Philsat Case

[ G.R. No.
230642, September 10, 2019 ]
OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, ERROL B. COMAFAY, JR., RENE B. GOROSPE, EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, VICTORIA B.
LOANZON, ELGIN MICHAEL C. PEREZ, ARNOLD E. CACHO, AL CONRAD B. ESPALDON, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO,
LEIGHTON R. SIAZON, ARIANNE C. ARTUGUE, CLARABEL ANNE R. LACSINA, KRISTINE JANE R. LIU, ALYANNA
MARL C. BUENVIAJE, IANA PATRICIA DULA T. NICOLAS, IRENE A. TOLENTINO AND AUREA I. GRUYAL,
PETITIONERS, VS.
LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD, AS REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, HON. EMERSON B. AQUENDE, AND LEB
MEMBER HON. ZENAIDA N. ELEPAÑO, RESPONDENTS;
DECISION
REYES, J. JR., J.:
On the principal grounds of encroachment upon the rule-making power of the Court concerning the practice of law, violation
of institutional academic freedom and violation of a law school aspirant's right to education, these consolidated Petitions for
Prohibition (G.R. No. 230642) and Certiorari and Prohibition (G.R. No. 242954) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assail
as unconstitutional Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7662,1 or the Legal Education Reform Act of 1993, which created the Legal
Education Board (LEB). On the same principal grounds, these petitions also particularly seek to declare as unconstitutional
the LEB issuances establishing and implementing the nationwide law school aptitude test known as the Philippine Law
School Admission Test or the PhiLSAT.
The Antecedents
Prompted by clamors for the improvement of the system of legal education on account of the poor performance of law
students and law schools in the bar examinations,2 the Congress, on December 23, 1993, passed into law R.A. No. 7662
with the following policy statement:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to uplift the standards of legal education in
order to prepare law students for advocacy, counselling, problem-solving, and decision-making, to infuse in them the ethics
of the legal profession; to impress on them the importance, nobility and dignity of the legal profession as an equal and
indispensable partner of the Bench in the administration of justice and to develop social competence.
Towards this end, the State shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education system, require proper selection of
law students, maintain quality among law schools, and require legal apprenticeship and continuing legal education.
R.A. No. 7662 identifies the general and specific objectives of legal education in this manner:
SEC. 3. General and Specific Objective of Legal Education. -
(a) Legal education in the Philippines is geared to attain the following objectives:
(1) to prepare students for the practice of law;
(2) to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and
oppressed sectors of society;
(3) to train persons for leadership;
(4) to contribute towards the promotion and advancement of justice and the improvement of its
administration, the legal system and legal institutions in the light of the historical and contemporary
development of law in the Philippines and in other countries.
(b) Legal education shall aim to accomplish the following specific objectives:
(1) to impart among law students a broad knowledge of law and its various fields and of legal institutions;
(2) to enhance their legal research abilities to enable them to analyze, articulate and apply the law
effectively, as well as to allow them to have a holistic approach to legal problems and Issues;
(3) to prepare law students for advocacy, [counseling], problem-solving and decision-making, and to
develop their ability to deal with recognized legal problems of the present and the future;
(4) to develop competence in any field of law as is necessary for gainful employment or sufficient as a
foundation for future training beyond the basic professional degree, and to develop in them the desire
and capacity for continuing study and self improvement;
(5) to inculcate in them the ethics and responsibilities of the legal profession; and
(6) to produce lawyers who conscientiously pursue the lofty goals of their profession and to fully adhere
to its ethical norms.
For these purposes, R.A. No. 7662 created the LEB, an executive agency which was made separate from the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), but attached thereto solely for budgetary purposes and administrative support.3 The
Chairman and regular members of the LEB are to be appointed by the President for a term of five years, without
reappointment, from a list of at least three nominees prepared, with prior authorization from the Court, by the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC).4
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7662 enumerates the powers and functions of the LEB as follows:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving the objectives of this Act, the Board shall have the following
powers and functions:
(a) to administer the legal education system in the country in a manner consistent with the provisions of
this Act;
(b) to supervise the law schools in the country, consistent with its powers and functions as herein
enumerated;
(c) to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among others, the size of
enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the library and other facilities, without
encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning;
(d) to accredit law schools that meet the standards of accreditation;
(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications and compensation to
faculty members;
(f) to prescribe the basic curricula for the course of study aligned to the requirements for admission to the
Bar, law practice and social consciousness, and such other courses of study as may be prescribed by the
law schools and colleges under the different levels of accreditation status;
(g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar which a law student shall
undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or legal assistance group anytime
during the law course for a specific period that the Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve
(12) months. For this purpose, the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation
and the specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new member of the
Bar[;]
(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board may provide for the
mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the Board may
deem necessary; and
(i) to perform such other functions and prescribe such rules and regulations necessary for the attainment
of the policies and objectives of this Act.
On the matter of accreditation of law schools, R.A. No. 7662 further elaborates:
SEC. 8. Accreditation of Law Schools. - Educational institutions may not operate a law school unless accredited by the
Board. Accreditation of law schools may be granted only to educational institutions recognized by the Government.
SEC. 9. Withdrawal or Downgrading of Accreditation. - The [LEB] may withdraw or downgrade the accreditation status of a
law school if it fails to maintain the standards set for its accreditation status.
SEC. 10. Effectivity of Withdrawal or Downgrading of Accreditation. - The withdrawal or downgrading of accreditation status
shall be effective after the lapse of the semester or trimester following the receipt by the school of the notice of withdrawal or
downgrading unless, in the meantime, the school meets and/or upgrades the standards or corrects the deficiencies upon
which the withdrawal or downgrading of the accreditation status is based.
Bar Matter No. 979-B

Re: Legal Education
In July 2001, the Court's Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters (CLEBM), through its Chairperson, Justice Jose C.
Vitug, noted several objectionable provisions of R.A. No. 7662 which "go beyond the ambit of education of aspiring lawyers
and into the sphere of education of persons duly licensed to practice the law profession."5
In particular, the CLEBM observed:
x x x [U]nder the declaration of policies in Section 2 of [R.A. No. 7662, the State "shall x x x require apprenticeship and
continuing legal education." The concept of continuing legal education encompasses education not only of law students but
also of members of the legal profession. [This] implies that the [LEB] shall have jurisdiction over the education of persons
who have finished the law course and are already licensed to practice law[, in violation of the Supreme Court's power over
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines].
x x x Section 3 provides as one of the objectives of legal education increasing "awareness among members of the legal
profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of the society." Such objective should not find a place
in the law that primarily aims to upgrade the standard of schools of ·law as they perform the task of educating aspiring
lawyers. Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution also provides that the Supreme Court shall have the power
to promulgate rules on "legal assistance to the underprivileged" and hence, implementation of [R.A. No. 7662 might give rise
to infringement of a constitutionally mandated power.
x x x [Section 7(e) giving the LEB the power to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and Section 7(h) giving the
LEB the power to adopt a system of continuing legal education and for this purpose, the LEB may provide for the mandatory
attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the LEB may deem necessary] encroach upon the
Supreme Court's powers under Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Aside from its power over the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Supreme Court is constitutionally mandated to promulgate rules concerning admission
to the practice of law.6
While the CLEBM saw the need for the LEB to oversee the system of legal education, it cautioned that the law's
objectionable provisions, for reasons above-cited, must be removed.7
Relative to the foregoing observations, the CLEBM proposed the following amendments to R.A. No. 7662:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to uplift the standards of legal education in
order to prepare law students for advocacy, counseling, problem-solving, and decision-making; to infuse in them the ethics
of the legal profession; to impress upon them the importance, nobility and dignity of the legal profession as an equal and
indispensable partner of the Bench in the administration of justice; and, to develop socially-committed lawyers with integrity
and competence.
law students, provide for legal apprenticeship, and maintain quality among law schools.
xxxx
SEC. 3. General and Specific Objectives of Legal Education. x x x

xxxx
2.) to increase awareness among law students of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society;
xxxx
SEC. 7. Power and functions. - x x x
(a) to regulate the legal education system in accordance with its powers and functions herein
enumerated;
(b) to establish standards of accreditation for law schools, consistent with academic freedom and
pursuant to the declaration of policy set forth in Section 2 hereof;
(c) to accredit law schools that meet the standards of accreditation;
(d) to prescribe minimum standards for admission to law schools including a system of law aptitude
examination;
(e) to provide for minimum qualifications for faculty members of law schools;
(f) to prescribe guidelines for law practice internship which the law schools may establish as part of the
curriculum; and
(g) to perform such other administrative functions as may be necessary for the attainment of the policies
and objectives of this Act.8 (Underscoring supplied)
xxxx
In a Resolution9 dated September 4, 2001, the Court approved the CLEBM's explanatory note and draft amendments to
R.A. No. 7662. The Senate and the House of Representatives were formally furnished with a copy of said Resolution. This,
notwithstanding, R.A. No. 7662 remained unaltered.
LEB Issuances
In 2003, the Court issued a resolution authorizing the JBC to commence the nomination process for the members of the
LEB. In 2009, the LEB was constituted with the appointment of Retired Court of Appeals Justice Hilarion L. Aquino as the
first Chairperson and followed by the appointment of LEB members, namely, Dean Eulogia M. Cueva, Justice Eloy R. Bello,
Jr., Dean Venicio S. Flores and Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Director Felizardo Y. Francisco. Despite the
passage of the enabling law in 1993, the LEB became fully operational only in June 2010.
Acting pursuant to its authority to prescribe the minimum standards for law schools, the LEB issued Memorandum Order No.
1, Series of 2011 (LEBMO No. 1-2011) providing for the Policies and Standards of Legal Education and Manual of
Regulation for Law Schools.
Since then, the LEB had issued several orders, circulars, resolutions, and other issuances which are made available through
their website:
A. Orders
Number Title/Subject
LEBMO No. 2 Additional Rules in the Operation of the Law Program
LEBMO No. 3-2016 Policies, Standards and, Guidelines for the

Accreditation of Law Schools to Offer and Operate
Refresher Courses
LEBMO No. 4-2016 Supplemental to [LEBMO] No. 3, Series of 2016
LEBMO No. 5-2016 Guidelines for the [Prerequisite] Subjects in the Basic
Law Courses
LEBMO No. 6-2016 Reportorial Requirements for Law Schools
LEBMO No. 7-2016 Policies and Regulations for the Administration of a

Nationwide Uniform Law School Admission Test for
Applicants to the Basic Law Courses in All Law
Schools in the Country
LEBMO No. 8-2016 Policies, Guidelines and Procedures Governing

Increases in Tuition and Other School Fees, and,
Introduction of New Fees by Higher, Education
Institutions for the Law Program
LEBMO No. 9-2017 Policies and Guidelines on the Conferment of

Honorary Doctor of Laws Degrees
LEBMO No. 10-2017 Guidelines on the Adoption of Academic/School

Calendar
LEBMO No. 11-2017 Additional Transition Provisions to [LEBMO] No. 7,

Series of 2016, on PhiLSAT
LEBMO No. 12-2018 LEB Service/Transaction Fees
LEBMO No. 13-2018 Guidelines in the Conduct of Summer Classes
LEBMO No. 14-2018 Policy and Regulations in Offering Elective Subjects
LEBMO No. 15-2018 Validation of the Licenses of, and the Law
Curriculum/Curricula for the Basic Law Courses in use
by Law Schools and Graduate Schools of Law
LEBMO No. 16-2018 Policies, Standards and Guidelines for the Academic
Law Libraries of Law Schools
LEBMO No. 17-2018 Supplemental Regulations on the Minimum Academic

Requirement of Master of Laws Degree for Deans and
Law Professors/Lecturers/Instructors in Law Schools
LEBMO No. 18-2018 Guidelines on Cancellation or Suspension of Classes

in All Law Schools
LEBMO No. 19-2018 Migration of the Basic Law Course to Juris Doctor
LEBMO No. 20-2019 Discretionary Admission in the AY 2019-2020 of

Examinees Who Rated Below the Cut-off/Passing
Score but Not Less than 45% in the Philippine Law
School Admission Test Administered on April 7, 2019
B. Memorandum Circulars
LEBMC No. 1 New Regulatory Issuances
LEBMC No. 2 Submission of Schedule of Tuition and Other School

Fees
LEBMC No. 3 Submission of Law School Information Report
LEBMC No. 4 Reminder to Submit Duly Accomplished LSIR Form
LEBMC No. 5 Offering of the Refresher Course for AY 2017-2018

LEBMC No. 6 Applications for LEB Certification Numbers
LEBMC No. 7 Application of Transitory Provision Under [LEBMO]

No. 7 Series of 2017 and [LEBMO] No. 11, Series of
2017 in the Admission of Freshmen Law Students in
Basic Law Courses in Academic Year 2017-2018
LEBMC No. 8 Guidelines for Compliance with the Reportorial

Requirements Under [LEBMO] No. 7, Series of 2016
for Purposes of the Academic Year 2017-2018
LEBMC No. 9 Observance of Law Day and Philippine National Law

Week
LEBMC No. 10 September 21, 2017 Suspension of Classes
LEBMC No. 11 Law Schools Authorized to Offer the Refresher

Course in the Academic Year 2016-2017

LEBMC No. 13 Legal Research Seminar of the Philippine Group of

Law Librarians on April 4-6, 2018
LEBMC No. 14 CSC Memorandum Circular No. 22, s.2016

LEBMC No. 16 Clarification to [LEBMO] No. 3, Series of 2016
LEBMC No. 17 Updated List of Law Schools Authorized to Offer the

Refresher Course in the Academic Year 2018-2019
LEBMC No. 18 PHILSAT Eligibility Requirement for Freshmen in the

Academic Year 2018-2019
LEBMC No. 19 Guidelines for the Limited Conditional

Admission/Enrollment in the 1st Semester of the
Academic Year 2018-2019 Allowed for Those Who
Have Not Taken the PhiLSAT
LEBMC No. 20 Updated List of Law Schools Authorized to Offer the

Refresher Course in the Academic Year 2018-2019
LEBMC No. 21 Adjustments/Corrections to the Requirements for Law

Schools to be Qualified to Conditionally Admit/Enroll
Freshmen Law Students in AY 2018-2019
LEBMC No. 22 Advisory on who should take the September 23, 2018
PhiLSAT
LEBMC No. 23 Collection of the PhiLSAT Certificate of

Eligibility/Exemption by Law Schools from Applicants
for Admission
LEBMC No. 24 Observance of the Philippine National Law Week
LEBMC No. 25 Competition Law
LEBMC No. 26 Scholarship Opportunity for Graduate Studies for Law

Deans, Faculty Members and Law Graduates with the
2020-2021 Philippine Fulbright Graduate Student
Program
LEBMC No. 27 Advisory on April 7, 2019 PhiLSAT and Conditional

[Enrollment] for Incoming Freshmen/1st Year Law
Students
LEBMC No. 28 April 25-26, 2019 Competition Law Training Program
LEBMC No. 29 Detailed Guidelines for Conditional Enrollment Permit

Application
LEBMC No. 30 Law Schools Authorized to Offer Refresher Course in

AY 2019-2020
LEBMC No. 31 Law Schools Authorized to Offer Refresher Course in

AY 2019-2020
LEBMC No. 40 Reminders concerning Conditionally Enrolled

Freshmen Law Students in AY 2019-2020
C. Resolutions and Other Issuances
Resolution No. 16 Reportorial Requirement for Law Schools with Small

Students Population
Resolution No.7, Series of 2010 Declaring a 3-Year Moratorium in the Opening of New
Law Schools
Resolution No. 8, Series of 2010 Administrative Sanctions
Resolution No. 2011-21 A Resolution Providing for Supplementary Rules to

the Provisions of LEBMO No. 1 in regard to
Curriculum and Degrees Ad Eundem
Resolution No. 2012-02 A Resolution Eliminating the Requirement of Special,

Orders for Graduates of the Basic Law Degrees and
Graduate Law Degrees and Replacing them with a
Per Law School Certification Approved by the Legal
Education Board
Resolution No. 2013-01 Ethical Standards of Conduct for Law Professors
Resolution No. 2014-02 Prescribing Rules on the Ll.M. Staggered Compliance

Schedule and the Exemption from the Ll.M.
Requirement
Resolution No. 2015-08 Prescribing the Policy and Rules in the Establishment
of a Legal Aid Clinic in Law Schools
Order Annual Law Publication Requirements
Chairman Memorandum Restorative Justice to be Added as Elective Subject

The PhiLSAT under LEBMO No.

