Final Report of Investigation Real

REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION:
Security Failures at the
United States Capitol on
January 6, 2021
Prepared at the direction of:

Congressman Jim Banks (R-IN)
Congressman Rodney Davis (R-IL)
Congressman Jim Jordan (R-OH)
Congressman Kelly Armstrong (R-ND)
Congressman Troy Nehls (R-TX)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Leadership and law enforcement failures within the U.S. Capitol left the complex
vulnerable on January 6, 2021. The Democrat-led investigation in the House of
Representatives, however, has disregarded those institutional failings that exposed
the Capitol to violence that day.
The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs and the Senate
Committee on Rules and Administration conducted a bipartisan investigation in the
1
months after the attack. On June 8, 2021, the committees released their findings in a
joint staff report (hereinafter, Senate Report). This report supplements the Senate
Report and provides findings from the perspective of the House of Representatives
regarding those areas of inquiry that the Democrat-led investigation has thus far
ignored, specifically answering the important question of why the Capitol was left so
unprepared. This report is based on documents and communications obtained from
key witnesses, and interviews with U.S. Capitol Police leaders and rank-and-file
officers.
Many of the witnesses who spoke to investigators are U.S. Capitol Police (USCP)
sources. Some of the sources are current USCP officers and others are former
officers. Several of the sources who sat for interviews are USCP intelligence analysts
within the Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division. Additionally,
investigators interviewed the Chief of the U.S. Capitol Police Tom Manger, the House
Sergeant at Arms William Walker, and the Assistant Director of the Intelligence and
Interagency Coordination Division Julie Farnam.
This report goes to great lengths to protect the identities of the line officers and
analysts who participated in interviews. Sources who cooperated with this
investigation described retaliation by USCP leadership for their participation in this
investigation and other investigations into the events of January 6, 2021. Additionally,
the Staff Director for the House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, David Buckley, has a track record of acting in a
2
retaliatory manner against whistleblowers. For those reasons, this report uses “USCP
source” to cite or otherwise refer to conversations with USCP employees who are not
in leadership positions. 2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
There are several reasons the Capitol was left unprepared on January 6, 2021,
including internal politics and unnecessary bureaucracy. Prior to that day, the U.S.
Capitol Police (USCP) had obtained sufficient information from an array of channels
to anticipate and prepare for the violence that occurred. However, officers on the
front lines and analysts in USCP’s intelligence division were undermined by the
misplaced priorities of their leadership. Those problems were exacerbated by the
House Sergeant at Arms, who was distracted from giving full attention to the threat
environment prior to January 6, 2021 by several other upcoming events.
Specifically, the leader of the USCP Intelligence and Interagency Coordination

Division failed to warn USCP leadership and line officers about the threat of violence,
despite the fact that IICD analysts gathered intelligence that clearly indicated a need
for a hardened security posture. In fact, IICD’s leader—Julie Farnam—spent the weeks
leading up to January 6, 2021 attempting to overhaul the division, including by
reassigning expert intelligence analysts to new roles and creating new processes for
synthesizing threat data. Information about planned protests and threats of violence
were siloed and not properly analyzed and disseminated during this key period
because of Farnam’s misplaced priorities. One IICD analyst testified to investigators:
“That unit was disbanded by her almost on day one. We, at the time of January 6, we
were not doing proactive searches of social media like we had been before. We were
strictly reactive and responding to requests for information.” This is also substantiated
by USCP’s own internal after-action report that was drafted in June of 2021.
Similarly, then-House Sergeant at Arms Paul Irving—who served on the Capitol Police
Board by virtue of his position—succumbed to political pressures from the Office of
Speaker Pelosi and House Democrat leadership leading up to January 6, 2021. He
coordinated closely with the Speaker and her staff and left Republicans out of
important discussions related to security. As a critical member of the Capitol Police
Board, the House Sergeant at Arms had an obligation to all Members, staff, and USCP
officers to keep them safe by consulting stakeholders without partisan preference.
3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
But rather than coordinate in a meaningful way, Irving only provided information to
Republicans after receiving instruction from the Speaker’s office. In one case, Irving
even asked a senior Democratic staffer to “act surprised” when he sent key
information about plans for the Joint Session on January 6, 2021 to him and his
Republican counterpart. The senior Democratic staffer replied: “I’m startled!”
To make matters worse, systemic issues have crippled the security apparatus for years.
USCP line officers were under-trained and ill-equipped to protect the Capitol
complex. One officer testified to investigators that he went into the fight on January
6, 2021 with nothing but his USCP-issued baseball cap. Even if every USCP officer
had been at work that day, their numbers would still have been insufficient to hold off
the rioters due to a lack of training and equipment. The USCP was set up to fail, and
there have been scant signs of progress toward addressing these weaknesses.
In fact, rather than address these systemic issues, USCP leadership ramped up its
intelligence gathering work as it relates to private citizens who meet with Members of
Congress and Senators, including extensive research on private residences and other
meeting venues. This investigation found that the information collected against
private citizens exercising their constitutional rights with respect to meeting Members
of Congress is not in fact used for security purposes in some cases. This issue, and
others require additional scrutiny by the relevant committees of Congress.
4
KEY FINDINGS
THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE AND DEMOCRAT LEADERSHIP WERE
CLOSELY INVOLVED IN SECURITY DECISIONS IN THE LEAD UP TO AND
ON JANUARY 6, 2021.
THE HOUSE SERGEANT AT ARMS TOOK DIRECTION FROM STAFF IN THE

OFFICE OF THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE AND INTENTIONALLY EXCLUDED
REPUBLICANS FROM KEY MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS RELATED TO
HOUSE SECURITY.
STAFF WITHIN THE HOUSE SERGEANT AT ARMS OFFICE EMAILED PAUL

IRVING THAT JANUARY 6TH WAS PELOSI’S FAULT.
WIDESPREAD CONCERN FROM DEMOCRAT LEADERSHIP OVER “OPTICS” IN

THE AFTERMATH OF SUMMER 2020 “BLACK LIVES MATTER” PROTESTS
PREVENTED EARLY DEPLOYMENT OF THE NATIONAL GUARD.
THE LEADERSHIP OF THE INTELLIGENCE AND INTERAGENCY

COORDINATION DIVISION OVERHAULED THE DIVISION IN THE WEEKS
BEFORE JANUARY 6, 2021 AND CREATED NEW PROCESSES FOR OBTAINING
AND ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE DATA. THOSE CHANGES CAUSED
CONFUSION AND RENDERED A KEY USCP COMPONENT INEFFECTIVE
DURING A CRITICAL PERIOD.
THE LEADERSHIP OF THE INTELLIGENCE AND INTERAGENCY

COORDINATION DIVISION RETALIATED AGAINST SUBORDINATES WHO
SPOKE OUT ABOUT THE DIVISION’S SHORTCOMINGS.
THE HOUSE SERGEANT AT ARMS WAS COMPROMISED BY POLITICS IN THE

LEAD UP TO AND ON JANUARY 6, 2021 AND DID NOT ADEQUATELY
PREPARE THE CAPITOL FOR POSSIBLE VIOLENCE.
U.S. CAPITOL POLICE DID NOT GIVE OFFICERS THE APPROPRIATE

TRAINING NECESSARY TO PREPARE THEM TO PROTECT THE CAPITOL FROM
VIOLENCE.
THE U.S. CAPITOL POLICE DOES NOT HAVE THE EQUIPMENT NECESSARY
TO PROTECT ITS OFFICERS.
THE COMMAND-AND-CONTROL STRUCTURE OF THE U.S. CAPITOL POLICE

AND THE CAPITOL POLICE BOARD CONTRIBUTED TO UNNECESSARY
DELAYS IN DECISION-MAKING ON JANUARY 6, 2021.
THE U.S. CAPITOL POLICE HAS STILL NOT IMPLEMENTED IMPORTANT

RECOMMENDATIONS ISSUED BY OVERSIGHT BODIES.
5
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2
FINDINGS 5
TABLE OF CONTENTS 6
TABLE OF NAMES AND ABBREVIATIONS 7
Events of January 6, 2021 8
United States Capitol Police 13
Background on Recent Violence and Changes to USCP 15
USCP Structure 16
Capitol Police Board 18
The Board has resisted long-standing calls for reform. 20
The Board continues to operate in the dark 23
The U.S. House Sergeant at Arms was compromised by politics and did not adequately prepare for 24
violence at the Capitol.
The Speaker’s office was heavily involved in planning and decision-making before and during the 25
events of January 6, 2021, and micromanaged the Sergeant at Arms.
In the lead up to January 6, 2021, the House Sergeant at Arms was distracted, and the Capitol 31
Police Board was dysfunctional.
USCP failed to adequately prepare for the events of January 6, 2021 35

USCP lacks adequate equipment 36
Systemic Department-Wide Training Failures 38
USCP intelligence failures are directly to blame for the lack of preparedness on January 6, 2021. 41
There had not been an intelligence failure at this scale in the USCP Intelligence Division prior to the 43
Joint Session of Congress on January 6, 2021.
Changes to the Intelligence Division after November 2020 caused the intelligence failures on 50
January 6, 2021.
Farnam undermined IICD analysts and downplayed important intelligence to USCP leadership. 59
IICD leadership reorganized the division to gather more intelligence on Members of Congress, 66
staff, and constituents to the detriment of preparing for the Joint Session.
USCP leadership doubled down on their failed management approach and retaliated against 70
officers and analysts who raised concerns.
USCP is withholding an internal report that confirmed many of the concerns raised by analysts and 73
officers who testified to investigators.
Recommendations 75
Make the Capitol Police Board more transparent 75
Compel the Board to send meeting minutes to the relevant oversight committees 75
Require the Board to regularly appear before the relevant oversight committees 76
Provide additional resources for the Capitol Police Board to professionalize its support staff 76
Clearly define and limit the Board’s authority 77
Make the Inspector General independent from the Board 77
Reform the structure of the Capitol Police Board 77
Add two new members to the Capitol Police Board 78
Replace the Chief of Police with the Commissioner on the Board 78
APPENDIX 79
Appendix A: Timeline of House Sergeant at Arms Paul Irving’s Records 79
Appendix B – Organizational Chart of Relevant Entities 103
ENDNOTES 104
TABLE OF NAMES &
ABBREVIATIONS
Names
Ali Alexander Organizer of the “Stop the Steal” rally
Brian Monahan Attending Physician of the U.S. Congress
Jamie Fleet Democratic Staff Director, Committee on House Administration, and shared staffer with
Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi
Paul Irving Former House Sergeant at Arms
Jack Donohue Former Director, Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division of U.S. Capitol Police
Jen Daulby Former Republican Staff Director, Committee on House Administration
Julie Farnam Assistant Director, Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division of U.S. Capitol Police
Kim Schneider Deputy Chief, U.S. Capitol Police
Luke Murry Former National Security Advisor, Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy
Michael Stenger Former Senate Sergeant at Arms
Norm Grahe Former Director, Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division of U.S. Capitol Police
J. Thomas Manger Chief of Police, U.S. Capitol Police
Timothy Blodgett Deputy House Sergeant at Arms, former acting-House Sergeant at Arms, current chief of staff to
USCP.
Sean Gallagher Acting Assistant Chief of Police for Police and Uniformed Operations, U.S. Capitol Police
Steven Sund Former Chief of Police, U.S. Capitol Police
Wyndee Parker National Security Advisor, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi
William J. Walker House Sergeant at Arms, former Commanding General of the DC National Guard
Yogananda Pittman Assistant Chief of Police for Protective and Intelligence Operations, U.S. Capitol Police, former
acting-Chief of U.S. Capitol Police
Abbreviations
AOC Architect of the Capitol
CPB Capitol Police Board
DPD Dignitary Protection Division
GAO Government Accountability Office
IICD Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division
IOS Intelligence Operations Section
HSAA House Sergeant at Arms
OIG Office of Inspector General
PSB Protective Services Bureau
SAA Sergeant at Arms
SSAA Senate Sergeant at Arms
SSB Security Services Bureau
TAS Threat Assessment Section
TSB Training Services Bureau
USCP U.S. Capitol Police

7
EVENTS OF JANUARY 6, 2021
THE U.S. SECRET SERVICE ESTIMATED

BEFORE 9:00 AM
OVER 10,000 PEOPLE WERE LINING UP.
THE INITIAL WAVE OF PROTESTERS BEGAN STORMING THE

OUTER POLICE BARRIER AROUND THE CAPITOL. MINUTES
1:00 PM
LATER, VICE PRESIDENT MIKE PENCE GAVELED IN THE
JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS TO CERTIFY THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE VOTE RESULTS.
U.S. CAPITOL POLICE CHIEF STEVEN SUND CALLED D.C.

1:49 PM NATIONAL GUARD COMMANDING GENERAL WILLIAM J.
WALKER TO REQUEST IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE
PROTESTERS BROKE THE FIRST WINDOWS OF THE CAPITOL

SHORTLY AFTER 2:00 PM AND BEGAN CLIMBING INSIDE.
SUSPICIOUS PACKAGES, LATER DETERMINED TO BE PIPE

BOMBS, WERE FOUND OUTSIDE THE REPUBLICAN
BETWEEN 1:30 AND 2:00 PM
NATIONAL COMMITTEE AND DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL
COMMITTEE HEADQUARTERS
THE SENATE AND HOUSE BOTH RECESSED AND THE

COMPLEX WAS LOCKED DOWN. NOTABLY, THE BUILDING
WAS LOCKED DOWN ALMOST AN HOUR AND A HALF AFTER
AROUND 2:20 PM
THE FIRST BARRIER WAS BREACHED AND ALMOST A HALF
HOUR AFTER THE FIRST PROTESTERS BEGAN ENTERING.
PRESIDENT TRUMP TWEETED “PLEASE SUPPORT OUR

CAPITOL POLICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT. THEY ARE
AROUND 2:30 PM
TRULY ON THE SIDE OF OUR COUNTRY. STAY PEACEFUL!”
RIOTERS BROKE INTO THE SENATE CHAMBER. THEY

SHORTLY BEFORE 3:00 PM CLIMBED ON THE PODIUM, TOOK SELFIES, AND RIFLED
THROUGH PAPERS IN THE ROOM
8
WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY KAYLEIGH MCENANY
3:36 PM TWEETED THAT PRESIDENT TRUMP ORDERED THE NATIONAL
GUARD TO THE CAPITOL.
NEARLY FIVE HOURS AFTER THE RIOTING STARTED,

JUST AFTER 6:00 PM POLICE STARTED TO SECURE THE CAPITOL AND CLEAR
PROTESTERS.
9
On January 6, 2021, criminal rioters assaulted police officers, broke into the U.S. Capitol,
damaged property, and temporarily interfered with the certification of states’ presidential
and vice presidential electors at the Joint Session of Congress—a typically pro forma event.
Article II, Section 1, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides that each state “shall appoint”
electors for President and Vice President in a manner directed by its state legislature.
Article II, Section 1, clause 3 provides that such appointment should take place on a day
determined by Congress. Congress determined that day to be Election Day, which occurs
3
on the “Tuesday next after the first Monday in November” every fourth year. Congress also
decided the date on which those electoral votes are counted in a joint session of Congress.
4
The date has been set by law to be January 6 following each presidential election.
Following the 2020 presidential election, the House and Senate prepared to count the
electoral votes for the 2020 presidential election submitted by the states on January 6,
2021.
Threats against large-scale political and public events are common. For that reason, most
“major public events such as presidential inaugurations, state of the union addresses,
nominating conventions and Super Bowls are routinely designated National Special Security
5
Events (NSSE) because of their perceived value as terrorist targets.” The 2021 Joint Session
of Congress, however, was different.
6
In the lead up to the Joint Session, there were known threats against Congress. Some
7
threats occurred as early as December, while others arrived just days and hours before the
8
Joint Session started. However, the Department of Homeland Security did not put the U.S.
Secret Service in charge of security planning, as in other NSSE events. 9
Due to the scale of the protest activity scheduled for January 6 and the nature of the Joint
Session, the Capitol and much of the city adopted an enhanced security posture. But it was
not adequate to stop thousands of violent protesters determined to get into the Capitol
building. Additionally, in the lead up to the Joint Session, General Mark Milley, the chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and then-Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy restricted the process
for approving changes to National Guard missions, limiting the authority to approve such
10
changes to “senior Pentagon leaders.”
10
Their decision to reduce the Pentagon’s alacrity with respect to mission changes led to
11
delays in the National Guard’s response to the attack on the Capitol. Indeed, city leadership
had asked the Guard to carry out only a narrow, unarmed mission to help handle traffic
12
ahead of planned protests. Over the course of three hours, rioters stormed barricades
surrounding the Capitol and overwhelmed the U.S. Capitol Police officers protecting the
building, and lawmakers barricaded themselves in various congressional offices, while the
Pentagon effectuated the change in the National Guard’s mission from traffic management
13
to riot response.
14
On January 6, President Donald Trump planned to speak at a rally near the White House.
15
City officials expected thousands of people to attend the rally. Before 9:00am that day, the
16
U.S. Secret Service estimated over 10,000 people were lining up. A Secret Service alert
warned of violence: “[S]ome members of the crowd are wearing ballistic helmets, body
17
armor and carrying radio equipment and military grade backpacks . . . .”
President Trump began speaking at noon and urged the rally goers to go to the Capitol and
18
demonstrate “peacefully.” At 1:00p.m. the initial wave of protesters began storming the
19
outer police barrier around the Capitol. Minutes later, Vice President Mike Pence gaveled in
20
the Joint Session of Congress to certify the Electoral College vote results.
At 1:49pm U.S. Capitol Police Chief Steven Sund called D.C. National Guard Commanding
21
General William J. Walker to request immediate assistance. Shortly after 2:00pm, protesters
22
broke the first windows of the Capitol and began climbing inside. Suspicious packages,
later determined to be pipe bombs, were found outside the Republican National Committee
23
and Democratic National Committee Headquarters between 1:30 and 2:00pm.
24
Around 2:20pm the Senate and House both recessed and the complex was locked down.
Notably, the building was locked down almost an hour and a half after the first barrier was
breached and almost a half hour after the first protesters began entering. At around
2:30pm President Trump tweeted “Please support our Capitol Police and Law Enforcement.
25
They are truly on the side of our Country. Stay peaceful!”
26
Shortly before 3:00pm, rioters broke into the Senate chamber.
11
They climbed on the podium, took selfies, and rifled through papers in the room. At 3:36pm
White House press secretary Kayleigh McEnany tweeted that President Trump ordered the
National Guard to the Capitol.27Just before 6:00pm, nearly five hours after the rioting
started, police started to secure the Capitol and clear protesters.28
The slow response to the violence at the Capitol represents a multi-jurisdictional security
breakdown. But the entity that is singularly tasked with protecting the Capitol complex
failed to do just that on January 6, 2021.
12
UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE
The U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) was established as part of the Public Buildings
Appropriations Act of 1828 “for the care, preservation, orderly keeping, and police, of those
portions of the Capitol and its appurtenances, which are in the exclusive use and
29
occupation of either House of Congress, respectively.” From an initial force of four officers,
USCP has swelled to over 1,800 officers today. The USCP currently has a budget of $602.5
30
million and received a 20 percent increase in Fiscal Year 2022. USCP oversees a relatively
small area of property given its budget, with only a few city blocks of continuous
jurisdictional space, stretching from H Street to Potomac Avenue SE and from Third Street
31
SW to Seventh St NE. Unlike most police forces, USCP is also tasked with personal
protection for members of Congress in the Capitol and during travel, intelligence gathering
for one of the most highly targeted institutions in the world, and operating as a protective
force in addition to its policing requirements for members and staff alike. Also, unlike other
police forces, USCP is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act.
DC
Metropolitan
USCP Police
Budget FY2022 $602.5 million FY2021 $578 million
% Increase 20%* 3.3%**
*from FY2021 **from FY2020
13
Map of Jurisdiction
14
A. Background on Recent Violence and Changes to USCP
Over the last three decades, political violence has shaped the USCP and its posture
regarding security on the Capitol campus. The bombing in 1995 at the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City led to physical security changes to Federal office
buildings across the country, including House and Senate office buildings. The July 24, 1998
shooting of Officer Jacob Chestnut and Detective John Gibson in the U.S. Capitol shocked
the Capitol campus.
In particular, the events of September 11, 2001, the 2001 anthrax attack, the 2011 shooting of
Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, and the 2017 shooting at the Republican baseball practice, led to
major changes to security on and around the U.S. Capitol Complex, including legislative,
administrative, and funding changes and a large increase in sworn officers. In 2002, the
USCP Chief of Police was given the authority to “deputize members of the DC National
Guard and duly sworn law enforcement personnel,” and the Senate Sergeant at Arms and
USCP chief administrative officer were given the authority to enter into memoranda of
understanding with relevant executive branch agencies to respond in case of an
32
emergency. In 2003, the Chief was also given new permissions to increase recruiting
incentives to bring in more officers. The same Act allowed:
[I]n the ‘event of an emergency, as determined by the Capitol Police Board or in

a concurrent resolution of Congress,’ the chief of the Capitol Police is
authorized to appoint law enforcement officers from federal, state, and local
agencies, and the armed forces (including the National Guard) to serve as
33
Capitol Police officers.’
In 2011, Rep. Gabrielle Giffords and nineteen others were shot by Jared Lee Loughner in a
34
politically-motivated assassination attempt, which led to a review of the USCP security
35
protocols and raised concerns of political violence throughout the country. Concerns about
member safety were renewed in 2017 when James Hodgkinson opened fire on Republicans
practicing for the annual Congressional Baseball Game, resulting in serious injuries to four
people, including Rep. Steve Scalise and a USCP officer. 36
15
These incidents of politically motivated violence led to a renewed emphasis on intelligence
gathering, better coordination with congressional district offices and more recently, to the
creation of regional USCP offices to provide better threat analysis and mitigation in
coordination with other law enforcement agencies.
B. USCP Structure
USCP’s organizational structure is led by the Chief of Police. Directly under the Chief are
the Chief Administrative Officer and two Assistant Chiefs: Assistant Chief of Police for
Protective and Intelligence Operations and Assistant Chief of Police for Police and
Uniformed Operations. There are five bureaus under the command of the two Assistant
Chiefs. Assistant Chief of Police for Protective and Intelligence Operations Yogananda
Pittman oversees the Protective Services Bureau (PSB) and the Security Services Bureau
(SSB), while Acting Assistant Chief of Police for Police and Uniformed Operations Sean
Gallagher oversees the Command and Control, Operational Services, and Uniformed
Services Bureaus. The Chief Administrative Officer oversees the Training Services Bureau
(TSB). Under those bureaus are 23 Divisions. PSB contains the Dignitary Protection Division
37
(DPD), Investigations Division, and Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division (IICD).
On January 6, 2021, Steven Sund was Chief of Police. Sund held that position from 2019
38
until shortly after the attack on January 6, 2021, when Speaker Pelosi asked him to resign.
Assistant Chief Pittman replaced Sund and became Acting Chief of Police. J. Thomas
Manger became the permanent Chief of Police on July 23, 2021.
On January 6, 2021, Yogananda Pittman was the Assistant Chief of Police for Protective and
Intelligence Operations, and Chad Thomas was the Assistant Chief of Police for Police and
Uniformed Operations. Thomas stepped down shortly after January 6. Sean Gallagher
replaced Chad Thomas as Acting Assistant Chief of Police for Uniformed Operations.
Assistant Chief Pittman remains in the position she held on January 6.
16
Fig. 1: USCP Organizational Structure
Chief of Police
Chief Administrative Assistant Chief of Police for Assistant Chief of Police for
Officer Protective and Intelligence Police and Uniformed
Operations Operations
Training Services
Bureau Security Services
Bureau Command and
Control Bureau
Protective Services
Bureau Operational
Services Bureau
Uniformed Services
Bureau
Dignitary Protection
Division
Investigations
Division
Intelligence and Interagency

