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The components of dialogue

a
John Poulakos
a
Doctoral student in Speech Communication
and Human Relations , University of Kansas
Published online: 06 Jun 2009.

To cite this article: John Poulakos (1974) The components of dialogue, Western
Speech, 38:3, 199-212, DOI: 10.1080/10570317409373830

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 The Components of Dialogue
JOHN POULAKOS*

A . CLEAR UNDERSTANDING and appreciation of any concept neces-

sitates an accurate isolation of the fundamental components of the concept and
a subsequent analysis of each component. The concept of dialogue is no ex-
ception. In the article, "The Emerging Concept of Communication as Dia-
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logue," Richard Johannesen sets out to examine components of the concept

of dialogue, but he actually describes what seem to be dialogical character-
istics.1 If one considers that "characteristic" refers to "a distinguishing trait,
feature, or quality, peculiarity,"2 and that component means "a part; con-
stituent; ingredient,"3 it should be obvious that (1) Genuineness, (2) Ac-
curate Empathie Understanding, (3) Unconditional Positive Regard, (4)
Presentness, (5) Spirit of Mutual Equality, and (6) Supportive Psychologi-
cal Climate are characteristics rather than components. Clearly, the addition
or omission of any one characteristic does not alter the essence of a concept,
whereas a similar addition or omission of a component may drastically change
the meaning of that concept. Components, then, are more definitive of and
more essential to the objectification of a concept. One way that components
may be discovered is through phenomenology, a method which implies a
careful examination and subsequent description of the concept under con-
sideration.
From a phenomenological point of view, then, it may be said that the
components of dialogue are three. They are: The Self, the Other, and the
Between. It is the purpose of this essay to describe each component in terms
of its relation to the notion of dialogue. Dialogue in this essay is regarded as
a mode of existence manifested in the intersubjective activity between two
partners, who, in their quest for meaning in life, stand before each other
prepared to meet the uniqueness of their situation and follow it wherever it
may lead.
T H E SELF

Several notions are implied by the idea of the Self. Individuality is one
of them. Being an individual is a state of being undivided in itself. In such a
* Mr. Poulakos is a doctoral student in Speech Communication and Human Rela-
tions,1 University of Kansas.
Richard L. Johannesen, "The Emerging Concept of Communication as Dialogue,"
The 2Quarterly Journal of Speech, LVII (December, 1971), 373-382.
Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language (The World Pub-
lishing
3
Company, New York, 1958), p. 245.
Ibid, p. 301.
[199]
 WESTERN SPEECH SUMMER 1974

state, the Self may be said to experience a meaningful integration of many

diverse characteristics into a unified whole known as personality. This inte-
gration one senses "in the conscious state of self-knowledge and self-identity
manifested and lived in the state of direct interiority and awareness . . ."4
Dividuality, or a state of being divided from everything else, is also suggested
by the nature of the Self. As such one stands before two possibilities : the one
possibility bears thé notions of singularity, uniqueness, difference, and other-
ness ; the second possibility connotes such aspects of the Self as limitations
and imperfections, all in the realm of distant isolation.6
In the light of the second possibility, the condition of the Self seems to be
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severely limited. However, the Self realizing his limitations and imperfections
may decide to alter his condition by abandoning his separateness and enter*
ing into togetherness, or by eliminating his distance and coming near others.
Clearly, then, any dialogical happening depends upon the decision of two
separate Selves to alter their present condition. In fact, it is the making of
such a decision that constitutes the most critical point preceding any dialogi-
cal interaction.
Affirming the thesis that dialogue is necessary for the improvement of
the Self, Martin Buber explains that "the inmost growth of the Self is not
accomplished, as people like to suppose today, in man's relation to himself,
but in the relation between the one and the other, between men . ..- ."6 One
must realize, in addition to Buber's insight, that in order to enter into relation
with his fellow man, man himself must have a starting point; he must have
been, and he must be. If it is accepted, then, that the Self grows only in a
dialogical relationship, but that there still must be a Self to begin with, it
should be agreed that this latter Self must be a highly imperfect and incom-
plete Self. Therefore, what one brings with him in dialogue is a Self that has
room and desire to grow. It is a Self-in-search of justification for and affirma-
tion of being by way of meaningful encounters with the other. It is a Self
aware that only because there is otherness can he attempt to establish himself
by distinguishing his being from that of the others. :
The idea of Self emerging in dialogue is supported by symbolic inter-
action which posits that "The meaning of a thing for a person grows out of
the ways in which other persons act toward the person with regard to the
thing. Their actions operate to define the thing for the person."7 Qearly the
meaning of Self for oneself arises in the process of interaction between Self
and others.
4
Frederick Patka, Existentialist Thinkers and Thought, (New York: The Citadel
Press,
5
1962), p. 47.
Ibid.
6
Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (London:
Kegan7
Paul, 1947), p.21.
Herbert Blumer,Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method, (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ : Prentice Hall, Inc., 1969), pp. 4-5.
[200]
 WESTERN SPEECH JOHN POULAKOS