7-2016, LEBMO No. 11-2017,
LEBMC No. 18-2018, and related
issuances
As above-enumerated, among the orders issued by the LEB was Memorandum Order No. 7, Series of 2016 (LEBMO No. 7-
2016) pursuant to its power to "prescribe the minimum standards for law admission" under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662.
The policy and rationale of LEBMO No. 7-2016 is to improve the quality of legal education by requiring all those seeking
admission to the basic law course to take and pass a nationwide uniform law school admission test, known as the
PhiLSAT.10
The PhiLSAT is essentially an aptitude test measuring the examinee's communications and language proficiency, critical
thinking, verbal and quantitative reasoning.11 It was designed to measure the academic potential of the examinee to pursue
the study of law.12 Exempted from the PhiLSAT requirement were honor graduates who were granted professional civil
service eligibility and who are enrolling within two years from their college graduation.13
Synthesizing, the key provisions of LEBMO No. 7-2016 are as follows:
(1) The policy and rationale of requiring PhiLSAT is to improve the quality of legal education. The PhiLSAT shall be
administered under the control and supervision of the LEB;14
(2) The PhiLSAT is an aptitude test that measures the academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of
law;15
(3) A qualified examinee is either a graduate of a four-year bachelor's degree; expecting to graduate with a four-
year bachelor's degree at the end of the academic year when the PhiLSAT was administered; or a graduate from
foreign higher education institutions with a degree equivalent to a four-year bachelor's degree. There is no limit as
to the number of times a qualified examinee may take the PhiLSAT;16
(4) The LEB may designate an independent third-party testing administrator;17
(5) The PhiLSAT shall be administered at least once a year, on or before April 16, in testing centers;18
(6) The testing fee shall not exceed the amount of P1,500.00 per examination;19
(7) The cut-off or passing score shall be 55% correct answers, or such percentile score as may be prescribed by
the LEB;20
(8) Those who passed shall be issued a Certificate of Eligibility while those who failed shall be issued a Certificate
of Grade;21
(9) Passing the PhiLSAT is required for admission to any law school. No applicant shall be admitted for enrollment
as a first year student in the basic law course leading to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor unless
he has passed the PhiLSAT taken within two years before the start of the study;22
(10) Honor graduates granted professional civil service eligibility who are enrolling within two years from college
graduation are exempted from taking and passing the PhiLSAT for purposes of admission to the basic law
course;23
(11) Law schools, in the exercise of academic freedom, can prescribe additional requirements for admission;24
(12) Law schools shall submit to LEB reports of first year students admitted and enrolled, and their PhiLSAT
scores, as well as the subjects enrolled and the final grades received by every first year student;25
(13) Beginning academic year 2018-2019, the general average requirement (not less than 80% or 2.5) for
admission to basic law course under Section 23 of LEBMO No. 1-2011 is removed;26
(14) In academic year 2017-2018, the PhiLSAT passing score shall not be enforced and the law schools shall have
the discretion to admit in the basic law course, applicants who scored less than 55% in the PhiLSAT, provided that
the law dean shall submit a justification for the admission and the required report;27 and
(15) Law schools, in violation of LEBMO No. 7-2016, shall be administratively sanctioned as prescribed in Section
3228 of LEBMO No. 2-201329 and/or fined up to P10,000.00.30
Effective for the academic year 2017 to 2018, no applicant to law school was allowed admission without having taken and
passed the PhiLSAT. The first PhiLSAT examination was held on April 16, 2017 in seven pilot sites: Baguio City, Metro
Manila, Legazpi City, Cebu City, Iloilo City, Davao City, and Cagayan de Oro. A total of 6,575 out of 8,074 examinees
passed the first-ever PhiLSAT. For the first PhiLSAT, the passing grade was adjusted by the LEB from 55% to 45% by way
of consideration.
Since the PhiLSAT was implemented for the first time and considering further that there were applicants who failed to take
the PhiLSAT because of the inclement weather last April 16, 2017, the LEB issued Memorandum Order No. 11, Series of
2017 (LEBMO No. 11-2017).
Under LEBMO No. 11-2017, those who failed to take the first PhiLSAT were allowed to be admitted to law schools for the
first semester of academic year 2017 to 2018 for justifiable or meritorious reasons and conditioned under the following
terms:
2. Conditions - x x x
a. The student shall take the next scheduled PhiLSAT;
b. If the student fails to take the next scheduled PhiLSAT for any reason, his/her conditional admission in
the law school shall be automatically revoked and barred from enrolling in the following semester;
c. If the student takes the next scheduled PhiLSAT but scores below the passing or cut-off score, his/her
conditional admission shall also be revoked and barred from enrolling in the following semester, unless
the law school expressly admits him/her in the exercise of the discretion given under Section/Paragraph
14 of LEBMO No. 7, Series of 2016, subject to the requirements of the same provision;
d. The student whose conditional admission and enrol[l]ment is subsequently revoked shall not be
entitled to the reversal of the school fees assessed and/or refund of the school fees paid; and
e. The student shall execute under oath, and file with his/her application for a Permit for Conditional
Admission/Enrol[l]ment, an UNDERTAKING expressly agreeing to the foregoing conditions.31
The conditional admission and enrollment under LEBMO No. 11-2017 and the transitory provision provided in LEBMO No.
7-2016 were subsequently clarified by the LEB through its Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of 2017 (LEBMC No. 7-
2017).
On September 24, 2017 and April 8, 2018, the second and third PhiLSATs were respectively held.
On October 26, 2017, the LEB issued a Memorandum reminding law schools, law students, and other interested persons
that the passing of the PhiLSAT is required to be eligible for admission/enrollment in the basic law course for academic year
2017 to 2018. It was also therein clarified that the discretion given to law schools to admit those who failed the PhiLSAT
during the initial year of implementation is only up to the second semester of academic year 2017-2018.
Because of the confusion as to whether conditional admission for academic year 2018 to 2019 may still be allowed, the LEB
issued Memorandum Circular No. 18, Series of 2018 (LEBMC No. 18-2018). Under LEBMC No. 18-2018, it was clarified that
the conditional admission was permitted only in academic year 2017 to 2018 as part of the transition adjustments in the
initial year of the PhiLSAT implementation. As such, by virtue of LEBMC No. 18-2018, the conditional admission of students
previously allowed under LEBMO No. 11-2017 was discontinued.
Nevertheless, on July 25, 2018, the LEB issued Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 2018 (LEBMC No. 19-2018)
allowing limited conditional admission/enrollment in the first semester of academic year 2018 to 2019 for those applicants
who have never previously taken the PhiLSAT. Those who have taken the PhiLSAT and scored below the cut-off score were
disqualified. In addition, only those law schools with a passing rate of not less than 25%, are updated in the reportorial
requirement and signified its intention to conditionally admit applicants were allowed to do so. The limited enrollment was
subject to the condition that the admitted student shall take and pass the next PhiLSAT on September 23, 2018, otherwise
the conditional enrollment shall be nullified. Non-compliance with said circular was considered a violation of the minimum
standards for the law program for which law schools may be administratively penalized.
The fourth PhiLSAT then pushed through on September 23, 2018.
The Petitions
Days before the scheduled conduct of the first-ever PhiLSAT on April 16, 2017, petitioners Oscar B. Pimentel (Pimentel),
Errol B. Comafay (Comafay), Rene B. Gorospe (Gorospe), Edwin R. Sandoval (Sandoval), Victoria B. Loanzon (Loanzon),
Elgin Michael C. Perez (Perez), Arnold E. Cacho (Cacho), Al Conrad B. Espaldon (Espaldon) and Ed Vincent S. Albano
(Albano) [as citizens, lawyers, taxpayers and law professors], with their co-petitioners Leighton R. Siazon (Siazon), Arianne
C. Artugue (Artugue), Clarabel Anne R. Lacsina (Lacsina) and Kristine Jane R. Liu (Liu) [as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers],
Alyanna Mari C. Buenviaje (Buenviaje) and Iana Patricia Dula T. Nicolas (Nicolas) [as citizens intending to take up law] and
Irene A. Tolentino (Tolentino) and Aurea I. Gruyal (Gruyal) [as citizens and taxpayers] filed their Petition for
Prohibition,32 docketed as G.R. No. 230642, principally seeking that R.A. No. 7662 be declared unconstitutional and that
the creation of the LEB be invalidated together with all its issuances, most especially the PhiLSAT, for encroaching upon the
rule-making power of the Court concerning admissions to the practice of law;33 They prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) to prevent the LEB from conducting the PhiLSAT.
Respondents-in-intervention Attys. Anthony D. Bengzon (Bengzon), Ferdinand M. Negre (Negre), Michael Z. Untalan
(Untalan), Jonathan Q. Perez (Perez), Samantha Wesley K. Rosales (Rosales), Erika M. Alfonso (Alfonso), Krys Valen O.
Martinez (Martinez), Ryan Ceazar P. Romano (Romano), and Kenneth C. Varona (Varona) [as citizens and lawyers] moved
to intervene and prayed for the dismissal of the Petition for Prohibition.34
On February 12, 2018, petitioners-in-intervention April D. Caballero (Caballero), Jerey C. Castardo (Castardo), MC Wellroe
P. Bringas (Bringas), Rhuffy D. Federe (Federe) and Conrad Theodore A. Matutino (Matutino) [as graduates of four-year
college course and applicants as first year law students], St. Thomas More School of Law and Business, Inc., [as an
educational stock corporation] and Rodolfo C. Rapista (Rapista), Judy Marie Rapista-Tan (Rapista-Tan), Lynnart Walford A.
Tan (Tan), Ian M. Enterina (Enterina) and Neil John Villarico (Villarico) [as citizens and law professors] intervened and joined
the Petition for Prohibition of Pimentel, et al., seeking to declare R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT as unconstitutional.35
Thereafter, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 242954, was filed by petitioners Francis Jose Lean
L. Abayata (Abayata), Gretchen M. Vasquez (Vasquez), Sheenah S. Ilustrismo (Ilustrismo), Ralph Louie Salaño (Solaño),
Aireen Monica B. Guzman (Guzman) and Delfino Odias (Odias) [as law students who failed to pass the PhiLSAT], Daryl
Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), Claire Suico (Suico), Aivie S. Pescadero (Pescadero), Niña Christine Dela Paz (Dela Paz), Shemark
K. Queniahan (Queniahan), Al Jay T. Mejos (Mejos), Rocellyn L. Daño (Daño), Michael Adolfo (Adolfo), Ronald A. Atig
(Atig), Lynette C. Lumayag (Lumayag), Mary Chris Lagera (Lagera), Timothy B. Francisco (Francisco), Sheila Marie C.
Dandan (Dandan), Madeline C. Dela Peña (Dela Peña), Darlin R. Villamor (Villamor), Lorenzana Llorico (Llorico) and Jan
Ivan M. Santamaria (Santamaria) [as current law students who failed to take the PhiLSAT] seeking to invalidate R.A. No.
7662 or, in the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional the PhiLSAT. They also sought the issuance of a TRO to defer the
holding of the aptitude test.36
These Petitions were later on consolidated by the Court and oral arguments thereon were held on March 5, 2019.
Temporary Restraining Order
On March 12, 2019, the Court issued a TRO37 enjoining the LEB from implementing LEBMC No. 18-2018 and, thus,
allowing those who have not taken the PhiLSAT prior to the academic year 2018 to 2019, or who have taken the PhiLSAT,
but did not pass, or who are honor graduates in college with no PhiLSAT Exemption Certificate, or honor graduates with
expired PhiLSAT Exemption Certificates to conditionally enroll as incoming freshmen law students for the academic year
2019 to 2020 under the same terms as LEBMO No. 11-2017.
Subsequently, the LEB issued Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 2019 (LEBMC No. 27-2019) stating that the PhiLSAT
scheduled on April 7, 2019 will proceed and reiterated the requirements that must be complied with for the conditional
enrollment for the academic year 2019 to 2020.
The Parties' Arguments
In G.R. No. 230642
Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 argue that R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT are offensive to the Court's power to regulate and
supervise the legal profession pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII38 of the Constitution and that the Congress cannot
create an administrative office that exercises the Court's power over the practice of law. They also argue that R.A. No. 7662
gives the JBC additional functions to vet nominees for the LEB in violation of Section 8(5), Article VIII39 of the Constitution.
In their Memorandum, petitioners also question the constitutionality of the LEB's powers under Section 7(c)40 and 7(e)41 to
prescribe the qualifications and compensation of faculty members and Section 7(h)42 on the LEB's power to adopt a system
of continuing legal education as being repugnant to the Court's rule-making power concerning the practice of law. They also
argue that the PhiLSAT violates the academic freedom of law schools and the right to education.
Petitioners-in-intervention meanwhile contend that the PhiLSAT violates the right to liberty and pursuit of happiness of the
student-applicants. They posit that the PhiLSAT violates the equal protection clause as it is an arbitrary form of classification
not based on substantial distinctions. They also argue that the PhiLSAT violates the right of all citizens to quality and
accessible education, violates academic freedom, and is an unfair academic requirement. It is also their position that the
PhiLSAT violates due process as it interferes with the right of every person to select a profession or course of study. They
also argue that R.A. No. 7662 constitutes undue delegation of legislative powers.
In G.R. No. 242954
Petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 argue that certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies either under the expanded or
traditional jurisdiction of the Court. They also invoke the doctrine of transcendental importance.
Substantively, they contend that R.A. No. 7662, specifically Section 3(a)(2)43 on the objective of legal education to increase
awareness among members of the legal profession, Section 7(e) on law admission, 7(g)44 on law practice internship, and
7(h) on adopting a system of continuing legal education, and the declaration of policy on continuing legal
education45 infringe upon the power of the Court to regulate admission to the practice of law. They profess that they are not
against the conduct of law school admission test per se, only that the LEB cannot impose the PhiLSAT as the power to do
so allegedly belongs to the Court.46
It is also their contention that the PhiLSAT violates academic freedom as it interferes with the law school's exercise of
freedom to choose who to admit. According to them, the LEB cannot issue penal regulations, and the consequent forfeiture
of school fees and the ban on enrollment for those who failed to pass the PhiLSAT violate due process.
The Comments
Procedurally, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the LEB, argues that certiorari and prohibition are not
proper to assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7662 either under the traditional or expanded concept of judicial power. For
the OSG, R.A. No. 7662 was enacted pursuant to the State's power to regulate all educational institutions, and as such,
there could be no grave abuse of discretion. It also claims that the Congress is an indispensable party to the petitions.
Substantively, the OSG contends that the Court's power to regulate admission to the practice of law does not include
regulation of legal education. It also defends Section 7(e) on the LEB's power to prescribe minimum standards for law
admission as referring to admission to law schools; Section 7(g) on the LEB's power to establish a law practice internship as
pertaining to the law school curriculum which is within the power of the LEB to regulate; and 7(h) on the LEB's power to
adopt a system of continuing legal education as being limited to the training of lawyer-professors.47 Anent the argument that
R.A. No. 7662 gives the JBC additional functions not assigned to it by the Court, the OSG points out that the Court had
actually authorized the JBC to process the applications for membership to the LEB making this a non-issue.
In defending the validity of the PhiLSAT, the OSG advances the argument that the PhiLSAT is the minimum standard for
entrance to law schools prescribed by the LEB pursuant to the State's power to regulate education. The OSG urges that the
PhiLSAT is no different from the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) which the Court already upheld as a valid
exercise of police power in the seminal case of Tablarin v. Gutierrez.48
It is also the position of the OSG that neither the PhiLSAT nor the provisions of R.A. No. 7662 violate academic freedom
because the standards for entrance to law school, the standards for accreditation, the prescribed qualifications of faculty
members, and the prescribed basic curricula are fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.
For their part, respondents in-intervention contend that R.A. No. 7662 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality and that
the study of law is different from the practice of law.
In its Comment to the Petition-in-Intervention, the OSG dismisses as speculative the argument that the PhiLSAT is anti-poor,
and adds that the Court has no competence to rule on whether the PhiLSAT is an unfair or unreasonable requirement, it
being a question of policy.
Respondents-in-intervention, for their part, argue that the right of the citizens to accessible education means that the State
shall make quality education accessible only to those qualified enough, as determined by fair, reasonable, and equitable
admission and academic requirements. They dispute the claimed intrusion on academic freedom as law schools are not
prevented from selecting who to admit among applicants who have passed the PhiLSAT. They stress that the right to
education is not absolute and may be regulated by the State, citing Calawag v. University of the Philippines Visayas.49
By way of Reply, petitioners-in-intervention emphasize that the doctrine in Tablarin50 is inapplicable as medical schools are
not the same as law schools. They further aver that the decline in enrollment as a result of the implementation of the
PhiLSAT is not speculative.51
The Issues
After a careful consideration of the issues raised by the parties in their pleadings and refined during the oral arguments, the
issues for resolution are synthesized as follows:
I. Procedural Issues:
A. Remedies of certiorari and prohibition; and
B. Requisites of judicial review and the scope of the Court's review in the instant petitions.
II. Substantive Issues:
A. Jurisdiction over legal education;
B. Supervision and regulation of legal education as an exercise of police power;
1. Reasonable supervision and regulation
2. Institutional academic freedom
3. Right to education
C. LEB's powers under R.A. No. 7662 vis-a-vis the Court's jurisdiction over the practice of law; and
D. LEB's powers under R.A. No. 7662 vis-a-vis the academic freedom of law schools and the right to education.
The Rulings of the Court
I.
Procedural Issues
A.
Remedies of Certiorari and Prohibition
The propriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition is assailed on the ground that R.A. No. 7662 is a legislative act
and not a judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial function. In any case, respondents argue that the issues herein presented
involve purely political questions beyond the ambit of judicial review.
The Court finds that petitioners availed of the proper remedies.
The 193552 and 197353 Constitutions mention, but did not define, "judicial power." In contrast, the 1987 Constitution
lettered what judicial power is and even "expanded" its scope.
As constitutionally defined under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,54 judicial power is no longer limited to the
Court's duty to' settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, or the power of
adjudication, but also includes, the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. This innovation under the 1987
Constitution later on became known as the Court's traditional jurisdiction and expanded jurisdiction, respectively.55
The expanded scope of judicial review mentions "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" to
harbinger the exercise of judicial review; while petitions for certiorari56 and prohibition57 speak of "lack or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." Petitions for certiorari and prohibition as
it is understood under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are traditionally regarded as supervisory writs used as a means by
superior or appellate courts, in the exercise of their supervisory jurisdiction, to keep subordinate courts within the bounds of
their jurisdictions. As such, writs of certiorari and prohibition correct only errors of jurisdiction of judicial and quasi-judicial
bodies.58
However, considering the commonality of the ground of "grave abuse of discretion," a Rule 65 petition, as a procedural
vehicle to invoke the Court's expanded jurisdiction, has been allowed.59 After all, there is grave abuse of discretion when an
act is done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or is executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of
malice, ill will, or personal bias.60 In Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,61 the Court emphasized that certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues.
That it is a legislative act which is being assailed is likewise not a ground to deny the present petitions.
For one, the 1987 Constitution enumerates under Section 5(2)(a), Article VIII,62 the Court's irreducible powers which
expressly include the power of judicial review, or the power to pass upon the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation.
For another, the Court's expanded jurisdiction, when invoked, permits a review of acts not only by a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also by any branch or instrumentality of the Government. "Any
branch or instrumentality of the Government" necessarily includes the Legislative and the Executive, even if they are not
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.63 As such, the Court may review and/or prohibit or nullify, when
proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, there being no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.64
The power of judicial review over congressional action, in particular, was affirmed in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of
Representatives,65 wherein the Court held:
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action.
Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire
whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of
their functions and prerogatives. In Tañada v. Angara, where petitioners sought to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on
the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raised a justiciable controversy and that when an
action of the legislative branch is alleged to have seriously infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact
the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda, [this Court] declared null and void a resolution of the
House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the
House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra, it held that the
resolution of whether the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review.
In Daza v. Singson, it held that the act of the House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tañada v. Cuenco, it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative
power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality
of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, it exercised its power of judicial review to determine which between
the Electoral Commission and the National Assembly had jurisdiction over an electoral dispute concerning members of the
latter. (Internal citations omitted; emphases supplied)
This was reiterated in Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council,66 as follows:
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach,
and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal,
corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain
any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly
authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials. (Internal citation omitted; emphasis supplied)
Consistently, in Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City,67 the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition were regarded as proper vehicles to assail the constitutionality of curfew ordinances, and in Agcaoili v.
Fariñas,68 to question the contempt powers of the Congress in the exercise of its power of inquiry in aid of legislation.
The consistency in the Court's rulings as to the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also to correct, undo, or restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the legislative and the executive, propels the Court to treat the instant petitions in the same manner.
B.
Requisites for Judicial Review
The power of judicial review is tritely defined as the power to review the constitutionality of the actions of the other branches
of the government.69 For a proper exercise of its power of review in constitutional litigation, certain requisites must be
satisfied: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must
have "standing" to challenge; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4)
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.70
These requisites are effective limitations on the Court's exercise of its power of review because judicial review in
constitutional cases is quintessentially deferential, owing to the great respect that each co-equal branch of the Government
affords to the other.
Of these four requisites, the first two, being the most essential,71 deserve an extended discussion in the instant case.
1. Actual Case or Controversy
Fundamental in the exercise of judicial power, whether under the traditional or expanded setting, is the presence of an
actual case or controversy.72 An actual case or controversy is one which involves a conflict of legal rights and an assertion
of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. The case must not be moot or academic, or based on extra-legal
or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.
To be justiciable, the controversy must be definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse
legal interests. It must be shown from the pleadings that there is an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one
hand, and a denial thereof on the other. There must be an actual and substantial controversy and not merely a theoretical
question or issue. Further, the actual and substantial controversy must admit specific relief through a conclusive decree and
must not merely generate an advisory opinion based on hypothetical or conjectural state of facts.73
Closely associated with the requirement of an actual or justiciable case or controversy is the ripening seeds for adjudication.
Ripeness for adjudication has a two-fold aspect: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship
to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration. The first aspect requires that the issue must be purely legal and
that the regulation subject of the case is a "final agency action." The second aspect requires that the effects of the regulation
must have been felt by the challenging parties in a concrete way.74
To stress, a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the challenged governmental act has a direct and existing
adverse effect on the individual challenging it.75 While a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived threat to a
constitutional interest may provide basis for a constitutional challenge, it is nevertheless still required that there are sufficient
facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues.76
In this regard, the Court's pronouncement in Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) v. Secretary of
Education77 deserves reiteration:
It should be understandable, then, that this Court should be doubly reluctant to consider petitioner's demand for
avoidance of the law aforesaid, [e]specially where, as respondents assert, petitioners suffered no wrong - nor
allege any - from the enforcement of the criticized statute.
It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the
fallibility of human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to
duty and official oath decline the responsibility. x x x
When a law has been long treated as constitutional and important rights have become dependent thereon, the Court may
refuse to consider an attack on its validity. x x x
As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and
necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned. x x x
xxxx
It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result
of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general [interest] to invoke the judicial power to determine the
validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or [has an] interest common to all members of
the public. x x x
Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its
operation. x x x
The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of litigants require the use of that judicial
authority for their protection against actual interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient. x x x
Bona fide suit. - Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies. The authority to pass on the
validity of statutes is incidental to the decision of such cases where conflicting claims under the Constitution and under a
legislative act assailed as contrary to the Constitution are raised. It is legitimate only in the last resort, and as necessity in
the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between litigants. x x x
xxxx
An action, like this, is brought for a positive purpose, nay, to obtain actual and positive relief. x x x Courts do not sit
to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein, however intellectually solid the problem
may be. This is [e]specially true where the issues "reach constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into play
regard for the court's duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion." x x x
(Internal citations omitted; emphases supplied)
Ultimately, whether an actual case is present or not is determinative of whether the Court's hand should be stayed when
there is no adversarial setting and when the prerogatives of the co-equal branches of the Government should instead be
respected.
As ruled in Republic v. Roque: 78
A perusal of private respondents' petition for declaratory relief would show that they have failed to demonstrate how they are
left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed
provisions of RA 9372. Not far removed from the factual milieu in the Southern Hemisphere cases, private respondents only
assert general interests as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which the government could prospectively commit if the
enforcement of the said law would remain untrammelled. As their petition would disclose, private respondents' fear of
prosecution was solely based on remarks of certain government officials which were addressed to the general public. They,
however, failed to show how these remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or governmental action geared towards the
implementation of RA 9372 against them. In other words, there was no particular, real or imminent threat to any of them. As
held in Southern Hemisphere:
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no
original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency," where both the activity the
petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial
review for lack of ripeness.
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the
surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may
be abused. Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. (Internal citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
Concededly, the Court had exercised the power of judicial review by the mere enactment of a law or approval of a
challenged action when such is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre:79
First, on prematurity. According to the Dissent, when "the conduct has not yet occurred and the challenged construction has
not yet been adopted by the agency charged with administering the administrative order, the determination of the scope and
constitutionality of the executive action in advance of its immediate adverse effect involves too remote and abstract an
inquiry for the proper exercise of judicial function."
This is a rather novel theory - that people should await the implementing evil to befall on them before they can question acts
that are illegal or unconstitutional. Be it remembered that the real issue here is whether the Constitution and the law are
contravened by Section 4 of AO 372, not whether they are violated by the acts implementing it. In the unanimous en banc
case Tañada v. Angara, this Court held that when an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this Court. By the mere enactment of the questioned law or
the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other
overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. Said the
Court:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt
raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The question thus posed is
judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.
Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court x x x, it
becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.
xxxx
As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty
and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate
cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government.
In the same vein, the Court also held in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy:
x x x Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. The courts, as
guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature
transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where the statute violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but
the duty of the judiciary to declare such act unconstitutional and void.
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws, as in the present case, settling the dispute becomes the duty and the
responsibility of the courts. (Internal citations omitted; emphases supplied)
In Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa,80 the Court took cognizance of the petitions despite posing a facial challenge against the
entire law as the petitions seriously alleged that fundamental rights have been violated by the assailed legislation:
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that
budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
xxxx
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law
cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is
launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the
press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which
one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some
modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statutes, it has
expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom,
and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the
U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever
vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights
to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law
can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual
case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law
has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people. (Internal citations omitted; emphases supplied)81
Likewise in Belgica v. Ochoa,82 the Court held that the requirement of an actual case or controversy is satisfied by the
antagonistic positions taken by the parties:
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the
constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since
the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization-such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the
Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund - are currently existing and
operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of
these public funds.
1(a). Scope of Judicial Review
To determine whether petitioners presented an actual case or controversy, or have seriously alleged that R.A. No. 7662
suffers from constitutional infirmities to trigger the Court's power of judicial review, resort must necessarily be had to the
pleadings filed.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 allege that R.A. No. 7662 and the LEB issuances relative to the admission and practice of
law encroach upon the powers of the Court.83 It is their position that the powers given to the LEB are directly related to the
Court's powers.84 In particular, they argue that the LEB's power to adopt a system of continuing legal education under
Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662 falls within the authority of the Court.85 In their Memorandum, they additionally argue that the
LEB's powers to prescribe the qualifications and compensation of faculty members under Section 7(c) and 7(e) of R.A. No.
7662, Sections 50-51 of LEBMO No. 1, and Resolution No. 2014-02 intrude into the Court's rule-making power relative to
the practice of law.86 They also argue that the PhiLSAT violates the academic freedom of law schools and the right to
education.87 It is their contention that the LEB is without power to impose sanctions.88 They also question the authority of
the LEB Chairperson and Members to act in a hold-over capacity.89
For their part, petitioners-in-intervention allege that the PhiLSAT requirement resulted to a reduced number of law student
enrollees for St. Thomas More School of Law and Business, Inc. and constrained said law school to admit only students who
passed the PhiLSAT which is against their policy of admitting students based on values.90 Their co-petitioners are students
who either applied for law school, failed to pass the PhiLSAT, or, were conditionally enrolled. Thus, they argue that Section
7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT violate the law school's academic freedom.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 allege that they are current law students who failed to pass and/or take the PhiLSAT, and
who are therefore threatened with the revocation of their conditional enrollment and stands to be barred from enrolling.
Twelve of the 23 petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 were not allowed to enroll for failure to pass and/or take the PhiLSAT.
It is their argument that the LEB's power under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 to prescribe minimum standards for law
admission, Section 7(g) to establish a law practice internship, Section 7(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education,
and Section 3(a)(2) on the stated objective of legal education to increase awareness among members of the legal
profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society usurp the Court's rule-making powers
concerning admission to the practice of law.91 In addition, they argue that the PhiLSAT issuances violate academic
freedom, and that the LEB is not authorized to revoke conditional enrollment nor is it authorized to forfeit school fees and
impose a ban enrollment which are penal sanctions violative of the due process clause. They also argue that the
classification of students to those who have passed or failed the PhiLSAT for purposes of admission to law school is
repugnant to the equal protection clause.
The petitions therefore raise an actual controversy insofar as they allege that R.A. No. 7662, specifically Section 2,
paragraph 2, Section 3(a)(2), Section 7(c), (e), (g), and (h) of R.A. No. 7662 infringe upon the Court's power to promulgate
rules concerning the practice of law and upon institutional academic freedom and the right to quality education. Necessarily,
a review of the LEB issuances when pertinent to these assailed provisions of R.A. No. 7662 shall also be undertaken.
2. Legal Standing
Inextricably linked with the actual case or controversy requirement is that the party presenting the justiciable issue must
have the standing to mount a challenge to the governmental act.
By jurisprudence, standing requires a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the petitioner has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of the violation of its rights,92 thus:
Legal standing or locus standi is the "right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." To possess legal
standing, parties must show "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that [they have] sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged." The requirement of direct injury guarantees that
the party who brings suit has such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy and, in effect, assures "that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."93 (Emphasis supplied)
The rule on standing admits of recognized exceptions: the over breadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third-party standing and the
doctrine of transcendental importance.94
Petitioners-in-intervention Caballero, Castardo, Bringas, Federe and Matutino, being graduates of a four-year college course
and applicants as first year law students, as well as petitioners Abayata, Vasquez, Ilustrismo, Salaño, Guzman and Odias,
as law students who failed to pass the PhiLSAT and were denied admission to law school for the academic year 2018 to
2019, and petitioners Dela Cruz, Suico, Pescadero, Dela Paz, Queniahan, Mejos, Daño, Adolfo, Atig, Lumayag, Lagera,
Francisco, Dandan, Dela Peña, Villamor, Llorico and Santamaria, being law students who were conditionally enrolled,
possess the requisite standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 and the implementing LEB
issuances, as they were, in fact, required to take the PhiLSAT, or to comply with the terms of the conditional enrollment and
failing which, were denied admission as regular students to law school.
Petitioner-in-intervention St. Thomas More School of Law and Business, Inc., likewise sufficiently alleges injury that it has
sustained in the form of reduced number of enrollees due to the PhiLSAT requirement and the curtailment of its discretion
on who to admit in its law school. Under the specific and concrete facts available in this case, these petitioners have
demonstrated that they were, or tend to be directly and substantially, injured.
Meanwhile, petitioners Pimentel, Comafay, Gorospe, Sandoval, Loanzon, Perez, Cacho, Espaldon, Albano, Siazon,
Artugue, Lacsina, Liu, Buenviaje, Nicolas, Tolentino, and Gruyal; and petitioners-in intervention Rapista, Rapista-Tan, Tan,
Enterina and Villarico commonly anchor their standing to challenge R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT as citizens.
Standing as a citizen has been upheld by this Court in cases where a petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
importance or when paramount public interest is involved.95
Legal standing may be extended to petitioners for having raised a "constitutional issue of critical significance."96 Without a
doubt, the delineation of the Court's rule-making power vis-a-vis the supervision and regulation of legal education and the
determination of the reach of the State's supervisory and regulatory power in the context of the guarantees of academic
freedom and the right to education are novel issues with far-reaching implications that deserve the Court's immediate
attention. In taking cognizance of the instant petitions, the Court is merely exercising its power to promulgate rules towards
the end that constitutional rights are protected and enforced.97
Now, to the core substantive issues.
II.
Substantive Issues
A.
Jurisdiction Over Legal Education
Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 argue that the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of
law necessarily includes the power to do things related to the practice of law, including the power to prescribe the
requirements for admission to the study of law. In support, they point to Sections 698 and 16,99 Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. They contend that the Congress cannot create an administrative body, like the LEB, that exercises this rule-making
power of the Court. They emphasize that the LEB belongs to the Executive department, and, as such, is not linked or
accountable to the Court nor placed under the Court's regulation and supervision.
For their part, petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 maintain that the Court exercises authority over the legal profession which
includes the admission to the practice of law, to the continuing requirements for and discipline of lawyers.100 According to
them, the rule-making power of the Court is plenary in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of
law. They argue that the Court's power to admit members to the practice of law extends to admission to legal education
because the latter is a preparatory process to the application for admission to the legal profession, which "residual power" of
the Court can be inferred from Sections 5101 and 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. They also emphasize that under
Sections 1102 and 2103 of Rule 138-A, non-lawyers are allowed to have limited practice of law and are held to answer by
the Court under the same rules on privileged communication and standard of conduct pursuant to Sections 3104 and
4105 of Rule 138-A.106
Contrary to petitioner's claims, the Court has no primary and direct jurisdiction over legal education. Neither the history of the
Philippine legal education nor the Rules of Court invoked by petitioners support their argument. The supervision and
regulation of legal education is an Executive function.
1 Regulation and supervision of legal education had