Coordination Division
17
CAPITOL POLICE BOARD
The Capitol Police Board (the Board) consists of three voting members—House Sergeant at
Arms, Senate Sergeant at Arms, and Architect of the Capitol—and the USCP Chief of Police
as an ex officio, non-voting member. Each year, the Chair rotates between the two
Sergeants at Arms. The Board is tasked with overseeing the operations of USCP to ensure
the safety of the Capitol Complex. But unlike other police oversight bodies, the Board has
an extraordinary level of involvement in the operations of USCP, including “designing,
installing, and maintaining security systems for the Capitol buildings and grounds,” “setting
standards for uniforms, furnishing belts and arms,” “addressing tort claims,” and until
recently “designating emergency situations for the purpose of appointing special officers
39
and accepting support services.”
The House Committee on Administration and the Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration oversee the Board. Following a stator change after the events of January 6,
2021, the two Committees are “authorized to jointly conduct oversight hearings of the
Capitol Police Board and may request the attendance of all members of the Capitol Police
Board” where all members of the Board shall attend. 40
The Capitol Police Board originated with the Civil Expenses Appropriations Act of 1867,
when responsibility for the Capitol Police was transferred from the Commissioner of Public
41
Buildings to the House and Senate Sergeants at Arms. Initially, the Board only consulted the
Architect of the Capitol, but the Architect was later added as a formal voting member and
42
the Board was officially recognized. The structure of the Board remained unchanged for
more than one hundred years.
On January 6, 2021, Michael C. Stenger was the Senate Sergeant at Arms and Chair of the
Board. He resigned the following day. Mr. Stenger was replaced by Acting Sergeant at
Arms Jennifer A. Hemmingway until the current Sergeant at Arms, Karen H. Gibson, was
selected.
On January 6, 2021, Paul D. Irving was the House Sergeant at Arms. He also resigned the
following day. Mr. Irving was replaced by Acting Sergeant at Arms Timothy P. Blodgett until
the current Sergeant at Arms, General William J. Walker, was selected. J. Brett Blanton was
the Architect of the Capitol on January 6, 2021 and remains so today.
18
US Capitol Police Board Structure

Non-Voting Member
USCP Chief of Police
Voting Members
Architect of the Capitol Senate Sergeant at Arms House Sergeant at Arms
The Chair Rotates Between

Sergeants at Arms
Every Year
19
A. The Board has resisted long-standing calls for reform
In response to frustrations related to the opaqueness and bureaucracy of the Board, the
House Committee on Appropriations in 2001 required the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) to perform an audit. The audit—which was issued in 2003—provided a measure of
clarity on the Board’s innerworkings and operations. GAO recommended the Board should
include the Chief of Police as a non-voting member and adopt a Manual of Procedures,
43
among other things. The report further stated that “The continuing lack of Congressional
and other key stakeholder input represents a major gap in the planning efforts’ usefulness to
44
USCP, the Congress and others that will need to be addressed as USCP moves forward.”
At the time, the USCP indicated a willingness to implement GAO’s recommendations and to
consult with outside experts to reform the Board’s governance structure. In July 2003, then-
Capitol Police Chief Terrance Gainer said, “Their criticisms are fair and their suggestions
are solid, and we will be working with a vendor to tighten it all up.” 45
The Board was required by the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of 2003 to examine
46
its mission and to assess the effectiveness and usefulness of its statutory functions. This
effort culminated in a 2003 report by the Board to Congress that determined it must align
with “corporate governance standards,” which broadly included accountability,
47
transparency, and external communication. But, in a harbinger of events to come, the Board
failed to implement its own recommendations.
A series of subsequent Government Accountability Office (GAO) reviews of the Board

yielded a 2017 omnibus report, “Capitol Police Board: Fully Incorporating Leading
Governance Practices Would Help Enhance Accountability, Transparency, and External
48
Communication.” Law enforcement experts interviewed for 49
the 2017 report described the
Board’s responsibilities as “wide ranging” and “atypical.” The experts further stated that
“typically, law enforcement oversight bodies focus exclusively on a narrow range of issues”
that involve long-term strategic planning and budgeting, not interfering with daily
50
operations.
20
The 2017 report also detailed an array of failures by the Board to implement the
51
recommendations from its 2003 report to Congress. The GAO report recommended “the
Board revise its Manual to fully incorporate leading practices, including evaluating its
performance, and engage with stakeholders and incorporate their views, as appropriate, on
52
any changes.”
The Board rejected several of GAO’s key findings and refused to make the recommended
53
changes. In fact, the Board rejected GAO’s recommendations with respect to corporate
governance as inapplicable because those recommendations were “geared towards private
publicly-traded corporations” and defended the Board’s structure as “nimble” to allow the
54
USCP to “perform their law enforcement mission with minimal hindrance.”
GAO eventually closed its recommendation related to corporate governance as

unimplemented and declared the Board non-compliant, only to reinstate the
recommendation following the January 6 attack. To date, the GAO recommendation is
open.
21
Fig. 2: Comments from the Capitol Police Board in response to Draft GAO Report circa 2017
22
Fig. 3: Current Status of Recommendations for Executive Action from 2017 GAO Report
B. The Board continues to operate in the dark

The Board similarly failed to address long-standing concerns about a lack of operational
transparency and accountability. To date, Board meetings are closed to the public.
Beginning in 2022, the Board began sending minutes of their meetings to the oversight
committees, but they are months in delay.
The Board does not record how individual members vote on certain measures. More
recently, members indicated the Board may begin to record its votes to come into
compliance with recommendations in the 2017 GAO Report, but members of the Board
were unwilling to commit to doing so during a hearing before the Committee on House
55
Administration in May 2021. Notably, the 2017 GAO report explains that “[t]he six committee
stakeholders who felt transparency could be improved said they lacked insight into the
Board’s decision-making in areas where the committees have responsibilities, such as
Capitol Police matters or campus-wide security.” 56
The Board has begun hosting a Capitol Police Board Forum where select members of their
oversight entities and Congressional Leadership offices are invited to provide input and
feedback to the Capitol Police Board directly.
23
THE U.S. HOUSE SERGEANT AT ARMS WAS COMPROMISED
BY POLITICS AND DID NOT ADEQUATELY PREPARE FOR
VIOLENCE AT THE CAPITOL.
On February 9, 2022, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi said, “I have no power over the
57
Capitol Police.” This is false. Documents provided by the House Sergeant at Arms show how
then-House Sergeant at Arms Paul Irving carried out his duties in clear deference to the
Speaker, her staff, and other Democratic staff. The Speaker’s statement created
uncertainty and confusion with respect to the historical reporting structure for the HSAA and
USCP.
House Rules dictate in several circumstances that the Sergeant at Arms (SAA) is to report
directly to the Speaker of the House, including when the House is in session for, the
Sergeant at Arms is to “maintain order under the direction of the Speaker and other
presiding officer” and “execute the commands of the House, and all processes issued by
authority thereof, directed to the Sergeant at Arms by the Speaker.” 58
Pursuant to the House Rules and for other reasons, the Sergeant at Arms in practice serves
under the direction of the Speaker. Accordingly, the Speaker and other Democratic staff
routinely have meetings with the Sergeant at Arms and staff. This dynamic is not unique to
this Speaker or this House Sergeant at Arms. Indeed, because the Speaker is the highest-
ranking Constitutional Officer of the first branch of Government, this structure is neither
novel nor controversial. What is novel, however, is a Speaker who denies the relationship
and ignores her office’s obligation to secure the Capitol, perhaps in an effort to shift blame.
Indeed, Speaker Pelosi exercised her authority with respect to the safety and security of the
House of Representatives when she directed the use of magnetometers outside the House
59
chamber in the name of safety. She announced the use of punitive fines for Members who
60
refused to go through the metal detectors. Similarly, she required masks in the House
chamber and around the House Office Buildings.
The Speaker also exerted influence on security protocols at the Capitol related to the
perimeter fence. Following January 6, 2021, the fence was quickly erected and remained up
until July of that year when Congressional leaders started getting pressure to take it down.61
She also oversaw the fencing that was erected for a purported rally on September 18, 2021,
62
that never materialized, and the State of the Union in March 2022.
24
Finally, as the highest-ranking Constitutional Officer, Pelosi used her authority to tap Retired
Lieutenant General Russel Honoré to “lead an immediate review of security infrastructure,
interagency processes and command and control,” following the attack at the Capitol on
63
January 6, 2021.
A. The Speaker’s office was heavily involved in planning and decision-making before
and during the events of January 6, 2021, and micromanaged the Sergeant at Arms.
Consult Appendix A for a timeline that illustrates how Irving acted in deference to the
Speaker and her staff, which was compiled from documents provided by current House
Sergeant at Arms William J. Walker. 64
EARLY DEC 2020 IRVING REMAINED IN CONSTANT COMMUNICATION WITH

JAMIE FLEET, A SHARED STAFFER ON SPEAKER PELOSI’S
STAFF AND THE STAFF DIRECTOR FOR THE COMMITTEE ON
HOUSE ADMINISTRATION, ABOUT PREPARATION FOR THE
UPCOMING SWEARING-IN ON JANUARY 3, 2021, THE JOINT
SESSION OF CONGRESS ON JANUARY 6, 2021,65AND THE
INAUGURATION ON JANUARY 20, 2021.
IRVING ALSO STAYED IN CONTACT WITH TERRI

MCCULLOUGH, SPEAKER PELOSI’S CHIEF OF STAFF
ABOUT THE PREPARATIONS.66
IRVING AND HIS STAFF MET WITH DEMOCRATIC STAFF

DEC 8, 2020
FOR PELOSI, HOUSE ADMINISTRATION AND LEGISLATIVE
BRANCH SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE APPROPRIATIONS
COMMITTEE WITHOUT REPUBLICAN STAFF PRESENT.
DEC 11, 2020 MCCULLOUGH EMAILED A HOUSE SERGEANT AT ARMS

STAFFER TO REQUEST A MEETING. THE EMAIL STATES,
“[W]E HAVE HAD A NUMBER OF INTERNAL DISCUSSIONS
ABOUT CHOREOGRAPHY AND SAFETY FOR THE OPENING
DAY AND ELECTORAL COLLEGE EVENTS. CAN WE GET
TOGETHER WITH YOU AND YOUR TEAM EARLY NEXT WEEK
TO MAP OUT WHAT WE THINK WE NEED GIVEN THE
67
COMPLEXITIES PRESENTED?” THEY SCHEDULED A
MEETING FOR THE FOLLOWING TUESDAY AT 10:00AM. 68
25
MCCULLOUGH AND HOUSE SERGEANT AT ARMS TEAM
DEC 15, 2020
MET.69 NO REPUBLICAN STAFF WERE PRESENT OR INVITED.70
71
AFTER MEETING ON A HOUSE SERGEANT AT ARMS STAFFER SENT IRVING A
DEC 15, 2020 DRAFT “DEAR COLLEAGUE” LETTER WITH GUIDANCE ON
72
HOUSE ACCESS TO THE CAPITOL FOR OPENING SESSION.
IRVING THEN TEXTED JAMIE FLEET FOR CLARIFICATION ON
WHO SHOULD REVIEW THE DEAR COLLEAGUE FROM HIS
73
OFFICE. FLEET RESPONDED, SAYING THE INDIVIDUALS
FROM THE MEETING EARLIER THAT DAY.74
Fig. 5: Text messages between HSAA and Speaker’s staff (Dec. 15, 2020)
DEC 21, 2020 IRVING AND HIS STAFF MET WITH DEMOCRATIC STAFF
WITHOUT REPUBLICAN STAFF PRESENT.
26
JAN 3, 2021 SERGEANT AT ARMS STAFF CIRCULATED A DRAFT DEAR
75
COLLEAGUE WITH DETAILS FOR JANUARY 6, 2021. IN THE
DRAFT, HSAA AND USCP ENCOURAGE MEMBERS AND
STAFF TO ARRIVE EARLY, PARK IN GARAGES, AND USE
ALTERNATIVE ROUTES TO WALK THROUGH THE PROTEST
AREAS.76 THE LETTER MENTIONS THERE WILL BE ADDITIONAL
POLICE ON CAMPUS THAT DAY AND PROVIDES KEY
CONTACT INFORMATION. 77
JAN 4, 2021 IRVING AND HIS STAFF MET WITH DEMOCRATIC STAFF
WITHOUT REPUBLICAN STAFF PRESENT. 78
JAMIE FLEET CONTACTED USCP CHIEF STEVEN SUND AND

JAN 4, 2021
HSAA PAUL IRVING TO SET UP A MEETING WITH THEIR
OFFICES AND CHAIRPERSON LOFGREN TO DISCUSS THE
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR JANUARY 6, 2021.79 THE
EMAIL STATES THAT THE “BRIEF SHOULD INCLUDE A
DISCUSSION OF USCP STAFFING LEVELS, COORDINATION
WITH OTHER DEPARTMENT, AND YOUR DETERMINATION TO 80
EXTEND (OR NOT) THE PERIMETER AROUND THE CAPITOL.”
IRVING RESPONDED, REQUESTING PERMISSION FOR
REPUBLICANS TO JOIN THE BRIEFING.81 FLEET NEVER
RESPONDED OVER TEXT.
IRVING SENT THE DRAFT TO MCCULLOUGH AND FLEET

JAN 4, 2021
AND REQUESTED “ANY EDITS, COMMENTS, OR
82
CONCERNS.” MCCULLOUGH RESPONDED SHORTLY AFTER
WITH EDITS. SHE SUGGESTED CLARIFYING PARKING AND
EVENT TIMING, AND PROVIDES EDITS TO THE LANGUAGE
83
REGARDING OFFICIAL BUSINESS VISITORS. MCCULLOUGH
STATED THAT NOT ALLOWING GUESTS INTO THE CAPITOL
(AS THEY PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED, ACCORDING TO HER)
84
“SENDS A MIXED SIGNAL.” LATER IN THE DAY, IRVING
TEXTED FLEET, SAYING, “WE’RE MAKING TERRI
[MCCULLOUGH]’S EDITS TO THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
AND IF YOU DON’T MIND, I’LL SEND IT TO YOU AND JEN
[DAULBY, COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION,
REPUBLICAN STAFF DIRECTOR] AS A HEADS UP, SO
85
PLEASE ACT SURPRISED.” FLEET RESPONDED, “I’M
STARTLED!” 86
27
Fig. 6: Text messages between HSAA and Speaker’s staff (Jan. 4, 2021)
JAN 5, 2021 MEETING PROCEEDS WITHOUT REPUBLICAN

REPRESENTATION.
JAN 5, 2021 ANOTHER DRAFT DEAR COLLEAGUE WAS SENT FROM

HSAA STAFF TO MCCULLOUGH, FOR MEMBERS AND STAFF
REGARDING SECURITY CONCERNS ABOUT THE UPCOMING
ELECTORAL COLLEGE COUNT.87 THE SERGEANT AT ARMS
STAFF REQUESTED MCCULLOUGH’S FEEDBACK ON WHAT
NEEDED TO BE CHANGED.88 MCCULLOUGH RESPONDED
WITH EDITS.89
MORNING OF IRVING AND HIS STAFF MET WITH DEMOCRATIC STAFF

JAN 6, 2021 WITHOUT REPUBLICAN STAFF PRESENT.
28
90
JAN 6, 2021 MCCULLOUGH CALLED IRVING
12:30 PM
12:33 PM IRVING CALLED MCCULLOUGH
1:32 PM FLEET MISSED A CALL FROM IRVING
91
1:33 PM FLEET RETURNED THE CALL FROM IRVING
1:40 PM AFTER CHIEF SUND’S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL

NATIONAL GUARD ASSISTANCE WAS DELAYED BECAUSE
MR. IRVING SAID HE NEEDED TO RUN CHIEF SUND’S
REQUEST FOR92NATIONAL GUARD TROOPS ‘UP THE CHAIN
OF COMMAND,’IRVING APPROACHED MCCULLOUGH, AND
OTHER STAFF MEMBERS IN THE SPEAKER’S LOBBY BEHIND
THE HOUSE CHAMBER. IT WAS THE FIRST TIME MR. IRVING
ASKED ABOUT PERMISSION TO SEEK SUPPORT FROM THE
NATIONAL GUARD.93
94
1:49 PM MCCULLOUGH SPOKE WITH IRVING TWICE
2:14 PM FLEET CALLED IRVING
2:30 PM MCCULLOUGH CALLED IRVING AGAIN 95
As demonstrated, the HSAA had a pattern and practice of seeking and obtaining permission
from the Speaker for all security decisions. This delayed the request for help from the
National Guard. While McCullough passed the note to Speaker Pelosi and received her
approval, doing so was not required by the Board – it had become required through years of
practice. The Board could have called a meeting and issued an emergency declaration
without prior approval from the Speaker. This conclusion is supported by a GAO report
issued in February 2022, which states:
According to a senior Capitol Police official, the Chief of the Capitol Police was
able to ask the Board to determine an emergency, and such a request could be
made verbally or in writing. Per the version of section 1974 in place on January 6,
2021, the Board was not required to consult with congressional leadership to do
so.
29
Once the Board determined that an emergency exists, the statutory language
authorized the Chief of the Capitol Police to appoint officers to serve as special
officers of the Capitol Police to provide law enforcement support in the policing
of the Capitol complex. 96
The report issued by Army Lt. Gen Russel Honoré in March 2021 similarly found that the
Board’s “deliberate decision-making process proved too slow and cumbersome to respond
to the crisis in January, delaying requests for critical supplemental resources.” 97
There was also serious concern about optics leading up to and on January 6, 2021. Chief
Sund testified that Irving said “optics” were the reason for not sending in the National
98
Guard. Similarly, the Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General said in a report that
“MG [William J.] Walker told us while the DCNG was preparing [for a presentation on DCNG
positioning on January 6], Mr. [Ryan C.] McCarthy and senior Army leaders talked about
99
optics, and how DCNG personnel were not to be close to the Capitol.”
Later in the report, General James McConville is quoted at length, saying “the general
feeling of all those involved [with approving the D.C. RFA] was that the military would have
100
no role, and many people talked about the optics of having military at the Capitol.”
Concerns about the optics of military personnel close to the Capitol were shared by
Democratic staff in the House of Representatives. On January 5, 2021, a Democratic staffer
on the Legislative Branch Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee emailed
Irving about the placement of National Guard troops. The Democratic staffer said, “I only
ask to be ahead of any members who might question a photo or live tv shot that shows
National Guard with the Capitol dome in the backdrop.” 101
The March 2022 GAO report states that USCP officers expressed various concerns related
102
to the use of force at the Capitol, including “a concern with optics by leadership” and
“several respondents stated that the concern with optics was related to leadership’s
103
perception of the desires of Members of Congress."
30
The July 30, 2021 USCP OIG report also notes that “Several officers stated that they were
104
deployed without all of their equipment because of ‘optics.’” Another officer explained that
“at one point in the morning of January 6, they witnessed a USCP Captain ask another
officer why they were wearing their helmet and carrying their PR24 baton, ordered the
105
officer to take them off, and said it was ‘not the image we want to portray.’” Similarly,
another officer told investigators, “there was a debate in [Civil Disturbance Unit] on January
6 about hard gear and ‘the officials stated there is going to be media so we don’t want you
in hard gear.’” 106
The documents and communications show concerns about the public perception of military
personnel at the Capitol and how the use of force by officers against violent protestors
were well known among Irving, Democratic leadership, and USCP leadership. Those
concerns diminished the capacity of USCP officers to effectively defend the Capitol and
prevented the D.C. National Guard from responding to the violence at the Capitol on
January 6, 2021.
B. In the lead up to January 6, 2021, the House Sergeant at Arms was

distracted, and the Capitol Police Board was dysfunctional.
In addition to preparing for the mounting security threats against the Joint Session on
January 6, 2021, Paul Irving and his staff were involved in a number of preparations for other
events, including the opening day of the 117th Congress. On December 9, 2020, Irving
texted Jamie Fleet about the upcoming Member swearing-in on January 3, 2021: “Just FYI,
107
we have a good plan for the issue you raised regarding opening day.” On December 11,
2020, the Assistant House Sergeant at Arms raised concerns with planned renovations to an
108
alternative Chamber space on campus. The Assistant Sergeant at Arms stated:
[I]f the project were to proceed as scheduled, it would require CAO to make
additional equipment purchases and install and configure it for use. This will take
several weeks to months after the completion . . . . This leaves the House with no
viable on-site alternate chamber option during two highly important event [sic] –
Opening Day of the 117th and Joint Session for Electoral Count. 109
31
Later in the day Irving followed up to say that Jamie Fleet weighed in on the situation,
110
agreeing that the work should be postponed. On December 15, 2021, Irving drafted the
Opening Session Dear Colleague and requested input from Fleet. 111
In a text message exchange with a personal friend, Irving said: “when your text
came in I was consumed with Opening Day and Electoral College logistics. The
week of January 3 will be very challenging.112
Irving was simultaneously planning for the Inauguration on January 20, 2021. Typically, the
Inauguration is a heavy lift for security staff at the Capitol. It takes up significant resources
and requires input from many stakeholders, especially the Chair of the Capitol Police Board,
which Irving was prior to January 1, 2021. On December 18, 2020, USCP circulated an
invitation to members of the Capitol Police Board to discuss the Inauguration in late
January.113 Notably, Irving met with Chief Sund and law enforcement partners on January 5,
2021, to plan for the Inauguration. 114
JANUARY 5TH AVIATION THREAT TIMELINE
6:20 PM IRVING SENT A TEXT TO MICHAEL STENGER, THE SENATE

SERGEANT AT ARMS: “ARE YOU MAKING ANY
NOTIFICATION REGARDING THE INTEL THAT I’M TOLD IS
115
GOING PUBLIC?” STENGER RESPONDED: “I AM UNDER THE
116
IMPRESSION THAT IT HAS BEEN DEEMED ASPIRATIONAL.”
117
IRVING RESPONDED: “AGREE, ALL GOOD.” STENGER AND
IRVING DID NOT TEXT AGAIN UNTIL JANUARY 11, 2021.118
6:50 PM CBS EVENING NEWS TWEETED: “THE FBI AND FAA ARE
LOOKING INTO A BREACH OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
FREQUENCIES AFTER A THREAT WAS MADE ABOUT FLYING
A PLANE INTO THE CAPITOL TOMORROW.” 119
CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP STAFF BEGAN
QUESTIONING IRVING AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE
CAPITOL POLICE BOARD ABOUT THE POSSIBLE THREAT.
32
7:07 PM A STAFFER FROM SENATE MINORITY LEADER CHUCK
SCHUMER’S OFFICE EMAILED CHIEF SUND, COPYING THE
HOUSE AND SENATE SERGEANTS AT ARMS AND MAJORITY
LEADER MITCH MCCONNELL’S STAFF. THE EMAIL
REQUESTED GUIDANCE AS TO HOW TO ADVISE SENATE
120
LEADERSHIP. CHIEF SUND RESPONDED AND SAID USCP
WAS INVESTIGATING, ALONG WITH FEDERAL PARTNERS,
AND THEY “HAVE NO INFORMATION DEEMING THIS AS
121
CREDIBLE.” THEN, WYNDEE PARKER, SPEAKER PELOSI’S
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, REACHED OUT TO IRVING,
REQUESTING MORE INFORMATION ON THE AVIATION
122
THREAT. IRVING RESPONDED SHORTLY AFTER TO SAY HE
123
WILL CALL.
8:31 PM A STAFFER IN SEN. MCCONNELL’S OFFICE RESPONDED TO

THE CHAIN OF EMAILS REGARDING THE AVIATION THREAT:
“I MUST OBSERVE THERE IS COLLECTIVE CONCERN FROM
CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP ABOUT LEARNING ABOUT
THIS THREAT REPORTING FROM THE MEDIA RATHER THAN
FROM USCP OR HSAA. WE ARE ALSO CONCERNED THAT
TIMELY NOTIFICATION MAY NOT HAVE BEEN MADE TO
USCP AND HSAA AND ARE MAKING INQUIRIES WITH
RESPECTIVE FEDERAL AGENCIES. EVEN IF IT IS NOT A
CREDIBLE THREAT, WE WANT TO ENSURE THE SYSTEMS WE
HAVE IN PLACE ARE APPROPRIATE.” 124
8:55 PM DEPUTY CHIEF SEAN GALLAGHER EMAILED HOUSE

SERGEANT AT ARMS STAFF, NOTIFYING THEM THAT ONLINE
GROUPS FOUND MAPS OF THE CAPITOL TUNNEL SYSTEM,
AND THAT THEY WERE PLANNING TO UTILIZE THEM TO
CONFRONT MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. FURTHER, THERE
WAS AN UPTICK IN MESSAGING OF “GROUPS INTENTIONS
OF FORMING A PERIMETER AROUND THE CAMPUS . . .
FROM 0600-1000 HOURS IN ORDER TO BLOCK ALL MOC’S
FROM GETTING INSIDE OUR PERIMETER TO THE BUILDINGS
WITH SPOTS IDENTIFIED FOR DIRECT ACTION.” 125
9:06 PM THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT GALLAGHER’S WARNING

ABOUT THE TUNNELS AND A PERIMETER WERE HEEDED, OR
EVEN SHARED WITH USCP OFFICERS, WHO WERE LEFT TO
FACE THOUSANDS OF RIOTERS UNPREPARED.
33
9:06 PM IN RESPONSE TO THE CHAIN OF EMAILS BETWEEN CHIEF
SUND AND SENATE LEADERSHIP STAFF, IRVING SENT AN
UNRELATED NOTE TO A SENIOR SAA STAFFER: “THE CHIEF
HAS TAKEN [ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL] BRETT
[BLANTON]’S PLACE. UNBELIEVABLE.” 126
9:09 PM THE SENIOR SAA STAFFER RESPONDED: “OH GOOD GOD.

