FACTS

Repide owns a certain parcel of

land consisting of 2,695.24
square meters and Afzelius made
a proposition for the purchase of
the property. The negotiation
terms are a payment of 2,000 at
the
FACTS
Repide owns a certain parcel of
land consisting of 2,695.24
square meters and Afzelius made
a proposition for the purchase of
the property. The negotiation
terms are a payment of 2,000 at
the
FACTS
Repide owns a certain parcel of
land consisting of 2,695.24
square meters and Afzelius made
a proposition for the purchase of
the property. The negotiation
terms are a payment of 2,000 at
the
FACTS
Repide owns a certain parcel of
land consisting of 2,695.24
square meters and Afzelius made
a proposition for the purchase of
the property. The negotiation
terms are a payment of 2,000 at
the
FACTS
Repide owns a certain parcel of
land consisting of 2,695.24
square meters and Afzelius made
a proposition for the purchase of
the property. The negotiation
terms are a payment of 2,000 at
the
[G.R. No. L-13438. November
20, 1918.]
Francisco Gutierrez Repide,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs. Ivar O. Afzelius and his wife,
Patrocinio R, Afzelius,
Defendants-Appellees.
FACTS
 Repide owns a certain parcel of
land consisting of 2,695.24
square meters and Afzelius made
a proposition for the purchase of
the property. The negotiation
terms are a payment of 2,000 at
the
signing of the deed and a
monthly installments of 150
pesos until the accumulation of a
total 8,000
pesos. Repide made a survey to
prepare the land and incur an
83.93 pesos. The defendants
failed to
sign the deed as they were
notified to appear and instead
wrote a letter containing that they
absolutely
cannot comply with the purchase,
for their business had failed
which had also loss the gain from
investments and savings. They
asked to pardon them by any
troubles they had caused to the
plaintiff
and claim that it was
impossible to effect the purchase
for the 2,000 pesos were not
paid. The
plaintiff is still willing to execute
the deed and asked judgment
against defendants demanding
them
to sign the deed and pay the price
as stipulated. The defendants
deny the claim and alleged that
the
plaintiff did not sustain any
damages, therefore pray the
dismissal of the case. The
judgement was in
favour of the defendants, hence
the presentation of appeal of the
plaintif
[G.R. No. L-13438. November 20, 1918.]

Francisco Gutierrez Repide, Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs. Ivar O. Afzelius and his wife, Patrocinio R, Afzelius, Defendants-Appellees.

FACTS

Repide owns a certain parcel of land consisting of 2,695.24 square meters and Afzelius made

a proposition for the purchase of the property. The negotiation terms are a payment of 2,000 at the

signing of the deed and a monthly installment of 150 pesos until the accumulation of a total 8,000

pesos. Repide made a survey to prepare the land and incur 83.93 pesos. The defendants failed to

sign the deed as they were notified to appear and instead wrote a letter containing that they absolutely

cannot comply with the purchase, for their business had failed which had also loss the gain from

investments and savings. They asked to pardon them by any troubles they had caused to the plaintiff

and claim that it was impossible to effect the purchase for the 2,000 pesos were not paid. The

plaintiff is still willing to execute the deed and asked judgment against defendants demanding them

to sign the deed and pay the price as stipulated. The defendants deny the claim and alleged that the

plaintiff did not sustain any damages, therefore pray the dismissal of the case. The judgement was in

favour of the defendants, hence the presentation of appeal of the plaintiff.

ISSUE

Whether or not the plaintiff has the right to condemn the defendants to sign the deed with the

same terms and the collection of the costs as said in the stipulation.

RULING

Yes. The court ordered to condemn the defendants of signing the deed and mortgage to the

land in question and to pay as stipulated. The appellant shall recover the costs of both instances. The

excuse of the defendants which is the impossibility of compliance did not discharge them of the

obligation of the contract. Articles 1451, 1096, 1098 and 1124 called attention as the bases of this

decision

Pormellosa vs. Land Tenure Administration 1 SCRA 375

Facts: 
The lot in controversy is a part of the Santa Clara Estate on which many families have settled through
the consent of its owner, each paid a rental. In May 1941, the said Estate was acquired by the
Government & was entrusted to an office known as the Rural Progress Admin., which was later
abolished & its functions was transferred to the Bureau of Lands. Recently, such duties was given to the
Land Tenure Administration.

