SYMBIOSIS LAW SCHOOL

HYDERABAD
CONSTITUENT OF
SYMBIOSIS INTERNATIONAL (DEEMED
UNIVERSITY) PUNE
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
(CLINICAL COURSE III)
BA LLB
ACADEMIC YEAR- 2022-23
FIFTH YEAR

NAME BOLLAMPALLY DEVRATH REDDY

PRN: 18010323039
DIV: A
BATCH: 2018-23
PROGRAMME: BA LLB
MOBILE NO: 9866556191
EMAIL: [email protected]

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INDEX
S.NO CASE PAGE
NUMBER

1 . Rajendra V.Pai Vs Alex Fernandes and 3

other (2002) 4 SCC 212

2 Noratanmal Chaurasia vs. M.R. Murli (2004)4

5 SCC 689

3 Narain Pandey vs. Pannalal Pandey (2013) 115

SCC 435 
4 RAMON SERVICES P.LTD v. SUBHASH6
KAPOOR & ORS (2001) 1 SCC 118
5 . Harish Chandra Tiwari vs. Baiju 2002 (2) SCC7
67
6 Harish Uppal vs. Union of India (2003) 2 8
SCC 45

7 . R.D. Saxena vs. Balram Prasad Sharma (2000) 9

7 SCC 264 
8 Suresh Shivarao Hattingadi v. N.D.10
Upadhaya (2002) 9 SCC 47

9 Madhav M. Bhokarikar v. Ganesh M.11

Bhokarikar (2004) 3 SCC 607
10 Bhupinder Kumar Sharma vs. Bar12
Association of Pathankot [AIR 2002 SC 41]

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11 .Noratanmal Chouraria vs M.R. Murli & Anr 13
[(2004) 5 SCC 689]

12 K.V. UMRE V. SMT. VENUBAI D. GAGE 14

& ANR.
13 Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh v. Kurapati 15
Satyanarayana, (2003) 1 SCC 102
14 SUPREME COURT BAR ASSOCIATION 16
V. UNION OF INDIA, (1998) 4 SCC 409
15 Shambhoo Ram Yadav Vs. Hanuman Das 17
Khatry AIR 2001 SC 2509

1. Rajendra V.Pai Vs Alex Fernandes and other (2002) 4 SCC 212

The appellant herein was an advocate, who was dealing with a case of 150 villagers whose lands
were acquired by the government. The appellant had personal interest in defending the case of the
villagers. Three complaints were filed against the appellant on the ground of professional
misconduct for charging contingent fees based on the quantum of compensation awarded to the
claimants. The complainants also alleged that the appellant withdrew the compensation on false
grounds. Therefore, as “Rule 20 of Section II, Part VI of the Bar Council Rules lays down that 'An
advocate shall not stipulate for a fee contingent on the results of litigation or agree to share the
proceeds thereof”, the complaints filed a complaint to the bar council of Maharashtra. The appellant
contended that the complainants had confined him on purpose as the appellant was also looking
after another litigation related to the complainants land. Therefore, he denied the charges. However
the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa had held that appellant guilt of misconduct and by the
virtue of the power under section 35 of the advocates act,1961, the bar council had directed to
remove the name off the appellant from the role of advocates. The appellant filed an appeal to the
Bar Council of India, however the Bar Council of India had confirmed the orders passed by the
State Bar council. Subsequently, the appellant filed an appeal to the supreme court of India under
section 38 of the Advocates act, 1961. The supreme court essentially dealt with two issues, first.
Being whether the order passed by the bar council of Maharashtra and Goa was right and second,
whether the punishment ordered was in accordance with the gravity of offence alleged to have been
committed by the appellant. The supreme. Court had held that based on the documentary and oral
evidence, the appellant is guilty of professional misconduct. However, the court held that

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punishment imposed upon him was not in accordance with the offence. Therefore, the court had
altered the punishment and suspended the appellant from 7 years of practise. In my view, the
decision of the supreme court was rational as though it found the appellant guilty of professional
misconduct, the punishment Imposed by the bar council of Maharashtra and Goa i.e debarred for
life from being able to practise was not proportionate to the offence committed.

