GNFC - PDIS (102-Safety Engineering-1)

Practical No:-

Aim: To study about fire hazards and their control measures.

INTRODUCTION :

Fire claims the lives of over 5000 people each year in India. Fire Causes thousands of
disabling injuries, millions of rupees of property damage and countless lost jobs each year.

Knowing the dangers of fire can help prevent fires. Flames, heat and smoke are obvious fire
dangers . Other dangers include : suffocation, toxic vapour, explosions. You can prevent fire
and its deadly damage when you eliminate fire hazards and learn how to respond quickly
and properly to a fire.

FIRE SAFETY INDIAN SAFETY ACT SEC 38 :

➔ In every factory, all practicable measures shall be taken to prevent outbreak of fire
and its spread, both internally and externally, and to provide and maintain-
➔ Safe means of escape for all people in event of fire.
➔ The necessary equipment and facilities for extinguishing fire.
➔ Effective measures shall be taken to ensure that in every factory all the workers are
familiar with the means of escape in case of fire and have been adequately trained in
the routine to be followed in such cases.
➔ The State Government may make rules, in respect of any factory or class or
description of factories, requiring the measures to be adopted to give effect to the
provisions of subsections (1) and (2)

STATUTORY PROVISION :

➔ Rule 66A of the GFR for fire Protection:

◆ Serious fire & explosion hazards
◆ Access for fire fighting
◆ Protection against lighting
◆ Precaution against ignition
◆ Spontaneous ignition
◆ Gas cylinder
◆ Storage of flammable liquids
◆ Flammable dust, gas vapour waste etc.
◆ Fire exits
◆ First aid fire fighting arrangements
◆ Other fire fighting arrangements
◆ Fire fighting team & drill etc.
◆ Hydrant & sprinklers

➔ Indian standards
➔ Guidelines of Regional tariff advisory Committee (TAC)
➔ NFPA Code (NFC)

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What is a fire hazard ?

➔ Conditions that favour the development or growth of fire i.e. with oxygen, fuel and
heat.
➔ Fire hazards usually involved the mishandling of fuel and heat.
➔ Fire or combustion is a chemical reaction between oxygen and a combustible fuel.
➔ Sources of ignition are spark, flame, and high temp. are needed.

Fire Phenomena :

Figure 1- Fire Triangle

➔ Fire triangles illustrate the three elements a fire needs to ignite : Heat, fuel and
Oxygen.
➔ The fire was extinguished by removing any one of the elements in the fire triangle.

Figure 2- Fire Phenomenon

1. Fuel -

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★ combustible material like paper, wood, rags, oil, gasoline, solvents, flammable gases,
vapours.

2. Oxygen -
★ The greater the concentration of oxygen, the bright and more rapid burning.

3. Heat or Sources of ignition-

★ Such as sparks, flames etc. necessary to start the fire initially.

4. Chain reaction -
★ Maintenance of chain reaction through free radicals.

➔ Instead of the old concept of fire triangle, these 4 sides constitute a fire Pyramid.

Class of Fire :

Figure - 3 Class of Fire

Class of Fire Extinguisher :

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Figure - 4 Class of Fire Extinguisher

Source of Fire Hazards:

➔ Failure of electrical system and equipment.

➔ Lightning strikes.

➔ Presence of a flammable gas or liquid mixture.

➔ Hot or heated surface.

➔ Hot engines.

➔ Bad Housekeeping

➔ Cigarettes

➔ Welding Cutting

➔ Friction

➔ Self Ignition

➔ Exposure

➔ Ignition Sparks

➔ Mechanical Sparks

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Factor contributing in Fire :

Factors contributing to fire %

Electrical 19
Friction 14
Foreign substance 12
Open flames 9
Smoking and Matches 8
Spontaneous ignition 8
Hot surface 7
Combustion sparks 6
Overhead materials 3
Static electricity 2
Miscellaneous 5
Not determined 7

Figure - 5 Factor contributing in Fire

Spared of Fire :

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Figure - 6 Spared of Fire

➔ Conduction:- Conduction fire spreads through direct contact between materials. A

conduction fire is spared when a fire heats up a material that’s a good heat
conductor. Like metal, which then comes into contact with a combustible material.
The fire can travel further across a room or building in this manner.

➔ Radiation:- A fire can be spared by radiation when the heat travels through
electromagnetic waves in the air. When fire breaks out, heat will travel in all
directions until it reaches an object which will absorb it. When it reaches a
combustible material, it will smoulder and eventually burn.

