Article

South East Asia Research

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Political dynasties in the ª SOAS 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/0967828X16659730
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patterns, perennial
problems
Teresa S Encarnacion Tadem
University of the Philippines, Diliman, Philippines

Eduardo C Tadem
University of the Philippines, Diliman, Philippines

Abstract
The results of the 2013 Philippine mid-term elections highlighted the dominance of political
dynasties in the country. With all 80 provinces littered with political families, 74 percent of the
elected members of the House of Representatives came from such dynastic groups. Despite
overwhelming recognition that political dynasties breed patronage politics and corruption, no
substantial steps have been undertaken to address this issue. This article examines the general
nature of Philippine political dynasties, the reasons for their continuing existence and their adverse
impact on the country. This problem emanates basically from three factors: (1) the political and
socio-economic foundations upon which political dynasties are built; 2) the inability to effectively
implement Philippine constitutional provisions by enacting an enabling law; and 3) the weakness of
potential countervailing forces that would challenge political dynasties.

Keywords
Colonialism, dynasties, legislature, oligarchy, patrimonialism, patronage politics, political families

Corresponding authors:
Teresa S Encarnacion Tadem, Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon
City, 1101, Philippines.
Email: [email protected]

Eduardo C Tadem, Asian Center, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, 1101, Philippines.
Email: [email protected]
2 South East Asia Research

The so-called ‘People Power Revolution’ in February 1986 raised hopes that the dominance of the
Filipino oligarchic class would be ended or seriously diminished,1 but this was not to be the case.
As one commentator put it, ‘The first elected Congress of the post-Marcos era, installed by the May
1987 elections, turned out to be a replica of the pre-martial law era. Of the 200 elected House of
Representatives, 169 (84.5 percent) were members of pre-1972 traditional families’.2 This sig-
nified a general trend in modern Philippines politics that continues until now.
In 2011, when handing down judgment in a case involving a dispute around electoral bound-
aries, Supreme Court Senior Justice Antonio Carpio defined political dynasties as a ‘phenomenon
that concentrates political power and public resources within the control of a few families whose
members alternately hold elective offices, deftly skirting term limits’.3 Two years later, in the 2013
Philippine mid-term elections, the dominance and perseverance of political dynasties in the
country was again clear.4 Election results showed that members of political families were present
in all 80 provinces and made up 74 percent of the members of the House of Representatives. Of the
23 sitting senators, 19 were from political families. Furthermore, 85 percent of the provincial
governors and 84 percent of the town mayors belong to political families.5 Although there seems to
be overwhelming agreement that it breeds patronage politics and corruption, the substantive steps
taken to address this political phenomenon have all so far been rendered futile.
This article outlines the origins and general nature of Philippine political dynasties, and examines
the reasons for their continued existence and their adverse impact on the country. It will argue that the
resilience of political dynasties is due largely to the following factors: first, the formidable political
and socio-economic foundations which established political dynasties; second, the failure to effec-
tively implement constitutional provisions to address the adverse effects of political dynasties; and
third, the weakness of potential countervailing forces against political dynasties.

The rise and rise of the political dynasty

The family is the foundation of Filipino political dynasties. In the scholarship in this field, if not yet
constitutionally, it is widely agreed that the definition and understanding of what constitutes
‘family’ in this context refers not only to blood relatives but also to ‘primary groups’ – small,
informal and non-specialised groups that openly and intimately interact with each other. For
example, Park’s definition of the political family is broad and inclusive, extending to ‘the kinship
group, the peer group, the group of friends and playmates, and the informal group of co-workers’.6

1. The 1986 uprising, forged by an alliance of reformist military and democratic forces, overthrew the 14-
year martial law dictatorship of President Ferdinand Marcos.
2. Park SW (2008) Oligarchic democracy in the Philippines: Democratization sans disintegration of
political monopoly. In: Cho HY, Surendra L and Park E (eds) States of Democracy: Oligarchic
Democracies and Asian Democratization. Mumbai: Earthworm Books, pp. 124–125.
3. Cabigao SS (2013) ‘It runs in the family’: The making of political dynasties in the Philippines. UP
Forum, April 30. This was in a Supreme Court ruling in 2011 in the case of Navarro vs. Ermita (GR No.
180050; 12 April 2011, pp. available at: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/
180050.htm.
4. GMA 7 News (2013) May 12.
5. GMA 7 News (2013) May 12.
6. Park (2008: 134).
Tadem and Tadem 3

As McCoy further explains, in the political sphere, family ties acquire greater meaning and
importance beyond the household.