AND OF COURSE [SEN. MCCONNELL’S STAFFER] HAS
NOTHING TO DO RIGHT NOW EXCEPT STIR EVERYONE UP.” 127
AT THE SAME TIME, IRVING FORWARDED THE CHAIN OF
EMAILS BETWEEN CHIEF SUND AND SENATE LEADERSHIP
STAFF TO MICHAEL STENGER WITH A NOTE: “NICE
LEADERSHIP ON YOUR SIDE.” 128
9:09 PM THE SENIOR SAA STAFFER RESPONDED TO IRVING:

“EXACTLY THOUGH I THINK [SEN. MCCONNELL’S STAFFER]
WOULD STILL GET SPUN UP.” 129
9:13 PM IRVING EMAILED THE SENIOR SAA STAFFER SEPARATELY.

IRVING WROTE: “JUST FYI, I BRIEFED TERRI, JAMIE AND
WYNDEE. SO, THEY’RE ALL GOOD. THEY GOT IT BEFORE
THE STORY BROKE. STENGER TOLD ME EARLIER HE WASN’T
GOING TO TELL ANYONE, AND THIS IS THE RESULT. I LOVE
MIKE, BUT SAME STORY, THE [SENATE SERGEANT AT
ARMS] DOESN’T GET IT: BRIEF LEADERSHIP IN ADVANCE
130
OF THE STORY” IT IS NOTABLE THAT IRVING ONLY BRIEFED
DEMOCRATIC STAFF AND LEADERSHIP.
The communications related to the aviation threat against the Capitol on January 5,
2021, show the ad hoc nature of the Board’s response to security events. Even if the
various stakeholders had attempted to proceed more deliberately, they would have been
stymied by a confusing web of authorities. GAO found the Capitol Police Board had to
utilize “various different authorities to obtain assistance from about 2,000 personnel
from outside agencies,” and they “lacked clear, detailed procedures to guide their
131
decisions about which authority to use or the steps to follow in obtaining assistance.”
The GAO also found issues with the Board’s operations are not limited to January 6,
2021. In their February 2022 report, GAO says that the Department and the Board lack
“comprehensive, documented process to assess and mitigate risks,” meaning “there is no
assurance that the Capitol Police and the Board are not overlooking potential security
risks.” 132
34
USCP FAILED TO ADEQUATELY PREPARE
FOR THE EVENTS OF JANUARY 6, 2021
As of November 30, 2022
The USCP Has
133
1971 Sworn
Officers
101 Fewer Than

Authorized Cap Of 2072
Recommended
To Have 2400 Officers
Resigned or Retired
At least 135 in the Last Year 134
35
A. USCP lacks adequate equipment
(Stephanie Keith/Reuters)
USCP lacks adequate equipment to protect themselves and the Capitol from an attack like
the one on January 6, 2021. This assessment is true today, as it was in various reports by the
USCP Office of Inspector General (OIG) and a March 2022 report by GAO. Many officers
have outdated equipment, if they have any at all. In fact, according to one USCP source,
many veteran officers who gave their equipment to new officers received nothing in return.135
For example, one Capitol Police officer testified:
36
Answer:
[W]hen I first came on the department, they gave us full hard-squad, you know, the
“turtle gear” is what we call it. So the plastic gear that you saw. When I got it issued
to me, when I came on, 15 years ago, it was probably already 15 years old. Probably
about seven years ago they took that equipment away from us to give to newer
officers. Including the helmets, gasmasks, and every piece of equipment that went
with that.
Question:
What did you get when they gave it to the newer officers?
Answer:
Nothing. Baseball cap. I mean, that’s pretty much our equipment now. Which I had on
January 6, was nothing, was my baseball cap. 136
USCP OIG also raised concerns about equipment deficiencies in a series of flash reports.
For example, the OIG found the First Responders Unit (FRU)—responsible for the integrity of
the perimeter around the Capitol buildings—“did not have the proper resources to complete
137
its mission.” More specifically, the FRU was “not equipped with adequate less lethal
138
weapons such as Pepper-Ball and Stinger-Ball weapon systems.” The USCP OIG found this
equipment would have been helpful, “because of [its] ability to incapacitate a person or a
group of people without directly escalating to lethal means” and “would be effective
assisting officers when confronting violent crowds similar to the ones encountered during
the events of January 6, 2021.” 139
Further, according to the OIG, what equipment the officers did have on January 6, 2021 was
ineffective or compromised. According to the OIG’s second flash report, “officers witnessed
riot shields shattering upon impact,” and crucial less-lethal weapons and munitions were not
140
deployed because they were expired. In some cases, equipment was disregarded because
141
USCP officers were not trained to use it.
The lack of effective training is a longstanding, USCP-wide issue that contributed to

confusion and dysfunction on January 6, 2021. The Office of Inspector General issued a
series of flash reports—report nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7—that all describe specific concerns
37
B. Systemic Department-Wide Training Failures

about the lack of training and certification throughout the USCP.
42.7%
of respondents described the
preoperational guidance from USCP
supervisors as “not at all” clear
142
Over Half Respondents Expressed That
More Include Need Large or More

Training Crowd Control Violent Crowd Realistic
Needed Training Control Training Training
38
These deficiencies are attributable in part to a high “officer utilization rate” and short
staffing, but also because USCP has a decentralized training structure that lacks
143
accountability to ensure training is completed. Because individual units are responsible for
their own training, USCP is largely unable to track who is trained and when, and
144
commanding officers are never held to account if training is not completed. According to
information obtained by investigators, this issue has only gotten worse since January 6, 2021
because of dwindling resources.
More specifically, officers are not being trained on how to use what little equipment is
issued to them, and officers who move into leadership positions are not sufficiently trained
145
to develop management skills. A USCP officer told investigators that training now occurs
online, which is insufficient to prepare a police officer for real-world scenarios. USCP Chief
Manger explained that the current shortage of officers limits the availability of officers to
146
be pulled from assignments to receive training. One USCP officer testified:
Answer:
[T]he baton I carried on January 6th, for instance, I got trained on in the academy. I
haven't been trained on it since. So, obviously we do firearms twice a year, but that‘s
about it for training on our equipment.
Question:
What's your expectation of training with your baton?
Answer:
Baton should be, at minimum, once a year, to every other year. I mean, it’s a piece of
equipment where we could actually hurt or kill somebody with, and we’re never trained
on it. We asked multiple times to be trained on it, we just were always told, never had
the manpower or we just carry it. That’s pretty much what we’re told.
Question:
And you were carrying that on January 6th?
Answer:
I not only carried it, I used it on January 6th, yes.
39
Question:
Without any training from Capitol Police?
Answer:
147
Not in 15 years, no.
Uniformed officers also raised concerns about the fact that certain segments of USCP
leadership do not have experience in the jobs they command. A USCP source stated:
Answer:
So we have different bureaus in our department. We have [Uniformed Services
Bureau], which I am. We’re the uniform guys. And then we have the [Protective
Services Bureau], which is the Protection. So, if you look at our regime right now, we
have no upper management in the Deputy Chief position or up that has been a
commander of USB. Not one. So, when it comes to our positions, which are roughly
1,200 to 1,300 officers –
Question:
Out of how many?
Answer:
I think we have 1,800 right now. Or less. I don’t even know what the numbers are now.
But, we have someone in position who doesn’t know our job, because they’ve
never commanded our job. 148
A shortage of officers, a lack of training, and insufficient equipment does not entirely
explain the failures at the Capitol on January 6, 2021. But the documents and testimony
make clear that more officers who were better equipped and trained could have effected a
starkly different outcome.
Likewise, had USCP leadership and middle-management been adequately trained, USCP
would have been better prepared and more capable of responding to the crisis. These
vulnerabilities were well known—the USCP OIG and GAO identified these very concerns,
repeatedly. Such longstanding and pervasive department-wide problems are consequences
of the Capitol Police Board’s tendency to ignore recommendations from the OIG and GAO
prior to January 6, 2021, among other things.
40
USCP INTELLIGENCE FAILURES ARE
DIRECTLY TO BLAME FOR THE LACK OF
PREPAREDNESS ON JANUARY 6, 2021.
The failure to limit the scope of the attack on January 6, 2021, was as much a
management failure as an intelligence failure. New leadership of the intelligence division
restructured the open-source intelligence team, moving the group into a reactionary
posture, and actively opposed a more proactive approach to preventing violence and
disruptions at the Capitol. The redesigned intelligence division was fragmented, and
Capitol Police leadership were not fully informed about the severity of the threats against
the Joint Session of Congress on January 6, 2021.
USCP houses two intelligence-related divisions, the Intelligence and Interagency

149
Coordination Division (IICD) and the investigations division. The investigations division is
bifurcated into two sections: the threat assessment section (TAS) and the intelligence
150
operations section (IOS). All the intelligence operations of USCP reside in the Protective
Services Bureau, which is overseen by the Assistant Chief of Police for Protective and
Intelligence Operations.151
152
USCP historically is not a “collector” but rather a “consumer” of intelligence. But in recent
years, USCP has attempted with mixed results to transition toward intelligence collection.
Norm Grahe led IICD for many years. Under his leadership in January of 2013, IICD stood
up an open-source section tasked with gathering open-source intelligence about the
goals and plans of groups who seek to harm Members of Congress and disrupt
congressional activities or large events like high-profile confirmation hearings or the Joint
153
Session of Congress to certify election results. The open-source section proved largely
effective at preventing harm to Members of Congress, staff, or events at the Capitol until
its restructuring in the months leading to January 6, 2021.
IICD regularly produces intelligence products for USCP and the House and Senate
Sergeants at Arms, including a Daily Intelligence Report, Special Event Assessments, and
Congressional Event Assessments.154
41
Daily Intelligence Reports are sent to security leaders in the Capitol with information and
analysis of relevant developments on and around the Capitol campus. Special Events
155
Assessments focus on upcoming, high-profile events on and around the Capitol campus.
USCP Leadership, the House and Senate Sergeants at Arms, and House and Senate
leadership routinely consult IICD regarding upcoming events, threat alerts to the Capitol,
and the threat environment more broadly. They also coordinate with relevant staff in
USCP to make their intelligence operational, and they are responsible for ensuring
156
intelligence is distributed up the chain of command. For IICD, this means passing
information to the Assistant Chief of Police for Protective and Intelligence Operations, the
House and Senate Sergeants at Arms, and DPD.
But as the second USCP OIG flash report on the events of January 6, 2021 notes,
intelligence is decentralized within the USCP. This fragmentation creates inefficiencies
157
with respect to the distribution and consumption of intelligence products. Further, the
report notes that distributing intelligence throughout the entire department was
challenging before and during the events of January 6, and that guidance for IICD was
158
“very ambiguous.”
The USCP OIG’s fifth flash report described the subsequent effect on preparation down
the chain of command. In interviews conducted by the OIG, “one officer stated at one
point in the morning of January 6, they witnessed a USCP Captain ask another officer why
they were wearing their helmet and carrying their PR24 baton, ordered the officer to take
them off, and said it was ‘not the image we want to portray.’” 159
42
Fig. 4: Excerpt from January 6, 2021 Daily Intelligence Report
A. There had not been an intelligence failure at this scale in the USCP
Intelligence Division prior to the Joint Session of Congress on January 6, 2021.
During preparation for large events, IICD is typically tasked with collecting open-source
intelligence about groups who may intend on causing a disruption, analyzing it, and passing
it to USCP leadership so it can be operationalized.160
43
For example, during the confirmation hearings of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brett
Kavanaugh, IICD relied on the expertise of their analysts and began scouring open-source
161
social media posts of groups that are notorious for causing problems with such event. After
gathering relevant intelligence, the IICD team typically designated a team lead to write an
162
intelligence assessment that would be disseminated to Capitol Police leadership. The
preparation in the lead up to the Kavanaugh hearings was illustrative. For example, one
analyst described the process of gathering and disseminating the information for the
Kavanaugh hearings:
We also worked on the special [event]/special permit assessments. They would

come from Special Events to us and we would contact the organizer, the
spokesperson and get some background information. We would look do they
have a history of protesting or causing disruptions on Capitol Hill? And we
would write all that up in an assessment and then send that up through our
chain of command. 163
***
[I]f we had stuff coming up during the week, we would send it out, either in
email, or in assessment -- I believe we wrote an assessment . . . saying that we
expected large crowds and disruptions to the confirmation hearings and, that
we had a number of protests that were planned, some that were permitted. That
they went through Special Events and found a permit for certain areas. 164
Preparation for such an event was a team effort that relied heavily on the expertise of the
165
analysts. One analyst testified about how the information moved up and down the chain of
command within IICD under then-IICD Director Norm Grahe:
Answer:
[Analyst] would gather up, receive all the information. [They] would write up a draft of
the intelligence assessment.
44
Answer:
And then [they] would provide that to Mr. Grahe for review, and then there is a daily
process. Mr. Grahe would say what they want. [They] would send him a draft. He
would say, make these changes. It would come back down. So it’s a circle. We collect
information. It goes up the chains. It gets evaluated –
Question:
Constantly getting updated.
Answer:
Updated. There’s more questions. They say, okay. I see this information. It raises this
question. And then it would be sent back down to us. And . . . they had daily meetings
referencing, creating this intelligence assessment. 166
IICD Director Norm Grahe held weekly intelligence briefings for Capitol Police leadership to
include an “inspector and above meeting, and a meeting with captains and then . . . a
meeting with both House and Senate Sergeant at Arms . . . to discuss . . . upcoming
demonstrations and things of concern.” 167
One IICD analyst testified:
Answer:
[The intelligence briefing] was every Tuesday, we had a weekly standing meeting in
the SCIF conference room. At 10 o’clock we briefed inspectors and above. At 11
o’clock it was captains. And then at 12 o’clock it was the House and Senate
Sergeant at Arms . . . . 168
***
So, we would get those people coming over and we would brief them. And it was a,
death by Power Point. And I would go through, “Okay, these are the permitted
events coming up for this week.“
45
Answer:
And then we would have them rated, whether it was going to be something of
concern, if [it] was a remote possibility, or yeah, we were concerned about this. . .
[W]e had the size, how many people were coming, what areas they were going to
be in, what their mission statement was. So that way they understood.
Question:
In the lead up to Kavanagh, was it once a week, or did you have increased
briefings?
Answer:
169
As we got more information, we would start sending it out ahead of time . . . .
***
I would think that there was an occasional email maybe the night before, saying,
“Okay, we got information, this group’s going to assemble at this place.” 170
***
[Norm Grahe] had his distribution list that he would send it out to. But, if he had any
questions or he wanted something clarified, he would send it back for a correction,
which very rarely did I get anything back for a correction. And he would send it out
to basically lieutenants and above, whoever needed that information.
Question:
And the assessments, like you said, were also rolling, they would come out when you
had new information?
Answer:
Yes. And I actually used to say, “Update number one . . .” and then put it on top of
171
the previous of assessment.
***
Question:
So, in the lead up to the Kavanagh hearings, how often, let’s say like the week of the
hearings, how often are you sending out these assessments?
46
Answer:
The assessment was probably sent out maybe once that week. But then we were on
the phone verbally and we were, because I had various members, they would call
me, the department members, . . . they would all be calling me, to say, “Do you have
any more information.” And I would say, “Yeah, I was just getting ready to send this
out to you guys.” And CDU, they would always call, whoever was commanding CDU
would call me. 172
***
Question:
And how would you grade the success of your, you know, your team, and what it was
able to do at, with the Kavanagh hearings?
Answer:
I think we were very successful, because the hearings were able to go on, we made
almost 800 arrests that week. We were well aware of who was going to be where,
what was going on, what was going to be expected, what the groups were
planning. And so, our officers knew that. 173
Grahe relied on his analysts—who are intelligence experts—to prepare the intelligence for
the assessments. Grahe then sent out the assessments to USCP leaders and officers to help
inform their decisions regarding how best to keep the Capitol safe. For example, one
analyst testified:
Answer:
[I]f I would have had a concern, which has happened numerous times, I would say, I
would go to him and say, “This demonstration’s coming up and I’m having a bad
feeling about it.”
Question:
Right.
47
Answer:
And he’d say, “Get me facts and I’ll go upstairs.”
Question:
Okay.
Answer:
And I would give him the facts, give them to him, and he would go up to the 7th
floor and tell them, . . . we would sit in briefings and he would take me into some of
the briefings, you know, and I could tell them, “I’m feeling bad about this because
X,Y, and Z.”
Question:
Right. So when he went to the 7th floor, who was he telling?
Answer:
174
He was telling the assistant chiefs and the Chief. The upper management.
IICD prepared by constantly socializing the intelligence. Grahe and his team knew the more
information USCP leadership had, the better they could prepare. That mentality also
applied from the top down. The more information the analysts had, the more effective they
could be at creating an intelligence assessment. A USCP source testified:
Answer:
And [they] would come back into the office. We would all sit in a circle, and [analyst
team lead] would say this is what came up during my meeting with Mr. Grahe. And
then [analyst team lead] would send out assignments.
Question:
So [they] would make sure everyone was informed on the updates, make sure that
whatever was needed was assigned out, and everyone was on the same page?
48
Question:
At what point is that then socialized with Capitol Police leadership or whoever
needs to know up the chain? Is it happening the whole time?
Answer:
Yes. 175
The analysts sought out and maintained relationships with outside agencies such as the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Park Police,
176
Washington D.C. Metro Police Department, and Secret Service. The IICD analysts kept an
177
open line of communication with those agencies to share important information. A USCP
source stated:
Between Mr. Grahe and commanders on the operational side, they were having
daily side conversations through their personal connections. And so was [USCP
analyst]. [USCP analyst] was with other agencies. [USCP analyst] has great
relationships with Park Police, MPD, Secret Service Police. So daily conversations
with all of these people. And then . . . everybody is in the know with the latest
information. 178
Norm Grahe intended to retire after the November 2020 election and Jack Donohue and
Julie Farnam were hired to replace him as the Director and Assistant Director respectively.
180
Farnam joined just before the election and Donohue joined weeks later. In the lead up to
January 6, 2021, Donohue and Farnam reported to Deputy Chief Kim Schneider, who was
181
replaced by Sean Gallagher. Sean Gallagher reported to Assistant Chief of Police for
182
Protective and Intelligence Operations Yogananda Pittman who reported to Chief Sund.
Farnam’s only previous intelligence experience was in the Immigration Vetting Division of
183
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Because Farnam had no relevant intelligence
184
experience, Grahe intended to remain on the job to train her. According to a USCP source
185
who testified to investigators, Farham declined. In her new role as the assistant director of
IICD, she attempted to remake the USCP. 186
49
B. Changes to the Intelligence Division after November 2020 caused the
intelligence failures on January 6, 2021.
Prior to November 2020 when USCP prepared for a special event, the intelligence analysts
in the open-source section worked together to gather intelligence and create an
187
assessment for each event. The USCP Special Events section sends all permits to IICD. One
188
analyst would typically be tapped to serve as de facto team lead. That analyst would assign
188
work out to the team and had visibility into what each team member was working on. The
team lead tracked and gathered all the information from the analysts and then prepared an
intelligence assessment to send to the Special Events section to inform decisions about
granting or denying the permit, and where to assign the group on the Capitol grounds.190
191
After November 2020—when Farnam took over for Norm Grahe—that process changed. The
USCP OIG found that those changes left USCP worse off. According to the OIG, as of
January 6, 2021, “IICD [lacked] comprehensive policies and procedures relevant to their
open source intelligence gathering efforts,” and “IICD did not always include previous
192
reporting into later assessments.”
50
FARNAM WAS ONLY ON THE JOB FOR
APPROXIMATELY 10 WEEKS BEFORE THE ATTACK
NOVEMBER 2020
ELECTION