been historically and consistently exercised
by the political departments
Legal education in the Philippines was institutionalized in 1734, with the establishment of the Faculty of Civil Law in the
University of Santo Tomas with Spanish as the medium of instruction. Its curriculum was identical to that adopted during the
time in the universities in Europe107 and included subjects on Civil Law, Canon Law, ecclesiastical discipline and elements
of Natural Law.108
In 1901, Act No. 74 was passed centralizing the public school system, and establishing the Department of Public Instruction
headed by the General Superintendent.109 The archipelago was then divided into school divisions and districts for effective
management of the school system. It was through Act No. 74 that a Trade School110 and a Normal School111 in Manila
and a School of Agriculture in Negros were established.112
In 1908, the legislature approved Act No. 1870 which created the University of the Philippines (UP). However, English law
courses were not offered until 1910 when the Educational Department Committee of the Young Men's Christian Association
(YMCA), through the efforts of Justice George Malcolm, offered law courses in the English language. In 1911, UP adopted
these classes by formally establishing its College of Law,113 with its first graduates being students who studied at
YMCA.114 The curriculum adopted by the UP College of Law became the model of the legal education curriculum of the
other law schools in the country.115
Private schools were formally regulated in 1917 with the passage of Act No. 2706116 which made obligatory the recognition
and inspection of private schools and colleges by the Secretary of Public Instruction, so as to maintain a standard of
efficiency in all private schools and colleges117 in the country. As such, the Secretary of Public Instruction was authorized to
inspect schools and colleges to determine efficiency of instruction and to make necessary regulations. Likewise, under Act
No. 2706, the Secretary of Public Instruction was specifically authorized to prepare and publish, from time to time, in
pamphlet form, the minimum standards required of law schools and other schools giving instruction of a technical or
professional character.118
In 1924, a survey of the Philippine education and of all educational institutions, facilities and agencies was conducted
through Act No. 3162, which created the Board of Educational Survey. Among the factual findings of the survey was that
schools at that time were allowed to operate with almost no supervision at all. This led to the conclusion that a great majority
of schools from primary grade to the university are money-making devices of persons who organize and administer them.
Thus, it was recommended that some board of control be· organized under legislative control to supervise their
administration.119 It was further recommended that legislation be enacted to prohibit the opening of any school without the
permission of the Secretary of Public Instruction. The grant of the permission was, in turn, predicated upon a showing that
the school is compliant with the proper standards as to the physical structure, library and laboratory facilities, ratio of student
to teacher and the qualifications of the teachers.120
Consistent with these statutory precursors, the 1935 Constitution expressed in no uncertain terms that "[a]ll educational
institutions shall be under the supervision and subject to regulation by the State."121
This was followed by several other statutes such as the Commonwealth Act No. 578122 which vests upon teachers,
professors, and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly-recognized private schools, colleges and universities
the status of "persons in authority" and Republic Act No. 139123 which created the Board of Textbooks, mandating all public
schools to use only the books approved by the Board and allowing all private schools to use textbooks of their choice,
provided it is not against the law or public policy or offensive to dignity.124
In 1947, the Department of Instruction was changed to the Department of Education.125 During this period, the regulation
and supervision of public and private schools belonged to the Bureau of Public and Private Schools. The regulation of law
schools in particular was undertaken by the Bureau of Private Schools through a special consultant who acted as a
supervisor of the law schools and as a national coordinator of the law deans.126
The Department of Education, through its Bureau of Private Schools, issued a Manual of Instructions for Private Schools
which contained the rules and regulations pertaining to the qualifications of the faculty and deans, faculty load and library
holdings of private learning institutions.127 Meantime, a Board of National Education was created128 with the task of
formulating, implementing and enforcing general educational policies and coordinating the offerings and functions of all
educational institutions. The Board of National Education was later renamed as the National Board of Education.129 In
1972, the Department of Education became the Department of Education and Culture,130 and was later on renamed as the
Ministry of Education and Culture in 1978.131
Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution remained consistent in mandating that all educational institutions shall be under the
supervision of and subject to regulation by the State.132
With the passage of Batas Pambansa Bilang 232133 (B.P. Blg. 232) or the Education Act of 1982, the regulatory rules on
both formal and non-formal systems in public and private schools in all levels of the entire educational system were codified.
The National Board of Education was abolished, and instead, a Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) was
organized to supervise and regulate educational institutions. Part and parcel of the MECS' authority to supervise and
regulate educational institutions is its authority to recognize or accredit educational institutions of all levels.134
Accordingly, the MECS was given the authority over public and private institutions of higher education, as well as degree-
granting programs, in all post-secondary public and private educational institutions.135 In particular, a Board of Higher
Education136 was established as an advisory body to the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports with the functions of
making policy recommendations on the planning and management of the integrated system of higher education and
recommending steps to improve the governance of the higher education system. Apart from the Board of Higher Education,
a Bureau of Higher Education was also established to formulate and evaluate programs and educational standards for
higher education137 and to assist the Board of Higher Education. Law schools were placed, under the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Higher Education.138
The MECS later became the DECS in 1987 under Executive Order No. 117139 (E.O. No. 117). Nevertheless, the power of
the MECS to supervise all educational institutions remained unchanged.140
The Administrative Code141 also states that it shall be the State that shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to
quality education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all; and that the DECS
shall be primarily responsible for the formulation, planning, implementation, and coordination of the policies, plans, programs
and projects in the areas of formal and non-formal education. The Administrative Code also empowered the Board of Higher
Education to create technical panels of experts in the various disciplines including law, to undertake curricula
development.142 As will be discussed hereunder, the 1987 Constitution crystallized the power of the State to supervise and
regulate all educational institutions.143
2 DECS Order No. 27-1989 was

the precursor of R.A. No. 7662
Pursuant to its mandate under B.P. Blg. 232, the DECS promulgated DECS Order No. 27, Series of 1989 (DECS Order No.
27-1989),144 in close coordination with the Philippine Association of Law Schools, the Philippine Association of Law
Professors and the Bureau of Higher Education. DECS Order No. 27-1989 specifically outlined the policies and standards
for legal education, and superseded all existing policies and standards related to legal education. These policies were made
applicable beginning school year 1989 to 1990.
"Legal education" was defined in DECS Order No. 27-1989 as an educational program including a clinical program
appropriate and essential in the understanding and application of law and the administration of justice. It is professional
education after completion of a required pre-legal education at the college level. For state colleges and universities, the
operation of their law schools was to depend on their respective charters, and for private colleges and universities, by the
rules and regulations issued by the DECS. Nevertheless, it was made clear under DECS Order No. 27-1989 that the
administration of a law school shall be governed primarily by the law school's own policies and the provisions thereof apply
only suppletorily.145
Likewise, in generally permissive terms, DECS Order No. 27-1989 prescribed the preferred qualifications and functions of a
law dean, as well as the preferred qualifications, conditions of employment and teaching load of law faculty members. It also
prescribed the general inclusions to the law curriculum, but gave the law schools the prerogative to design its own
curriculum. The DECS also drew a model law curriculum, thus, revising the 122-unit curriculum prescribed in 1946 by the
Office of Private Education, as well as the 134-unit curriculum prescribed in 1963. The law schools were also given the
option to maintain a legal aid clinic as part of its law curriculum. It also prescribed the need for law schools to have relevant
library resources. Applicants for a law course are required to comply with the specific requirements for admission by the
Bureau of Higher Education and the Court.
Such was the state of the regulation of legal education until the enactment of R.A. No. 7662 in 1993. In 1994, R.A. No.
7722146 was passed creating the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) tasked to supervise tertiary degree programs.
Except for the regulation and supervision of law schools which was to be undertaken by the LEB under R.A. No. 7662, the
structure of DECS as embodied in E.O. No. 117 remained practically unchanged.
Due to the fact that R.A. No. 7662 was yet to be implemented with the organization of the LEB, the CHED, meanwhile,
assumed the function of supervising and regulating law schools. For this purpose, the CHED constituted a Technical Panel
for Legal Education which came up with a Revised Policies and Standards for Legal Education, which, however, was
unpublished.
3 Legal education is a mere

