HONESTLY SPEAKING LESSONS FROM UKRAINE

(Maj Gen Harvijay Singh, SM)

WAKING UP TO FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES IN THE TACTICAL SPHERE

Leonardo DRS, U.S subsidiary of Italian defence firm Leonardo SpA, is a mid-tier defence electronics firm that
primarily serves the US military. They build Active Protection Systems for Tanks and Armoured Fighting Vehicles.

RADA Electronic Industries, an Israeli firm provides software-defined tactical radars; provide air surveillance with
emphasis on counter-UAV with advanced on-the-move capabilities.

RADA is being acquired by Leonardo DRS. Their merger provides for an integrated Force Protection System with the
marriage of Active Protection Systems and Tactical on the Move Radars.

It has evidently got the super powers thinking that even they are vulnerable.

It is not just the tank that is under threat, the Ukraine war has exposed chinks in other military establishments too.
Come to think of it, in the battlefield, the tank remains the most agile, protected and armed weapon of war.

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Why Force Protection Measures? few Examples:

 9 Jun 2022 - A Russian Ammunition Depot in Voskresenka, Zaporizhia Oblast was destroyed by Ukraine’s
45th Artillery Brigade after a 15-year-old local boy with a toy drone determined its precise coordinates;
remarkable circumstances.
 In beginning of the war, Ukrainian troops have been devastatingly effective in ambushing Russian armoured
vehicles with shoulder-launched munitions; Russians mostly bunched up on highways or bogged down due to
Rasputitsa. Other vehicle columns met a similar fate.
 18 Mar 2022, Russian armed forces used for the first time Kinzhal hypersonic missile launched from an
aircraft to destroy a Ukrainian ammunition depot in the village of Deliatyn in the Ivano-Frankivsk region.
 14 Apr 2022, two R-360 Neptune anti-ship missiles sank Russian Warship Moskva. The battleship was blind
to the attack, its fire control radars were not switched on; complacency killed the cat.
 18 Jan 2022, a drone attack targeted a key oil facility in Abu Dhabi and also sparked a fire at Abu Dhabi's
international airport. Later UAE has claimed to have enhanced its anti-Drone capability and brought down a
few hostile drones near its borders.
 Azerbaijan’s UAVs obliterated Armenia’s formidable array of ground-based air defences, and then,
systematically decimated Armenia’s ground force, including tanks, artillery pieces, and supply trucks. This
onslaught forced Armenia to accept a humiliating ceasefire imposed by Russia.

Preparing for the future battlefield, a strong defence against the Drones has to be on top of the list.

Defence against Drones

 Kinetic measure - Use of anti-Drone guns and nets.

 Electronic and Cyber Warfare measures – Detect, track and control/destroy Drones by Spoofing and
Jamming. Use of Radars and Jammers.
 Directed Energy Weapons.
 Active Protection Systems for the defence of tanks and vehicle columns. Similar concept could be used for
land based systems like Ammunition Dumps and Ships.

Active Protection Systems

Trophy Active Protection System Developed by Leonardo DRS in partnership with Rafael Advanced Defence
Systems, used by the US Army on M1 Abrams tanks. The Iron Fist systems that are now being tested on the Bradley
Infantry Fighting Vehicle. The integration of RADA Software Defined Tactical radars will complement the system.

The Russian T-14 Armata tank features the Afghanit Active Protection System, which includes a millimetre-
wavelength radar to detect, track, and intercept incoming anti-tank munitions, both kinetic energy penetrators
and tandem-charges. Currently, the maximum speed of the intercept able target is 1,700 m/s (Mach 5.0), with
projected future increases of up to 3,000 m/s (Mach 8.8). It is reported to protect the tank from all sides.

