Digested Cases
Digested Cases
Digested Cases
No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this
Constitution without its advice and concurrence. (Sec. 30, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
Facts:
Fabian filed an administrative charge for grave misconduct against Agustin committed by him as then
DPWH Assistant Regional Director of Region IV-A. The Ombudsman found Agustin guilty but upon
reconsideration, he was exonerated.
Fabian elevated the case to the SC, arguing that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of
1989) provides that all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10)
days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
May administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman be
appealed to the Supreme Court without its advise and concurrence?
Held: No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It violates the proscription
in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court. The constitutional prohibition was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases
placed under its appellate Jurisdiction.Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging
its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 was declared INVALID. (Fabian vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742.
September 16, 1998)
Facts:
On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit[10] was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso
VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the
City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et... al), accusing them of Plunder[11] and violation of Republic
Act No. (RA) 3019,[12] otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection
with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the
, a copy of the preventive suspension order was sent to the Office of the City Mayor, and received by
Maricon Ausan, a member of Binay, Jr.'s staff
On even date,[58] Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari[59] before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
139453, seeking the nullification of the preventive suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a
TRO and/or
a) Phases I and
Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a
second term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus... rendering the
administrative cases against him moot and academic.
In any event, Binay, Jr. claimed that the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order failed to show that
the evidence of guilt presented against him is strong
Resolution[78] dated March 20, 2015, the CA ordered the consolidation of CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and
CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, and, without necessarily giving due course to Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt,...
Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, or on March 25, 2015, the Ombudsman filed
the present petition before this Court, assailing the CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution, which granted
Binay, Jr.'s prayer for TRO
The Ombudsman claims that: (a) the CA had no jurisdiction to grant Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, citing
Section 14 of RA 6770,[82] or "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," which states that no injunctive writ could
be issued to delay the Ombudsman's investigation unless there is prima facie evidence that the subject
matter thereof is outside the latter's jurisdiction... and
(b) the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt is illegal and
improper, considering that the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer, and therefore, cannot be
subjected to contempt proceedings.
Binay, Jr. argues that Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution specifically grants the CA judicial
power to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of government, including the Office of the
Ombudsman, in case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which he
asserts was committed in this case when said office issued the preventive suspension order against him.
Binay, Jr. maintains that... the CA correctly enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension
order given his clear and unmistakable right to public office, and that it is clear that he could not be held
administratively liable for any of the charges against him since his subsequent re-election in
2013 operated as a condonation of any administrative offenses he may have committed during his
previous term.
Binay, Jr. submits that while the Ombudsman is indeed an... impeachable officer and, hence, cannot be
removed from office except by way of impeachment, an action for contempt imposes the penalty of fine
and imprisonment, without necessarily resulting in removal from office. Thus, the fact that the
Ombudsman is an impeachable officer... should not deprive the CA of its inherent power to punish
contempt.
the CA issued a Resolution... which further enjoined the implementation of the preventive... suspension
order.
In so ruling, the CA found that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, namely, the
nullification of the preventive suspension order, in view of the condonation doctrine, citing Aguinaldo v.
Santos.
, the Ombudsman filed a supplemental petition[99] before this Court, arguing that the condonation
doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of whether the evidence... of guilt is strong for purposes of
issuing preventive suspension orders. The Ombudsman also maintained that a reliance on the
condonation doctrine is a matter of defense, which should have been raised by Binay, Jr. before it during
the administrative proceedings, and that, at... any rate, there is no condonation because Binay, Jr.
committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013... the Ombudsman has been
adamant that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any provisional injunctive writ against her office to
enjoin its preventive suspension orders. As basis, she invokes the first paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770... in conjunction with her office's independence under the 1987 Constitution. She advances the
idea that "[i]n order to further ensure [her office's] independence, [RA 6770] likewise insulated it from
judicial intervention,"[157] particularly, "from injunctive... reliefs traditionally obtainable from the
courts,"[158] claiming that said writs may work "just as effectively as direct harassment or political
pressure would."
Issues:
Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the
implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman;
Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and eventually, the WPI in CA-
G.R. SP No. 139453 enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr.
based on the condonation doctrine
Ruling:
The Ombudsman's argument against the CA's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition,
and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the
Ombudsman Act
The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any court (except the Supreme
Court[119]) from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an investigation being conducted by the Office of
the Ombudsman.
Considering the textual qualifier "to... delay," which connotes a suspension of an action while the main
case remains pending, the "writ of injunction" mentioned in this paragraph could only refer to
injunctions of the provisional kind, consistent with the nature of a provisional injunctive relief.
