Hernan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 217874, 5 December 2017
Hernan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 217874, 5 December 2017
Hernan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 217874, 5 December 2017
FACTS:On or about September 16, 1996, in Baguio City, Ophelia Hernan, a public officer, being thenthe
Disbursing Officer of the Department of Transportation and Communications, Baguio City,and as such
an accountable officer, entrusted with and responsible for the amount of11,300.00 which
accused received and collected for the DOTC, and intended for deposit under₱the account of DOTC
with the Land Bank of the Philippines-Baguio City, by reason of herposition, while in the
performance of her official functions, taking advantage of her position, didthen and there, wilfully,
feloniously, and unlawfully misappropriate or consent, or throughabandonment or negligence,
permit other persons to take such amount of 11,300.00 to the₱damage and prejudice of the
government.Ophelia Hernan was convicted by the RTC of the crime of malversation. Hernan’s first
counsel,filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, which affirmed her conviction but modified the
penaltyimposed. Upon motion, however, the CA set aside its decision on the finding that it has
noappellate jurisdiction over the case. Instead, it is the Sandiganbayan which has
exclusiveappellate jurisdiction over petitioner occupying a position lower than Salary Grade 27. Hernan
procured a new counsel who appealed to the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayanaffirmed the
conviction. Atty. Leticia Gutierrez Hayes-Allen, her 2nd counsel, filed a motion forreconsideration
blaming the first counsel in failing to elicit facts that would have acquittedHernan of the
charge. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion filed in a Resolution dated August31, 2010 which became
final and executory on June 26, 2013.On July 26, 2013, Atty. Meshack Macwes, third counsel, filed a
motion to reopen the case andstay the execution of the judgment because the second counsel allegedly
failed to receive 2010Sandiganbayan’s Resolution. Hernan’s second counsel was appointed to the PAO
and thuschanged office address. However, the Sandiganbayan was not notified of the
change ofaddress. Hernan’s counsel invoked the ruling in People v. Chavez wherein the Court held
thatentry of judgment without receipt of the Resolution was premature. But the Sandiganbayan
stilldenied the motion to reopen finding the pleadings prohibited.On January 9, 2014, Hernan’s third
counsel filed a “Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer forRecall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of Prayer
for Stay of Execution of Judgment”. On February 2,2015, the Sandiganbayan denied the petition
finding the petition a third Motion forReconsideration which was likewise prohibited.Hernan’s
counsel then filed a Rule 65 of the Rules of Court petition seeking to reverse and setaside the Resolution
dated February 2, 2015 and Decision dated November 13, 2009 of theSandiganbayan 2nd Division
which affirmed, with modification, the Decision dated June 28,2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 7, Baguio City convicting petitioner of the crimeof malversation of public funds. Petitioner
imputes grave abuse of discretion in the denial of theSandiganbayan of her motion to reopen of the case
since evidence, not produced before thetrial court, would warrant reversal of the conviction
ISSUE: Whether or not the final judgment can still be modified.RULING:No, but with exception. The
general rule is that a judgment that has acquired finality becomesimmutable and unalterable, and
may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification ismeant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court thatrendered it or by the highest
court of the land. When, however, circumstances transpire after thefinality of the decision rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable, the Court may sit en bane andgive due regard to such exceptional
circumstance warranting the relaxation of the doctrine ofimmutability.Let it be remembered
that the doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and
sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-
judicial agencies must become final on some definite date fixed by law. The only exceptions to the
general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tune entries which cause no
prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the
decision which render its execution unjust and inequitable. None of the exceptions is present in this
case.The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds that it is still necessary to reopen the instant case
andrecall the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, not for further reception
ofevidence, however, as petitioner prays for, but in order to modify the penalty imposed by said court.
To the Court, the recent passage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951 entitled An Act Adjusting the Amount
or the Value of Property and Damage on which a Penalty is Based and the Fines Imposed Under the
Revised Penal Code Amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815 Otherwise Known as the "Revised Penal
Code" as Amended which accordingly reduced the penalty applicable to the crime charged herein is an
example of such exceptional circumstance. Therefore, We have here a novel situation wherein the
judgment convicting the accused, petitioner herein, has already become final and executory and yet the
penalty imposed thereon has been reduced by virtue of the passage of said law. Because of this, not
only must petitioner's sentence be modified respecting the settled rule on the retroactive effectivity of
laws, the sentencing being favorable to the accused, she may even apply for probation, as long as she
does not possess any ground for disqualification, in view of recent legislation on probation, or R.A. No.
10707 entitled An Act Amending Presidential Decree No. 968, otherwise known as the "Probation Law of
1976," As Amended. allowing an accused to apply for probation in the event that she is sentenced to
serve a maximum term of imprisonment of not more than six (6) years when a judgment of conviction
imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed, and such judgment is modified through
the imposition of a probationable penalty.