NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5784 OF 2022 
 (@ S.L.P (CIVIL) NO. 7015/2022) 

MY PALACE MUTUALLY AIDED             …APPELLANT(S)
CO­OPERATIVE SOCIETY                                                  
VERSUS

B. MAHESH  & ORS.                                                   …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

N. V. Ramana, CJI

1. Leave granted.

2. The   present   Civil   Appeal   has   been   filed   by   the   appellant   against

impugned final judgment and order dated 21.09.2021, passed by

the   High   Court   of   Telangana   in   Interlocutory   Application   No.

5/2020 in Application No. 837/2013 in CS No. 7/1958. 

3. The brief facts of this case necessary for the disposal of the appeal
Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by
Rajni Mukhi
Date: 2022.08.23

are as follows: the present dispute relates to Sy. No. 57 (Old Sy.
17:18:34 IST
Reason:

1
 No. 274) in Shamsguda Village, Ranga Reddy District, Telangana

forming part of S. No. 252 of the list of Mukthas in the preliminary

decree   dated   06.04.1959  by  the erstwhile High  Court  of  Andhra

Pradesh in CS No. 7/1958. 

4. The underlying original suit was filed in 1953 before the City Civil

Court,   Hyderabad   by   one   Smt.   Sultana   Jahan   Begum,   the

daughter   of   Nawab   Moinuddowla   Bahadur.   The   plaintiff   was

seeking partition of properties of the Nawab known as ‘Asman Jahi

Paigah’.  This suit was ultimately transferred to the file of the High

Court numbered as C.S. No. 7/1958. The suit along with certain

applications   were   disposed   of   by   a   preliminary­cum­final   decree

dated 06.04.1959 passed by the learned Judge of the High Court

of   Andhra   Pradesh.     The   judgment   recorded   that   the   plaintiff

withdraws   the   suit   against   defendant   Nos.   27   to   49.     It   also

recorded   that   a   compromise   was   affected   amongst   some   of   the

defendants.   The   litigation   relating   to   this   original   suit

subsequently enters a complicated phase, wherein several different

parallel proceedings take place. Suffice to state, that even after 60

years, the issues in the same are not settled. 

5. It is the say of the present appellant that they acquired the property

in   Sy.   No.   57   of   Shamsguda  Village  under   an  Assignment   Deed

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 dated   16.09.2000   executed  by  the  earlier  predecessor­in­interest

under   the   preliminary   decree.     The   predecessors­in­interest   had

also executed a Conveyance Deed dated 03.08.2003 in favour of

the   appellant,   conveying   the   schedule   property   with   specific

boundaries. As the earlier Assignment Deed dated 16.09.2000 and

Conveyance Deed dated 03.08.2003 were unregistered documents,

the predecessors­in­interest also executed a registered document

in   favour   of   the   appellant,   namely   a   ‘Deed   of   Declaration/

Confirmation’ dated 12.08.2011. 

6. On the above basis, an application (No. 837/2013) was filed in C.S.

No. 7/1958 by the appellant herein along with a party (not before

us) for passing a final decree in their favour in respect of property

measuring Acs 92.56 cts. and Acs. 27.00 gts land in Sy. No. 57 of

Shamsguda   Village,   Balanagar   Mandal,   Ranga   Reddy   District.   A

further   prayer   was   made   for   a   direction   to   deliver   the   physical

possession of the said properties.

7. The   learned   Single   Judge   of   the   High   Court   of   Andhra   Pradesh

allowed   the   said   Application   in   part  vide  final   decree   dated

19.09.2013 as sought by the appellant, and granted a declaration

that they are the absolute owners of Acs. 92.56 cts in Sy. No. 57 of

Shamsguda Village.  
3
8. The State of Andhra Pradesh challenged the said order in OSA SR

No. 3744 of 2014. After formation of the State of Telangana on the

bifurcation of the composite State of Andhra Pradesh, the State of

Telangana filed IA No. 2 of 2016 seeking condonation of delay of

182   days   in   filing   the   Appeal.   Responding   to   the   said   IA,   the

appellant   stated   that   the   delay   in   filing   of   the   Appeal   is   much

longer, amounting to 729 days. Thereafter, I.A. No. 2 of 2017 was

filed by the State of Telangana to condone a delay of 913 days in

filing the Appeal.