composite of the educational system
As recounted, the historical development of statutes on education unerringly reflects the consistent exercise by the political
departments of the power to supervise and regulate all levels and areas of education, including legal education.
Legal education is but a composite of the entire Philippine education system. It is perhaps unique because it is a specialized
area of study. This peculiarity, however, is not reason in itself to demarcate legal education and withdraw it from the
regulatory and supervisory powers of the political branches.
Notwithstanding, petitioners maintain that legal education, owing to its specialized "legal" nature and being preparatory to
the practice of law, should fall within the regulation and supervision of the Court itself. Petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 went
as far as professing that they are not against the creation of an administrative body that will supervise and regulate law
schools, only that such body should be placed under the Court's supervision and control.
Two principal reasons militate against such proposition:
First, it assumes that the Court, in fact, possesses the power to supervise and regulate legal education as a necessary
consequence of its power to regulate the admission to the practice of law. This assumption, apart from being manifestly
contrary to the above-recounted history of legal education in the Philippines, is likewise devoid of legal anchorage.
Second, the Court exercises only judicial functions and it cannot, and must not, arrogate upon itself a power that is not
constitutionally vested to it, lest the Court itself violates the doctrine of separation of powers. For the Court to void R.A. No.
7662 and thereafter, to form a body that regulates legal education and place it under its supervision and control, as what
petitioners suggest, is to demonstrate a highly improper form of judicial activism.
4 Court's exclusive rule-making power covers the practice of law and not the study of law
The Constitution lays down the powers which the Court can exercise. Among these is the power to promulgate rules
concerning admission to the practice of law.
The rule-making power of the Supreme Court had been uniformly granted under the 1935, the 1973 and the 1987
Constitutions. The complexion of the rule-making power, however, changes with the promulgation of these organic laws.
Under the 1935 Constitution, existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure were repealed and were instead converted
as the Rules of Court which the Court can alter and modify. The Congress, on the other hand, was given the power to
repeal, alter or supplement the rules on pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law
promulgated by the Court.147
This power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and admission to the practice of law is in fact
zealously guarded by the Court.
Thus, in Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,148 the Court asserted its "exclusive" and constitutional power with
respect to the admission to the practice of law and when the act falls within the term "practice of law," the Rules of Court
govern.149
In In Re: Petition of A.E. Garcia,150 the Court withheld from the executive the power to modify the laws and regulations
governing admission to the practice of law as the prerogative to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law
belongs to the Court and the power to repeal, alter, or supplement such rules is reserved only to the Congress.
Even then, the character of the power of the Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law under the 1935 Constitution was held not to be absolute
and that any law passed by the Congress on the matter is merely permissive, being that the power concerning admission to
the practice of law is primarily a judicial function.
The 1973 Constitution is no less certain in reiterating the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts and the admission to the practice of law. As observed in Echegaray v. Secretary of
Justice,151 the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving it the additional power to
promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar.152
The ultimate power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure, the admission to the practice of law, and the
integration of the Bar remains to be with the Court under the 1973 Constitution even when the power of the Batasang
Pambansa to pass laws of permissive and corrective character repealing, altering, or supplementing such rules was
retained.
The 1987 Constitution departed from the 1935 and the 1973 organic laws in the sense that it took away from the Congress
the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law, and the integration of the Bar and therefore vests exclusively and beyond doubt, the power to promulgate
such rules to the Court, thereby supporting a "stronger and more independent judiciary."153
While the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions "textualized a power-sharing scheme" between the legislature and the Court in the
enactment of judicial rules,154 the 1987 Constitution "textually altered the power-sharing scheme" by deleting the Congress'
subsidiary and corrective power.155
Accordingly, the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar has been interpreted as vesting upon the Court the
authority to define the practice of law, to determine who will be admitted to the practice of law, to hold in contempt any
person found to be engaged in unauthorized practice of law, and to exercise corollary disciplinary authority over members of
the Bar.
The act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating lawyers in the practice of law is a judicial function because it
requires "(1) previously established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate
individuals; and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles."
Petitioners readily acknowledge that legal education or the study of law is not the practice of law, the former being merely
preparatory to the latter. In fact, the practice of law has a settled jurisprudential meaning:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice as the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination
by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations
and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always
subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with
men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far
as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involved
appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the
welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and
skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys.161 (Internal citations omitted)
The definition of the practice of law, no matter how broad, cannot be further enlarged as to cover the study of law.
5 The Court exercises judicial power only
Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution clearly provides that "[t]he Members of the Supreme Court and of other
courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions." The
Court exercises judicial power only and should not assume any duty alien to its judicial functions, the basic postulate being
the separation of powers. As early as Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co.,162 the Court already stressed:
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our government. It is judicial
power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of
constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly
confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The
Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to
assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions. (Emphases supplied)
Neither may the regulation and supervision of legal education be justified as an exercise of the Court's "residual" power. A
power is residual if it does not belong to either of the two co-equal branches and which the remaining branch can, thus,
exercise consistent with its functions. Regulation and supervision of legal education is primarily exercised by the Legislative
and implemented by the Executive, thus, it cannot be claimed by the judiciary.
It is with studied restraint that the Court abstains from exercising a power that is not strictly judicial, or that which is not
expressly granted to it by the Constitution.163 This judicial abstention is neither avoidance nor dereliction - there is simply
no basis for the Court to supervise and regulate legal education.
Court supervision over legal education is nevertheless urged to the same extent as the Court administers, supervises and
controls the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA).165 The parallelism is mislaid because the PHILJA is intended for judicial
education.166 It particularly serves as the "training school for justices, judges, court personnel, lawyers and aspirants to
judicial posts."167 Court supervision over judicial education is but consistent with the Court's power of supervision over all
courts and the personnel thereof.168
Still, petitioners insist that the Court actually regulated legal education through Sections 5, 6, and 16 of Rule 138 and
Sections 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Rule 138-A of the 1997 Rules of Court. On the contrary, the Rules of Court do not intend nor
provide for direct and actual Court regulation over legal education. At most, the Rules of Court are reflective of the inevitable
relationship between legal education and the admissions to the bar.
6 The Rules of Court do not support

the argument that the Court directly
and actually regulates legal education
While the power of the Court to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law exists under the 1935
Constitution and reiterated under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, the Court has not promulgated any rule that directly and
actually regulates legal education.
Instead, the 1964 Rules of Court concerned only the practice of law, admission to the bar, admission to the bar examination,
bar examinations, and the duties, rights and conduct of attorneys. The 1997 Rules of Court is no different as it contained
only the rules on attorneys and admission to the bar under Rule 138, the law student practice rule under Rule 138-A, the
integrated bar in Rule 139-A and disbarment and discipline of attorneys in Rule 139-B.169
In the exercise of its power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law, the Court has prescribed the
subjects covered by, as well as the qualifications of candidates to the bar examinations. Only those bar examination
candidates who are found to have obtained a passing grade are admitted to the bar and licensed to practice law.170 The
regulation of the admission to the practice of law goes hand in hand with the commitment of the Court and the members of
the Philippine Bar to maintain a high standard for the legal profession. To ensure that the legal profession is maintained at a
high standard, only those who are known to be honest, possess good moral character, and show proficiency in and
knowledge of the law by the standard set by the Court by passing the bar examinations honestly and in the regular and
usual manner are admitted to the practice of law.171
Thus, under the 1997 Rules of Court, admission to the bar requires: (1) furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral,
and other qualifications; (2) passing the bar examinations; and (3) taking the lawyer's oath,173 signing the roll of attorneys
and receiving from the clerk of court a certificate of the license to practice. An applicant for admission to the bar must have
these qualifications: (1) must be a citizen of the Philippines; (2) must at least be 21 years of age; (3) must be of good moral
character; (4) must be a resident of the Philippines; (5) must produce satisfactory evidence of good moral character; and (6)
no charges against the applicant, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. It
is beyond argument that these are the requisites and qualifications for admission to the practice of law and not for admission
to the study of law.
In turn, to be admitted to the bar examinations, an applicant must first meet the core academic qualifications prescribed
under the Rules of Court.
6(a). Sections 5, 6, and 16, Rule 138
Section 5 provides that the applicant should have studied law for four years and have successfully completed all the
prescribed courses. This section was amended by Bar Matter No. 1153,176 to require applicants to "successfully [complete]
all the prescribed courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent, in a law school or university officially
recognized by the Philippine Government, or by the proper authority in foreign jurisdiction where the degree has been
granted." Bar Matter No. 1153 further provides that a Filipino citizen who is a graduate of a foreign law school shall be
allowed to take the bar examinations only upon the submission to the Court of the required certifications.
In addition to the core courses of civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law,
political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation, and legal ethics, Section 5 was further amended
by A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC or the Revised Law Student Practice Rule dated June 25, 2019 to include Clinical Legal Education
as a core course that must be completed by an applicant to the bar examinations.
Notably, Section 5, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is not directed to law schools, but to those who would like
to take the bar examinations and enumerates the academic competencies required of them. The Court does not impose
upon law schools what courses to teach, or the degree to grant, but prescribes only the core academic courses which it finds
essential for an applicant to be admitted to the bar. Law schools enjoy the autonomy to teach or not to teach these courses.
In fact, the Court even extends recognition to a degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent obtained abroad or that granted
by a foreign law school for purposes of qualifying to take the Philippine Bar Examinations, subject only to the submission of
the required certifications. Section 5 could not therefore be interpreted as an exercise of the Court's regulatory or
supervisory power over legal education since, for obvious reasons, its reach could not have possibly be extended to legal
education in foreign jurisdictions.
In similar fashion, Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court requires that an applicant to the bar examinations must have
completed a four-year high school course and a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences. Again, this requirement is imposed
upon the applicant to the bar examinations and not to law schools. These requirements are merely consistent with the
nature of a law degree granted in the Philippines which is a professional, as well as a post-baccalaureate degree.
It is a reality that the Rules of Court, in prescribing the qualifications in order to take the bar examinations, had placed a
considerable constraint on the courses offered by law schools. Adjustments in the curriculum, for instance, is a compromise
which law schools apparently are willing to take in order to elevate its chances of graduating future bar examinees. It is in
this regard that the relationship between legal education and admissions to the bar becomes unmistakable. This, however,
does not mean that the Court has or exercises jurisdiction over legal education. Compliance by law schools with the
prescribed core courses is but a recognition of the Court's exclusive jurisdiction over admissions to the practice of law - that
no person shall be allowed to take the bar examinations and thereafter, be admitted to the Philippine Bar without having
taken and completed the required core courses.
Section 16, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, on the other hand, provides that those who fail the bar examinations for three or
more times must take a refresher course. Similarly, this is a requirement imposed upon the applicant. The Court does not
impose that a law school should absolutely include in its curriculum a refresher course.
6(b). Revised Law Student Practice Rule
Neither does Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC on law student practice manifest the
Court's exercise of supervision or regulation over legal education. The three-fold rationale of the law student practice rule is
as follows:
1. [T]o ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as a result of incompetence or inexperience of law
students, who, not having as yet passed the test of professional competence, are presumably not fully equipped to
act [as] counsels on their own;
2. [T]o provide a mechanism by which the accredited law school clinic may be able to protect itself from any
potential vicarious liability arising from some culpable action by their law students; and
3. [T]o ensure consistency with the fundamental principle that no person is allowed to practice a particular
profession without possessing the qualifications, particularly a license, as required by law.177
Consistently, the Revised Law Student Practice Rule is primordially intended to ensure access to justice of the marginalized
sectors and to regulate the law student practitioner's limited practice of law pursuant to the Court's power to promulgate
rules on pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
In allowing the law student and in governing the conduct of the law student practitioner, what the Court regulates and
supervises is not legal education, but the appearance and conduct of a law student before any trial court, tribunal, board, or
officer, to represent indigent clients of the legal clinic - an activity rightfully falling under the definition of practice of law.
Inasmuch as the law student is permitted to act for the legal clinic and thereby to practice law, it is but proper that the Court
exercise regulation and supervision over the law student practitioner. Necessarily, the Court has the power to allow their
appearance and plead their case, and hereafter, to regulate their actions.
In all, the Rules of Court do not support petitioners' argument that the Court regulates and supervises legal education. To
reiterate, the Rules of Court are directed not towards legal education or law schools, but towards applicants for admission to
the bar and applicants for admission to the bar examinations - consistent with the Court's power to promulgate rules
concerning admission to the practice of law, the same being fundamentally a judicial function.
Having, thus, established that the regulation and supervision of legal education do not fall within the competence of the
Court and is, instead, a power exercised by the political departments, the Court now proceeds to determine the extent of
such police power in relation to legal education.
B.
Reasonable Supervision and Regulation of Legal
Education as an Exercise of Police Power
The term police power was first used178 in jurisprudence in 1824 in Gibbons v. Ogden179 where the U.S. Supreme Court,
through Chief Justice Marshall, held that the regulation of navigation by steamboat operators for purposes of interstate
commerce was a power reserved to and exercised by the Congress, thus, negating state laws interfering with the exercise of
that power. Likewise often cited is Commonwealth v. Alger180 which defined police power as "the power vested in
legislature by the [C]onstitution, to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the [C]onstitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the Commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."
Closer to home, early Philippine jurisprudence pertain to police power as the power to promote the general welfare and
public interest;181 to enact such laws in relation to persons and property as may promote public health, public morals, public
safety and the general welfare of each inhabitant;182 to preserve public order and to prevent offenses against the state and
to establish for the intercourse of [citizens] those rules of good manners and good neighborhood calculated to prevent
conflict of rights.183
In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel [Operators] Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila,184 the nature and scope of police
power was reaffirmed as embracing the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order,
safety, or the general welfare of the people. It is negatively defined as the authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare185 and the State's inherent power to prohibit all that
is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society,186 and flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema
lex.187 It is described as the most essential, insistent and illimitable188 of the powers of the State. It is co-existent with the
concept of the State and is the very foundation and one of its cornerstones,189 and therefore even precedes the written
Constitution.
1 Enactment of education laws

is an exercise of police power
The State has a "high responsibility for [the] education of its citizens" and has an interest in prescribing regulations to
promote the education, and consequently, the general welfare of the people. The regulation or administration of educational
institutions, especially on the tertiary level, is invested with public interest. Thus, the enactment of education laws,
implementing rules and regulations and issuances of government agencies is an exercise of the State's police power.
As a professional educational program, legal education properly falls within the supervisory and regulatory competency of
the State. The legislative history of the Philippine legal educational system earlier recounted evinces that the State, through
statutes enacted by the Congress and administrative regulations issued by the Executive, consistently exercises police
power over legal education.
The exercise of such police power, however, is not absolute.
2 Supervisory and regulatory

