afa7c9ae514bc444f0ec1575c95873fc685216a5030f4c71e1d5da6ffce2
DVS.Utilities.AudioConverters.dll 7fc6a5c8468b684a5c74242853b073e6d4f9a8dec8b219a1f61509b431440c50
DVS.Utilities.BinaryFileAccess2007.dll 7369f99f045888658cfad09eb88002d0fcddf80308846b9f827f19103664dfc2
DVS.Utilities.Common.dll d5fa1b91e9e915eaa2a3801bae98166c0fb3dd33353e9fde951b2409104f6b2a
DVS.Utilities.FileSystemServiceFacade.dll 5d0048bd3ec7e386ff579d93f09770aecb572754f001cb7c87a2b69c722981f9
DVS.Utilities.MSWinManager.dll 4ffb1e0407fdcf32ad324e8a621d765793a427bdf021e6357ff093e49d048b53
DVS.Utilities.PdfConverter.exe f261cffe0be8e7a5687d8eeb3aba99f1c9de7591768094f7a38fce2eee6c65ff
DVS.Utilities.PdfConverter.exe.config f4988d39842ba14286723fafaf34d0386c4346c7b1b057ac415356c9e26d6a2d
DVS.Utilities.RemoteCache.dll 7f41b3087777207f949ab40c6e5a110affb487f8660fbc4d0e06240a49199126
DVS.Utilities.RemoteCacheProxy.dll a126388cb4f337db8cc3753337245872a873eda4b2712e8333c4694ee0842b02
DVS.Utilities.RemoteInterfaces.dll b379429abaced02e1bbc199e3ef79984f6e94b43fc655a8228c7dd9ced53a2bc
DVS.Utilities.UsbFileSystem.dll 48552d0640d88b668f66fdb114c11fa35499ba163e9b65f714c63b1d3b9fe837
DVS.UtilitiesFullFrameworkWrapper.dll 185a0b6c5552c49d1a97ac04c39cd62d4161ddd4ab3c8870500bd5c0faf82ebb
ElectionFilesGeneration.dll aab24c796a92c6b9cc2f97994f39909f8aeef59fe1f13ad3d2c49d9dd7768036
EMSApplicationServerManager.exe 5f1c8ae92f748727fa6baecb1688e7ff998dbaff2a4ebcc742f84d108d1fd37b
EMSApplicationServerManager.exe.config b83ddb07892129a38dda10ceef69b8161f33b1cadab2a1cedffd8e26f1c2cb6f
EMSApplicationServerManager.XmlSerializers.dll 672572295fe8163e541325e814320524a4a9c8ed394ec59457ffa0df26bd5ad9
EmsBallotGeneration.dll b585355f7b4c45b5fa650049cf57a8555ec2e0bfc9c87a5af0e7523da9a0852f
EntityFramework.dll ed6ebd749052f9018f6699671ae5469adedf086cf8b1bd4256bbe9c4e7f6ff05
EntityFramework.SqlServer.dll a1bf6c9e3820e83f43e9f20dd7d9b0a3362a93146f0afe0b1330185e2d51b0cb
EntityFrameworkUtil.dll 07fef8c019ff423a33997504e67712f895a30b29922631c9609efb4c364656de
en-US\ DVS.ElectionEvent.BallotRendererSupport.resources.dll ed73f51170e762772405fb12af7db6dbecb7725af76f562280d83419ea0c9b78
gsdll32.dll c8c7cbcd1485e71e1fb2d01bcb1ef1ddf15d3e729d1947b30abf2ba41ee7c58c
Infragistics2.Shared.v11.1.dll 43d6d97cef01feb0187608a3b10296f9e57301f344c3cccd4c0f6959de59a4c7
Infragistics2.Win.UltraWinTabControl.v11.1.dll 944d9958f8a86d1ea682275aafca2c5719edaf9dab51ede3cf062c745e8c596a
Infragistics2.Win.v11.1.dll 7550da2b0699879ad0552777d6cc3499969eae9ba3e76ca4518d73dc82b41207
InfragisticsWPF4.Controls.Editors.XamColorPicker.v12.1.dll 751645399f3e60df0c89c0aeb70288ed4a0a4eccbf5f6a8edb40c69a24d4ab34
InfragisticsWPF4.Controls.Editors.XamComboEditor.v12.1.dll e51d61487ea90ab3547e2d396c248ee1ac1b9923cc016488f6694a359abff80c
InfragisticsWPF4.Controls.Editors.XamSlider.v12.1.dll 71848e74fa3c3708d740921a69e11753dc1faa672bd7fb98b1c78eae5a0ee956
InfragisticsWPF4.DataManager.v12.1.dll 49ef3da0db6e257fe9f8244ba6431c67df3fac5df80459538e4815c7989e9627
infragisticswpf4.editors.v12.1.dll 6eaf86848c240faea4f5bd4c15388ce31ac23e085a14c52540fb1b131df70c16