9. By order dated 22.12.2020, the Division bench of the High Court of

Telangana dismissed the two applications for condonation of delay

in filing the appeal, being I.A. No. 2 of 2016 and I.A. No. 2 of 2017.

As   a  consequence   of   the  same, the  State  of Telangana’s  appeal,

OSA SR No. 3744 of 2014 was dismissed.

10. In these circumstances, after lapse of nearly 7 years since the final

decree   was   granted   in   favor   of   the   appellant   herein,   the

respondents herein filed 6 IAs (in Application 837/2013 in CS No.

7/1958) before the High Court of Telangana in 2020. The details of

the applications are as follows:

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 I.A No. Prayer
1/2020 To grant leave to the respondents to file implead petition

in the above­mentioned application.

2/2020 To   dispense   with   the   filing   of   a   neatly   typed   copy   of

material   papers   in   application   filed   in   the

abovementioned application

3/2020 To allow impleadment

4/2020 To allow impleadment.

5/2020 To   recall   the   order   dated   19.09.2013   passed   in   the

above­mentioned application and to set aside and pass

such other order or orders as deemed fit and proper in

the circumstances of the case

6/2020 To   direct   the   appellant   to   not   to   alienate,   not   to

interfere, not to change peaceful possession, not register

any documents in scheduled property in Sy No.57 and

any subdivision numbers in Sy No 57 of Shamsguda in

the above­mentioned application.

11. A Division Bench of the High Court of Telangana  vide  order dated

05.01.2021, allowed IA No. 1/2021 preferred by the respondents

and  granted  them leave to file the application recalling  the final

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 decree dated 19.09.2013, passed by the learned Single Judge of

the High Court in Application No. 837/2013 in C.S No. 7/1958. 

12. The aforesaid order was challenged before this Court in an earlier

Special Leave Petition, being SLP(C) No. 8025/2021. This Court, by

order dated 06.07.2021, dismissed the said petition and gave the

parties   liberty   to   raise   all   objections   when   the   substantial

application for recalling the final decree was being heard.

13. After hearing the submissions of the parties, the Division Bench of

the High Court in I.A No. 5/2020 in Application No. 837 of 2013 in

CS No. 7 of 1958, passed the impugned order dated 21.09.2021,

allowing the recall of the final decree dated 19.09.2013. 

14. One of the primary objections taken by the appellant herein before

the Division Bench of the High Court related to the fact that the

senior   member   of   the   Bench   hearing   the   recall   application   was

presiding   over   the   Bench   which   had   heard   and   dismissed   the

appeal   filed   by   the   State   of   Telangana   against   the   same   final

decree dated 19.09.2013. On this issue, the Division Bench held

that  the earlier  appeal  filed by the State of Telangana had been

dismissed as a consequence of the dismissal of the application for

condonation of delay in filing the appeal filed by the State. There

was   no   discussion   on   the   merits   of   the   matter,   particularly   the

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 claim of the appellant. Further, the Division Bench held that as

per the roster prepared by the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the High

Court of Telangana, all matters arising out of C.S. No. 7 of 1958

were placed before it. As such, the Division Bench held that there

were   no   strong   reasons   put   forth   by   the   appellant   for   the   said

member of the Bench  to recuse from the hearing of the present

matter. 

15. The High Court, on merits, held that the appellant had obtained the

final decree dated 19.09.2013 by suppressing certain information

and   by   exercising   its   powers   under   Section   151,   Code   of   Civil

Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”), has recalled its earlier final decree dated

19.09.2013.   At   the   same   time,   the   High   Court   clarified   that

recalling of the order would not enure to the benefit of the State of

Telangana,   whose   appeal   had   already   been   dismissed,   or   the

respondents,   who   would   have   to   establish   their   right,   title   and

interest in the subject property in appropriate proceedings. 

16. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment of the High Court recalling the

final decree dated 19.09.2013, the appellant has approached this

Court by way of the present Civil Appeal. 

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17. It   is   appropriate   to   mention   here   that   the   State   of   Telangana,

despite   dismissal   of   its   appeal   in   2020,   and   the   specific

observations   of   the   High   Court   in   the   impugned   order,   initially

filed an impleadment application, being IA No. 98965/2022, in the

present   Civil   Appeal.   This   Court   dismissed   the   abovementioned

application for impleadment vide order dated 22.07.2022. 
18. The State of Telangana also filed separate Special Leave Petitions

challenging the present impugned order dated 22.12.2020, as well

and the earlier order dated 22.12.2020 dismissing their intra court

appeal [SLP (C) No. 13453 of 2022 and SLP (C) No. 13454­ 13456

of 2022]. These Special Leave Petitions were heard on 01.08.2022

by this Court and were dismissed in light of the observations made

by the High Court in paragraph 116 of the impugned order. In any

case,   the   claim   of   the   State   over   the   scheduled   property   is   not

sufficiently supported by any documentary evidence. 

19. Dr. A. M. Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of

the appellant, submitted as follows:

(i) No recall application could have been filed by the respondents.

Their only remedy was a separate civil suit for declaration of

title.
(ii) The   preliminary   decree   in   the   matter   was   passed   on

06.04.1959 and the final decree in favour of the appellant was
8
 passed on 19.09.2013. The appeal preferred by the State of

Telangana challenging the final decree was dismissed by the

High   Court   on   22.12.2020.  The respondents’  application   for

recall of final decree, in which the impugned order has been

passed, was filed before the High Court on 16.12.2020, raising

issues of fraud for the first time. The High Court ought to have

dismissed the application for recall on the grounds of delay. 

(iii) A   reading   of   the   impugned   order   shows   that   the   survey

numbers claimed by the respondents are distinct from those

claimed by the appellant. 

(iv) The   Senior   Judge   heading   the   Division   Bench,   Justice  M.S.

Rama   Chander   Rao   who   passed   the   impugned   judgment

appeared   on  behalf  of   one of the parties who were claiming

possession   in   parallel   proceedings   relating   to   the   subject

property,   which   party   had   also   filed   an   FIR   against   the

appellant herein.

(v) The respondents alleged fraud on the basis of non­disclosure

of certain orders passed against the appellant. The first such

order   is   of   10.06.2003,   whereby   the   High   Court   set   aside

recognition of the assignment deed in favor of the appellant.

The   second   order   is   of   26.08.2013,   passed   in   injunction

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 proceedings   preferred   by   the   appellant   against   the   revenue

authorities. However, both these orders were passed at a time

when   the   assignment   deed   in   favour   of   the   appellant   was

unregistered.   At   the   time   when   final   decree   was   passed   in

2013 the appellant had a registered assignment deed in their

favour with respect to the subject property. The earlier orders

are therefore not relevant. 

(vi) The   fact   that   the   subject   property   had   certain   proceedings

pending against it was recorded in the preliminary decree, and

the same was in the notice of the learned Single Judge at the

time of passing of the final decree in 2013. No fraud can be

alleged on this ground by the respondents. 

20. Mr.   Dushyant   Dave,   learned Senior  Counsel  also appearing  on

behalf of the appellant, submitted as follows:

(i) After   the   final   decree   was   passed   on   19.09.2013,   the

respondents, who are rank outsiders to the proceedings, filed

the application for recall only in 2020. The respondents have

neither provided an explanation as to the delay, nor have they

filed any application for condonation of delay. 

(ii) The affidavit supporting the application for recall was filed by

power of attorney holders. The person who signs the affidavit

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 must   have   personal   knowledge   of   the   facts.   Without   such

personal   knowledge,   such   an   affidavit   could   not   have   been

filed. 

(iii) The   present   litigation   is   nothing   but   a   proxy   litigation.

Unrelated third parties are seeking to interfere in the present

matter as the value of the subject property is very high.

(iv) The   allegations   of   fraud   were   never   taken   before   any   forum

until the impugned recall application before the High Court.