4 WEEKS
NORM GRAHE
RETIREMENT DATE
4 WEEKS
2 WEEKS
ATTACK ON THE
US CAPITOL
51
In a May 2022, review, the USCP Inspector General found that “up until December/January
2020/2021, or possibly a little earlier, IICD was divided into an unofficial ‘Open Source
Section (OSS)’ and ‘Intelligence Analysis Section (IAS),’” and that “IICD officials changed
the process around that time, eliminated OSS, and made all [Intelligence Research
193
Specialists] responsible for performing open source searches.”
Even though there had not been an intelligence-based security failure prior to Farnam’s
194
arrival, she believed the analyst team was not sufficiently performing its job. Upon her
195
arrival, Farnam immediately began disassembling the open-source section. She described
196
the team as “struggling with some of [the] taskings” she assigned. She testified, “I felt
coming on board I had to do a lot of the analytic work myself. I’m not going to speak for
Jack [Donahue], but I know the two of us did a lot of, like, the analyst type work in the
beginning because the team didn’t have the capability.” 197
The analyst team lead, however, described Farham as non-responsive and hostile to the
analyst’s effort to provide support. The analyst testified:
Answer:
[T]he special event permits would come to me, from Special Events and I would
assign them out. I’d log them in and assign them out. So that way I could always
tell where they were and I could go put my hands on them at any given time. . . . I
would assign out a special event permit, and a half an hour later she would assign it
to somebody else.
So, I would send [Julie Farnam] an email and say, “You don’t have to worry about
this, I take care of this, and we’ll get it done.” She never responded. In the [first]
phone call [with Farnam] I was told I was insubordinate because I was explaining
the process to her and no underling should ever tell a supervisory what to do.198
***
And then I got written up over the weekend for that, because I was unprofessional
and unwelcoming. So I got a 550 the following Monday morning.
52
Question:
[Y]ou were written up because you were unwelcoming?
Answer:
Yes. And unprofessional. 199
Analysts and other USCP sources interviewed by the Committee described how the changes
implemented by Farnam undermined their work. Analysts testified to investigators that the
200
section became “nonfunctional” immediately upon Farnam’s arrival. One analyst testified
that Farnam’s changes—which were not formally communicated—stripped experts out of the
roles in which their experience could be leveraged.
The analyst testified:
[S]he basically didn’t come out and say, “I’m shutting out the open-source
Section,” but she started assigning our taskings to other analysts upstairs, who
were unfamiliar with what we did.201
***
[W]e have very specific lanes that we worked in, for a reason. I mean, because
there’s so much one person can’t possibly keep up with everything. And we
developed expertise in those areas. My expertise was with the groups that used
to come up to the Hill to demonstrate all the time. I checked with their social
media pages every day. I knew who the key players were. And I could tell, from
202
experience, this is going to be a problem, or this isn’t going to be a problem.
Similarly, another analyst testified, “That unit was disbanded by her almost on day one. We,
at the time of January 6, we were not doing proactive searches of social media like we had
been before. We were strictly reactive and responding to requests for information.” 203
53
The analyst further stated that Farnam removed the open-source experts from the process
to consolidate power for herself to the detriment of the safety and security of the Capitol.204
One analyst stated:
[W]hen we identified a threat, we would assess the threat and create a

notification sheet and send it to the threat assessment section. But we would
copy everybody in the division, so everybody had eyes on threats that were being
made. And she changed that policy to say it would only be her and the director
copied on the email sent to threats, not all of the analysts. So when in the lead-up
to January 6, many people, many of the analysts weren’t even aware of the vitriol
of threats that were coming through on social media.205
Those changes had consequences. Due to the sudden changes to the structure of the open-
source section, experienced analysts missed clear signs of violence and important
information that indicated a threat to the Capitol. One analyst testified:
Answer:
[T]he standard procedure up to that is there would be an analyst assigned as the
lead for that event, and that analyst would track the event from notification to the
final assessment. And that analyst would receive all the information from the other
analysts as the point person, and produce a draft assessment. And that draft
assessment would go to the director. And as we mentioned before, it’s a cyclical
process, going on from the time you know about it, until the final assessment.
Whereas in this case, Ms. Farnham said herself was going to be the point person for
the assessment. So all the information was sent to her. There was no analyst
assigned to follow or track the event.
Question:
[W]hat does it tell you as an expert if the same person is getting a permit for every
spot around the Capitol? Would that raise a flag to you?
54
Answer:
206
Absolutely.
***
I would point out that one of our duties in the intelligence unit is to conduct an
event assessment that is predicated on the assessment permit. So special events
section gets a permit. And while they are doing their job, they notify us, and we
conduct an event assessment as well. And our final assessment goes back to special
events section. And that would be all coordinated. Prior to that, it would come
through [the analysts’ team lead]. So, if -- but in this case, it was being coordinated
and everything was going through Ms. Farnham. So we had . . . no idea what
permits were being applied for.207
According to the analysts, Farnam regularly assigned tasks, reassigned tasks, and then
locked the completed assessment files so the analysts could not access them, even as those
208
analysts were working on the same issue. A USCP source told investigators:
[S]he kept re-assigning things to people, different people, because that was her
version of “cross-training” everybody, which she basically came in and said okay
everybody up and change chairs immediately. And we became non-functional,
because nobody knew what they were doing, and we had to learn the job. And
we were trying to learn from the people that did it before, and it was just a lot of
confusion and things were being written up in wrong formats. . . . Files were
209
moved around. Files were re-named. There’s a locked file.
If Farnam received an assessment and was not satisfied with the final product, she rewrote
210
it. Analysts never saw the final intelligence product. In some cases, Farnam locked the file
211
and analysts could not access it. The final product was shared outside the division, but
212
analysts still did not have access to the final version.
One analyst stated:
55
The way we functioned before was, each section had our own case log, and we
would put everything on there and draw the next case number. And we could
easily go back and find—and it would be saved under the file name, you know,
“21-O- --” we could easily go put our hands on that document. Now, we can’t put
our hands on documents if we have to go back and research something. Files are
constantly being moved around. Folder names are being changed all the time.
213
So you’re always hunting for things.
The documents and testimony show that

immediately upon joining the USCP, and without
time to acclimate, Farnam began to dismantle the
systems that had kept the Capitol safe for so long.
In fact, upon her arrival at IICD, Farnam reassigned analysts to projects outside the scope of
their regular work and required analysts to perform jobs they had not been trained to do.
One analyst described the breakdown of productivity.
The analyst testified:
Answer:
I mean, the one analyst, [USCP analyst], was told to monitor a protest and [they] had
never done that before. So, [they] didn’t have a clue how to start to do that. And
[they] didn’t have the accounts, the social media accounts established, to be able to
monitor on social media. I mean, how functional is that? And I was getting assigned
threats and things like that that I hadn’t worked on, it took me a while to knock the dust
off to do that because I’d been so focused on demonstrations.
56
Answer:
But I was one of the fortunate ones that I have kind of worked all those jobs in IICD,
but some of those analysts hadn’t; they’d always been pigeon-holed. And they were
being plucked out and stuffed into another chair. And it took a while to get our feet
on the ground. And even now, I would say nobody’s 100 percent comfortable with
their job. Because it’s constant, it’s a constantly changing environment. She’s
changing forms. She’s changing names of things. She’s changing logs. It’s just a
constant flux. You can’t ever get your feet on the ground, if that makes sense? 214
Question:
And these changes began when she arrived in November?
Answer:
Yes.
Question:
Do you feel that the team had their feet on the ground by December, when the
threats were escalating as it relates to January, or –
Answer:
215
No, definitely not.
***
Because we were still being shifted around and assigned different projects and by
December some of the analysts were being assigned ridiculous projects. There
[were] three analysts at least that were working on an assassination project for her.
They were told to research all political assassinations in the history of the world,
worldwide. And I’m, when they told me that’s what they were assigned, I was like,
“But that’s like a Ph.D. dissertation, that’s not an assessment document, or an
intelligence document.” I said, and what is that, somebody being assassinated in
1700 in England, what does that have to do with us now? I could see if it was
focused more on the U.S. political assassination attempts and things like that. But it
was everything.
57
Question:
And when was that assigned?
Answer:
That was in December.
Question:
And how many analysts were working on it?
Answer:
Three. We had two analyst --
Question:
How many analysts are there total?
Answer:
I think there’s like eleven or twelve of us at that time. And one of them, it was two
analysts and a light-duty officer who was functioning as an analyst. And they got
43 pages written, sent it to her for approval, and they’ve never heard anything else
on that project. 216
Farnham discussed these “research projects.” She testified:
[O]ne of the projects was to look at assassinations and assassination attempts

against elected officials because we have seen a huge surge in threats. . . . So,
that information is helpful to see, you know, are there patterns . . . . So yes, there
have – and there have been other projects. For example, we did an information
paper on sovereign citizens.” 217
In the days leading up to a joint session of Congress, where every national law enforcement
agency was on high alert, the head of intelligence for the USCP was assigning research
papers with absolutely no nexus to the immediate threat environment.
58
C. Farnam undermined IICD analysts and downplayed important intelligence
to USCP leadership.
During that period, IICD analysts completed a first special event assessment on December
218
16, 2020 and updated the assessment on three occasions to include new information. The
December 16 assessment concluded there was “NO social media indications for specific
219
threats or concerning comments directed at the Joint Session of Congress.”
Analysts told investigators they were not advised about how to prepare for the imminent
Joint Session until mid-December 2020. In one case, an intelligence assessment update for
the event was tasked to an analyst on December 21, 2020, and the analyst only had 12
hours to complete it. The hastily prepared assessment was not published. The analyst
testified:
Question:
So, in the lead up to, let’s say mid-December, Capitol Police knows the Joint Session
is happening. . . . In those weeks leading up to it, were [you] given any information?
Answer:
220
Zero information. Zero. Even the day of, we were given zero information.
***
When it came time for the Joint Session, I was tasked, December 21st, to write an
assessment on the Joint Session. . . . So, I did not see that until the 22nd when I
logged in in the morning. I started writing it, she called me the next day, I think the
next morning, and asked where the assessment was. And I said, “I’m still researching
it.” She goes, “I need it by lunch time.”
So, I had, basically had 12 hours to totally research this whole thing, which I would
have been working on for at least a month. Totally research it and write it. And I
admit that was awful assessment because I did not have the time to put into it, and
research it. And I was not familiar with the subject matter.
59
Question:
Right.
Answer:
So I wrote that. As far as I know that was not published. The next week, [USCP
analyst] was tasked with writing an assessment on the Joint Session. [The analyst
was] not told that I had written one the previous week. But [the analyst] wrote an
assessment. As far as I know, that was not published. 221
222
The next document shared by IICD was produced on December 21, 2020. The report
signaled concerns about the Joint Session for the first time. The December 21 IICD Report
attached a map of the tunnels of the Capitol complex that appeared online and indicated
protesters could be “carrying firearms during the protest” and could “confront members of
Congress.” 223
Senate Committee investigators interviewed Yogananda Pittman, who was serving as

224
Assistant Chief in charge of the Protective Intelligence Operation on January 6, 2021.
According to the Senate Report, “The December 21 IICD [intelligence] Report attached a
map of the Capitol campus that was posted to the blog and noted: ‘several comments
225
promote confronting members of Congress and carrying firearms during the protest.’”
226
This report was labeled 21-TD-159. Pittman told Senate investigators, “this report was
227
distributed only to “command staff,” including the deputy chiefs and assistant chiefs.”
Capitol police officers—according to Pittman—would have received that report. But USCP
228
sources testified to investigators they never saw it, and never received it. According to the
officers, Pittman lied to Senate investigators. One USCP source testified:
Answer:
And everybody, every deputy chief, knew they didn’t get this email and that
everybody had been lied to. So, like I said, that’s when people started like, did you
get that? No. Did you get it? And they’re like, no.
60
Question:
So you’ve confirmed with everyone that no one got that email?
Answer:
229
One hundred percent. Yeah. Everybody’s certain of that.
Additionally, Farnam confirmed in her interview with investigators that the report was not
230
shared with officers. A whistleblower similarly told House and Senate leaders that Pittman
lied about whether her officers were prepared in advance for the brutality they faced on
231
January 6. A USCP source told investigators that the entire USCP force acknowledges that
Pittman did not testify truthfully to the Senate, and accordingly it will be difficult to trust her
to lead and protect the rank-and-file.232
IICD sent out several additional assessments after December 21, most of which were
233
reproductions of previous information that did not indicate violence was a concern.
234
The final Special Assessment was shared on January 3, 2021. This was the first assessment
that mentioned Congress was the target of violence. The document, however, did not
include that important fact in the “Bottom Line Up Front” portion on the first page, but
rather buried it toward the end of the fifteen-page assessment. 235
Regarding the placement of that key portion of the assessment, the USCP Inspector
General found, if one “does not read the [January 3 Special Assessment] in its entirety, they
could draw an inaccurate conclusion since the [Bottom Line Up Front section] is not
consistent with the rest of the document.” 236
Jack Donohue and Julie Farnam tasked two analysts to write the final Special Assessment.237
Throughout mid to late-December, they drafted three versions and received edits from
238
Donohue. The portion that stated Congress was the target of violence, however, was
written by Farnam.239
The source of the intelligence that led Farnam to conclude the Capitol was a target is
unclear. Indeed, Farnam testified that she drafted the final assessment.240
61
The documents and testimony create the appearance that Farnam used the work of the
analysts to cobble together the assessment to send to USCP leadership. One analyst
described the process of writing the assessment during an interview with investigators.
The analysts testified:
Answer:
January 3rd, Julie [Farnam] writes the assessment. She took a little bit from mine,
basically talking about how the Joint Session would work, the background, and the
list of demonstrations that I’d found at that point, and she put that in there. And she
took a little bit from [the other analyst’s].
And she composed the assessment that was published prior to 1/6, I think it was the
3rd or the 4th. And she put the BLUF in there, the bottom line up front, that did not
say anything about violence. I, we didn’t get that until I would say, either late on the
4th or the 5th, when Jack Donohue sent it to us, after it had been published to other
people.
Question:
So, you’re saying that her threat assessment that she sent out on the 3rd, was sent
to you by Jack Donohue on the 4th or the 5th?
Answer:
Yes.
Question:
And did it include threats, possible violence in that version?
Answer:
It was the version that everybody’s talking about. I did not, when I read that
document, and I’ve talked to the other analysts, they had the same impression
from me, that that document tell anybody that it was, to expect violence that we
experienced. There was nothing in there.
62
Answer:
When I wrote my first assessment and I had all these demonstrations listed, she
came back to me and said, “Well, these are all different groups, but there’s
probably only going to be five, so we only need to be concerned about five
demonstrations.” I said, “Those 40 demonstrations are people coming from all
over the country, that tells us something, that’s important to know that we have 5
people coming from Alaska, and 20 people for Minnesota, and 500 coming from
Maryland,” and that’s important information, and she did not see it that way.
She just thought it’s five main demonstrations and these other groups are just
going to join in those. I disagreed, but, like I said, she never really published [my
version of the assessment] with her list, she copied and pasted, I believe, some of
it, into the assessment.241
On this issue, Farnam testified she was not concerned about the permits because “COVID
242
protocols” only allowed 50 people per permit. This statement shows a staggering lack of
awareness and concern, especially in light of more than a year of massive protests
throughout the country where “COVID protocols” were ignored.
Farnam testified that she and her team do not bear responsibility for what happened on
243
January 6, 2021. She said “[IICD] provided leadership with information that it was going to
be violent, that Congress was going to be targeted, that extremists would be there, that
there were going to be thousands of protesters, and that intelligence was not
244
operationalized.”
Farnam is relying on the portion of the January 3 Special Event Assessment that she sent up
the chain of command that included the lines: “protestors have indicated they plan to be
armed” and that “Unlike previous protests . . . Congress itself is the target on the 6th.” 245
However, there was no relevant or underlying information along these lines in prior
assessments, nor in three subsequent Daily Intelligence Reports. Farnam admitted she
246
should “have given those reports more attention on January 4, 5, and 6.”
63
But Farnam also testified that concerns about the possibility of violence during the Joint
247
Session developed much earlier, to late December. She stated:
Because remember, you know, the MAGA 2 March was December 12th, and so
January 6 wasn’t even a thing until after December 12th. I didn’t learn of it until,
you know, mid-December sometime, and it wasn’t until we got closer to the end
part of December right around the holidays that we really started to see things
pick up. 248
Farnam’s testimony about the timeline of her concerns about the possibility of violence at
the Capitol during the Joint Session is contradictory and alarming. The Joint Session to
count the electoral votes was the focus of much national news in the weeks leading up to
249
January 6, 2021. The Joint Session is a constitutionally mandated process; even under
normal circumstances, the USCP’s preparation for a joint session of Congress should be a
high priority for the department’s chief intelligence officer far in advance of the event.250
Farnam testified the first indicators of violence came around December 21, 2020. She 251
stated, “around that time is when we started to see more worrisome intelligence coming in.”
Farnam appears to be referencing the December 21 IICD report that mentioned the Capitol
tunnels and the likelihood that protesters could be armed.
But, according to her testimony, those concerns were neutralized by her confidence that
COVID protocols only allowed 50 people per permit. Farnam further testified that she
learned there would be thousands of people at the Ellipse rally and the Freedom Plaza rally
252
around mid to late December. Even that information did not seem to register with Farnam,
in terms of the heightened potential for violence during the Joint Session. Farnam testified
that, even after learning about the larger-than-expected rallies in mid to late December,
she did not develop concerns until “right around the new year.” She stated:
Question:
You also told CBS you said, “I knew things were not going to be good that day.” Did
you know that on January 3rd? Did you know that December 21st?
64
Question:
When did you know things were going to be bad?
Answer:
I’d say right around the new year. 253
So, while experienced and tenured analysts were alerting Farnam to the need to consider
the fact that multiple events were coalescing in the vicinity of the Capitol, Farnam
continued to incorporate “COVID protocols” into her overall threat assessment. The results
were catastrophic.
While Farnam stated in a televised interview with CBS as a part of an anniversary special
that she “knew things were not going to be good that day,” the day before the Joint
254
Session, the entire team of intelligence officers of the USCP attended a mandatory training.
When pressed about why she would send her staff to a training when she knew there could
be violence the next day, she responded, “because the violence wasn’t happening on the
5th.” 255
That day, the FBI’s Norfolk Field Office shared a Situational Information Report regarding
256
online discussions of potential violence at the Capitol on January 6, 2021. One analyst
described how USCP failed to register the FBI’s warning. The analyst testified:
[W]e were so fragmented and nobody was really focused on that. If this would
have been under a previous manager, Norm, it would have been all hands on deck
as soon as we got inklings that there was going to be violence everybody would
have been working on it, that would have been our focus. Instead we were being
fragmented and moved around, so, yes, I could see where that information did not
make it to the officers. . . . [W]hatever information they passed to Julie was not
passed to us. We didn’t know about that information from the Norfolk office until
after the event when it came out in the press is when we learned about it. 257
65
Such failures had consequences department-wide. The fifth USCP OIG flash report stated:
Many of the officers interviewed stated they received very little or no

intelligence about events planned for January 6, 2021, or that it would be any
different than previous MAGA events. For example, one officer stated they did
not receive any intelligence that day and that social media was a better source
of information because it forecasted the intensity and the number of people.258
The documents and testimony show the abrupt changes to the processes for gathering and
disseminating intelligence within IICD and USCP in late 2020 were counterproductive and
ill-conceived in advance of a high-profile event. The processes that Farnam inherited had
kept the Capitol safe for years. Farnam’s decision to overhaul the intelligence division
amidst mounting evidence that various groups intended to direct violence at the Capitol
during the upcoming Joint Session left the USCP under-prepared to perform its mission.
D. IICD leadership reorganized the division to gather more intelligence on Members of

Congress, staff, and constituents to the detriment of preparing for the Joint Session.
One of IICD’s responsibilities is to produce Congressional Event Assessments (CEAs), which

are assessments requested by the Dignitary Protection Division, Members of Congress, or
House or Senate Sergeants at Arms. These assessments are specific to events that Members
hold in their district or events outside of Washington, D.C. that they wish to have reviewed
by USCP analysts. Julie Farnam overhauled the protocols for CEAs.
Analysts interviewed for this investigation explained that a Member of Congress is

encouraged to submit a list of all participants and the location of the event to the Sergeant
259
at Arms. The Sergeant at Arms then transfers that information to IICD to run a check. This
check, also known as LECOR (Law Enforcement Coordination), is an open-source check on
260
all the names provided by the Member of Congress via the Sergeant at Arms. Analysts
261
assessed any derogatory information identified during the LECOR. USCP Chief Manger
testified that USCP does not run record checks or criminal history checks.262
66
He stated: “if there is nothing derogatory or nothing of concern, the information is not kept.
If it—if there is something of concern, it’s put in the assessment.” 263
House Sergeant at Arms William Walker also testified about the process for vetting the
people who meet with Members of Congress. He stated:
[Y]ou’re going to -- you name the place. You’re going to meet with people there.
Who’s going to be there? Are they predisposed to violence? Do they have a
criminal history? Are they violent? Do they have -- are they somebody that’s made
264
a threat against you? Just want to understand who’s around you.
One analyst, however, described the process in more specific terms. The analyst testified
that USCP also ran checks on Members of Congress and Senators, congressional staff, and
donors. The analyst stated:
Answer:
If we, when the form that we get from the Sergeant of Arms House or Senate, if they
list Members that are, and other Members that are attending, staffers that may be
attending, who they’re meeting with. If there’s names in there, we have to research
them, and we have to go back and see -- look at their social media accounts.
As an example, this summer I had numerous meetings. [Republican Senator], he was

meeting with donors, and I had to background the donors. I had to go and look at
their social media accounts, which most of them were elderly and didn’t have social
media accounts.
Question:
Right.
Answer:
I had to look at their residence. I had to see who owned the residence and where it
was located. And most of them, they know, the Members know where they’re going.
67
In response to questions about researching a donor’s house, Walker testified: “I would hope
a Member would want to know who has proximity to him, who’s within arm’s reach, who can
265
reach out and cause alarm. I would hope.” But Walker did not answer whether Members
knew that USCP was conducting such research on the people whose names they submitted
to the Sergeant at Arms. According to a copy of the template that Farnam created,
analysts were directed to review the people meeting privately and publicly with members,
and to describe “the backgrounds of the participants (other than [Members of Congress])
and attendees, if known.” 266
Indeed, the security value of such research is further undermined by the fact that the
resultant case file was not reviewed by Dignitary Protection agents. A USCP source
testified:
Question:
So, these new requirements, did Ms. Farnam create a form so that you have to
basically fill it out, so you’re asked the same questions from every person, or how
would these instructions relate to you?
Answer:
She made a new form, and she sent it out, and it was, it would have the heading
and she would put in parentheses what to put in there.
Question:
[S]o the form gets filled out. You do the work that is requested of you, and you
send it up. And, you don’t know what happens to it next, is that fair?
Answer:
No. That’s fair.
Question:
And so how do you learn about whether or not all the information you’ve gathered
and all this work that you’ve done is going to somewhere useful, or if it’s going into a
file or a somewhere else?
68
Answer:
Word of mouth.
Question:
Word of mouth. And so, have you heard instances in which you know you did a big
project on an event and then later you learned that the people who were actually
working that event didn’t ever have the benefit of your work?
Answer:
Yes, we’ve heard back from some of the DPD agents, the Dignitary Protection
agents, that they have not seen what we wrote. So, it, I don’t know where this
information’s going, and I feel like we’re almost spinning our wheels. 267
If the information collected against private citizens exercising their constitutional rights with
respect to meeting Members of Congress is not in fact used for security purposes by the
officers responsible for securing those meetings, then the purpose of the program and the
scope of the information collected needs to be reviewed.
Similar concerns were covered in a January 2022 story in Politico, which stated:
268
69
On January 25, 2022, Republicans wrote a letter to the Capitol Police Board, demanding
269
answers on these allegations. Chief Manger responded on January 27 in a letter detailing
IICD’s processes and asked the USCP OIG “to review the USCP’s programs related to these
security assessments . . . ” 270
It is important to note that the USCP OIG as a matter of course does not review claims
made by media outlets—it only reviews those by whistleblowers, Congressional stakeholders,
or the USCP Chief of Police. This is reflected in the USCP OIG’s May 2022 report on IICD,
which does not address the claims in the Politico article. The report states in the
methodology section that OIG “could not benchmark IICD processes and procedures
against other protective agencies’ processes,” meaning the report fails to address the key
271
allegations at stake in this matter. The specific constitutional and civil liberties concerns
raised in the Politico story therefore remain unresolved by USCP and unaddressed by the
USCP OIG, and they are reaffirmed by this investigation.
E. USCP leadership doubled down on their failed management approach