Lessons

 Force Protection Measures against Drones, loitering munition, and guided weapons will be decisive. These
have to be developed soon; bread and butter concerns over the military needs can threaten civilisations.
 These measures are essential for the defence of Infantry in the open and in trenches, Mechanised Forces,
Vehicular Columns, Artillery Gun Areas, Military trains and critical static establishments like Ammunition
Depots, Command and Control Centres, Airports, and Communication Centres.
 The tank is a well-protected weapon system, the availability of even one Active Protection System with a
Troop of Tanks (Four Tanks) will give added strength. Some advocating the demise of the tank have a
defensive and a fortress mind-set. Tanks provide attacking Armies manoeuvrability, protection and
firepower. A fast moving tank column can spell fear for those who choose to cocoon themselves in trenches
and pill boxes. Mind you, even the fortresses are not safe if you are not prepared for it.

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STRATEGIZING MOBILE COMMUNICATION NETWORKS

Ukraine’s telecommunications services—especially its cell phone networks—have shown great resilience in the war;
broadband networks are being defended, maintained and used under attacks and bombardment, Consistent
internet access has helped Ukraine’s war efforts too:

 Mobile services have been exploited by Ukrainian army to allow citizens report the positions of Russian
forces. These include a Telegram channel, a website and even an app called Bachu that uploads details once
data connectivity has been re-established.
 Mobile services have contribute to Psychological Warfare by spreading images and videos of brutal Russian
attacks on apartments, hospitals and other civilian targets; half their war is being fought on the Internet.

Preparing the Ukrainian Networks for War: Systematic and Front-footed

 Allotment of additional 3G and 4G frequency bands when the war began; increased capacity.
 Ensuring across networks, that no account gets suspended even if it ran out of credit; humanitarian
initiative.
 Suspending/blocking all roaming (In/Out) with Russia and Belarus; no alternate linkup to their backbone
communications and no homebound calls even with Ukrainian SIM Cards.
 The airgap so created protects Ukraine networks from Cyber-attacks.
 Implement national roaming. Residents of Mariupol, could in the final stages regardless of their phone
subscription stay connected via a single remaining Kyivstar cell tower; remarkable resilience.

In the absence of a Tactical Communications System, Russians were forced to rely on Ukrainian mobile phones
(stolen or purchased SIMs). With Ukraine able to intercept, eavesdrop, and trace calls made on its networks, it
developed a significant intelligence advantage leading to numerous strikes on Russian command posts; kill chain
crowd sourcing. The Defence Ministry put out images of what is valuable to report and kill (e.g Russian EW Systems).

Contribution to the War Effort

 Positive impact on morale and marshalling international support for Ukraine.

 Impacting Russian forces’ communications and allowing Ukrainian forces to receive information about
Russian troop movements to execute attacks.
 Resilience and Security across the entire spectrum of operations.

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Lessons

 Every civilian infrastructure must be built to compliment a nation’s war effort. Frequent exercises must be
conducted to audit their efficacy. This requires deliberate planning as a national policy.
 Secure, efficient, reliable, and resilient military communications are essential for military operations across
all domains and frontiers. Dependence on civilian networks especially that of the enemy is not a wise option.
 Armies in battle will be deaf, dumb and blind without a mobile networked Tactical Communication System
which is capable of rolling forward into the enemy territory.

POLITICS OF INDIFFERENCE

Dec 1991 Ukraine became independent and enacted a resolution taking jurisdiction over all Soviet formations
stationed in Ukraine. Its military then had 780,000 personnel, 6,500 tanks, 7,000 combat armoured vehicles, 1,500
combat aircraft, and more than 350 ships (fourth largest in the world).

2.5 million tons of ammunition were left in Ukraine, also more than 7 million rifles, pistols, mortars, and machine
guns stored in over 180 military bases, in bunkers, salt mines and in the open. Ukraine also inherited a large arms
industry. Prior to 2014 a major part of Ukraine's military business was selling of Soviet stocks to whoever was willing
to pay. In mid-1990s, 320 T-80 tanks were sold to Pakistan and an unfinished Soviet aircraft carrier the Varyag to
China (now the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning).

Most crucial of the stranded weapons were: the Soviet nuclear arsenal and Russian Black Sea fleet stationed in
Sevastopol on the Crimean Peninsula.