2. Noratanmal Chaurasia vs. M.R. Murli (2004) 5 SCC 689

The appellants were landlords of the property which they leased to the respondents. A rent control
case was pending in the small cause courts with respect to the same property. Both the parties
alleged misconduct on each other as it was alleged that the respondent came out of the court room
and assaulted the appellants and that the respondents had threatened the appellants with anti social
elements. The appellants alleged that the respondent had kicked him with the intention to cause
hurt. The appellant filed a complaint wit the disciplinary committee of the bar council of Tamil
Nadu and the matter was transferred to the disciplinary committee of the bar council of India. The
bar council of India observed that no criminal charge was filed and no FIR had been registered and
moreover that the respondent was not advocate but was merely appearing in person to defend his
case. The bar council had also noted that the appellant had not produced any evidence as to prove
any follow up action taken by him towards the alleged act, therefore the bar council held that the
respondent is not guilty for any professional misconduct . An appeal was filed in the supreme court
against the impugned order of the bar council of India. The counsel for the appellant argued that
misconduct cannot be confined to advocates only and that the action of the respondent on various
occasions mentioned above amount to misconduct. The counsel for the respondent contended
denied the same and contended that if the said acts were committed in the court room, then the same
would have been witnessed by the presiding officer and that neither a private complaint was filed by
the appellant. Therefore, there is no prima facie case. The supreme court in this case held that the
matter in hand no merits as there was no complaint made by the appellant immediately after the
incident had taken place nor he had ignited any criminal case. The court while deciding the case had
also discussed about the definition of misconduct in the Advocates act 1961, the court observed that

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the word ‘misconduct’ had not been defined in the act, however, it amounts to any act that breaches
discipline. The court further observed that an exhaustive definition cannot be laid down but the
meaning of the word is wide enough to be inclusive of any wrongful act or omission that has been
being committed wilfully or unintentionally.

3. Narain Pandey vs. Pannalal Pandey (2013) 11 SCC 435 

In this case the respondent is an advocate practising in the Tehsil Gyanpur, the appellant filed a
complainant against the respondent for professional misconduct under section 35 of the Advocates
Act, 1961. The complainant alleged that the respondent was involved in the act of fixing false
vakalthnama, forging signatures, fabricating documents and settling disputes without the knowledge
of the parties. Based on the. Above mentioned allegations the complainant filed a complaint with
the bar council of Uttar Pradesh. The said bar council had held proceedings for the same wherein
the respondent had produced documentary evidence and had also filed an affidavit and had got
seven witnesses examined. The appellant denied the said allegations and contended that the
allegations have been made based on enmity. After hearing both the parties, the bar council had
found the appellant guilty of serious misconduct and had suspended him from seven years of
practise. Aggrieved from the said order, the appellant appealed to the bar council of India. The bar
council of India, upon evaluating the case at hand held that the advocate was not guilty of
misconduct and they set aside the order of the bar council of Uttar Pradesh on the basis that there is
evidence to prove that the said allegations were committed by the respondent. Subsequently, the
appellants appealed the supreme court against the impugned order passed by the bar council of
India. The supreme court considering the fact that the appellant had produced documentary
evidence and that the appellant had cross-examined seven witnesses, whereas on the other hand the
respondent has not produced any evidence or cross examination. The court had also referred to the
preamble of the advocates act, 1961, chapter II Part VI, where in the act describes the duty of the
an advocate to behave with high morale and in a lawful order, the said preamble also mentions that
acts of misconduct are limited to the ones mentioned in the provisions of the Advocates Act, 1961.

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Therefore, the supreme court had observed that with the evidence at hand, the balance of
conveyance favours the appellant and it is clear that the respondent had committed to the said
allegations. The supreme court had observed that the offence being committed is a serious one and
the court reversed the order of the bar council of India. The court held the advocate guilty and
ordered for 3 years of suspension from practise.
In my view, the supreme court was right in reversing the order of the bar council of India, as the
evidence produced by both the parties is the deciding factor in such cases and clearly the evidence
produced by the appellants were stronger. However, In my opinion the court should have imposed 7
year suspension as the offence committed is a serious one and the same disregards ethical conduct
and it may also effect the integrity of the profession on the whole. Therefore, imposing a higher
punishment would held in deference.