Such   plea   taken   by   the   third   party   without   any   supporting

documents cannot be raised at a belated stage.

(v) Once the State’s appeal against the final decree was dismissed

on   grounds   of   delay,   the   respondents’   recall   application

should have been similarly dismissed. 

21. Mr. C. S. Sundaram, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf

of respondent No. 1, submitted as follows: 

(i) respondent No.1 is claiming through the original pattedar of the

property.   The   recall   applications   were   filed   soon   after   his

possession   over   the   property   was   sought   to   be   disturbed.

Therefore, the question of delay does not arise.

(ii) The   preliminary   decree   indicates   that   the   title   to   the   suit

property was conditional. The respondents’ claim was upheld

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 in the Atiyat Court, which was not shown before the learned

Single   Judge   at   the   time   of   passing   of   the   final   decree   on

19.09.2013.
(iii) Respondents had also filed another application seeking leave

to file the recall application, which was allowed by the High

Court on 05.01.2021. The Special Leave Petition against the

same   was   dismissed   by   this   Court   on   06.07.2021   and,   as

such, the locus of the parties to file recall application cannot

be questioned at this stage. 

(iv) The Court always has the power to recall its order, if such an

order was obtained by playing fraud upon the Court. 

(v) Ultimately, the impugned order does not decide the title of the

parties. The parties have been relegated to file a civil suit to

decide title. The appellant may exercise its right and do the

same. 

22. Mr. V. Giri,  learned  Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the

respondents no. 3 to 8, submitted as follows:

(i) The preliminary decree was a conditional decree as it was subject

to pending Revenue Court proceedings. 

(ii) The   respondents   are   the   pattedars   of   the   property   who   were

owners in possession.

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 (iii) The   appellant’s   earlier   application   seeking   delivery   of   the

property on the basis of assignment deed was remanded to the

Single Judge and subsequently dismissed for non­prosecution

as   it   was   not   pressed.   They   abandoned   their   original

application. Additionally, the civil suit filed by the appellant for

injunction in 2007 was also dismissed. 

(iv) None   of   these   facts   and   findings   against   the   appellant   were

disclosed by them in 2013 when the final decree was sought. It

is a clear case of fraud on the Court.

(v) In any event, no final decree could have been passed on the

assignment deed as no order for partition of property was ever

passed.

(vi) These points moved the learned Division Bench in allowing the

recall application filed by the respondents. The impugned order

therefore, merits no interference by this Court. 

23. Mr. Yatin Oza, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the

respondent no. 4, submitted as follows:

(i) The   conduct   of   the   appellant   is   clear   for   all   to   see.   They

committed fraud on the Court to have the final decree dated

19.9.2013 passed in their favour by supressing judgement of

Nazim Atiyat.

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 (ii) The fundamental principle of equity is that the parties must

come   to   Court   with   clean   hands.   In   the   present   case,   this

Court   should   not   show   any   indulgence   to   the   appellant   by

interfering with the well­reasoned impugned judgment of the

High Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.

24. We have heard the learned Senior counsel on either side, perused

the entire material on record.  Though several grounds have been

raised,   the   first   ground   taken   is   that   the   High   Court   erred   in

exercising   jurisdiction   under   Section   151   of   the   CPC,   when

alternate remedies exist under the CPC. Second ground is that the

Senior Judge on the Bench, who appeared for one of the parties,

ought not to have heard the matter.

25. In   response   to   the   first   leg   of   challenge,  i.e.,   on   the   procedural

aspect,   we   may   note   that   the   recall   application   was   filed   under

Section 151 of the CPC against the final decree dated 19.09.2013.

It is in this context that we must ascertain whether a third party to

a final decree can be allowed to file such applications, by invoking

the inherent powers of the Court under Section 151 of the CPC.

26. Section   151   of   the   CPC   provides   for   Civil   Courts   to   invoke   their

inherent   jurisdiction   and   utilize   the   same   to   meet   the   ends   of

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 justice or to prevent abuse of process. Although such a provision is

worded broadly, this Court has tempered the provision to limit its

ambit to only those circumstances where certain procedural gaps

exist, to ensure that substantive justice is not obliterated by hyper

technicalities. As far back as in 1961, this Court in Padam Sen v.