Many politicians try to transform their electoral offices into lasting family assets, building on what
Filipinos call a ‘political dynasty’. Once entrenched, influential politicians often work to bequeath
power and position to their children, in effect seeking to transform the public office that they have won
into a private legacy for their family.7

The state has played a crucial role in institutionalising the primacy of the family in Philippine
society. In its ‘‘Declaration of Principles and State Policies’, the Philippine Constitution states that
‘the state recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institutions’’’.8 In this context, elite Filipino families often perform a
broad range of economic, social and political functions’.9 In relation to this,

two key elements seem to have contributed most directly to the formation of powerful political families
– the rise of ‘rents’ as a significant share of the nation’s economy and a simultaneous attenuation of
central government control over the provinces. The results are the privatization of public resources
which has strengthened a few families while weakening the state’s resources and its bureaucratic
apparatus.10

Such a situation has allowed political dynasties to make use of patronage politics to perpetuate
themselves. The entrenchment of this practice can be traced historically to the American colonial
regime beginning in the early 20th century. As Sidel explains, American colonialism’s economic
heritage included the introduction on to the capitalist stage of ‘primitive accumulation’, forcing
masses of people off their lands and depriving them of their means of subsistence. In the end, voters
were left ‘susceptible to clientelistic, coercive, and monetary pressures’.11 This in turn ‘facilitated
the emergence and entrenchment of small-town bosses, provincial ‘‘warlords’’, and authoritarian
presidents by providing mechanisms for private monopolisation of the resources and prerogatives
of the state’.12
Following independence in 1946, the story of the political family is one of remarkable resilience
facilitated by a combination of militarisation and economic diversification. In keeping with Sidel,
as McCoy explains, the Filipino oligarchy was further strengthened as the fledgling

Philippine central government effectively lost control over the countryside to regional politicians,
some so powerful that they became known as warlords. Reinforcing their economic power and political

7. McCoy AE (1994) ‘An anarchy of families’: The historiography of state and family in the Philippines.
In: McCoy AE (ed.) An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines. Quezon City: Ateneo
de Manila University Press, pp. 24–25.
8. McCoy (1994: 24–25).
9. McCoy (1994: 24–25).
10. McCoy (1994: 24–25).
11. Sidel JT (1999) Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, p. 18.
12. Sidel (1999: 19).
4 South East Asia Research

offices with private armies, these warlords terrorised the peasantry and extracted a de facto regional
autonomy as the price for delivering their vote banks to Manila politicians.13

In the 1950s, ethnic Chinese elites joined the colonial elites, mainly Spanish creoles, in diver-
sifying their interests into manufacturing, and together emerged as the most dominant families and
economic groups in the fledgling nation.14 As Renato Velasco explains, these pre-1972 elites
tended to be associated with the landed oligarch and this group’s rent-seeking activities and careers
were anchored in state patronage and intervention.15
Upon declaring martial law in September 1972, Ferdinand Marcos disarmed the provincial
warlords and stripped the oligarchs opposed to him of their wealth. He transferred their assets to his
relations and retainers. The late 1970s saw a new system of power sharing emerge between the
political executive and the oligarchs. However, ‘(i)nstead of breaking the entrenched provincial
elites and ruling through the central bureaucracy, Marcos tried to control them by creating a new
stratum of supralocal leaders whom he financed with rents’.16
After the fall of Marcos in 1986, new party elites emerged from ‘a broader economic base
and diverse career backgrounds, and they were more disposed towards free enterprise and
limited government’.17 Nevertheless, the diversification of economic interests adopted in the
post-war period among elites, both established and emerging, continued.18 The resilience of
the established political dynasties across the decades was in great part due to their ability to
diversify economically, enabling them to adapt and hold on to their political power. At the
same time, for new dynasties, the accumulation of a diversity of economic interests means
that a small dynasty can emerge from even the poorest provinces of the country. As David
and Legara explain,

While in office, they amass both money and political capital through favors and patronage-driven
spending of public funds. They collect enough to field multiple family members in the next
elections. Armed with the advantage of capital, all members enjoy an advantage and then many
of them win.19