4. RAMON SERVICES P.LTD v. SUBHASH KAPOOR & ORS (2001) 1 SCC 118
The appellant-company was a tenant in a building on New Delhi's Barakhamba Road. A complaint
was filed against the appellant seeking eviction from the building and other consequential reliefs,
which the appellant fought using a variety of arguments. The Court outlined the issues in the action,
and the trial date was set for August 26, 1998. Because the advocates from the appellant's law firm
were on strike called by the relevant advocates association, none of them appeared in court that day.
The defendant was tried ex parte because no one from the appellant's side was present, and the
plaintiff's evidence was recorded. When the appellant learned of the events, he filed an application
under Code of Civil Procedure Order 9 Rule 7. (for short the "Code"). The application, however,
was denied, and the case was finally decided on November 13, 1998. Following our independence,
we incorporated the concept of social justice into our legal system. This concept gives meaning and
relevance to democratic modes of existence as well as the dynamic nature of life. The concept of a
welfare state will perish unless social justice is abolished. The achievement of the Constitution's
goals and the dispensation of social justice are not possible without the active, concerted, and
dynamic efforts of the individual involved with the justice dispensation system. The country's ailing
socioeconomic-political structure necessitates immediate attention, which judicial incision may
provide. It is difficult to carry out such an operation unless the Bench and the Bar collaborate. As a
result, the function of members of the Bar has gained enormous prominence in the country's post-
independence era. Respect for our nation's legal and judicial institutions is owed in large part to the
tireless role played by the profession's stalwarts in strengthening them. They took their jobs
seriously and performed them with reverence, respect, and dedication. If the legal profession is to
thrive, the judicial system must be revitalised. No service will be too small in order to make the

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system efficient, successful, and credible. The casualness and indifference with which some
members practise the profession is almost certainly not geared toward achieving that goal or
elevating the status of the profession or the organisation they serve.
According to the Supreme Court, if an advocate claims that his or her right to strike must be free of
charge to him or her, but that the cost must be borne solely by his or her innocent client, such a
claim is contrary to any concept of fair play and ethical canons. As a result, if he/she chooses to
strike or boycott the Court, he/she must also be willing to bear at least the monetary damage
suffered by the litigant client who committed his/her brief to that advocate with complete
confidence that his/her case would be secure in that advocate's hands.

5. Harish Chandra Tiwari vs. Baiju 2002 (2) SCC 67

The appellant is an advocate enrolled with the bar council of Uttar Pradesh. The appellant was
representing the respondent in a land acquisition case. The state deposited Rs.8118 as compensation
for the said land. The appellant had applied for the release of the said amount deposited in the court.
However, the appellant did not hand over the same to the respondent nor he had informed the
respondent about the same. Subsequently the same came to the knowledge of the respondent and as
the appellant failed too hand over the, money to the respondent, a complaint was lodged against the
respondent. In reply to the complaint, the appellant contended that he had returned the money but
however, he gave the money after deducting his fee and expenses. The appellant had also filed an
affidavit before the state bar council of Uttar Pradesh, the said affidavit stated that a compromise
was settled between the appellant and the respondent. However, the respondent denied the contents
of the affidavit and further informed the court that he did not receive any amount from the
appellant. The bar council of Uttar Pradesh had transferred the said case to the Bar council of India
under section 36-B of the Advocates Act, 1961. The disciplinary committee of the bar council of
India had concluded that the affidavit produced by the appellant was forged and that the appellant
was guilty of the said act. Therefore, the bar council imposed suspense from practise for a period of
3 years. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant filed an appeal to the supreme court under
section 38 of the advocates act, 1961. The issue that was to be decided. by supreme court was
whether the appellant is guilty of misappropriating clients money and if so, what is the quantum of
punishment that shall be imposed for such an act. The appellant had contended that he was not
guilty and moreover, that had handover the amount of compensation to the client. However, upon
evaluating the evidence and arguments had come to a conclusion that there is no evidence that

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backs the defence of the appellant and that moreover, the affidavit filed by the appellant is false.
Therefore, the court came to a conclusion that the appellant was guilty of the said act. The court
while deciding the quantum of damages had observed that misappropriating clients money is a
grave offence and moreover, filing a fabricated affidavit to misguide the proceedings of the bar
council increases the gravity of the offence. The concluded that the appellant must be given the
highest degree of punishment. The court ordered that the name of the advocate to be permanently
removed from the roll of advocates, debarring him to practise for life.