As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the whole range of remedies
against issuances of the Ombudsman
The subject provision, however, crafts an exception to the foregoing general rule. While the specific
procedural vehicle is not explicit from its text, it is fairly deducible that the second paragraph of Section
14, RA 6770 excepts, as the only allowable remedy... against "the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman," a Rule 45 appeal, for the reason that it is the only remedy taken to the Supreme Court on
"pure questions of law," whether under the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman
As may be deduced from the various discourses in Gonzales III, the concept of Ombudsman's
independence covers three (3) things:
First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be abolished, nor its
constitutionally specified functions and privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the
Constitution itself allows, or an amendment thereto is made;
Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed from [its] freedom to use
or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its] functions;[168] hence, its budget cannot be...
strategically decreased by officials of the political branches of government so as to impair said functions;
and
Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that those within the ranks of the
office can only be disciplined by an internal authority.
Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of the Ombudsman from
political harassment and pressure, so as to free it from the "insidious tentacles of politics."[169]
That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate
the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical
bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to... all. Hence, the
Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt from an incident of judicial power - that is, a provisional writ
of injunction against a preventive suspension order - clearly strays from the concept's rationale of
insulating the office from political harassment or... pressure.
The Ombudsman's erroneous abstraction of her office's independence notwithstanding, it remains that
the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 textually prohibits courts from extending provisional
injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted by her office. Despite the... usage of the general
phrase "[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any court," the Ombudsman herself concedes that the
prohibition does not cover the Supreme Court.
Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing the first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770) without the Court's consent thereto, it remains that the CA had the authority to
issue the questioned injunctive writs enjoining the implementation of the... preventive suspension order
against Binay, Jr. At the risk of belaboring the point, these issuances were merely ancillary to the
exercise of the CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of BP 129, as
amended, and which it had already... acquired over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 case.
The Ombudsman contends that it was inappropriate for the CA to have considered the condonation
doctrine since it was a matter of defense which should have been raised and passed upon by her office
during the administrative disciplinary proceedings.[243]
However, the Court agrees with the CA that it was not precluded from considering the same given that it
was material to the propriety of according provisional injunctive relief in conformity with the ruling in
Governor Garcia, Jr., which was the subsisting jurisprudence... at that time. Thus, since condonation was
duly raised by Binay, Jr. in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,[244] the CA did not err in passing upon
the same. Note that although Binay, Jr. secondarily argued that the evidence... of guilt against him was
not strong in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,[245] it appears that the CA found that the
application of the condonation doctrine was already sufficient to enjoin the implementation of the...
preventive suspension order. Again, there is nothing aberrant with this since, as remarked in the same
case of Governor Garcia, Jr., if it was established that the acts subject of the administrative complaint
were indeed committed during Binay, Jr.'s prior term, then,... following the condonation doctrine, he
can no longer be administratively charged. In other words, with condonation having been invoked by
Binay, Jr. as an exculpatory affirmative defense at the onset, the CA deemed it unnecessary to
determine if the evidence of guilt against him... was strong, at least for the purpose of issuing the
subject injunctive writs.
The condonation doctrine - which connotes this same sense of complete extinguishment of liability as
will be herein elaborated upon - is not based on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation that
originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon.
Provincial Board ofNueva Ecija,[247] (Pascual), which was therefore decided under the 1935
Constitution.
As there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, the Court, in Pascual, resorted to American
authorities and "found that cases on the matter are conflicting due in part, probably, to differences in
statutes and constitutional provisions, and also,... in part, to a divergence of views with respect to the
question of whether the subsequent election or appointment condones the prior misconduct
The conclusion is at once problematic since this Court has now uncovered that there is really no
established weight of authority in the United States (US) favoring the doctrine of condonation, which, in
the words of Pascual, theorizes that an official's re-election denies the... right to remove him from office
due to a misconduct during a prior term. In fact, as pointed out during the oral arguments of this case, at
least seventeen (17) states in the US have abandoned the condonation doctrine.[250] The Ombudsman
aptly cites several... rulings of various US State courts, as well as literature published on the matter, to
demonstrate the fact that the doctrine is not uniformly applied across all state jurisdictions
In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since the time Pascual was decided, the legal
landscape has radically shifted. Again, Pascual was a 1959 case decided under the 1935 Constitution,
which dated provisions do not reflect the experience of the
Filipino People under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore, the plain difference in setting,
including, of course, the sheer impact of the condonation doctrine on public accountability, calls for
Pascual's judicious re-examination.
