Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-49097             March 31, 1944

G. VDA. DE ANGELES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
THE CITY OF DAVAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

OZAETA, J.:

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Davao declaring a city ordinance
valid, upon the following facts:

On December 29, 1934, the municipality of Davao passed ordinance No. 381, prescribing,
among other things, a slaughter fee of P2 per head of cow or carabao slaughtered.

On March 1, 1937, after the conversion and organization of the municipality of Davao into
a city by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 51, the municipal board of the City of Davao
approved resolution No. 2, whereby it re-enacted "into ordinances of the City of Davao all
subsisting ordinances of the former Municipality of Davao, insofar as they are not
inconsistent with the provisions of the Character of the City of Davao (Commonwealth Act
No. 51) and the Constitution of the Philippines."

At the time municipal ordinance No. 381 was passed the law empowering chartered cities
and municipalities to establish slaughterhouses and collect fees therefor was Act No. 4142,
which was approved on November 24, 1934, and which provided that the slaughter fee that
might be charged by a chartered city or municipality on large cattle and other domestic
animals shall not exceed two centavos per kilo of dressed meat.

At the time resolution No. 2 of the municipal board of the City of Davao was passed, said
Act No. 4142 had been amended by Commonwealth Act No. 155, which took effect on
November 9, 1936, and by which chartered cities, municipalities, and municipal districts
were empowered to establish or authorize the establishment of slaughterhouses and "to
charge reasonable slaughter fees."

This action was commenced by the appellants on December 6, 1937, to recover from the
City of Davao slaughter fees paid by them under protest and collected by the City under
the said municipal ordinance No. 381 before and after its re-enactment by resolution No. 2
of the municipal board of the City of Davao. The plaintiffs contended that said municipal
ordinance No. 381 was null and void because it contravened Act No. 4142, and that
Commonwealth Act No. 155 did not validate it.
The trial court held that the slaughter fees collected by the City of Davao before March 1,
1937 (i.e., from January 14 to February 28, 1937, inclusive), in excess of two centavos per
kilo of meat were unauthorized by Act No. 4142 and should be refunded to the plaintiffs;
but that the slaughter fees collected from and after March 1, 1937, when resolution No. 2
was approved, were legal because they were authorized by Commonwealth Act No. 155.
From that judgment the plaintiffs appealed.

Appellants' contention is that since ordinance No. 381 was passed upon the authority of Act
No. 3422, which had been repealed by Act No. 4142, it was illegal and "could not have been
revived by the passage of Commonwealth Act No. 155." Counsel for the appellants asserts:

. . . We submit that since the Ordinance in question is illegal, the passage of

Commonwealth Act No. 155 could not legalize the said Ordinance. We admit that in this
particular case, the City of Davao if it preferred could have passed a new and similar
ordinance by virtue of Act No. 155. But that the same had not been done in this particular
case. And we repeat that notwithstanding the provision of Act No. 155 and the resolution of
the City Council in re-enacting all existing ordinances of the then municipality of Davao,
the said Ordinance No. 381 still remained illegal. (Page 9, brief.)

The trial court did not hold that municipal ordinance No. 381 was revived or legalized by
the passage of Commonwealth Act No. 155. It held that said ordinance was legally re-
enacted by resolution No. 2 of the municipal board of the City of Davao on March 1, 1937,
when Commonwealth Act No. 155 was already in force. We find this opinion of the trial
court to be correct. Ordinance No. 381 was not completely illegal or nonexistent. It was
illegal only insofar as it contravened Act No. 4142, which prescribed a maximum slaughter
fee of two centavos per kilo. On March 1, 1937, ordinance No. 381 was one of the
"subsisting ordinances of the former Municipality of Davao," it never having been
theretofore annulled by a competent court. Therefore, when on said date the municipal
board of the City of Davao, by resolution No. 2, "resolved to re-enact into ordinances of the
City of Davao all subsisting ordinances of the former Municipality of Davao," ordinance
No. 381 was continued in operation as if it had been enacted verbatim by the municipal
board of the City of Davao; and since on said date Act No. 4142 had been amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 155, the latter, and not the former, was the enabling Act by which
the legality of said ordinance as re-enacted should be judged. Hence, any defect or illegality
ordinance No. 381 might have by reason of the limitation provided by Act No. 4142 was
cured or removed by the re-enactment of said ordinance under Commonwealth Act No.
155.

In conclusion, we hold that a municipal ordinance which is invalid because and insofar as it
contravenes on Act of the Legislature, may be re-enacted and validated by a resolution
approved after the Act which it contravened had been so amended as to make said
ordinance lawful.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs.

Yulo, C.J., Moran, Horrilleno, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-49124             August 18, 1944

BASILIA CABRERA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
FLORENCIA BELEN, ET AL., defendants, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, defendant-
appellee.

Dominador Al. Acuña and Jose Anonuevo Garcia for appellants.

Rafael Dinglasan for appellee.

OZAETA, J.:

This is an appeal from the Court of First Instance of Laguna, which dismissed the
plaintiffs' complaint insofar as the defendant Philippine National Bank was concerned, on
the ground that it did not state a cause of action against said bank.

From the allegations of the original complaint we deduce the following pertinent facts: The
plaintiffs are purchasers of a portion of four (4) hectares of a parcel of land of 35.9338
hectares formerly described in transfer certificate of title No. 5979 in the name of Eusebia
Disingco, the original vendor of plaintiffs' predecessors in interest. After Disingco's death,
the title was transferred to her daughter and only heir, the defendant Florencia Belen, to
whom was issued transfer certificate of title No. 15952, covering the said parcel of land.
The sale of the portion of four hectares in question was never annotated on the transfer
certificate of title, nor was a separate title therefor ever issued to the plaintiffs or to any of
their various successive predecessors in interest, altho the original sale by Eusebia Disingco
to one Marciano Celino is alleged to have taken place as early as March 9, 1917. On August
27, 1937, the defendant Florencia Belen mortgaged the entire parcel of 35-odd hectares
covered by said transfer certificate of title No. 15952 to the Philippine National Bank to
secure a loan of P4,500. Among the prayers of the complaint was, that the defendant
Florencia Belen and her husband Alfonso Buiser be required to pay off the mortgage to the
Philippine National Bank and to execute a new deed of sale of the portion of land in
question in favor of the plaintiffs free from all liens and encumbrances.

Upon motion of the bank, the trial court dismissed the complaint against it for lack of a
cause of action. A motion for reconsideration and an amended complaint were
subsequently filed. The court denied said motion and rejected the amended complaint
insofar as it referred to the bank.

Leaving aside the questions raised by the parties as to whether the appeal was filed on time
and as to whether the amended complaint has changed the theory of the original complaint
 insofar as the bank is concerned, we shall examine the new allegations of the amended
complaint and determine whether it state as sufficient cause of action against the bank to
justify the latter's inclusion therein as a party defendant.

The pertinent allegations of the amended complaint are the following:

16. — Estando registrada en el registro la venta a favor de la demandante Cabrera y

estando poseido el terreno adversamente por los causantes de ella en la fecha de la
hipoteca, el demandado Banco Nacional Filipino, que tiene la practica de inspeccionar el
terreno ofrecido en hipoteca, tenia motivos de saber y averiguar que la deodora Belen no
era la duena ni poseedora del terreno en cuestion, y no obstante concedio el credito
hipotecario arriba mencionado.