6. Harish Uppal vs. Union of India (2003) 2 SCC 45

The petitioner herein was a former army officer, who was posted to Bangladesh. During the tenure
of the said posting the petitioner was accused for theft and the same was brought to the military
court in India. The military court suspended the debarred the petitioner form his post and order for
imprisonment for two years. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an application in the civil court to hear
the matter, the civil court had informed the petitioner that the period limitation has expired as there
was delay of 11 years in filing the petition. Later on, the petitioner was informed that his documents
that were submitted to the court were misplaced due to strike but advocates. The petitioner filed a
special leave petition in the supreme court praying to the court to declare that strikes by advocates
are not in conformity with law. The issue before the supreme court was whether lawyers have the
right to strike. The court considered the Article 226: Powers given to the court to issue writs, Article
145: defines the rules of court of the Indian constitution and Section 7: Functions of the Bar Council
of India, Section 30: defines the right of advocates to practice, Section 34: Powers given to the High
Court to make rules, Section 38: Appeal to the Supreme Court in order to evaluate the issue. The
petitioner contended that strikes and protests were only in the purview of industrial disputes and
lawyers being officials of court cannot resort to strike to achieve their motive. The Upon evaluation
the court observed that participating in strikes are violation of the contract that the lawyer enters
with the client. Upon considering the above mentioned provision of law and the arguments of the
petitioner, the court came to the conclusion that lawyers do most have the right to protest for any
reason. The court further held that a lawyer is an official of the court and holds a status in the
common public domain. Strikes also disrupt the procedure of the court and also cause undue loss to
the clients. Therefore, the supreme court banned strikes by lawyers. In my view, the opinion of the
court that it is the duty of the advocate to represent his client and respect the procedure of court as

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any strike would cause undue delay in the proceedings which is not unjust to the parties. Moreover,
if the advocates have a grievance, the same shake be in accordance with law and they should not
resort to a manner which damages the image of the profession.

7. R.D. Saxena vs. Balram Prasad Sharma (2000) 7 SCC 264 

The appellant herein was an advocate, the Madhya Pradesh co-operative bank had appointed him as
its legal counsel and on various occasions the appellant represented the bank. Subsequently the
bank terminated the appellant as its legal counsel and requested the appellant to retrain the files.
The appellant had informed the bank that he would return the files only after clearing the dues that
the bank owed to the advocate. Subsequently, the bank filed a complaint to the bar council of
Madhya Pradesh. In the proceedings held by the bar council, the appellant contended that he has the
lien on those files. The case was transferred to the bar council of India, wherein the appellant was
held guilty for professional misconduct and imposed a fine of Rs.1000 and suspended him from
practise for a period of eighteen months. The appellant appealed to the supreme court against the
impugned order passed by the bar council of India. The issue before the court was whether an
advocate has right of lean over the files of his client. The court explained this by citing Section 148
of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which defines the term "bailment" and mandates that goods that
have been transferred from one person to another must be returned after the completion of the said
transfer. The court was of the opinion that the advocate is not entitled to a right of lien over the
bank's files because there was no delivery of the said goods and the advocate had possession of the
documents on his own volition. Therefore, Section 171 of the Indian Contract Act is invalid since
the aforementioned documents do not fit within its scope. The court held that unless there is an
express agreement between the parties for the same, an advocate will not have a claim to a lien.
According to Rules 28 and 29 of the Advocates Act of 1961, the advocate has the right to
appropriate any funds belonging to the client that are in his or her possession after the conclusion of
the relevant proceeding. If the legal fees are still pending, the advocate has the right to deduct those
funds from the client's funds in his or her possession, and any remaining funds must be given to the
client. According to Section 35 of the Advocates Act of 1961, there is a penalty for misconduct if an

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advocate refuses to release the client's files. A client has the right to select his own advocates to
represent his interests.The court concluded that an advocate has. O right of lien on the files
entrusted by his clients , however, the court set aside the punishment. In my opinion it right that
lawyers do not have the right to lien over the filed entrusted by the clients.