13. McCoy (1994: 7).

14. Rivera T (2004) Landlords & Capitalists: Class, Family, and State in Philippine Manufacturing. Quezon
City: Center for Integrative and Development Studies (CIDS) and the University of the Philippine Press
in cooperation with the Philippine Center for Policy Studies, p. 28.
15. Velasco R (2002) Parties, Elections and Democratization in the Philippines. Paper presented in the
Philippine Politics and Governance Textbook Writing Project Workshop, Department of Political Sci-
ence, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Philippines.
16. McCoy AE (1994) Rent-seeking families and the Philippine state: A history of the Lopez family. In:
McCoy AE (ed.) An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines. Quezon City: Ateneo de
Manila University Press, p. 436.
17. Velasco (2002: 17).
18. Velasco (2002: 22).
19. David CC and Legara EF (2015) How much of our country will we lose to political dynasties in 2016?
Rappler, October 20. Available at: http://www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/109892-how-much-country-
lose-political-dynasties-2016 (accessed 4 February 2016).
Tadem and Tadem 5

Patronage politics
As patrimonial politics became ingrained in the Philippine state in the post-war period, political
dynasties were also strengthened and the need for the oligarchy to entrench itself in Philippine
politics through dynasties was intensified.20 In addition to expanding their economic interests, it
was also ‘common for families to diversify their political networks to guard against changes in
political leadership’.21 According to Parks, the ‘oligarchy’ can be viewed as a subset of political
families and comprises ‘a small group who are a very powerful and prestigious element of the
political families and, as such, are the upper echelon of the ruling class’.22 Following this defi-
nition, Hutchcroft describes the Philippine state as a ‘patrimonial oligarchic state’23 whereby ‘the
dominant social force has an economic base largely independent of the state apparatus, but the state
nonetheless plays a central role in the process of wealth accumulation’. 24
The scholarship in this field recognises variants of political dynasties within Filipino politics.
McCoy observes that the main ways political dynasties perpetuate themselves is through political
violence and rent-seeking, with the former prevalent in the provinces and the latter concentrated in
the cities. These political families generally fuse local power with national access by delivering
blocs of votes ‘by whatever means’.25 As for the rent-seeking families, McCoy cites Eugenio
Lopez as the most prominent case of someone who ‘used his commercial and legal skills to become
the Republic’s leading rent-seeking entrepreneur. Simultaneously, his younger brother Fernando
maintained the family’s political base in the home province of Iloilo and used it to bolster his climb
to national elective office’.26
In addition to economic, military and bureaucratic means, another power base for political
dynasties in the Philippines is through electoral politics and networks.27 Mojares points to the
Osmeñas of Cebu as an example. By winning ‘mandates’ from the voters in their local province,
which comprises 25 percent of the population of the Philippines, this family have successfully
extended their power base from the local to the national level of politics.28

Adverse effects of political dynasties on Filipino society

The persistence of political dynasties in the Philippines is acknowledged as bringing adverse
effects on the country including the perpetuation of poverty and underdevelopment, the propa-
gation of political and socio-economic inequality and the prevalence of massive corruption.
Political dynasties breed an incoherent economic policy that has stunted the development of a
strong state apparatus whereby ‘the personal favor and disfavor of those currently in power is a

20. Hutchcroft PD (1998) Booty Capitalism: The Politics of Banking in the Philippines. Quezon City: Ateneo
de Manila University Press.
21. Hutchcroft (1998: 39).
22. Park (2008: 124).
23. Hutchcroft (1998: 20).
24. Hutchcroft (1998: 52).
25. McCoy (1994: 21).
26. McCoy (1994: 21).
27. Mojares R (1994) The dream goes on and on: Three generations of the Osmenas, 1906–1990. In: McCoy
AE (ed.) An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila
University Press, p. 318.
28. Mojares (1994: 318).
6 South East Asia Research