17. — Aun suponiendo el demandado Banco Nacional Filipino acreedor hipotecario de

buena fe, una vez enterado de que acepto como garantia una propiedad ajena, en su deber
no permitir aumento de gravamen desde entonces y reconocer al dueno verdadero el
derecho de liberar del mismo la propiedad, permitiendole el rescate de todo el inmueble
hipotecado caso preciso.

It is not alleged that the sale in favor of the plaintiff Cabrera was annotated on the
certificate of title. Neither is it alleged that the bank had knowledge of the alleged sale of
the portion of land in question by the registered owner thereof in favor of the plaintiffs of
their predecessors in interest. The sale alleged to have been registered (presumably
Registration Act) was that referred to in paragraph 12 of the complaint, namely, the sale to
the plaintiff Basilia Cabrera by the spouses Artemio Fule and Paz Cabrera dated February
28, 1935. Artemio Fule and Paz Cabrera are not alleged to have ever been the registered
owners of the land in question. The allegation that "the defendant Philippine National
Bank, which has the practice of inspecting the land offered in mortgage, had reasons to
know and find out that the debtor Belen was neither the owner nor the possessor of the
land in question," is not sufficient, in our opinion, to charge the bank with knowledge of
the alleged sale to the plaintiff Cabrera, or with bad faith in accepting the mortgage from
the registered owner. It is not alleged or pretended that, as a matter of fact, the bank did
inspect the land and did find out that the mortgagor Florencia Belen was not the owner
and possessor thereof. It must be borne in mind that the land in question (4 hectares) is
only a small portion of the parcel of 35-odd hectares mortgaged to the bank, and even if a
representative of the bank had in fact inspected it, he was not bound to inquire whether of
not any portion thereof was possessed and owned by some person other than the registered
owner. It is not alleged that a representative of the bank inspected the land and that the
plaintiffs or someone in their behalf told him that they were the owners and possessors of a
portion thereof.

It is, nevertheless, further alleged that "even supposing that the defendant Philippine
National Bank is a mortgage creditor in good faith, once it learned that it had accepted as
security another person's property, it was its duty not to permit any increase of the
encumbrance thereafter and to recognize in the true owner the right to free the property
from the mortgage by permitting the redemption of the entire property." But who is the
true owner of the property? That question is still under litigation between the plaintiffs and
the defendants Florencia Belen and Alfonso Buiser. The bank cannot arrogate to itself the
authority to decide that question. Pending the court's decision, the bank cannot recognize
the plaintiffs as the true owners in lieu of the registered owner for the simple reason that the
certificate of Torrens title is presumed to speak the truth.

Appellants' pretensions against the bank under their original as well as their amended
complaint cannot be entertained in view of the provisions of sections 38, 39, 45, and 50 of
the Land Registration Act, and the various decisions of this Court, among the latest of
which is that of Sumira vs. Vistan, 1 Off. Gaz., [Nov. 1943], 133-136, which is on all fours
with the present case.

The orders appealed from are affirmed, with costs against the appellants.

Yulo, C.J., Moran Horrilleno, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-48058 October 20, 1944

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

CLEMENCIO ABAQUITA, defendant-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Avanceña for appellant.
 Gaudencio R. Juezan and Ciriaco S. Salazar for appellee.

OZAETA, J.:

This case of homicide thru reckless imprudence, commenced in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu on October 2, 1940, is before us for the second time. The first time, it was brought
here on appeal by the Government from an order of the trial court remanding the case to
the municipal court of Cebu for preliminary investigation. In our decision of September 4,
1942, we reversed that order and instructed the trial court to proceed. But the trial court
(then presided over by another judge), instead of proceeding, dismissed the case on motion
of the accused upon the ground of supposed lack of jurisdiction arising from the change of
sovereignty. Hence this second appeal by the Government.

We are constrained again to reverse the trial court. lawphil.netThe supposed lack of
jurisdiction is premised on the trivial and over-technical observation that the heading of
the information describers or indicated the former and not the present sovereignty under
which the case is prosecuted. We do not think such a purely formal defect in the heading of
the information (if defect it has become) affected the jurisdiction of the court. If it did,
practically all the final judgments rendered by our courts of justice during the last thirty-
two months in cases filed before 1942 would have to be declared null and void. The mere
suggestion of such a pause and reflect: Is the court's jurisdiction conferred by, or in any
way dependent upon, the heading of the information or complaint? We are not aware of
any law to that effect. It is the parties and the subject matter that should be considered. If
the heading or superscription to the pleading is set of any consequence, it may, with the aid
of common sense and a little imagination, be taken for granted as having been impliedly
and necessarily changed with the changing circumstances, as indeed the trial court must
have so taken it for granted when, without any change in the heading of the original
information, it used in the very order appealed from the heading it considered appropriate
under the then existing circumstances, namely, "Philippine Executive Commission," in lieu
of "Commonwealth of the Philippines."

The order appealed from is reversed and the case is again ordered remanded to the court
of origin for trial and decision on the merits, with costs against the appellee.

Yulo, C.J., Moran, Horrilleno and Paras, JJ., concur.

 YULO, C.J.:

Mr. Justice Bocobo took no part in the deliberation and voted to reverse and remand.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 198832, January 13, 2021 ]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. SPS. VIRGILIO AND ANNA

RAMIREZ LONTOK, RISING SUN MOTORS CORPORATION, AND THE REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF LOS BAÑOS AND SANTA CRUZ, LAGUNA, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

GESMUNDO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the September 29, 2011

Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86968. The CA affirmed the
January 26, 2006 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch 91
(RTC) which dismissed the complaint filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines (the
Republic) for failure to state a cause of action.

Antecedents

The CA summarized the facts as follows:

On 30 May 1986, Anna R. Lontok (A. Lontok) was granted Free Patent No. (IV-2) 27332
by the Department of [Environment and] Natural Resources thru the Bureau of Lands, NR
District No. IV-2, Los Baños, Laguna over a parcel of land located at Banca-Banca,
Victoria, Laguna more particularly described as Lot No. 97-A CSD-04-005006 (Cad/Pls No.
420- D) with a total area of 2,180 sq. meters (subject property, for brevity). On even date,
defendant-appellee A. Lontok was issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-8554 by
the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Laguna.

On 11 November 1991, A. Lontok sold 1,623 sq. meter portion of the subject property to
defendant-appellee The Rising Sun Motors Corporation (defendant-appellee Rising Sun),
represented by its president Napoleon A. Dator, Jr. As a consequence, OCT No. P-8554 was
cancelled insofar as the 1,623 sq. meter portion was concerned and Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-129346 was issued by the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Laguna to
defendant-appellee Rising Sun on 25 November 1991. Defendant-appellee Rising Sun,
thereafter, occupied the property covered by TCT No. T-129346.

It appears on record that OCT No. P-8554 had been totally cancelled by TCT No. T-129346
and TCTs Nos. 129354-55, but no other information exists as to the specificity of the two
latter titles.