When in dialogue, the participant Self is met with the difficulty of observ-
ing himself interacting because such an observation presupposes at least a
double sense of Self : the Self observed, and the Self as observer. Karl Jaspers,
the German philosopher, devotes a great deal of his thought on the subject
of the Self, and regarding its dual nature he states : " T is the being that grasps
itself. It is aware of itself as aiming at itself—as one, and at the same time
as two beings which remain one despite their distinction. It is the subject
that makes an object of itself."8 This distinction introduces the dichotomy of
the subjective and objective Self, and the difference between the empirical
and the transcendental ego, considerations which go beyond the limits of this
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essay.
In any discussion regarding the Self, an essential consideration is that
man senses the need to know himself, a need which can be met only if one has
the ability to step back from his particular situation and view his very own
Self as he would view another man. Although dialogue may have little to do
with the development of this ability, it allows each participant to see himself
in his partner as though his partner were an existing mirror. Such a Self
perspective based on the other partner's perceptions is attainable through
what is known as feedback. It is only through feedback from the other that
one begins to visualize and later understand himself as the object of his own
thought. Gradually, and in the context of feedback, there emerges a Self
with a double awareness : the one of the participant Self and that of the Self
as observer.
Being the Self that one sees, or the Self that one becomes, in dialogue
means actively choosing to become one's own creator. But as one becomes,
and discovers who he really is, he also experiences a resistance against the
acceptance of himself as he simply is. Sometimes the resistance is so strong
that it makes a man feel guilty for being the way he is. Jaspers points out that
there is a basic difference between the acceptance of internal states of being
and phenomena external to the Self. Referring to external things, he suggests
that "Those things exist for me as downright otherness, not as themselves."
Then he continues : "but I am in myself, I am the being which acts and thus
is, the being which appears to itself as what it can be but cannot simultaneously
be aware of. . . . This is why something in me resists recognition of myself
as being simply given the way I am ;. . ."9
are several cultural and social norms which often force one to assume un-
In addition to the resistance from within that Jaspers talks about, there
are several cultural and social norms which often force one to assume un-
desirable roles and be what he actually is not. When such a thing occurs his
essence is identified with the external forces around him. He is no longer
8
Karl Jaspers, Philosophy Volume II, trans. E.B. Ashton (Chicago: The Universi-
ty of9 Chicago Press, 1970), p. 26.
Jaspers,Phibsophy Volume II, p. 32.
[201]
 WESTERN SPEECH SUMMER 1974

the center of emphasis. Instead, his Self gradually becomes a byproduct of the
interplay of the existing sociocultural influences. His self-identity is even-
tually lost. Social philosophers and cultural anthropologists warn constantly
against social norms with dehumanizing effects or cultural forces which lead
to alienation.
When totally immersed in his social surroundings a man may never dis-
cover who he is because, as argued previously, he lacks the ability of dis-
establishing himself from his particular situation. But, if he temporarily steps
back, he may discover that he has become dehumanized and alienated. This
realization will probably make him reject hiself as such. This rejection is
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tantamount to the abolition of one of the components of dialogue which, of