InfragisticsWPF4.v12.1.dll e6d7c6e94d4bc62b5ebea0d887196b0e4d0bca5d978914325d9dac00a6f7fdbd
itextsharp.dll beb5c25eb5f659cbb2574f3eaddda35c5b18e860558daac4533b4ed98e29bd55
Microsoft.Deployment.WindowsInstaller.dll 9aebc76cb8c864593e0419162b2bf40b81bd52b3ff12edac1d032828df83dcfa
Microsoft.Web.Administration.dll 5b28ceefb320c6a808cb352385ae4523fbecc676af1cb091ceb1789b3b83aefc
NLog.config 757a311b652b2eab347d220dba290d80081a015b584d18d8fc6db82fd973b72e
NLog.dll e17aac589bd48a623857de7f8113bcae6f72e4fe4652ca615ffa1028353b246d
OneWireAPI.NET.dll e0e95a3b2fe54ee9dc7c907124d8b564aa0781b163d0d091147f59a3008e7673
PdfConvertLib.dll 83041f00842bae9cce9ed065cd603cce216e4fd4d1895bf1451141209d14ec3d
PdfToImageConverter.exe 84dff156f665837160378a197b81462fcd496a1e062ad95b61635a8a15b48bd7
Renci.SshNet.dll 451ba700ecb5e77bea05160fda3ee6fb706839d831c925279634614d610ab8d9
Resources\ Arial.xml 8a4a0ff9c4f9eb2cc198a2e4f096631d383b2a7126df8b6036e2c1ce42650c54
Resources\ ArialBold.xml 2a2cf9e764699a6189777b084601da22e109d84d24071a7ea4821059ea287b7c
Resources\ avalon-framework-cvs-20020806.jar 51ed0ddf5c6cb03f76f250eb22f1b4e5585c0e6242af3a02d5f40ed563af149c
Resources\ batik.jar a8af031e63b8807066f094ab2cd1eae28de6aac92a460705ab44b14b5bb0f07b
Resources\ fop.jar aa97ad1ca47782cfb5cfae2eac3f7153a87056d924b6987ff8d68542865f2b47
Resources\ fopcfg.xml 4d55239b7df47170d1bb4f3a7e878a94a2afa149cbe8d613ca160d2f9430841d
Resources\ lame.exe af62aa829fd07d8b8729b8ecb9a5c4bb30c9a7add248a25e0861e50e50ec9904
Resources\ libgomp-1.dll 287804ff69730b3f5830fb488ea7640fdd52a27250275aca1052adff37c8c25c
Resources\ oggdec.exe b0240ed9dbacb149f3f5500331f64e875aa4945f6a8490cef0d8b208955ca7c8
Resources\ oggenc2.exe ba60d33c845a416eacd78936202b0808c4f14c83dc79976f6766194c06bb91b1
Resources\ pthreadgc2.dll cf14602bb18e7670ea6dc89e577d473b9d65b98f926c998aa40614d671adf98e
Resources\ ResultData.dtsx 65d2d844557c48cd9016b334d9097d832295d08cdea878ef2f8591ab6d355c3a
Resources\ sox.exe 9bf1ed9cfce4092a1b14c442acdb0ea59d3bc1eef32e209e577daf1c23a1ce08
Resources\ speexdec.exe 9b935d21d2b9e7fb1394cc3cbab13af3d562105237535f08764137dfbb686038
EMS Service
Version: 5.5.32.4
Filename SHA-256 Value
VirtualDirectories\ EMSService\ bin\ BitMiracle.LibTiff.NET.dll f752a459a1eb5d35c597ff26437a75cc9aff7a5ca1d4fcdb2bc08ded5cb71465
VirtualDirectories\ EMSService\ bin\ DVS.Utilities.Common.dll b325fdb47ec3b2725e2cdb087d89beea1c300f4f710566bb846332d3f3935524
VirtualDirectories\ EMSService\ bin\ DVS.Utilities.MSWinManager.dll f860d3efdf1b97c7d8d612fd2e27fc1e2bb53689ed5b41c141f469618ea832a0
VirtualDirectories\ EMSService\ bin\ EMSBusinessProcess.dll 96401d3160563ca36520bfd60784727653e4c3085c6b1f36239cfb81d66c0121
VirtualDirectories\ EMSService\ bin\ EMSDataRepository.dll b23022ed1e229a6f2ebff3158b4a4e026ef8b176639af1b03112ae1d13d41e0d
VirtualDirectories\ EMSService\ bin\ EMSServiceFacade.dll 2c2405156c925fd6ca3e1d0cf73bc679bc98d0f5286c4b215885b203818cb358
VirtualDirectories\ EMSService\ bin\ EMSSvcCustomAction.CA.dll 57515f9925d7c6960164560400ef6356494794bfe4f15ec317792e5559d6dc68