critical determinant of business success and failure’.29 Empirical evidence also shows ‘a signifi-
cant relationship between political dynasties and lower per capita income, higher incidence of
poverty, and lower human development indices (specifically, lower primary elementary comple-
tion rates) in their areas’.30 Members of political dynasties in Congress are also wealthier
(as evidenced by their statements of assets, liabilities and net worth) than their non-dynasty
colleagues’.31
Political dynasties are also symptomatic of the country’s underdevelopment because many of
these political families come from very poor regions and provinces that rely heavily on the central
government. These political clans act as ‘channels for Manila’s beneficence’, deriving kickbacks
from public works and other public projects. In the process of ensuring funding support from
Manila, ‘they neglect the programs to foster commerce and development in their territories, a task
that requires vision, competence, and ethics, which they sorely lack’.32 A 2012 study found that
political dynasties have also perpetuated political inequality ‘which reinforces the unequal dis-
tribution of political power thereby producing a type of low level democratic equilibrium where
mutually reinforcing forces of weakened democratic institutions lead to poor economic outcomes
and vice versa’.33
Socio-economic and political inequalities are further perpetuated with the association of
political dynasties with massive corruption. This in itself is a ‘form of threat to democracy’, a kind
of distortion in social relations, and makes the field of competition (such as political competition)
uneven.34 It was also pointed out that when a family member takes over when the term of an
incumbent runs out, there are no checks and balances in place over the process.35

Tackling dynastic dominance

Constitutional attempts to challenge political dynasties
After the 1986 People Power Revolution, there was an attempt to curb the power of political
dynasties through significant constitutional efforts. The new Philippine constitution issued in 1987
included provisions for term limits, an anti-dynasty provision and party list representation. Pro-
visions on term limits were instituted in the 1987 Constitution as a means of breaking ‘the per-
petual control, from generation to generation, of the old oligarchy and political families over
various policy-making institutions’.36 The term of office of senators was set at six years with no
senator serving for more than two consecutive terms, while members of the House of Represen-
tatives were limited to three consecutive three-year terms. However, established political elites

29. Hutchcroft (1998: 14).

30. Monsod S (2013) Evaluate candidates carefully, junk dynasties. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 11 May, p.
A14.
31. Monsod (2013: A14).
32. Philippine Daily Inquirer (2013) Dynastic hubris. 2 February.
33. Mendoza RU, Yap DB II, Beja EL Jr et al. (2012) An empirical analysis of political dynasties in the 15th
Philippine Congress. Working Paper12 – 001, Asian Institute of Management, Asian Institute of Man-
agement Policy Center and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, p. 5.
34. Luci C (2013) Dynasty ‘form of corruption’. (Third of a series). Manila Bulletin, 21–22 March.
35. Cruz N (2013) Don’t vote for members of political dynasties. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 11 February.
36. Park (2008: 119).
Tadem and Tadem 7

have easily circumvented the term limit clauses by ‘passing their congressional seats on to their
heirs’ or re-contesting the seats after a short absence.37
The Anti-Dynasty Provision was instituted in Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution and
prescribes that ‘the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law’. Aside from this, there are other relevant
constitutional provisions, for example Article 7, Section 13 bars presidential relatives from
office.38 Several bills have also been proposed but are mostly in hiatus with either the House
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms or the Rules Committee. None have come close to
being passed into law.39
There are other major obstacles to the implementation of the constitutional provisions on
eliminating political dynasties. One substantial hurdle is that those in Congress charged with
enacting and implementing law themselves belong to political dynasties. A second hindrance is the
different interpretations among legislators on what constitutes a dynasty, and thirdly, some poli-
ticians simply do not see anything wrong with political dynasties.40
In an attempt to break this logjam on the Anti-Dynasty Bill, in December 2013 Caloocan Rep.
Edgar Erice of the Liberal Party introduced a bill limiting the number of MPs from one family to
one or two members at most. The bill proposed limiting the number from one family holding or
running for office in ‘successive, simultaneous, or overlapping terms’.41 Anti-dynasty advocates
were allowed a glimmer of hope when the bill successfully reached the plenary in the House of
Representatives in mid-2014. Known as House Bill 3587 or an ‘Act Prohibiting the Establishment
of Political Dynasties’, the bill had made slow progress to the plenary where it was then stalled and
has since remained.42 As Edgar Erice himself admitted when he introduced the bill, its success was
always in doubt given that of the 290 members in the House, 180 would be affected by his proposed
original cap of one family member only and 60 of the total would be impacted if the cap was upped
to two members. At the time it was debated, House speaker Feliciano Belmonte commented that a
limit of one family member had ‘absolutely no chance’ of passing in Congress while he doubted
whether a dynasty cap of two would be enacted either.43
Since mid-2013 the Philippine Senate has filed another three anti-dynasty bills. One bill pro-
posed an even stricter version than House Bill 3587, allowing only one member of a family to run
for office in all levels.44 Unsurprisingly, it too failed, paving the way for the further proliferation of