Nuclear weapons issue was resolved in 1994 by signing of the Budapest Memorandum. Ukraine agreed to hand all its
nuclear weapons (1900 nuclear warheads) to Russia in exchange of security assurances from Russia, USA, Britain and
France. Ukraine's concessions are hardly remembered today—except by the beleaguered Ukrainians who otherwise
could have benefited from the deterrent value of a nuclear arsenal.

……….and Crimea was simply captured by the Russians in 2014.

Without its own arms, no principality is secure; indeed, it is wholly obliged to fortune since it does not have virtue to
defend itself in adversity - Machiavelli, Italian author, philosopher, and historian of the Renaissance Period.

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After independence, the Ukrainian military was neglected and underfunded by its government. Maintenance of
equipment and training were ignored too. The Ukrainians were so lethargic in their military strategy that, till 2014,
majority of their forces were located to the West still facing Cold War NATO threats.

Till 2014 Ukraine, forced by economic considerations, maintained military relations with Russia, and, then Ukraine
chose European partnership over Russia. This made the Big Bear angry and armed Russian-backed separatists seized
government buildings throughout the Donbas Region, leading to armed conflict with Ukrainian government forces.

A frantic crisis management investment in the military was the first significant increase in defence spending after
two decades. Before the war in Donbas, the budget for military spending was only 1% of GDP. In 2015 and 2016, it
rose to 2.5%, barely enough to meet the needs of the military operations in Donbas.

The war also forced partial mobilisations of conscripts to generate ‘bayonet strength’. It remained just numbers; the
new conscripts had poor, or even no military training. As the war continued, the number of volunteers declined.
Young Ukrainians began to avoid military service due to poor leadership, conditions of service, deaths and injuries.

During the first two years of the conflict between 2014 and 2016, Ukrainian army lost 800 fighting vehicles (including
tanks and self-propelled artillery). Half were abandoned because of technical failures. Consequently at the beginning
of the war in Feb 2022, military equipment of the Ukrainian army was in the dumps.

Lessons

 Treaties between nations are mostly unreliable and fickle. Agreements involving abdication of strategic
assets in exchange of "assurances" of undefined future support are not worth the paper they are written on.
 Chronic underfunding of a military, lack of reforms in doctrine and transformation overloaded with
bureaucratic baggage is disastrous for national security.
 Patchwork reforms and crisis management do not work when faced with war; it may already be too late.
 Gaps created due to ‘politics of indifference’ take years to fill and can leave serious dents in the geography
and demography of a nation; Crimea, Luhansk and strategically important Kherson region lost so far.
 Ukrainian government, desperate for foreign aid would like us to believe: all that is needed is the ‘last little
push’. Reality however is not that romantic.

REALITY CHECK ON AI AND ROBOTICS

While ‘Technology Ahead Nations’ were predicting victory in future wars riding AI and Robotics, Ukraine happened. It
has a wakeup lesson:

the ‘Bite’ still hurts more than the ‘Byte’.

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In the modern world overwhelmed by technology, it would be sacrilege to audit the role of AI and Robotics in warfare.
However, with Europe witnessing a devastating attrition war and mighty USA hurriedly retreating from Afghanistan, it
is prudent to do so. While this account is not ‘future blind’, conclusions are based on ‘Epilogism’ - inferences which
move entirely within the domain of visible evidence, simply accumulation of facts without generalization.

Technology can be sharp and surgical, But, if there are no well-trained battle inoculated men and women behind the
machines, you are eating soup with a knife: slow and messy and you can hurt yourself if not careful.

A fancy prediction of wars being ‘Short and intense’ has not stood the Ukraine test. A similarly prediction on the
influence of AI and Robotics in warfare is perhaps being overstated ahead of time. AI enabled systems like drone
swarming, command and control decision-making support systems and a few autonomous weapon systems at best
remain ‘demonstrative’ under peaceful and favourable conditions.

