Soliven vs. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 394 (1998)

Soliven vs.
Makasiar, 167 SCRA 394 (1998)
Facts:
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not
petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although
the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of
Justice and, subsequently, by the President; (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran
were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally
examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and (3)
whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal
proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit. The first issue has
been rendered moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice
sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7,
1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they
have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.
Issue: Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC
judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the
witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause
Ruling:
No. The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the
constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the
grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as
may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced Beltran that the Constitution now requires
the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself with the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted
by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant
of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. It has not been shown that respondent judge
has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of
arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot
be sustained.

Soliven vs. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 394 (1998)

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