course, denies or transforms dialogue itself. If dialogue is to be maintained
and carried on meaningfully, each partner must simply work toward becom-
ing what he is. Such a direction involves, according to Carl Rogers, moving
away from facades, from "oughts," from meeting expectations, and from
pleasing others. Additionally, it involves moving toward self-direction, to-
ward a process view of the Self, toward openness to experience, acceptance
of others, and self trust. 10 But regardless of what is involved in being one's
Self, the man who can be himself is unquestionably worthy of admiration. In
the following lines, Jaspers demonstrates his extraordinary insight into hu-
man nature by picturing the man who is being hiself in a dialogical context.
The wonder of wonders, the one and only true being I can meet,
is the man who is himself. He will not rigidly cling to anything he has
objectified as valid; he permits and asks limitless questions, not at
random, but so that his self will speak and reply. As a rational being he
wants to hear all reasons and at the same time the voice of the one self.
Him I love absolutely. He is here and now, doing what the time de-
mands. He can wait calmly and act confidently without hesitation. He
commits himself in the situation he finds himself in, and yet he never
identifies with his situation. He will go among all kinds of people and
wil take the risks involved. H e feels drawn to strangeness, to opposi-
tion, to what will doubt or deny him the most ; he goes looking for all
of this to find out what he is and what it will make of him. He never
comes to be wholly himself, for as such a valid image he would not be
himself any more ; he is no less aware of being finite than of being
infinitely original. To him existence grows only to reveal its true ob-
scurity. From all reflection he will reemerge as himself without know-
ing how, for in his unceasing effort he cannot succeed by manifest, all
settled ; it is all so simple now, so inescapable—how could it possibly
have been in doubt for so long. 11
The reason it takes so long for the Self to become is that on the way to
selfhood he often falls into the false dichotomy of individualism and collec-
10
Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person, A Therapist's View of Psychotherapy
(Boston:
11
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961), pp. 171-175.
Jaspers, Philosophy Volume II, pp. 41-42.
[202]
 WESTERN SPEECH J O H N POULAKOS

tivism, a dichotomy which dominates our age. Basically, the individualist

becomes so involved with himself that he either loses sight of the basic reality
of otherness, or, the times he perceives it, he regards it as an obstacle to be
overcome or avoided. Furthermore, he fails to come out and communicate
with others because he believes himself to be the core of all there is. For him
relationships between people as well as group situations are conceived only
insofar as they consist of separate individuals.
The collectivist, on the other hand, stands alone in the midst of a faceless
crowd, offering himself for its making and in so doing loses his individuality,
his uniqueness. Immersed in the masses of the collective, he is at best an
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anonymous, disoriented self recognized by others only in terms of his use-

fulness for the whole. Most of his loyalties and efforts are directed to the
preservation of a system which owes him nothing in return and which can
replace him any time. Little by little, the collectivist loses his ability to interact
with others on a personal basis because he has no thoughts or ideas of his
own. His ideas represent, for the most part, the mentality of the collective
he is a member of.
Gabriel Marcel, the French philosopher and playwright, openly condemns
both poles of the dichotomy of individualism and collectivism as false and
illusory. Specifically, he takes a stand against individualism by insisting that
as a Self "I must puncture is illusion... that I am possessed of unquestionable
privileges which make me the centre of my universe, while other people are
either mere obstructions to be removed or circumvented, or else these echoing
amplifiers, whose purpose is to foster my self-complacency."12 Marcel also
denounces collectivism because the collective reduces a person into a statisti-
cal unit, or a percentage point. In his words, the collectivist" . . . is simply a
specimen among an infinity of others since the opinions, which he thinks
are his own, are merely reflections of the ideas accepted in the circles he
frequents and handed round in the press which he reads daily."13 While
dismissing both individualism and collectivism, Marcel thinks that one can
claim to be a person insofar as he is responsible for what he does and says,
both to himself and to everyone else. Personhood means believing in the
existence of others and allowing this belief to influence ones conduct in life.14
Referring to the dialogically minded person, the French philosopher states,
"The being who is ready for anything is the opposite of him who is occupied
or cluttered up in himself. He reaches out, on the contrary, beyond his narrow
self, prepared to concentrate his being to a cause which is greater than he is,
but which at the same time he makes his own." 15
12
Gabriel Marcel, Homo Viator: Introduction to a Metaphysics of Hope, trans.
Emma
13
Crawford (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1951), p. 19.
14
Ibid., pp. 20.21.
15
Ibid., pp. 21-22.
Ibid., pp. 24-25.
[203]
 WESTERN SPEECH SUMMER 1974