State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 218, observed as under:

“8.  …The   inherent   powers   of   the   Court   are   in

addition  to  the   powers specifically  conferred  on
the Court by the  Code    . They are complementary
to   those   powers   and   therefore   it   must   be   held
that   the   Court   is   free   to   exercise   them   for   the
purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code
when the exercise of those powers is not in any
way   in   conflict   with   what   has   been   expressly
provided in the Code or against the intentions of
the Legislature. It is also well recognized that the
inherent   power   is   not   to   be   exercised   in   a
manner   which   will   be   contrary   to   or   different
from   the   procedure   expressly   provided   in   the
Code.”
(emphasis supplied)

27. In exercising  powers  under Section 151 of the CPC, it cannot be

said that the civil courts can exercise substantive jurisdiction to

unsettle already decided issues. A Court having jurisdiction over

the relevant subject matter has the power to decide and may come

either to a right or a wrong conclusion. Even if a wrong conclusion

is arrived at or an incorrect decree is passed by the jurisdictional

15
 court, the same is binding on the parties until it is set aside by an

appellate court or through other remedies provided in law. 

28. Section   151   of   the   CPC   can   only   be   applicable   if   there   is   no

alternate   remedy   available   in   accordance   with   the   existing

provisions of law. Such inherent power cannot override statutory

prohibitions or create remedies which are not contemplated under

the Code.  Section 151 cannot be invoked as an alternative to filing

fresh   suits,   appeals,   revisions,   or   reviews.   A   party   cannot   find

solace   in   Section   151   to   allege   and   rectify   historic   wrongs   and

bypass procedural safeguards inbuilt in the CPC.

29. The respondents in the present case had access to recourse under

Section 96 of the CPC, which allows for appeals from an original

decree. It must be remembered that the present matter was being

heard   by   the   High  Court   exercising   its   original   jurisdiction.  The

High Court was in effect conducting a trial, and the final decree

passed by the High Court on 19.09.2013 was in effect a decree in

an   original   suit.   As   such,   there   existed   a   right   of   appeal   under

Section 96 of the CPC, for the respondents. Though they were not

parties to the suit, they could have filed an appeal with the leave of

the   Court  as   an   affected   party.   Section   96  of   the  CPC   reads  as

under:
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 96. Appeal from original decree  .­(1) Save where
otherwise   expressly   provided   in   the   body   of   this
Code or by any other law for the time being in force,
an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any
Court   exercising   original   jurisdiction   to   the   Court
authorized   to   hear   appeals   from   the   decisions   of
such Court.
(2) An appeal may lie from an original decree passed
ex parte.
(3) No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the
Court with the consent of parties.
[(4) No appeal shall lie, except on a question of law,
from a decree in any suit of the nature cognizable by
Courts of Small Causes, when the amount or value
of   the   subject­matter   of   the   original   suit   does   not
exceed [ten thousand rupees.]

30. Sections   96   to   100   of   CPC   deals   with   the   procedure   for   filing

appeals   from   original   decrees.   A   perusal   of   the   above   provision

makes it clear that the provisions are silent about the category of

persons   who   can   prefer   an   appeal.   But   it   is   well   settled   legal

position that a person who is affected by a judgment but is not a

party to the suit, can prefer an appeal with the leave of the Court.

The  sine qua non  for filing an appeal by a third party is that he

must   have   been   affected   by   reason   of   the   judgment   and   decree

which is sought to be impugned. 

31. In the light of the above, it can be safely concluded any aggrieved

party can prefer an appeal with the leave of the Court. 