37. Park (2008: 119).

38. Republic of the Philippines Constitution, p. 20.
39. Coronel SS, Chua YT, Rimban L et al. (2004) The Rulemakers: How the Wealthy and Well-Born
Dominate Congress. Quezon City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism; Eaton K (2003)
Restoration or transformation? Trapos versus NGOs in the democratization of the Philippines. Journal of
Asian Studies 62(2): 469–496.
40. Esguerra CV (2012) Erap: What dynasty? Let the people decide. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 1 November,
p. A9.
41. Geronimo GY (2015) Susan Ople ‘act of courage’ to speak vs. political dynasties. Rappler, 25
November. Available at: http://www.rappler.com/nation/politics/elections/2016/113936-susan-ople-
political-dynasty (accessed 7 March 2016).
42. Rappler (2015) Homestretch: Will FOI, Bangsamoro, anti-political dynasty bills be dead in 2016? 31
December.
43. Cabancungan GC (2014) Anti-dynasty bill faces ‘loosening up’ in House. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 14
June, p. A7.
44. Macaraig A (2015) Senate anti-dynasty bill allows only 1 Binay in office. Rappler, 10 June.
8 South East Asia Research

political dynasties in the coming May 2016 national elections. These failures were especially
disappointing for advocates, since in his sixth and final State of the Nation Address in 2015,
President Benigno Aquino III (despite having relatives of his own in public office), had endorsed
the anti-political dynasty bill.45 As will be explained below, however, Aquino’s message on
political dynasties has also been highly inconsistent.

The system of party-list representation

Another potential foil against political dynasties is the Constitutional provision for party-list
representation in Congress, which seeks to remedy the problem of under-representation by less
privileged classes of society.46 As Coronel observes, in contrast to the traditional electoral system
of ‘simple plurality or first-past-the post’, which only favours members of the major established
parties, the goal of the party-list system was to

open up the hall of Congress and political society to . . . the marginalized sectors including labour,
peasant, urban poor, women, and other civil-society groups, which had so far been underrepresented in
the institutionalized political arena. The intent was to allow the delegates from small parties, partic-
ularly those from the left, to have a presence in the hall of Congress . . . 47

The party-list representation system is marred by deficiencies, including its limitation when
transferring votes into seats. A more serious problem to emerge in recent years is that the
system has been co-opted by traditional politicians who have organised their own party-list
groups. In the 2013 party-list elections, ‘the majority of the winners came from the elite class –
particularly from political clans – while legitimate party-list groups were eased out of the
winners’ circle . . . ’.48 In many cases, ‘the political dynasties of a region delivered the votes for
a certain party-list group whose nominees belong to that dynasty’. Dynasties that are not satisfied
with winning congressional seats ‘have now taken to using the party-list system to expand their
power and influence and to accommodate relatives possibly competing for limited local
positions’.49

The Local Government Code

The enactment of the 1991 Local Government Code (LGC) which devolved significant powers to
the local government units (LGUs) provided some hope in altering the character of Philippine
political parties and lessening the hold of political dynasties. The Code provided local gov-
ernments with greatly increased and automatic financial allotments from the central government,
ranging from 11 percent to as high as 40 percent of its internal revenue allotment (IRA).50 As a
consequence, local officials have become less dependent on patronage resources from Manila,

45. Geronimo (2015).

46. Coronel et.al. (2004).
47. Coronel et.al. (2004).
48. Tubeza PC (2013) Dynasties helped party-lists win. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 24 May, p. A2.
49. Tubeza PC (2013: A2).
50. Atienza MEL (2006) Local governments and devolution in the Philippines. In: Morada MN and
Encarnacion Tadem TS (eds) Philippine Politics and Governance: An Introduction. Quezon City:
Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines, pp. 415–440.
Tadem and Tadem 9

whilst, on the other hand, national-level politicians still need local assistance in securing the
votes from the provinces.51 The LGC also mandates an increased role for NGOs in local gov-
ernance bodies.
The LGC was thus seen as encouraging ‘new types of popular participation and new types of
political leadership at the local level, which in turn can engender new pressures for important
political reforms at the national level’.52 However, several challenges confront the proper
implementation of the LGC: traditional politicians continue to dominate through patronage and
coercion; the presence of NGOs remains uneven and insufficient to fill available positions on local
special bodies; and non-traditional and well-intentioned officials are largely powerless as they are
simply too small or too poor to invest resources of their own.53