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do
otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have
elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did... this with knowledge of his life and character,
and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for
the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people.
What remains apparent from the text of these cases is that the basis for condonation, as jurisprudential
doctrine, was - and still remains - the... above-cited postulates of Pascual, which was lifted from rulings
of US courts where condonation was amply supported by their own state laws. With respect to its
applicability to administrative cases, the core premise of condonation - that is, an elective official's... re-
election cuts qff the right to remove him for an administrative offense committed during a prior term -
was adopted hook, line, and sinker in our jurisprudence largely because the legality of that doctrine was
never tested against existing legal norms. As in the US, the... propriety of condonation is - as it should be
-dependent on the legal foundation of the adjudicating jurisdiction. Hence, the Court undertakes an
examination of our current laws in order to determine if there is legal basis for the continued application
of the doctrine of... condonation.
The foundation of our entire legal system is the Constitution. It is the supreme law of the land;[284]
thus, the unbending rule is that every statute should be read in light of the Constitution.[285] Likewise,
the Constitution is a... framework of a workable government; hence, its interpretation must take into
account the complexities, realities, and politics attendant to the operation of the political branches of
government.
As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in 1959. Therefore, it was decided within the
context of the 1935 Constitution which was silent with respect to public accountability, or of the nature
of public office being a public trust. The provision in the
1935 Constitution that comes closest in dealing with public office is Section 2, Article II which states that
"[t]he defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens
may be required by law to render personal military or civil... service."[287] Perhaps owing to the 1935
Constitution's silence on public accountability, and considering the dearth of jurisprudential rulings on
the matter, as well as the variance in the policy considerations, there was no glaring objection
confronting... the Pascual Court in adopting the condonation doctrine that originated from select US
cases existing at that time.
After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People have framed and adopted the 1987
Constitution, which sets forth in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies in Article II that "[t]he
State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service... and take positive and effective
measures against graft and corruption."[288] Learning how unbridled power could corrupt public
servants under the regime of a dictator, the Framers put primacy on the integrity of the public service by
declaring it as a... constitutional principle and a State policy. More significantly, the 1987 Constitution
strengthened and solidified what has been first proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by commanding
public officers to be accountable to the people at all times:
To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of
accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly
inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's... administrative liability for a misconduct
committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of
office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and
there is simply no... constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an
official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense
done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from... administrative offenses may be
condoned bv the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was
interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos[293] to apply to administrative offenses:
That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this
jurisdiction. As can be seen from this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings
way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from - and now rendered... obsolete by - the current legal
regime. In consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that
originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima,
Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia,... Jr. which were all relied upon by the CA.
It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be
prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal... system of the Philippines
Principles:
The exception to the no injunction policy is when there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter of
the investigation is outside the office's jurisdiction.
The Office of the Ombudsman has disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the...
government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, with the exception only of
impeachable officers, Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.[121] Nonetheless, the Ombudsman
retains the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office... allegedly committed by officials
removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if
warranted.[122] Note that the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over certain administrative cases
which are within the... jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrative agencies, but has primary
jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee who is under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbaya
On the other hand, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 provides that no appeal or application
for remedy may be heard against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, with the exception of the
Supreme Court on pure questions of law. This paragraph, which the
Ombudsman particularly relies on in arguing that the CA had no jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP
No. 139453 petition, as it is supposedly this Court which has the sole jurisdiction to conduct a judicial
review of its decisions or findings, is vague for two (2) reasons:
(1) it is unclear what the phrase "application for remedy" or the word "findings" refers to; and (2) it does
not specify what procedural remedy is solely allowable to this Court, save that the same be taken only
against a pure question of law. The... task then, is to apply the relevant principles of statutory
construction to resolve the ambiguity.
Gonzales III is the first case which grappled with the meaning of the Ombudsman's independence vis-a-
vis the independence of the other constitutional bodies. Pertinently, the Court observed:
(1) "[T]he independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional
Commissions shares certain characteristics - they do not owe their existence to any act of Congress, but
are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all... enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the
framers of the Constitution intended that these 'independent' bodies be insulated from political
pressure to the extent that the absence of 'independence' would result in the impairment of their core...
functions"[163];
(2) "[T]he Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence
and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and
constraints on the manner the independent constitutional... offices allocate and utilize the funds
appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only [of] the express
mandate of the Constitution, but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and
separation of powers upon which... the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based";[164] and
(3) "[T]he constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional Commissions' need for independence.