The plaintiff acquired by purchase the right of occupation of the lot in question from Vicente San Jose,
predecessor-in-interest. After the purchase of the Santa Clara Estate by the Government, the plaintiffs
were allowed to make payments on account of the purchase price of the lot, as fenced, included two
hundred (200) sq.m. Thereafter, the plaintiffs found out that the lot had been subdivided into two (2)
smaller lots, No. 44 and 78. Lot No. 44 had been sold to Hermino Guzman. The plaintiffs then filed a
complaint to compel the Director of Lands to execute a Deed of Sale in their favor & declare null and
void the Deed of Sale of Lot No. 44, executed in favor of respondent Hemino. The trial court rendered
judgment in favor of plaintiff, but was reversed by the Court of Appeals, dismissing the petitioner’s
complaint. Hence, this petition.

Issue: 

Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to purchase from the Government the lot, allegedly includes
200 sq.m.

Held: The judgment under review was affirmed.

The lot on which San Jose’s house stood had not been specified, nor had the boundaries thereof been
mentioned. Significantly, the plaintiff cannot show a contract whereby the Rural Progress Admin., has
sold or promised to sell them a lot of 200 sq.m. A party claiming a right granted or created by law must
prove his claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the
weakness of that of his opponent.

Moreover the Deed of Sale allegedly executed by Vicente San Jose in favor of Pornellosa is a mere
private document and does not conclusively establish their right to the parcel of land. Acts and contracts
which have for their subject the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights
over immovable property must appear in a public document.

CHARLES F. WOODHOUSE, plaintiff-appellant,  vs.

FORTUNATO F. HALILI, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-4811             July 31, 1953

FACTS
On November 29, 1947, plaintiff Woodhouse entered into a written agreement with defendant Halili
stating among others that: 1) that they shall organize a partnership for the bottling and distribution of
Mission soft drinks, plaintiff to act as industrial partner or manager, and the defendant as a capitalist,
furnishing the capital necessary therefore; 2) that plaintiff was to secure the Mission Soft Drinks
franchise for and in behalf of the proposed partnership and 3) that the plaintiff was to receive 30 per
cent of the net profits of the business.
Prior to entering into this agreement, plaintiff had informed the Mission Dry Corporation of Los Angeles,
California, that he had interested a prominent financier (defendant herein) in the business, who was
willing to invest half a million dollars in the bottling and distribution of the said beverages, and
requested, in order that he may close the deal with him, that the right to bottle and distribute be
granted him for a limited time under the condition that it will finally be transferred to the corporation.
Pursuant to this request, plaintiff was given “a thirty days’ option on exclusive bottling and distribution
rights for the Philippines”. The contract was finally signed by plaintiff on December 3, 1947.
When the bottling plant was already in operation, plaintiff demanded of defendant that the partnership
papers be executed. Defendant Halili gave excuses and would not execute said agreement, thus the
complaint by the plaintiff.
Plaintiff prays for the : 1.execution of the contract of partnership; 2) accounting of profits  and 3)share
thereof of 30 percent with 4) damages in the amount of P200,000. The Defendant on the other hand
claims that: 1) the defendant’s consent to the agreement, was secured by the representation of plaintiff
that he was the owner, or was about to become owner of an exclusive bottling franchise, which
representation was false, and that plaintiff did not secure the franchise but was given to defendant
himself 2) that defendant did not fail to carry out his undertakings, but that it was plaintiff who failed
and 3)that plaintiff agreed to contribute to the exclusive franchise to the partnership, but plaintiff failed
to do so with a 4) counterclaim for P200,00 as damages.
The CFI ruling: 1) accounting of profits and to pay plaintiff 15 % of the profits and that the 2) execution
of contract cannot be enforced upon parties. Lastly, the 3) fraud wasn’t proved

ISSUES

WON false representation, if it existed, annuls the agreement to form the partnership