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32. The High Court, in the impugned judgment, relied on the judgment

of this Court in Indian Bank vs Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd.,

(1996) 5 SCC 550, wherein this Court acknowledges the possibility

of   maintaining   a   recall   application   against   a   judgement   if   it   is

obtained by fraud on the Court. However, it went on to hold that in

cases   of   fraud,   the   Court  may  direct  the  affected  party   to  file  a

separate suit for setting aside the decree obtained by fraud. The

Court held as follows:

“22.  The   judiciary   in   India   also   possesses

inherent   power,   specially   under   Section   151
CPC,   to   recall   its   judgment   or   order   if   it   is
obtained by fraud on court.  In the case of fraud
on a party to the suit or proceedings, the court
may   direct   the   affected   party   to   file   a   separate
suit   for   setting   aside   the   decree   obtained   by
fraud…”

33. The subsequent judgment of this Court in Ram Prakash Agarwal

v. Gopi Krishan, (2013) 11 SCC 296 further clarifies the law on

the use of the power under Section 151 of the CPC by the Court in

cases of fraud and holds as follows:

“13.   Section   151   CPC   is   not   a   substantive

provision that confers the right to get any relief of
any kind. It is a mere procedural provision which
enables   a   party   to   have   the   proceedings   of   a
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pending   suit   conducted   in   a   manner   that   is
consistent with justice and equity. The court can
do justice between the parties before it. Similarly,
inherent   powers   cannot   be   used   to   re­open
settled matters. The inherent powers of the Court
must, to that extent, be regarded as abrogated by
the legislature. A provision barring the exercise of
inherent power need not be express, it may even
be   implied.   Inherent   power   cannot   be   used   to
restrain the execution of a decree at the instance
of one who was not a party to suit. Such power is
absolutely   essential   for   securing   the   ends   of
justice,   and   to   overcome   the   failure   of   justice.
The Court under Section 151 CPC may adopt any
procedure   to   do   justice,   unless   the   same   is
expressly prohibited.

Xxx

19. In view of the above, the law on this issue
stands   crystallised   to   the   effect   that   the
inherent powers enshrined under Section 151
CPC can  be exercised only where no remedy
has been provided for in any other provision
of CPC. In the event that a party has obtained a
decree   or   order   by   playing   a   fraud   upon   the
court, or where an order has been passed by a
mistake of the court, the court may be justified
in rectifying such mistake, either by recalling the
said order, or by passing any other appropriate
order.  However,   inherent   powers   cannot   be
used   in   conflict   of   any   other   existing
provision,   or   in   case   a   remedy   has   been
provided   for   by   any   other   provision   of   CPC.
Moreover, in the event that a fraud has been
played upon a party, the same may not be a

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 case where inherent powers can be exercised.”
(emphasis supplied)

34. The   High   Court,   relying   upon   the  above   judgments   of  this   Court

which recognizes the power to recall, seems to have lost sight of

the   restrictions   imposed   while   exercising   jurisdiction   under

Section 151 of the CPC, which were elaborately discussed by this

Court in the above referred judgment about exercising of the power

under Section 151 of the CPC being only in circumstances where

alternate remedies do not exist. 

35. Therefore, we are of the firm opinion that recalling a final decree in

such circumstances cannot be countenanced under Section 151 of

the CPC. The High Court erred in exercising its jurisdiction under

Section   151   of   the   CPC,   to   hear   and   pass   a   detailed   judgment

recalling   its   earlier   final   decree   dated   19.09.2013,   rather   than

directing   the   respondents   to   pursue   the   effective   alternate

remedies under law. Having said the above, we must clarify that

we are not, in any way, doubting the proposition of law that fraud

nullifies all proceedings, or that the Court has power to recall an

order   which   was   passed   due   to   a   fraud   played   on   the   Court.

However,   while   exercising   the power  under   Section  151 CPC  for

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 setting   aside   the   final   judgment   and  decree,  the  Division   Bench

should   have   taken   into   consideration   the   restriction   which   was

observed by this Court in the captioned judgment. Once we have

come   to   the   irresistible   conclusion   that   exercising   power   under

Section 151 CPC in the facts and circumstances of the case is bad,

we are not inclined to go into further issues that were extensively

argued. 