For Buber, who also dismisses individualism and collectivism, the funda^
mental fact of human existence is man with man. This means that "The
individual is a fact of existence insofar as he steps into a living relation with
other individuals. The aggregate is a fact of existence insofar as it is built
up of living units of relation."16 Therefore, any knowledge concerning human
existence "can only be attained through man's personal engagement, through
his entering with his whole being into dialogue."17
In this section, it has been pointed out that the Self constitutes one of
the three components of dialogue. As such, the Self stands undivided in him-
self and divided from everything else. When in dialogue, the Self exists both
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as the observer and as that which is observed. In the context of dialogue, the
incomplete Self aims toward personal growth and seeks self-knowledge. By
avoiding individualism or collectivism the Self can enter into the relational
event of dialogue and become self-accepting.

T H E OTHER

The category of otherness encompasses everything outside ones own self.

In the case of dialogue, each participant Self is confronted by his partner
who vividly represents the concept of the Other. For each one of the partici-
pnats of dialogue the Other is essentially different from himself. As such the
Other is potentially observable. But the Other is not only different. It is also
distant from the Self. In fact, it is the very distance between the Self and the
Other which allows for their distinction. The same distance also possibilitates
the coming together of the two, their mutual entering into relation. It may
be said, then, that the Other is a component of dialogue insofar as he is dif-
ferent and distanct from the Self, yet always potentially in relation with the
Self.
As a component, the Other constitutes a vital force whose presence largely
deetrmines the shaping of one's Self. In his early years, man experiences the
otherness that is his family and his mother. Later on, in school, the child
begins to learn only because he encounters things really "other" than himself.
In any relation, each partner needs the Other so that the relation may happen
and last and so that both participants may reach higher states of being. Ac-
cording to Peter Koestenbaum, author of The Vitality of Death, otherness is
to man's becoming " . . . . as is the wind to the child's kite, the kite it lifts into
the skies. But if otherness becomes overwhelming, then the kite, destroyed
by the gale, falls to the ground ; . . . . Conversely, insufficient otherness leads
to a flabby sense of selfhood, a weak and insignificant ego. . . . There is an
optimum amount of otherness, sought. . . . which elevates and inspires the
16
17
Buber, Between Man and Man, p 202.
Maurice Friedman, Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue, (New York : Harper
and Row Publishers, 1960), p. 146.
[204]
 WESTERN SPEECH J O H N POULAKÖS

ego to the security of a strong and solid sense of inwardness/' 18 From the
above insight, one may easily infer that a creative and successful dialogical
relationship depends, among other things, on the presence of an optimum
amount of otherness before each partner.
Generally, the notion of otherness as it relates to people has a variety of
meanings. For some it is the source of zest for life as they in awe discover
the experience of being alive. Among them Martin Buber nostaligically
recollects his first experience with the Other :
When I was eleven years of age, spending the summer on my
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grandparents' estate, I used, as often as I could do it unobserved, to

steal into the stable and gently stroke into the neck of my darling, a
broad dapply-grey horse. It was not a causal delight but a great, cer-
tainly friendly, but also deeply stirring happening. If I am to explain
it now beginning from the still very fresh memory of my hand, I must
say that what I experienced in touch with the animal was the Other,
the immense otherness of the Other, which, however, did not remain
strange like the otherness of the ox and the ram, but rather let me draw
near and touch it. When I stroked the mighty mane, sometimes mar-
vellously smooth-combed, at other times just as astonishingly wild,
and felt the life beneath my hand, it was as though the element of
vitality itself bordered on my skin, something that was not I, was
certainly not akin to me, palpably the other, not just another, really
the Other itself ; and yet it let me approach, confided itself to me, placed
itself elementally in . . . . relation . . . . with me.19
For those who believe in solipsism, nothing exists but the Self ; all else
is incidental, pointing to or deriving from the concept of Self. The paradox
of the solipsist position lies, of course, in the fact that such a position has been
formed only because there exists somthing more than the Self, namely, the
Other. In fact, it is the Other that allows that there be a Self.
For some of those who do take into consideration the part of reality con-
stituted by otherness, the Other is the means while the Self is the end ; the
former stands as an object before the latter who is the subject. According
to Marcel, treating the other person as an object is equal to stripping this
person of his humanity. As he puts it in a form of a question, "Is it not obvi-
ous that if I treat the other person as a sort of mechanism exterior to my own
ego, a mechanism of which I must discover the spring or manner of opera-
tion, even supposing I manage to take him to pieces in the process I shall
never succeed in obtaining anything but a completely exterior knowledge of
him which is in a way the very denial of his real being ?"20
Obviously Marcel's skepticism points out the potential danger of de-
humanization inherent in the knowledge of the Other in terms of an object.
18
Peter Koestenbaum, The Vitality of Death, (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Pub-
lishing
19
Company, 1971), p. 304.
20
Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 23.
Marcel, Howo Viator, pp. 23-24.
[ 205 ]
 WESTERN SPEECH SUMMER 1974