Tests of resilience
Aside from the various constitutional and legal efforts to restrict political dynasties, there are
other potential challenges to the dominance of the political family. Quite simply, one challenge
facing dynasties is to be able to adjust to the changing times. As pointed out, political families
like the Osmeñas of Cebu have generally adapted to shifting conditions, as Mojares describes, by
‘modifying their rhetoric by adding new messages, revising their campaign style, and addressing
new issues’.54 This has enabled some to appropriate new symbols and co-opt new leaders, but
pressures from below have also made this difficult to sustain.55 The 2013 elections seemed to
validate this, as political families that have long dominated Cebu slowly lost their grip on their
traditional power base.
Political dynasties have also faced challenges from the new breed of celebrity politicians in the
Philippines who have cashed in on their popularity and successfully run for office, in the process
toppling members of political dynasties. One example is Ted Failon, a popular broadcaster for
ABS-CBN, a major television network in the Philippines, who defeated a member of Imelda
Romualdez Marcos’ clan of Leyte, to win his parliamentary seat in 2001. In the more recent 2013
elections, Maria Leonor ‘Leni’ G Robredo, widow of the late Interior and Local Governments
Secretary Jesse Robredo, won a congressional seat in Camarines Sur garnering 80 percent of the
votes.56 She defeated a member of the Villafuerte clan, which has been in power in Camarines Sur
for over 40 years.57 In addition to the celebrity candidates, though in no way what could constitute
a sustainable trend, there are examples of NGO and church personalities who have successfully
challenged political dynasties at elections. This was seen, for example, in the much celebrated

51. Hutchcroft PD and Rocamora J (2003) Strong demands and weak institutions: The origins and evolution
of the democratic deficit in the Philippines. Journal of East Asian Studies 3: 259–292.
52. Hutchcroft and Rocamora (2003: 280).
53. Atienza (2006: 434).
54. Mojares (1994: 343).
55. Mojares (1994: 343).
56. Robredo’s husband was the very popular mayor of Naga City and was the Aquino administration’s
Secretary of Interior and Local Governments when he died in a plane crash in Masbate last August 2012.
57. Escandor J Jr (2013) Villafuertes fight baffles voters in Camarines Sur. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2 May,
p. A9; Escandor J Jr (2013) Group targets dynasties in CamSur. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 15 May,
p. A14.
10 South East Asia Research

victory of NGO activist, Grace Padaca, as Congressional representative of Isabela, Northern Luzon
and governor of Isabela in 2004, over the powerful Dy family dynasty.58

Presidential plays
As in the past, the role of the Philippine president is crucial in sustaining or hindering the power
base of political dynasties. President Aquino played a role in perpetuating political dynasties
during the May 2013 elections, coming under fire for including in his advisory team – Team
P-Noy59 – members of political dynasties including his own cousin Paolo Benigno Aquino. The
basis of Philippine presidents’ support for a political dynasty appears to be a simple case of
reciprocity for support given to his/her administration.
During the 2013 elections this was seen with the defeat of all members of the dominant Jalosjos
clan in Mindanao, previously undefeated since 2001, to Liberal Party candidates in the provinces
of Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga Sibuguey and Misamis Occidental. This
defeat was credited to President Aquino’s support for the local Liberal Party’s campaign to strike a
fatal blow on the Jalosjos clan’s grip on local politics.60 On the other hand, Presidential backing
does not always guarantee a win. In the case of Panlilio, despite Aquino’s support for his candidacy
in the 2013 gubernatorial race in Pampanga, he lost to Pineda by a margin of four to one.61 Through
his Liberal Party, President Aquino also played a role in divisions and feuds within political clans
such as the Ecleo family of Dinagat Island, a province in the Southern Philippines. The party
backed Jade Ecleo in a failed bid for the vice-governorship during the May 2013 elections against
her mother Glenda Buray Ecleo. Through their religious cult, the Philippine Benevolent Mis-
sionary Association (PBMA), the Ecleos have dominated politics in Dinagat for several decades.62
The role of the president to potentially make or break political dynasties came to public
attention in August 2013 with the ‘pork barrel’ scam. This involved alleged ‘con-artist’ Janet Lim-
Napoles, who was accused of being the mastermind of a P10-billion scam using the priority
development assistance funds (PDAF), or pork barrel, of five senators and 23 congressmen over
the past 10 years for ghost projects channelled through bogus NGOs.63 The public see the pork
barrel funds as resources used by Philippine presidents to perpetuate dynasties, as the ‘main
sources of financing for projects or assistance that politicians belonging to known political clans
deliver to their constituents’.64 Despite an initial refusal, public outcry and protest actions forced