On 19 January 1994, the heirs of Sps. Juanito Armando and Rizalina Bartolome
(protestants) filed a formal protest before the Department of Envirorunent and Natural
Resources (DENR) - Manila against the issuance of the free patent in A. Lontok's name.
Protestants' allegations was summarized by the DENR-Manila as follows:

[T]hat protestants are the children of the late spouses Dr. Juanito Armando Bartolome and
Rizalina Sison; that upon the death of their late father, he left a parcel of land situated in
Banca-Banca, Victoria, Laguna with an area of .310 hectare, of which .2980 hectare is
agricultural and 200 square meters is residential; that the agricultural portion of the land
is devoted to coconuts, lanzones, star apple and avocado; that said parcel of land is covered
by a tax declaration and that realty taxes thereon had been paid up to the year 1993, as
shown by the Certification issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Victoria, Laguna dated
January 10, 1994; that protestants' father acquired the land in tum from his late father
Juan Bartolome by way of his last will dated October 19, 1936 probated by the court in SP
No. 3539; that the protestants' ownership of property was attested by Monina Corcuera,
daughter of Eduardo Gutierrez, the former overseer of the property in an Affidavit dated
October 19, 1993 and by Estelita Sangalang, an [adjoining) landowner in an Affidavit
dated January 4, 1994; that the cadastral survey of Victoria, Laguna Cad-427-D was
surveyed in the name of Juanito Armando as Lot No. 97, Cad-427-D with an area of 2,980
square meters; that on February 28, 1986, the District Land Officer of Land District IV-2,
upon request of respondents, issued Survey Authority No. 248-86 to subdivide Lot 97, Cad.
427 D-situated in Banca-Banca, Victoria, Laguna; that pursuant to the survey authority,
the respondents caused the subdivision of Lot 97, Cad. 427-D into Lots 97-A and 97-B
under plan Csd-04-005006 approved by the Lands Regional Director on March 18, 1986;
that subsequent thereto, respondent Anna Ramirez Lontok filed with the District Land
Office of Los Baños, Laguna, Free Patent Application No. 20722 covering Lot No. 97-A
with an area of 2,180 sq. meters; that after final investigation report was duly submitted by
Land Inspector Rogelio Diamante, Free Patent No. 27332 was issued on May 30, 1986
which was registered on even date with the Register of Deeds. x x x

Investigation ensued, and on 18 January 1995, a Resolution was issued by the DENR-
Manila thru its Regional Executive Director for Region IV-A, Antonio G. Principe,
recommending the cancellation of A. Lontok's Free Patent No. (IV-2) 27332 and Original
Certificate of Title No. P-8554. The pertinent portion of the Resolution reads:

xxxx
Based on the investigation/ocular inspection conducted (sic) it was evident that protestants
through their predecessors-in-interest have proven substantially their claim of ownership
over the controverted Lot No. 97-A. The fact of their possession of a portion thereof does
not preclude them from claiming the whole lot identified as Cad Lot No. 97, since the
subsequent sub-division was without the protestants' knowledge.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby, as it is, ordered that a

CANCELLATION proceeding be instituted against Free Patent No. 27332 and Original
Certificate of Title No. P-8554 issued in the name of Anna Ramirez Lontok over Lot 97-A
and such other title/s emanating from the FP of Lontok by this Office in accordance with
the Office of the Solicitor General.

SO ORDERED.

On 17 July 1998, the Republic thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Complaint for Annulment of Patent and Cancellation of Title against the Spouses Virgilio
and A. Lontok (Spouses Lontok) and defendant-appellee Rising Sun docketed as SC 3723.
It was alleged in the Complaint that a protest was filed by the Heirs of the Spouses Juanita
Armando and Rizalina Bartolome against the issuance of A. Lontok's Free Patent No. (N-2)
27332, and which protest was subject of an administrative investigation by the DENR-
Manila. It was further alleged in the Complaint that: (1) protestants, together with their
predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous and adverse possession of the subject
property since time immemorial; (2) A. Lontok committed fraud and misrepresentation in
her free patent application when she claimed that she had complied with all the cultivation
and residence requirement of the free patent law, when in fact she was not in possession of
the subject property; and (3) A. Lontok's misrepresentation constitutes sufficient ground
for the cancellation of the patent and the corresponding title issued to her under the
mandate of Section 91 of the Public Land Act. The Republic prayed for the following
reliefs:

xxxx

1. Declaring Free Patent No. (IV-2) 27332 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-8554 in
the name of defendant Anna Ramirez Lontok, TCT No. T-129346 in the name of defendant
Rising Sun Motors Corporation, and all other derivative titles, in [sic] any, null and void ab
initio;

2. Ordering defendants Anna Ramirez Lontok and Rising Sun Motors Corporation to
surrender their respective owners' duplicate certificates of title to the Register of Deeds of
Laguna and the latter to cancel the same as well as all other derivative titles, if any; and

3. Ordering the reversion of land covered by the aforesaid patent and titles to the mass of
the public domain under the administration and disposition of the Director of Lands.

xxxx
 On 17 December 1998, defendant-appellee Rising Sun filed its Answer with Counterclaim
denying the allegations in the Complaint and countered that it was a buyer in good faith
and is not aware of any imperfection in A. Lontok's title to the subject property. Rising
Sun also alleged, among others, that (1) the Republic has no cause of action against it; (2)
the cause of action had prescribed or barred by the statute of limitations since the Free
Patent No. (IV-2) 27332 and OCT No. P-8554 was issued to A. Lontok on 30 May 1986; (3)
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action; (4) that the
cause of action had been barred by prior judgment/order and thus, constitutes res judicata;
and (5) the Republic is guilty of forum shopping.

On 18 December 1998, the Spouses Lontok filed their Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim claiming regularity in the issuance of Free Patent No. 27332 on 30 May 1986.
In their defense, the Spouses Lontok alleged, among others, that the Republic had not been
candid with the court as it failed to mention that it had filed a similar case before the
Municipal Trial Court of Victoria[,] Laguna on 26 December 1996.

On 1 February 2000, the court a quo issued a Pre-Trial Order defining the issues of the
case, as follows:

xxxx

1. Whether plaintiff has a cause of action against defendants;

2. Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, or nature of the action;

3. Whether free patent (sic) No. (IV-2) 27332 and original certificate of title (sic) No. P-8554
are null and void ab initio;

4. Whether the defendant corporation is a purchaser in good faith;

5. Whether the plaintiff is guilty of Forum Shopping;

6. Whether the cause of action of the plaintiff had prescribed or barred by the statute (sic)
of Limitations, since the original certificate of title (free patent) was issued on 30 May 1986;

7. Whether the cause of action had been barred by prior judgment (principle of res
judicata) in Civil Cases No. SC 3042, RTC, Branch 27, SC-No. 3397 RTC Branch 91 (sic). x
xx

During the proceedings a quo, a Motion to Withdraw Appearance dated 29 October 2001
was filed by Spouses Lontok's counsel, Atty. Antonio Oliva, citing irreconcilable differences
in the handling of the case. He also stated that the consent of the Spouses Lontok was not
obtained and that the latter had manifested their financial constraints in paying for his
services. Nothing on record shows that Atty. Oliva's Motion to Withdraw Appearance was
acted upon by the court a quo. Records disclosed that as of 18 January 2002, there was no
appearance in court of the Spouses Lontok.4 (citations omitted)
 The RTC Ruling

In its Decision dated January 26, 2006, the RTC dismissed the case for the Republic's
failure to establish its cause of action, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the plaintiff to establish its cause of
action against the defendants, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED and no damages are
awarded as the plaintiff is representing the Government. Defendants spouses Virgilio and
Anna Ramirez-Lontok, Rising Sun Motors Corporation, rep. by Napoleon A. Dator, Jr.,
the registered owners of the respective portions of the land, subject matter of this case are
entitled to the lawful ownership, possession and enjoyment thereof. Defendant's
counterclaim for other damages is likewise dismissed for lack of sufficient basis.