8. Suresh Shivarao Hattingadi v. N.D. Upadhaya (2002) 9 SCC 47

The appellant in this case was admitted to the Maharashtra and Goa State Bar Councils as an
advocate. While enrolled as an advocate, the appellant accepted a full-time job offer from M/s
Vulcan Leval ltd. Following his hiring, a complaint was filed against him for professional
misconduct in the form of a violation of Rule 49 of the BCI rules, which prohibits an advocate from
working full-time. The State Bar Council's disciplinary committee initiated proceedings against the
appellant, which were transferred to the BCI because no orders were issued by the State Bar
Council within the mandatory one-year period. After considering the merits of the case, the BCI
disciplinary committee found the appellant guilty of professional misconduct because he had taken
full-time employment and changed his address without informing the State Bar Council, and thus
imposed a two-year ban from practise. As a result, the current appeal has been filed before the
Supreme Court under Section 38 of the Advocates act, 1961. The issue herein was whether Whether
the appellant is guilty of professional misconduct for not intimating to the State Bar Council that he
had taken up full time employment and had changed his address? The Supreme Court determined
that the complaint filed against the appellant contained no allegation that the appellant continued to
practise as an advocate while also working full-time for the said company. The SC reasoned that
there was no evidence on record to show that the appellant had violated Rule 49 of the BCI rules,
and thus allowed the appeal and quashed the BCI's punishment. The Supreme Court ruled that the
punishment imposed on the advocate was excessive and unjustified, given that no convincing
evidence was presented to show that he had taken up gainful employment and continued to practise
as an advocate. According to Section 22 of the Advocates Act, he is required to notify the State Bar
Council of his decision to take up full-time employment and change of address. Keeping this in
mind, the Supreme Court found him guilty of failing to notify the changes and partially allowed the
appeal, reprimanding the appellant for failing to notify the changes.

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9. Madhav M. Bhokarikar v. Ganesh M. Bhokarikar (2004) 3 SCC 607
The appellant in this case was registered as an advocate under the provisions of the Advocates Act.
A complaint was filed against the appellant by his own uncle, who was involved in prior litigation.
The complaint was filed with the Maharashtra and Goa Bar Councils, and the allegation was that
the appellant, while continuing to practise as an advocate, had secured a dealership for running a
retail petrol pump. The complainant alleged a violation of BCI rules prohibiting an advocate from
being an active partner in a business venture, and following the initiation of disciplinary
proceedings based on the complaint, the State Bar Council found the appellant to be guilty of
professional misconduct and thus imposed a one-year suspension from practise. The errant advocate
filed an appeal with the BCI. BCI agreed with the findings that the appellant continued to be an
active partner in the said business for a period of two years while continuing his practise as an
advocate and observed that the punishment was lenient, so the punishment was increased from a
one-year ban from practise to a five-year ban from practise. The current appeal has been filed in
opposition to the BCI's order. The issue to be considered by the supreme court was whether the
appellant guilty of professional misconduct in violation of BCI Rule 47? The Supreme Court held
that in cases where both bar councils issued concurrent findings of the appellant's guilt, the SC
would not intervene as a matter of course. The Court stated that the advocate's guilt was proven
beyond a reasonable doubt because there was evidence on record indicating that the delinquent
advocate continued to be an active partner while also practising as an advocate. The appellant
contended that soon after the proceedings against him were initiated, he entered into an agreement
with his brother in which it was agreed that the brother would be the active partner and the advocate
would be the sleeping partner. Thus, the main argument was that the aforementioned agreement
corrected the professional misconduct by bringing it in line with BCI Rule 47, which states that an
advocate cannot be an active partner in any business but may be a sleeping partner in a business that
does not degrade the legal profession. The Supreme Court considered the contention, as well as the
fact that the appellant had not practised for nearly 5 years, and thus allowed the appeal with the
condition that the appellant be allowed to practise after obtaining permission from the State Bar
Council to continue as a sleeping partner, as provided for under Rule 47.