58. GMA News Online (2010) All eyes on Isabela . . . . 24 March. Available at: http://www.gma
network.com/news/story/186879/news/regions/all-eyes-on-isabela-for-dy-vs-padaca-rematch (accessed
29 February 2016). Padaca was defeated by a member of the Dy family in the 2010 elections. She is
running again for governor in 2016.
59. P-Noy is a contraction of ‘President Noynoy’ (Aquino’s nickname) and a play on words of ‘Pinoy’ (a
colloquial reference to Filipinos).
60. Rosauro RD (2013) Zamboanga voters crush Jalosjos dynasty. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 16 May, pp. A1
and A15.
61. Randy D (2013) The return of traditional politics in Pampanga. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 26 May, p.
A14.
62. Adorador DV III (2013) Polls worsen clan feud in Dinagat. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2 June, p. A9.
63. Aning J and Ubac ML (2013) Palace backs NBI probe: DOJ secretary confirms P10-B pork investigation.
Philippine Daily Inquirer, 13 July, p. A1.
64. Cabreza V and Sotelo Y (2013) Pork helps keep dynasties in power. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 4
October.
Tadem and Tadem 11

President Aquino to announce the abolition of the Congressional pork barrel, with the exception of
the fund allotted to his office. The initial scandal resulted in the Office of the Ombudsman charging
three senators and Janet Napoles with plunder. This did not, however, appease an enraged public,
which continued to demand the abolition of the Presidential pork barrel fund. The result was a
drastic drop in Aquino’s popularity rating by 15 points to 49 percent in mid-2013.65
Poverty and socio-economic inequalities have been major factors in the perpetuation of
political dynasties in the Philippines and their persistence has placed great pressure upon the
government to implement economic policies which will address ‘inclusive’ growth. In May
2013, the Philippine economy posted a stunning quarterly growth of 7.8 percent, outperforming
China and the rest of Asia. This data came right on the heels of the election results, reinforcing
the dominance of political dynasties in the country.66 While raving about the unexpected growth,
Presidential spokesperson Abigail Valte acknowledged that it needed to be sustained to enable
the masses to benefit from it, admitting that ‘the trickle-down effect does not happen
overnight’.67

The role of civil society

Traditionally, in the Philippines strong challenges to the status quo have been mounted by social
movements and from within civil society. The split in the mainstream Philippine Left movement in
the early 1990s over ideological and strategic differences has stymied this potential countervailing
force.68 This break between an orthodox reaffirmist group (RAs) and an opposition rejectionist
faction (RJs) occurred in mid-1992. RAs maintained that the left revolutionary movement should
continue to strictly adhere to the orthodox Marxist-Leninist and Maoist principles that they had
advocated from the early days of the movement in the late 1960s, while the RJs opted for exploring
other non-mainstream left paradigms and more nuanced strategies of struggle. The weakening of
the left movement is also because it is perceived to be unable to offer any concrete or feasible
alternatives to what traditional politicians are offering. Given this, its preferred electoral strategy is
through alliances with the traditional elites, which in turn has damaged their reputation and tainted
their moral authority.
There are, however, civil society movements in the Philippines that are not part of the left
ideological blocs and which have spearheaded a campaign against political dynasties. One of these
is the Movement Against Dynasties (MAD) supported by the Catholic Church hierarchy. MAD
maintains that there is no such thing as a ‘good’ political dynasty. Ahead of the May 2013 election
it launched a petition to gather at least 5.2 million signatures to push for a people’s initiative to put
an end to political dynasties.69 At the time, the group recognised that it would be a significant
challenge to gather the required signatures as stipulated by Republic Act 6735 or the Initiative and
Referendum Act, to mount an initiative in which ‘the people themselves would craft an enabling
law that would define and ban political dynasties’.70 At the time of writing, this petition has fallen