SO ORDERED.5

The trial court held that based on the findings of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), the subject property is private in character, to which an action
for reversion shall not avail.

The CA Ruling

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC and noted that the Republic had asserted in its
appellant's brief that the subject property is considered private land, to wit:

[A]ppellee Spouses Lontok should not have been granted a patent as the subject property
had been considered private in nature in favor of the protestants led by Melinda
Bartolome-Orosa thereby necessitating the cancellation of said patent and its concomitant
title in the name of respondent Anna Ramirez Lontok and now Rising Sun.6

The CA held that the above statement, in conjunction with its allegations in the complaint
that the heirs of Dr. Juanita Bartolome and Rizalina Sison (Spouses Bartolome) and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous and adverse possession of the subject
property since time immemorial, indicates that the subject property is actually private in
nature. Accordingly, the complaint filed by the Republic failed the test for the sufficiency of
a cause of action.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue

The Republic, represented herein by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), submits the
lone issue of whether the CA committed a reversible error in finding that the Republic
failed to establish its cause of action.7

The OSG maintains that the subject complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action because
it contained allegations that respondent Anna Ramirez Lontok fraudulently acquired the
 property through a free patent. Since the State may dispose of property by awarding free
patents, it follows that the subject realty originally formed part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. Hence, when Anna Ramirez Lontok fraudulently
applied for and was irregularly awarded a free patent, the State can validly file an action
for reversion under Section 91 of the Public Land Act.8 Furthermore, the rule on
indefeasibility of title shall not apply because the requirement of cultivation and occupation
under the Public Land Act had not been satisfied.9

Respondent Rising Sun counters that the Republic failed to state a cause of action as it
admitted that the subject property is private and beyond the reach of an action for
reversion. It also alleges that the said case was an attempt to resurrect the case filed by the
heirs of Spouses Bartolome which had already been dismissed with prejudice.

On the other hand, respondent Spouses Lontok failed to file their comment on the petition
despite several notices issued by this Court.10 Hence, We deemed the Spouses Lontok to
have waived their right to file a comment.11

May a complaint for annulment of patent and cancellation of title with prayer for reversion
be dismissed if the subject property does not anymore belong to the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain?

The Court's Ruling

We find merit in the petition.

The CA ruled in the assailed decision that the subject complaint failed to meet the test of
sufficiency of cause of action. The CA noted the Republic's allegation that the Spouses
Bartolome (from whom respondent Anna Ramirez Lontok purchased the contested lot)
and their predecessors and successors-in interest, had been in continuous and adverse
possession of the property since time immemorial. Since the subject property had acquired
a private character due to the continued and adverse possession of the Spouses Bartolome
and their predecessors-in-interest, the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a
cause of action.12

The CA is partly mistaken.

Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading.13 In

determining whether an initiatory pleading states a cause of action, the test is whether
admitting the truth of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer?14 Hence, only the allegations in the complaint may properly
be considered.15 Failure to make a sufficient allegation of a cause of action in the
complaint "warrants its dismissal."16

To determine whether the CA and the RTC had been correct in ordering the dismissal of
the complaint filed by the Republic, We have to review the allegations contained therein.
 Hence, We quote the pertinent averments made by the Republic in the subject
complaint, viz.:

10. On January 19, 1994, the heirs of spouses Juanita Armando and Rizalina Bartolome
tiled a formal protest against the issuance of the aforesaid free patent and certificate of title
alleging, among others, that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of Lot No. 97, Cad
427D, with a resultant area of 2,180 square meters which lot was surveyed in the name of
Juanita Armando, protestants' father, during the cadastral survey of Victoria, Laguna in
1970, and that the protestants by themselves and thru their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land since 1919
and that, consequently, defendant Anna Ramirez Lontok, misrepresented in her free
patent application that she, by herself and her predecessor-in-interest, have occupied and
cultivated the land since July 4, 1945.

11. The protest was the subject of an administrative investigation conducted by Roberto S.
Cortes, Jr., Chief of the Claims and Conflicts Section of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, Region IV, Manila, who came out with the finding that subject
patent and the corresponding original certificate of title were irregularly issued to, and
fraudulently acquired by defendant Anna Ramirez Lontok in that:

a) Lot 97-A is a portion of a bigger lot, Lot 97, Cad 427- D, with a resultant area of 2,180
square meters, which lot was surveyed in the name of Juanito Armando, protestants'
father, during the cadastral survey of Victoria, Laguna in 1970.

b) Juanita Armando inherited the land from his father. Juan Bartolome, by way of a last
will and testament dated October 19, 1936, which will was probated by the court in Special
Proceedings No. 3539. Juan Bartolome, in turn, acquired the land from Pedro Gala thru
sale with pacto de retro on April 25, 1919. For his part, Pedro Gala acquired the land from
Eufemia Pantaleon who had been in open, continuous, peaceful and public possession
thereof for twenty years.

c) Protestants, together with their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous and

adverse possession of the subject land since time immemorial. Moreover, it was verified
from several residents in the locality during the ocular inspection that defendant spouses
Lontok never occupied or introduced any improvements over the subject land.

d) Subject property was declared for taxation purposes in the name of Juan Armando
Bartolome and the corresponding taxes were duly paid from previous years up to the year
1993.

e) The "Kasulatan ng Bilihan Tuluyan" dated March 20, 1977, which deed of sale was
purportedly executed by Juan Bartolome in favor of defendant Anna Ramirez Lontok, and
was issued as basis for the issuance of the disputed patent and its corresponding title to
defendant Lontok, is of questionable authenticity. The NBI Report states that the
questioned and standard signatures of Juan Bartolome and Rizalina Sison Bartolome, the
alleged vendors, were not written by one and the same person.
 12. Based on the finding of Special Investigator Roberto S. Cortes, Jr., it is evident that
defendant Anna Ramirez Lontok committed fraud and misrepresentation in her free
patent application when she claimed that she has complied with all the cultivation and
residence requirements of the free patent law, when in fact she was not in possession
thereof, and when she used a spurious document of sale to secure title over the land.

13. Such misrepresentation constitutes sufficient ground for the cancellation of the patent
and the corresponding title issued to her, by explicit mandate of Section 91 of the Public
Land Act (C.A. No. 141, as amended) x x x

xxxx

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered in favor of herein

plaintiff as follows:

1. Declaring Free Patent No. (IV-2) 27332 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-8554 in
the name of defendant Anna Ramirez Lontok, TCT No. T-129346 in the name of defendant
Rising Sun Motors Corporation, and all other derivative titles, if any, null and void, ab
initio;

2. Ordering defendants Anna Ramirez Lontok and Rising Sun Motors Corporation to

surrender their respective owners' duplicate certificates of title to the Register of Deeds of
Laguna and the latter to cancel the same as well as all other derivative titles, if any; and

3. Ordering the reversion of land covered by the aforesaid patent and titles to the mass of
the public domain under administration and disposition of the Director of Lands.17

As correctly observed by the CA and the RTC, the complaint showed that the subject lot
already acquired a private character even before the State granted the free patent
application of respondent Amla Ramirez Lontok. The Republic had particularly admitted
and recognized in paragraph 11(b) of the complaint, the fact of the open, continuous and
adverse possession of the heirs of Juan Bartolome and their predecessors-in-interest for
more than thirty (30) years. In our jurisdiction, the prima facie proof of ownership of
private land includes a duly registered possessory information or a clear showing of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or previous occupants.18

When property has ceased to be public because it has been acquired by a private individual
by operation of law, the Director of Lands loses jurisdiction over the said property and the
State has no more title over the property.19 In this instance, the State no longer possessed a
right to initiate an action or even pray for reversion because the realty had already been
acquired by virtue of an imperfect title and no longer forms part of the public domain.