In the deliberations of the 1973 Constitution, the delegates amended the 1935 Constitution by providing
for a constitutionally-created Civil Service Commission,... instead of one created by law, on the premise
that the effectivity of this body is dependent on its freedom from the tentacles of politics. In a similar
manner, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission on Audit highlighted the
developments in the past
Constitutions geared towards insulating the Commission on Audit from political pressure."[165]
At bottom, the decisive ruling in Gonzales III, however, was that the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as well as that of the foregoing independent bodies, meant freedom from control or
supervision of the Executive Department:
(1) Lizares v. Hechanova[275] (May 17, 1966) - wherein the Court first applied the condonation doctrine,
thereby quoting the above-stated passages from Pascual in verbatim.
(2) Insco v. Sanchez, et al.[276] (December 18, 1967) - wherein the Court clarified that the condonation
doctrine does not apply to a criminal case. It was explained that a criminal case is different from an...
administrative case in that the former involves the People of the Philippines as a community, and is a
public wrong to the State at large; whereas, in the latter, only the populace of the constituency he
serves is affected. In addition, the Court noted that it is only the
(3) Aguinaldo v. Santos[277] (Aguinaldo; August 21, 1992) - a case decided under the 1987 Constitution
wherein the condonation doctrine was applied in favor of then Cagayan Governor Rodolfo E.
Aguinaldo... although his re-election merely supervened the pendency of, the proceedings.
(4) Salalima v. Guinsona, Jr.[278] (Salalima; May 22, 1996) -wherein the Court reinforced the
condonation doctrine by stating that the same is justified by "sound public policy." According to the
Court, condonation prevented the elective official from being "hounded" by administrative cases filed by
his "political enemies" during a new term, for which he has to defend himself "to the detriment of public
service." Also, the Court mentioned that the administrative... liability condoned by re-election covered
the execution of the contract and the incidents related therewith.[279]
(5) Mayor Garcia v. Mojica[280] (Mayor Garcia; September 10, 1999) - wherein the benefit of the
doctrine was extended to then Cebu City Mayor Alvin B. Garcia who was administratively charged for his
involvement in... an anomalous contract for the supply of asphalt for Cebu City, executed only four (4)
days before the upcoming elections. The Court ruled that notwithstanding the timing of the contract's
execution, the electorate is presumed to have known the petitioner's background and... character,
including his past misconduct; hence, his subsequent re-election was deemed a condonation of his prior
transgressions. More importantly, the Court held that the determinative time element in applying the
condonation doctrine should be the time when the contract was... perfected; this meant that as long as
the contract was entered into during a prior term, acts which were done to implement the same, even if
done during a succeeding term, do not negate the application of the condonation doctrine in favor of
the elective... official.
(6) Salumbides, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman[281] (Salumbides, Jr.; April 23, 2010) - wherein the Court
explained the doctrinal innovations in the Salalima and Mayor Garcia rulings, to wit:
Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica reinforced the doctrine. The condonation rule
was applied even if the administrative complaint was not filed before the reelection of the public official,
and even if the alleged misconduct... occurred four days before the elections, respectively. Salalima did
not distinguish as to the date of filing of the administrative complaint, as long as the alleged misconduct
was committed during the prior term, the precise timing or period of which Garcia did... not further
distinguish, as long as the wrongdoing that gave rise to the public official's culpability was committed
prior to the date of reelection.
The Court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Sojor,[283] also clarified that the condonation doctrine
would not apply to appointive officials since, as to them, there is no sovereign will to disenfranchise.
(7) And finally, the above discussed case of Governor Garcia, Jr. -wherein the Court remarked that it
would have been prudent for the appellate court therein to have issued a temporary restraining order
against the implementation of a... preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman in view of the
condonation doctrine.
What remains apparent from the text of these cases is that the basis for condonation, as jurisprudential
doctrine, was - and still remains - the... above-cited postulates of Pascual, which was lifted from rulings
of US courts where condonation was amply supported by their own state laws. With respect to its
applicability to administrative cases, the core premise of condonation - that is, an elective official's... re-
election cuts qff the right to remove him for an administrative offense committed during a prior term -
was adopted hook, line, and sinker in our jurisprudence largely because the legality of that doctrine was
never tested against existing legal norms. As in the US, the... propriety of condonation is - as it should be
-dependent on the legal foundation of the adjudicating jurisdiction. Hence, the Court undertakes an
examination of our current laws in order to determine if there is legal basis for the continued application
of the doctrine of... condonation.