exercise, not control
The 1935 and 1973 Constitutions plainly provide that all educational institutions shall be under the supervision of and
subject to regulation by the State. These reflect in express terms the police power already inherently possessed by the
State. Making express an already inherent power is not a superfluous exercise, but is rather consequential in case of conflict
between express powers. As elucidated in Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities:196
In this connection we do not share the belief that [now Article XIV, Section 4(1)] has added new power to what the State
inherently possesses by virtue of the police power. An express power is necessarily more extensive than a mere implied
power. For instance, if there is conflict between an express individual right and the express power to control private
education it cannot off-hand be said that the latter must yield to the former - conflict of two express powers. But if the power
to control education is merely implied from the police power, it is feasible to uphold the express individual right[.] x x x
The 1987 Constitution under Section 4(1), Article XIV, even when expressly recognizing the complementary roles played by
the public and private schools in education, reiterated that these educational institutions are subject to State supervision and
regulation, thus:
SEC. 4.(1) The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private institutions in the educational system and
shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational institutions. (Emphasis supplied)
As much as possible, the words of the Constitution are understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say.197
As worded, the Constitution recognizes that the role of public and private schools in education is complementary in relation
to each other, and primordial in relation to the State as the latter is only empowered to supervise and regulate. The exercise
of police power in relation to education must be compliant with the normative content of Section 4(1), Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution.198 The exercise of police power over education must merely be supervisory and regulatory.
The State's supervisory and regulatory power is an auxiliary power in relation to educational institutions, be it a basic,
secondary or higher education. This must necessarily be so since the right and duty to educate, being part and parcel of
youth-rearing, do not inure to the State at the first instance. Rather, it belongs essentially and naturally to the
parents,199 which right and duty they surrender by delegation to the educational institutions. As held in Samahan ng mga
Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City,200 the right and duty of parents to rear their children being a natural and
primary right connotes the parents' superior right over the State in the upbringing of their children. The responsibility to
educate lies with the parents and guardians as an inherent right,201 over which the State assumes a supportive
role.202 Withholding from the State the unqualified power to control education also serves a practical purpose - it allows for
a degree of flexibility and diversity essential to the very reason of education to rear socially responsible and morally upright
youth and to enable them, also, to come in contact with challenging ideas.
In this sense, when the Constitution gives the State supervisory power, it is understood that what it enjoys is a supportive
power, that is, the power of oversight over all educational institutions. It includes the authority to check, but not to interfere.
In addition to supervision, educational institutions are likewise made subject to State regulation. Dispensing a regulatory
function means imposing requirements, setting conditions, prescribing restrictions, and ensuring compliance. In this regard,
the political departments are vested with ample authority to set minimum standards to be met by all educational institutions.
Starkly withheld from the State is the power to control educational institutions. Consequently, in no way should supervision
and regulation be equated to State control. It is interesting to note that even when a suggestion had been made during the
drafting of the 1935 Constitution that educational institutions should be made "subject to the laws of the State," the
proponent of the amendment had no totalitarian intentions,205 and the proposal was not meant to curtail the liberty of
teaching,206 thus:
I think it only insures the efficient functioning of educational work and does not limit liberty of administrators of schools. The
gentleman will notice that my amendment does not tend to curtail which he used in asking the question [sic]. I want the
power of the State to be supervisory as supervision in educational parlance should be of the constructive type in the matter
of help rather than obstruction.207 (Emphasis supplied)
3 Reasonable exercise
To be valid, the supervision and regulation of legal education as an exercise of police power must be reasonable and not
repugnant to the Constitution.208
As held in Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr.,209 the exercise of police power, in order to be valid, must be compliant with
substantive due process:
[T]he State, x x x may be considered as having properly exercised [its] police power only if the following requisites are met:
(1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise[;] and (2) the
means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. (Emphases supplied)
In Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon,210 the Court held that:
Notwithstanding its. extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it
may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is
exercised, that is, to advance the public good. (Emphasis supplied)
Obviating any inference that the power to regulate means the power to control, the 1987 Constitution added the word
"reasonable" before the phrase supervision and regulation.
The import of the word "reasonable" was elaborated in Council of Teachers,211 as follows:
x x x Section 4(1) was a provision added by the Framers to crystallize the State's recognition of the importance of the role
that the private sector plays in the quality of the Philippine education system. Despite this recognition, the Framers added
the second portion of Section 41 to emphasize that the State, in the exercise of its police power, still possesses the power of
supervision over private schools. The Framers were explicit, however, that this supervision refers to external governance, as
opposed to internal governance which was reserved to the respective school boards, thus:
Madam President, Section 2(b) introduces four changes: one, the addition of the word "reasonable" before the phrase
"supervision and regulation"; two, the addition of the word "quality" before the word "education"; three, the change of the
wordings in the 1973 Constitution referring to a system of education, requiring the same to be relevant to the goals of
national development, to the present expression of "relevant to the needs of the people and society"; and four, the
explanation of the meaning of the expression "integrated system of education" by defining the same as the recognition and
strengthening of the complementary roles of public and private educational institutions as separate but integral parts of the
total Philippine educational system.
When we speak of State supervision and regulation, we refer to the external governance of educational institutions,
particularly private educational institutions as distinguished from the internal governance by their respective boards of
directors or trustees and their administrative officials. Even without a provision on external governance, the State would still
have the inherent right to regulate educational institutions through the exercise of its police power. We have thought it
advisable to restate the supervisory and regulatory functions of the State provided in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions with
the addition of the word "reasonable." We found it necessary to add the word "reasonable" because of an obiter dictum of
our Supreme Court in a decision in the case of Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities vs. The Secretary of
Education and the Board of Textbooks in 1955. In that case, the court said, and I quote:
It is enough to point out that local educators and writers think the Constitution provides for control of education by the State.
The Solicitor General cites many authorities to show that the power to regulate means power to control, and quotes from the
proceedings of the Constitutional Convention to prove that State control of private education was intended by organic law.
The addition, therefore, of the word 'reasonable' is meant to underscore the sense of the committee, that when the
Constitution speaks of State supervision and regulation, it does not in any way mean control. We refer only to the power of
the State to provide regulations and to see to it that these regulations are duly followed and implemented. It does not include
the right to manage, dictate, overrule and prohibit. Therefore, it does not include the right to dominate. (Emphases in the
original; underscoring supplied)
The addition of the word "reasonable" did not change the texture of police power that the State exercises over education. It
merely emphasized that State supervision and regulation of legal education cannot amount to control.
4 Academic freedom
Fundamental in constitutional construction is that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole, and that all provisions
bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the purposes of the
Constitution.212
Accordingly, the reasonable supervision and regulation clause is not a stand-alone provision, but must be read in
conjunction with the other Constitutional provisions relating to education which include, in particular, the clause on academic
freedom.
Section 5(2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.
This guarantee is not peculiar to the 1987 Constitution. A similar· provision was found in the 1973 Constitution providing
that: "All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom."213 Both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions provide for
a broader scope of academic freedom compared to the 1935 Constitution which limits the guarantee of academic freedom
only to universities of higher learning established by the State.214
In fact, academic freedom is not a novel concept. This can be traced to the freedom of intellectual inquiry championed by
Socrates, lost and replaced by thought control during the time of Inquisition, until the movement back to intellectual liberty
beginning the 16th century, most particularly flourishing in German universities.215
Academic freedom has traditionally been associated as a narrow aspect of the broader area of freedom of thought, speech,
expression and the press. It has been identified with the individual autonomy of educators to "investigate, pursue, [and]
discuss free from internal and external interference or pressure."216 Thus, academic freedom of faculty members,
professors, researchers, or administrators is defended based on the freedom of speech and press.217
Academic freedom is enjoyed not only by members of the faculty, but also by the students themselves, as affirmed
in Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong:
x x x. After protracted debate and ringing speeches, the final version which was none too different from the way it was
couched in the previous two (2) Constitutions, as found in Article XIV, Section 5(2) states: "Academic freedom shall be
enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." In anticipation of the question as to whether and what aspects of academic
freedom are included herein, ConCom Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna explained: "Since academic freedom is a dynamic
concept, we want to expand the frontiers of freedom, especially in education, therefore, we shall leave it to the courts to
develop further the parameters of academic freedom."
More to the point, Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon asked: "When we speak of the sentence 'academic freedom
shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning,' do we mean that academic freedom shall be enjoyed by the institution
itself?" Azcuna replied: "Not only that, it also includes x x x" Gascon finished off the broken thought, "the faculty and the
students." Azcuna replied: "Yes."
Jurisprudence has so far understood academic freedom of the students as the latter's right to enjoy in school the guarantees
of the Bill of Rights. For instance, in Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines219 and in Non v. Dames II,220 it was
held that academic standards cannot be used to discriminate against students who exercise their rights to peaceable
assembly and free speech, in Malabanan v. Ramento,221 it was ruled that the punishment must be commensurate with the
offense, and in Guzman v. National University,222 which affirmed the student's right to due process.
Apart from the academic freedom of teachers and students, the academic freedom of the institution itself is recognized and
constitutionally guaranteed.
The landmark case of Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology elucidates how academic
freedom is enjoyed by institutions of higher learning:
[I]t is to be noted that the reference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as the recipients of this boon. It would follow then
that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to
attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not
to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose, nullify its intent.
Former President Vicente G. Sinco of the University of the Philippines, in his Philippine Political Law, is similarly of the view
that it "definitely grants the right of academic freedom to the university as an institution as distinguished from the academic
freedom of a university professor." He cited the following from Dr. Marcel Bouchard, Rector of the University of Dijon,
France, President of the conference of rectors and vice-chancellors of European universities: "It is a well-established fact,
and yet one which sometimes tends to be obscured in discussions of the problems of freedom, that the collective liberty of
an organization is by no means the same thing as the freedom of the individual members within it; in fact, the two kinds of
freedom are not even necessarily connected. In considering the problems of academic freedom one must distinguish,
therefore, between the autonomy of the university, as a corporate body, and the freedom of the individual university
teacher." Also: To clarify further the distinction between the freedom of the university and that of the individual scholar, he
says: The personal aspect of freedom consists in the right of each university teacher - recognized and effectively guaranteed
by society - to seek and express the truth as he personally sees it, both in his academic work and in his capacity as a private
citizen. Thus the status of the individual university teacher is at least as important, in considering academic freedom, as the
status of the institutions to which they belong and through which they disseminate their learning. (Internal citations omitted;
emphasis supplied)
Garcia also enumerated the internal conditions for institutional academic freedom, that is, the academic staff should have de
facto control over: (a) the admission and examination of students; (b) the curricula for courses of study; (c) the appointment
and tenure of office of academic staff; and (d) the allocation of income among the different categories of expenditure.
Reference was also made to the influential language of Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire,225 describing it as the "business of the university" to provide a conducive atmosphere for speculation,
experimentation, and creation where the four essential freedoms of the university prevail: the right of the university to
determine for itself on academic grounds (a) who may teach; (b) what may be taught; (c) how it shall be taught; and (d) who
may be admitted to study.
4(a). State's supervisory and regulatory power over

legal education in relation to academic freedom
The rule is that institutions of higher learning enjoy ample discretion to decide for itself who may teach, what may be taught,
how it shall be taught and who to admit, being part of their academic freedom. The State, in the exercise of its reasonable
supervision and regulation over education, can only impose minimum regulations.
At its most elementary, the power to supervise and regulate shall not be construed as stifling academic freedom in
institutions of higher learning. This must necessarily be so since institutions of higher learning are not mere walls within
which to teach; rather, it is a place where research, experiment, critical thinking, and exchanges are secured. Any form of
State control, even at its most benign and disguised as regulatory, cannot therefore derogate the academic freedom
guaranteed to higher educational institutions. In fact, this non-intrusive relation between the State and higher educational
institutions is maintained even when the Constitution itself prescribes certain educational "thrusts" or directions.
This attitude of non-interference is not lost in jurisprudence. To cite an example, due regard for institutional academic
freedom versus State interference was recognized in Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, the commendable purpose of the
Philippine Regulation Commission of ensuring the integrity of the examination notwithstanding:
Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned.
Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers believe would best
enable their enrollees to meet the standards required before becoming a full-[f]ledged public accountant. Unless
the means or methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with
corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out their students. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, in University of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission,228 the Court upheld the university's academic
freedom to choose who should teach and held that the Civil Service Commission had no authority to dictate to the university
the outright dismissal of its personnel. Nothing short of marked arbitrariness,229 or grave abuse of discretion230 on the part
of the schools, or overriding public welfare231 can therefore justify State interference with the academic judgment of higher
educational institutions. As held in Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong,232 "[a]s corporate entities, educational
institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise,
unhampered by external controls or pressure."
5. Right to education
Apart from the perspective of academic freedom, the reasonable supervision and regulation clause is also to be viewed
together with the right to education. The 1987 Constitution speaks quite elaborately on the right to education. Section 1,
Article XIV provides:
SEC. 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and shall take
appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.
The normative elements of the general right to education under Section 1, Article XIV, are (1) to protect and promote quality
education; and (2) to take appropriate steps towards making such quality education accessible.
"Quality" education is statutorily defined as the appropriateness, relevance and excellence of the education given to meet
the needs and aspirations of the individual and society.233
In order to protect and promote quality education, the political departments are vested with the ample authority to set
minimum standards to be met by all educational institutions. This authority should be exercised within the parameters of
reasonable supervision and regulation. As elucidated in Council of Teachers:234
While the Constitution indeed mandates the State to provide quality education, the determination of what constitutes quality
education is best left with the political departments who have the necessary knowledge, expertise, and resources to
determine the same. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission again are very instructive:
Now, Madam President, we have added the word "quality" before "education" to send appropriate signals to the government
that, in the exercise of its supervisory and regulatory powers, it should first set satisfactory minimum requirements in all
areas curriculum, faculty, internal administration, library, laboratory class and other facilities, et cetera, and it should see to it
that satisfactory minimum requirements are met by all educational institutions, both public and private.
When we speak of quality education we have in mind such matters, among others, as curriculum development, development
of learning resources and instructional materials, upgrading of library and laboratory facilities, innovations in educational
technology and teaching methodologies, improvement of research quality, and others. Here and in many other provisions on
education, the principal focus of attention and concern is the students. I would like to say that in my view there is a slogan
when we speak of quality of education that I feel we should be aware of, which is, "Better than ever is not enough." In other
words, even if the quality of education is good now, we should attempt to keep on improving it. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
On the other hand, "accessible" education means equal opportunities to education regardless of social and economic
differences. The phrase "shall take appropriate steps" signifies that the State may adopt varied approaches in the delivery of
education that are relevant and responsive to the needs of the people and the society. This is why, towards this end, the
State shall:
(1) Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of education relevant
to the needs of the people and society;
(2) Establish and maintain a system of free public education in the elementary and high school levels.
Without limiting the natural right of parents to rear their children, elementary education is compulsory for
all children of school age;
(3) Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan programs, subsidies, and other
incentives which shall be available to deserving students in both public and private schools, especially to
the underprivileged;
(4) Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning systems, as well as self-learning,

independent, and out-of-school study programs particularly those that respond to community needs; and
(5) Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in civics, vocational
efficiency, and other skills.235 (Emphases supplied)
The deliberations of the framers in this regard are instructive:
MR. GASCON: When we speak of education as a right, what we would like to emphasize is that education should be equally
accessible to all regardless of social and economic differences. So we go into the issue of providing opportunities to such an
education, recognizing that there are limitations imposed on those who come from the poorer social classes because of their
inability to continue education.236 x x x (Emphasis supplied)
And further, as follows:
This is why when we speak of education as a right, it means very clearly that education should be accessible to all,
regardless of social and economic differences, meaning, educational opportunities should be provided through a system of
free education, at least, up to the secondary level. And recognizing the limits of our financial resources, tertiary education
should still be afforded and provided availability to those who are poor and deserving. That is why when we say that
education is a right, it imposes a correlative duty on the part of the State to provide it to the citizens. Making it a right shows
that education is recognized as an important function of the State. Education is not merely a social service to be provided by
the State. The proposed provision recognizes that a right to education is a right to acquire a decent standard of living, and
that, therefore, the State cannot deprive anyone of this right in the same manner that the right to life, the right to liberty and
property cannot be taken away without due process of law.237 (Emphasis supplied)
The element of accessibility under the Constitution, thus, pertains to both the elimination of discrimination especially against
disadvantaged groups and to the financial duty of the State for, after all, the right to education is part and parcel of social
justice. The objective is to make quality education accessible by appropriate means.
Apart from the Constitution, the right to education is also recognized in international human rights law under various
instruments to which the Philippines is a state signatory and to which it is concomitantly bound.
For instance, Article 13(2)238 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) recognizes
the right to receive an education with the following interrelated and essential features; (a) availability; (b) accessibility; (c)
acceptability; and (d) adaptability.239
In particular, accessibility is understood as giving everyone, without discrimination, access to educational institutions and
programs. Accessibility has three overlapping dimensions:
(1) Non-discrimination - education must be accessible to all, especially the most vulnerable groups, in law and fact,
without discrimination on any of the prohibited grounds x x x;
(2) Physical accessibility - education has to be within safe physical reach, either by attendance at some reasonably
convenient geographic location ([e.g.] a neighborhood school) or [via] modern technology ([e.g.] access to a
"distance learning" programme); [and]
(3) Economic accessibility - education has to be affordable to all. This dimension of accessibility is subject to the
differential wording of [A]rticle 13(2) in relation to primary, secondary and higher education: whereas primary
education shall be available "free to all", States parties are required to progressively introduce free secondary and
higher education[.]240
Pertinent to higher education, the elements of quality and accessibility should also be present as the Constitution provides
that these elements should be protected and promoted in all educational institutions.
Nevertheless, the right to receive higher education is not absolute.
5(a). Right to education is subject to fair,

reasonable, and equitable admission and
academic requirements
Article 26(1)241 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that "[t]echnical and professional education shall be
made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit[,]" while the ICESCR
provides that "[h]igher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate
means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education[.]"242 Thus, higher education is not to be
generally available, but accessible only on the basis of capacity.243 The capacity of individuals should be assessed by
reference to all their relevant expertise and experience.244
The right to receive higher education must further be read in conjunction with the right of every citizen to select a profession
or course of study guaranteed under the Constitution. In this regard, the provisions of the 1987 Constitution under Section
5(3), Article XIV are more exacting:
SEC. 5. x x x
xxxx
(3) Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission
and academic requirements.
There is uniformity in jurisprudence holding that the authority to set the admission and academic requirements used to
assess the merit and capacity of the individual to be admitted and retained in higher educational institutions lie with the
institutions themselves in the exercise of their academic freedom.
In Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong,245 the Court ruled:
Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently upheld the salutary proposition that admission to an
institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student
rather than a right. While under the Education Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose their field of
study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as
all rights are, to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution.
"For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the admission, discipline and promotion
of students. This right x x x extends as well to parents x x x as parents are under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation,
individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools."
Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the successful management of the college.
The rules may include those governing student discipline." Going a step further, the establishment of rules governing
university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the
smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival.
Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the academic groves as collectively, the students
demanded and plucked for themselves from the panoply of academic freedom their own rights encapsulized under the rubric
of "right to education" forgetting that, in Hohfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty, and that is, their duty to learn under
the rules laid down by the school. (Citation in the original omitted; emphases supplied)
In Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines,246 the Court similarly held:
xxxx
2. What cannot be stressed too sufficiently is that among the most important social, economic, and cultural rights is
the right to education not only in the elementary and high school grades but also on the college level. The
constitutional provision as to the State maintaining "a system of free public elementary education and, in areas
where finances permit, establish and maintain a system of free public education" up to the high school level does
not per se exclude the exercise of that right in colleges and universities. It is only at the most a reflection of the lack
of sufficient funds for such a duty to be obligatory in the case of students in the colleges and universities. As far as
the right itself is concerned, not the effectiveness of the exercise of such right because of the lack of funds, Article
26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: "Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be
free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and
professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on
the basis of merit."
3. It is quite clear that while the right to college education is included in the social economic, and cultural rights, it is
equally manifest that the obligation imposed on the State is not categorical, the phrase used being "generally
available" and higher education, while being "equally accessible to all should be on the basis of merit." To that
extent, therefore, there is justification for excluding three of the aforementioned petitioners because of their marked
academic deficiency.
4. The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning" includes the right to set academic standards
to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students. Once it has done so,
however, that standard should be followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students
who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does so, then there is a
legitimate grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause being disregarded.
(Emphases supplied)
Likewise, in Calawag:247
Lastly, the right to education invoked by Calawag cannot be made the basis for issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction. In Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. San Diego, we held that the right to education is not absolute.
Section 5(e), Article XIV of the Constitution provides that "[e]very citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study,
subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements." The thesis requirement and the
compliance with the procedures leading to it, are part of the reasonable academic requirements a person desiring to
complete a course of study would have to comply with. (Citation in the original omitted; emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the framers on the qualifications to the right to education are also illuminating:
MR. NOLLEDO: Thank you, Madam President. Before I ask questions directed to the chairman and members of the
committee, I would like to warmly congratulate them for a job well-done. The committee report to my mind, Madam
President, is excellent and I hope it will not, in the course of amendments, suffer from adulteration. With respect to page 1,
lines 12-13: "Education is the right of every citizen of the Philippines," I agree with this statement, but when we talk of the
right, I understand from the chairman that it is compellable and from Commissioner Guingona, that it is enforceable in
court. Suppose a student of a private school is not allowed to enroll by reason of misconduct or that his stay in the school is
considered by the administration of that school to be undesirable, does he have a right to enforce his right to education
under this situation?
MR. GUINGONA: Madam President, the right to education, like any other right, is not absolute. As a matter of fact, Article
XXVI of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, when it acknowledges the right to education, also qualifies it when at
the end of the provision, it say, "on the basis of merit." Therefore, the student may be subject to certain reasonable
requirements regarding admission and retention and this is so provided in the draft Constitution. We admit even of
discrimination. We have accepted this in the Philippines, and I suppose in the United States there are schools that can
refuse admission to boys because they are supposed to be exclusively for girls. And there are schools that may refuse
admission to girls because they are exclusively for boys. There may even be discrimination to accept a student who has a
contagious disease on the ground that it would affect the welfare of the other students. What I mean is that there could be
reasonable qualifications, limitations or restrictions to this right, Madam President.
MR. GASCON: May I add, Madam President.
MR. NOLLEDO: Yes, the Commissioner may.
MR. GASCON: When we speak of education as a right, what we would like to emphasize is that education should be equally
accessible to all regardless of social and economic differences. So we go into the issue of providing opportunities to such an
education, recognizing that there are limitations imposed on those who come from the poorer social classes because of their
inability to continue education.
However, in the same light, this right to education is subject to the right of educational institutions to admit students upon
certain conditions such as ability to pay the required entrance examination fee and maintaining a respectable school record.
When we speak of this right of schools as far as maintaining a certain degree or quality of students, these conditions must
be reasonable and should not be used just to impose certain unfair situations on the students.
MR. GUINGONA: Madam President, may I add.
There is already established jurisprudence about this. In the United States, in the case of [Lesser] v. Board of Education of
New York City, 239, NYS 2d 776, the court held that the refusal of a school to admit a student who had an average of less
than 85 percent which is the requirement for that school was lawful.
In the Philippines, we have the case of Padriguilan [sic] v. Manila Central University where refusal to retain the student was
because of the alleged deficiency in a major subject and this was upheld by our Supreme Court. There is also the case
of Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, wherein Garcia, a woman, tried to continue studying in this school of
theology.248 (Citation in the original omitted; emphases supplied)
Extant from the foregoing is that while there is a right to quality higher education, such right is principally subject to the broad
academic freedom of higher educational institutions to impose fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements. Plainly stated, the right to receive education is not and should not be taken to mean as a right to be admitted
to educational institutions.
With the basic postulates that jurisdiction over legal education belongs primarily and directly to the political departments, and
that the exercise of such police power must be in the context of reasonable supervision and regulation, and must be
consistent with academic freedom and the right to education, the Court now proceeds to address whether the assailed
provisions of R.A. No. 7662 and the corresponding LEB issuances fall within, the constitutionally-permissible supervision
and regulation of legal education.
C.
LEB's Powers Under R.A. No. 7662 vis-a-vis the
Court's Jurisdiction Under Article VIII, Section
5(5) of the Constitution
1 Section 3(a)(2) on increasing awareness