10. Bhupinder Kumar Sharma vs. Bar Association of Pathankot [AIR 2002 SC 41]

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A complaint was filed with the Bar Association alleging that an attorney (the appellant) was
running a full-fledged business, specifically a copier shop in the court complex with a PCO/STD
booth.
Advocacy controversies After joining the State Bar's roster of advocates, he gave the company to
his father and brother. He was expelled after the Punjab and Haryana State Bar Council found him
guilty of misconduct. A BCI appeal was filed, but the appeal was denied. The case was appealed to
the Supreme Court. There were twonissues that were needed to be addressed by the supreme court
first, Whether the applicant is currently or has previously worked in a trade, business, or profession?
Second, Is the order suspending the applicant's right to practise as an advocate and removing his
name from the State Roll of Advocates valid under Section 35(3)(d)? The Supreme Court found
him guilty of professional misconduct but reduced the severity of his punishment because the
appellant's punitive punishment was deemed excessive in light of his disability. It is a rule that the
punishment must be proportionate to the crime and the accused's current circumstances. As a result,
the Supreme Court modified the BCI order so that he was only barred from practising until
December 2006, rather than indefinitely. Despite the fact that it did not issue any specific guidelines
on the subject of advocates operating and maintaining other businesses after enrolling as advocates,
the court finds that the appellant was in fact operating the business beyond a reasonable doubt after
considering the evidence presented to the Disciplinary Committee and Bar Council of India.
Furthermore, it believes that a temporary restriction on the lawyer is understandable given his
medical condition. It does, however, reject the Bar Council of India's decision to permanently bar
the appellant, arguing that this is an unjust punishment. The rule of law in this case is the
implementation of the rule stated by the Bar Council of India that no advocate can carry on a
business while practising law. Furthermore, the Disciplinary Committee's findings were critical in
assisting the court in evaluating the evidence and reaching a decision. The Supreme Court decided
that there were enough compelling arguments to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The
Senior Telecommunications Office Assistant testified in court that the appellant received the PCO
booth as part of the disability quota and that he never informed his brother that the PCO booth had
been transferred to him. There was no evidence or information presented to suggest that the bar
members are hostile to the advocate.

11.Noratanmal Chouraria vs M.R. Murli & Anr [(2004) 5 SCC 689]

The facts of the case involved an advocate who punched and kicked the complainant and urged him
not to pursue the matter further while posing as a respondent's lawyer and not an advocate in a rent
control procedure. The central issue in this case was whether the advocate's actions constituted

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misconduct against which the Bar Council could file a complaint, despite the fact that he was not
acting in the capacity of an advocate. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that in order to
earn the public's trust as a court official, a lawyer must adhere to the standards of conduct required
of him. As a result, his behaviour was unbecoming of an advocate, even though he was not acting in
that capacity, and the Bar Council was correct to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings against
him. The issues before the court was Whether the advocate's actions constituted misconduct,
actionable by the Bar Council despite the fact that he was not acting in the capacity of an advocate,
Whether the Bar Council's findings are so irrational that this court should intervene? The court
deliberated on how the concept of "Misconduct" applied to this specific situation. It was stated that
the aforementioned phrase was not defined by the Advocates Court in 1961. The court then
examined the definition of the term in light of the Honorable Supreme Court's numerous precedents.
The court then heard the case of Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar, which addressed
Section 35 of the 1961 Advocates Act's "Punishment of Advocates for Misconduct." The court
ruled that no general rule regarding the initiation of legal misconduct proceedings by a member of
the bar could be established because doing so would necessitate applying the proportionality test,
which would vary from case to case. Furthermore, the court used its appellate authority under
Section 38 of the Advocates Act of 1961 to review the ruling of the Disciplinary Committee of the
Bar Council. The court ruled that, despite the broad and extensive discretion, it could not be used to
overturn the Committee's decision because it carries significant weight. It must reach a decision
based on the facts of the complaint. The court stated that the conclusion was not illogical and was
based on the facts and relevant grounds stated above. In order to analyse the current case, the court
looked at the cases of "M," an advocate, Re, Hikmat Ali Khan v. Ishwar Prasad Arya, and N.G.
Dastane v. Shrikant S. Shivde. The appellant provided the court with brief summaries of the
aforementioned cases involving professional misconduct. The court ruled that the preceding
decisions have no bearing on the current dispute. That a lawyer has a responsibility to uphold the
standards of conduct expected of him as a court official in order to earn the public's trust. As a
result, his behaviour was unbecoming of an advocate, even though he was not acting in that
capacity, and the Bar Council was correct to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings against him.