and retaliated against officers and analysts who raised concerns.
Since the analysts in the open-source section came forward to speak with investigators and
filed official complaints with the USCP Office of Inspector General, they have been
retaliated against and, in some cases been terminated.
For example, one analyst testified that he was asked to participate in the Select
Committee’s investigation by USCP, and then written up for participating. He testified:
Answer:
I was contacted by [Capitol Police attorney]. And she was the one who notified me
that the January 6 Committee was interested in conducting an interview. She asked for
some available times, and she was the one who actually scheduled the interview. In my
response to her I requested that, you know, Capitol Police . . . not be present for the
interview due to my complaints of ongoing retaliation, discrimination, harassment by
my supervisor, Ms. Farnam. She said that was fine. I conducted the interview with the
January 6 Committee. There was no Capitol Police presence.
70
Answer:
I found out on Monday in speaking with [Capitol Police attorney] that she had
contacted Ms. Farnam about my meeting with the committee. She would not say
what they talked about. And then when I pressed her and asked about my request
not to notify my supervisor because of ongoing retaliation, she said that -- she said,
I cannot make demands of the Inspector General. I said, of course not. I understand.
I am making a request. Can you just acknowledge if my request will be upheld or
not? And her comment was that she cannot speak anymore about my request for
the Capitol Police not to be notified.
Question:
Did she give you a reason why she notified Ms. Farnam?
Answer:
She did not. She said she could not talk about her conversation at all other than she
had a conversation. A few hours after that, I was contacted by Ms. Farnam, and we
had a teleconference where she issued me a CP-550, which is an administrative
document. In the document, she cited mismanagement of my time and prioritization
of resource -- of casework. Because during the day, she had given me two
assessments to complete. But due to my two-and-a-half hours with the interview, I
was only able to complete one assessment.
272
So that was her justification for issuing me the administrative write-up.
Analysts testified that Farnam intentionally created a toxic environment. According to

witnesses, Farnam’s strategy was to “create stress” in order to assess the adaptability and
resilience of IICD analysts. One analyst testified:
Answer:
She also said that she wanted to create stress, and so she could evaluate the
adaptability of the analysts. Yet she has put in an email that there was a method to
her madness, as she put it. Those are her words. That she wanted to see which
analysts could adapt to new and difficult assignments.
71
Question:
So she told you that she intentionally created stress to see if you were able to adapt
under stressful situations?
Answer:
Yes. She said this in an all-hands-on teleconference with everybody in the division.
Because we had been sending so many complaints to our supervisors. Inspector
Schneider was also on the call, and Chief Gallagher was on the call, and they, you
know --
Question:
Which are her supervisors, correct?
Answer:
Correct. And they were on the call because they had been receiving so many
complaints of us just gross mismanagement. We were essentially -- the military term
is combat ineffective. We were not able to properly perform our jobs under the
current conditions. 273
In response to this testimony, Chief Manger stated: “Well, certainly that’s not the way I
274
would want a supervisor to conduct their day-to-day activities.” Manger also stated that he
would not tolerate retaliation: “I will not tolerate people being mistreated, discriminated
against, retaliated against. I have been doing this a long time. And there is -- there are
times when I have, in fact, taken action because I felt that someone was mistreated or
275
someone was retaliated against. I won’t tolerate it.” But in consideration of Farnam’s
endeavor to disassemble the open-source section of IICD, reassign analysts to new tasks
they were not trained to do, and purposefully create a stressful environment, Manger
remained satisfied with the department’s direction. He said:
72
Answer:
We are far and away much better. . . . I am not kept up at night by, oh, my God,
could this -- you know, could intelligence be the problem again? We need to stay on
top of it. Make no mistake. It’s not like I don’t think about it. I do. But I know that with
the improvements we have made, that these improvements will be sustained for
years to come.
Question:
Okay. So it’s safe to say that you are satisfied with the changes that have been
made in intelligence?
Answer:
There is more work to be -- yes, I am.
The analyst sources who testified and assisted this investigation were subsequently
separated from the USCP.
F. USCP is withholding an internal report that confirmed many of the

concerns raised by analysts and officers who testified to investigators.
U.S. Capitol Police completed its After-Action Report on June 4, 2021.
Notably, this report was not shared with the Capitol Police Board and was only shared with
the USCP Inspector General after he concluded his investigation. Further, USCP has not
officially provided the After-Action Report to either Republicans or Democrats on the
Committee on House Administration despite bipartisan requests, and they have yet even to
inform the Committee that the After-Action Report is complete as of the writing of this
report. The After-Action Report made several findings related to the Intelligence Division
that align with the testimony of analysts who participated in this investigation. The After-
Action report was provided to investigators through concerned whistleblowers. The findings
state: 73
1. Intelligence products must be updated and disseminated for appropriate planning and
officer readiness.
2. Individuals with the most experience extrapolating open source material were not
tasked with reviewing social media to glean intel related to the even.
3. IICD was urged in an email, to be sure that the Bottom Line Up Front (BLUF) was on all
their documents. This is put into an assessment to express urgency or concerns.
4. The intelligence briefing that Hazardous Incident Response Division (HIRD) received
differed from the official intelligence reports, causing confusion in preparation,
postings, and overall response at the Capitol.
5. Minimal updates were provided by units in the field assigned to monitor demonstration
276
activity prior to the arrival on U.S. Capitol Grounds.
The findings make clear that USCP’s After-Action Report confirmed what several analysts
shared during transcribed interviews with investigators and tends to confirm the
department’s dysfunction under the management of Julie Farnam. Farnam ignored these
findings and the analysts who raised concerns were terminated by USCP.
74
RECOMMENDATIONS
This investigation found that the events of January 6, 2021 revealed structural and
operational failures by the Capitol Police Board. To prevent a similar situation from
happening again, and to ensure USCP is prepared to respond in case it does, it is
imperative that Congress embraces the original intent of the Board: the separation of
security decisions from politics. For that reason, the Board’s structure must be
reformed.
To do so effectively, distance must be created between congressional leadership and

USCP so law enforcement and intelligence experts are making security decisions, not
politicians. The Board must also demonstrate a commitment to functioning as an
oversight entity, not an entity carrying out the partisan demands of the Speaker. The
Board needs to drive transparency and accountability at USCP through proactive
oversight with long-term objectives in mind, rather than taking a passive and opaque
role beholden to the political winds of the day. The recommendations made below are
intended to acknowledge the important role the Board plays, the structural failures that
contributed to January 6, and the path forward for Capitol security.
A. Make the Capitol Police Board more transparent
There are necessary changes unrelated to the Board’s structure that must be made to
ensure transparency and accountability at USCP and the Board. These changes could
take place with or without changes to the Board’s structure to correct longstanding
issues.
COMPEL THE BOARD TO SEND MEETING MINUTES TO THE

RELEVANT OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES
Require more consistency and timeliness from the Board in communication and sending
meeting minutes to oversight entities - There has been a consistent lack of
transparency from the Board regarding security decisions, recommendation
implementation, timelines, and other oversight related requests. Due to pressure from
House Republicans, the Board has taken steps to improve transparency, including
providing the oversight committees copies of their Manual of Procedures, the Board’s
monthly meeting minutes, and creating the Capitol Police Board Fora.
75
RECOMMENDATIONS
To increase oversight and accountability, it is important that the Board submit
minutes to the House Committee on House Administration, the Senate Committee
on Rules and Administration, and House and Senate leadership offices in a
consistent and timely manner.
REQUIRE THE BOARD TO REGULARLY APPEAR BEFORE THE

RELEVANT OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES
The Board, in its entirety, has not met with any Senate or House committees since
1946. When asked to do so post-January 6, 2021, the newly appointed Senate
Sergeant at Arms refused to participate. The Board members who did participate in
CHA’s oversight hearing deflected requests for information, stating they could not
make such a commitment without the full Board’s approval. The Board should be
required to meet annually before a Joint Committee of Senate Rules and CHA, with
the expectation that requests for information from the Joint Committee shall be
answered, fully.
PROVIDE ADDITIONAL RESOURCES FOR THE CAPITOL POLICE BOARD

TO PROFESSIONALIZE ITS SUPPORT STAFF
Administrative functions of the Board are often conducted by borrowed staff from the
House Sergeant at Arms and Architect of the Capitol offices, used to supplement the
needs of Board members. It is important to consider providing additional executive
staff specifically to serve the Board to professionalize the Board’s functions, establish
clear points of contacts, and ensure proper documentation and record keeping. There
should also be consideration for more staff on the oversight committees with
277
experience in policing and protective forces. The Board should also be compelled to
meet before either committee at the call of the Chair. It is important that these
committees have the resources to attract experienced security analysts capable of
overseeing USCP and the Board. This will also inspire confidence from the Board in
the expertise of the relevant oversight entities. Despite a statutory change after the
events of January 6, 2021 requiring this to occur every Congress, no oversight hearing
has been scheduled by the Democrat-majorities in the House or Senate.
76
RECOMMENDATIONS
CLEARLY DEFINE AND LIMIT THE BOARD’S AUTHORITY
The Board’s structure and responsibilities are an “anomaly” relative to peer security
entities, according to the 2017 GAO report. The Board’s direct role in the day-to-day
operations of the USCP hinders USCP’s mission and, as witnessed on January 6,
dangerously handicaps USCP’s function. The Board’s focus should be limited to long-
term strategic thinking and overseeing USCP’s budget. The Board also needs to
prioritize its oversight responsibilities in relation to tracking and implementing the
USCP IG’s recommendations.
MAKE THE INSPECTOR GENERAL INDEPENDENT FROM THE BOARD
The USCP IG has testified before CHA four times since January 6, 2021. Though
thorough in his investigations of the security shortcomings on January 6, the IG is
limited and conflicted in his oversight role of the Board. His refusal to answer basic
questions about the Board’s responsibilities and operations demonstrates that the IG
is not able to conduct audits of the security posture of the Capitol when the Board
holds much of the decision-making responsibilities and directs the actions of the IG.
For this reason, we recommend that the authority to hire and remove the USCP IG be
shifted to the relevant oversight committees, with three-fourths of the Chairs and
Ranking Members of those committees sufficient to approve any personnel actions.
The Inspector General’s budget should also be independent from the Board.
B. Reform the structure of the Capitol Police Board
The structure of the Board needs to change. It cannot be left to the two Sergeants
at Arms to make all security decisions for the Board. Adding members from outside
of the USCP and of the political chain of command would ensure less political
influence and introduce new perspectives to USCP and the Board. Further, the Board
needs to shift away from making day-to-day management decisions for USCP to
overseeing its operations and ensuring coordination between various stakeholders,
both on and off the Hill.
77
RECOMMENDATIONS
These proposals aim to balance the various considerations above to address the
findings contained herein related to the politicization of security decisions and
the USCP’s overall level of professionalism.
ADD TWO NEW MEMBERS TO THE CAPITOL POLICE BOARD
Two new members should be added to the Board whose full-time job will be
oversight of USCP, long-term strategic planning, and identifying industry best
practices. These new members should be appointed to staggered terms of four
years. The appointing authorities should prioritize members with pre-existing
relationships at relevant Executive Branch departments, including the
Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of
Justice, who can facilitate a direct line to those departments in circumstances
like those on January 6, 2021. Prior experience as either a chief of police, police
commissioner, or security director of a prominent state or federal protection
agency should also be prioritized. Given its hybrid nature, USCP would benefit
from protective and policing experience on the Board.
REPLACE THE CHIEF OF POLICE WITH THE

COMMISSIONER ON THE BOARD
Currently, the chief of police’s role on the Board creates a conflict of interest.
They are tasked with overseeing the department of which they are in charge. This
position should be replaced by the newly installed commissioner who will liaise
with the Board and the chief of police to inform the oversight goals of the Board.
It will also make a clear division of oversight between the Board and the
Department.
78
APPENDIX
Appendix A: Timeline of House Sergeant at Arms Paul Irving’s Records
Thursday, December 3
House Sergeant at Arms staff receive an intelligence report from USCP IICD that
reflects an event at the Capitol on January 6. The report includes time, date, and
location information for the event: “Donald Your [sic] Fired March on DC.” It is labeled
as an anti-Trump event that could draw counter demonstrators, and it has 2 people
listed as going and 12 more that are interested. The Level of Probability for civil
278
disobedience/arrests is listed at “highly improbable.” House Sergeant at Arms Paul
Irving receives a separate daily briefing from his staff that does not include information
for January.279
Saturday, December 5
Jamie Fleet, a shared staffer on Speaker Pelosi’s and the staff director for the
Committee on House Administration, texts Irving with the contact information of a large
metropolitan area’s police chief and mentions the name of a member-elect to Congress
from that city. Fleet then states, “If you let me know when you connect I’ll close loop
with np.” 280
Sunday, December 6
Irving sends an update to Jamie Fleet, saying, “Just spoke with [Police Chief] and
established contact; also spoke with Chief Sund who will liaise with the . . . Police Chief
and ensure all threats and security issues pertaining to the Member-elect is transmitted
to the USCP." 281
Tuesday, December 8
Terri McCullough, Speaker Pelosi’s Chief of Staff, texts Irving, “Paul would you be
available sometime between 12-3 for a meeting or call with Speaker?” Irving agrees to
the meeting and they schedule a time. 282
79
APPENDIX
Wednesday, December 9
Jamie Fleet texts Irving, to ask if he has touched base with the previously mentioned
Member, saying, “NP hosting a pick up lunch today and most members will be by.” 283
Irving texts Fleet, saying, “Just FYI, we have a good plan for the issue you raised
regarding opening day.” 284
Friday, December 11
House Assistant Sergeant at Arms relayed concerns with renovations being made to an
alternative Chamber space on Campus. The Assistant Sergeant at Arms notes that “[i]f
the project were to proceed as scheduled, it would require CAO to make additional
equipment purchases and install and configure it for use. This will take several weeks to
months after the completion of the AOC project. . . This leaves the House with no viable
on-site alternate chamber option during two highly important event [sic] – Opening Day
of the 117th and Joint Session for Electoral Count.” Later in the day he follows up to say
that Jamie Fleet weighed in on the situation, agreeing that the work should be
postponed. 285
Terri McCullough emails a Sergeant at Arms staffer to request a meeting. The email
states, “…[W]e have had a number of internal discussions about choreography and
safety for the Opening day and electoral college events. Can we get together with you
and your team early next week to map out what we think we need given the
complexities presented?” They schedule a meeting for the following Tuesday at 10am.286
Monday, December 14
9:39am: Irving asks one of his staffers to call him. The staffer says he is available to talk.
The next text references Jamie Fleet. 287
Tuesday, December 15
Irving meets with members of Speaker Pelosi’s and Committee on House
288
Administration’s Democratic staff.
A draft order for the temporary restriction of access to House Office Buildings from
January 3 to January 6 is passed along to Irving from a HSAA staffer. The draft states
that “ . . . such closing is necessary assure [sic] the security or safety of persons in the
House Office Buildings, or the preservation of peace or good order, and securing the
House Office Buildings Building [sic] from defacement, and for the protection of public
289
property therein . . . ”
80
APPENDIX
Irving texts Jamie Fleet, asking, “Should we send the draft Opening Session [Dear
Colleague] to just you (and Terri [McCullough]), or to the group that was on the call this
am?” Jamie tells him “That group.” 290
House Sergeant at Arms staff receive a Daily Intelligence Report with information for
the first time referencing a Pro-Trump rally. The report says that on January 6 “Patriot
Party and Pat King – Patriots United March on Congress” will be at the Capitol with the
exact location to be determined. It says that as Congress meets to count electoral
votes, “ . . . they must know that We The People will not sit idly by without a full
accounting for every legal vote cast on November 3rd. March for Election Integrity.
March for the Constitution. March to Save America. Come to Washington and meet us
at the base of the Capitol.” It says that the group had listed on their social media page
49 people attending and 294 interested in the event at the time of the report. The Level
of Probability listed for acts of civil disobedience/arrests is listed as “highly
291
improbable.” This information was not included in the intelligence briefing sent to Irving.292
Without further context, then-Chief of U.S. Capitol Police Steven Sund texts Irving to
say, “Not in favor of a [redacted] fence.” Irving responds, “Copy. You’ll need to provide
adequate posting nonetheless, but I know the AOC wants [redacted]. I’d ask that your
293
staff work closely with the AOC staff to find a mutually agreeable [redacted] decision.”
In a personal exchange with a friend, Irving says, “…when your text came in I was
consumed with Opening Day and Electoral College logistics. The week of January 3 will
be very challenging.” 294
Friday, December 18
USCP circulates to staff of the Senate Sergeant at Arms, House Sergeant at Arms, and
the Architect of the Capitol an invitation to join a meeting on January 5 to discuss plans
for the Inauguration along with stakeholders from across the National Capitol Region.295
Irving texts Jamie Fleet, saying, “First draft models coming to you from Erik [Speranza
with House Sergeant at Arms]. Prepared to discuss anytime (either direct with Erik or
also with me and Tim).” 296
81
APPENDIX
Sunday, December 20
Jamie Fleet texts Irving to ask when he is back in town from the holidays, saying, “Sent
you a teams thing for meeti [sic] tomorrow on special opening day issues.” 297
Monday, December 21
Irving receives a Daily Intelligence Report, mentioning the Million MAGA March, Woman
for a Great America-50+ Days of Blessing, and Ali Alexander’s Stop the Steal protests
for the first time. Very little details are provided here, but the Level of Probability for
acts of civil disobedience/arrests is listed as “remote” for each demonstration. 298
Monday, December 28
Irving receives a Daily Intelligence Report with 17 new protests planned for January 6
around the Capitol campus. Most of them are Pro-Trump, but two are Anti-Trump
groups, both reference being there in “force.” The likelihood of civil
disobedience/arrests is listed as “improbable” for both. For the other 15 protests,
likelihoods of disobedience/arrests range from remote to improbable. 299
Tuesday, December 29
Chief Sund requests to set up a call with Irving. Irving responds that he is available.
Then, he says, “Be careful that [a prominent Democratic member of Congress] doesn’t
ask you to have your officers pick her up from home. The answer is NO [emphasis added
by Irving].” 300
Assistant Sergeant at Arms Tim Blodgett sends a draft front office schedule for January
3 – January 8. In order to comply with Office of the Attending Physician guidance on
maintaining social distancing, their schedule has half of the staff working in the office
and the other half in telework or scheduled leave.301
Irving receives a Daily Intelligence Report that now includes 27 protests on the day, the
overwhelming majority of which are pro-Trump. All the protests continue to list the
302
likelihood of civil disobedience/arrests ranging from “remote” to “improbable.”
82
APPENDIX
Irving receives a Daily Intelligence Report that now has 22 protests on the day. All of
the protests continue to list the likelihood of civil disobedience/arrests ranging from
“remote” to “improbable.” 303
Saturday, January 2
Irving texts Jamie Fleet, saying, he “ . . . spoke with Terri [McCullough] about vandalism
issue (will provide greater coverage of the home and researching prosecution options,
Federal and State, and will be getting back to her), and also spoke about the 6th – a
draft [Dear Colleague] coming your way on Member safety and security for the day.” 304
Sunday, January 3
Irving accepts a meeting with USCP for an intelligence briefing regarding January 6
305
from 11:00am-12:00pm.
House Sergeant at Arms office circulates a draft e-Dear Colleague to be sent out to
members of Congress and Congressional staffers for First Amendment activities taking
place at the Capitol on January 6. In the draft, they along with USCP encourage
members and staff to arrive early, park in garages, and use alternative routes to walk
through the protest areas. The recommendations mention that there will be additional
police on campus that day and provides contact information for when they are on
campus. The draft also includes information about how official business visitors are to
access the Capitol. 306
6:53pm: Without further context, Jamie Fleet directs Irving via text, “You should come to
the floor” and “Officers might come quick.” Irving responds “En route.” 307
Monday, January 4
7:49am: Irving texts a House Sergeant at Arms staffer to request a call, saying, “I have
an idea about the [Dear Colleague] language we spoke about last night and thought
I’d share it before you do any heavy drafting.” 308
Jamie Fleet reaches out to Chief Sund and Irving to set up a meeting with their offices
and Committee on House Administration Chairperson Lofgren where they can discuss
the security arrangements for January 6. The email states that the “brief should include
a discussion of USCP staffing levels, coordination with other department, and your
determination to extend (or not) the perimeter around the Capitol (e.g. using jersey
309
barriers to keep folks off the plaza etc.).”
83
APPENDIX
11:35am: Irving texts Fleet, saying, “[Representative Rodney] Davis also wants a briefing;
can we do a joint or do you prefer separate? Either way obviously works.” Fleet did not
respond. 310
Irving receives the USCP IICD “Special Event Assessment” dated January 3, and it
311
includes the intelligence analysis, saying that “Congress itself is the target on the 6.”
Irving receives a Daily Intelligence Report that now has 23 protests on January 6. All the
protests continue to list the likelihood of civil disobedience/arrests ranging from
“remote” to “improbable.” 312
2:30pm-3:00pm: Irving meets with the Speaker’s office to discuss the Electoral College
Count. 313
House Sergeant at Arms staffer sends an updated draft of the e-Dear Colleague
regarding security information for January 6 to Terri McCullough and Jamie Fleet. They
request “any edits, comments, or concerns.” 314
Terri McCullough responds shortly after with edits. She suggests clarifying parking
language, timing of events, and edits to the language regarding official business
visitors. Given that they are not allowing guests to the Capitol (as they previously
discussed according to her) “it sends a mixed signal…” 315
The House Sergeant at Arms staffers agree to the changes proposed. 316
The House Sergeant at Arms incorporates the edits suggested by McCullough and
317
says they will send it out.
4:28pm: Irving texts Jamie Fleet, saying, “We’re making Terri [McCullough]’s edits to the
electoral college and if you don’t mind, I’ll send it to you and Jen [Daulby, Committee on
House Administration, Republican staff director] as a heads up, so please act
surprised.” Fleet responds, “I’m startled!” 318
The e-Dear Colleague with the suggested edits is sent out to the House.319
The Office of the House Sergeant at Arms receives notice of a threat against a senior
Republican Senator from USCP Investigations Division.320
Tuesday, January 5
7:16am: Irving sends to Chief Sund a web link to an article discussing the Metropolitan
Police Department of D.C.’s (MPD) arrest of the Proud Boys leader. Irving says, “ . . . just
thought I’d send it along to let you know the story broke. And always interesting how the
media gets information that we may not necessarily get from our sources . . .” 321
84
APPENDIX
8:15am: Jamie Fleet, sends edits to a proposed timeline of events sent by