To this Marcel adds that "We must even go further and say that such a
knowledge is in reality sacrilegious and destructive, it does no less than
denude its object of the one thing he has which is of value and so it degrades
him effectively."21
Still, for someone, the other person might be of interest insofar as "he is
likely to form a favourable picture of him, which in turn he will receive
back."22 Once again, to see the Other in this utilitarian light is a form of what
Marcel calls "moral egocentricity". This term refers to one's unwillingness
to see the other person independently of his usefulness for one's Self. Such
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an attitude Marcel disapproves by stating: "From the very fact that I treat
the other person merely as a means of resonance or an amplifier, I tend to
consider him as a sort of apparatus which I can, or think I can, manipulate,
or of which I can dispose at will. I form my own idea of him and, strangely
enough, this idea can become a substitute for the real person, a shadow to
which I shall come to refer my acts and words."33
Whether by encountering the Other one is overcome by existential awe
or by mere frustration, what cannot be denied, for certain, is that the Other
not only exists but exists in interaction with the Self. Yet, the role or the
influence of the Other varies from situation to situation.
In dialogue, the Other is faced by the Self as this particular Other made
in this particular way. And so the task emerges very clearly, requesting as it
were that the Self attempt to meet the Other in his uniqueness and peculiarity,
and come to terms with him. Coming to terms with the Other becomes actu-
ality when the Other is recognized, accepted, and confirmed as he is.
Initially, each partner becomes aware of the Other, and through this
awareness he recognizes that the Other is elementally different from himself.
That is to say that the Other " . . . does not have merely a different mind, or
a way of thinking or feeling, or a different conviction or attitude, but has also
a different perception of the world, a different recognition and order of mean-
ing, a different touch from the regions of existence, a different faith, a differ-
ent soil.. ."24
This recognition of the differentiation implicit in the Other seems to be
necessary before the Other can be accepted by the Self. Acceptance, however,
does not imply agreement. One can accept the Other's being while opposing
the Other's views. Disagreement in arguments and opposition in views lies
in the conversational interchange, not in the human relationship. Accepting
the Other means allowing him to partake in one's life. It also means denounc-
ing one's egocentric tendencies, and act of admission of personal imperfec-
tion and desire for growth possible only in relation. It may be said that accept-
21
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid., p. 17.
24
Ibid., pp. 17-18.
Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, pp. 61-62.
[206]
 WESTERN SPEECH J O H N POULAKOS

ance of the Other is one of the prerequisites for authentic existence. When
two partners can turn to each other and say : "I accept you as you are", their
dialogue may proceed in the climate of authenticity. Yet the Other is not only
to be recognized and accepted ; he is to be confirmed, too.
According to Buber, confirmation constitutes the basis of the existence of
man with man. Every man needs confimation from others. In turn, every
man is capable of confirming others. Confirmation is the most critical factor
in the growth and development of the Self, because it allows one to confidently
become himself. Such confidence can come to a man only from another fellow
man. As Buber puts it, "Sent forth from the natural domain of species into
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the hazard of the solitary category, surrounded by the air of a chaos which
came into being with him, secretly and bashfully he watches for a Yes which
allows him to be and which can come to him only from one human person to
another." 25
In this section, the Other has been seen as the second component of dia-
logue. As such it is different and distant from the Self. It is also a necessary
factor for the existence of the Self. If the Other is dismissed the notion of
dialogical interaction is negated. Seen in an objective or utilitarian light, the
Other has little to offer to the development of the Self. A proper recognition,
acceptance, and confirmation of the Other leads into a meaningful sense of
selfhood.
T H E BETWEEN