12. K.V. UMRE V. SMT. VENUBAI D. GAGE & ANR.

Citation: (1984) 1 SCC 29

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The Disclipnary Committee of the Bar Council found K.V. Umre ("Appellant") guilty of
misconduct in an order dated 9-5-1977 on the grounds that the Appellant misappropriated the
decretal amount of Rs 11,760.70 payable to Venubai Gage ("Respondent") within the time frame
specified.The BCI gave the Appellant the option of paying Rs 10,000 as directed or being
suspended from practise for a year. If the Appellant fails to pay the stipulated amount on time, his
or her name will be permanently removed from the rolls of advocates.
The Appellant made payments for the first two instalments, but he failed to make the payments by
the due dates, resulting in permanent debarment. The Appellant filed a review application with the
Bar Council of India for a delay condonement, but the Disciplinary Committee rejected the
application on the grounds that he defrauded a helpless widow due to her lack of knowledge for no
reason. The Appellant, who was dissatisfied with the BCI order, filed an appeal with the Supreme
Court of India. The issue was Whether or not the BCI will excuse the Respondent's payment delay?
The Supreme Court noted in its decision in this case that it is critical that the punishments be
deterrent. The Appellant exhibits a complete lack of candour. The Appellant made a false claim that
Rs. 6600 was owed to him for the fee and other expenses. According to the Supreme Court, the
Disciplinary Committee took a lenient stance by limiting the period of suspension to only one year.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the Appellant committed grave misconduct, but the fact
remains that he paid the first two instalments and that his application for condonation of delay
should have been accepted by the BCI. As a result, the Supreme Court did not intervene on the
merits of the case and left it to the BCI's Disciplinary Committee to accept the application for delay
condonation. Thus, the Supreme Court issued the aforementioned direction to the Disciplinary
Committee, but the court also clarified that this aforementioned direction should not be construed as
limiting the period of suspension to only one year, and that it is up to the Disciplinary Committee to
either condone the delay and increase the suspension, or to make any other decision that it deems
appropriate in light of the facts and circumstances of the case at hand.

13. Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh v. Kurapati Satyanarayana, (2003) 1 SCC 102
A suit was filed by Shri Gutta Nagabhushanam, the de facto complainant who was represented by
the Defendant in the instant case, Adv. Kurapati Satyanarayana. Execution Petition was instituted in
the instant suit for realisation of the decretal amount. As the Defendant was the de facto
complainant’s counsel in the EP, he received an amount of Rs. 14,600 in regards to the EP but did
not make payment of the same to the de facto complainant. The de facto complainant filed a
complaint against the Defendant with the Additional District Munsif, Eluru, which was eventually

14
forwarded to the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh to take notice.
Upon examination of witnesses and other evidence, the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar
Council of Andhra Pradesh found that the Defendant had in fact received the total amount of Rs.
14,600 and had failed to produce any receipt given by the complainant evidencing the payment of
the said amount to the complainant. This amounted to grave professional misconduct and the State
Bar Council directed the Defendant to make payment of the same to the de facto complainant. It
was specifically mentioned that the payment of the said two amounts would not obliterate the
misconduct of the delinquent. The Defendant preferred an appeal to the Disciplinary Committee of
the Bar Council of India that also found that the Defendant had failed to make the payment of Rs
14,600 received by the delinquent on behalf of the complainant in the execution proceedings, but
came to the conclusion that the delinquent had not committed any professional misconduct though
there might have been some negligence on his part which did not involve any moral turpitude. The
case went for appeal before the Supreme Court of India. The issue at hand was whether
misappropriation of client’s money is a grave misconduct under the Advocates Act 1961 The
Supreme Court set aside the order of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India and
found the defendant guilty of grave professional misconduct and directed the removal of the
Defendant’s name from the roll of the Bar Council. The Supreme Court rightly observed that
amongst the various forms of misconduct envisaged for a legal practitioner, misappropriation of the
client’s money must be the gravest. The amount of trust placed upon a lawyer by his client is
immense and to violate that trust and misappropriate money due to his client amounts to a breach of
trust of the highest degree. The finding of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India
that there was no intention on the part of the delinquent advocate to misappropriate the money of
his client or to defraud him is not only unfounded and perverse but also lacks the serious thought
which was required to be given by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India in the
discharge of quasi-judicial function while probing into the grave charge of professional misconduct
by an advocate in the discharge of his duties as a counsel.