HELD

No. In consequence, article 1270 of the Spanish Civil Code distinguishes two kinds of (civil) fraud, the
causal fraud, which may be ground for the annulment of a contract, and the incidental deceit, which
only renders the party who employs it liable for damages only. The Supreme Court has held that in order
that fraud may vitiate consent, it must be the causal (dolo causante), not merely the incidental (dolo
incidente) inducement to the making of the contract.
The record abounds with circumstances indicative of the fact that the principal consideration, the main
cause that induced defendant to enter into the partnership agreement with plaintiff, was the ability of
plaintiff to get the exclusive franchise to bottle and distribute for the defendant or for the partnership.
The original draft prepared by defendant’s counsel was to the effect that plaintiff obligated himself to
secure a franchise for the defendant. But if plaintiff was guilty of a false representation, this was not the
causal consideration, or the principal inducement, that led plaintiff to enter into the partnership
agreement. On the other hand, this supposed ownership of an exclusive franchise was actually the
consideration or price plaintiff gave in exchange for the share of 30 per cent granted him in the net
profits of the partnership business. Defendant agreed to give plaintiff 30 per cent share in the net profits
because he was transferring his exclusive franchise to the partnership.
Having arrived at the conclusion that the contract cannot be declared null and void, may the agreement
be carried out or executed? The SC finds no merit in the claim of plaintiff that the partnership was
already a fait accompli from the time of the operation of the plant, as it is evident from the very
language of the agreement that the parties intended that the execution of the agreement to form a
partnership was to be carried out at a later date. , The defendant may not be compelled against his will
to carry out the agreement nor execute the partnership papers. The law recognizes the individual’s
freedom or liberty to do an act he has promised to do, or not to do it, as he pleases.

Tanguilig vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 78 [1997]

FACTS:

Petitioner, doing business under the name and style J.M.T. Engineering and General Merchandising,
proposed to respondent to construct a windmill system for him (respondent). They agreed on the
construction of the windmill for a consideration of P60,000.00 with a one-year guaranty from the date
of completion and acceptance by respondent of the project. Pursuant to the agreement, respondent
paid petitioner a down payment of P30,000.00 and an installment payment of P15,000.00, leaving a
balance of P15,000.00.

On 14 March 1988, due to the refusal of respondent to pay the balance, petitioner filed a complaint. In
his Answer, respondent denied the claim saying that he had already paid this amount to the San Pedro
General Merchandising Inc. (SPGMI) which constructed the deep well to which the windmill system was
to be connected. According to respondent, since the deep well formed part of the system, the payment
he tendered to SPGMI should be credited to his account by petitioner.

Moreover, assuming that he owed petitioner a balance of P15,000.00, this should be offset by the
defects in the windmill system which caused the structure to collapse after a strong wind hit their place.

Petitioner denied that the construction of a deep well was included in the agreement to build the
windmill system, for the contract price of P60,000.00 was solely for the windmill assembly and its
installation. He also disowned any obligation to repair the system and insisted that he delivered it in
good condition to respondent who accepted the same without protest. Besides, its collapse was
attributable to a typhoon, a force majeure, which relieved him of any liability.

In finding for plaintiff, the trial court held that the construction of the deep well was not part of the
windmill project and that “there is no clear and convincing proof that the windmill system fell down due
to the defect of the construction. “

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. It ruled that the construction of the deep well was
included in the agreement of the parties because the term “deep well” was mentioned in both
proposals. It also rejected petitioner’s claim of force majeure and ordered the latter to reconstruct
the windmill in accordance with the stipulated one-year guaranty.

ISSUES:

Whether or not petitioner is under obligation to reconstruct the windmill after it collapsed.

RULING:
Yes. In order for a party to claim exemption from liability by reason of fortuitous event under Art. 1174
of the Civil Code the event should be the sole and proximate cause of the loss or destruction of the
object of the contract.

In Nakpil vs. CA, four (4) requisites must concur:

(a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor;

(b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable;

(c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner; and,

(d) the debtor must be free from any participation in or aggravation of the injury to the creditor.

Petitioner failed to show that the collapse of the windmill was due solely to a fortuitous event.
Interestingly, the evidence does not disclose that there was actually a typhoon on the day the windmill
collapsed. Petitioner merely stated that there was a “strong wind.” But a strong wind in this case cannot
be fortuitous — unforeseeable nor unavoidable. On the contrary, a strong
wind should be present in places where windmills are constructed, otherwise the windmills will not turn.