Speaker Pelosi’s director of floor operations, Keith Stern. Irving and Terri
McCullough, are included on the email. 322
8:30am-9:00am: House and Senate Sergeants at Arms and representatives
from USCP meet to conduct a walkthrough for the Electoral College Joint
323
Session. Terri McCullough, and other Democratic staffers from the Majority
Leader and Democratic Cloakroom were invited to attend. No Republicans are
listed in the invitation.324
9:18am: A Sergeant at Arms staffer sends a draft copy of a Dear Colleague to
Terri McCullough to be sent out to members and staff regarding security
concerns with the upcoming Electoral College Count, and requests feedback
on what needs to be changed. 325
10:00am-10:30am: Irving meets via video conference with Committee on House
Administration Chairperson Zoe Lofgren regarding security arrangements for
Wednesday’s Joint Session. 326
10:02am: The House Sergeant at Arms staff receives a Daily Intelligence Report
that now has 24 protests listed on January 6. All the protests continue to list
the likelihood of civil disobedience/arrests ranging from “remote” to
“improbable.” 327
10:14am: Dr. Brian Monahan, the Attending Physician, responds to the Floor and
Operations Manager in the Sergeant at Arms Office to ask if there is a “plan to
limit the maximum number of people that can be in the Chamber” for the Joint
Session. He also suggests, “Perhaps we could be more prescriptive about
people attending who fail to wear a mask or more stringent language barring
children and anyone other than the Member in the interest of reducing the
people in the chamber.” The Floor and Operations Manager responds, saying,
“Yes; the plan is to limit Senate/House staff – Speaker’s office is coordinating
this as we speak. We will also do as we do for voting, and do everything in
groups of no more than 72 at a time on the Floor. We will direct overflow
Members to the Gallery.” 328
10:20am: Irving receives notice of another threat against the same senior
329
Republican Senator from USCP Investigations Division.
85
APPENDIX
11:22am: An Architect of the Capitol staffer sends to the Capitol Police Board and their
assistants a note informing them that they are prepared with “normal assets: and
increased staff”. It is unclear what the context of this email is. 330
11:50am: Terri McCullough responds to the e-Dear Colleague regarding January 6
security concerns with two suggestions:
“To Members are encouraged to remain in their offices can we add unless or until
they are called to vote?” [sic]
“Also can we add similar staff guidance (except no voting)?” 331
12:00pm-1:00pm: Irving joins a meeting hosted by Chief Sund with law enforcement
partners to discuss the Inauguration.332
12:03pm: House Sergeant at Arms staffer sends to Jamie Fleet a draft Dear Colleague
detailing road closures for January 6. He requests “edits, comments or concerns.” 333
2:20pm: House Sergeant at Arms Director of Protocol and Chamber Operations
responds to proposed edits from the Speaker’s staff director, saying they will verify with
Dr. Monahan regarding the proposed edits and send another draft.334
12:32pm: Jamie Fleet says the street closure Dear Colleague “looks good.” 335
12:32pm: House Sergeant at Arms Director of Protocol and Chamber Operations sends
an updated version of the COVID procedures Dear Colleague with the changes Terri
McCullough suggested to Irving. 356
12:40pm: Jamie Fleet sends a follow-up email from his earlier message regarding the
street closures Dear Colleague, saying, “Wait a minute. How are members who drive
themselves going to get to the garage? Will there be check points. [sic] We need to
discuss that in the note.” 337
12:42pm: Without further context, the House Sergeant at Arms Director of Protocol and
Chamber Operations sends an updated copy of the COVID protocols Dear Colleague
to Irving. 338
1:15pm-1:45pm: Irving schedules a walk-through with House Sergeant at Arms staff for
339
the Electoral College.
1:30pm: Terri McCullough reaches out to Irving to thank a House Sergeant at Arms
staffer who “masterfully handled a difficult situation with two members refusing to wear
masks on the floor.” She says he should expect Mr. Clyburn and the Speaker “may be
coming to you at some point to discuss additional support for the staff in these
situations…” 340
86
APPENDIX
1:32pm: A House Sergeant at Arms staffer reaches out to Irving to let him know they
scheduled a 2:30pm walkthrough for January 6 with staff. It also references another
walkthrough just prior to that with Senate Sergeant at Arms, Mike Stenger. 341
1:56pm: The House Sergeant at Arms Director of Protocol and Chamber Operations
emails Dr. Monahan an updated version of the COVID protocols Dear Colleague. 342
1:59pm: House Sergeant at Arms staffer emails Jamie Fleet with the updated road
343
closures Dear Colleague with Fleet’s recommended changes incorporated.
2:05pm: Jamie Fleet responds, saying, “Good.” 344
2:27pm: The House Sergeant at Arms staffer sends out to both Jamie Fleet and Jen
Daulby, Republican staff director on House Administration Committee, the street
closures Dear Colleague, requesting feedback from both parties as though he had
345
not already received feedback from the Democrats.
2:30pm-3:00pm: Irving conducts a walkthrough of the evacuation plan for the Joint
346
Session of Congress.
2:55pm: Chief Sund requests a conference call meeting with the other Capitol Police
Board members to discuss moving bike racks on campus intended for crowd control. 347
3:43pm: Chief Sund circulates a new perimeter, seemingly in follow-up to their
conversation. 348
3:56pm: Paul Irving agrees with the new perimeter. 349
4:00pm-4:30pm: Irving meets with Appropriations – Legislative Branch Subcommittee
Chairman Tim Ryan to discuss threats. 350
4:00pm: COVID procedures Dear Colleague is disseminated by the House Sergeant at
Arms. 351
4:02pm: Chief Sund in a group text with the two Sergeants at Arms informs them that
“MPD just locked up 2 with weapons 9th and Constitution.” 352
4:05pm: Terri McCullough texts Irving, saying she is stuck in a meeting and will call
about the next day soon. 353
354
4:26pm: Road Closures Dear Colleague is disseminated by the House Sergeant at Arms.
4:57pm: A Democratic staffer from the Appropriations – Legislative Branch
Subcommittee Majority sends an email questioning how close National Guard troops
deployed for traffic control purposes will be in relation to the Capitol complex, saying, “I
only ask to be ahead of any members who might question a photo or live tv shot that
shows National Guard with the Capitol dome in the backdrop.” 355
87
APPENDIX
4:57pm: Irving responds to the Democrat Appropriations staffer, saying, “Good talking
with you this evening. My cell is [phone number redacted] and my desk is [phone
number redacted]. Don’t hesitate to call with any questions or issues (everyone else
does!).” 356
5:40pm: Terri McCullough texts Irving, saying, “Paul – when is a good time to talk about
this afternoon and the floor tomorrow.” They agree to speak at 6:15pm. 357
6:17pm: Terri McCullough messages Irving, requesting to push back their 6:30pm
meeting to 6:45pm, due to her being stuck in another meeting. 358
6:18pm: Paul Irving agrees to push back the meeting. 359
6:20pm: Irving sends a text to Michael Stenger, Senate Sergeant at Arms, asking, “Are
you making any notification regarding the Intel that I’m told is going public?” Stenger
responds, “I am under the impression that it has been deemed aspirational.” Irving
360
responds, “Agree, all good.” They do not text again until January 11th.
361
6:37-6:40pm: Terri McCullough and Paul Irving coordinate to call at 6:45pm.
6:52pm: House Sergeant at Arms staffer sends around a CBS tweet, stating that “the
FBI and FAA are looking into a breach of air traffic control frequencies after a threat
362
was made about flying a plane into the Capitol on January 6.
7:07pm: A staffer for Senator Schumer’s Office emails Chief Sund, copying the House
and Senate Sergeants at Arms and McConnell’s staff on the email, requesting guidance
on how to advise Senate Leadership. 363
7:24pm: Chief Sund responds, saying they are investigating, along with federal
364
partners, and they “have no information deeming this as credible.”
7:50pm: Wyndee Parker, Speaker Pelosi’s National Security Advisor, reaches out to
Irving, requesting more information on the aviation threat. Irving responds shortly after,
365
saying he will call her.
8:31pm: A staffer in Senator McConnell’s Office responds to the chain of emails
regarding the aviation threat, saying “I must observe there is collective concern from the
Congressional leadership about learning about this threat reporting from the media
rather than from USCP or SAA. We are also concerned that timely notification may not
have been made to USCP and SAA and are making inquiries with respective federal
agencies. Even if it is not a credible threat, we want to ensure the systems we have in
place are appropriate.” 366
88
APPENDIX
8:55pm: Deputy Chief Sean Gallagher emails House Sergeant at Arms, notifying them
that online groups found maps of the Capitol tunnel system, and they were planning to
find and utilize them to confront members of Congress. Further, there was an uptick in
messaging of “groups intentions of forming a perimeter around the campus . . . from
0600-1000 hours in order to block all MOC’s from getting inside our perimeter to the
Buildings with spots identified for direct action.” 367
9:06pm: In response to the chain of emails between Chief Sund and Senate Leadership
staff, Irving sends a note to a senior HSAA staffer, “The Chief has taken [Architect of the
368
Capitol] Brett [Blanton]’s place. Unbelievable."
9:10pm: AOC Chief Security Officer emails Blanton, informing him of changes being
made to the bike rack perimeter. 369
9:09pm: The senior HSAA staffer responds, “Oh good god. And of course [Senator
McConnell’s staffer] has nothing to do right now except stir everyone up.” 370
9:09pm: Irving forwards the chain of emails between Chief Sund and Senate Leadership
371
staff to Michael Stenger, “Nice Leadership on your side.”
9:12pm: Irving emails the senior HSAA staffer separately, stating, “Just FYI, I briefed Terri,
Jamie and Wyndee. So, they’re all good. They got it before the story broke. Stenger told
me earlier he wasn’t going to tell anyone, and this is the result. I love Mike, but same
story, the SSAA doesn’t get it: brief Leadership in advance of the story” in response to
the senior HSAA staffer’s message.” 372
9:14pm: The senior HSAA staffer responds to Irving, “Exactly though I think [Senator
McConnell’s staffer] would still get spun up.” 373
9:16pm: Paul responds to the senior HSAA staffer’s earlier message, “Yeah, I guess you’re
right. But, at least Stenger doesn’t care, so...who does? Phenomenal!” 374
9:21pm: Blanton responds to Hasberry, saying “Val, This seems absolutely illogical. It
removes a zone of defense. If you find out a logical impetus for the change, let me
know ASAP. I’ll make calls to the board if necessary.” 375
10:29pm: Tim Blodgett emails Paul Irving to inform him that three House security officers
were exposed to COVID-19, and they are unable to get tested until the next day,
meaning they are unavailable for service for January 6. Additionally, this results in their
SCIF being unavailable for January 6. 376
89
APPENDIX
11:37pm: A staffer in Senator McConnell’s Office relays his frustration to Chief Sund on
the lack of forthcoming information on intelligence. He states, “Although it is
encouraging USCP was made aware of this threat reporting last night, it raises more
questions about why the Joint Congressional Leadership only became aware of it
through the news media.” He goes on to request further information as to when both
Sergeants at Arms were notified, why Joint Congressional Leadership were not notified,
and what protocols are in place for sharing such information with Leadership. 377
10:49pm: Tim Blodgett emails Paul Irving, saying the SCIF will be cleaned in time for the
next day. 378
Wednesday, January 6
7:46am: Chief Sund sends a text to the two Sergeants at Arms, saying “MPD reporting
approximately 10,000 already in line for the ellipse event.” The ellipse event was the rally
planned where President Trump would be speaking. This is the only text exchange sent
in the group chat until 8:52pm.379
8:06am: Call from Admiral Brian Monahan for 3 minutes. 380
8:13am: The director of protocol and chamber operations emails Paul Irving to inform
him that Speaker Pelosi’s director of operations “ . . . coordinated with House and
Senate Leadership to agree on recommended [underlined by author] numbers for the
Floor . . . ” and how they plan to control numbers on the Floor. 381
9:00am: A House Sergeant at Arms staffer circulates a map of the permitted
demonstrations around the Capitol for that day. They received the map from USCP
Command Center. This map was initially sent to AOC’s Command Center, Senate
Sergeant at Arms, and House Sergeant at Arms. The map depicts the Capitol
surrounded by five of those protests with another protest by the Russell Senate Office
Building. This is the first time that the map arrives in Irving’s inbox. 382
9:04am: Hasberry responds to Blanton’s email from January 5, saying “The racks were
moved after a meeting with between Paul Irving and Chief Sund. They walked the site
on Monday and the concern by the HSAA was that the House side was not as protected
as the Senate.” She mentions later in the email, “There are several historical factors on
why AOC has not been included in these decisions that I can discuss with you later. I will
383
continue working to improve the coordination and input.
9:10am: Irving receives the “[IICD] Situational Report 01/06/2021.” It includes 25
384
protests, and one protest that is no longer listed on social media.”
90
APPENDIX
9:32am: The director of research and data at the US Sentencing Commission sends a
385
note to Paul, saying “Good luck today. Stay safe.”
9:35am: Call from Chief Sund for 2 minutes. 386
9:45am: USCP liaison in the HSAA office sends to the HSAA office, “USCP responding
to report of individuals with a propane cooker on the North CVC Walkway.” 387
9:50am: the individuals are sent away. 388
9:51am: Speaker Pelosi’s National Security Advisor sends a note to Irving, saying “USCP
notified on Monday but you weren’t notified until late Tuesday afternoon. FBI provided a
very detailed timeline that showed very active USCP engagement on Monday. In fact
USCP was alerted as late as 7 pm Monday. That was good but you as HSAA should have
been given a heads up much earlier.” It is not clear without further context what this
message is referencing, but it appears to be regarding the airplane threat. 389
Irving responds, saying “Definitely agree; I wasn’t notified until Erik briefed me at
about 4 p.m. yesterday. He got notified by the PO, not USCP. The Chief called me
around 6 p.m. to inform me (and I told him that I had just been notified by the PO). I
was unaware that the USCP had the information on Monday. I’ll speak with the
390
Chief about this.”
10:13am: Speaker Pelosi’s National Security Advisor responds, “Thanks. Again the
Monday night and Early Tuesday unclassified timeline FBI laid out to us re: USCP
contact and engagement is extensive.” 391
10:00am: Call to Luke Murry, National Security Advisor for Republican Leader Kevin
McCarthy, for 1 minute (possibly unanswered).392
10:20am: Terri McCullough requests to connect with Irving. Irving says he can meet
“shortly.” 393
394
10:26am: Call to Luke Murry for 10 minutes.
10:32am: Admiral Brian Monahan sends suggested language to Irving, saying “The
Attending Physician has determined that the number of people present on the House
floor is in excess of the predetermined coronavirus risk reduction requirement The [sic]
Attending Physician requires that operations be temporarily paused to permit excess
personnel to leave the House floor at which time operations can be resumed.” 395
10:36am: Irving is alerted that “Radio reports about a black pickup with Trump flags and
reports of a catapult in the bed. They were initially stopped earlier coming over the 14th
Street Bridge and released. USCP stopping the vehicle, I believe at S. Capitol and E.
Streets, SW, out of caution to interview the driver verify what is in fact in the bed of the
truck.” 396 91
APPENDIX
10:48am: Call to Senate Sergeant at Arms Stenger for 6 minutes. 397
HSAA counsel sends language to Irving, “Melding House OGC’s advice and OAP’s
advice” provided at 10:32am. 398
10:50: Irving sends the updated language to Admiral Monahan, adding that he is
consulting the Parliamentarian. 399
10:54am: Admiral Monahan responds, asking “What would be the enforcement
400
mechanisms for noncompliance in response to invoking the statutory authority?”
10:51am: Irving receives a Daily Intelligence Report. There are 26 protests at the Capitol
noted for the day, 17 are explicitly Pro-Trump, 3 are Anti-Trump, and the rest are either
religious or interest-group gatherings appearing to be right-leaning. All the protests
continue to list the likelihood of civil disobedience/arrests ranging from “remote” to
“improbable.” 401
11:01am: HSAA office is alerted that “A group of approximately 200-300 of the “Proud
Boys” is reportedly coming up the Mall, headed toward the Capitol. This group is known
for civil disobedience and occasional outright violence.” 402
11:02am: HSAA staffer forwards to Irving an update from Sean Gallagher of USCP from
11:01am. The update was sent to staffers from House and Senate Sergeants at Arms. It
includes the following:
"Our intelligence assessment that we sent on Monday stands as accurate for today.
We have been inundated with posts from social media showing pictures of
weapons, anti-Congress and anti-police statements. We have given all of our
operational teams the most updated information for their situational awareness. We
have all hands on deck for USCP and all of our teams are operational.”
“This entire crowd will be marching to the Capitol at the conclusion of POTUS’
speech. Almost every speaker so far has engaged the crowd to “get up to the
Capitol” or “Let’s go storm the Capitol” as soon as the event is over. Numerous
subjects are wearing body armor, ballistic helmets, military grade backpacks and
carrying radio equipment. Our partner agents will be assisting with this massive
march to the Capitol and our SOD and CDU teams are aware of the march. It is
anticipated that POTUS will arrive somewhere after 1100/1130 and depart at 1215.
The crowd would start marching after that to the Capitol.” 403
11:05am: Irving forwards the question about enforcement from Admiral Monahan to his
staff. 404
11:06am: HSAA counsel responds with a link to US Code, saying that quarantine
405
violators will be subject to a fine, imposed by the House Sergeant at Arms.
92
APPENDIX
11:11am: HSAA office is alerted that “‘Proud Boys’ group has arrived to Capitol grounds.
They are lining up by the Reflecting Pool at the moment.” 406
11:12am: Irving responds to Admiral Monahan, saying “I’ll check with the Parliamentarian
and attorneys, but the enforcement mechanism would probably be recessing subject to
the call of the chair (to clear and clean the chamber and re-establish the appropriate
407
number).”
11:13am: HSAA is alerted that “USCP responding to reports of a disruptive individual on
the Senate Egg.” 408
409
11:19am: HSAA is alerted that “‘Proud Boys’ group has taken Garfield Circle.”
410
11:20am: Admiral Monahan responds, saying “Thanks.”
11:25am: HSAA is alerted that “‘Proud Boys’ walking up SW Drive.” 411
11:34am: HSAA is alerted that “‘Proud Boys’ also walking up Constitution toward the East
Front. They and other groups are converging on the East Front at this time.” 412
12:06pm: Call from Irving to Admiral Monahan for 1 minute (possibly unanswered). 413
12:13pm: Irving emails Brian Monahan that “Terri [McCullough] does not want us to use
the “Q” word, so we’re going to soften it. Please call when you get a moment. Thanks.”
The “Q” word in question is quarantine. 414
12:16-12:17pm: There is confusion between the House General Counsel, Douglas Letter,
and HSAA office whether Admiral Monahan signed a quarantine order. Speaker Pelosi’s
staff is consulted for clarification over email. 415
12:19pm: HSAA is alerted for the first time of a breach to the fence. “USCP responding
to the communications tower area near 2nd and Constitution NW. A group of
demonstrators has breached the fence in order to use the porta-potty.” 416
12:19pm: Terri McCullough, Speaker Pelosi’s Chief of Staff, responds to the question of
whether the Attending Physician signed a quarantine order, simply saying “no.” 417
12:23pm: Staffer in HSAA emails Irving, Admiral Monahan and HSAA counsel with new
418
proposed language for what to say in the event of a capacity issue on the House Floor.
12:26pm: Speaker Pelosi’s National Security Advisor forwards a tweet to Paul Irving,
saying “Trump announces he’s going to Capitol Hill this afternoon. “We are going to
cheer on our brave senators and congressmen and women. We’re probably not going to
be cheering for some of them . . . ” 419
12:27pm: Irving forwards this email to his deputy.420
12:27pm: Irving responds, saying “Thanks; have NOT heard this, I’ll contact USSS off-
line and see what I can find out.” 421
93
APPENDIX
12:27pm: A staffer in Senator Schumer’s office sends a message to Chief Sund with
House and Senate Leadership staffers from both sides of the aisle and the two
Sergeants at Arms, requesting crowd estimates.422
Chief Sund responds, “Looks like a couple thousand on Capitol grounds and a very
large event down at the Ellipse and Washington Monument Grounds. We are
currently monitoring several thousand marching down Pennsylvania Avenue towards
the Capitol now.” 423
12:30pm: Call from Terri McCullough for 1 minute (possibly unanswered).424
12:32pm: HSAA is alerted for the first time of a taser being heard (but unconfirmed) at
the Senate Egg. 425
12:33pm: Call to Terri McCullough for 2 minutes.426
12:44pm: HSAA is alerted that “POTUS speech has concluded. Groups are headed our
way. The group currently walking up Penn Ave is estimated to be 10,000.” 427
12:45pm: Chief Sund emails Brett Blanton, Michael Stenger, and Paul Irving that “The
President has completed his speech at the Ellipse and the large group at the event is
428
preparing to march to the Capitol.”
12:45 pm Irving calls Chief Sund for 1 minute (possibly unanswered). 429
12:47pm: HSAA is alerted to a radio report “of a suspicious package behind the RNC”
that initial reports say is “a black pipe ‘bomb looking’ device with timer/wires attached
to it.” 430
12:57pm: HSAA is alerted that “Group has pushed through the bike racks on the West
Front from Peace and Garfield. Grounds only. Locking down South Door, Law Library
Door, North Door, Lower Terrace Door out of precaution.” 431
12:58pm: Call to Chief Sund for 1 minute (possibly unanswered). 432
12:59pm: HSAA staffer messages Irving, saying “barricades are breached. Protesters are
approaching the inaugural stand,” “UsCp [sic] are engaging,” and “Protesters holding at
base of stand but have accessed press platform.” Shortly after, she texts him about a
medical incident at West Dome, and “Will communicate further on other device.” She
433
then states, “I have your things snd [sic] secured your office.”
1:01pm: HSAA is alerted that “Demonstrators starting to swarm the Inaugural stage. Not
434
compliant. Calling all available hands to Upper West Terrace to an elevated position.”
1:02pm: HSAA is alerted that the Madison Building is being evacuated due to the bomb
435
threat.
94
APPENDIX
1:08pm: HSAA staffer send Irving a note, saying “Protesters now on press risers talk of
using less lethal.” 436
437
1:09pm: HSAA is alerted to reports of a bomb threat at DNC.
1:12pm: HSAA is alerted that the Cannon House Office Building is being evacuated due
to the bomb threat. 438
1:15pm: HSAA staff receives from IICD a tweet by a Washington Post journalist, saying
“Protestors are charging toward the Captiol [sic] steps. Some tried to scale the
construction structures and have been tackled by police. They want to enter the building
439
and are making attempts at intervals. Capitol police trying to hold them back.”
1:16pm: A staffer in Senator Schumer’s office requests an update from Chief Sund on
whether the President is coming to the Hill, and whether folks have broken through the
440
barricade.
1:21pm: HSAA staff are told that USCP and MPD are holding the line at the Lower West
441
Terrace on the West Front.”
1:25pm: A staffer in Senator McConnell’s office requests information on the evacuation
of Madison and Cannon.442
Senator Schumer’s staffer responds with a tweet, saying “Trump supporters have
breached the Capitol building, tearing down 4 layers of security fencing and are
443
attempting to occupy the building — fighting federal police who are overrun.”
1:28pm: Call from Chief Sund for 3 minutes. 444
445
1:30pm: Call from Don Kellaher from the House Sergeant at Arms office for 2 minutes.
1:32pm: Call to Jamie Fleet for 1 minute (possibly unanswered).446
1:33pm: Irving texts Jamie Fleet, saying, “Tried to call with an update. Call anytime.” 447
1:33pm: Jamie Fleet returns call for 1 minute (possibly unanswered or ended early due to
next call).448
1:33pm: HSAA staff are alerted that “Individuals throwing projectiles and arguing with
449
officers on the line.
1:34pm: Call from Chief Sund for 1 minute (possibly unanswered).450
1:37pm: HSAA staff are alerted that “Demonstrators deploying some kind of flash-bangs
or smoke bombs down on the LWT. Not sure of the specific nature of the smoke from the
cameras yet.” 451
1:39pm: Chief Sund responds to the chain email with Stenger, Irving, and the Senate
and House staffers, saying “Cannon will be doing internal relocations. Madison
452
evacuating due to suspicious package.”
95
APPENDIX
1:40pm: HSAA staff are told that USCP is calling for a decontamination tent to be set
up. 453
1:43pm: A HSAA staffer emails Irving to tell him protestors are “tearing down
scaffolding.” 454
455
1:45pm: The same staffer informs him that there is a large breach to the East Front.
1:45pm: Call from Chief Sund for 4 minutes. 456
1:49pm: Two calls with Terri McCullough for 3 minutes.457
1:50pm: HSAA staff are informed that a “Shelter in Place” notice for the House Office
458
Buildings is about to be issued.”
1:51pm: HSAA staff are informed that “Demonstrators starting [sic] to mount the stairs
toward the Upper West Terrace.” 459
1:51pm: Back-to-back 1-minute calls with Blodgett. 460
2:00 – 2:07 pm Two calls to HSAA and two calls from Chief Sund. It appears the calls
461
from Sund went unanswered.
2:00pm: HSAA staff are informed that “Demonstrators how [sic] breaching the East
462
Front. Capitol is going to be placed in lockdown shortly.”
2:08pm: HSAA staff are informed that “Demonstrators flooded the East Steps en masse
and are attempting to enter the Rotunda Door. Demonstrators also on the West steps
463
trying to enter the LWT Door.”
2:09pm: HSAA staff are informed that the “Campus is on full lockdown.” 464
465
2:14pm: Call from Jamie Fleet for 1 minute (possibly unanswered).
2:14pm: Brian Ebert from U.S. Secret Service texts Irving, saying, “Wanted you to know
that Director has reached out to Sund to offer any/all Service support. SAs and officers
rolling now.” Irving responds shortly after, “Thank you. We’ve been breached and could
use the help.” 466
467
2:15pm: Call from Blodgett for 2 minutes.
2:20pm: HSAA staff are informed that reinforcements are gearing up.468
469
2:22pm: Call from Sean Gallagher for 4 minutes.
2:25pm: HSAA staff are informed that “…we have essentially lost our exterior perimeter.
Units being called inside the Capitol. MPD and other LE assets maintaining presence
470
outside. HDS detonating both the packages at the DNC and RNC.”
2:27pm: Call from Stenger for 4 minutes. 471
2:30pm: Call from Terri McCullough for 1 minute (possibly unanswered). 472
2:31pm: Both Chambers being evacuated. Tear gas being deployed at the Rotunda
Door. 473
96
APPENDIX
474
2:34pm: Call from Kim Campbell from the House Sergeant at Arms office for 2 minutes.
2:39pm: HSAA staff are informed that “Demonstrators are attempting to enter the
475
House Chamber.”
477
2:44pm: HSAA staff are informed that “Shots fired on the House Floor.”
2:51pm: Call to Stenger for 1 minute (possibly unanswered).478
2:53pm: HSAA staff are informed that there are “reports of officer down in the Dirksen
subway.” 479
2:57pm: Call from Jamie Fleet for 1 minute (possibly unanswered). 480
2:57pm: Call from Kim Campbell for 2 minutes. 481
3:02pm: Call from Kim Campbell for 1 minute (possibly unanswered). 482
3:08pm: Irving texts Jamie Fleet, saying, “No text, please re-send.” Fleet responds,
“Didn’t go thru” and “So command center is saying guard on the way?” Irving responds,
“Yes, they indicate the.National [sic] Guard is on the way.” After some confusion, Irving
says, “They are en route. I’m told some leadership from the NG have shown up at the
USCP Command Post but not the troops yet.” 484
3:09pm: Call to Bob Dohr, Chief Operations Officer for the House Sergeant at Arms for
2 minutes. 485
486
3:26pm: Call to Bob Dohr for 2 minutes.
487
3:27pm: Call from Stenger for 1 minute (possibly unanswered).
3:28pm: Call from Jamie Fleet for 2 minutes.488
3:30pm: Call to Bob Dohr for 1 minute (possibly unanswered).489
490
3:31pm: Call to Jamie Fleet for 2 minutes.
3:36pm: Call to Bob Dohr for 2 minutes.492
3:55pm: HSAA staff are informed that “CNN reporting that the protestors breached the
Speaker’s Office.” 495
4:02pm: A staffer for Rep. Tim Ryan on the Appropriations, Legislative Branch
Subcommittee emails leadership of HSAA, USCP, Clerk’s office, Speaker Pelosi’ office,
and House Administration’s Democratic staff that “All video of today’s events needs to
be preserved, and after the protestors are removed, an investigation needs to begin
496
immediately.”
97
APPENDIX
4:09pm: Call from Chief Sund for 4 minutes.497
4:13pm: Call to Stenger for 2 minutes.498
4:28pm: Call from unknown number ending in 2911 for 10 minutes. 702 area code
(Fairfax, VA).499
4:32pm: Jamie Fleet texts Irving to say, “when it’s safe to do if drew [sic] and I can get
a look in the chamber that would be helpful” followed by “only when it’s safe to do so”
and “Drew and I are outside [the Committee on House Administration’s main office] for
whoever wants to get us. Thank you.” Irving responds, “Officers en route”, “Are you be
[sic] route yet?”, “En route?” Fleet affirms they are on their way. 500
4:33pm: Jamie Fleet opens a group chat between Paul Irving, Erik Speranza (HSAA), and
himself, asking for estimates on how long it will take for various locations to again be
operational.501
4:34pm: An update to the HSAA staff notes that most of the Capitol is cleared of
demonstrators and the House Chamber is secured. 502
4:41pm: Call to Jamie Fleet for 1 minute (possibly unanswered). 503
504
4:46pm: Call to Don Kellaher for 5 minutes.
4:56pm: Call from Chief Sund for 2 minutes.505
5:08pm: HSAA staff are informed that “CDU assets are preparing to push demonstrators
down the West Front steps. [USCP Deputy Chief] Eric Waldow also just called for a
platoon to try to re-establish an East Front perimeter.” 506
5:18pm: Call from Sund for 3 minutes. 507
5:19pm: HSAA Counsel texts Irving to inform him that “[Representative Rodney] Davis has
508
indicated a desire to inspect the chamber, if possible.”
5:21pm: Call to Erik Speranza for 2 minutes. 509
5:30pm: Erik Speranza texts Irving, requesting to set up a call between Cheryl Johnson,
the Clerk of the House, Catherine Szpindor, the Chief Administrative Officer of the
House, and him. 511
5:44pm: Call to Chief Sund for 5 minutes.512
5:41pm: Calls (2) from Chief Sund lasting 5 minutes. 513
5:57pm: “National Guard is on the West Front assisting with pushing the perimeter back
to at least 1st Street. East Front perimeter mostly re-established at this time. Capitol
Building interior has been confirmed CLEAR of demonstrators. Both Chambers being
inspected right now for damage and to determine whether we will reconvene on-site or
possibly at the alternate location. We should have that information within an hour.” 514
98
APPENDIX
6:12pm: Call from Emily Berret (Speaker’s then-Director of Operations) for 9 minutes. 516
6:13pm: Call to Sund for 8 minutes (this was a 3-way phone call with Berret).517
518
6:22pm: Call to Stenger for 2 minutes.
6:23pm: Brian Ebert, Chief of Staff of the US Secret Service, messages Irving to let him
know that “the Service has been getting pinged by Executive Branch leadership about
assisting you with erecting fencing around perimeter of Capitol [sic]” and offers to
“support in any way.” 519
6:29pm: HSAA staff are alerted that “Perimeter has been pushed back to the 1st Streets,
between Independence and Constitution. USCP conducting exterior sweeps at this
520
time. House Egg/SE Drive are clear.”
6:30pm: Call to Jamie Fleet for 2 minutes. 521
6:32pm: Call from Stenger for 1 minute (possibly unanswered).522
524
6:42pm: Call to Stenger for 2 minutes.
6:53pm: Call to Terri McCullough for 2 minutes. 525
526
6:59pm: Assistant Sergeant at Arms sends to Irving language for reconvening the House.
7:10pm: Irving sends his first email since 12:37pm. It is an email to Jamie Fleet with plans
on how to reconvene the House, along with the language from the Assistant Sergeant at
Arms. 527
528
7:22pm: Call to Jamie Fleet for 2 minutes.
7:25pm: Call to Jen Daulby, Republican Staff Director of the Committee on House
529
Administration, for 2 minutes.
7:25pm: Irving emails Terri McCullough and Jamie Fleet to inform them that “The Capitol
is secure and we can resume activity in the Chamber at your discretion.” 530
7:29pm: McCullough responds to say, “Paul we need to talk to you about limiting
members on the floor for the remainder of the proceedings.” 531
7:57 – 8:22pm: Calls (3) with Sund totaling 8 minutes. 532
8:37pm: Call from Stenger for 2 minutes.533
8:41pm: Call from Brian Monahan for 2 minutes.534
8:52pm: Chief Sund texts the two Sergeants at Arms to say “MPD went to 12 hour shift
and all days off cancelled.” 535
99
APPENDIX
9:46pm: HSAA counsel forwards an article of statements made by prominent
Democrats, including Rep. Tim Ryan saying “there were some strategic mistakes from
the very beginning” and “I think it’s pretty clear that there’s going to be a number of
people who are going to be without employment very, very soon.” 536
10:09pm: The Capitol Police Board executive assistant emails the members of the
Capitol Police Board to inform them that they need to sign two Board Orders for
approval. One is an emergency order beginning at 6:00pm on January 6 to be in place
for 48 hours. The other is a curfew for the building, beginning at 6:00pm on January 6
537
until 6:00am on January 22nd.
10:21pm: Jamie Fleet requests of Irving, “Can you come to floor?” Irving does not
respond. 538
10:48pm: Call to Stenger for 6 minutes.539
11:06pm: Michael Stenger says, “ok,” in response to the CPB orders. 540
11:12pm: HSAA staffer approves CPB orders on behalf of Paul Irving.541
11:23pm: AOC staffer approves CPB orders on behalf of J. Brett Blanton.542
11:27pm: Call from Ted Daniel for 1 minute (possibly unanswered).543
11:33pm: Republican staff director of the Committee on House Administration emails
Irving to request follow-up on a man who claimed he was in the building who witnessed
Ashli Babbitt’s shooting and was conducting the interview from his hotel room.544
11:58pm: HSAA staffer responds, saying they have forwarded to MPD. 545
11:58pm: USCP General Counsel emails the HSAA staffer, saying a recent call was
“Brutal. Ryan is furious. Sen. Murphy less so but not happy.” 546
Thursday, January 7
3:41am: Chief Sund sends to the members of the Capitol Police Board a draft statement
regarding the events of January 6. 547
7:16am: AOC staffer emails HSAA staff to let them know that they are conducting a full
assessment of the damage caused by January 6. 548
9:13am: Wyndee Parker, Speaker Pelosi’s National Security Advisor emails Irving, saying
“Paul, I hope you are hanging in there. Lots to discuss. An item for right now: Pls ensure
that rigorous ID checks are being done today. We are getting reports from people
entering the plaza and building that it isn’t happening this morning.” 549
9:19am: Terri McCullough emails Irving to ask if his team has been in touch with
Transportation Security Administration for enhanced security for members traveling to
550
their districts.”
100
APPENDIX
10:49am: Chief Sund circulates to all Capitol Police Board members the US Capitol
551
Police statement on January 6 for their review.
11:17am: A HSAA staffer emails Irving to let him know that Jamie Fleet “is looking for
arrest number comparisons for other Capitol grounds protests especially BLM protests.”
Irving responds, inquiring if USCP is handling it. 552
11:31am: Irving forwards Wyndee Parker’s request for “rigorous ID checks” to Chief Sund,
saying, “please ensure ID checks are happening.” Chief Sund agrees to the request
shortly after. 553
4:10pm: Following the announcement of Irving’s resignation, a HSAA staffer sends him
an email frustrated by the events from January 6 and the fallout, stating:
“For the Speaker’s knee-jerk reaction to yesterday’s unprecedented event (and God
knows how Congress lives for its knee-jerk reactions and to hell with future
consequences . . . ). To immediately call for your resignation . . . after you have