VirtualDirectories\ EMSService\ bin\ EMSSvcCustomAction.dll 0d5f3b51203f546dd7c19a887cd82b34363523ed5620315f501916faa7618eb6
VirtualDirectories\ EMSService\ bin\ EMSSvcManager.exe 50ca073340daf5ea616ffbddb17a0eb74d9cd63d86be1164f455d8c5e86bc383
VirtualDirectories\ EMSService\ bin\ EMSSvcManager.exe.config 8202310b15586d1e5d43e18740528e0b1056812996c3ed366019273480e24989
ICC
Version: 5.5.32.5
Filename SHA-256 Value
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\ImageCast
5c321804357d587dc954fe155f3ee8a058e51788e77173d21107dcbfd33e8def
Central\bin\ImageCast Central.exe
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\ImageCast
d11e92f738e6f1ac5b8ba1393d2ae3378ba55757822a856da3a9cba9fe124723
Central\bin\libeay32.dll
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\ImageCast
27631b6b7b566e50cabdf8056f74f6c284f8c702e1f03d4a7d99345da638bb0d
Central\bin\Log\1 1 1 0 slog.txt
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\ImageCast
c6c0ab88e81bf7fb0c36be41f161aed345535a59d82178ef5044c4108dd8593f
Central\bin\Log\1 1 3 0 slog.txt
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\ImageCast
9acce20399313a1136cf00962990c72252fa91e1ca709098c58ca3fa2c05366e
Central\bin\Log\1 2 1930 0 slog.txt
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\ImageCast
89b0a005f16022fbdb9152e1bf57e877dca19c87ce49948f554b6a055d013f1d
Central\bin\Log\1 333333 100001 0 slog.txt
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\ImageCast
28f2fe4d27b694023255f8dbfa6e30ff81d3155c12bd0060e30bd7c39e4ea19f
Central\bin\ssleay32.dll
Program Files (x86)\Dominion Voting Systems\ImageCast
ba747e28769d85458a33a61a2a230435612e376f99b9a2dc104a817e2d451bfa
Central\\bin\TWAINDSM.dll
ICP2
Version: 5.5.1.8
Filename SHA-256 Value
dvs 18A0B06B7EF36F6D7CA6C0BF4FBE513B0092632E5DC628C1C441295B74AF1762
initramfs 1418A85ABFFC829D3B52ABCF8DF32C30E5C00613AEA861909D8D715C42AD969E
rfs 32188DC9677471650E2EC6F3EAC17E5226FC2312E1EEE6F061CEA93608C923CB
icp2.dtb 6596FCEDE64E448A7531B097B53148D23C043F6A061BF32A27B4FAFBE4C1540A
zImage 61BB6BE39627257A7C140D00E226480FAAAFC543FC56EEA1DB96B4EAD1F705C2
logo.bmp.gz 70E02B3EE3BFB97FEFAF8BB060E851FC84A54E88C210C96456D628849AE8603C
data.squashfs ED68837801E726A9AA1F4E89B7019DDE23196E0851409BDEB14FFCF6D575EE69
The table below prescribes the criteria utilized in review of the Dominion DS 5.5B
voting system. This review is designed to ascertain whether any component
contained malicious software of any kind.
Jump Lists: List of recently opened items including files, folders, websites etc. We will
examine these areas to look for indicators of malicious software activities and
internet connectivity.
Recycle Bin: Used to determine if there are any deleted files that would indicate
malicious software activity or internet connectivity.
USB: This will tell you every USB device connected to the system, to help identify
potentially malicious file activity.
FileName Search: A check of filenames, verifying files associated with products, and
looking for known malicious files.
DVS DS 5.5B For. Aud. Attachment B - User Activity and Malicious Software Review 1 of 1
SLI Compliance