➔ Convection:- Convection is the most common cause of fire spreading in domestic &
commercial buildings and is also the most dangerous. Heat Always rises, but in the
setting of an office for example, the heat is trapped once it hits the ceiling and so it
then begins to travel horizontally, thus spreading the fire simultaneously. Any
materials in the room that are combustible will also ignite, further fuelling the fire.

➔ Direct Contact fire :- A direct contact fire is one that spreads simply when the
flames contact other fuel sources which then also catch fire. This process continues
over time, thus spreading further.

Mostly fire devolve in four stage :-

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Figure - 7 Stage of Fire

★ Incipient stage :-
➔ No visible smoke, flame or more heat developed. Invisible combustion particles are
generated over a period of minutes, hours or days.
★ Smouldering stage :-
➔ Visible smoke generation. Photoelectric detectors can detect this smoke.
★ Flame stage :-
➔ Flame starts after the point of ignition. Smoke decreases and heat increases. Infrared
detectors can detect this stage.
★ Heat Stage :-
➔ Heat, Flame, Smoke & gases are produced in large amounts. Thermal detectors
respond to this stage.

Control of Fire :

Figure - 8 Control of Fire

(Human Brain without Oxygen survive only 4 minutes.)

★ Cooling :- Limiting temperature by increasing the rate at which heat is lost

from the burning material.

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★ Smothering :- Limiting Oxygen by preventing air from reaching the seat of

the fire to allow the combustion process to reduce the oxygen content in the
confined atmosphere until it extinguishes itself.

★ Starving :- Limiting fuel by removing potential fuel from the vicinity of the fire,
removing the fire from the mass of combustible materials or by dividing the
burning material into smaller fires that can be extinguished more easily.

★ Interrupting :- Inhibiting the chemical chain reaction by applying

extinguishing media to the fire that inhibits the chemical chain reaction at the
molecular level.

Fire Prevention System :

Figure - 9 Fire Prevention System

★ Smoke detectors
★ Heat detectors
★ Flame detectors
★ Fire evacuation plan
★ Fire alarm control system
★ Manual call points
★ Fire Door

Fire Protection System :

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Figure - 10 Fire Protection System

★ Fire extinguisher
★ Fire Hydrant
★ Fire hose reel
★ Sprinkler system
★ Fire water Monitor system
★ Fire tender
★ Siren / Audio / Visual Alarm system
★ Fire emergency kit
★ PPE’S
★ Spill Control Kit
★ ERT

Case Study-1

❖ The Indian Oil Corporation’s POL (Petroleum Oil Lubricants) Terminal,

Sangane, Jaipur, India, 29 October 2009

★ WHAT HAPPENED :-

➔ During the evening shift of 29 Oct 2009, the Terminal was preparing to carry out a
routine transfer of Motor Spirit (MS) to the neighbouring Terminal operated by Bharat
Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL). Four employees were supposed to be on the
shift and the operating crew started to prepare the MS tank (tank 401-A) for pumping
to BPCL terminal. At about 6.10 pm, while preparing the MS tank for the transfer, a
huge leak occurred from a ‘Hammer Blind Valve’ at the bottom of the tank. The leak
resulted in a jet of MS directed upwards from the valve under the hydrostatic
pressure head of MS in the tank. The liquid MS rapidly generated vapours which
made the operator lose consciousness. The fact that this critical activity was initiated
after normal working hours led to delay in responding to the situation. The shift officer
tried to help the operator but was also affected by the vapours and barely managed

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to evacuate the area. The 2nd operator, who was in the canteen and was contacted
by the shift officer, rushed to the tank but also lost consciousness. The 3rd operator
on the shift had earlier left for home and was not available for initiate any rescue or
mitigating steps. With no other operating crew available to initiate control actions, the
leak remained uncontrolled for 75 minutes. After 75 minutes, the vapour cloud ignited
causing a huge explosion followed by a fireball covering the entire installation.

➔ It is notable that in the case of the Jaipur incident, the vapour cloud was not visible.
Personnel on site were aware of the presence of the vapour by its odour. Some
personnel were able to make their escape from the site, whilst others were either
incapacitated by the MS vapors or were caught within the vapor cloud when it ignited.