AI to work like the human mind is still a few decades away. Current is AI that generates statistical models to accomplish
specific tasks, solving tough computational problems through search, heuristics and probability; the hyperbole being
created is possibly premature and industry driven.

The epic Russian defeat in Kiev happened because of the amazing in-ability of the Russian Forces to perform basic
military tasks and battle procedures. The overconfident Russians reached a dead end when faced by the overcharged
Ukrainians who fought with whatever they could throw at the Russians. The war has since taken its due course: it is
bloody and violent, it is destructive, modern technology tools have won some and lost some. There has however been
no visible intense technology vs technology contest to draw evidence from this, the biggest conflict of the 21st Century.

Lessons

 While there is little doubt that whoever has significantly superior technology will have considerable advantage
in future conflicts, technologies must still be seen with scepticism before they are allowed to autonomous
military decisions.
 Technology predictions are often hyped to exhibit overly-optimistic outcomes via high grade multimedia
presentations. Caution: When military leaders join this glamour clamour, the politicians and bureaucrats kick-
start replacing soldiers with gadgets.
 Is conventional warfare passé? Are collateral damage and attrition barbaric and illegal? Will there be no
refugees now?…… if the answer is ‘NOT YET’, then - gardez cette garde - keep that guard up.

WHAT IS LEAN IS ALSO LIKELY TO BE BRITTLE

Management Definition: A lean organization tries to create more value ‘for customers’ with fewer resources.

Militaries across the world are being persuaded to transform to adopt ‘lean’ by doing away with the ‘tail’ and still
manage to remain ‘mean’ with their ‘teeth’!!!! (Tail relates to logistics).

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A thought that must ring a bell in the mind of those pliant enough to be persuaded is: what is lean can be brittle too;
having a texture that readily breaks into little pieces under pressure.

The first phase of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a logistics nightmare; traffic jams, broken down vehicles, fuel
shortages, hungry troops and so on. The Russian Army had sat on the border for weeks flexing its muscles at Ukraine
and the world; Kiev at 380 Kms appeared just a gunshot away. The Russians hoped to cripple the Ukrainians with fear
and force them to surrender. Pumped by a sense of overwhelming numerical superiority they failed to appreciate the
terrain, weather and the enemy’s will. During such egoistic highs, commanders also tend to keep logistics minimalist.
Some won’t even discuss them; a ‘Hubris’ of another kind.

Russian logistics depots are always close to the railways as Russian military has a serious lack of transport units. Early
in the war on 26 Feb, Ukraine destroyed all rail links between Russia and Ukraine. They also made the Ukrainian Cellular
services unavailable for use by the enemy. Russia had hoped to use both to fight a war!! Within hours, their own brittle
logistics shattered under pressure.

Russians were forced to use the roads. Adding to their woes, much of the Ukrainian highway network is composed of
narrow roads winding through forests and small towns, with bridges crossing rivers and streams along the way. Russian
convoys were made to suffer hit and run raids using mines, machine guns and missiles.

In war, if history repeats itself, there can be nothing more irresponsible: Last time the Russian Army rolled through
Ukraine, they were fighting the Germans during World War II. The Ukrainians were on their side, and, Ukrainian
guerrilla units were attacking and destroying German logistic convoys.

Lessons

 War-fighting concepts must not shift from battle experience and basic reality towards more facile and
simplistic definitions conjured by management interns; lest we forget - war is the ‘last resort’, let it not fall
prey to theories of reductionism.
 Moving thousands of troops, equipment and supplies into war zones avoiding hostile combatants is hazardous
work; as a rule, transformational concepts must emerge from lessons learnt in real battlefields and not from
board rooms.
 A crucial lesson for Commanders from Kiev: it is actually easier to halt an army in its tracks by destroying
the logistics pipeline than fighting it.

Must end with a Joke

Future wars will be Short and Intense

Since this war refuses to follow the predicted path, and, laboratory and boardroom theories get tested at human
cost, wait for more ‘Honestly Speaking Lessons’.

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