Thus, We agree with the CA in faulting the Republic for its failure to state a cause of action
in relation to its prayer for reversion. It is well to remind the Republic that in reversion,
 the pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership of the disputed
land.20 By acknowledging the imperfect title of the heirs of Juan Bartolome, the State no
longer has a cause of action for reversion because the subject realty is already of private
ownership.

Nonetheless, We find the dismissal of the subject complaint to be improper.

To recall, the Republic initiated this complaint upon a finding of fraud in the application of
a free patent. The authority to file an action in the event of fraud in the application of free
patents is based on Sec. 91 of the Public Land Act which reads:

Section 91. The statements made in the application shall be considered as essential
conditions and parts of any concession, title, or permit issued on the basis of such
application, and any false statements therein or omission of facts altering, changing, or
modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such statements, and any subsequent
modification, alteration, or change of the material facts set forth in the application
shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title, or permit granted. It shall
be the duty of the Director of Lands, from time to time and whenever he may deem it
advisable, to make the necessary investigations for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
material facts set out in the application are true, or whether they continue to exist and are
maintained and preserved in good faith, and for the purposes of such investigation, the
Director of Lands is hereby empowered to issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces
tecum and, if necessary, to obtain compulsory process from the courts. In every
investigation made in accordance with this section, the existence of bad faith, fraud,
concealment, or fraudulent and illegal modification of essential facts shall be presumed if
the grantee or possessor of the land shall refuse or fail to obey a subpoena or
subpoena duces tecum lawfully issued by the Director of Lands or his authorized delegates
or agents, or shall refuse or fail to give direct and specific answers to pertinent questions,
and on the basis of such presumption, an order of cancellation may issue without further
proceedings. (emphasis supplied)

Sec. 91 expressly provides for the automatic cancellation of the applications filed on the
ground of fraud and misrepresentation. In Angeles v. Republic,21 this Court held that
although the State may no longer have a cause of action for reversion, it may still validly
initiate a complaint for nullification of patents and titles in order to maintain the integrity
of the land registration process, thus:

Indeed, petitioners managed to secure the free patents through District Land Officer
Braulio Darum, acting for the Director of Lands and the Republic of the Philippines. They
were likewise issued titles over the lots subject of the complaint despite the fact that, by
operation of law, spouses Juan Sanga were already its owners. The Republic of the
Philippines, through the Bureau of Lands, is obliged to undo what has been perpetrated by
petitioners in violation of law. It behooved the Republic, through the Director of the
Bureau of Lands, to institute the proper action for the nullification of the patents and titles.
Public respondent is not proscribed from filing the amended complaint merely because the
Heirs of Juan Sanga had a cause of action for the cancellation of said patents and titles. We
quote, with approval, the ruling of the CA on the matter:

That the State has the personality to file a case for the cancellation of issued land titles is
supported by Sec. 91 of the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended) which provides:

Section 91. The statements made in the application shall be considered as essential
conditions and parts of any concession, title, or permit issued on the basis of such
application, and any false statements therein or omission of facts altering, changing, or
modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such statements and any subsequent
modification, alteration or change of the material facts set forth in the application shall
ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title, or permit granted. It shall be the
duty of the Director of Lands. from time to time and whenever he may deem it advisable. to
make the necessary investigations for the purpose of ascertaining whether the material
facts set out in the application are true. or whether they continue to exist and are
maintained and preserved in good faith and for the purposes of such investigation, the
Director of Lands is hereby empowered to issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and
necessary to obtain compulsory process from the courts. x x x

Under this provision which speaks, inter alia, of the "cancellation of the concession, title or
permit granted" the State's authority to cancel an issued title is expressly given. The
authority to investigate vests in the Director of Lands. The State must of course act through
its appropriate agencies - i.e., the Office of the Solicitor General and the courts-to secure
the actual cancellation after observance of due process. The Honorable Supreme Court
confirmed this authority when it held in Gamao vs. Calamba that -

The mere fact that a patent and title have already been issued to defendant Calamba does
not preclude administrative investigation by the Director of Lands, who, if he finds that
there was fraud in obtaining the same, may himself or in representation of the Republic of
the Philippines file an appropriate action for the cancellation of the patent and title or for
the reversion of the land to the public domain, as the case may be.

Based on these premises, the amendment of government's complaints to drop the reversion
aspect did not divest the State of the authority and personality to proceed with its
complaints for the cancellation of the patentee's titles despite the State's admission that the
lands covered by the disputed patents and titles are private in character. The State
maintained sufficient interests in terms of the maintenance of the integrity of the
land registration process to have standing in these cases. (emphasis supplied)

To reiterate, the effort by the Republic to claim for reversion was rightfully denied due to
the private character of the subject realty.ℒαwρhi ৷ However, the complaint which contains
allegations of fraud on the part of respondent Anna Ramirez Lontok, clearly vests in the
Republic a cause of action to cancel the free patent and the derivative titles pursuant to
Sec. 91 of the Public Land Act. The fact that the State can no longer pray for reversion
should not have affected its cause of action to cancel the free patent and the derivative titles
on the ground of fraud. Hence, it was error for the CA and the RTC to have ordered the
 dismissal of the Republic's complaint merely on the basis that the prayer for reversion
cannot be sustained.

Accordingly, We remand this case to the court of origin for further proceedings on whether
fraud attended the application for free patent of respondent Anna Ramirez Lontok.

WHEREFORE, We GRANT the Petition for Review; SET ASIDE the Court of Appeals

Decision dated September 29, 2011; and REMAND this case to the Regional Trial Court,
Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch 91 to determine with dispatch whether Free Patent No. (IV-2)
27332 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-8554 in the name of Anna Ramirez Lontok,
and the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-129346 in the name of Rising Sun Motors
Corporation are null and void.

SO ORDERED.

Perlas-Bernabe, Senior Associate Justice, (Chairperson), Lazaro-Javier, Lopez,

and Rosario, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 247866, September 15, 2020 ]

FEDERATION OF CORON, BUSUANGA, PALAWAN FARMER'S ASSOCIATION,

INC. (FCBPFAI), REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, RODOLFO CADAMPOG, SR,;
SAMAHAN NG MAGSASAKA SA STO. NINO, BUSUANGA, PALAWAN (SAMMASA)
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, EDGARDO FRANCISCO; SANDIGAN NG
MAMBUBUKID NG BINTUAN CORON, INC. (SAMBICO), REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHAIRMAN, RODOLFO CADAMPOG, SR.; AND RODOLFO CADAMPOG, SR., IN
HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY AS A FILIPINO CITIZEN, AND IN BEHALF OF
MILLIONS OF FILIPINO OCCUPANTS AND SETTLERS ON PUBLIC LANDS
CONSIDERED SQUATTERS IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY, PETITIONERS, VS. THE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES (DENR) AND THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM (DAR),
RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

GESMUNDO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section 3(a) of Presidential

Decree (P.D.) No. 705, or the Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines.