Neither the Self nor the Other has boundaries which are really obvious
and clearly denned. One can never be certain where one personality ends
and another begins. In this essay, the Self and the Other have been treated
as two separate entities for analytical purposes. In actuality, however, the
two are less distinct than the foregoing analysis might suggest. At this point,
it may be said that the most significant thing about these two components is
that they both possibilitate and subsequently define a third reality which
belongs to neither one of them but without which dialogue is negated. This
reality Martin Buber designates as the realm of the "Between". The Between
focuses one's attention to the relationship that exists between the two parti-
cipants, a relationship which does not reside within themselves but without
which dialogue cannot be conceived. An implicit assumption operating here
is that there can be no dialogue between two persons neither one of whom is
aware of the other's existence.
Traditionally, dialogue has been viewed as a phenomenon composed of
the characteristics and attributes of each of the two partners put together.
The appraisal of the facts of the dialogical situation has up to the present
25
Martin Buber, "Distance and Relation" Martin Buber, The Knowledge of Man,
(New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1965), p. 71.
[207]
 WESTERN SPEECH SUMMER 1974

time included first, the physical aspects (i.e., the two people who talk to each
other with words and gestures), and second, the psychological aspects (i.e.,
what happens inside each participant). But as Buber states, "In this view
the meaningful dialogue itself that proceeds between them and to which the
acoustic and optical events fit, the dialogue that arises out of the souls and is
reflected in them, this remains unregistered."23
Of course, the view of the two participants in their separateness fails to
account for their "partnership", the actual "interconnection" of the two as
they engage in dialogue. Their relationship to each other is bypassed if their
dialogue is regarded as the mere sum of two individual entities. As Buber
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remarks, "If I and another come up against one another... the sum does not
exactly divide, there is a remainder, somewhere, where the souls end and the
world has not yet begun, and this remainder is what is essential."27
But however essential the area of the Between may be, it has not, thus
far, been the concern of communication theory,".. .because in distinction
from the individual soul and its context, it does not exhibit a smooth con-
tinuity, but is ever again reconstructed in accordance with men's meeting
with one another ; . . ."2S Judging from the available communication literature
one may conclude that theorists and researchers in the field have for the most
part neglected to pursue the Between as an object of inquiry. It is ironic,
however, that the Between is unknowingly represented in known communi-
cation models, although it is not accounted for. Most models include two
major foci, one of which is labeled source, originator, etc., while the other
is termed receiver, interpreter, etc. ; they also include various other things
such as message, noise, channel, feedback, etc. Conceivably, the area devoid
of labels or pictures that is between the two foci, the empty space, is what
represents the Between.
Referring to the notion of the Between by the term "intersubjectivity",
Gabriel Marcel points ont that if one were to place a chair next to a table it
would make no difference to either one of the objects. Similarly, there would
be no difference if one were to take the chair away from the table. The same
is not true with two partners. Marcel insists that the relationship between the
two people as well as any interference with that relationship does make a
difference to both partners.29 Emphasizing the significance of "intersubject-
ivity", Marcel proclaims that "Between two people . . . who have an intimate
relationship, a kind of unity tends to be created which makes a third person,
26
Martin Buber, "Replies to my Critics" The Philosophy of Martin Buber, eds.
Paul Schilpp, Maurice Friedman (La Salle, Ill.: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1967),
P. 707.
27
28
Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 204.
29
Ibid., p. 203.
Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery of Being Volume I, trans. GS Fraser (Chicago:
Henry Regnery Co., 1950), p. 181.
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 WESTERN SPEECH JOHN POULAKOS