36. The   other   ground   that   the   learned   senior   judge   who   passed   the

present   impugned   order   had   represented   one   of   the   opposite

parties   in   certain   collateral   proceedings   related   to   the   subject

property,   merits   some   discussion.   It   appears   that   although   the

appellant raised this ground before us, it was neither raised before

the High Court nor brought to the attention of the learned senior

Judge. The party ought to have raised this issue also at the time of

arguments, particularly when the issue of recusal of the learned

Judge had been specifically raised on the other ground that he had

been the presiding member of the Bench which had dismissed the

appeal filed by the State. 

37. When an issue was not raised before the learned Division Bench,

we   do   not   wish   to   spill   much   ink   on   this   issue.   However,   the

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 material placed on record by the counsel for the appellant cannot

be ignored. Annexure P8 of the appeal paper book indicates that

the   Senior   Judge   heading   the   Division   Bench,   while   being   an

advocate,   had   represented   the   Andhra   Pradesh   State   Financial

Corporation   in   one   of   the   connected   proceedings   related   to   this

case.

38. Although we have no doubt in our mind about the absence of bias

of any form of the learned senior Judge, we must at the same time

also   look   at   the   issue   of   whether   right   minded   persons   could

consider   there   exists   any   real   likelihood   of   bias.   In   the   case   of

State of West Bengal v. Shivananda Pathak, 1998 5 SCC 513,

this Court held as under: 

“34.  In  Metropolitan   Properties   Co.  v.  Lannon

[(1968) 1 WLR 815 : (1968) 1 All ER 354] it was
observed “whether there was a real likelihood of
bias or not has to be ascertained with reference
to   right­minded   persons;   whether   they   would
consider that there was a real likelihood of bias”.
Almost the same test has also been applied here
in  an old  decision, namely, in  Manak Lal  v.  Dr
Prem   Chand   Singhvi  [AIR   1957   SC   425   :   1957
SCR   575]   .   In   that   case,  although   the   Court
found   that   the   Chairman   of   the   Bar   Council
Tribunal appointed by the Chief Justice of the
Rajasthan   High   Court   to   enquire   into   the
misconduct of Manak Lal, an advocate, on the
complaint of one Prem Chand was not biased

22
 towards him, it was held that he should not
have   presided   over   the   proceedings   to   give
effect   to   the   salutary   principle   that   justice
should   not   only   be   done,   it   should   also   be
seen   to   be   done  in   view   of   the   fact   that   the
Chairman,   who,   undoubtedly,   was   a   Senior
Advocate   and   an   ex­Advocate   General,   had,   at
one time, represented Prem Chand in some case.
These principles have had their evolution in the
field   of   administrative   law   but   the   courts
performing   judicial   functions   only   cannot   be
excepted   from   the  rule  of bias as  the Presiding
Officers   of   the   court   have   to   hear   and   decide
contentious issues with an unbiased mind. The
maxim  nemo   debet   esse   judex   in   propria   sua
causa  and the principle “justice should not only
be   done   but   should   manifestly   be   seen   to   be
done” can be legitimately invoked in their cases.”

(emphasis supplied)

39. It   is   a   well­established   principle,   both   in   our   jurisprudence   and

across the world, that “[N]ot only must justice be done; it must also

be seen to be done”.1  In the present circumstances, it may have

been more apposite for the concerned Judge to have recused from

this case. The appellant should have brought it to the notice of the

learned   senior   Judge   at   the   very   first   instance,   and   not   at   this

belated stage.

1 R v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy, 1924 (1) KB 256.

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40. In   the   above   circumstances,  we  are  of  the   opinion  that   the  High

Court should not have decided the recall application filed by the

respondents, let alone pass such extensive orders which has the

effect   of   unsettling   proceedings   and   transactions   which   have   a

history   of   more   than   60   years   in   a   proceeding,   basing   on   an

application filed under Section 151 of the CPC. 

41. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed by setting aside the order

dated 21.09.2021 passed in I.A No. 5/2020 in Application No. 837

of 2013 in CS No. 7 of 1958.

............................CJI.
(N. V. RAMANA)

..…..........................J.
(KRISHNA MURARI)

.........…………….......J.
    (HIMA KOHLI)

NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 23, 2022.

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