been denied again and again by Appropriations for proper security outfitting of the
Capitol (and I WROTE several of those testimonies, dangit) . . . and to blame you
personally because our department was doing the best they could with what they
had and our comparatively small department size and limited officer resources . . .
and because other agencies stepped in to assist just a fraction too late . . . again,
for Congress to demand your resignation is spectacularly unjust, unfair, and
unwarranted. This is not your fault. Or Sund’s fault. If anything, Appropriations
should be hung out to dry. (In fact, our biggest Approps whiner [I will not name
names, but you know who I mean] is now demanding a personal escort to and from
her DC residence to the Capitol and to the airport and anywhere else she wants to
go). Frankly, you would have been damn well within your rights to authorize lethal
force as soon as the Capitol Doors were breached. But the point may be made that,
of the two evils, we chose to protect human lives in the end. And the Capitol is still
standing. A little worse for wear, maybe . . . but still standing. THAT is a successful
day, in my book.” 554
6:07pm: Irving sends an updated security notice to be sent out from his office to House
offices, to Jamie Fleet for his review.555
A HSAA staffer texts Irving a link to a tweet with footage of USCP officers allowing
protesters through the East gate. Irving responds, “Not surprising. They breached too
fast.” 556
101
APPENDIX
Following a message of condolence from a friend, Irving responds, “Please know that I’m
fine. I’m so at peace with my career and the decisions we made last night. You know
this town, you live by the sword, you die by the sword." 557
Responding to a message of condolence, Irving says, “These high profile DC jobs have
their pros and cons. And this is one of the cons. Taking the hit; so it goes. I’m at peace
with my career and life, and I feel we made all the right decisions at the time.” 558
Friday, January 8
Irving texts with a HSAA staffer, expresses frustration with the USCP officers who let
protestors into the building, saying “the video of the officers letting the protesters in
absolutely outrageous [sic] me.” He goes on to say, “It’s incredulous. I just don’t trust the
USCP anymore. Not my issues now, but beware. Either incompetence or blatant
sympathy to Trump.” 559
In response to a message of condolence, Irving states, “This is worthy of another Waco
Review: much behind the scenes.” Irving’s friend responds, “Paul, you are so right; this is
worthy of another Waco review; my instincts tell me I need to read between the lines!” 560
Sunday, January 10
Wyndee Parker, Speaker Pelosi’s National Security Advisor, texts Irving, saying, “Pls check
you [sic] email. It’s tonight’s Washington Post article. You are prominently featured.” In
the records we received, this is the only time she reached out to him via text between
August 12th, 2020 and January 10th, 2021. 561
Irving texts Chief Sund, saying, “Please call when you’re available; just want to sync with
562
press strategy” and “Just read the Post article. Please no worries from me.”
Wednesday, January 13
A friend of Irving’s sends him a message of condolence, saying, “You’re quite something
to take this one for the team, Paul, as they say. I know how these things work and you
know I do, too.” 563
102
APPENDIX
564
Appendix B: Organizational Chart of Relevant Entities
103
ENDNOTES
1. See Examining the U.S. Capitol Attack, A Review of the Security, Planning, and
Response Failure on January 6, S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Gov’t Affairs & S.
Comm on Rules and Administration (June 8, 2021),
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-media/peters-portman-klobuchar-
blunt-release-bipartisan-report-investigating-january-6th-capitol-attack [hereinafter
“Senate Report”].
2. Jenna McLaughlin, Exclusive: Jan. 6 select committee will include former CIA inspector
general found to have retaliated against whistleblower, Yahoo News (July 23, 2021).
3. 3 U.S.C. §1.
4. 3 U.S.C. §6.
5. See Jacqueline Aleman, et al., Red Flags, Washington Post (Oct. 31, 2021),
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/interactive/2021/warnings-jan-6-insurrection/; see
also Transcribed Interview of USCP sources.
6. See Jacqueline Aleman, et al., Red Flags, Washington Post (Oct. 31, 2021),
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/interactive/2021/warnings-jan-6-insurrection/.
7. On December 17, 2020, the FBI shared a memorandum with U.S. Capitol Police that an
online post encouraged protesters to shoot police on January 6, 2021. Red Flags,
Washington Post (Oct. 31, 2021),
8. Id.
9. Jacqueline Aleman, et al., Red Flags, Washington Post (Oct. 31, 2021),
10. Jacqueline Aleman, et al., Red Flags, Washington Post (Oct. 31, 2021),
11. Id.
12. Paul Sonne, Peter Hermann and Missy Ryan, Pentagon placed limits on D.C. Guard
ahead of pro-Trump protests due to narrow mission, Washington Post (Jan. 27, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/trump-protests-washington-
guard-military/2021/01/07/c5299b56-510e-11eb-b2e8-3339e73d9da2_story.html.
13. Id.
14. Transcribed Interview of USCP source.
15. Kat Lonsdorf et al, A timeline of how the Jan. 6 attack unfolded – including who said
what and when, NPR (Jan 5, 2022), https://www.npr.org/2022/01/05/1069977469/a-
timeline-of-how-the-jan-6-attack-unfolded-including-who-said-what-and-when.
104
ENDNOTES
16. Scott Macfarlane & Cassidy McDonald, January 6 timeline: Key moments from the
attack on the Capitol, CBS News (Jan. 7, 2022), https://www.cbsnews.com/live-
updates/january-6-capitol-riot-timeline-key-moments/.
17. Id.
18. Id.
what and when, NPR (Jan. 5, 2022), https://www.npr.org/2022/01/05/1069977469/a-
21. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
26. Id.
27. Kayleigh McEnany 45 Archived, @PressSec45, Twitter (Jan. 6, 2021, 3:36 PM).
29. Bill Establishing the United States Capitol Police, History, Art & Archives, U.S. House of
Representatives, https://history.house.gov/HouseRecord/Detail/25769816242?
current_search_qs=%3FPreviousSearch%3DSearch%252cAll%252c%252c%252cTitle%26
CurrentPage%3D1%26SortOrder%3DTitle%26Command%3DNext.
30. Press Release, S. Comm. on Legislative Branch, H. Comm. on Appropriations, Chair
Ryan Statement on U.S. Capitol Police FY 2022 Budget Hearing (Mar. 3, 2021),
https://appropriations.house.gov/news/statements/chair-ryan-statement-on-us-capitol-
police-fy-2022-budget-hearing.
105
ENDNOTES
31. Traffic Regulations for the United States Capitol Grounds 238 (amended Feb. 17, 2019),
https://www.uscp.gov/sites/uscapitolpolice.house.gov/files/wysiwyg_uploaded/US%20
Capitol%20Grounds%20Traffic%20Regulations_Amended%20February%202019.pdf.The
Long Arm of the U.S. Capitol Police by First Branch Forecast was helpful in gathering
information for this section. https://firstbranchforecast.com/2019/08/07/the-long-arm-
of-the-u-s-capitol-police/.
32. Stephen W. Stathis & Paul E. Dwyer, Cong. Research Serv., RL30861, Capitol Hill
Security: Recent Actions and Organizational Responsibilities
(2004),https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20040203_RL30861_0bb95752db6320d95
5eec51b7d9895e9cd78c083.pdf.
33. Id.
34. Jonathan Allen, Jake Sherman & Molly Ball, Giffords shooting sparks national debate,
Politico (Jan. 8, 2011),https://www.politico.com/story/2011/01/giffords-shooting-sparks-
national-debate-047244.
35. Ewen MacAskill, US Congress security to be reviewed after Gabrielle Giffords
shooting, The Guardian (Jan. 9,
2011),https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/09/us-congress-security-review-
giffords-shooting.
36. Camila Domonoske, What We Know About The Suspect In GOP Baseball Practice
Shooting, NPR (June 14, 2017),https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2017/06/14/532921612/what-we-know-about-the-suspect-in-gop-baseball-
practice-shooting.
37. U.S. Capitol Police, Office of the Inspector General, Review of Intelligence and
Interagency Coordination Division Processes and Procedures Surrounding the Protection of
Member Events 2022-I-004 3 (May 2022).
38. Chris Marquette, Katherine Tully-McManus & Jennifer Shutt, Mob fallout: Pelosi calls for
Capitol Police chief to be fired; house SAA to resign, Roll Call (Jan. 7, 2021),
https://rollcall.com/2021/01/07/mob-fallout-pelosi-calls-for-capitol-police-chief-to-be-
fired-house-saa-to-resign/.
39. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-17-112, Capitol Police Board: Fully Incorporating
Leading Governance Practices Would Help Enhance Accountability, Transparency, and
External Communications 13 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-17-112.pdf. [2017
GAO Report]
106
ENDNOTES
40. Pub. L. No. 117-77, § 3, 135 Stat. 1523.
41. 2017 GAO Report.
42. Id. at 5-6.
43. Id. at 2.
44. Jennifer Yachnin, GAO Calls for Overseers’ Input on Police Staffing Plan, Roll Call, July
15, 2003, https://rollcall.com/2003/07/15/gao-calls-for-overseers-input-on-police-
staffing-plan/.
45. Id.
46. 2017 GAO Report at 8.
47. Id. at 8-9.
48. 2017 GAO Report.
49. Id. at 14
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 43.
54. Id. at 51.
55. Reforming The Capitol Police And Improving Accountability For The Capitol Police
Board, Hearing before the H. Comm. on House Administration, 117th Cong. (2021),
https://cha.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/reforming-capitol-police-and-
improving-accountability-capitol-police.
56. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-17-112, Capitol Police Board: Fully Incorporating
Leading Governance Practices Would Help Enhance Accountability, Transparency, and
External Communications (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-17-112.pdf.
57. Press Conference by Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House (https://www.c-
span.org/video/?517842-1/house-speaker-weekly-briefing)
58. House rule II clause 3(a) and 3(c).
59. The Latest: Pelosi wants fines for bypassing House security, AP (Jan. 13, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-politics-adam-kinzinger-liz-cheney-
impeachments-2a2431b25720b8815727d4e2fe4e9062.
60. Cristina Marcos, Pelosi announces lawmakers will be fined $5,000 if they bypass metal
detectors to House floor, The Hill (Jan. 13, 2021),
https://thehill.com/homenews/house/534165-pelosi-announces-lawmakers-will-be-
fined-if-they-bypass-metal-detectors-to/.
107
ENDNOTES
61. Claudia Grisales, Capitol Police are Upping Security Ahead of A Rally In Support Of
The Jan. 6 Rioters, NPR (Sept. 13, 2021),
https://www.npr.org/2021/09/13/1036700856/the-u-s-capitol-police-will-reinstall-
fencing-ahead-of-a-far-right-rally.
62. Id.
63. Rebecca Shabad, Pelosi tasks retired Lt. Gen. Russel Honore with leading review of
Capitol security, NBC News (Jan. 15, 2021),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/pelosi-tasks-retired-lt-gen-russel-honor-
leading-review-capitol-n1254421.
64. See Appendix.
65. See generally Texts from documents received by the Committee on House
Administration, Minority Staff from House Sergeant at Arms on January 28, 2022.
66. Id.
67. Re: Plans for January 3 and 6, Email dated December 11, 2020, from documents
produced to the Minority Staff of the Committee on House Administration from the House
Sergeant at Arms on January 28, 2022.
68. Id.
69. See generally Emails from documents produced to the Minority Staff of the Committee
on House Administration from the House Sergeant at Arms on January 28, 2022.
70. Id.
71.See generally Emails from documents produced to the Minority Staff of the Committee
72. HOB order, Emails dated December 15, 2020, from documents produced to the
Minority Staff of the Committee on House Administration from the House Sergeant at Arms
on January 28, 2022.
73. Text Messages dated December 15, 2020, from documents produced to the Minority
Staff of the Committee on House Administration from the House Sergeant at Arms on
January 28, 2022.
74. Id.
75. FW: eDC Wednesday January 6 (First Draft), Email dated January 3, 2021, from
documents produced to the Minority Staff of the Committee on House Administration from
the House Sergeant at Arms on January 28, 2022.
76. Id.
77. Id.
108
ENDNOTES
78. See generally Emails from documents produced to the Minority Staff of the Committee
79. meeting with Chairperson Lofgren, Email dated January 4, 2021, from documents
80. Id.
81. Text Message dated January 4, 2021, from documents produced to the Minority Staff of
the Committee on House Administration from the House Sergeant at Arms on January 28,
2022.
82. Draft - Dear Colleague re Security Information for January 6 Joint Session, Email dated
January 4, 2021, from documents produced to the Minority Staff of the Committee on
House Administration from the House Sergeant at Arms on January 28, 2022.
83. RE: Draft - Dear Colleague re Security Information for January 6 Joint Session, Email
dated January 4, 2021, from documents produced to the Minority Staff of the Committee
84. Id.
85. Text Message dated January 4th, 2021, from documents produced to the Minority Staff
of the Committee on House Administration from the House Sergeant at Arms on January
28, 2022.
86. Id.
87. Draft notification, Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents produced to the
88. Id.
89. RE: Draft notification, Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents produced to the
90. See generally Phone records from documents produced to the Minority Staff of the
Committee on House Administration from the House Sergeant at Arms on January 28,
2022.
91. Id.
92. Mark Mazzetti & Luke Broadwater, The Lost House: How Confusion and Inaction at the
Capitol Delayed a Troop Deployment, NYT (Feb. 21, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/21/us/politics/capitol-riot-security-delays.html.
93. Id.
109
ENDNOTES
94. See generally Phone records from documents produced to the Minority Staff of the
2022.
95. Id.
96. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-22-105001, Capitol Attack: The Capitol Police Need
Clearer Emergency Procedures and a Comprehensive Security Risk Assessment Process 26,
(2022).
97. See Task Force 1-6, Capitol Security Review (March 5, 2021).
98. Letter from Steve Sund, Former Chief of Police, U.S. Capitol Police, Nancy Pelosi,
Speaker, House of Representatives, (Feb. 1, 2021).
99. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, Review of DOD’s Role,
Responsibilities, and Actions to Prepare for and Respond to the Protest and Its Aftermath
at the U.S. Capitol Campus on January 6, 2021 26 (Nov. 16, 2021).
100. Id. at 27.
101. One follow up question., Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents produced to
the Minority Staff of the Committee on House Administration from the House Sergeant at
Arms on January 28, 2022.
102. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-22-104829, Capitol Attack: Additional Actions
Needed to Better Prepare Capitol Police Officers for Violent Demonstrations 47 (2022).
103. Id. at 49.
104. U.S. Capitol Police, Office of the Inspector General, Review of the Events Surrounding
the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol, Flash Report: Command and
Coordination Bureau 13 (July 30, 2021).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Text Messages dated December 9, 2020, from documents produced to the Minority
January 28, 2022.
108. Re: FYI: [Space Redacted] Issue, Email dated December 11, 2020, from documents
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Text Message dated December 17, 2020, from documents produced to the Minority
January 28, 2022. 110
ENDNOTES
January 28, 2022.
113. FW: Law Enforcement Partners Meeting, Email dated December 18, 2020, from
114. PI Calendar for Tuesday, January 5, 2021, Email dated January 5, 2021, from
115. Text Messages dated January 5, 2021, from documents produced to the Minority Staff
28, 2022.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Text Message dated January 11, 2021, from documents produced to the Minority Staff
28, 2022.
119. Tweet by CBS Evening News on Twitter, Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents
120. CBS reporting re: plane being flown into the Capitol Building tomorrow., Email dated
121. Re: CBS reporting re: plane being flown into the Capitol Building tomorrow., Email
122. Re: What is going on?, Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents produced to the
123. Id.
111
ENDNOTES
125. Fwd: Interest in Tunnels Leading to the US Capitol, Email dated January 5, 2021, from
128. Fwd: CBS reporting re: plane being flown into the Capitol Building tomorrow., Email
130. Id.
Clearer Emergency Procedures and a Comprehensive Security Risk Assessment Process, 26
(2022).
Clearer Emergency Procedures and a Comprehensive Security Risk Assessment Process, 26
(2022).
133. Transcribed Interview of USCP Chief Tom Manger.
137. See United States Capitol Police Office of the Inspector General, Review of the
Events Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol, Flash Report: Civil
Disturbance Unit and Intelligence, (March 31, 2021).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
Needed to Better Prepare Capitol Police Officers for Violent Demonstrations, (2022).
112
ENDNOTES
143. Task Force 1-6, Capitol Security Review 5 (March 5, 2021).
Needed to Better Prepare Capitol Police Officers for Violent Demonstrations, (2022); Task
Force 1-6, Capitol Security Review 5 (2021).
148. Transcribed Interview of USCP source. (emphasis added)
149. United States Capitol Police Office of the Inspector General, Review of the Events
Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol, Flash Report: Operational
Planning and Intelligence, (March 1, 2021).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol, Flash Report: Civil
Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol, Flash Report: Operational
Planning and Intelligence, (March 1, 2021).
156. Id.
Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol, Flash Report: Civil
158. Id.
Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol, Flash Report: Command
and Coordination Bureau, (July 30, 2021).
113
ENDNOTES
179. Transcribed Interview of Julie Farnam.
192. U.S. Capitol Police, Office of the Inspector General, Review of the Events Surrounding
the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol, Flash Report: Civil Disturbance Unit and
Intelligence, 2021-I-003-B 23-24 (March 2021).
193. U.S. Capitol police, Office of the Inspector General, Review of Intelligence and
Interagency Coordination Division Processes and Procedures Surrounding the Protection of
Member Events 2022-I-004 11-12 (May 2022).
114
ENDNOTES
218. Intelligence & Interagency Coordination Div., U.S. Capitol Police, Special Event
Assessment, 21-A0468 (Dec. 16, 2020).
219. Id.
222. Intelligence & Interagency Coordination Div., U.S. Capitol Police, Investigative
Research And Analysis Report, 21-TD-159 (Dec. 21, 2020).
223. Id.
224. See Senate Report.
225. Senate Report at 41.
226. Id. at 40.
227. Id. at 41.
115
ENDNOTES
231. See Letter from Anonymous Whistleblower, U.S. Capitol Police, to Nancy P. Pelosi,
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, Chuck Schumer, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,
Kevin McCarthy, Minority Leader, U.S. House of Representatives, Mitch McConnell, Minority
Leader, U.S. Senate (Sept. 28, 2021),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/21080866-letter#document/p4/a2059186;
see also Transcribed Interview of USCP Source.
Assessment, 21-A0468 V.3 (Jan. 3, 2021).
235. Id.
236. USCP OIG FLASH REPORT 2, at 26.
237. Emails on file with the Committee on House Administration.
238. Emails on file with the Committee on House Administration.
242. Transcribed interview of Julie Farnam.
Assessment 21-A-0468 v.3 (Jan. 3, 2021).
249. See, e.g., Grace Segers & Melissa Quinn, How does Congress count electoral votes,
and can results be challenged, CBS News (Dec. 23, 2020),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/electoral-college-congress-counts-votes-january-6/.
250. See U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 1, cl. 2-3; see also 3 U.S.C. §6.
116
ENDNOTES
256. Examining the U.S. Capitol Attack – Part II: Joint Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs and the S. Comm. on Rule & Admin., 117th Cong.
(2021) (testimony of Jill Sanborn, Ass’t Dir., Counterterrorism Div., Fe. Bureau of
Investigation).
258. See United States Capitol Police Office of the Inspector General, Review of the
Events Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol, Flash Report:
Command and Coordination Bureau, (July 30, 2021).
264. Transcribed Interview of William Walker.
265. Transcribed Interview of William Walker.
266. Betsy Woodruff Swan & Daniel Lippman, Capitol Police examines backgrounds, social
media feeds of some who meet with lawmakers, Politico (Jan. 24, 2022)
https://www.politico.com/news/2022/01/24/capitol-police-social-media-00000948.
268. Betsy Woodruff Swan & Daniel Lippman, Capitol Police examines backgrounds, social
media feeds of some who meet with lawmakers, Politico (Jan. 24, 2022)
https://www.politico.com/news/2022/01/24/capitol-police-social-media-00000948.
269. Letter from House Republicans to the Capitol Police Board (Jan. 25, 2022).
270. Letter from J. Thomas Manger, Chief of Police, U.S. Capitol Police, to House
Republicans (Jan. 27, 2022).
271. See United States Capitol Police Office of the Inspector General, Review of
Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division Processes and Procedures Surrounding
the Protection of Member Events (May 10, 2022).
273. Transcribed Interview of USCP source. (emphasis added)
276. January 6, 2021 Event, After-Action Report, U.S. Capitol Police (June 4, 2021).
117
ENDNOTES
277. Note: this is an important step toward encouraging confidence from the Board and
USCP.
278. Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division Daily Intelligence Report Thursday,
December 3, 2020, Email dated December 3, 2020, from documents produced to the
279. Office of the Sergeant at Arms With United States Capitol Police Daily Intelligence
Brief Thursday, December 3, 2020, Email dated December 3, 2020, from documents
January 28, 2022.
January 28, 2022.
January 28, 2022.
January 28, 2022.
January 28, 2022.
285. Re: FYI: [Space Redacted] Issue, Email dated December 11, 2020, from documents
286. Re: Plans for January 3 and 6, Email dated December 11, 2020, from documents
January 28, 2022.
118
ENDNOTES
288. PI Calendar for Tuesday, December 15, 2020, Email dated December 15, 2020, from
289. HOB order, Email dated December 15, 2020, from documents produced to the
January 28, 2022.
291. Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division Daily Intelligence Report Friday
December 16, 2020, Email dated December 16, 2020, from documents produced to the
Brief Wednesday, December 16, 2020, Email dated December 16, 2020, from documents
January 28, 2022.
January 28, 2022.
295. FW: Law Enforcement Partners Meeting, Email dated December 18, 2020, from
January 28, 2022.
January 28, 2022.
Brief Monday, December 21, 2020, Email dated December 21, 2020, from documents
Sergeant at Arms on January 28, 2022. 119
ENDNOTES
Brief Monday, December 28, 2020, Email dated December 28, 2020, from documents
January 28, 2022.
301. FW: Draft - Immediate Office staff schedule for January, Email dated December 29,
2020, from documents produced to the Minority Staff of the Committee on House
Administration from the House Sergeant at Arms on January 28, 2022.
Brief Wednesday, December 30, 2020, Email dated December 30, 2020, from documents
Brief Report Thursday, December 31, 2020, Email dated December 31, 2020, from
28, 2022.
305. Accepted: Intel brief for Wednesday, Email dated January 3, 2021, from documents
306. FW: eDC Wednesday January 6 (First Draft), Email dated January 3, 2021, from
28, 2022.
28, 2022.
120
ENDNOTES
309. meeting [sic] with Chairperson Lofgren, Email dated January 4, 2021, from documents
28, 2022.
311. FW: Updated Assessment, Email dated January 4, 2021, from documents produced to
Brief Monday, January 4, 2021, Email dated January 4, 2021, from documents produced to
313. Accepted: Meet in Paul’s office to do Electoral college call with Speaker’s team, Email
314. Draft - Dear Colleague re Security Information for January 6 Joint Session, Email
28, 2022.
319. Security Information – Wednesday, January 6 Joint Session, Email dated January 4,
2021, from the Office of the Sergeant at Arms.
121
ENDNOTES
320. TAS Criminal Threat Notification – [Senator’s name redacted] 01.04.2021 - #2, Email
28, 2022.
322. RE: Draft timeline, Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents produced to the
324. Walkthrough for Electoral College Joint Session, Email dated January 5, 2021, from
325. Draft notification, Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents produced to the
327. Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division Daily Intelligence Report Tuesday,
January 5, 2021, Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents produced to the Minority
January 28, 2022.
328. RE: Draft Electoral College notification [sic], Email dated January 5, 2021, from
329. TAS Criminal Threat Notification – [Senator’s name redacted] 01.05.2021, Email dated
330. Ready for Tomorrow, Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents produced to the
122
ENDNOTES
333. Dear Colleague Follow Up, Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents produced
to the Minority Staff of the Committee on House Administration from the House Sergeant
at Arms on January 28, 2022.
335. RE: Dear Colleague Follow Up, Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents
336. This has both of Terri’s requests in it, Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents
337. RE: Dear Colleague Follow Up, Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents
338. latest version, Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents produced to the Minority
January 28, 2022.
339. Electoral College W/T, Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents produced to the
340. Masks on floor, Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents produced to the
341. FW: meeting with Paul today, Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents produced
123
ENDNOTES
342. 2021_01_06_Electoral College_v3, Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents
343. 2021_01_05_21_First Amendment Activities Follow Up.pdf, Email dated January 5,
344. RE: 2021_01_05_21_First Amendment Activities Follow Up.pdf, Email dated January 5,
345. Dear Colleague - Wednesday January 6 Road Closures, Email dated January 5, 2021,
from documents produced to the Minority Staff of the Committee on House Administration
from the House Sergeant at Arms on January 28, 2022.
346. Accepted: Meet re evac plan for tomorrow - Tim, Fitz, Erik, Email dated January 5,
347. FW: Bike rack for January 6, Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents produced
348. Perimeter, Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents produced to the Minority
January 28, 2022.
349. FW: Perimeter, Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents produced to the Minority
January 28, 2022.
350. Accepted: Brief Chairman Ryan on threats, Email dated January 5, 2021, from
351. Dear Colleague: Joint Session to Count Electoral Votes, Email from the Office of the
Sergeant at Arms, dated January 5, 2021.
28, 2022.
28, 2022.
124
ENDNOTES
354. Dear Colleague: Road Closures – Wednesday, January 6 Joint Session, Email from the
Office of the Sergeant at Arms, dated January 5, 2021.
355. One follow up question., Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents produced to
356. Re: One follow up question., Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents produced
28, 2022.
358. Re:6:30, Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents produced to the Minority Staff
28, 2022.
359. Re:6:30, Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents produced to the Minority Staff
28, 2022.
28, 2022.
361. Re: 6:30, Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents produced to the Minority Staff
28, 2022.
326. Tweet by CBS Evening News on Twitter, Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents
365. Re: What is going on?, Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents produced to the
125
ENDNOTES
367. Fwd: Interest in Tunnels Leading to the US Capitol, Email dated January 5, 2021, from
369. Re: //CUI/LES//Changes to the Security Perimeter, Email dated January 5, 2021,
from the Architect of the Capitol on April 20, 2021.
376. COVID positive, Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents produced to the
126
ENDNOTES
378. SCIF, Email dated January 5, 2021, from documents produced to the Minority Staff of
2022.
28, 2022.
380. Phone records from documents produced to the Minority Staff of the Committee on
381. Numbers on Floor today (January 6, 2021), Email dated January 6, 2021, from
382. FW: Demos/Map – Wed, 1/6/2021, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents
384. FW: 01/06/2021 - Planned Demonstrations in Washington, DC Update #1, Email dated
385. Thinking of you today, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the
387. Police Response – N CVC Walkway, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents
388. Police Response - N CVC Walkway (final), Email dated January 6, 2021, from
127
ENDNOTES
389. Issue exposed, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the Minority
January 28, 2022.
390. RE: Issue exposed, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the
391. RE: Issue exposed, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the
28, 2022.
395. Suggested language for note card we discussed, Email dated January 6, 2021, from
396. FSA: BOLO for suspicious-looking truck, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents
398. RE: Suggested language for note card we discussed, Email dated January 6, 2021,
399. Fwd: Suggested language for note card we discussed, Email dated January 6, 2021,
128
ENDNOTES
Brief Wednesday, January 6, 2021, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced
402. Demonstration Activity - eastbound on the Mall toward Capitol, Email dated January
6, 2021, from documents produced to the Minority Staff of the Committee on House
403. Fwd: Update #1, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the
404. Fwd: Suggested language for note card we discussed, Email dated January 6, 2021,
405. Re: Suggested language for note card we discussed, Email dated January 6, 2021,
406. Demonstration Activity - Proud Boys, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents
408. USCP Response - Senate Egg, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents
409. Demonstration Activity - Proud Boys (update 2), Email dated January 6, 2021, from
129
ENDNOTES
415. Fwd: Quarantine order, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the
416. Police Activity - 2nd and Con NW, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents
417. Fwd: Quarantine order, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the
418. FW: Document1, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the
419. FW: Trump says he’s coming to Capitol Hill, Email dated January 6, 2021, from
420. FW: Trump says he’s coming to Capitol Hill, Email dated January 6, 2021, from
421. RE: Trump says he’s coming to Capitol Hill, Email dated January 6, 2021, from
422. Crowd estimates, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the
423. RE: Crowd estimates, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the
130
ENDNOTES
425. Demonstration Update (update 2), Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents
427. Demonstration Update (update 3), Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents
428. March to US Capitol, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the
430. Possible [redacted] – RNC, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to
431. Priority - Breach on West Front, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents
28, 2022.
434. Priority - Breach on West Front, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents
435. Building Evacuation – Madison, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents
436. West front, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the Minority
January 28, 2022.
131
ENDNOTES
437. [redacted] DNC, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the
438. Building Evacuation: CANNON, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents
439. FW: 01/06/2021 - Planned Demonstrations in Washington, DC Update #14, Email
440. Re: Crowd estimates, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the
441. Priority - Breach on West Front (update), Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents
443. Re: Crowd estimates, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the
28, 2022.
449. Priority - Breach on West Front (update), Email dated January 6, 2021, from
132
ENDNOTES
451. Priority - Breach on West Front (update), Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents
454. Protestors, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the Minority
January 28, 2022.
455. Large breach east front, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to
458. Shelter in Place - CHOB, LHOB RHOB, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents
462. 2nd Breach - East Front, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to
133
ENDNOTES
463. Rotunda Door, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the Minority
January 28, 2022.
464. LOCKDOWN - entire campus, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced
28, 2022.
468. [Redacted], Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the Minority
January 28, 2022.
470. Capitol breached, exterior perimeter compromised, Email dated January 6, 2021,
473. Chamber Evacuation, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the
475. House Chamber – compromised, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents
134
ENDNOTES
477. SHOTS FIRED - HOUSE FLOOR, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents
479. Reports of officer down, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to
28, 2022.
135
ENDNOTES
495. CNN Report, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the Minority
January 28, 2022.
496. VIDEO & Immediate investigation, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents
28, 2022.
28, 2022.
502. Update from Waldow, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the
506. Update: West Front, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the
on January 28, 2022. 136
ENDNOTES
28, 2022.
28, 2022.
514. Status Brief, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the Minority
January 28, 2022.
28, 2022.
520. Exterior sweeps, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the
137
ENDNOTES
526. (no subject), Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the Minority
January 28, 2022.
527. Possible Message to Reconvene, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents
530. Capitol Is Secure, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the
531. Re: Capitol Is Secure, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the
28, 2022.
138
ENDNOTES
536. Fwd: Capitol Police firings imminent after ‘attempted coup,’ top appropriator warns,
Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the Minority Staff of the
2022.
537. Approval Needed - Emergency Board Orders, Email dated January 6, 2021, from
28, 2022.
540. RE: Approval Needed - Emergency Board Orders, Email dated January 6, 2021, from
541. Re: Approval Needed - Emergency Board Orders, Email dated January 6, 2021, from
542. Re: Approval Needed - Emergency Board Orders, Email dated January 6, 2021, from
544. (no subject), Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the Minority
January 28, 2022.
545. Re:, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the Minority Staff of
2022.
546. Fwd:, Email dated January 6, 2021, from documents produced to the Minority Staff of
2022.
547. STATEMENT - USCP Statement - Events of January 6 2021 V1.docx, Email dated
139
ENDNOTES
548. Fwd: Disaster Assessment, Email dated January 7, 2021, from documents produced to
549. ID Checks Today, Email dated January 7, 2021, from documents produced to the
550. TSA, Email dated January 7, 2021, from documents produced to the Minority Staff of
2022.
551. USCP Press Release for January 6, 2021 Events, Email dated January 7, 2021, from
552. Arrest numbers, Email dated January 7, 2021, from documents produced to the
553. Fwd: ID Checks Today, Email dated January 7, 2021, from documents produced to the
554. STAND STRONG, SIR, Email dated January 7, 2021, from documents produced to the
555. Security Update & Door Access, Email dated January 7, 2021, from documents
28, 2022.
28, 2022.
28, 2022.
28, 2022. 140
ENDNOTES
28, 2022.
28, 2022.
28, 2022.
28, 2022.
564. This organizational chart is not an exhaustive chart of all security entities, only those
relevant to this report. The sources for this chart include a chart provided to the Minority
Staff of the Committee on House Administration by the U.S. Capitol Police and a chart
found in the March 7, 2022, GAO report, “Capitol Attack: Additional Actions Needed to
Better Prepare Capitol Police Officers for Violent Demonstrations.” The Chief of Police is a
non-voting member of the Board; Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-22-104829, Capitol
Attack Additional Actions Needed to Better Prepare Capitol Police Officers for Violent
Demonstrations (2022), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104829.pdf
141