➔ The fire which followed the explosion spread to all other tanks and burnt for 11 days.
All the petroleum products stored in the Terminal at the time of the accident (approx.
60 million litres) were consumed in the fire and the installation was totally destroyed.
Buildings in the immediate neighbourhood were heavily damaged. Minor damage
and window panes breakages occurred within a radius 2 km from the site. Eleven
people lost their lives in the accident - six from IOC and five outsiders, and several
others were injured. There were factories and industrial complexes in close proximity
to the site.

★ WHY IT HAPPENED :-

➔ The immediate causes of the accident were the non-observance of normal safe
procedure which involves a sequence of valve operations during line up activity and
an engineering design which permitted use of a ‘Hammer Blind Valve’. A large area
at the top of these valves can remain completely open every time the valve position
has to be changed. It was through this open area that the liquid MS leaked when the
tank was prepared for pumping to BPCL) because another valve connecting to the
tank was also open when the Hammer Blind was in the changeover position.

➔ The root causes were the absence of site specific written operating procedures,
absence of remotely operated shutdown valves and lack of understanding of
hazards, risks and consequences.

➔ Formation of a large vapour cloud

➔ At the time the leak and subsequent explosion occurred, calm, low wind speed,
conditions prevailed. This, coupled with the nature of the release (an upwards jet of
MS), is likely to have assisted in the production of vapour. Post incident analysis
indicates that a flammable vapour cloud covered much of the IOC site, bound by a
perimeter wall which would have contained most of the cloud. The cloud diameter
was approximately 1000 m, almost four times that which developed in the Buncefield
accident (12/2005).

➔ Explosion severity

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➔ The explosion resulted in widespread severe pressure damage over almost the entire
site. The evidence indicates that the vapour cloud explosion generated
overpressures that were in excess of 200kPa over most of the IOC site. The nature
of damage was similar to that observed at Buncefield (12/2005) with crushing of oil
drums above liquid level, severe damage to buildings and severe damage to
vehicles. Areas exhibiting high overpressures included many open regions, without
trees, bushes or pipework. In these areas, a deflagration would not be sustained and
overpressures would have decayed. The overpressure damage evidence is therefore
not consistent with the vapour cloud explosion involving only deflagration. Directional
indicators were also inconsistent with the explosion resulting from a deflagration only.

➔ The exact source of the transition to detonation cannot be determined due to the
limited evidence from the Pipeline Division area.

➔ The directional indicators point to the source of the detonation being in the Pipeline
Division area in the north east corner of the site. Unlike Buncefield, the possibility of
the detonation occurring as a result of flame acceleration in trees does not appear
consistent with the evidence. The most likely cause of the detonation is flame
entering either the Pipeline Area control room or the pipeline pump house, causing a
confined or partially confined explosion that then initiates a detonation as it vents
from the building. In drawing this conclusion it would seem necessary for some of the
directional evidence to be affected by lack of symmetry in the vapour cloud. The
exact source of the transition to detonation cannot be determined due to the limited
evidence from the Pipeline Division area.

➔ Implications
➔ Immediate measures

➔ Introduction of measures to make emergency action possible from remote locations.

➔ Introduction and enforcement of site operating procedures to reduce human error,

improve operating discipline, improve site communications and ensure availability
and competency in the use of personal protective equipment.

➔ Introduction of dual level gauges and alarms, detectors and CCTV systems;
➔ Introduce a requirement for QRA to be undertaken on larger sites. Long-term
measures

➔ Design and layout improvements to prevent loss of hydrocarbon containment;

➔ Improvement to firefighting capabilities.
➔ Better training, performance evaluation criteria and safety oriented corporate policies.

➔ Making the safety function independent and autonomous, reporting directly to the
company
➔ CEO; Strengthening the internal safety auditing functions and providing professional
safety
➔ auditing training; Siting criteria should be informed by QRA.
➔ Review of land use legislation in the vicinity of major hazard facilities and the role of

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local and
➔ state governments in such matters;Country-wide review of major hazard facilities
from
➔ Security view-point.

★ LESSONS LEARNT :-

➔ Facilities and installations with inherently high hazards should incorporate

redundancy in safety systems and ensure their upkeep at all times.

➔ Management should ensure that reliable systems are in place to give timely feedback
on the current practices and state of readiness in different facilities.

➔ Management must ensure that identified actions are being carried out.
➔ A high priority on safety from the senior and top management groups will send the
right signals down the line to ensure safety and production.
➔ High degree of operational competence should be maintained at all times by building
on the combined knowledge and experience of all the professional groups. The
lessons learnt from all major incidents should be shared and widely disseminated in
the entire Industry preferably through an appropriate website.