The Antecedents

Petitioners Federation of Coron, Busuanga, Palawan Farmer's Association, Inc., (FCBPFAI) and

Sandigan ng Mambubukid ng Bintuan Coron, Inc., (SAMBICO) are federations consisting of
fanners in Palawan. Sometime in 2002, the farm lands occupied by the members of SAMBICO
in Sitio Dipangan and Langka, Brgy. Bintuan, Coron, Palawan were placed under the coverage
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). The lands placed under CARP had titles in the name of Mercury Group of
Companies, covering a total area of 1,752.4006 hectares.1

However, the implementation of the CARP over the subject lands was stopped because the said
lands were unclassified forest land under Sec. 3(a) of P.D. No. 705 and thus, are inalienable and
belong to the government. As these are forest lands, they are under the administration of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and not the DAR.2

In March 2014, a meeting was conducted at the office of the DAR, Coron, Palawan, attended by
the Legal Division Region IV-B, where petitioner Rodolfo Cadampog, Sr. of FCBPFAI was
formally informed that the CARP coverage will not push through because the lands were
unclassified forest land.3

Similarly, members of the Samahan ng Magsasaka ng Sto. Nino (SAMMASA) alleged that they

farmed the lands of Brgy. Sto. Nino, Busuanga, Palawan. Farming was their means of livelihood
even before their barangay was established in the 1960s. Sometime in 1980, the farm lands they
tilled were placed under the coverage of CARP. The land tilled by the farmers was originally
titled under the name of a certain Jose Sandoval. However, the land distribution was stopped
under the CARP because the DENR stated that the said lands were unclassified forest land under
Sec. 3(a) of P.D. No. 705 and these forest lands belong to the government.4

In April 3, 2014, petitioner Rodolfo Cadampog, Sr., of FCBPFAI received a letter from
Provincial Agrarian Reform Program Officer (PARPO) Conrado S. Gueverra stating that the
lands of Mercury Group of Companies and Josefa Sandoval Vda. De Perez are within the forest
classification of the DENR under Sec. 3 (a) of P.D. No. 705. Thus, the same cannot be covered
by CARP.5

Hence, this petition to declare Sec. 3(a) of P.D. No. 705 unconstitutional.

Issue

WHETHER SECTION 3(a) OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 705 IS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Petitioners argue that Sec. 3(a) of P.D. No. 705 violates the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitution; that under the Philippine Bill of 1902, when an unclassified land is
not covered by trees and has not been reserved as a forest land, then it is considered as an
agricultural land; that Sec. 3(a) retroactively changed the unclassified lands into forest lands; that
the said law deprived millions of Filipinos, who possess land and informally settle on the land,
with their vested right of ownership; that it unreasonably stated that unclassified land shall be
forest land; instead, petitioners insist that unclassified land should be considered as alienable and
disposable land of public domain; and that only those lands with trees and timber should be
considered as forest land, and the rest should be considered as public agricultural land.
In their Comment,6 respondents Secretary of the DENR and DAR, as represented by the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), countered that petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of
constitutionality of the law; that petitioners have no locus standi to file the petition; that the
Philippine Bill of 1902 simply gave the State the power to classify lands; that pursuant to the
Regalian Doctrine, all lands belong to the State and there must be a positive act from the State
before the land can be alienable and disposable; that Sec. 3(a) of P.D. No. 705 is in accordance
with the Regalian Doctrine; and that there is no violation of the rights of petitioners because
unclassified lands, which are forest lands, belong to the State, hence, petitioners have no property
rights to be violated.

In their Reply,7 petitioners argued that they have the locus standi to file this petition; that prior to
Sec. 3(a) of P.D. No. 705, there was no requirement that land must first be declared alienable and
disposable before it could subject to private ownership; that informal settlement or material
occupancy of vacant crown lands were allowed; that there is a presumption that land is
agricultural unless the contrary is shown; and that Sec. 3(a) of P.D. No. 705 renders the
implementation of the land reform under CARP impossible because the biggest landowner is the
government.

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Presumption of constitutionality;
locus standi

Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. This presumption is rooted in
the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three (3) coordinate departments of
the government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts. The theory is that every law, being the
joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in
accord with the fundamental law. This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof,
unconstitutional, where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one. In other words, the grounds for nullity
must be beyond reasonable doubt, for to doubt is to sustain.8

The presumption of constitutionality, in its most basic sense, only means that courts, in passing
upon the validity of a law, will afford some deference to the statute and charge the party assailing
it with the burden of showing that the act is incompatible with the Constitution. The doctrine
comes into operation when a party comes to court praying that a law be set aside for being
unconstitutional. In effect, it places a heavy burden on the act's assailant to prove invalidity
beyond reasonable doubt; it commands the clearest showing of a constitutional infraction. Thus,
before a law may be struck down as unconstitutional, courts must be certain that there exists a
clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution, and not one that is speculative or
argumentative.9

The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For
a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Those who seek
to declare the law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional, must clearly establish the basis therefore.
Otherwise, the arguments fall short.10

In this case, petitioners assail Sec. 3(a) of P.D. No. 705. However, the Court finds that petitioners
failed to discharge the heavy burden in assailing the constitutionality of the law. As will be
discussed later, Sec. 3(a) is consistent with the Constitution, which adapted the Regalian
Doctrine that all lands of public domain belong to the State.

Further, petitioners failed to prove that they have the locus standi to raise a constitutional
question. Legal standing or locus standi is defined as a "personal and substantial interest in the
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental
act that is being challenged." For a citizen to have standing, he must establish that he has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.11

A party is allowed to "raise a constitutional question" when (1) he can show that he will
personally suffer some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely
to be redressed by a favorable action. Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an
interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial
interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest."12

In this case, aside from their bare assertion that they are recipients of the distribution of the lands
in Sitio Dipangan and Langka, Brgy. Bintuan, Coron, and Brgy. Sto. Nino, Busuanga, Palawan
under the CARP, petitioners failed to substantiate their claim of ownership and possession over
the same. As properly pointed out by respondents, petitioners have not presented any evidence to
prove that they actually occupy the lands much less that the lands are alienable and
disposable.13 Further, petitioners have not even alleged that they attempted to file an application
to have the subjects lands re-classified from forest lands to alienable and disposable lands of
public domain with the proper government agency and that their application was denied. Hence,
no actual or threatened injury can be attributed to petitioners.

In any case, even on the substantive aspect, the petition fails.

Sec. 3 (a) is constitutional;

Regalian Doctrine

Sec. 3(a) of P.D. No. 705 states:

(a) Public forest is the mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the
present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest
purposes and which are not.

According to petitioner, it is against the Constitution to declare that unclassified lands should be
treated as forest lands because it deprives the actual possessors of the land to claim ownership
over it; and that under the Philippine Bill of 1902, lands of public domain are presumed to be
agricultural lands.

The argument, however, of petitioner is not of first impression; rather, this issue has already been
settled in several decisions of the Court, particularly, in Heirs of the late Spouses Vda. de
Palanca v. Republic (Vda. De Palanca)14 and The Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources v. Yap (Yap).15 It is already well-settled that unclassified land cannot be
considered as alienable and disposable land of public domain pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country
from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State. This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands not
appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public
lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have
reclassified or alienated them to private persons.16

To further understand the Regalian Doctrine, a review of the previous Constitutions and laws is
warranted. The Regalian Doctrine was embodied as early as in the Philippine Bill of 1902. Under
Section 12 thereof, it was stated that all properties of the Philippine Islands that were acquired by
the United States through the treaty with Spain shall be under the control of the Government of
the Philippine Islands, to wit:

SECTION 12. That all the property and rights which may have been acquired in the Philippine
Islands by the United States under the treaty of peace with Spain, signed December tenth,
eighteen hundred and ninety- eight, except such land or other property as shall be designated by
the President of the United States for military and other reservations of the Government of the
United States, are hereby placed under the control of the Government of said Islands, to be
administered for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof, except as provided in this Act.