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REPORT OF

Prepared at the direction of:

Specifically, the leader of the USCP Intelligence and Interagency Coordination

THE HOUSE SERGEANT AT ARMS TOOK DIRECTION FROM STAFF IN THE

STAFF WITHIN THE HOUSE SERGEANT AT ARMS OFFICE EMAILED PAUL

WIDESPREAD CONCERN FROM DEMOCRAT LEADERSHIP OVER “OPTICS” IN

THE LEADERSHIP OF THE INTELLIGENCE AND INTERAGENCY

THE LEADERSHIP OF THE INTELLIGENCE AND INTERAGENCY

THE HOUSE SERGEANT AT ARMS WAS COMPROMISED BY POLITICS IN THE

U.S. CAPITOL POLICE DID NOT GIVE OFFICERS THE APPROPRIATE

THE COMMAND-AND-CONTROL STRUCTURE OF THE U.S. CAPITOL POLICE

THE U.S. CAPITOL POLICE HAS STILL NOT IMPLEMENTED IMPORTANT

USCP failed to adequately prepare for the events of January 6, 2021 35

THE U.S. SECRET SERVICE ESTIMATED

THE INITIAL WAVE OF PROTESTERS BEGAN STORMING THE

U.S. CAPITOL POLICE CHIEF STEVEN SUND CALLED D.C.

PROTESTERS BROKE THE FIRST WINDOWS OF THE CAPITOL

SUSPICIOUS PACKAGES, LATER DETERMINED TO BE PIPE

THE SENATE AND HOUSE BOTH RECESSED AND THE

PRESIDENT TRUMP TWEETED “PLEASE SUPPORT OUR

RIOTERS BROKE INTO THE SENATE CHAMBER. THEY

NEARLY FIVE HOURS AFTER THE RIOTING STARTED,

Budget FY2022 $602.5 million FY2021 $578 million

% Increase 20%* 3.3%**

*from FY2021 **from FY2020

[I]n the ‘event of an emergency, as determined by the Capitol Police Board or in

Intelligence and Interagency

US Capitol Police Board Structure

USCP Chief of Police

Architect of the Capitol Senate Sergeant at Arms House Sergeant at Arms

The Chair Rotates Between

A series of subsequent Government Accountability Office (GAO) reviews of the Board

GAO eventually closed its recommendation related to corporate governance as

B. The Board continues to operate in the dark

EARLY DEC 2020 IRVING REMAINED IN CONSTANT COMMUNICATION WITH

IRVING ALSO STAYED IN CONTACT WITH TERRI

IRVING AND HIS STAFF MET WITH DEMOCRATIC STAFF

DEC 11, 2020 MCCULLOUGH EMAILED A HOUSE SERGEANT AT ARMS

JAMIE FLEET CONTACTED USCP CHIEF STEVEN SUND AND

IRVING SENT THE DRAFT TO MCCULLOUGH AND FLEET

JAN 5, 2021 MEETING PROCEEDS WITHOUT REPUBLICAN

JAN 5, 2021 ANOTHER DRAFT DEAR COLLEAGUE WAS SENT FROM

MORNING OF IRVING AND HIS STAFF MET WITH DEMOCRATIC STAFF

12:33 PM IRVING CALLED MCCULLOUGH

1:32 PM FLEET MISSED A CALL FROM IRVING

1:40 PM AFTER CHIEF SUND’S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL

2:14 PM FLEET CALLED IRVING

2:30 PM MCCULLOUGH CALLED IRVING AGAIN 95

B. In the lead up to January 6, 2021, the House Sergeant at Arms was

JANUARY 5TH AVIATION THREAT TIMELINE

6:20 PM IRVING SENT A TEXT TO MICHAEL STENGER, THE SENATE

8:31 PM A STAFFER IN SEN. MCCONNELL’S OFFICE RESPONDED TO

8:55 PM DEPUTY CHIEF SEAN GALLAGHER EMAILED HOUSE

9:06 PM THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT GALLAGHER’S WARNING

9:09 PM THE SENIOR SAA STAFFER RESPONDED: “OH GOOD GOD.

9:09 PM THE SENIOR SAA STAFFER RESPONDED TO IRVING:

9:13 PM IRVING EMAILED THE SENIOR SAA STAFFER SEPARATELY.

101 Fewer Than

The lack of effective training is a longstanding, USCP-wide issue that contributed to