14. SUPREME COURT BAR ASSOCIATION V. UNION OF INDIA, (1998) 4 SCC 409
The Supreme Court exercised its authority under Article 129 read with Article 142 of the
Constitution and sentenced the defendant to a suspended prison sentence as well as the suspension
of his practise as an advocate. Vinay Chandra Mishra's case is an example of this. The Supreme
Court Bar Association, through its Honorary Secretary, has filed a writ petition under article 32 of
the Indian Constitution, seeking the following

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(I) An appropriate writ, direction, or declaration declaring that the disciplinary committees of the
Bar Councils established under the Advocates Act, 1961, alone have exclusive jurisdiction to
inquire into and suspend the contemner from practising as an Advocate for a period of three years.
(ii) Declaration that, in exercising its inherent jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of India or any High
Court has no original jurisdiction, power, or authority in that regard.
The Supreme Court had to rule on the following legal issues:
• Whether the punishment for established contempt of court committed by an advocate can include
the Supreme Court suspending his licence (Sanad) for a specified period in exercise of its powers
under Article 129 read with Article 142 of the Indian Constitution?
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Disciplinary Committee to remove the Appellant
from the Bar Council and suspend him from further practise.
The constitutional court correctly held that suspension from practise and removal from the State roll
of advocates are both punishments specifically provided for in the Advocates Act, 1961, for proven
'professional misconduct' of an advocate. The only cause or matter before the Court while
exercising its contempt jurisdiction under article 129 is the commission of contempt of court. As a
result, in exercising its jurisdiction under article 129, this Court cannot take over the disciplinary
committee of the Bar Council of the State or the Bar Council of India's jurisdiction to punish an
advocate by suspending his licence, which punishment can only be imposed after a finding of
'professional misconduct' is recorded in the manner prescribed by the Advocates Act and the Rules
framed thereunder. The curative powers conferred on the Court by article 142 cannot be interpreted
as allowing the Court to disregard a litigant's substantive rights while dealing with a case before it.
This authority cannot be used to "supplant" substantive law applicable to the case or cause before
the court. Article 142, no matter how broad its amplitude, cannot be used to construct a new edifice
where none previously existed, by ignoring express statutory provisions dealing with a subject and
thus achieving something indirectly that cannot be achieved directly. The Supreme Court cannot, in
exercising its jurisdiction under Article 142 read with Article 129 of the Constitution, punish a
contemner for contempt of court by also suspending his licence to practise if the contemner is an
Advocate.

15. Shambhoo Ram Yadav Vs. Hanuman Das Khatry AIR 2001 SC 2509

In this case, a complaint was filed against the advocate alleging that the advocate had advised his
client to to bribe the judge in order to get an order in his favour. It was alleged that the advocate
wrote a letter to his client mentioning that the judge accepts bribes and that the client can get on

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order in bis favour if he pays thew judge Rs.10,000 or if he can influence him. Subsequent to the
complaint filed before the state bar council, the disciplinary committee held proceedings for the
same. In the said proceedings the advocate had admitted the alleged letter. Owner, the advocate
contended that the judge was removed from office due to unlawful acts and that he was just
informing his clients about the same as its his duty to caution the clients. However, the state bar
council had suspended the advocate from practise for a period of 2 years. Aggrieved by the order of
the state bar council the advocate had appealed to the bar council of India. On appeal, the bar
council of India had held that the advocate was guilty of professional ,misconduct and thad debarred
him from practise for life. The advocate filed a review petition and conceded that he is a 80- year
old advocate and he had never faced such allegations during the entire tike of practise, considering
the same, the bar council of India had remanded the said suspension for life time. The respondent
appealed to the supreme court against the order passed by the bar council in India in the review
petition. The supreme court observed that the advocate violated  Rule 3, which imposes a duty on
the advocate not to influence the decision of the court and 4 which contemplates that it is the duty
of the advocate to prevent his client from restoring to u unfair and unlawful practises in relation to
court, of BCI Rules- – Chapter II. Therefore, as the advocate violated the said rules and had
admitted the letter written by him. The supreme court held that the order passed in the review
petition I.e imposing lesser poudnshiment cannot be Imposed and the court had upheld the original
order of suspension for life time. In my view, it was right on fort of the supreme court top restore
the original order of suspension for life time as the violation co omitted by the advocate was a
serious one which is totally unethical moreover, the advocate had admitted the letter. There was no
reason for the court to impose lesser punishment.

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