who has not been initiated into the relationship, who does not participate in
it, feel an intruder."30
In contrast to the components of the Self and Other, the unity between
two people in dialogue that Marcel talks about is very difficult to describe,
partly because it cannot be observed. It is, then, one might assert, the invisi-
ble entity which interconnects two people who have turned to each other. It
is, more precisely, the entity which allows us to view the two participants
as partners rather than two separate individuals. The Between is like the
force which binds all the particles of an organism together and permits us to
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consider such an organism alive. When this force is absent we regard such
an organism dead, although it may have all the particles of an alive one. The
Between, then, may be seen as the interhuman force which sustains dialogue
between two people and makes the actual relationship be an end, not a means
to some other end. When this unity is present, the participants are neither
one nor two. Instead, by interacting with each other and by responding to
one another simultaneously, each becomes himself. Between them there is
created an intimacy which cannot be compared to two electronic boards ex-
changing signals. Martin Buber advances further the notion of this inter-
human force by explaining: " .. .by the interhuman I mean solely actual
happenings between men, whether wholly mutual or tending to grow into
mutual relations. For the participation of both partners is in principle in-
dispensable. The sphere of the interhuman is one in which a person is con-
fronted by another. We call this unfoulding the dialogical."31
From what has been said so far, it should be obvious that the Between can-
not be found between any two people and at any time. To be sure, certain
conditions must be there before its emergence becomes possible. Initially,
the two partners must be in each other's presence. Yet, physical presence is
not enough. It is not uncommon for two people to be in the same room and
mutually unaware. Therefore, in addition to their physical presence the two
must become aware of each other, at least on a perceptual level. Mutual
awareness, however, is not a sufficient condition, either. Conceivably, two
people can be perceptually aware of each other but oblivious to each other's
humanity. Some degree of interaction between the two seems to be another
necessary condition, but like the others it fails to account for the emergence
of the Between. Three essential conditions have been suggested all of which
are inadequate. Equally essential, yet more adequate than the above three
is a fourth condition which describes an attitudinal disposition on the part of
the participants. This disposition refers to the concept known as openness.
The participants are open to the extent that they allow what has already
30
31
Ibid.
Martin Buber, "Elements of the Interhuman," Martin Buber, The Knowledge of
Man, ed. Maurice Friedman (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1965), p. 75.
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 WESTERN SPEECH SUMMER 1974
impressed upon them—their awareness of the other—impress on them deeper
and affect them decidedly. For Buber, being open means granting a share of
one's being to one's partner.
As the Between emerges, it gradually becomes incorporated into the par-
ticipants' personal world. Part of their humanity is defined by their ability
to create in cooperation the entity we have called the Between. In view of
this entity, man may be envisioned as a center surrounded by other distant
and separate centers. Becoming in this situation means interconnecting one-
self with other centers, constructing something between oneself and particular
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others, or to use Buber's phrase, "entering into relation".

At this point, several questions may arise : Does the Between exist only
while partners interact? Is the Between permanent? Once there, how does it
affect its creators? Which variables facilitate its creation? Which ones inter-
fere with its development? In answer to the above questions, the following
may be said : Once established, the Between is there permanently, and it no
longer requires the physical presence, awareness, and interaction on the part
of the partners. But even though it is permanent it constantly changes form
whenever it is brought to mind by the partners in absentia, and it is reconsti-
tuted each time the partners meet. Because of the permanency of the Between
one is not automaticallly disconnected from friends or loved ones when held
prisoner for years in distant lands. For the same reason, receiving a letter from
an old friend can lead one to recreate his relationship with that particular
friend, and as a result be moved.
The creation of the Between remains always unfinished. It is never com-
plete in the same sense that being is never complete ; there are always higher
states of being. Its constitution and evolution depend primarily on the state
of the two partners who define it. One of the most significant things that the
Between does is that it puts both participants in such a position that each can
confirm the other and in turn be confirmed by the other. Thus, it appears that
both the Self and the Other can benefit from their creation, the Between.
Out of man's basic need to be confirmed by his fellow man and his pre-
ference to be confirmed falsely than not at all, there arises the dichotomy of
being and seeming.32 Being facilitates the growth of the Between, while seem-
ing interferes with it. The man who chooses being is direct in his expressions
and spontaneous in his actions. He is not concerned with the images or opin-
ions which the others may form of him. Running the risk of possible disap-
proval, he simply is. On the other hand, the seeming man appears to be what
he is not. Concerned about the production of a good impression, constantly
wary of what others might think of him, and still interested in securing the
others' approval, he succumbs to the compromises involved in the making of
"the good looks". The irony of his position lies in the fact that he wants to
32
Ibid.
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 WESTERN SPEECH JOHN POULAKOS