The appellate court correctly observed that “given the newly-constructed windmill system, the same
would not have collapsed had there been no inherent defect in it which could only be attributable to the
appellee.”

Llorente vs. Sandiganbayan 287 SCRA 382 (1998)

Facts:

The Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) was reorganized in 1981, causing resignation of hundreds

of its employees, including Mr. Curio, Mrs. Perez, Mr. Azucena and Mrs. Javier. To acquire their gratituity

benefits, they should apply and secure a clearance from PCA. Their clearance would be approved only if

they have no pending accountability. The officer from who they should get the first approval from is

Atty. Llorente or by Col. Duefias, and then by Atty. Rodriguez, the corporate auditor. Despite unsettled

obligations from different sources (which were deducted from their gratituity benefits), the clearances

of Mr. Perez, Mrs. Javier and Mr. Azucena were approved. Under Mrs. Javier’s pending accountabilities

was the amount of P92,000, which was handwritten. This was the disallowered portion of the cash

advances of Mr. Curio in connection with his duties as “super cargo” in the distribution of seed nuts

throughout the country. He received them through and in the name of Mrs. Javier, the latter being

primarily liable for the disallowances. Other documents were submitted during the deductions, with an

affidavit by Mr. Curio. However, Mr. Curio’s application for a clearance was not approved by Atty.
Llorente in his capacity as Deputy Administrator, due to the grounds of the affidavit that Mr. Curio

executed. He further justified his action as following the condition of the clearance (pending

accountabilities). This made Mr. Curio bring the matter to the legal affairs department, which was also

under Atty. Llorente as Deputy Administrator. But the same was not approved. In 1986 or 5 years later,

his pending request for clearance was approved. However, in the course of 5 years he was not able

acquire gainful employment because of his failure to present his clearance from PCA. Thus, he filed a

case against the petitioner for failure to act in his duty.

Issue: 

Whether or not petitioner exercised an abuse of right and he is liable for damages against Mr. Curio in
accordance with Article 19 of the Civil Code 

Ruling:

Yes. Although petitioner Llorente he did not act with evident bad faith as he was following the

procedures in securing a clearance as one of the public officer tasked for it, the fact that he was able to

approve clearances to other 3 employees despite their pending accountabilities somehow show that he

unjustly discriminated Mr. Curio. Thus, he is liable for damages under Article 19 of the Civil Code.

RAKES v ATLANTIC [G.R. No. 1719. January 23, 1907.]

FACTS:
The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of the defendant, was at work
transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard near the malecon in Manila.
Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was used in this work. The defendant has proved that there were
two immediately following one another, upon which were piled lengthwise seven rails, each weighing
560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but
without side pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping off. According to the testimony of the
plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the car or at its sides. According to that defendant, some of
them were also in front, hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the track
sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking
his leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the knee.

ISSUE:
Whether the company is liable

RULING:
Yes. The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to what extent it existed in fact and
what legal effect is to be given it. In two particulars is he charged with carelessness:
First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work; and
Second. That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the boards, either
before or behind it.
The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work after noticing the slight depression of
the rail was not of so gross a nature as to constitute negligence, barring his recovery under the severe
American rule. While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were they not forbidden to
proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of the
company and three of the workmen testify that there was a general prohibition frequently made known
to all the gang against walking by the side of the car, and the foreman swears that he repeated the
prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On this contradiction of proof we think that the
preponderance is in favor of the defendant's contention to the extent of the general order being made
known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in
some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as its primary cause.

Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there
could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but
contributing under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. this
produced the event giving occasion for damages — that is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of the
iron rails.

1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. — In order to enforce the liability of an employer for injuries to his
employee, it is not necessary that a criminal action be first prosecuted against the employer or his
representative primarily chargeable with the accident. No criminal proceeding having been taken, the
civil action may proceed to judgment.

2. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. — The responsibility of an employer to his employee of a

fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.

3. FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. — Sua cuique culpa nocet. The doctrine known as the "Fellow-servant rule,"
exonerating the employer where the injury was incurred through the negligence of a fellow-servant of
the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.