Case Study-2

❖ Surat fire Incident 24th May 2019

➔ Incident Brief Detail of surat Fire incident

➔ On 24 May 2019, a fire occurred at a coaching centre (commercial complex) in
Sarthana area of Surat in the Gujarat state of India Twenty-two students died and
others were injured in an academic coaching centre Owner of the Institute, Builder
and two officials from Gujarat Fire Safety Department (Fire service Gujarat) were
arrested.
➔ How the fire started (Surat Fire Incident)
➔ Fire Started with a Short Circuit at Ground Floor.
➔ Then Fire Spread to other floors and the Coaching Centre which was at Terrace!

★ Lapses in SURAT Fire Incident :-

➔ Spread of Fire from Ground Floor to Terrace.

➔ Inflammables are hugely used like Fluxes and Tires as seats.
➔ Fire Tender was 45 minutes away and Hydraulic ladder reached in 45 minutes.
➔ Ceiling Height was just 5 feet.
➔ 16 students died due to asphyxiation.
➔ Makeshift Dome was the building on the terrace where the actual tragedy happened.
➔ The Short Circuit happened on the Air Conditioner Circuit.
➔ 3 died as they jumped off the terrace of the building.
➔ No Safety Equipment in the building.
➔ Heavy traffic and people taking videos at the incident site.

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➔ 2 Floors was built without permission

➔ There was no audit conducted for building.
➔ Another Staircase was locked.

★ Learning of SURAT Fire Incident:-

➔ Lack of Passive Fire Protection. An adequate Passive Fire Protection.

➔ measure restricts the spread of fire and smoke.

➔ Interior coatings, internal walls etc. are spreading the fire fast. Fire Load Must be
calculated and checked on regular intervals.

➔ At least for 2 hours fire-fighting capacity must be available within every commercial
and industrial establishment.

➔ National Building Code of India shall be followed for safety compliance.

➔ Smoke is more dangerous than fire. Smoke Extraction System, Ventilation and
Maintaining Air Changes per Hour are critical aspects.

➔ Members of Structure, Wall, Floor and Roof etc. shall be as per National Building
Code of India which guide on fire rating of each.

➔ Continuous running loads will have fire hazard. Thermography and electrical audits
will help to improve every time.

➔ Inadequate exit staircase could have been the reason. Based on each floor's
occupant load, travel distance, number of exit must be calculated in a scientific
manner rather than having one or two staircases.

➔ Requirement of Safety Equipment and Training & Awareness on how to use it might
have saved many lives.

➔ If not able to extend support, others should not hamper the rescue team.

➔ Adherence to statutory will not only save the building owner/occupier from legal battle
but it is for Personnel and Property Safety. In the end it has business/commercial
benefits.

➔ All high rise buildings and industrial complexes must conduct a third party audit every
two years.

➔ Maintaining the equipment/facility “ready to use” is very critical which over a period of
time building occupants ignore.

➔ Learning from previous or similar incidents is very important to improve safety

standards of each premises.

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★ Do’s & Don’ts

● DO’S :

➔ Store flammable liquids, gases, solvents, chemicals in stable racks, correctly

labelled.
➔ Keep chemicals in a cool and dry place away from heat.
➔ Where hazardous chemicals are used / stored, ensure adequate ventilation and
prohibit smoking.
➔ All receptacles for waste should be emptied at regular intervals.
➔ Welding /Cutting jobs should be carried out under strict supervision.
➔ Before welding operations, all traces of flammable material must be removed to a
safe distance.
➔ Good Housekeeping must be ensured.
➔ Keep all machinery clean and lubricate it to avoid friction and overheating.
➔ Faculty electrical appliances should be repaired / replaced immediately.
➔ Switches and fuses should conform to the correct rating of the circuit.
➔ Keep smoke/Fire Check doors closed.
➔ Keep means of escape clear of obstructions.
➔ Emergency organisation must be set up.
➔ Impart elementary firefighting training to occupants.
➔ Fire Rescue drills should be carried out at regular intervals.

● Don’ts:

➔ Don’t smoke in prohibited areas.

➔ Don’t plug too many electrical appliances in one socket.
➔ Don’t paint fire detector/sprinkler heads .
➔ Don’t place obstruction in means of escape.
➔ Don’t use damaged cords and avoid temporary connections.

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