appear to others as man who is being himself when, in fact, he is not. His
fear, of course, amounts to the possibility of disapproval or rejection from the
others if he were really to be himself.
From these two ways of being in relation to others, one does not always
choose the one to the exclusion of the other. Most people stand between the
two poles, and, depending on what the situation distates, they oscillate. This
being the case, one can only distinguish between men who, for the most part,
are and men who mostly seem.
The value implied in this section is that being is more desirable than
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seeming. In the words of Martin Buber, "To yield to seeming is man's es-
sential cowardice, to resist it is his essential courage."33 One decisive part of
man's becoming in life is the painful movement toward being himself. One
must always try to be whoever and whatever he is.
One can struggle to come to oneself—that is to come to confidence
in being. One struggles, now more successfully, now less, but never
in vain, even when one thinks he is defeated. One must at 34 times pay
dearly for life lived from the being ; but it is never too dear.
When the two men in dialogue communicate themselves to one another as
what they are, their interchanges is marked by truth and authenticity. But
authenticity in their relationship does not depend on " . . . one saying to the
other everything that occurs to him, but only on his letting no seeming creep
in between himself and the other. It does not depend on one letting himself
go before another, but on his granting to the man to whom he communicates
himself, a share of his being. This is a question of the authenticity of the inter-
human and where this is not to be found, neither is the human element itself
authentic."35
Contrary to the above treatment of seeming, some communication writers
assert that "man is by nature a role taker and that his most common ex-
istential choice is not one of playing or not playing a role but one of selecting
among the roles available to him".38 Such a position questions the view that
one has a "Real Self" and establishes that man operates exclusively in the
realm of seeming. The limitations of the above position are obvious if one
considers that being a role taker does not necessaryrily eliminate other di-
mensions of one's essence, i.e., the existence of a "Real Self". But even if we
adopt that man is basically a role taker, we cannot escape the more basic
reality of a Real Self who must perceive the available roles, choose a particular
one, interpret it, and act it out. In the process of acting out a role one is de-
fined only in part. For the most part one is affected positively or negatively by
33
34
Maurice Friedman, ed. Martin Buber, The Knowledge of Man, p. 78.
34
Ibid.
36
Ibid., p. 77
Roderick Hart, Don Burks, "Rhetorical Sensitivity and Social Interaction"
Speech Monographs, 1972 p. 77.
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 WESTERN SPEECH SUMMER 1974

the role he chooses. In the performing arts an actor is moved by the nobility
and courage of the character he is portraying. In everyday life one becomes
sick when, although angry and distressed, he acts calm and composed. To
consider then, the actor and his role as one and the same implies no distinc-
tion between being and seeming. This, in turn, implies no distinction between
sincerity and pretentiousness, superficiality and substantiality, rhetoric and
dialectic, illness and health, or falsity and truth.
In summary, the Between directs one's attention to neither the Self nor
the Other, but to the actual happenings between men. Even though very
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difficult to conceptualize, it does characterize all relationships, and therefore

dialogue, too. Physical presence, mutual awareness, interaction, and willing-
ness to be influenced on the part of the partners constitute the conditions
necessary for the emergence of the Between. Once created, it is permanent
but is constantly changing form in accordance to the interaction of its creators.
Being enhances dialogue, while seeming hampers it.
In this essay, the Self, the Other, and the Between have been presented
as the three basic components of dialogue. Admittedly, the Self and the Other
have been discussed elsewhere in more detail. However, the contribution of
this essay lies on the treatment of the Between. This treatment is by no means
an exhaustive analysis of this new concept. Instead, it is a major step toward
the conceptualization of a new entity whose elucidation promises to be highly
instrumental in our understanding of the communication process, and dia-
logue in particular. Furthermore, it is an attempt to emphasize a new direc-
tion that future communication research might follow.

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