65. Cabreza and Sotelo (2013).

66. Olchondra RT (2013) Economy grows a stunning 7.8%. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 31 May, p. A19.
67. Olchondra RT (2013).
68. Park (2008: 134).
69. Luci (2013).
70. Luci (2013).
12 South East Asia Research

short of its target. Moreover, in November 2015, a founder of MAD and the so-called ‘father of the
anti-dynasty campaign’, Quintin ‘‘Ting’’ Paredes San Diego, was assassinated on his property in
Dingalan, Aurora.71
Nevertheless, perhaps the most formidable stumbling block to the ability of popular movements
to mount a serious challenge to dynasties is the economic growth and aid-dependent model pursued
by all ruling regimes since independence. This development model is based on neo-liberal stra-
tegies of free trade, market liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation which have continuously
exacerbated political and social inequalities and widened the gap between rich and poor. With the
impact of these strategies as a context, Hutchcroft sums up the situation for potential counter-
vailing social forces: ‘External resources and economic growth have done more to strengthen the
oligarchy’s hegemony than to encourage the growth of social forces to challenge it’.72

Conclusion
A Pulse Asia survey of 1800 registered voters conducted in January 2016 revealed that public
opinion on political dynasties in the Philippines is split.73 The poll showed that 32 percent agreed
that ‘one should not vote for candidates who have children, spouses, siblings or parents who are
current or former elected government officials’, while a further 34 percent disagreed, and the
remaining 34 percent were undecided. Given this lack of significant popular concern about their
role, it will be no surprise that the May 2016 national elections have once again been dominated
by political dynasties.
Since the American colonial period, political dynasties in the Philippines have continued to
gain prominence and become more widespread nationally. Their resilience is due to various
mechanisms at work within the patrimonial state such as rent-seeking, warlordism, electoral
politics and patronage networks. The results are rampant patronage politics, corruption, poverty
and underdevelopment and glaring socio-economic inequalities. During the post-martial law
period, institutional efforts have been sought to address the elimination of dynasties. These
include the 1987 constitutional anti-dynasty provisions, term limits on members of Congress, the
party-list system and the 1992 Local Government Code. As evidenced by the results of electoral
contests over the years, all have been ineffective in curtailing the dominance of political
dynasties. Lawmakers in a position to enact the enabling law to implement the anti-dynasty
Constitutional mandate have different perceptions of precisely what constitutes a political
dynasty. But the bottom line is that an overwhelming majority of the legislators are themselves
from political clans.
That Philippine presidents, including the incumbent, Benigno S Aquino III, support political
dynasties so long as these are supportive of his/her administration is a major impediment to real
change. Aquino’s rhetorical support for the anti-dynasty bill in late 2015 was contradicted in
statements made in a televised presidential debate in February 2016 by presidential candidate

71. Suerte Felipe C (2015) Anti-PDAF petitioner shot dead in Aurora. The Philippine Star, 8 November.
Available at: http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2015/11/08/1519621/anti-pdaf-petitioner-shot-dead-
aurora.
72. Hutchcroft (1998: 61).
73. Hegina AJ (2016) Pulse Asia: Filipinos split on political dynasties. 22 February. Available at: http://
newsinfo.inquirer.net/76.273/pulse-asia-filipinos-split-on-political-dynasties.
Tadem and Tadem 13

Vice-President Jejomar Binay who commented, ‘Why would there be a law preventing those who
want to serve (the country), are qualified and elected in honest elections?’.74
Other potential challenges to the political dynasty, including individual candidates, remain the
exception rather than the rule and have been shown to be unsustainable. Aggravating this situation
is the inability of social movements and civil society to challenge the power base of these political
families or to affect public opinion. A major reason for this is the decline of a once formidable left
movement due to ideological divisions, which have driven its various factions to enter into
counterproductive alliances with traditional elite and dynasty-infested parties.
Such is the state of Philippine political society, the paradox of a country with one of the most
vibrant popular movements in the region but which is dominated by the hydra of political
dynasties. The consequence of this is a dysfunctional democracy and electoral system in which the
political hegemony of elite families endures, the majority of Filipinos remain marginalised and
disempowered and wealth and power is increasingly in the hands of the few.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

74. Cayabyab MJ (2016) Binay on political dynasty: Why ban qualified people from gov’t post? Inquirer.net,
21 February. Available at: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/767024/binay-on-political-dynasty-why-ban-
qualified-people-from-govt-post.