The only exception in the Regalian Doctrine is native title to land, or ownership of land by
Filipinos by virtue of a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant
from the Spanish Crown.17 In Cariño v. Insular Government,18 the United States Supreme
Court at that time held that:

It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory
goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be
presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to
have been public land.19
As pointed out in the case of Republic v. Cosalan:20

Ancestral lands are covered by the concept of native title that "refers to pre-conquest rights to
lands and domains which, as far back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of
private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed
to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest." To reiterate, they are considered
to have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way.

The CA has correctly relied on the case of Cruz v. Secretary of DENR, which institutionalized

the concept of native title. Thus:

Every presumption is and ought to be taken against the Government in a case like the present. It
might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory
goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be
presumed to have been held in the same way before the Spanish conquest, and never to have
been public land.

From the foregoing, it appears that lands covered by the concept of native title are considered an
exception to the Regalian Doctrine embodied in Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution which
provides that all lands of the public domain belong to the State which is the source of any
asserted right to any ownership of land.21

On the other hand, Section 13 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 states that the Government of the
Philippine Islands could classify the lands of public domain either as agricultural, timber or
mineral land. Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the law does not provide any presumption that a
land of public domain is agricultural. Notably, it merely gave the said government the
prerogative to classify land; nothing therein states that unclassified lands are ipso facto treated as
agricultural land, which are alienable and disposable, to wit:

SEC. 13. That the Government of the Philippine Islands, subject to the provisions of this Act and
except as herein provided, shall classify according to its agricultural character and
productiveness, and shall immediately make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other
disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands, but such rules and regulations
shall not go into effect or have the force of law until they have received the approval of the
President, and when approved by the President they shall be submitted by him to Congress at the
beginning of the next ensuing session thereof and unless disapproved or amended by Congress at
said session they shall at the close of such period have the force and effect of law in the
Philippine Islands: Provided, That a single homestead entry shall not exceed sixteen hectares in
extent.

Further, Sec. 13 referred to the President of the United States, who had the power to classify
public land, subject to the disapproval or amendment of the Congress of the United States. At
that time, the Philippine Islands only had a Philippine Commission, which exercised the powers
of the government,22 but did not have the power to classify lands.
As the Executive and Legislative Branch in the Philippine Islands had no power to classify lands
of public domain then, the Judiciary had the jurisdiction to determine for itself the classification
of a particular parcel of land in justiciable cases. In Ramos v. The Director of Lands
(Ramos),23 and Ankron v. The Government of the Philippine Islands (Ankron),24 which were
decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the courts had a right to presume, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands. At that moment, since
there was no central authority in the Philippine Islands to classify lands, the courts had to rely on
their own judicial discretion with respect to the classification of land.

However, the power to classify the lands by the Philippine courts was finally removed in 1919
when Act No. 2874,25 or the Public Land Act, was enacted, which stated that the Governor-
General in the Philippines had the power to classify land:

SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture

and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into —

(a) Alienable or disposable

(b) Timber, and

(c) Mineral lands,

and may at any time and in a like manner, transfer such lands from one class to another, for the
purposes of their government and disposition.

Then, under the 1935 Constitution, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141 or the present Public
Land Act, was enacted. It retained the provision that the President of the Philippines had the
power to classify lands of public domain, to wit:

SECTION 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into —

(a) Alienable or disposable

(b) Timber, and

(c) Mineral lands,

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the
purposes of their administration and disposition, (emphasis supplied)

Thus, the State, through the legislature enacting Act No. 2874 and C.A. No. 141, delegated to the
Executive Branch the power to classify lands of public domain and finally removed from the
courts the power to classify such. Accordingly, the presumption of agricultural classification
under Ankron and Ramos applied by the courts was also set aside. The removal of the court's
presumption that a public land was agricultural was succinctly discussed in Yap, citing Vda. De
Planca:

Petitioner's reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is misplaced.

These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No.
926 enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal
provision vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the Philippines the power to classify
lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free
to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to
do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.

To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then necessary to
devise a presumption on land classification. Thus, evolved the dictum in Ankron that "the courts
have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."

But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument that
all lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable
agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all lands of the
public domain into agricultural lands.

If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926
would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as
timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of State
ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-
entrenched Regalian Doctrine.

xxxx

Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the facts of
each case, except those that have already became private lands. Act No. 2874, promulgated in
1919 and reproduced in [Sec] 6 of [C.A.] No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the
President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or
disposable, mineral or forest. Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or
implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public domain.26

The 1935 Constitution embodied the Regalian Doctrine, to wit:

ARTICLE XII.
Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources

SECTION 1. All agricultural timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other natural resources
of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right,
grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under
this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be
alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of
any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be
the measure and limit of the grant.27 (emphasis supplied)

Similarly, the 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian Doctrine that all lands of public domain
belong to the State:

ARTICLE XIV
The National Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation

xxxx

SECTION 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial,
residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated,
and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization
of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases,
beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.28 (emphasis supplied)

The 1987 Constitution also stated the Regalian Doctrine:

SECTION 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated. x x x29

In 1975, P.D. No. 705 was enacted and Sec. 3(a) thereof essentially stated that lands of the public
domain which have not been the subject of the present system of classification are considered as
forest land. Verily, this provision is consistent with the Regalian Doctrine. Lands of public
domain are, by default, owned by the State. The only classification of land that may be subject to
private ownership would be agricultural lands that are classified as alienable and disposable
lands. Forest and mineral lands cannot be the subject of private ownership. Thus, Sec. 3(a)
merely reiterates that unclassified lands are in the same footing as forest lands because these
belong to the State; these are not alienable and disposable land of public domain; and these are
not subject to private ownership.

However, it must be emphasized that even without Sec. 3(a), which declared that unclassified
lands are considered as forest lands, the exact same result shall apply - unclassified lands are still
not subject to private ownership because they belong to the State and are not alienable and
disposable lands of public domain.

In Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court,30 the Court explained that when a land of

public domain is unclassified, it cannot be released and rendered open for private disposition
pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine and that the private applicant in a land registration case has the
burden of proof to overcome State ownership of the lands of public domain, to wit:

Lands of the public domain are classified under three main categories, namely: Mineral, Forest
and Disposable or Alienable Lands. Under the Commonwealth Constitution, only agricultural
lands were allowed to be alienated. Their disposition was provided for under [C.A.] Act No. 141
(Secs. 6-7), which states that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper
department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable
or disposable, timber and mineral lands. Mineral and Timber or forest lands are not subject to
private ownership unless they are first reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for
alienation. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until
released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. Courts have no authority to do so.

This is in consonance with the Regalian Doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged
with the conservation of such patrimony. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence, a
positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land into alienable or disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes.