among members of the legal profession
One of the general objectives of legal education under Section 3(a)(2) of R.A. No. 7662 is to "increase awareness
among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society[.]" This
objective is reiterated by the LEB in LEBMO No. 1-2011, Section 7, Article II, as follows:
SEC. 7. (Section 3 of the law) General and Specific Objectives of Legal Education.
a) Legal education in the Philippines is geared to attain the following objectives:
xxxx
(2) to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors
of society[.] (Emphasis supplied)
The plain language of Section 3(a)(2) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 7(2) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 are clear and need no
further interpretation. This provision goes beyond the scope of R.A. No. 7662, i.e., improvement of the quality of legal
education, and, instead delves into the training of those who are already members of the bar. Likewise, this objective is a
direct encroachment on the power of the Court to promulgate rules concerning the practice of law and legal assistance to
the underprivileged and should, thus, be voided on this ground. As aptly observed by the CLEBM and which the Court had
approved:
In the same vein Section 3 provides as one of the objectives of legal education increasing "awareness among members of
the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of the society." Such objective should not find
a place in the law that primarily aims to upgrade the standard of schools of law as they perform the task of educating
aspiring lawyers. Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution also provides that the Supreme Court shall have
the power to promulgate rules on "legal assistance to the underprivileged" and hence, implementation of R.A. No. 7662
might give rise to infringement of a constitutionally mandated power.
2 Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7(g) on legal

apprenticeship and law practice internship
as a requirement for taking the bar
Towards the end of uplifting the standards of legal education, Section 2, par. 2 of R.A. No. 7662 mandates the State to (1)
undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education system; (2) require proper selection of law students; (3) maintain
quality among law schools; and (4) require legal apprenticeship and continuing legal education.
Pursuant to this policy, Section 7(g) of R.A. No. 7662 grants LEB the power to establish a law practice internship as a
requirement for taking the bar examinations:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. - x x x x
xxxx
(g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar, which a law student shall undergo with any duly
accredited private or public law office or firm or legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific period
that the Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose, the Board shall prescribe the
necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a
new member of the Bar.
This power is mirrored in Section 11(g) of LEBMO No. 1-2011:
SEC. 11. (Section 7 of the law) Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving the objectives of this Act, the Board
shall have the following powers and functions:
xxxx
g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar which a law student shall undergo with any duly
accredited private or public law office or firm or legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific period
that the Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12)months. For this purpose, the Board shall prescribe the
necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a
new member of the Bar[.]
It is clear from the plain text of Section 7(g) that another requirement, i.e., completion of a law internship program, is
imposed by law for taking the bar examinations. This requirement unduly interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Court to promulgate rules concerning the practice of law and admissions thereto.
The jurisdiction to determine whether an applicant may be allowed to take the bar examinations belongs to the Court. In fact,
under the whereas clauses of the Revised Law Student Practice Rule, the Court now requires the completion of clinical legal
education courses, which may be undertaken either in a law clinic or through an externship, as a prerequisite to take the bar
examinations, thus:
Whereas, to produce practice-ready lawyers, the completion of clinical legal education courses must be a prerequisite to
take the bar examinations as provided in Section 5 of Rule 138.
Under Section 7(g), the power of the LEB is no longer confined within the parameters of legal education, but now dabbles on
the requisites for admissions to the bar examinations, and consequently, admissions to the bar. This is a direct
encroachment upon the Court's exclusive authority to promulgate rules concerning admissions to the bar and should,
therefore, be struck down as unconstitutional.
Further, and as will be discussed hereunder, the LEB exercised this power in a manner that forces upon law schools the
establishment of a legal apprenticeship program or a legal aid clinic, in violation of the schools' right to determine for
themselves their respective curricula.
3 Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7(h) on

continuing legal education of practicing lawyers
Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 argue that the power given to the LEB to adopt a system of continuing legal education
implies that the LEB exercises jurisdiction not only over the legal education of those seeking to become lawyers, but also
over those who are already lawyers which is a function exclusively belonging to the Court. Respondent, on the other hand,
maintains that the LEB's power to adopt a system of continuing legal education is different from the mandatory continuing
legal education required of all members of the bar. Respondent explains that the continuing legal education under R.A. No.
7662 is limited to the training of lawyer-professors and not to the practice of the legal profession.
The questioned power of the LEB to adopt a system of continuing legal education appears in Section 2, par. 2 and Section
7(h) of R.A. No. 7662:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policies. - x x x
xxxx
law students, maintain quality among law schools, and require legal apprenticeship and continuing legal education.
xxxx
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. - x x x
xxxx
(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the [LEB] may provide for the mandatory attendance of
practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the [LEB] may deem necessary; x x x (Emphases supplied)
This power is likewise reflected in Section 11(h) of LEBMO No. 1-2011, as follows:
SEC. 11. (Section 7 of the law) Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving the objectives of this Act, the Board
shall have the following powers and functions:
xxxx
h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board may provide for the mandatory
attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the Board may deem necessary[.] x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
By its plain language, the clause "continuing legal education" under Section 2, par. 2, and Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662
unduly give the LEB the power to supervise the legal education of those who are already members of the bar. Inasmuch as
the LEB is authorized to compel mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the
LEB deems, necessary, the same encroaches upon the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the Integrated Bar
which includes the education of "lawyer-professors" as teaching of law is practice of law. The mandatory continuing legal
education of the members of the bar is, in fact, covered by B.M. No. 850 or the Rules on Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) dated August 22, 2000 which requires members of the bar, not otherwise exempt, from completing, every
three years, at least 36 hours of continuing legal education activities approved by the MCLE Committee directly supervised
by the Court.
As noted by the CLEBM:
Thus, under the declaration of policies in Section 2 of [R.A. No. 7662, the State "shall undertake appropriate reforms in the
legal education system, require the proper selection of law students, maintain quality among law schools and require
apprenticeship and continuing legal education["]. The concept of continuing legal education encompasses education not only
of law students but also of members of the legal profession. Its inclusion in the declaration of policies implies that the [LEB]
shall have jurisdiction over the education of persons who have finished the law course and are already licensed to practice
law. Viewed in the light of Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution that vests the Supreme Court with powers
over the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, said portion of Section 2 of [R.A. No. 7662 risks a declaration of constitutional
infirmity.253 (Underscoring supplied)
4 Section 7(e) on minimum

standards for law admission
and the PhiLSAT issuances
Of the several powers of the LEB under R.A. No. 7662, its power to prescribe minimum standards for law admission under
Section 7(e) received the strongest objection from the petitioners. Section 7(e), provides:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. - x x x
xxxx
(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications and compensation of faculty members;
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners argue that the power to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission belongs to the Court pursuant to its
rule-making power concerning the admission to the practice of law; Thus, Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 which gives the LEB
the power to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission is allegedly unconstitutional as it violates the doctrine of
separation of powers. Necessarily, according to the petitioners, the PhiLSAT which was imposed by the LEB pursuant to
Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 is likewise void.
The Court finds no constitutional conflict between its rule-making power and the power of the LEB to prescribe the minimum
standards for law admission under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662. Consequently, the PhiLSAT, which intends to regulate
admission to law schools, cannot be voided on this ground.
4(a). LEB's power to prescribe minimum standards

for "law admission" pertain to admission to
legal education and not to the practice of law
Much of the protestation against the LEB's exercise of the power to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission
stems from the interpretation extended to the phrase "law admission." For petitioners, "law admission" pertains to the
practice of law, the power over which belongs exclusively to the Court.
The statutory context and the intent of the legislators do not permit such interpretation.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that
is, every part must be read together with the other parts, to the end that the general intent of the law is given primacy.254 As
such, a law's clauses and phrases cannot be interpreted as isolated expressions nor read in truncated parts, but must be
considered to form a harmonious whole.255
Accordingly, the LEB's power under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission
should be read with the State policy behind the enactment of R.A. No. 7662 which is fundamentally to uplift the standards of
legal education and the law's thrust to undertake reforms in the legal education system. Construing the LEB's power to
prescribe the standards for law admission together with the LEB's other powers to administer, supervise, and accredit law
schools, leads to the logical interpretation that the law circumscribes the LEB's power to prescribe admission requirements
only to those seeking enrollment to a school or college of law and not to the practice of law.
Reference may also be made to DECS Order No. 27-1989, as the immediate precursor of R.A. No. 7662, as to what is
sought to be regulated when the law speaks of "law admission" requirements.
Section 1, Article VIII of DECS Order No. 27-1989 is clear that the admission requirement pertains to enrollment in a law
course, or law school, or legal education, thus:
Article VIII
Admission, Residence and Other Requirements
SEC. 1. No applicant shall be enrolled in the law course unless he complies with specific requirements for admission by the
Bureau of Higher Education and the Supreme Court of the Philippines, for which purpose he must present to the registrar
the necessary credentials before the end of the enrollment period. (Emphases supplied)
This contemporary interpretation suffice in itself to hold that the phrase "law admission" pertains to admission to the study of
law or to legal education, and not to the practice of law. Further support is nevertheless offered by the exchanges during the
Senate interpellations, wherein it was assumed that the phrase "minimum standards for law admission" refers to the
requirements that the student must fulfill before being admitted to law school. This assumption was not corrected by the bill's
sponsor.
4(b). Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 is reasonable supervision and regulation
Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662, insofar as it gives the LEB the power to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission is
faithful to the reasonable supervision and regulation clause. It merely authorizes the LEB to prescribe minimum
requirements not amounting to control.
Emphatically, the law allows the LEB to prescribe only the minimum standards and it did not, in any way, impose that the
minimum standard for law admission should be by way of an exclusionary and qualifying exam nor did it prevent law schools
from imposing their respective admission requirements.
Thus, under LEBMO No. 1-2011, the minimum standards for admission to law schools as implemented by the LEB are: (1)
completion of a four-year high school course; and (2) completion of a course for a bachelor's degree in arts or
sciences.257 Again, these requirements are but consistent with the nature of the law course in the Philippines as being both
a professional and post-baccalaureate education.
As the facts disclose, however, the LEB later on introduced the PhiLSAT as an additional prerequisite for admission to law
school.
4(c). Pursuant to Section 7(e), LEB is authorized to administer

an aptitude test as a minimum standard for law admission
Evident from the Senate deliberations that, in prescribing the minimum standards for law admission, an aptitude test may be
administered by the LEB although such is not made mandatory under the law. Thus:
Senator Tolentino: x x x
I will proceed to another point, Mr. President. I have taught law for more than 25 years in private schools and in the
University of the Philippines as well. There is one thing I have noticed in all these years of teaching and that is, many
students in the law school are not prepared or apt by inclination or by ability to become lawyers. I see that the objectives of
the legal education that are provided for in this bill do not provide for some mechanism of choosing people who should take
up the law course.
As it is now, because of our democratic principles, anybody who wants to become a lawyer, who can afford the tuition fee, or
who has the required preparatory course, can be admitted into the law school. And yet, while studying law, many of these
students - I would say there are about 30 or 40 percent of students in private schools - should not be taking up law but some
other course because, simply, they do not have the inclination, they do not have the aptitude or the ability to become
lawyers.
Can that be provided for in this bill, Madam Sponsor? Would it contravene really our principles of democracy where
everybody should be free to take the course that he wants to take? Or should the State be able to determine who should be
able or who should be allowed to take a particular course, in this case of law?
Senator Shahani: Mr. President, there are those aptitude tests which are being taken when the student is in high school to
somehow guide the guidance councilors [sic] into the aptitude of the students. But the talent or the penchant for the legal
profession is not one of those subjects specifically measured. I think what is measured really is who is, more or less,
talented for an academic education as against a vocational education. But maybe, a new test will have to be designed to
really test the aptitude of those who would like to enter the law school. x x x
Senator Tolentino: x x x
Many parents want to see their children become lawyers. But they do not consider the aptitude of these children, and they
waste money and time in making these children take up law when they really are not suited to the law course. My real
concern is whether by legislation, we can provide for selection of those who should be allowed to take up law, and not
everybody would be allowed to take up law. x x x
xxxx
Senator Shahani: Mr. President, of course, the right to education is a constitutional right, and I think one cannot just
categorically deny a student - especially if he is bright - entrance to a law school. I think I would stand by what I had
previously said that an aptitude examination will have to be specially designed. It is not in existence yet. x x
x258 (Emphases supplied)
This matter was amplified in second reading:
Senator Angara: x x x
Senator Tolentino asked why there is an omission on the requirements for admission to law school. I think [Senator Shahani]
has already answered that, that the [LEB] may prescribe an aptitude test for that purpose. Just as in other jurisdictions, they
prescribe a law admission test for prospective students of law. I think the board may very well decide to prescribe such a
test, although it is not mandatory under this bill.259 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The lawmakers, therefore, recognized and intended that the LEB be vested with authority to administer an aptitude test as a
minimum standard for law admission. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible, and just law
and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law.260 This
presumption has not been successfully challenged by petitioners.
It also bears to note that the introduction of a law aptitude examination was actually supported by the Court when it
approved the CLEBM's proposed amendment to Section 7(e), as follows:
SEC. 6. Section 7 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 7. Power and Functions. - x x x
xxxx
d). to prescribe minimum standards for ADMISSION TO LAW SCHOOLS INCLUDING A SYSTEM OF LAW APTITUDE
EXAMINATION x x x[.]" (Underscoring supplied)
And further in Bar Matter No. 1161261 when the Court referred to the LEB the conduct of a proposed law entrance
examination.
4(d). PhiLSAT, as an aptitude exam,

is reasonably related to the improvement
of legal education
Having settled that the LEB has the power to administer an aptitude test, the next issue to be resolved is whether the
exercise of such power, through the PhiLSAT, was reasonable.
Indeed, an administrative regulation is susceptible to attack for unreasonableness. In Lupangco v. Court of Appeals,262 the
Court held:
It is an [axiom] in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the
issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to
secure the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be
issued, then they must be held to be invalid. (Emphasis supplied)
To determine whether the PhiLSAT constitutes a valid exercise of police power, the same test of reasonableness, i.e., the
concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful means, is employed. Petitioners argue that the PhiLSAT is unreasonable
because: it is not a conclusive proof of the student's aptitude;263 it entails unreasonable examination and travel expenses
and burdensome documentary requirements;264 applying for PhiLSAT exemption is inconvenient;265 it is redundant to
existing law school entrance exams;266 and it is not supported by scientific study.267
Unfortunately, these grounds are not only conclusions of fact which beg the presentation of competent evidence, but also
necessarily go into the wisdom of the PhiLSAT which the Court cannot inquire into. The Court's pronouncement as to the
reasonableness of the PhiLSAT based on the grounds propounded by petitioners would be an excursion into the policy
behind the examinations - a function which is administrative rather than judicial.
Petitioners also argue that there is no reasonable relation between improving the quality of legal education and regulating
access thereto. The Court does not agree.
The subject of the PhiLSAT is to improve the quality of legal education. It is indubitable that the State has an interest in
prescribing regulations promoting education and thereby protecting the common good. Improvement of the quality of legal
education, thus, falls squarely within the scope of police power. The PhiLSAT, as an aptitude test, was the means to protect
this interest.
4(e). Tablarin sustained the conduct of an

admission test as a legitimate exercise
of the State's regulatory power
Moreover, by case law, the Court already upheld the validity of administering an aptitude test as a reasonable police power
measure in the context of admission standards into institutions of higher learning.
In Tablarin, the Court upheld not only the constitutionality of Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 2382, or the Medical Act of 1959, which
gave the Board of Medical Education (BME) the power to prescribe requirements for admission to medical schools, but
also MECS Order No. 52, Series of 1985 (MECS Order No. 52-1985) issued by the BME which prescribed NMAT.
Using the rational basis test, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as follows:
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing
of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and
safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that
the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting
the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to
regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and
administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations
have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical
educational requirements - i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school - for admission to the
medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have
before us in the instant case is closely related; the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as
noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of
the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical
schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of
limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical
practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and
medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated
objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical
education, in the country." Given the widespread use today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the
United States of America the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably in other countries with far more
developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even
attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of
legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly
effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or
trauma.268 (Emphases supplied)
The Court reached its conclusion that NMAT is a valid exercise of police power because the method employed, i.e.,
regulation of admissions to medical education is reasonably related to the subject, i.e., the protection of the public by
ensuring that only those qualified are eventually allowed to practice medicine.
The necessity of State intervention to ensure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by those unqualified to take care of
the life and health of patients was likewise the reason why the Court in Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. San
Diego269 upheld the "three-flunk" rule in NMAT:
We see no reason why the rationale in the [TabIarin] case cannot apply to the case at bar. The issue raised in both cases is
the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at least initially by the admission test and, indeed with more
reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in the regulation of the
medical profession.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a)
the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State,
and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed
the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom
patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or
oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession
from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. (Emphases supplied)
Tablarin recognized that State intervention was necessary, and therefore was allowed, because of the need to meet the goal
of promoting public health and safety.
In similar vein, the avowed purpose of the PhiLSAT is to improve the quality of legal education by evaluating and screening
applicants to law school. As elucidated, the State has an interest in improving the quality of legal education for the protection
of the community at-large, and requiring an entrance test is reasonably related to that interest. In other words, the State has
the power and the prerogative to impose a standardized test prior to entering law school, in the same manner and extent
that the State can do so in medical school when it prescribed the NMAT.
In all, the Court finds no constitutional conflict between the Court's rule-making power concerning admissions to the practice
of law and on the LEB's power to prescribe minimum standards for law admission under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662.
Further, pursuant to its power under Section 7(e), the Court affirms the LEB's authority to initiate and administer an aptitude
test, such as the PhiLSAT, as a minimum standard for law admission. Thus, the PhiLSAT, insofar as it functions as an
aptitude exam that measures the academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of law to the end that the quality of
legal education is improved is not per se unconstitutional.
However, there are certain provisions of the PhiLSAT that render its operation exclusionary, restrictive, and qualifying which
is contrary to its design as an aptitude exam meant to be used as a tool that should only help and guide law schools in
gauging the aptness of its applicants for the study of law. These provisions effectively and absolutely exclude applicants who
failed to pass the PhiLSAT from taking up a course in legal education, thereby restricting and qualifying admissions to law
schools. As will be demonstrated, these provisions of the PhiLSAT are unconstitutional for being manifestly violative of the
law schools' exercise of academic freedom, specifically the autonomy to determine for itself who it shall allow to be admitted
to its law program.
D.
LEB's Powers vis-a-vis Institutional Academic
Freedom and the Right to Education
1 PhiLSAT
Paragraphs 7, 9, 11, and 15 of LEBMO No. 7-2016, provide:

xxxx
7. Passing Score - The cut-off or passing score for the PhiLSAT shall be FIFTY-FIVE PERCENT (55%) correct answers, or
such percentile score as may be prescribed by the LEB.
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9. Admission Requirement - All college graduates or graduating students applying for admission to the basic law course
shall be required to pass the PhiLSAT as a requirement for admission to any law school in the Philippines. Upon the
effectivity of this memorandum order, no applicant shall be admitted for enrollment as a first year student in the basic law
courses leading to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor unless he/she has passed the PhiLSAT taken within
2 years before the start of studies for the basic law course and presents a valid [Certificate of Eligibility] as proof thereof.
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11. Institutional Admission Requirements - The PhiLSAT shall be without prejudice to the right of a law school in the
exercise of its academic freedom to prescribe or impose additional requirements for admission, such as but not limited to:
a. A score in the PhiLSAT higher than the cut-off or passing score set by the LEB;
b. Additional or supplemental admission tests to measure the competencies and/or personality of the applicant; and
c. Personal interview of the applicant.
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15. Sanctions - Law schools violating this Memorandum Order shall [be] imposed the administrative sanctions prescribed in
Section 32 of LEBMO No. 2, Series of 2013 and/or fine of up to Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) for each infraction.
(Emphases supplied)
Without doubt, the above provisions exclude and disqualify those examinees who fail to reach the prescribed passing score
from being admitted to any law school in the Philippines. In mandating that only applicants who scored at least 55% correct
answers shall be admitted to any law school, the PhiLSAT actually usurps the right and duty of the law school to determine
for itself the criteria for the admission of students and thereafter, to apply such criteria on a case-by-case basis. It also
mandates law schools to absolutely reject applicants with a grade lower than the prescribed cut-off score and those with
expired PhiLSAT eligibility. The token regard for institutional academic freedom comes into play, if at all, only after the
applicants had been "pre-selected" without the school's participation. The right of the institutions then are constricted only in
providing "additional" admission requirements, admitting of the interpretation that the preference of the school itself is merely
secondary or supplemental to that of the State which is antithetical to the very principle of reasonable supervision and
regulation.
The law schools are left with absolutely no discretion to choose its students at the first instance and in accordance with its
own policies, but are dictated to surrender such discretion in favor of a State-determined pool of applicants, under pain of
administrative sanctions and/or payment of fines. Mandating law schools to reject applicants who failed to reach the
prescribed PhiLSAT passing score or those with expired PhiLSAT eligibility transfers complete control over admission
policies from the law schools to the LEB. As Garcia tritely emphasized: "[c]olleges and universities should [not] be looked
upon as public utilities devoid of any discretion as to whom to admit or reject. Education, especially higher education,
belongs to a different, and certainly higher category."
1(a). Comparison of PhiLSAT with NMAT and LSAT
Respondent urges the Court to treat the PhiLSAT in the same manner that the Court treated the NMAT in Tablarin.
Petitioners oppose on the ground that the PhiLSAT and the NMAT are different because there is a Constitutional body, i.e.,
the Court, tasked to regulate the practice of law while there is none with respect to the practice of medicine.
The Court treats the PhiLSAT differently from the NMAT for the fundamental reason that these aptitude exams operate
differently.
For one, how these exams allow the schools to treat the scores therein obtained is different.
While both exams seem to prescribe a "cut-off" score, the NMAT score is evaluated by the medical schools in relation to
their own cut-off scores. Unlike the PhiLSAT score, the NMAT score is not the sole determining factor on whether or not an
examinee may be admitted to medical school. The NMAT score is only meant to be one of the bases for evaluating
applicants for admission to a college of medicine.
Medical schools further enjoy the discretion to determine how much weight should be assigned to an NMAT score relative to
the schools' own admissions policy. Different medical schools may therefore set varying acceptable NMAT scores. Different
medical schools may likewise assign different values to the NMAT score. This allows medical schools to consider the NMAT
score along with the other credentials of the applicant. The NMAT score does not constrain medical schools to accept pre-
selected applicants; it merely provides for a tool to evaluate all applicants.
Obtaining a low NMAT percentile score will not immediately and absolutely disqualify an applicant from being admitted to
medical school. Obtaining a high NMAT percentile score only increases an applicant's options for medical schools. Taking
the NMAT, thus, expands the applicant's options for medical schools; it does not limit them.
For another, medical schools are not subjected to sanctions in case they decide to admit an applicant pursuant to their own
admissions policy. In fact, at some point,271 there was even no prescribed cut-off percentile score for the NMAT, and
instead it was stressed that a student may enroll in any school, college or university upon meeting the latter's specific
requirements and reasonable regulations.272 Also, the issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission to a college of
medicine had been transferred to. the medical schools, thus, rightfully giving the responsibility for and accountability of
determining eligibility of students for admission to the medical program to the schools concerned.273
Similar to the NMAT, the Law School Admission Test (LSAT) is only one of the several criteria for evaluation for law school
admission. It is just one of the methods that law schools may use to differentiate applicants for law school. The American
Bar Association actually allows a law school to use an admission test other than the LSAT and it does not dictate the
particular weight that a law school should give to the results of the LSAT in deciding whether to admit an applicant.274
In contrast, the PhiLSAT score itself determines whether an applicant may be admitted to law school or not, the PhiLSAT
being strictly a pass or fail exam. It excludes those who failed to reach the prescribed cut-off score from being admitted to
any law school. It qualifies admission to law school not otherwise imposed by the schools themselves. The PhiLSAT, as
presently crafted, employs a totalitarian scheme in terms of student admissions. This leaves the consequent actions of the
applicant-student and the school solely dependent upon the results of the PhiLSAT.
1(b). Balancing State interest with

institutional academic freedom
Thus far, it is settled that the PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude test, is reasonably related to the State's
unimpeachable interest in improving the quality of legal education. This aptitude test, however, should not be exclusionary,
restrictive, or qualifying as to encroach upon institutional academic freedom. Moreover, in the exercise of their academic
freedom to choose who to admit, the law schools should be left with the discretion to determine for themselves how much
weight should the results of the PhiLSAT carry in relation to their individual admission policies. At all times, it is understood
that the school's exercise of such academic discretion should not be gravely abused, arbitrary, whimsical, or discriminatory.
With the conclusion that the PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude test, passes the test of reasonableness, there is no
reason to strike down the PhiLSAT in its entirety. Instead, the Court takes a calibrated approach and partially nullifies
LEBMO No. 7-2016 insofar as it absolutely prescribes the passing of the PhiLSAT and the taking thereof within two years as
a prerequisite for admission to any law school which, on its face, run directly counter to institutional academic freedom. The
rest of LEBMO No. 7-2016, being free from any taint of unconstitutionality, should remain in force and effect, especially in
view of the separability clause275 therein contained.
1(c). PhiLSAT and the right to education
Anent the argument that the PhiLSAT transgresses petitioners' right to education and their right to select a profession or
course of study, suffice to state that the PhiLSAT is a minimum admission standard that is rationally related to the interest of
the State to improve the quality of legal education and, accordingly, to protect the general community. The constitutionality
of the PhiLSAT, therefore, cannot be voided on the ground that it violates the right to education as stated under Section 1,
Article XIV of the Constitution. The Court's pronouncement in Tablarin276 again resonates with significance:
Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note that once more, petitioners have failed to demonstrate
that the statute and regulation they assail in fact clash with that provision. On the contrary, we may note - x x x - that the
statute and the regulation which petitioners attack are in fact designed to promote "quality education" at the level of
professional schools. When one reads Section 1 in relation to Section 5(3) of Article XIV, as one must, one cannot but note
that the latter phrase of Section 1 is not to be read with absolute literalness. The State is not really enjoined to take
appropriate steps to make quality education "accessible to all" who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a
professional school, but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements."
2 Other LEB issuances on law admission
Apart from the PhiLSAT, the LEB also imposed additional requirements for admission to law schools under LEBMO No. 1-
2011, specifically:
Article III
Prerequisites and Program Specification
SEC. 15. Prerequisites to admission to Law School. - x x x
xxxx
Where the applicant for admission into a law school is a graduate of a foreign institution or school following a different
course and progression of studies, the matter shall be referred to the Board that shall determine the eligibility of the
candidate for admission to law school.
SEC. 16. Board Prerequisites for Admission to the Ll.B. or J.D. Program. - The Board shall apply Section 6 of Rule 138 in
the following wise: An applicant for admission to the Ll.B. or J.D. program of studies must be a graduate of a bachelor's
degree and must have earned at least eighteen (18) units in English, six (6) units in Mathematics, and eighteen (18) units of
social science subjects.
SEC. 17. Board Prerequisites for Admission to Graduate Programs in Law. - Without prejudice to other requirements that
graduate schools may lay down, no applicant shall be admitted for the Master of Laws (Ll.M.) or equivalent master's degree
in law or juridical science, without an Ll.B. or a J.D. degree. Admission of non-Members of the Philippine Bar to the master's
degree shall be a matter of academic freedom vested in the graduate school of law. The candidate for the doctorate degree
in juridical science, or doctorate in civil law or equivalent doctorate degree must have completed a Master of Laws (Ll.M.) or
equivalent degree.
Graduate degree programs in law shall have no bearing on membership or non-membership in the Philippine
Bar.277 (Emphases supplied)
Further, LEBMO No. 1-2011, Article V, provides:
xxxx
SEC. 23. No student who has obtained a general average below 2.5 or 80 in the college course required for admission to
legal studies may be admitted to law school. Exceptions may be made by the Dean in exceptionally meritorious cases, after
having informed the Board.278
These provisions similarly encroach upon the law school's freedom to determine for itself its admission policies. With regard
to foreign students, a law school is completely bereft of the right to determine for itself whether to accept such foreign
student or not, as the determination thereof now belongs to the LEB.
Similarly, the requirement that an applicant obtain a specific number of units in English, Mathematics, and Social Science
subjects affects a law school's admission policies leaving the latter totally without discretion to admit applicants who are
deficient in these subjects or to allow such applicant to complete these requirements at a later time. This requirement also
effectively extends the jurisdiction of the LEB to the courses and units to be taken by the applicant in his or her pre-law
course. Moreover, such requirement is not to be found under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court as this section simply
requires only the following from an applicant to the bar exams:
SEC. 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that
he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily
completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-
year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the
following subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history and economics.
Likewise, in imposing that only those with a basic degree in law may be admitted to graduate programs in law encroaches
upon the law school's right to determine who may be admitted. For instance, this requirement effectively nullifies the option
of admitting non-law graduates on the basis of relevant professional experience that a law school, pursuant to its own
admissions policy, may otherwise have considered.
The required general weighted average in the college course suffers the same infirmity and would have been struck down
had ·it not been expressly repealed by the LEB because of the PhiLSAT.279
3 Section 7(c) and 7(e) on the minimum

qualifications of faculty members
The LEB is also empowered under Section 7(c) to set the standards of accreditation taking into account, among others, the
"qualifications of the members of the faculty" and under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 to prescribe "minimum qualifications
and compensation of faculty members[.]"
Relative to the power to prescribe the minimum qualifications of faculty members, LEB prescribes under LEBMO No. 1-2011
the following:
[PART I]
Article V
Instructional Standards
SEC. 20. The law school shall be headed by a properly qualified dean, maintain a corps of professors drawn from the ranks
of leading and acknowledged practitioners as well as academics and legal scholars or experts in juridical science[.] x x x
xxxx
PART III
QUALIFICATIONS AND CURRICULUM
Article I
Faculty Qualifications
SEC. 50. The members of the faculty of a law school should, at the very least, possess a L1.B. or a J.D. degree and should
be members of the Philippine Bar. In the exercise of academic freedom, the law school may also ask specialists in various
fields of law with other qualifications, provided that they possess relevant doctoral degrees, to teach specific subjects.
Within a period of five (5) years of the promulgation of the present order, members of the faculty of schools of law shall
commence their studies in graduate schools of law.
Where a law school offers the J.D. curriculum, a qualified Ll.B. graduate who is a member of the Philippine Bar may be
admitted to teach in the J.D. course and may wish to consider the privilege granted under Section 56 hereof.
SEC. 51. The dean should have, aside from complying with the requirements above, at least a Master of Laws (Ll.M.)
degree or a master's degree in a related field, and should have been a Member of the Bar for at least 5 years prior to his
appointment as dean.
SEC. 52. The dean of a graduate school of law should possess at least a doctorate degree in law and should be an
acknowledged authority in law, as evidenced by publications and membership in learned societies and organizations;
members of the faculty of a graduate school of law should possess at least a Master of Laws (Ll.M.) degree or the relevant
master's or doctor's degrees in related fields.
Aside from the foregoing, retired justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of
Tax Appeals may serve as deans of schools of law, provided that they have had teaching experience as professors of law
and provided further that, with the approval of the Legal Education Board, a graduate school of law may accredit their
experience in the collegiate appellate courts and the judgments they have penned towards the degree [ad eundem] of
Master of Laws.280 (Emphases supplied)
Thus, under LEBMO No. 1-2011, a law faculty member must have an Ll.B or J.D. degree and must, within a period of five
years from the promulgation of LEBMO No. 1-2011, or from June 14, 2011 to June 14, 2016, commence studies in graduate
school of law.
The mandatory character of the requirement of a master's degree is underscored by the LEB in its Resolution No. 2014-02,
a "sequel rule" to Section 50 of LEBMO No. 1-2011, which provides that:
xxxx
1. Members of the law faculty are required to be holders of the degree of Master of Laws. It is the
responsibility of the law deans to observe and implement this rule.
2. The law faculty of all law schools shall have the following percentage of holders of the master of laws
degree:
2.1. School Year- 2017-2018-20%
2.2. School Year- 2018-2019 - 40%
2.3. School Year- 2019-2020-60%
2.4. School Year- 2020-2021-80%
In computing the percentage, those who are exempted from the rule shall be included.
3. Exempted from this requirement of a master's degree in law are the following:
The Incumbent or Retired Members of the:
3.1. Supreme Court;
3.2. Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals;
3.3. Secretary of Justice and Under-Secretaries of Justice, Ombudsman, Deputy Ombudsmen,

Solicitor General and Assistant Solicitors General
3.4. Commissioners of the National Labor Relations Commission who teach Labor Laws;
3.5. Regional Trial Court Judges;
3.6. DOJ State and Regional State Prosecutors and Senior Ombudsman Prosecutors who
teach Criminal Law and/or Criminal Procedure;
3.7. Members of Congress who are lawyers who teach Political Law, Administrative Law,
Election Law, Law on Public Officers and other related subjects;
3.8. Members of Constitutional Commissions who are Lawyers;
3.9. Heads of bureaus who are lawyers who teach the law subjects which their respective
bureaus are implementing;
3.10. Ambassadors, Ministers and other [D]iplomatic Officers who are lawyers who teach
International Law or related subjects;
3.11. Those who have been teaching their subjects for 10 years or more upon recommendation
of their deans; and
3.12. Other lawyers who are considered by the Board to be experts in any field of law provided
they teach the subjects of their expertise.
4. The following are the sanctions for non-compliance with the foregoing rules:
4.1. If a law school is non-compliant with these rules for the first time beginning School Year
2017-2018, the Board shall downgrade its Recognition status to Permit status;
4.2. If a law school under a Permit status should remain non -compliant with these rules in
succeeding school years, the Board shall downgrade the Permit status to Phase-Out status;
4.3. If a law school which is under Phase-Out status remains non-compliant with these rules in
succeeding school years, the Board shall order its closure to take effect at the end of the school
year.
5. If a law school under sanction shall become compliant, its Recognition status shall be restored.
(Emphases supplied)
xxxx
And under LEBMO No. 2:
SEC. 31. Unfitness to Continue Operating a Law Program. A law school which is operated below quality standards of a law
school is unfit to continue operating a law program.
xxxx
2) A law school is substandard if the result of the inspection and evaluation of the law school and its facilities by members of
the Board or its staff shows that the law school has serious deficiencies including a weak faculty as indicated, among others,
by the fact that most of the members are neophytes in the teaching of law[.] x x x
xxxx
SEC. 32. The imposable administrative sanctions are the following:
a) Termination of the law program (closing the law school);
b) Phase-out of the law program;
c) Provisional cancellation of the Government Recognition and putting the law program of the
substandard law school under Permit Status.
This master of laws degree requirement is reiterated in LEBMO No. 17, Series of 2018 (Supplemental Regulations on the
Minimum Academic Requirement of Master of Laws Degree for Deans and Law Professors/Lecturers/Instructors in Law
Schools), as follows:
xxxx
B) For Members of the Law Faculty
SEC. 6. For purposes of determining compliance with the minimum academic requirement of a Ll.M. degree for the
members of the law faculty in law schools required under Section 50 of LEBMO No. 1, Series of 2011 and Resolution No.
2014-02, the required percentage of holders of Ll.M. shall be computed based on the aggregate units of all courses/subjects
offered during the semester by the law school.
SEC. 7. Within thirty (30) days upon completion the effectivity this of this memorandum [sic], the President of the HEI and
the Dean of each law school shall jointly submit to the LEB separate certification of the total teaching assignments/load for
the 1st Semester and 2nd Semester of the Academic Year 2017-2018 in the prescribed matrix form containing the names of
every faculty member, his/her highest academic law degree, qualification for , exemption from the Ll.M. requirement, if
applicable, courses/subjects assigned to teach, and academic weight of each course/subject, and a disclosure whether or
not the law school is compliant with the prescribed percentage of Ll.M. holders for faculty members. Thereafter, the same
certification shall be submitted for every regular semester not later than 45 days from the start of the semester.
xxxx
SEC. 12. Law schools failing to meet the prescribed percentage of its faculty members required to have Ll.M. degrees shall
be imposed the appropriate administrative sanction specified under Resolution No. 2014-02. (Emphases supplied)
To be sure, under its supervisory and regulatory power, the LEB can prescribe the minimum qualifications of faculty
members. This much was affirmed by the Court when it approved the CLEBM's proposal to revise the powers of LEB under
R.A. No. 7662, but nevertheless retaining the LEB's power to "provide for minimum qualifications for faculty members of law
schools." As worded, the assailed clauses of Section 7(c) and 7(e) insofar as they give LEB the power to prescribe the
minimum qualifications of faculty members are in tune with the reasonable supervision and regulation clause and do not
infringe upon the academic freedom of law schools.
Moreover, this minimum qualification can be a master of laws degree. In University of the East v. Pepanio,281 the Court
held that the requirement of a masteral degree, albeit for tertiary education teachers, is not unreasonable. Thus:
The requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers is not unreasonable. The operation of
educational institutions involves public interest. The government has a right to ensure that only qualified persons,
in possession of sufficient academic knowledge and teaching skills, are allowed to teach in such institutions.
Government regulation in this field of human activity is desirable for protecting, not only the students, but the
public as well from ill-prepared teachers, who are lacking in the required scientific or technical knowledge. They
may be required to take an examination or to possess postgraduate degrees as prerequisite to
employment. (Emphasis supplied)
This was reiterated in Son v. University of Santo Tomas,282 as follows:
As early as in 1992, the requirement of a Master's degree in the undergraduate program professor's field of instruction has
been in place, through DECS Order 92 (series of 1992, August 10, 1992) or the Revised Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools. Article IX, Section 44, paragraph [1(a)] thereof provides that college faculty members must have a master's degree
in their field of instruction as a minimum qualification for teaching in a private educational institution and acquiring regular
status therein.
DECS Order 92, Series of 1992 was promulgated by the DECS in the exercise of its [rule]-making power as provided for
under Section 70 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, otherwise known as the Education Act of 1982. As such, it has the force and
effect of law. In University of the East v. Pepanio, the requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers was
held to be not unreasonable but rather in accord with the public interest.
xxxx
From a strict legal viewpoint, the parties are both in violation of the law: respondents, for maintaining professors without the
mandated masteral degrees, and for petitioners, agreeing to be employed despite knowledge of their lack of the necessary
qualifications. Petitioners cannot therefore insist to be employed by UST since they still do not possess the required master's
degrees; the fact that UST continues to hire and maintain professors without the necessary master's degrees is not a ground
for claiming illegal dismissal, or even reinstatement. As far as the law is concerned, respondents are in violation of the
CHED regulations for continuing the practice of hiring unqualified teaching personnel; but the law cannot come to the aid of
petitioners on this sole ground. As between the parties herein, they are in pari delicto.
xxxx
The minimum requirement of a master's degree in the undergraduate teacher's field of instruction has been cemented in
DECS Order 92, Series of 1992. Both petitioners and respondents have been violating it. The fact that government has not
cracked down on violators, or that it chose not to strictly implement the provision, does not erase the violations committed by
erring educational institutions, including the parties herein; it simply means that government will not punish these violations
for the meantime. The parties cannot escape its concomitant effects, nonetheless. And if respondents knew the
overwhelming importance of the said provision and the public interest involved - as they now fiercely advocate to their favor -
they should have complied with the same as soon as it was promulgated.
xxxx
In addition, the Court already held in Herrera-Manaoisi v. St. Scholastica's College that -
Notwithstanding the existence of the SSC Faculty Manual, Manaois still cannot legally acquire a permanent status of
employment. Private educational institutions must still supplementarily refer to the prevailing standards, qualifications, and
conditions set by the appropriate government agencies (presently the Department of Education, the Commission on Higher
Education, and the Teclmical Education and Skills Development Authority). This limitation on the right of private schools,
colleges, and universities to select and determine the employment status of their academic personnel has been imposed by
the state in view of the public interest nature of educational institutions, so as to ensure the quality and competency of our
schools and educators. (Internal citations omitted)
Thus, the masteral degree required of law faculty members and dean, and the doctoral degree required of a dean of a
graduate school of law are, in fact, minimum reasonable requirements. However, it is the manner by which the LEB had
exercised this power through its various issuances that prove to be unreasonable.
On this point, the amicus curiae, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, while admitting that the masteral degree requirement is a
"laudable aim" of the LEB, nevertheless adds that the LEB-imposed period of compliance is unreasonable given the
logistical and financial obstacles:
The masteral degree requirement is a laudable aim of LEB, but the possibility of meeting the LEB period of compliance is
unreasonable and unrealistic in the light of logistical and financial considerations confronting the deans and professors,
including the few law schools offering graduate degrees in law.
To illustrate, to the best of my knowledge there are no more than six (6) graduate schools of law around the country to
service potential applicants. Those who have opted for graduate studies in law find it very costly to fly to the venue. While
one or two programs may have been delivered outside the provider's home school venue to reach out to graduate students
outside the urban centers, pedagogical standards are often compromised in the conduct of the modules. This is even
aggravated by the fact that very few applicants can afford to go into full-time graduate studies considering that most deans
and professors of law are in law practice. Perhaps, LEB should work in consultation with PALS in designing a cost-effective
but efficient delivery system of any graduate program in law, [especially] for deans and law professors.283
Further, the mandatory character of the master of laws degree requirement, under pain of downgrading, phase-out and
closure of the law school, is in sharp contrast with the previous requirement under DECS Order No. 27-1989 which
merely prefer faculty members who are holders of a graduate law degree, or its equivalent. The LEB's authority to review the
strength or weakness of the faculty on the basis of experience or length of time devoted to teaching violates an institution's
right to set its own faculty standards. The LEB also imposed strict reportorial requirements that infringe on the institution's
right to select its teachers which, for instance, may be based on expertise even with little teaching experience. Moreover, in
case a faculty member seeks to be exempted, he or she must prove to the LEB, and not to the concerned institution, that he
or she is an expert in the field, thus, usurping the freedom of the institution to evaluate the qualifications of its own teachers
on an individual basis.
Also, while the LEB requires of faculty members and deans to obtain a master of laws degree before they are allowed to
teach and administer a law school, respectively, it is ironic that the LEB, under Resolution No. 2019-406, in fact considers
the basic law degrees of Ll.B. or J.D. as already equivalent to a doctorate degree in other non-law academic disciplines for
purposes of "appointment/promotion, ranking, and compensation."
In this connection, the LEB also prescribes who may or may not be considered as full-time faculty, the classification of the
members of their faculty, as well as the faculty load, including the regulation of work hours, all in violation of the academic
freedom of law schools. LEBMO No. 2 provides:
SEC. 33. Full-time and Part-time Faculty. There are two general kinds of faculty members, the full-time and part-time faculty
members.
a) A full-time faculty member is one:

1) Who possesses the minimum qualification of a member of the faculty as prescribed in
Sections 50 and 51 of LEBMO No. 1;
2) Who devotes not less than eight (8) hours of work for the law school;
3) Who has no other occupation elsewhere requiring regular hours of work, except when
permitted by the higher education institution of which the law school is a part; and
4) Who is not teaching full-time in any other higher education institution.
b) A part-time faculty member is one who does not meet the qualifications of a full-time professor as
enumerated in the preceding number.
SEC. 34. Faculty Classification and Ranking. Members of the faculty may be classified, in the discretion of the higher
education institution of which the law school is a part, according to academic proceeding, training and scholarship into
Professor, Associate Professor, Assistant Professor, and Instructor.
Part-time members of the faculty may be classified as Lecturers, Assistant Professorial Lecturers, Associate Professorial
Lecturers and Professorial Lecturers. The law schools shall devise their scheme of classification and promotion not
inconsistent with these rules.
SEC. 35. Faculty Load. Generally, no member of the faculty should teach more than 3 consecutive hours in any subject nor
should he or she be loaded with subjects requiring more than three preparations or three different subjects (no matter the
number of units per subject) in a day.
However, under exceptionally meritorious circumstances, the law deans may allow members of the faculty to teach 4 hours
a day provided that there is a break of 30 minutes between the first 2 and the last 2 hours. (Emphases supplied)
The LEB is also allowed to revoke permits or recognitions given to law schools when the LEB deems that there is gross
incompetence on the part of the dean and the corps of professors or instructors under Section 41.2(d) of LEBMO No. 1-
2011, thus:
SEC. 41.2. Permits or recognitions may be revoked, or recognitions reverted to permit status for just causes including but
not limited to:
a) fraud or deceit committed by the institution in connection with its application to the Board;
b) the unauthorized operation of a school of law or a branch or an extension of a law school;
c) mismanagement or gross inefficiency in the operation of a law school;
d) gross incompetence on the part of the dean and the corps of professors or instructors;
e) violation of approved standards governing institutional operations, announcements and

advertisements;
f) transfer of the school of law to a site or location detrimental to the interests of the students and inimical
to the fruitful and promising study of law;
g) repeated failure of discipline on the part of the student body; and
h) other grounds for the closure of schools and academic institutions as provided for in the rules and
regulations of the Commission on Higher Education.284 (Emphasis supplied)
In this regard, the LEB is actually assessing the teaching performance of faculty members and when such is determined by
the LEB as constituting gross incompetence, the LEB may mete out penalties, thus, usurping the law school's right to
determine for itself the competence of its faculty members.
4 Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7(g)
on legal apprenticeship and legal internship
While the clause "legal apprenticeship" under Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7(g) on legal internship, as plainly worded,
cannot immediately be interpreted as encroaching upon institutional academic freedom, the manner by which LEB exercised
this power through several of its issuances undoubtedly show that the LEB controls and dictates upon law schools how such
apprenticeship and internship programs should be undertaken.
Pursuant to its power under Section 7(g), the LEB passed Resolution No. 2015-08 (Prescribing the Policy and Rules in the
Establishment of a Legal Aid Clinic in Law Schools) wherein it classified legal aid clinics into three types: (1) a legal aid clinic
which is an outreach project of a law school; (2) a legal aid clinic which entitles the participating student to curricular credits;
and (3) a legal aid clinic that entitles the participating student to avail of the privileges under Rule 138-A of the Rules of
Court.
Pertinent to the third type, the LEB requires the law schools to comply with the following rules:
xxxx
b) Implementing Rules
(1) A LAC should be established by the law school.
(2) The law school should formulate its Clinical Legal Education Program and submit it to the
Legal Education board for its assessment and evaluation.
(3) If Legal Education Board finds the Clinical Legal Education Program to be proper and in order
it shall endorse it to the Supreme Court for its approval.
(4) Once approved by the Supreme Court, fourth (4th) year law students in that law school enrolled in it
shall be allowed to practice law on a limited manner pursuant to the provisions of Rule 138-A of the Rules
of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
Further, Section 24(c), Article IV of LEBMO No. 2 prescribes the activities that should be included in the law school's
apprenticeship program, as follows:
Article IV
Law School: Administrative Matters and Opening of Branches or Extension Classes
SEC. 24. Administrative Matters.
xxxx
c) Apprenticeship Program. The apprenticeship program should be closely supervised by the Dean or a member of the
faculty assigned by the Dean to do the task. The apprenticeship program should at least include any of the following
activities:
1) Preparation of legal documents
2) Interviewing clients
3) Courtroom observation and participation
4) Observation and assistance in police investigations, inquests and preliminary investigations
5) Legal counseling
6) Legal assistance to detention prisoners

7) For working students, participation in the legal work of the legal section or office of the employer-entity
x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Relatedly, Section 59(d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011, provides:
Article IV
Grading System
SEC. 59. Grading System. - The law school, in the exercise of academic freedom, shall devise its own grading system
provided that on the first day of classes, the students are apprised of the grading system and provided further that the
following are observed:
xxxx
(d) When apprenticeship is required and the student does not complete the mandated number of apprenticeship hours, or
the person supervising the apprenticeship program deems the performance of the student unsatisfactory, the dean shall
require of the student such number of hours more in apprenticeship as will fulfill the purposes of the apprenticeship
program.285 (Emphasis supplied)
These provisions unduly interfere with the discretion of a law school regarding its curriculum, particularly its apprenticeship
program. Plainly, these issuances are beyond mere supervision and regulation.
III.
Conclusion
In general, R.A. No. 7662, as a law meant to uplift the quality of legal education, does not encroach upon the Court's
jurisdiction to promulgate rules under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. It is well-within the jurisdiction of the State,
as an exercise of its inherent police power, to lay down laws relative to legal education, the same being imbued with public
interest.
While the Court is undoubtedly an interested stakeholder in legal education, it cannot assume jurisdiction where it has none.
Instead, in judicial humility, the Court affirms that the supervision and regulation of legal education is a political exercise,
where judges are nevertheless still allowed to participate not as an independent branch of government, but as part of the
sovereign people.
Nevertheless, inasmuch as the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance
to the underprivileged is settled as belonging exclusively to the Court, certain provisions and clauses of R.A. No. 7662
which, by its plain language and meaning, go beyond legal education and intrude upon the Court's exclusive jurisdiction
suffer from patent unconstitutionality and should therefore be struck down.
Moreover, the exercise of the power to supervise and regulate legal education is circumscribed by the normative contents of
the Constitution itself, that is, it must be reasonably exercised. Reasonable exercise means that it should not amount to
control and that it respects the Constitutionallyguaranteed institutional academic freedom and the citizen's right to quality
and accessible education. Transgression of these limitations renders the power and the exercise thereof unconstitutional.
Accordingly, the Court recognizes the power of the LEB under its charter to prescribe minimum standards for law admission.
The PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude test to guide law schools in measuring the applicants' aptness for legal
education along with such other admissions policy that the law school may consider, is such minimum standard.
However, the PhiLSAT presently operates not only as a measure of an applicant's aptitude for law school. The PhiLSAT, as
a pass or fail exam, dictates upon law schools who among the examinees are to be admitted to any law program. When the
PhiLSAT is used to exclude, qualify, and restrict admissions to law schools, as its present design mandates, the PhiLSAT
goes beyond mere supervision and regulation, violates institutional academic freedom, becomes unreasonable and
therefore, unconstitutional. In striking down these objectionable clauses in the PhiLSAT, the State's inherent power to
protect public interest by improving legal education is neither emasculated nor compromised. Rather, the institutional
academic freedom of law schools to determine for itself who to admit pursuant to their respective admissions policies is
merely protected. In turn, the recognition of academic discretion comes with the inherent limitation that its exercise should
not be whimsical, arbitrary, or gravely abused.
In similar vein, certain LEB issuances which exceed the powers granted under its charter should be nullified for being ultra
vires.
As in all levels and areas of education, the improvement of legal education indeed deserves serious attention. The parties
are at a consensus that legal education should be made relevant and progressive. Reforms for a more responsive legal
education are constantly introduced and are evolving. The PhiLSAT, for instance, is not a perfect initiative. Through time and
a better cooperation between the LEB and the law schools in the Philippines, a standardized and acceptable law admission
examination may be configured. The flaws which the Court assessed to be unconstitutional are meanwhile removed, thereby
still allowing the PhiLSAT to develop into maturity. It is, thus, strongly urged that recommendations on how to improve legal
education, including tools for screening entrants to law school, reached possibly through consultative summits, be taken in
careful consideration in further issuances or legislations.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED.
The jurisdiction of the Legal Education Board over legal education is UPHELD.
The Court further declares:
As CONSTITUTIONAL:
1. Section 7(c) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the power to set the standards of
accreditation for law schools taking into account, among others, the qualifications of the members of the faculty
without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning; and
2. Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the power to prescribe the minimum
requirements for admission to legal education and minimum qualifications of faculty members without encroaching
upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning.
As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for encroaching upon the power of the Court:
1. Section 2, par. 2 of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it unduly includes "continuing legal education" as an aspect of legal
education which is made subject to Executive supervision and control;
2. Section 3(a)(2) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 7(2) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 on the objective of legal education to
increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed
sectors of society;
3. Section 7(g) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11(g) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as it gives the Legal Education
Board the power to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar; and
4. Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11(h) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as it gives the Legal Education
Board the power to adopt a system of mandatory continuing legal education and to provide for the mandatory
attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as it may deem necessary.
As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being ultra vires:
1. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of excluding, restricting, and qualifying admissions to law
schools in violation of the institutional academic freedom on who to admit, particularly:
a. Paragraph 9 of LEBMO No. 7-2016 which provides that all college graduates or graduating students
applying for admission to the basic law course shall be required to pass the PhiLSAT as a requirement
for admission to any law school in the Philippines and that no applicant shall be admitted for enrollment
as a first year student in the basic law courses leading to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws or Juris
Doctor unless he/she has passed the PhiLSAT taken within two years before the start of studies for the
basic law course;
b. LEBMC No. 18-2018 which prescribes the passing of the PhiLSAT as a prerequisite for admission to
law schools; Accordingly, the temporary restraining order issued on March 12, 2019 enjoining the Legal
Education Board from implementing LEBMC No. 18-2018 is made PERMANENT. The regular admission
of students who were conditionally admitted and enrolled is left to the discretion of the law schools in the
exercise of their academic freedom; and
c. Sections 15, 16, and 17 of LEBMO No. 1-2011;
2. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the qualifications and classification of faculty
members, dean, and dean of graduate schools of law in violation of institutional academic freedom on who may
teach, particularly:
a. Sections 41.2(d), 50, 51, and 52 of LEBMO No. 1-2011;
b. Resolution No. 2014-02;
c. Sections 31(2), 33, 34, and 35 of LEBMO No. 2;
d. LEBMO No. 17-2018; and
3. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the policies on the establishment of legal
apprenticeship and legal internship programs in violation of institutional academic freedom on what to teach,
particularly:
a. Resolution No. 2015-08;
b. Section 24(c) of LEBMO No. 2; and
c. Section 59(d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011.
SO ORDERED.

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[ G.R. No.

230642, September 10, 2019 ]

SEC. 3. General and Specific Objective of Legal Education. -

(1) to prepare students for the practice of law;

(3) to train persons for leadership;

(d) to accredit law schools that meet the standards of accreditation;

Bar Matter No. 979-B

In particular, the CLEBM observed:

SEC. 3. General and Specific Objectives of Legal Education. x x x

SEC. 7. Power and functions. - x x x

(c) to accredit law schools that meet the standards of accreditation;

(e) to provide for minimum qualifications for faculty members of law schools;

LEBMO No. 2 Additional Rules in the Operation of the Law Program

LEBMO No. 3-2016 Policies, Standards and, Guidelines for the

LEBMO No. 6-2016 Reportorial Requirements for Law Schools

LEBMO No. 7-2016 Policies and Regulations for the Administration of a

LEBMO No. 8-2016 Policies, Guidelines and Procedures Governing

LEBMO No. 9-2017 Policies and Guidelines on the Conferment of

LEBMO No. 10-2017 Guidelines on the Adoption of Academic/School

LEBMO No. 11-2017 Additional Transition Provisions to [LEBMO] No. 7,

LEBMO No. 12-2018 LEB Service/Transaction Fees

LEBMO No. 13-2018 Guidelines in the Conduct of Summer Classes

LEBMO No. 14-2018 Policy and Regulations in Offering Elective Subjects

LEBMO No. 17-2018 Supplemental Regulations on the Minimum Academic

LEBMO No. 18-2018 Guidelines on Cancellation or Suspension of Classes

LEBMO No. 20-2019 Discretionary Admission in the AY 2019-2020 of

LEBMC No. 1 New Regulatory Issuances

LEBMC No. 2 Submission of Schedule of Tuition and Other School

LEBMC No. 3 Submission of Law School Information Report

LEBMC No. 4 Reminder to Submit Duly Accomplished LSIR Form

LEBMC No. 5 Offering of the Refresher Course for AY 2017-2018

LEBMC No. 7 Application of Transitory Provision Under [LEBMO]

LEBMC No. 8 Guidelines for Compliance with the Reportorial

LEBMC No. 9 Observance of Law Day and Philippine National Law

LEBMC No. 10 September 21, 2017 Suspension of Classes

LEBMC No. 11 Law Schools Authorized to Offer the Refresher

LEBMC No. 12 Law Schools Authorized to Offer the Refresher

LEBMC No. 13 Legal Research Seminar of the Philippine Group of

LEBMC No. 14 CSC Memorandum Circular No. 22, s.2016

LEBMC No. 15 Law Schools Authorized to Offer the Refresher

LEBMC No. 16 Clarification to [LEBMO] No. 3, Series of 2016

LEBMC No. 17 Updated List of Law Schools Authorized to Offer the

LEBMC No. 18 PHILSAT Eligibility Requirement for Freshmen in the

LEBMC No. 19 Guidelines for the Limited Conditional

LEBMC No. 20 Updated List of Law Schools Authorized to Offer the

LEBMC No. 21 Adjustments/Corrections to the Requirements for Law

LEBMC No. 23 Collection of the PhiLSAT Certificate of

LEBMC No. 24 Observance of the Philippine National Law Week

LEBMC No. 25 Competition Law

LEBMC No. 26 Scholarship Opportunity for Graduate Studies for Law

LEBMC No. 27 Advisory on April 7, 2019 PhiLSAT and Conditional

LEBMC No. 29 Detailed Guidelines for Conditional Enrollment Permit

LEBMC No. 30 Law Schools Authorized to Offer Refresher Course in

LEBMC No. 31 Law Schools Authorized to Offer Refresher Course in

LEBMC No. 40 Reminders concerning Conditionally Enrolled

C. Resolutions and Other Issuances

Resolution No. 16 Reportorial Requirement for Law Schools with Small

Resolution No. 8, Series of 2010 Administrative Sanctions

Resolution No. 2011-21 A Resolution Providing for Supplementary Rules to

Resolution No. 2012-02 A Resolution Eliminating the Requirement of Special,