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of state ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable.31

Similarly, in Manalo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,32 it was held that when the land is
unclassified, it shall not be subject to disposition pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine that all lands
of public domain belong to the State, viz.:

In effect, what the Court a quo has done is to release the subject property from the unclassified
category, which is beyond their competence and jurisdiction. The classification of public lands is
an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government and not of the Courts.
In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released
therefrom and rendered open to disposition (Sec. 8, [C.A.] No. 141, as
amended: Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 123 SCRA 441
193; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 742 1980. This should be so under time-honored
Constitutional precepts. This is also in consonance with the Regalian Doctrine that all lands of
the public domain belong to the State (Secs. 8 & 10, Art. XIV, 1973 Constitution), and that the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation
of such patrimony (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648 1979.33
Indeed, under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is
the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private
person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.34

The argument of petitioners that Sec. 3(a) of P.D. 705 is unconstitutional because unclassified
lands of public domain should instead be treated as agricultural land, subject to private
disposition, is utterly baseless. The said provision is consistent with the Constitutional mandate
of the Regalian Doctrine that lands of public domain, whether unclassified, forest, or mineral
lands, remain within the ownership of the State and shall not be subject to alienation or
disposition of private persons.35 Absent any positive act of the government to classify a land of
public domain into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, it remains with
the State.36

Forest lands; No private rights violated

Finally, petitioners argue that only those lands with trees and timber should be considered as
forest land, and the rest should be considered as public agricultural land.

The argument fails.

Even if an island or a parcel of land has already been stripped of its forest cover, it does not
negate its character as public forest. Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
Constitution classifying lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks", do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses
covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.37

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in
brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks
like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules
on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.38

To reiterate, even if the subject lands are unclassified, these are still not subject to private
ownership. In Republic v. Heirs of Daquer,39 the Court stated:

While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands are
public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence
of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released
and rendered open to disposition. When the property is still unclassified, whatever possession
applicants may have had, and however long, still cannot ripen into private ownership. This is
because, pursuant to Constitutional precepts, all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
and the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in such lands and is charged with
the conservation of such patrimony. Thus, the Court has emphasized the need to show in
registration proceedings that the government, through a positive act, has declassified inalienable
public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.40 (emphasis supplied)

To subscribe to the view of petitioners - that unclassified lands should be presumed as disposable
land, and not a forest land - would run afoul to the Regalian Doctrine. Any person could simply
declare that a parcel of land of public domain is alienable and disposable by the mere fact that it
is not covered by trees. The recognized system of classification of lands by the State would be
destroyed and conflicting classifications of lands of public domain would arise. Indeed, the better
approach is to uphold Sec. 3(a) of P.D. No. 705 because it is consistent with the Regalian
Doctrine that all lands of public domain belongs to the State.

In Republic v. Heirs of Sin,41 the Court underscored that there must be a positive act from the
Government before a land of public domain can be considered as alienable and disposable land
of public domain:

Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land.
All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public
domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a
private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Property of the
public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot
ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. The burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.

There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To
prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or
an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from
the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is
alienable and disposable.42 (emphasis supplied)

In effect, as petitioners failed to assail Sec. 3(a) of P.D. No. 705, which is consistent with the
Regalian Doctrine, wherein the subject lands remain within the ownership of the State. To
repeat, the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of state ownership of the lands of the
public domain is on the person applying for registration that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or
disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter
how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.43 In other words, petitioners
have no vested right over the subject lands because these unclassified lands belong to the State,
hence, no private right was violated by the State.

Verily, Sec. 3(a) of P.D. No. 705 is not unconstitutional because it merely enforces the Regalian
Doctrine in favor of the State. No amount of possession will expose the subject lands to private
ownership. Petitioners should not seek to devoid the said statutory provision; instead, they
should proceed to the Executive Department, through the Secretary of DENR, to establish that
the subject unclassified forest lands must be re-classified to alienable and disposable lands of
public domain.44 Only when the lands of public domain are classified as alienable or disposable,
may petitioners assert their property rights over the subject lands.

Remedy is beyond the courts

Assuming that petitioners have indeed been tilling the subject lands, which they eventually
discovered to be unclassified forest lands of public domain, hence, non-registrable, the Court
commiserates with their predicament. It is distressing for a farmer to physically possess and till a
parcel of land for decades, or even generations, only to discover that it is not subject to
disposition and alienation simply because it is an unclassified land or a forest land of public
domain. However, as thoroughly discussed-above, the assailed provision Sec. 3(a) of P.D. No.
705 is constitutional because it is consistent with the Regalian Doctrine. In such a case, the
farmer must undergo the tedious process for the reclassification of land to be alienable and
disposable; the authority to reclassify is lodged with the central executive government. It is
settled that the declaration of alienability must be through executive fiat, as exercised by the
Secretary of the DENR.45 As the centralized process may be beyond the farmer's reach and
means, the land ultimately remains untitled.

Notably, as the Court painstakingly discussed in Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic46 the difficulty

arising from the classification of land is attributable to the policy of the law itself:

A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal doctrines established in
this decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the implications of today's ruling cannot be
discounted. For, every untitled property that is occupied in the country will be affected by this
ruling. The social implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court would be abdicating its
social responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply levied the law without comment.

The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a phenomenon tied
to long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common among the so-called "Third
World" countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the disconnect between a legal system and
the reality on the ground. The law so far has been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of
acquisition of these public domain lands, such as through homestead or free patent, have proven
unattractive due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or alienation of said
properties. Judicial confirmation of imperfect title has emerged as the most viable, if not the
most attractive means to regularize the informal settlement of alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain, yet even that system, as revealed in this decision, has considerable limits.

There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively held
residential lands on which they have lived and raised their families. Many more have tilled and
made productive idle lands of the State with their hands. They have been regarded for generation
by their families and their communities as common law owners. There is much to be said about
the virtues of according them legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not for the Court to translate
into positive law, as the law itself considered such lands as property of the public dominion. It
could only be up to Congress to set forth a new phase of land reform to sensibly regularize and
formalize the settlement of such lands which in legal theory are lands of the public domain
before the problem becomes insoluble. This could be accomplished, to cite two examples, by
liberalizing the standards for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code
itself to ease the requisites for the conversion of public dominion property into patrimonial.

One's sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being not only of that
individual, but also to the person's family. Once that sense of security is deprived, life and
livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the political branches to bring welcome closure to the long
pestering problem.47

C.A. No. 141 could be improved with respect to manner and method of classifying land. Instead
of giving the President, through his alter ego the Secretary of DENR, the sole power to classify
lands of public domain, this authority could be decentralized and simplified so that the masses,
especially the farmers of the far-flung provinces, would not have to rely on the central executive
government in order to secure a title in their land. Of course, decentralization of the
governmental functions has both positive and negative impact on State regulation, which must be
thoroughly studied and deliberated by policy-makers.

In any case, the remedy that petitioners seek is definitely beyond the powers of the Court;
Rather, it is matter of policy that must be addressed by the other branches of government.
Indeed, the question of wisdom of the law is beyond the province of this Court to inquire. An
inquiry of that sort amounts to a derogation of the principle of separation of powers.48

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141
and other related laws for the decentralization of the authority and simplification of the process
to classify lands of public domain.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Gesmundo, Reyes, Jr., Hernando, Carandang,
Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, Lopez, Delos Santos, Gaerlan, and Baltazar-Padilla, JJ., concur.
 NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on September 15, 2020 a Resolution, copy attached herewith, was
rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by
this Office on December 3, 2020 at 2:00 p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA

Clerk of Court